turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by
[G.R. No. 78778 : December 3, 1990.]
LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA
RETIZOS, BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA
MONTEFALCON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS,
Respondents.
SYLLABUS:
CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; WHEN THE
CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT. — Even assuming arguendo
that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of
the said property for over ten years since 1934, said
possession is insufficient to constitute the fundamental
basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil
Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the
term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character
performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the
owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such
possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do
not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila
Electric Company v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
71393, June 28, 1989). In this case, Monterola, as found
by the respondent appellate court and the lower court,
never categorically claimed ownership over the property
in question, much less his possession thereof en
concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have
acquired said property by acquisitive prescription.|||
FACTS:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land
situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square
meters. Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana
Albovias, herein private respondent, on the one hand,
and Coronado and others. Juana Albovias (JUANA, for
brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion
of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and
testament executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga,
grandfather of JUANA. JUANA further claims that
sometime in 1925 or 1926 the property was divided into
two lets, her getting the northern portion while her
brother Domingo received the southern portion which he
sold to Dr. Dalmacio Monterola.
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included
together with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio
Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-
interest Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno)
to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in
JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita
Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof,
sometime in 1974.
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-
petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity) claim that the
property in question was bequeathed to Leonida
Coronado under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio
Monterola
CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's
finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have
acquired the subject land by acquisitive prescription.
Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CORONADO
claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever
right or legal title she had over the property in question,
the reason being that Monterola's continued possession
of the said property for over ten years since 1934
ripened into full and absolute ownership.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in
question, JUANA filed an action for quieting of title,
declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in
the RTC Laguna. RTC ruled in favor of JUANA. CA
affirmed decision. Petitioners appealed to SC.
ISSUE
W/N Juana’s property has already been acquired by
Monterola through adverse possession – NO
W/N Monterola acquired the property through adverse
possession in the concept of an owner - NO
RULING
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola
never claimed ownership over the property in question.
As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation
executed by Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado
acknowledged that the boundary owner on the property
conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason
why during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio Monterola,
JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the
benefits or produce of the said property. It was only after
the death of said Monterola in 1970 that Leonida
Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it. See
syllabus.
[G.R. Nos. L-18099 and L-18136. July 31, 1962. ] ISSUE

MARIANO CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. BENJAMIN W/N petitioner acquired the land through prescription –
PADILLA, Respondent. NO

SYLLABUS: W/N Corpuz Sr. expressly recognized lot 4 as belonging

to Domingo – YES
PRESCRIPTION; REQUISITES OF ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION; MANNER OF POSSESSION THAT IS RULING
REQUIRED. — One cannot recognize the right of
The pretension of oppositor-appellant that he has
another and at the same time claim adverse possession
acquired the whole of lot 4 by prescription is contradicted
which can ripen to ownership, thru acquisitive
by his own evidence. He claims that said lot 4 had been
prescription. For prescription to set in, the possession
declared by his predecessor-in-interest for tax purposes
must be adverse, continuous, public and to the exclusion
since 1925. This could not be true, otherwise there
of all.|||
would have been no reason or necessity at all for
FACTS: Corpuz, Sr. to buy the two hectare portion of lot 2 in
1937. Again, he contends that after the sale of the two
In 1956, Corpuz filed a complaint for forcible entry with hectares, Pedro Domingo abandoned the same and his
the Justice of the Peace Court of Nueva Ecija against predecessor-in-interest cultivated it, thru a tenant. This
Padilla which was granted. Padilla appealed to the CFI. does not also reflect the truth, because the two hectares
which he claims to have been abandoned, were already
While pending appeal, Benjamin Padilla, on May 7, included in his property lot 2, for which he had a title. It
1959, presented an application for registration of the could not have referred to another two hectares which
land, subject matter of the forcible entry case, under the formed part of the remaining portion of lot 4. The
Torrens System, which was opposed by Corpuz. oppositor’s claim that the three-hectare portion of Lot 4,
was acquired by him, by prescription, thru continuous
The land in question is a rice-land having an area of
possession since 1934, is negated by the very
54,554 square meters situated in barrio Sagana,
admission of Corpuz, Sr., that Lot 4 belonged to Pedro
Municipality of Laur, Nueva Ecija. It is also designated
Domingo. One cannot recognize the right of another and
as Lot 4 and adjoins lot 2, titled under the name Mariano
at the same time claim adverse possession which can
Corpuz, Sr. It formerly belonged to Sixto Domingo, who
ripen to ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For
had been in possession thereof for about four or five
prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse,
years prior to the Spanish revolution. When he died in
continuous, public and to the exclusion of all. These
1918, he was succeeded by his son, Pedro Domingo
circumstances do not obtain in the case under
who continued possessing and cultivating the same until
consideration.
the outbreak of the second world war. In 1953, one
Rufino Tawagin borrowed the land from Pedro Domingo, Decision AFFIRMED. Petition DENIED.
and cultivated the same until it was sold to Benjamin
Padilla on May 11, 1956. The evidence for oppositor
Corpuz, disclosed that in 1937 Pedro Domingo and
Corpuz Sr executed a deed of sale wherein Corpuz Sr
sold the two hectares of land belonging to lot 2 being
claimed by Domingo to him for P100 pesos. Corpuz Sr
also admitted in the deed that Lot 4 belongs to Pedro
Domingo. The pertinent provisions state: ----Na sa
nasabing lupa ay may nasakop ako na lupa na
hinahabol ni Pedro Domingo na mayroong dalawang
hectarea, mas o menos, na nasakop ng nasabing titulo
at Lote 4 sa plano na akin namang kinikilala na kanya.

CFI ruled in favor of respondent Padilla. CA affirmed.

G.R. No. L-17738 April 22, 1963
LUPO L. DIÑOSO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO P.
FONTILLAS, respondents.
SYLLABUS:
PRESCRIPTION; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF
LAND SOLD UNDER PACTO DE RETRO; STARTS
ONLY UPON EXPIRATION OF REDEMPTION
PERIOD. — The possession of petitioner under the
sale a retro did not actually become hostile or adverse
until the expiration of the redemption period, since until
then he recognized the superior right of the vendor to
oust him, and his claim of ownership was not absolute.
FACTS:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA affirming a
judgment rendered by the CFI Zambales.
On December 18, 1944 appellee (Antonio D. Fontillas)
bought from Modesta Feria four parcels of land, three of
which were located in San Narciso, Zambales, and the
fourth — the lot in question — in sitio Cawatan Kiling,
Cabangan, Zambales (Exhibit A.) The vendor was given
the right repurchase the properties on or before
December 1, 1945. As she failed to exercise her right,
the vendee consolidated his ownership and registered
the deed of sale of option to repurchase in accordance
with Act 3344 on January 10, 1946. However, he failed
to take possession thereof when the present action was
commenced on September 4, 1952.
It also appears that on April 6, 1940, Modesta Feria
executed in favor of appellant the pacto de retro sale
Exhibit 1 which was registered only on May 25, 1948.
After the sale appellant took possession of the land in
question and was still in possession thereof when the
present action was commenced on September 4, 1952.
This finding of non-identity is conclusive, and, as a
matter of fact, appellant does not question it. His
assignment of error center on the ruling of the appeals
court disallowing his claim of title by adverse
possession.
ISSUE
W/N Diñoso acquired the land by adverse possession –
NO
RULING
We further agree with the appeals court that the
possession of petitioner Diñoso under the sale a Retro,
Exhibit "1", did not actually become hostile or advance
until the expiration of the redemption period, since until
then he recognized the superior right of the vendor to
oust him, and his claim of ownership was not absolute.
Authorities are to the effect that —
Where the sale is subject to the owner's right of
redemption, the purchaser's possession has
been held in subordination to the title of the
owner prior to the expiration of the redemption
period, although it may become hostile
thereafter.
It was incumbent upon the petitioner to show when his
vendor's right of redemption expired, and that he had
held adversely for ten years thereafter. In truth, his own
deed (Exhibit "1") recites that Feria's right of repurchase
would expire only on 6 April 1950, so that the present
suit for recovery has begun, in 1952, well within the
prescription period..
Decision AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-48433 April 30, 1984
PACITA, FILOMENO, REMEDIOS, ADELAIDA and
NELIA, all surnamed, DIMAYUGA, and HEIRS OF
SOCORRO DIMAYUGA-LASALA; SERGIO LASALA,
MARCELINO; SATURNINO and Minors AIDA,
DANTE, BELEN, LITO, JOHN, ESTER and EDWIN, all
surnamed LASALA, represented by guardian ad
litem Sergio Lasala, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL
DIMAYUGA, respondents.
SYLLABUS:
CIVIL LAW; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP; PRESCRIPTION; HOMESTEAD
CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION. — The
contention of petitioners that their possession of about
one-half of the homestead since the 1948 partition made
them owners by prescription is devoid of merit. It may be
morally plausible but it is legally indefensible. No portion
of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by
prescription. "No title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession (Article 1126, Civil
Code).
FACTS
The spouses Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda
Gayapanao, who were married in 1915 (Exh. 2),
acquired a Torrens title for that homestead in 1928 (Exh.
1). Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived by her son,
Manuel, and her husband, Genaro.
During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named
Emerenciana Panganiban by whom he begot five
children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaide, Remedios
and Socorro. A sixth child, Nelia Dimayuga, was born in
1944 or after Segunda's death. Genaro married
Emerenciana which legitimated Nelia but it did not
improve the status of her brother and four sisters who
were adulterous or spurious children.
On September 16, 1948, or about a month before
Genaro's death a "partition of real property", which
Genaro treated the homestead as his sole property and
not conjugal which it actually was giving Manuel 5 ½ and
to others 7 7/10.
Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel
executed an affidavit of adjudication which he registered.
He obtained a Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare
homestead.
About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed
a complaint for the annulment of Manuel's title and for
the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's
seven children including Manuel.
RTC ruled in favor of the illegitimate children, giving
them all shares equally. CA modified decision, gave
Manuel 3/4ths and Nelia 1/4ths, nothing was given to
petitioners.
Petitioners contend that their possession of about one-
half of the homestead since the 1948 partition made
them owners by prescription and that Manuel is
estopped to deny that fact because he adjudicated the
homestead to himself only twenty-two years later.
ISSUE
W/N the petitioners already acquired the homestead by
prescription – NO
RULING
That contention isdevoid of merit. It may be morally
plausible but it is legally indefensible. No portion of the
homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by
prescription. "No title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession."
The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was
legitimated) have no rights whatsoever to the said
homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or
spurious children.
G.R. No. 110207 July 11, 1996
FLORENTINO REYES, SPOUSES EDUARDO REYES
AND ANITA MABABANGLOOB, ENGRACIA REYES,
SPOUSES ZACARIAS AND NORMA R. MADRID,
SPOUSES ALBERTO AND NORMA N. REYES,
SPOUSES, TEODORO AND DOLORES S.
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION) AND
JACINTA REYES, PAULA REYES, AND PETRA
REYES, respondents.
SYLLABUS:
CIVIL LAW; POSSESSION; POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY UNDER A FORGED DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND SETTLEMENT CAN
NOT SERVE AS JUST TITLE. — Petitioners cannot
justify their ownership and possession of the subject
parcel of land since they could not meet the requisites
provided by the provisions they have cited. The
requirement of good faith is provided in the first
paragraph of Article 526. From the cited provision,
petitioners could not have been possessors in good faith
of the subject parcel of land considering the finding that
at the very inception they forged the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they claim to
be the basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed
and simulated the signatures of private respondents,
petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed
containing private respondents' stimulated signatures is
a nullity and cannot serve as just title.
ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THERE CAN BE NO
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OVER A TITLED
PROPERTY. — There can be no acquisitive prescription
considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled
property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Bernardino
Reyes, the father of both petitioner Florentino and the
private respondents. This fact, petitioners do not deny.
Hence, even if they allege adverse possession that
should ripen into ownership due to acquisitive
prescription, their title cannot defeat the real rights of
private respondents who stepped into the shoes, as it
were, of their father as successors-in-interest. As it is,
petitioners cannot even claim adverse possession as
they admit that the private respondents likewise resided
and continue to reside on the subject property.|
FACTS
On July 29, 1970, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Settlement was allegedly entered into between petitioner
Florentino and his sisters (private respondents). The
subject land is 383 meters, registered in the name of
their father. The Deed which allegedly partitioned the
subject parcel of land extrajudicially among petitioner
and private respondents stated that the latter waived
their rights, interest and participation therein in favor of
the former. On March 16, 1971, petitioner caused the
registration of the alleged Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
and Settlement with the Register of Deeds of Rizal which
he obtained TCT 318944. Thereafter, petitioner
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling 240 square
meters of the land to his children while retaining 93
square meters for himself and they executed a deed of
co-ownership dividing the land among themselves.
Private respondents filed a complaint with the RTC. RTC
ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
W/N petitioners have become absolute owners of the
land by virtue of acquisitive prescription – NO
RULING
With respect to the second assignment of error,
petitioners contend that even assuming that there was
forgery, they had become absolute owners of the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription citing
Articles 1117 and 1134 of the Civil Code as follows:
Art. 117. Acquisitive prescription of
dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real
rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.
By virtue of said articles, they claim that they have been
possessors of the contested parcel of land in good faith,
for ten years and with a just title for the period required
by law.
This Court is not impressed with this argument.
Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession
of the subject parcel of land since they could not meet
the requisites provided by the provisions they have cited.
Regarding the requirement of good faith, the first
paragraph of Article 526 states, thus:
He is deemed a possessor in good faith
who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.
From the above-cited provision, petitioners could not
have been possessors in good faith of the subject parcel
of land considering the finding that at the very inception
they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Settlement which they claim to be the basis for their just
title.
Having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of
private respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith.
The forged Deed containing private respondents'
simulated signatures is a nullity and cannot serve as a
just title.
Moreover, this Court agrees with the private respondents
that there can be no acquisitive prescription considering
that the parcel of land in dispute is titled property, i.e.,
titled in the name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the
father of both petitioner Florentino and the private
respondents. This fact, petitioners do not deny.Hence,
even if they allege adverse possession that should ripen
into ownership due to acquisitive prescription, their title
cannot defeat the real rights of private respondents who
stepped into the shoes, as it were, of their father as
successors-in-interest. As it is, petitioners cannot even
claim adverse possession as they admit that the private
respondents likewise resided and continue to reside on
the subject property.
G.R. No. L-31267 November 24, 1972
IGNACIA NEGRETE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MARINDUQUE and
IGMEDIO MADERAZO, represented by his legal
representative CATALINO MADERAZO, defendants-
appellees.
“The possessor in good faith is the one who is not aware
of any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition; conversely,
one who is aware of such flaw is a possessor in bad
faith.” (Art. 525 Civil Code)
Recit-Ready:
In 1967, Negrete filed an action for recovery against
Maderazo alleging that they have been in an open and
peaceful possession of their land since 1945 when
defendant forcibly entered their land in 1954 and started
cultivating it. Maderazo denied the claims of plaintiff and
asserted that they already became the owners of the
land through acquisitive prescription having possessed it
in good faith within a period of 10 years. There is good
faith because the defendant’s possession is by virtue of
the deed of sale executed by said Tito Oriendo. The
issue herein is whether or not the deed of sale can be a
valid basis for their good faith in order to justify their
acquisition. The Court ruled that Maderazo is not a
possessor in good faith. A deed of sale, in order to
constitute a just title and to generate a good faith for the
ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, should refer
to the same parcel of land, which is adversely
possessed. In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor
of Maderazo covers a parcel of land patently different
from the disputed land owned by plaintiff as to area,
location and boundary owners. It was later found out that
the land sold by Tito Oriendo was distinct from the land
of Negrete as to location, boundaries and area.
Maderazo is a possessor in bad faith and can only
acquire ownership by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription thru an adverse possession of 30 years (Art.
1137 Civil Code).
FACTS:
• On 1956, plaintiff Negrete filed a forcible entry
suit against Igmedio Maderazo alleging that they
have been in a peaceful occupation and
possession over a 9 hectare parcel of land since
1945 when said defendant, through strategy,
force, intimidation and stealth unlawfully entered
the northern portion of their land and cultivated
it.
• Defendant asserted that the land he is presently
cultivating is a different land so an ocular
inspection was conducted on the disputed land
to determine whether the area cultivated by
Maderazo is the same land claimed by plaintiff
as the northern portion of her land under Tax
Declaration No. 8431. The ocular inspection
showed that it was the same land.
• The municipal trial court decided in favor of
Maderazo based on the finding that the
defendant has been in a material and physical
possession of said land since 1951 when he
bought it.
• The plaintiff did not file an appeal. Instead, she
filed an action for recovery of ownership of
property (reinvindicatoria) after the lapse of 10
years against defendant alleging that she is the
owner of the 9 ha. parcel of land in Putting
Buhangin having inherited the same from her
father and that when defendant entered in 1957,
she repeatedly prohibited the defendant from
making any improvement but the latter
threatened her with bodily harm. The defendant,
on the other hand, denied the allegations and
asserted that he bought the northern portion in
1954 from Tito Oriendo as proven by their tax
declaration and deed of sale.
• The Court of First Instance again decided in
favor of Maderazo declaring that the deed of
sale was perfectly valid and even if there was
flaw in their title, the defendant would still have
the land through acquisitive prescription having
possesses it in good faith within a period of 10
years. There is good faith because the
defendant’s possession is by virtue of the deed
of sale.
ISSUE: WON the deed of sale executed by Tito Oriendo
on August 30, 1954 in favor of Maderazo could be
considered as a valid basis for good faith and as a just
title, in order to justify the acquisition of the disputed land
by ordinary prescription thru adverse possession of only
10 years
RULING:
No. A deed of sale, in order to constitute a just title and
to generate a good faith for the ordinary acquisitive
prescription of 10 years, should refer to the same parcel
of land, which is adversely possessed. In the case at
bar, the deed of sale in favor of Maderazo covers a
parcel of land patently different from the disputed land
owned by plaintiff as to area, location and boundary
owners.
It was later found out that the land sold by Tito Oriendo
was distinct from the land of Negrete as to location,
boundaries and area. The land of Negrete is 9 ha
located in Sitio Putting Buhangin, Mogpog, while the
land of defendant is only 3,700sqm and situated in barrio
Puyog, Boac. The 2 parcels have also different boundary
owners.
Defendant cannot claim good faith in occupying said
land on the basis of the said deed of sale. Having signed
the deed of sale, which clearly states that the southern
half of the portion containing an area of 3,700sqm was
the parcel he acquired from his vendor which is located
in barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. He is therefore
aware that the land sold to him is situated in Barrio
Puyog and is only about 3,700sqm not the 9ha in barrio
Putting Buhangin belonging to plaintiff. Tito Oriendo did
not also testify in the forcible entry suit. Moreover,
defendant did not submit any tax declaration or tax
receipts in the name of Tito Oriendo.
Maderazo is a possessor in bad faith and can only
acquire ownership by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription thru an adverse possession of 30 years (Art.
1137 Civil Code). Since he only occupied it from 1954-
1967 (13 years), his claim is untenable.
G.R. No. 90365 March 18, 1991
VICENTE T. TAN, VICTAN & COMPANY, INC.,
TRANSWORLD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, FIRST
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC.,
FAR EAST PETROLEUM & MINERALS
CORPORATION, and PHILCONTRUST
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS:
RULES ON RECOVERY OF MOVABLES. — The
rule anent prescription on recovery of movables
(shares of stock in this case) is expressed in Article
1140 of the Civil Code.As it provides, Article 1140 is
subject to the provisions of Articles 1132 and 1133
of the Code, governing acquisitive prescription, in
relation to Articles 559 and 1505 thereof. Acquisitive
prescription sets in after uninterrupted possession of
four years, provided there is good faith, and upon
the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is present.
Where, however, the thing was acquired through a
crime, the offender can not acquire ownership by
prescription under Article 1133. Please note that
under the above Article, the benefits of prescription
are denied to the offender; nonetheless, if the thing
has meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder,
prescription begins to run (four or eight years,
depending on the existence of good faith). For
purposes of extinctive prescription vis-a-
vis movables, we therefore understand the periods
to be: 1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;
2. Eight years in all other cases, except where the
loss was due to a crime in which case, the offender
can not acquire the movable by prescription, and an
action to recover it from him is imprescriptible.
CASE AT BAR. — For purposes of the complaint in
question, that the petitioners had at most eight years
within which to pursue a reconveyance, reckoned
from the loss of the shares in 1977, when the
petitioner Vicente Tan executed the various
agreements in which he conveyed the same in favor
of the Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property
Management, Inc., and Antolum Trading
Corporation. We are hard put to say, in this regard,
that the petitioners' action is after all, imprescriptible
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1133 of the Civil
Code, governing actions to recover loss by means of
a crime. For one thing, the complaint was not
brought upon this theory. For another, there is
nothing there that suggests that the loss of the
shares was indeed made possible by a criminal act,
other than simple bad faith and probably abuse of
right. Since the complaint was filed on January 13,
1987, ten years more or less after the petitioners
transferred the shares in question, it is clear that the
petitioners have come to court too late.
FACTS:
On June 15, 1974, private respondent Tan was arrested
by the military authorities pursuant to an Arrest, Search
and Seizure Order (ASSO) issued by the then Secretary
of National Defense on the basis of criminal charges
filed against him before the PC Criminal Investigation
Service for alleged irregular transactions at Continental
Bank.
Because of a possible bank run as a result of the
arrests, the officers of Continental Bank requested an
emergency loan to meet pending withdrawals of
depositors. The Monetary Board approved the request
on June 21, 1974 subject, however, to a verification of
the bank's assets.
However, the said bank assets cannot meet its
liabilities, since the latter exceeded the former by P
67.260 million. The report also indicated that Continental
Bank was insolvent and that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors and
creditors, which are the two grounds mandated under
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as
the Central Bank Act, justifying the closure and placing
under receivership of a bank.
On the basis of the report, petitioner ordered the closure
of Continental Bank effective June 24, 1974 and
designated the Director of its Department of Commercial
and Savings Banks as receiver with instructions to take
charge of the bank's assets pursuant to Sec. 29 of R.A.
No. 265.
While still under detention by the military, respondent
Tan executed certain agreements on February 2, 1977,
May 12, 1977 and July 5, 1977 transferring and
assigning 359,615 shares of stock in Continental Bank,
as well as other properties belonging to him and his
affiliate firms, to Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel
Property Management, Inc. and Antolum International
Trading Corporation in consideration of the assumption
by these assignees of the liabilities and obligations of
respondents Tan and his companies.
The assignees of respondents Tan and his companies
rehabilitated Continental Bank and, in support thereof,
respondent Tan wrote the petitioner on July 5, 1977
certifying on his own behalf and in behalf of the
corporations owned and controlled by him, that they
have no objection to the reopening and rehabilitation of
Continental Bank under its new name, International
Corporate Bank or Interbank.
Interbank reopened in 1977 and since then operated as
a banking institution with controlling ownership thereof
changing hands during the past decade.
After the lapse of more than twelve (12) years, private
respondents filed the present case of reconveyance of
shares of stock with damages and restraining order
before the respondent court.
However, the court found that tan is guilty of laches
which he filed for a Motion for reconsideration but was
also denied.
Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not petitioners' action for damages against
respondent is barred by prescription under Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.
2. Assuming, arguendo, that the action is not barred by
prescription under Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265,
whether or not the action for damages is barred by
prescription under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
1. The first question refers to prescription. In this
connection, we are not disposed to accept the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that under Republic Act No. 265,
the action has prescribed, and that in any event,
assuming that Republic Act No. 265 is inapplicable,
Article 1146 of the Civil Code is nonetheless a bar. With
respect to Republic Act No. 265, the Court notes that the
statute talks of enjoining the Monetary Board from taking
charge of a bank's assets. The Court also notes,
however, that the Monetary Board has since
relinquished possession of Continental Bank's assets,
and the controlling ownership of the bank has passed
from hand to hand in the course of the decade. It has
likewise since reopened under a new name,
International Corporate Bank, and a new management.
Clearly, and as a perusal of the petitioners' complaint
confirms, the petitioners are not asking for an injunction
against the Monetary Board and the Board has since in
fact ceased from performing any act in connection with
Continental Bank or its successor bank.
Be that as it may, and assuming ex gratia argumenti that
Article 1149 were applicable, it still would not have
rescued the petitioners since that meant that they had
until 1982 at most, within which to institute a claim.
Prescription would still have been a bar.
2. The rule anent prescription on recovery of movables
(shares of stock in this case) is expressed in Article 1140
of the Civil Code, which we quote:
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall
prescribe eight years from the time the
possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor
had acquired the ownership by prescription for a
less period, according to article 1132, and
without prejudice to the provisions of articles
559, 1505, and 1133.
As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the provisions of
Articles 1132 and 1133 of the Code, governing
acquisitive presciption, in relation to Articles 559 and
1505 thereof. Under Article 1132:
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables
prescribes through uninterruped possession for
four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also
prescribes through uninterrupted possession for
eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover
personal property lost or of which he has been
illegally deprived, as well as with respect to
movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or
market, or from a merchant's store the
provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code
shall be observed.
acquisitive prescription sets in after uninterrupted
possession of four years, provided there is good faith,
and upon the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is present.
Where, however, the thing was acquired through a
crime, the offender can not acquire ownership by
prescription under Article 1133, which we quote:
Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime
can never be acquired through prescription by
the offender.
Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of
prescription are denied to the offender; nonetheless, if
the thing has meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder,
prescription begins to run (four or eight years, depending
on the existence of good faith).9
For purposes of existence prescription vis-a-vis
movables, we therefore understand the periods to be:
1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;
2. Eight years in all other cases, except where
the loss was due to a crime in which case, the
offender cannot acquire the movable by
prescription, and an action to recover it from him
is imprescriptible.
It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in question,
that the petitioners had at most eight years within which
to pursue a reconveyance, reckoned from the loss of the
shares in 1977, when the petitioner Vicente Tan
executed the various agreements in which he conveyed
the same in favor of the Executive Consultants, Inc.,
Orobel Property Management, Inc., and Antolum Trading
Corporation.
We are hard put to say, in this regard, that the
petitioners' action is after all, imprescriptible pursuant to
the provisions of Article 1133 of the Civil Code,
governing actions to recover loss by means of a crime.
Since the complaint was filed on January 13, 1987, ten
years more or less after the petitioners transferred the
shares in question, it is clear that the petitioners have
come to court too late.
In fine, the respondent court did not commit any
reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-2765 December 27, 1906
JOSE DOLIENDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO BIARNESA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
This is an action for the possession of a certain parcel of
land situated in the Province of Iloilo and specifically
described in the complaint. It appears from the evidence
that the plaintiff bought the land in question from one
Ventura Belarmino on the 30th of November, 1888, on
which day he paid the purchase price and took
possession; that the vendor, Ventura Belarmino, died on
the 20th of July, 1889; that thereafter proceedings were
instituted against the estate of the said Ventura
Belarmino which resulted in a sale at public auction of
certain real and personal property; that the parcel of
land in question in this action was included in the
property thus sold; that the defendant was the purchaser
of this land at the public sale and that some time
thereafter, and not later than the 31st of December,
1892, he took possession by virtue of his purchase at
said public auction and continued in possession until the
18th day of February, 1903, when this action was
instituted.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that since the plaintiff
had purchased the land in question prior to the alleged
sale at public auction, the commission had no lawful
authority to include it in the list of property of the vendor
which could be subjected to the payment of his debts,
and that the sale, therefore, was invalid and of no effect;
ISSUE
W/N Biarnesa(Defendan) owns the land through ordinary
acquisitive prescription with just title and good faith –
YES
RULING
It is admitted that the defendant had been in possession
more than ten years prior to the institution of this action
and he must, therefore, be held to have acquired a title
by prescription under the provisions of article 1957 of the
Civil Code if it appear that this possession was con
buena fe y justo titulo.
This evidence, we think, was sufficient to establish the
fact that the defendant was in possession con justo
titulo — of the Civil Code — because, granting that the
debtor was the owner of the property at the time of the
sale, this sale of land at public auction by a
commissioner appointed for the making of such sales
and the payment of the purchase price and occupation
of the land purchased were sufficient to transfer the
ownership to the purchaser provided these proceedings
where had in accordance with law; and since there was
no evidence which tended to show that the defendant
occupied the land in bad faith, or that he had any reason
to believe that the commissioner selling it had no
authority to sell, or that he could not lawfully purchase at
the sale, he must be deemed to have purchased
in buena fe (good faith) in accordance with the
provisions of articles 436 and 1950 of the Civil Code.
Hence, even should it prove to be true upon
investigation that the land in question was not lawfully
included in the list of property subject to the payment of
the debts of the said Ventura Belarmino, deceased, or
that the documentary evidence of title introduced at the
trial was deficient in form and lacks the formalities
prescribed by law, the defendant's title by prescription
must still be sustained, since it is clear that the sale at
public auction did in fact take place, that the transaction
was in good faith, and that the defendant bought the
land from one whom he believed to have the right to sell.
Decision REVERSED.
G.R. No. L-46753-54 August 25, 1989
ANTONIO SOLIS and ANGELA SOLIS
CALIMLIM, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE SOLIS
and FLORENCIA DIOQUINO respondents.
SYLLABUS:
CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP;
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; ONLY "TITULO
COLORADO" NOT TITULO "VERDADERO Y VALIDO";
JUST TITLE REQUIRED THEREFOR. — A void
donation may be the basis of claim of ownership which
may ripen into title by prescription (Pensador vs.
Pensador, 47 Phil. 959, 961). It is the essence of the
statute of limitations that, whether the party had a right to
the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of
such right and remained in possession for the period
(ten years) named in the statute of limitations, the right
of action of the plaintiff who had the better title is barred
by that adverse possession. The right given by the
statute of limitations does not depend upon, and has no
necessary connection, (with) the validity of the claim
under which the possession is held. . . ." (Vda. de Lima
vs. Tio, L-27181, April 30, 1970, citing Conspecto v.
Fruto, 129 US 182 [1889]). The "just title" required for
acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y
valido" — or such title which by itself is sufficient to
transfer ownership without necessity of letting the
prescriptive period elapse but only "titulo colorado" — or
such title where, although there was a mode of
transferring ownership, still something is wrong because
the grantor is not the owner.
FACTS:
In a complaint dated May 30, 1967, plaintiffs Antonio
Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim alleged that they are co-
owners of a parcel of residential land situated at Barrio
Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, with an area of 1,073
square meters more or less; that this parcel of land was
inherited from their parents, Simeon Solis and Petronila
Bauzon; that in 1939, they allowed defendants Jose
Solis and his wife Florencia Dioquino to construct a
house on the eastern portion of plaintiffs' parcel of land
(consisting of 536 square meters) with the understanding
that they (defendants) should vacate the premises as
soon as their financial conditions would permit them. In
1965, plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the
premises but the latter refused.
The answer of the defendants is that they received the
property by donation propter nuptias from Tomas Solis in
1931. They also alleged that since 1931, they were in
possession of said property openly, continuously and
adversely, to the exclusion of all others, and in the
concept of owners and that since 1931 they have paid
the taxes due on the property.
CFI Pangasinan ruled in favor of petitioners, stated that
indeed private respondents spouses Jose Solis and
Florencia Dioquino were in possession of the eastern
half portion of the property described in the complaint for
more than thirty years, but ruled that such possession
cannot be held adversely against the plaintiffs who had
shown a better title thereto.
CA reversed decision, ruled that respondents have been
in the adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and
interrupted possession of the disputed property in the
concept of an owner until this case was filed in court on
May 30, 1967. Petitioners appealed to the SC.
It is the contention of petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that private respondents'
possession of the land was adverse and in the concept
of an owner because such possession was merely
tolerated by petitioners, and that the donation is void
because Simeon Solis owns the property, not Tomas
who donated it to respondents.
ISSUE
W/N respondents acquired the property by adverse
possession even if donation is void – YES
RULING
This contention of petitioners is not meritorious. Suffice it
to state that even a void donation may be the basis of
claim of ownership which may ripen into title by
prescription. See syllabus.
he donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis
and Florencia Dioquino took possession of the land in
1933 by virtue of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil
Procedure which was then in force. Under the Code of
Civil Procedure, ten years of adverse possession by a
person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such
occupancy may have commenced shall vest in every
actual possessor of such land a full complete title.
Adverse possession in either character ripened into
ownership after the lapse of ten years.
Therefore, whatever claim petitioners had over the
disputed property had prescribed in view of private
'respondents' open, actual, peaceful, continuous and
adverse possession of the same property for more than
thirty years or at the least, for more than twenty (20)
years.
Petition DENIED.
G.R. No. L-17249 November 28, 1964
LICOTEDRA PARCOTILO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FILOMENA PARCOTILO, CRISPIN PRIETO, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
SYLLABUS:
PRESCRIPTION; INVALID TESTAMENT MAY SUPPLY
BASIS OF CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP WHICH MAY
RIPEN INTO TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION OVER
UNREGISTERED LAND. — Even if a testament was not
executed with all the requirements of a valid will or of a
valid donation mortis causa, still it may supply the basis
for a claim of ownership of land mentioned therein after
the death of the testators. This claim of ownership,
coupled with the claimant's open, continuous and
adverse possession for a period of over thirty years is
held, in the case at bar, to have ripened into a title by
prescription over the parcels of unregistered land in
question.
FACTS:
The petitioners are nephews of Pablo Parcotilo who
during his lifetime owned two parcels of land in
Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental; that Pablo Parcotilo was
married to Filomena Dipolog, that both died during the
cholera epidemic of the year 1918, and that they were
not survived by any descendant or ascendant. The
petitioners contend that they are co-owners of the land
left behind by Pablo.
Defendant Demetrio Parcotilo declared that he was the
heir of Pablo and was able to transfer the name of the
TD’s of the land to his name, a portion of which he sold
to Crispin Prieto.
Petitioners filed a complaint to partion the two parcels of
land in question.
The defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, in his answer, alleged
that he acquired the lands in question by virtue of a
donation mortis causa, executed by the late Pablo
Parcotilo and Filomena Dipolog on July 20, 1917, and
that after the death of these espouses in 1918 he
immediately took possession of those two parcels of
land in good faith, he had introduced improvements
thereon, and had since then been in possession of said
lands actually, publicly, and uninterruptedly, under a
claim of ownership adverse to all other rights up to the
time when the complaint in this case was filed on
January 23, 1956.
RTC ruled in favor of defendants. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE
W/N defendants have absolute ownership of the land
through adverse prescription even though the will
executed is not valid – YES
RULING
We agree with the trial court that even if the document
Exh. "1-a" was not executed with all the requisites of a
valid will or of a valid donation mortis causa the said
document supplied the basis for the claim of ownership
by the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo of the two parcels of
land in question after the death of the spouses Pablo
Parcotilo and Filomena Botanog. This claim of
ownership by Demetrio Parcotilo, coupled with his open,
continuous and adverse possession for a period of thirty-
eight years had ripened into a title by prescription.
The lands in question being unregistered lands, and the
rights of the defendants Demetrio Parcotilo and Crispin
Prieto having accrued before the New Civil Code went
into effect, the law applicable is Sec. 41 of Act 190, the
old Code of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows: -
---- Ten years actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or
interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years
by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever
may such occupancy may have commenced or
continued
Even the provisions of Article 1137 of the New Civil
Code on extraordinary prescription through uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years, regardless of
whether there was title or good faith, uphold the right of
the defendant Pablo Parcotilo as owner through adverse
possession in this present case.
Decision AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 76386 May 21, 1990
HEIRS OF AMARANTE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
GREGORIO BOLO, EPIFANIO VILLANUEVA @
PANIYO, MATEA FELIX @ ESTRELLA, SUAREZ
FELIX, BUENAVENTURA @ TURA, ANDA FELIX,
DIOSDADO FELIX, DIRO FELIX, ANTONIA FELIX,
EVANGELISTA FELIX and VICTORIA
FELIX, respondents.
SYLLABUS:
PUBLIC LAND ACT (C.A. 141); ALIENABLE PUBLIC
LAND HELD BY POSSESSOR FOR THIRTY YEARS;
CONVERTED TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. — There is no
question that petitioners, at the time they had been
forcibly driven off the Sitio Campulay parcel of land, had
through their possession and that of their predecessors-
in-interest complied with the requirements of long
continued (at least 30 years), bona fide, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 1236
which was of course, originally agricultural land of the
public domain. As such, they had become owners of Lot
1236 even before formal confirmation of their title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. In Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., the
Supreme Court, in overruling the earlier case of Manila
Electric Company v. Castro Bartolome, et al., said, "The
Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so
holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of
cases already referred to, is that alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure.
CIVIL LAW; EXTRAORDINARY PRESCRIPTION OF
OWNERSHIP; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. —
The testimony of Celso Amarante showed that in 1974,
the coconut trees planted by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest were already approximate]y
seventy (70) years of age. The mango trees had trunks
with circumferences of about three (3) arm lengths;
indicating once more that those trees were very
old. Thus, it was clearly shown that Malonis Infiel had
begun occupying Lot No. 1236 a very long time ago.
When the possession of Malonis Infiel of the land is
tacked on to that of petitioners, there is no question that
possession exceeded thirty (30) years which is the
period for extraordinary prescription provided for in
Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
On 20 August 1954, petitioners filed a complaint for the
recovery of a twenty-hectare parcel of unregistered
agricultural land (Lot 1236, Pls-667) situated in Sitio
Campulay, Barrio Atotes Bindoy, a remote, mountainous
region of Negros Oriental. The complaint was dismissed
by the trial court on 31 January 1962 due to the failure of
counsel for petitioners to appear at the scheduled
hearing of the case; the dismissal however, was ordered
without prejudice to the refiling of the same complaint.
On 20 December 1962, petitioners refiled their complaint
with CFI Negros Oriental. The evidence for the
petitioners indicate that Lot 1236 was one of two pieces
of real property originally owned and cultivated by the
late Malonis Infiel, a native negrito or Aeta and upon his
death, said land has been inherited by petitioner’s
ascendants.
The occupation and possession by Malonis Infiel, his
children and petitioners of Lot 1236 remained
undisturbed until sometime in 1953 when respondent
Gregorio Bolo proceeded to occupy Lot 1236 claiming to
have purchased the same on 11 April 1948 from
respondent heirs of Felix Malonis.Petitioners claim that
what had been sold by Lot 1237 (5 hectares) and
respondent surreptitiously included Lot 1236 as property
exclusively of Malonis.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed. SC
remanded case back to RTC. SC finally decided on the
case themselves.
ISSUE
W/N the heirs of Amarante owned the land through
adverse and continuous possession – YES
RULING
We should consider next the character of the rights held
by petitioners in respect of Lot 1236. The testimony of
Celso Amarante showed that in 1974, the coconut trees
planted by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
were already approximately seventy (70) years of age.
The mango trees had trunks with circumferences of
about three (3) arm lengths; indicating once more that
those trees were very old. 10 Thus, it was clearly shown
that Malonis Infiel had begun occupying Lot No. 1236 a
very long time ago. When the possession of Malonis
Infiel of the land is tacked on to that of petitioners, there
is no question that possession exceeded thirty (30)
years which is the period for extraordinary prescription
provided for in Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
More importantly, there is Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
which provides as follows: ------(b) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
the title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
There is no question that petitioners, at the time they
had been forcibly driven off the Sitio Campulay parcel of
land, had through their possession and that of their
predecessors-in-interest complied with the requirements
of long continued (at least 30 years), bonafide, open,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
Lot 1236 which was of course, originally agricultural land
of the public domain. As such, they had become owners
of Lot 1236 even before formal confirmation of their title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view,
and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of
cases already referred to, is that alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statuory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as ammended) is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure.
Petitioners declared OWNERS of the land.
G.R. No. 76564 May 25, 1990
SOUTH CITY HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner owns two lots surrounding the parcel of land in
dispute. The land is identified as Lot 5005 and has an
area of 613 square meters situated in Biñan, Laguna.
It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005
should be registered in its name for either of two
reasons. The first is that the disputed strip of land really
formed part of Lots 2381 and 2386-A but was omitted
therefrom only because of the inaccuracies of the old
system of cadastral surveys. The second is that it had
acquired the property by prescription through
uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by
itself and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty
years.
Petitioner also claims that his possession should be
tacked in with the possession of the previous owners.
ISSUE
W/N petitioner owns the land by adverse possession by
tacking in the period of possession of its previous
owners – NO
RULING
But the more telling consideration, as the Court sees it,
is this. By the testimony of the two witnesses, the
petitioner obviously meant to tack the possession of the
two lots by the previous owners to its own possession.
There was no need for this because the petitioner
acquired ownership of Lot No. 2381 by assignment and
Lot No. 2386-A by purchase; and such ownership
includes the right of possession. The petitioner is not
claiming prescriptive rights to these two lots, which had
previously been registered in the name of the transferors
The lot it is claiming by prescription is Lot No. 5005,
which it did not acquire from the owner of the other two
lots, or from any previous private registered owner of the
lot, as there was none.
Neither of the owners of Lots Nos. 2381 or 2386-A, in
their respective deeds, transferred Lot No. 5005 to the
petitioner; as already explained, Lot No. 5005 was not
part of either of the two lots. The petitioner merely
occupied the disputed strip of land believing it to be
included in the two lots it had acquired from Koo Jun
Eng and the Garcia spouses. However, even if it be
conceded that the previous owners of the other two
lots possessed the disputed lot, their possession
cannot be tacked to the possession of the
petitioner. The simple reason is that the possession
of the said lot was not and could not have been
transferred to the petitioner when it acquired Lots
Nos. 2381 and 2386-A because these two lots did not
include the third lot. Article 1138 of the Civil Code
provides that —
(1) The present possessor may complete the period
necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to
that of his grantor or predecessor- in interest.
However, tacking of possession is allowed only when
there is a privity of contract or relationship between the
previous and present possessors. In the absence of
such privity, the possession of the new occupant should
be counted only from the time it actually began and
cannot be lengthened by connecting it with the
possession of the former possessors. Thus it has been
held:

A deed, in itself, creates no privity as to land outside its

calls. Nor is privity created by the bare taking of
possession of land previously occupied by the grantor. It
is therefore the rule, although sharply limited, that a
deed does not of itself create privity between the grantor
and the grantee as to land not described in the deed but
occupied by the grantor in connection
therewith, although the grantee enters into possession of
the land not described and uses it in connection with that
conveyed. 9

Where a grantor conveys a specific piece of property,

the grantee may not tack onto the period of his holding
of an additional piece of property the period of his
grantor's occupancy thereof to make up the statutory
period. His grantor has not conveyed such property or
his interest therein, and there is no privity.

It is said, in Hanlon v. Ten Hove supra, that this rule is

not harsh, the court using the following language: "If A
purchases and by adverse possession obtains title to an
adjoining 40 acres, it would hardly be contended that a
conveyance by him of the 40 acquired by deed would
carry with it title to the 40 acquired by adverse
possession. So if A acquires by deed a 40 acres and
obtains an adjoining strip 2 rods wide or some interest in
it, his conveyance of the 40 acquired by deed does not
carry with it his interest in the adjoining strip. If the sole
defense here was that of adverse possession, we would
be obliged to hold that it had not been made out. 11

It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of

the Civil Code:

In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an

area greater, or less, than that expressed in his title,
prescription shall be based on the possession.

This possession, following the above quoted rulings,

should be limited only to that of the successor-in-
interest; and in the case of the herein petitioner, it should
begin from 1981 when it acquired the two adjacent lots
and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be
part of the other two.

It follows that when the application for registration of the

lot in the name of the petitioner was filed in 1983, the
applicant had been in possession of the property for less
than three years. This was far too short of the
prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable
property, which is ten years if the possession is in good
faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public.

Petition DENIED.