[G.R. No. 240230. November 28, 2019.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. ROGELIO DIVINAGRACIA, JR. y
DORNILA, **** a.k.a. "Ensol" and ROSWORTH SY y
BERSABAL, a.k.a. "Roro", accused-appellants.

DECISION

J.C. REYES JR., ** J  :

p

The Case
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated
January 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
08978 which affirmed the Amended Decision 2 dated September 6,
2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch
259, finding accused-appellants Rogelio Divinagracia, Jr. y Dornila,
alias "Ensol" (Divinagracia) and Rosworth Sy y Bersabal, alias "Roro"
(Sy) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.  HEITAD

The Facts
The CA summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Two (2) Informations dated 17 April 2013 were filed
against [accused-appellants] which charged them with
violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs; and against
[Sy] for violation of Section 12, Article II, of Republic Act No.
9165, for the possession of a drug paraphernalia.
The Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 11[-0464]
That on or about the 25th day of April, 2011
in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport one (1) self-sealing
transparent plastic bag marked as 'EP' weighing
14.58 grams of Marijuana fruiting tops to police
Poseur[-]Buyer PO3 Edwin Plopinio, the content of
said plastic bag when tested was found positive to
be Marijuana, a dangerous drug.
Criminal Case No. 11-0465
That on or about the 25th day of April, 2011
in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess or have under his control one
(1) improvised glass pipe marked as 'RB,' an
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing an[y] dangerous drug into the body, in
violation of the above-cited law. 
[Accused-appellants] were arraigned on 5 May 2011,
wherein they pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the Prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Police Officer Edwin Plopinio (PO3 Plopinio);
Police Inspector Richard Allan Mangalip (P/Insp. Mangalip);
Police Officer Rolly Burgos (PO2 Burgos); Kagawad Cho
Villar (Kagawad Villar); and Police Officer Mildred
Kayat (PO3 Kayat).
The Prosecution alleged the following facts:
On 25 April 2011, at around 6:50 p.m., PO3 Plopinio was
stationed at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Task Group (SAID-SOTG), Parañaque City, when a confidential
informant arrived and informed them that a certain alias Ensol
(later on identified as [Divinagracia]), was selling marijuana in
Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City.
In response to the information, Police Inspector Roque
Tome, the Chief of SAID-SOTG ordered the team of PO3
Plopinio, PO3 Sarino, PO2 Julaton, PO2 Del Rosario, PO2
Ocampo and PO2 Burgos to conduct a buy-bust operation and
to arrest [Divinagracia]. PO3 Plopinio was assigned as the
poseur-buyer, PO2 Burgos as the immediate back-up, and the
others as perimeter back-ups. PO3 Plopinio was provided with
a five hundred peso bill with serial number KA281867, on
which he placed his initials "EP."
At around 8:45 p.m., the policemen went to Brgy. Don
Bosco in Parañaque City. Before heading to the target
location, PO3 Plopinio and the informant went out of the
vehicle and walked towards Doña Soledad Extension, while
the rest of the policemen followed behind. When PO3 Plopinio
and the informant saw two (2) male persons standing near a
parked van on the road, the informant identified the man
wearing a white shirt as [Divinagracia]. PO3 Plopinio claimed
that when they approached [Divinagracia], the informant
introduced PO3 Plopinio to [Divinagracia] as a user of
marijuana and that PO3 Plopinio will buy marijuana worth five
hundred pesos (Php500.00). [Divinagracia] replied "tamang-
tama mayroon pang isang (1) plastic itong kasama ko (just in
time, my friend still has one (1) plastic with him.)" Thereafter,
PO3 Plopinio handed the marked money to [Divinagracia] who
placed the marked money inside the latter's right pocket.
Afterwards, [Divinagracia] asked his friend (who was later on
identified as [Sy]) to hand over a zip-lock plastic sachet
containing suspected marijuana fruity tops.  ATICcS

When PO3 Plopinio received the zip-lock plastic sachet

from [Divinagracia], he performed the pre-arranged signal (to
reverse the cap he was wearing) in order to signal the other
policemen that the sale has been consummated. Immediately
after executing the pre-arranged signal, PO3 Plopinio
introduced himself as a policeman and arrested
[Divinagracia], while PO2 Burgos rushed towards [Sy] and
arrested the latter.
When PO3 Plopinio ordered the appellants to empty
their pockets, [Divinagracia] surrendered the marked money
from his right pocket. On the other hand, [Sy] surrendered an
improvised glass pipe which contained suspected marijuana.
Thereafter PO3 Plopinio conducted an inventory of the seized
items. PO3 Plopinio marked the zip-lock plastic sachet with his
initials "EP," while the improvised glass pipe was marked with
PO2 Burgos' initials "RB." The Receipt/Inventory of Property
Seized was signed by PO3 Plopinio and Kagawad Villar, the
Kagawad of Brgy. Don Bosco, Parañaque City. PO2 Julaton
took pictures of the proceedings and the seized items.
Afterwards, the police took [accused-appellants] to the
police station and prepared the Request for Drug Test of
[accused-appellants], as well as the Request for Laboratory
Examination of the zip-lock plastic sachet containing
suspected marijuana and the improvised glass pipe. PO3
Plopinio prepared the Chain of Custody Form which stated
that he transferred the seized items to PO2 Julaton, the
investigating officer, for documentation.
On 26 April 2011, both the [accused-appellants] and the
seized items were taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination. At 12:20 a.m., PO3 Plopinio delivered
the Request for Laboratory Examination and transferred
custody over the seized items to PO3 Kayat of the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Immediately afterwards, PO3 Kayat gave the
seized items to P/Insp. Mangalip for laboratory testing.
Thereafter, P/Insp. Mangalip issued Physical Science
Report No. D-190-11S which stated that he received the
seized items at "0020H 26 April 2011" and that the laboratory
examination conducted on the seized items marked as "EP"
and "RB" resulted positive for the presence of Marijuana, a
dangerous drug. 
PO2 Burgos corroborated the material allegations of
PO3 Plopinio. PO2 Burgos testified that he is the immediate
backup of PO3 Plopinio, and that he is the one who arrested
[Sy].
Kagawad Villar testified that he was the Barangay
Kagawad of Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City, at the time
of the incident. He claimed that in the evening of 25 April
2011, he was in his house when he received a radio call from
the radio operator of Brgy. Don Bosco that a buy bust
operation was held at Doña Soledad extension and that the
arresting team was asking him to witness the inventory. When
he arrived at the scene of the crime, he saw Police Inspector
Roque Tome, the Chief of SAID-SOTG and his men with the
[accused-appellants]. He further claimed that he saw a plastic
sachet containing dried marijuana leaves, a small pipe, and a
five hundred peso bill. He averred that he signed the
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized, which stated the items
seized from the [accused-appellants].
When the Prosecution offered the testimonies of PO3
Kayat and P/Insp. Mangalip, the following facts were
stipulated by the parties:
PO3 Kayat:
that he was the one who received the
request for laboratory examination together with
the specimen reflected in the said request; that
his name is shown in the rubber stamp by the PNP
 Crime Lab as the one who received from Officer
Plopinio the request for laboratory examination;
that on the very same day that he received the
request together with the specimen, he
immediately turned over the same to Forensic
Chemist Richard Allan Mangalip for laboratory
examination as shown in Physical Science Report
No. D-190-11S and Chemist Mangalip received the
said request on the same time and date received
by Officer Kayat x x x 
TIADCc

P/Insp/Mangalip:
that he received a request for Laboratory
Examination on April 26, 2011 at 0020H; that he
conducted an examination on one (1) self-sealing
transparent plastic bag containing dried
suspected marijuana fruiting tops and one (1) self-
sealing transparent bag containing one (1)
improvised glass pipe without markings
containing partially burnt dried suspected
marijuana leaves; that he reduced his findings by
way of Physical Science Report No. D-190-11S in
connection with the laboratory examination he
conducted resulting therein that the specimen
gave positive result to the test for the presence of
marijuana; that he would be able to identify the
specimen; that he would be able to identify the
result together with his signature and the
signature of his superiors.
On the other hand, the Defense presented the [accused-
appellants] as witnesses. The facts according to the Defense,
are as follows:
[Sy] testified that on 25 April 2011, at about 9:30 p.m.,
he alighted from a tricycle at the Doña Soledad extension
when he saw a certain Police Officer Ocampo (PO2 Ocampo).
[Sy] claimed that PO[2] Ocampo was his former arresting
officer in a different case. [Sy] claimed that PO2 Ocampo
demanded [P]20,000.00 from him. [Sy] averred that when he
replied that he does not have any money, he was suddenly
handcuffed by PO2 Ocampo and ordered to go with the latter.
Thereafter, a vehicle suddenly parked in front of them. [Sy]
claimed that he did not know [Divinagracia] and that he only
came to know about the latter when he met [Divinagracia]
who was inside the vehicle. 
 During his cross-examination, [Sy] admitted that he did
not report the alleged extortion to the authorities and that he
did not file any case against PO2 Ocampo.
[Divinagracia] testified that on 25 April 2011, at around
9:00 p.m., he was walking home from work when four (4)
persons approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. He claimed that he was asked by the police officers if
he was "Nognog," and when he told the police officers that he
was not Nognog, he was asked by the police officers to go
with them for verification purposes. When [Divinagracia]
refused to go with the police officers, he was immediately
held by two (2) police officers and was boarded into a red
vehicle. He claimed that the four (4) officers took him at
Taiwan Street, Doña Soledad, where he saw another group of
police officers and another person who was handcuffed.
[Divinagracia] was taken outside of the vehicle and was
handcuffed together with the other person who turned out to
be [Sy]. Afterwards, the police took out a plastic sachet
containing dried leaves and took pictures of the said plastic
sachet with them. Thereafter, a [barangay] personnel arrived
and was told by the police officers that they caught Nognog
(referring to [Divinagracia]). However, the [barangay]
personnel told the police officers that [Divinagracia] is not
Nognog because the former knows who Nognog is.
[Divinagracia] noticed that the [barangay] personnel and one
of the police officers talked to each other and thereafter, he
and [Sy] were taken to the Police Station where they were
detained.
During his cross-examination, [Divinagracia] admitted
that prior to the incident, he had no encounter or
misunderstanding with the police officers who arrested him.
Moreover, he admitted that he did not bother to know the
names of the police officers who arrested him, nor did he
bother to file a case against the said police officers. 3 
AIDSTE

The Ruling of the RTC

On August 20, 2016, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the
accused-appellants guilty in Criminal Case No. 11-0464 for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 12 years and one day as minimum to 17 years as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P400,000.00. As regards Criminal
Case No. 11-0465, however, Sy was acquitted of the charge for
violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. 4
 On September 6, 2016, the RTC rendered an Amended
Decision 5 amending the original penalty imposed upon the
accused-appellants in its August 20, 2016 Decision to life
imprisonment and a fine of one million pesos each. 6
In convicting the accused-appellants for violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the RTC was convinced that the
prosecution was able to prove with moral certainty the elements of
the crime. It brushed aside the defense proffered by the accused-
appellants of denial and frame-up for their failure to present any
evidence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
falsely impute the commission of the said crime upon them. The
RTC explained that without proof of ill motive, the testimonies of the
police officers are entitled to great respect and they are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner.
While the RTC recognized that the police officers failed to
comply with the procedure under Section 21 of R.A. 9165 in that no
representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media
were present after seizure, it nevertheless held that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized drugs had been duly preserved
by the unbroken chain of custody of the corpus delicti. 
Thus, the trial court disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Court finds
accused ROGELIO DIVINAGRACIA[,] JR[.] y DORONILA @
ENSOL and ROSWORTH SY y BERSABAL @ RORO in
Criminal Case No. 11-0464 for Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA
9165 for sale of MARIJUANA with a total weight of 14.58
grams, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of one million pesos (Ph[P]1,000,000.00)
each.
In Criminal Case No. 11-0465 for Violation of Section 12,
Article II of RA 9165, the Court finds accused ROSWORTH SY
y BERSABAL @ RORO NOT GUILTY on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
It appearing that accused ROGELIO DIVINAGRACIA[,]
JR[.] y DORONILA @ ENSOL and ROSWORTH SY y
BERSABAL @ RORO are presently detained at Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology [BJMP], Parañaque City and
considering the judgment of conviction and the penalties
imposed, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of the said
 accused from the BJMP, Parañaque City to the New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa City pursuant to Supreme Court OCA
Circular No. 163-2013.
The sachet of marijuana marked "EP" weighing 14.58
grams and improvised glass pipe tooter subject of these
cases, are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court is directed to immediately turn over the same
to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposal pursuant to Section 21 of RA 9165 and Supreme
Court OCA Circular No. 51-2003.
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved, accused-appellants elevated their case to the
CA via a Notice of Appeal. 8 AaCTcI

The Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC
that the elements for the prosecution of offenses involving the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 had been shown to exist. It also agreed with the lower court
that non-compliance by the police officers with the procedure laid
down in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that it was able to sufficiently prove
the unbroken chain of custody of the zip lock plastic sachet
containing marijuana, from the moment it came into the possession
of PO3 Plopinio, the poseur-buyer, until the same was brought to the
crime laboratory for testing, and its subsequent presentation in
court. The CA brushed aside accused-appellants' defenses of alibi,
denial and frame-up for being unmeritorious in light of their failure
to present strong and concrete evidence that would support their
claim as well as any ill motive on the part of the police officers to
concoct the false charge against them. Such defenses cannot
prevail over the positive assertions of the police officers who were
presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular
manner. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.
The Amended Decision dated 6 September 2016 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 259, in
Criminal Case Nos. 11-0464 and 11-0465, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 9
 Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants center their defense on
the failure of the police officers to comply with the mandatory
procedure in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 relative to the
handling of the seized marijuana. In particular, they contend that
the police officers conducted the inventory without the presence of
a representative from the DOJ and the media. Even if Kagawad
Villar, a barangay elected official, signed the inventory receipt, he
did not witness the actual seizing and marking of the confiscated
item. Accused-appellants likewise question the credibility of the
witnesses presented by the prosecution on the ground that there
were inconsistencies in their respective testimonies, such as: the
number of members that comprised the buy-bust team; the person
who prepared and signed the spot report; and the manner by which
the arresting officers secured the presence of Kagawad Villar for the
inventory. Accused-appellants also put in issue the failure of the
police officers to indicate the amount and serial number of the
marked money used in the Pre-Operation Form, Coordination Form
and the Spot Report. 
The Issue
The primordial issue for determination is whether accused-
appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The Ruling of the Court
In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. 10 It is likewise indispensable for a conviction that the
drugs subject of the sale be presented in court and its identity
established with moral certainty through an unbroken chain of
custody over the same. In cases like this, it is incumbent that the
prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to
its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. 11
The legality of entrapment operations involving illegal drugs
begins and ends with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. 12 Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides the chain of
custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value. 13 It provides: EcTCAD

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,

Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165,
(IRR) on the other hand, filled in the void of the law by providing the
details as to the place where the physical inventory and
photographing of seized items should be accomplished and added a
proviso on permissible deviation from the strict compliance with
what the law requires on justifiable grounds. It states:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner: 
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
 photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Succinctly stated, the law commands that the seized drugs
must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
and that the same must be conducted in the presence of the
accused or his representative or counsel, and three other witnesses,
namely: (a) a representative from the media; (b) a representative of
the DOJ; and (c) an elected public official. 14 Compliance with the
requirements forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner. Non-compliance, on the
other hand, is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity
of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, thus, engendering the acquittal of an
accused. 15 Such stringent requirement was placed as a safety
precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who
might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those
suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal
drugs. 16 In People v. Malabanan, 17 the Court enunciated the two-
fold purpose Section 21 seeks to achieve, viz.:  HSAcaE

The procedure set forth under Section 21 of R.A. No.

9165 serves a two-fold purpose. First, it protects individuals
from unscrupulous members of the police force who are out to
brandish the law on the innocent for personal gain or
otherwise. Second, a faithful compliance of Section 21 of R.A.
 No. 9165 benefits the police and the entire justice system as
it assures the public that the accused was convicted on the
strength of uncompromised and unquestionable evidence. It
dispels any thought that the case against the accused was
merely fabricated by the authorities.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the police officers
failed to comply with the three-witness rule under Section 21
mentioned above. The prosecution never hid this fact nor made any
attempt to deny that only Kagawad Villar witnessed the inventory of
the confiscated items. However, the prosecution takes exception to
the three-witness rule on the ground that it had been able to
sufficiently prove the integrity of the drugs seized from the accused-
appellants as well as the unbroken chain of custody of the same. In
short, they posited that since the prosecution had been able to show
that the drugs sold by the accused-appellants were the very same
drugs seized by the police officers, marked, inventoried and
subjected to laboratory examination which tested positive for
marijuana and ultimately presented before the court as evidence
against them, the proper chain of custody of the drugs was
sufficiently established. 
Such contention has no merit. In People v. Mendoza 18 this
Court stressed that:
The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen
to comply with the requirements of Section 21[a] supra, were
dire as far as the Prosecution was concerned. Without the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or
the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their
ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses
would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
To be sure, non-compliance with the mandatory procedure
under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR does not per
se render the confiscated drugs inadmissible, 19 as the desire for a
perfect and unbroken chain of custody rarely occurs, 20 but only
triggers the operation of the saving clause enshrined in the IRR of
R.A. No. 9165. 21 However, for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses,
and the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless
been preserved. 22 Stated otherwise, before a deviation from the
mandatory procedural requirements under Section 21 may be
allowed, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) justifiable
grounds must be shown to exist warranting a departure from the
rule on strict compliance; and (2) the apprehending team must
prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items had been properly preserved. 23 However, in order for such
saving mechanism to apply, the prosecution must first recognize the
lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures and then explain the
lapse or lapses. 24 Also, the justifiable ground for non-compliance
must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist. 25  HESIcT

In this case, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of

any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses
under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 must be
adduced. 26 Unfortunately, the prosecution did not do so. As a
matter of fact, it did not offer any explanation why representative
from the media and DOJ were not present at the place and time of
the seizure, as well as in the inventory and photographing of the
same. Considering that the first prong of the saving clause —
presence of justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, was not
complied with, any and all evidence tending to establish the chain of
custody of the seized drugs become immaterial. 27 Even the
identification of the seized evidence in court during the trial became
ambiguous and unreliable, rendering the proof of the links in the
chain of custody of the corpus delicti unworthy of belief. 28 Given
that the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the
glaring breaches of the mandatory requirements of Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the accused-appellants' acquittal is
perforce in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 12, 2018
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08978
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellants Rogelio Divinagracia Jr. y Dornila, alias
"Ensol" and Rosworth Sy y Bersabal, alias
"Roro" are ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is ORDERED to cause their immediate release, unless they are
confined for any other lawful cause.
 Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is DIRECTED to report to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision of the action he has taken. A copy of this Decision shall
also be furnished the Director General of the Philippine National
Police for his information. 
SO ORDERED.
 (People v. Divinagracia, Jr. y Dornila, G.R. No. 240230, [November 28,
|||

2019])
 [G.R. No. 243627. November 27, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. XANDRA SANTOS y LITTAUA * a.k.a.
"XANDRA SANTOSLITTAUA", accused-appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J  : p

Assailed in this ordinary appeal 1 is the Decision 2 dated May

31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09438,
which affirmed the Joint Decision 3 dated May 31, 2017 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 (RTC) in Crim.
Case Nos. 118-V-16 and 119-V-16 finding accused-appellant
Xandra Santos y Littaua (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." 
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations 5 filed before the
RTC charging accused-appellant with the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. The
prosecution alleged that at around 6:30 in the evening of January
16, 2016, acting on the information received from a confidential
informant, operatives from the Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special
Operation Task Group of the Valenzuela City Police successfully
conducted a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant along
Bisig Street, Valenzuela City, during which one (1) plastic sachet
containing 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance was recovered
from her. When accused-appellant was searched after her arrest,
police officers found one (1) more plastic sachet containing 0.10
gram of the same substance from her possession. As
noisy people started to crowd the place of arrest, officers
immediately brought accused-appellant back to the police station
where they marked, inventoried, 6 and photographed 7 the seized
items in her presence as well as that of Kagawad Roberto Dawat
(Kgd. Dawat) of Barangay Bisig. Subsequently, the seized items
were brought to the Philippine National Police-Northern Police
District crime laboratory 8 where, after examination, 9 their contents
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug. 10
In defense, accused-appellant denied the charges against her,
claiming instead that, at the time of the incident, while waiting for
the tricycle that carried the grandchildren of her live-in partner's
mother to arrive, she was accosted by several police officers in
civilian clothes who forcibly brought her to a police station and
falsely made it appear that she had sold shabu. 11
In a Joint Decision 12 dated May 31, 2017, the RTC found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the following
penalties: (a) in Crim. Case No. 118-V-16, for the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00; and (b)in Crim. Case No.
119-V-16, for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and
to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00. 13 It ruled that the
prosecution was able to successfully prove all the respective
elements of the crimes charged, and had duly established the chain
of custody of the confiscated drugs. Meanwhile, it found accused-
appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up untenable for lack of
evidence. 14
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed 15 to the CA, arguing
that she should be acquitted on account of the conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as non-compliance
with the rule on chain of custody, particularly because the marking
of the alleged drugs was not immediately done at the place of
arrest, nor was the inventory of the same witnessed by a
representative of the media or the National Prosecution Service
(NPS). 16
In a Decision 17 dated May 31, 2018, the CA affirmed the
conviction of accused-appellant. 18 It held that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
pertained to insignificant matters not relating to the actual conduct
of the buy-bust operation, and that there was substantial
compliance with the chain of custody rule considering that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were
properly preserved. 19
 Hence, this appeal seeking that accused-appellant's conviction
be overturned.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs under RA 9165, 20 it is essential that the identity of the
dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering
that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. 21 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants
an acquittal. 22
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral
certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of
the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 23 As part of the
chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the
marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.
In this regard, case law recognizes that "[m]arking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team." 24 Hence, the failure to
immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest
neither renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs the
integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is
sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody. 25
The law further requires that the said inventory and
photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a)if prior to the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, 26 a representative from the
media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official; 27 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
an elected public official and a representative of the NPS 28 OR the
media. 29 The law requires the presence of these witnesses
primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and
remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence." 30
 As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody
procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded not
merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive
law. 31 This is because "[t]he law has been 'crafted by Congress as
safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially
considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.'" 32
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying
field conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody
procedure may not always be possible. 33 As such, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves
that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. 34 The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in
Section 21 (a), 35 Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which was later adopted into the text
of RA 10640. 36 It should, however, be emphasized that for
the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, 37 and
that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist. 38
Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be
permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers
exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of
such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the
earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case
basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that
the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances. 39 Thus, mere statements of unavailability,
absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance. 40 These considerations arise from the fact that police
officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the
moment they have received the information about the activities of
the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements
beforehand, knowing fully well that they would have to strictly
comply with the chain of custody rule. 41
 Notably the Court in People v. Lim, 42 explained that the
absence of the required witnesses must be justified based on
acceptable reasons such as: "(1) their attendance was impossible
because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety
during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any
person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official
themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ
[and] media representative[s] and an elected public official within
the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face
the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time
constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often
rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape." 43
Moreover, the Court, in People v. Miranda, 44 issued a
definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing with drugs cases. It
implored that "[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set
forth in the law, then the State retains the positive duty to account
for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from
the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the
same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of
having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are
raised only for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become
apparent upon further review." 45
In this case, the arresting officers' acts of performing the
marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items not at the
place of arrest but at the police station were justified as a crowd
was already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the
Court observes that there was still a deviation from the witness
requirement as the conduct of inventory and photography was not
witnessed by a representative from the NPS or the media. This may
be easily gleaned from the Inventory of Seized
Properties/Items 46 which only confirms the presence of an elected
public official, i.e., Kgd. Dawat. Markedly, such finding was also
admitted by the poseur-buyer, Police Officer 3 Allan T. Vizconde
(PO3 Vizconde), on direct and cross-examination, who explained
that despite their efforts at contacting representatives from the DOJ
and the media, no one was available, so they decided to proceed
with the conduct of inventory and photography without their
presence, to wit:
Direct Examination
[Fiscal Benedict Sta. Cruz]:
There appears to be no representative from the Media
and DOJ, could you tell us why?
[PO3 Vizconde]:
Our chief called and after an hour, they told us that there
is no available representatives, sir. 47
Cross-Examination
[Atty. Abraham Alipio]:
During the inventory, who were then present?
[PO3 Vizconde]:
PCI Ruba, Kgd. Dawat and other police officers.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Isn't it a fact that no representative from the media was
present?
A: Our chief was calling for a representative from the media but
until the kagawad arrived[,] there was no
representative from the media, so we decided to
conduct drug inventory.
Q: How about the representative from the DOJ?
A: None. They were calling but no one is answering.
Q: Did they inform you who were the persons they were trying
to call?
A: Major Ruba was not able to tell us.
Q: According to you, this is a planned operation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Considering that it was a planned operation, why did you not
secure a representative from [the] DOJ and Media before
you conduct[ed] the operation?
A: What I know is that Major Ruba has already talked to those
persons but during the conduct of inventory no one
arrived. 
Q: Did you not try to call any other person?
 A: It was Major Ruba who was in charged (sic). 48
The Court, however, finds such explanation untenable.
The sheer statement of PO3 Vizconde that representatives
from the DOJ and the media had been contacted but were simply
unavailable, without more, cannot be deemed reasonable enough to
justify a deviation from the mandatory directives of the law. Indeed,
as earlier stated, mere claims of unavailability, absent a showing
that actual and serious attempts were employed to contact the
required witnesses, are unacceptable as they fail to show that
genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by police officers. In
view of the foregoing, the Court is impelled to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
accused-appellant, which constitute the corpus delicti of the crimes
charged, have been compromised; 49 hence, her acquittal is
perforce in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09438 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Xandra Santos y Littaua is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause her
immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for
any other reason. 
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. Santos y Littaua, G.R. No. 243627, [November 27, 2019])

[G.R. No. 227371. October 2, 2019.]

CARLOS
A. CATUBAO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J  : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by

the accused-appellant Carlos A. Catubao (Catubao) assailing the
Decision 1 dated April 6, 2016 (assailed Decision) and
Resolution 2 dated September 29, 2016 (assailed Resolution) of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0420,
finding Catubao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Direct Bribery.
The Facts
Acting on a complaint filed by Cornelio Ragasa (Ragasa) and
Atty. Fernando Perito (Atty. Perito), an Information was filed by the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) against Catubao, the
accusatory portion of which reads: 
That sometime in December 2008 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Guiuan, Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, CARLOS A. CATUBAO, a public officer, being the
Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office, Bacoor, Cavite, assigned to resolve
criminal complaints filed in his Office, committing the offense
in relation thereto, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously accept and receive the amount of three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00) from one Cornelio Ragasa, a party litigant
in I.S. Nos. B-07-5856 to 5858 and I.S. No. B-08-8161 and I.S.
No. B-08-900, pending before him in consideration for
expediting the resolution of said cases, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
During the arraignment on January 12, 2012, Catubao pleaded
not guilty. 4 Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution's version, as summarized by

the Sandiganbayan, is as follows:
In 2007, estafa cases were filed against Cornelio Ragasa
("Ragasa"). He hired Atty. Fernando Perito ("Atty. Perito") as
his lawyer. The cases were pending before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Bacoor, Cavite and
accused Catubao was then the handling prosecutor. For two
years, the cases remained unresolved prompting Atty. Perito
to personally follow them up with the accused several times.
Accused Catubao asked him for "pang inom" whenever Atty.
Perito makes a follow up. Before going on a Christmas
vacation, they again met and it was there that the accused
said he need[ed] money for he was leaving for Samar.
 On December 19, 2008 and while in Guiuan, Samar,
accused Catubao called Atty. Perito asking any amount of
money for a drinking session with his friends and mentioned
that five thousand pesos (Php5,000.00) will do. Atty. Perito
immediately informed Ragasa about it. Ragasa proceeded to
Atty. Perito's office and handed him said amount. Atty. Perito
then ordered his secretary, Susan Remoquillo, to send only
four thousand pesos (Php4,000.00) to the accused through
LBC Padre Faura. DETACa

Accused Catubao finally resolved the cases in favor of

Ragasa. However, the resolution was denied by the Chief
Provincial Prosecutor. Eventually, the case was reassigned to
Fiscal Ferdinand Falafox.
Atty. Perito also testified that the accused had once
asked him to prepare the resolution.
Accused Catubaoexplained that he had no time to do it. Atty.
Perito claimed that he drafted one but was not accepted by
the Chief Prosecutor, Emmanuel Velasco, who was not
convinced that the accused prepared it.
Atty. Perito then filed a complaint-affidavit on August
18, 2009 against accused Catubao before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon. 5
Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the version of the defense, as also

summarized by the Sandiganbayan, is as follows:
Accused Catubao was assigned the estafa cases against
Ragasa for purposes of conducting the preliminary
investigation. Around September to December of 2008, Atty.
Perito went to his office about three times to follow up the
resolution of the cases. Accused explained that he had other
cases to resolve that were submitted earlier than the estafa
cases. Sometime in October 2008, Atty. Perito approached the
accused telling him that he left his wallet. He asked the
accused a favor since he needed to go home to San Pedro,
Laguna. The accused gave him one thousand pesos
(Php1,000.00).
On December 19, 2008, accused was in his hometown
in Guiuan, Samar. Atty. Perito informed him through a text
message that the former sent something for him which he can
claim at the local LBC Branch. Accused Catubaoexpected Atty.
Perito's payment of the Php1,000.00 he lent him so he
replied, "Thanks."
 After Christmas, he went to the town proper of Guiuan
which is about 18 to 20 kilometers away from his house. He
remembered the text message and went to claim the money
at the local LBC branch. He expected to receive Php1,000.00
only but Atty. Perito sent him Php4,000.00. He immediately
called Atty. Perito and asked him why he sent such amount.
Atty. Perito replied that he was just repaying the favor that
accused extended to him and that he also won a case. 
In January 2009, Atty. Perito continued following up on
the estafa cases by calling and sending text messages.
Accused repeatedly answered him that there are other cases
earlier submitted for resolution. Atty. Perito became
unfriendly and angry. To keep away from him, the accused
then changed his cellphone number.
Early February of 2009, the accused resolved the estafa
cases and submitted his resolution to the provincial
prosecutor for approval. He informed Atty. Perito about it
when the latter visited his office. Atty. Perito asked for a copy
of the resolution but the accused refused explaining that it
was not yet signed and released by the provincial prosecutor.
Atty. Perito then said that he will file a case against the
accused and he had evidence. The accused then realized that
Atty. Perito set him up when he received the money sent
through LBC. 6
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After trial on the merits, in its Decision 7 dated April 6, 2016,
the Sandiganbayan convicted Catubao of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Carlos A. Catubao is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer
in prison the indeterminate penalty of 7 years 4 months
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, up to 8 years
and 8 months of prision mayor, as maximum. He has to
pay the fine of Nine Thousand Pesos (Php9,000.00) and to
suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification from
holding any public office.
SO ORDERED. 8
The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime
had been sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan held that, based on the
evidence, Catubao solicited and received a gift from Atty. Perito to
expedite the resolution of the estafa cases of Ragasa pending
before him. Thus, Catubao received a gift in consideration for doing
an act, though not constituting a crime in itself, but was related to
the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
Catubao filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the Sandiganbayan through a Resolution 9dated
September 29, 2016.  aDSIHc

Hence, Catubao filed the instant appeal.

Issue
For resolution of this Court is the issue of whether
the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Catubao of the crime of
Direct Bribery.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is impressed with merit. The Court
acquits Catubao of the crime of Direct Bribery because of
reasonable doubt.
In questioning his conviction, Catubao relies on supposed
contradictions in the testimonies of Ragasa and Atty. Perito. For
instance, he points out that Atty. Perito testified that he called
Ragasa after the former's phone conversation with Catubao. He
then compared the said testimony with Atty. Perito's other
testimony that he was in a car with Ragasa when Catubao called
Atty. Perito to ask for money, 10 arguing then that Atty. Perito could
not have called Ragasa afterwards as they were supposedly
together in the latter's car. He also points out that Atty. Perito
testified that he only asked for money from Ragasa on December
19, 2008 — as the supposed phone call between Atty. Perito
and Catubao only happened on the same date — but Ragasa
testified that he gave Atty. Perito the money before that date, or
around December 17 or 18, 2008. 11
He also claims as inconsistent Atty. Perito's testimonies as to
when Catubao would ask money from him and/or his client. In one
instance, Atty. Perito testified that Catubao asked money from him
whenever they would meet in the corridors of Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs), but then Atty. Perito likewise testified that Catubao asked
money from him when they were in the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Bacoor, Cavite. 12 He likewise insists that, contrary to
Atty. Perito and Ragasa's claims, the estafa cases involving Ragasa
were not pending in his docket for two years, but instead were only
pending with him for months. 13
The Sandiganbayan, however, simply dismissed his
contentions, explaining that the inconsistencies referred to were just
minor inconsistencies which did not discredit their credibility. 14
To recall, the crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1)
that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such
gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his
commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to
refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4)
that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a
public officer. 15
The existence of the first element of the crime is undisputed, it
being established by the prosecution, and admitted
by Catubao himself, that he held the position of Fourth Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Cavite at the time of the incident complained of.
The second element is also undoubtedly present. As
the Sandiganbayan found:
There is likewise no question that the accused received
a gift or present by himself. Accused Catubao received the
amount of Php4,000.00 from Atty. Perito's client, Cornelio
Ragasa. He personally claimed the amount from the local LBC
Branch in Guiuan, Samar while he was there [in] December
2008. There was a clear intention on his part to accept and
take the money sent and consider it as his own. He pocketed
the money. His defense that he only received the amount as a
return of a favor he extended to Atty. Perito does not
convince this Court to free him from liability.
The records and the evidence establish that sometime
in October of 2008, Atty. Perito went to the accused to tell the
latter that he lost his wallet. As a kind gesture, the accused
gave Atty. Perito the amount of Php1,000.00 since the latter
had to travel to his residence in San Pedro, Laguna. The fact
that accused Catubao lent Php1,000.00 to Atty. Perito as
testified by a Mr. Regino Monzon, a staff of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor, was given probative weight by the Office of
the Ombudsman. However, assuming arguendo that the
Php1,000.00 was repayment of the money the accused lent
 Atty. Perito, there was no effort on his part to return the
Php3,000.00. He admitted that he did not return the
Php3,000.00. His excuse that the excess was a gift from Atty.
Perito in appreciation of his kindness and it was a "balato" for
a case he won does not hold water. The amount is three times
more than the money he lent him. Considering the
Php3,000.00 as a return of a favor amounting to a mere
Php1,000.00 he once lent the lawyer of a party litigant is not
sufficient to lead this Court to accept such absurd defense. 16
It is an established fact, therefore, that Catubao received
a gift of at least P3,000.00 from Atty. Perito and Ragasa. There is
thus no doubt that the second element is present.  TIADCc

The fourth element is likewise undoubtedly present because

the resolution of the estafa cases filed against Ragasa indubitably
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The third element, however, was not duly proven. The
third element of the crime requires that the gift be given in
consideration of the accused's commission of some crime, or any
act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do.
In the present case, the prosecution claimed, and
the Sandiganbayan believed, that the P3,000.00 was solicited
by Catubao in exchange for finally acting on the estafa cases filed
against Ragasa that were then pending before Catubao. Catubao, on
the other hand, claims that it was only (1) a "return of favor"
because he previously lent Atty. Perito P1,000.00, and (2)
a "balato" because Atty. Perito told him that Atty. Perito just won
another case.
Apart from the testimonial evidence of Atty. Perito and
Ragasa, the prosecution presented no other evidence that the
money was solicited by Catubao and that it was given in
consideration of the latter finally acting on the case. The existence
of the third element, therefore, boils down to the credibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court holds that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the third
element. This is so because the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were so marred by inconsistencies that they are no longer
believable. For instance, Atty. Perito testified that the first
time Catubao asked money from him was around December 16, 17,
or 18, 2008. 17 On direct examination, he said
that Catubao demanded money from him via phone call, 18and that
he called Ragasa after to tell him that Catubao was demanding
money. 19 Yet, on cross-examination, Atty. Perito was so confused
about the supposed incident as to when Catubao actually demanded
money. Thus:
Q  You told us that the accused has been demanding money
before he resolves these cases pending before him.
That's what you told us, is it not?
AWhat I said, sir, is that sometime in December, he asked from
me P4,000.00 to resolve the case, more or less,
P5,000.00, but I gave only P4,000.00. 
Q  Precisely. And this happened at the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bacoor?
A  No, no, sir.
Q  Where?
AwxwxIt was . . . whenever we meet in the corridor, in
the sala of the RTC judges, sir when we see each
other, he would ask and I will warn him that I will
file a case against you.
Q  So, you saw each other on December 16, 17, 18, and 19?
A  Sir, I was just surmising the dates, sir, but he called me on
those dates. In fact, Mr. Ragasa was beside me in
his car when he called me through his cellphone.
Q  But, Mr. Witness, you said that whenever you meet at the
hallway or at the sala of Branch 19, where else, wherever
you meet? Where else that accused will demand money
from you?
A  Specifically on those dates he will ask from me in December,
sir.
Q  You said that whenever you meet at the hallway, at the sala
of Branch. . .
AwxwxI never said that, sir. I never said that.
Q  So where else?
A  I was emphatic about December 19 when he asked money
from me, sir.
Q  You never said that the accused was demanding money
whenever you meet at the hallway, at the sala of Branch
19? So, where else?
 A  The truth is that whenever I have to follow up the cases
especially the resolution, he will always intimate to
me, "wala bang pang inom d'yan?"
Q  So, whenever you follow up? So you will follow up at the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite in Bacoor, am
I correct? Because you denied awhile ago. . .
AwxwxYes, sometimes whenever in the presence of the
court, he will always have to ask from
me. 20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Atty. Perito was not the only one confused as to
how Catubao demanded money from them. Even Ragasa's
testimony was confusing. During his direct examination, his version
of the incident was that Catubao called Atty. Perito while the latter
and Ragasa were together in Ragasa's car. 21 However, during the
cross-examination, he confusingly testified: 
Q  Now, Mr. Witness, during the setting of the preliminary
investigation of your case, was there any instance or
occasion where the accused demanded from you cash or
money before he would resolve these cases?
A  No, not from me, sir.
Q  Not from you. So, we are clear about this matter, Mr.
Witness. The accused never demanded personally from
you any cash or even hinted that he need some money
before he would resolve these cases of you?
A  He did hint in my presence, sir.
Q  He did not hint?
A  He did hint, sir.
Q  When was that during the conduct of the preliminary
investigation?
A  No, sir after the cases had been dragging and no resolutions
were released, sir.
Q  Where was that, Mr. Witness, that Pros. Catubao hinted that
you must give him money before he would resolve these
cases of you, where was that?
AwxwxThat was in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, sir.
Q  Do you know, Mr. Witness, that the Office of
Fiscal Catubao is in Bacoor and not in Imus, are you
aware of that?
A  He also goes to the Office of the Prosecutor in Imus because
that is their office, sir.
Q  For purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation, is
that correct?
A  Yes, sometimes we see him in the Court in Bacoor, Cavite,
sir.
Q  Mr. Witness, where is the office of Pros. Catubao in Imus,
could you tell us the room?
AJ HERNANDEZ
Room number?
ATTY. CORTEZ
Whatever, Your Honors.
A  There is no room number, sir.
Q  So, the office of Pros. Catubao is in Imus, you are sure about
that?
A  I know that Pros. Catubao conducts preliminary investigation
in Imus and he has also an office in Bacoor, Cavite, sir.
Q  You mentioned that Pros. Catubao hinted that he needs
money at his office in Imus so, you are sure that it was in
his office?
AwxwxActually, it is outside the office of the
Prosecutor's Office, sir.
Q  Now, it is not at the office of Pros. Catubao, it was outside?
A  Yes, sir.
Q  Where in particular in the compound of the Justice Hall, Mr.
Witness?
AwxwxIn front of the office, at the parking lot, sir.
Q  When Pros. Catubao showed you at the parking lot, he went
to you and told you that he needed money, is that
correct?
A  It's like this, sir, I was with Atty. Perito and we catch upon
him in the Imus office and we were following up the
resolution of the case and he hinted that he needs some
money, sir.
Q  So, it's now at the Imus office, not at the parking lot?
A  The whole area is the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and
that was the place where it happened, sir.
 Q  What particular area, Mr. Witness, at the office or at the
parking lot because the parking lot is different from the
office, am I correct?
AwxwxYes, that is the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, sir.
Q  So, you said that Pros. Catubao hinted that you must give
him money at the parking lot?
A  That is one instance, that he hinted to ask money from Atty.
Perito, sir. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ragasa even added that the events he testified to happened
around last week of November to around second week of December
2008, 23 contrary to Atty. Perito's claim that Catubao demanded
money from him on December 19, 2008. 
The Sandiganbayan, however, simply dismissed the above
inconsistencies by saying:
Accused Catubao points out the inconsistencies of the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Atty. Fernando Perito
("Atty. Perito") and Cornelio Ragasa ("Ragasa") as to the
solicitation for pang-inom (money for drinking) and for money
to finance his drinking spree for his friends while in
Samar. This Court agrees with the prosecution that the
inconsistencies as to the particular date, time and
place of communication between the prosecution
witnesses and the accused where the latter asked for
money are just minor inconsistencies which do not
discredit their credibility. The Supreme Court has held
that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality
touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair
their credibility. In fact, these minor inconsistencies may even
serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses as they
negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been
rehearsed. 24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics in
the original)
The Court disagrees.
The inconsistencies are not trivial or minor, as they do, in fact,
touch upon the central fact of the crime. To reiterate, the existence
of the third element of the crime — that the gift was given in
consideration of Catubao doing an act — is altogether hinged on the
testimonies alone of Atty. Perito and Ragasa. These testimonies, in
turn, then have to be credible enough to establish the said
element beyond reasonable doubt.
It bears stressing that "[t]he burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime is upon the
prosecution, as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own
evidence. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused." 25 As
the Court held in Patula v. People: 26
[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden,
the Prosecution's duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other
crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor
its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the
accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution
arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused
has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and
set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption
of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the
defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the
proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged
its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime
charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor
responsible for it. 27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) AaCTcI

Here, the prosecution clearly failed to discharge its duty. Not

only is the prosecution's version unable to stand on its own; worse,
the version of the defense, in fact, is more believable all things
considered. What further bolsters the believability of the version of
the defense is that part of his claim has already been an established
fact since the preliminary investigation of this case. The
Ombudsman's Resolution 28 dated April 28, 2011 finding probable
cause against Catubaoalready found that Catubao indeed lent
P1,000.00 to Atty. Perito in a previous instance. It said:
We must state that We give probative weight to
respondent's allegation that complainant borrowed one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) from him. We are persuaded by
the sworn statement of Mr. Regino N. Monzon that respondent
 gave complainant the said amount sometime in October
2008. Mr. Monzon is a staff of RTC, Bacoor, Cavite, Branch
19. 29
The foregoing is the reason why the Information filed
against Catubao alleged that he received and accepted only
P3,000.00 and not P4,000.00. The Sandiganbayan similarly adopted
this finding of fact. 30
Thus, Catubao's version that the money he received was partly
a repayment by Atty. Perito and partly "balato" is, to the mind of the
Court, more believable. As Catubao testified during
the Sandiganbayan's clarificatory questions:
Q  Now, upon learning that the amount sent to you was Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00), what did you do?
A  Well, I called him, and tell (sic) him, why did you send me
this amount, I was only expecting One Thousand
(P1,000.00) in repayment of the amount I lent to you, Sir.
Q  So, what was the answer of Atty. Perito?
A  The answer was, he was just repaying the favor that I have
extended to him, and that he won a case, Sir.
CHAIRPERSON:
Off the record.
[OFF THE RECORD]
Back to record.
You mean to say that Atty. Perito instead of giving you,
sending you One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), he sent
Four Thousand Pesos as what?
MR. CATUBAO
As repayment —
CHAIRPERSON
No, you had said something.
AJ HERNANDEZ
Repayment of the One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and
for the favor of having won in a case with you. That is
what you said.
MR. CATUBAO
 No, Your Honors. He said in repayment of the favor that I
have extended to him, the One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), and he just won a case, Your Honors.
CHAIRPERSON
He just won a case, so, at that time, he was giving you
additional Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00).
MR. CATUBAO
"Balato," Your Honors.
CHAIRPERSON
Yes. Balato. 31
This claim of Catubao that the money was sent and received
as "balato" was brushed aside by the Sandiganbayan, as it ruled
that: 
Being a government employee for more than twenty
years, the accused is highly expected to be familiar and
knowledgeable of the rules and to refrain from soliciting or
accepting money for public servants shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything for monetary value from any
person in the course of their official duties or in connection
with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their office. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives. 32 (Italics in the original)
While the Sandiganbayan was not wrong in its exhortation
regarding integrity of public officials, it erred in its reliance on
Section 7 (d) of Republic Act No. 6713 33 (RA 6713), a different
penal law, which provides that:
x x x Public officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any
person in the course of their official duties or in connection
with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their office. 34
Verily, the crime charged against Catubao was Direct Bribery
and it has specific elements which are different from a violation of
Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. While the standard provided in Section 7
(d) of RA 6713 may be the ideal for all public officials,
 the Sandiganbayan nevertheless erred in adjudging the guilt
of Catubao on the basis of the same standard when, to recall, Direct
Bribery requires that the gift be in consideration of his commission
of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which is his official duty to do.
In other words, while a prosecutor's receipt of a "balato" from
a party litigant may indeed be reprehensible from the lens of public
service, such act, at the end of the day, is not punishable as Direct
Bribery.
In sum, for failure of the prosecution to establish all the
elements of the crime of Direct Bribery beyond reasonable
doubt, Catubao must thus be acquitted of the charge.  EcTCAD

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 6, 2016 and Resolution

dated September 29, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case
No. SB-11-CRM-0420 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Carlos A. Catubao is ACQUITTED of the crime of Direct
Bribery on the ground that his guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Catubao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 227371, [October 2, 2019])
 [G.R. No. 218210. October 9, 2019.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. NOLI VILLEGAS, JR. y LACRETE, accused-
appellant.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J  : p

On appeal is the September 24, 2014 Decision 1 rendered by

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01553 affirming
the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barotac Viejo,
Iloilo, Branch 66, convicting accused-appellant Noli Villegas,
Jr. y Lacrete (Villegas) of rape with homicide.
The Antecedents:
Accused-appellant Villegas appeals his conviction for rape with
homicide. He denies the charge and argues that his guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent facts, as stated in the Appellee's Brief
(represented by the Office of the Solicitor General), are as follows:
On x x x November 12, 2003 at around 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, victim AAA 3 asked permission from her mother,
BBB, 4 to go with x x x Villegas, Jr. to visit a friend in Barangay
x x x, Estancia[,] Iloilo. BBB did not allow AAA to go with
[Villegas] but, thereafter, she noticed that her daughter x x x
was no longer in [their] house. 
At 5:30 x x x, Felicidad Bornales [who] was fetching
water at the jetmatic pump in Barangay x x x, Estancia, Iloilo
x x x noticed AAA [in the company of Villegas]. Felicidad
observed that AAA was wearing a black striped t-shirt and
floral shorts while [Villegas] was wearing a white t-shirt,
maong pants and x x x carrying x x x a dark blue bag. While
fetching water, Felicidad [overheard Villegas inviting] AAA to
go with him somewhere in the nearby mountain but AAA
declined because her mother might get angry. After Felicidad
x x x finished fetching water, she left the place
[leaving Villegas] and AAA still x x x conversing with each
other.
 At 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, BBB got
worried when she noticed [that] AAA was still not home. BBB
went out to look for AAA x x x but to no avail. She then asked
help from one of the children of her neighbor, Jun-jun dela
Cruz, and her daughter, CCC, 5 to look for AAA. They went to
the house of Eva Catalan [Catalan], the aunt of [Villegas], but
the latter [denied knowing] the whereabouts of AAA and
[Villegas].
Thereafter, about [eight] 8 meters on their way out [of
Catalan's house], they noticed x x x sledge prints leading to
[the] abandoned house of Antonio Lacrete which was 35
meters away. Upon reaching the abandoned house, they
entered through the slightly opened door and found a white t-
shirt, a pair of black slippers with green strap[s] and a pair of
yellow slippers belonging to AAA. They also noticed x x x
blood stains on the bamboo floor. Thereafter, BBB together
with [CCC] and Jun-jun went to the barangay to report the
incident.
Barangay Captain Editha Lamigo with her [t]anods went
with BBB, CCC and Jun-jun to the abandoned house. When
they arrived, they found a dark-blue bag containing a pair of
maong pants, money worth P80.50 and torn birth certificate of
[Villegas].
Thereafter, BBB[,] together with the barangay officials
went to the house of Noli Villegas, Sr., accused-appellant's
father[,] to inquire on the whereabouts of his son and AAA.
However, he told the barangay officials [that] he did not know
where his son [was]. So they went back to the abandoned
house.
At 11 o'clock in the evening, BBB was informed by a
certain Nico that AAA's body was found dumped in a pond
along the rice field. 
On November 14, 2003, [Villegas], accompanied by his
father, surrendered to the authorities. 6 (Citations omitted)
On April 28, 2004, an Information was filed
charging Villegas with Rape with Homicide, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about November 12, 2003 in the x x x
Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Noli Villegas, Jr.
y Lacrete] with the use of force, and with lewd design did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA, without her consent and against her will
 and by reason or in the occasion of such rape with a decided
purpose to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike a hard object on the
victim's head which caused intracranial hemorrhage due to a
traumatic injury of the head which resulted to her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
During his arraignment, Villegas entered a plea of "not
guilty." 8 At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated only on the identity
of Villegas as the person who was charged in the Information. 9
During trial, the prosecution established that after AAA's body
was retrieved from the rice paddy, the same was submitted for a
medical examination wherein the attending medico-legal officer,
Police Chief Inspector Owen Jaen Lebaquin (Lebaquin), found that
the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage due to a traumatic
injury to the head. He likewise noted that the victim sustained
wounds, abrasions and contusions, and had recently lost her
virginity. 10 This was noted in his Medico-Legal Report No. M-760-
2003 11 dated November 16, 2003.
Aside from this, the prosecution submitted the
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay of BBB 12 and Felicidad
Bornales 13(Bornales) which supported the prosecution's version of
the incident.
Bornales, during her testimony, averred that she saw AAA
talking to Villegas in the vicinity of the jetmatic pump. She narrated
that she overheard Villegas inviting AAA to go to the mountain but
AAA declined since it was already late and BBB might get angry.
Bornales described the clothes which AAA and Villegas wore as well
as the bag which Villegas held at the time. 14 On cross-examination,
she stated that AAA and Villegas were still in the area where the
jetmatic pump was when she left after fetching water. 15
AAA's mother, BBB, testified that she last saw AAA alive
around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of November 12, 2003, when the
latter asked permission to accompany Villegas to visit a friend in the
neighboring barangay. BBB, however, did not allow AAA to leave.
Afterwards, AAA left to fetch water from a water pump but did not
return home anymore. At around 8 o'clock in the evening, BBB,
along with her other daughter and the children of her neighbors,
started looking for AAA. 16 BBB asked Eva Catalan, Villegas' aunt,
where AAA and Villegas were but Catalan denied knowing their
whereabouts. However, when they were about to leave Catalan's
house, they noticed sledge prints on the ground around eight (8)
meters away leading to the abandoned house owned by Antonio
Lacrete. 17
BBB also narrated the following details, as follows:
Q: What did you find when you reached [the] abandoned house
of Mr. Lacrete?
A: x x x I saw that the door was open and [when] we entered x
x x we saw a white T-shirt and [a pair of] black slippers
with green strap[s] and x x x [a pair of] yellow slippers
owned by my daughter [AAA].
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Besides this T-shirt, this slipper, what else did you find if any
inside that abandoned house?
A: [Droplets] of blood on the bamboo floor of the abandoned
house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you do then when you found x x x these things
[that] you mentioned? What else did you do?
A: I returned to the house of Eva Catalan bringing along with
me that white T-shirt, Sir.
Q: Why did you return to the house of Eva Catalan bringing that
white T-shirt?
A: We returned there to ask for x x x help [in locating] my
daughter [AAA] and I reported to her that we saw
[droplets] of blood and upon seeing the white T-shirt, she
cried with this remark "Ay, he really killed her" (Ay,
pinatay niya gid gali). 18
They then reported the matter to the barangay captain who
helped them search the area. Eventually, they found the dark blue
bag supposedly containing Villegas' personal effects. Thereafter,
they asked Villegas' father about his son's whereabouts but he
claimed that he had no clue. Later on, BBB was told that AAA's body
has been found in the rice field. 19
During cross-examination, BBB denied that AAA
and Villegas were sweethearts. 20 She confirmed that the droplets of
blood on the bamboo floor of the abandoned house were found near
the pair of black slippers. 21
 Editha Lamigo (Lamigo), the barangay captain at the time,
testified about the contents of the bag. Lamigo said that BBB found
the bag near the abandoned house and that it was turned over to
her. She however handed the bag over to a kagawad since she had
to leave. Upon her return, Lamigo retrieved the bag from
the kagawad and inventoried the contents thereof in the presence
of the police. Afterwards, she turned over the bag to the police for it
to be sealed as evidence. 22However, Lamigo admitted that she was
unsure whether somebody previously opened the bag before the
same was turned over to her for safekeeping. 23
Conversely, Catalan, Villegas' aunt, testified that she
saw Villegas talking to AAA on November 12, 2003. She claimed
that Villegas and AAA were sweethearts. She averred that at around
5 o'clock in the afternoon, she sent Villegas on an errand, i.e., to
borrow palay from Ronilo Esteban (Ronilo) and even gave him fare
money. 24 She denied having uttered "Ay, he really killed her" as
alleged by BBB. However, she admitted that Villegas kept some of
his belongings inside the abandoned house. 25
On cross-examination, Catalan revealed that after Villegas left
to borrow palay from Ronilo, he did not return that same night
because of the inclement weather; moreover, he supposedly dried
the palay at Ronilo's place. 26
Ronilo, Villegas' uncle, testified that Villegas arrived at his
house around 6 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 2003 to
borrow palay upon the request of Catalan. He asserted
that Villegas slept at his house that night and did not leave due to
the heavy rains and the need to dry the palay. 27 Ronilo alleged that
after Villegas found out that the police was looking for him, the
latter told him that he did not kill AAA and that he wanted
assistance to surrender in order to prove his innocence. 28 On cross-
examination, Ronilo stated that the distance from his house
to Villegas' residence could be traversed in 10 to 15 minutes. 29
Finally, Villegas insisted that he and AAA were
sweethearts. 30 He averred that Catalan asked him to
borrow palay and that from November 12, 2003 until November 14,
2003, he stayed at the house of his uncle (Ronilo) due to heavy
rains. 31 He alleged that he last saw AAA on November 12, 2003
when he helped her fetch water. 32 He denied the allegations
against him. 33
The Ruling of the RTC
 In a Decision 34 dated December 15, 2011, the RTC found that
the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution all point
to Villegas, and to no other, as the perpetrator of the crime. It made
the following observations:
1. [Villegas] and [AAA] [were] neighbors and
sweethearts. It [was] not difficult for [Villegas] to convince
and lure the victim to go with him to any secluded place;
2. [AAA asked permission from] her mother that she will
[accompany] Villegas, Jr. to [visit a friend in a neighboring
barangay], but her mother did not permit [her]. Yet, the victim
left the house and by inference, she went with no other
person except x x x Villegas. In fact, prosecution witness
Felicidad Bornales saw them at the [vicinity of the] jetmatic
pump and she even [over]heard the accused convincing the
victim to go with him to the nearby mountain;
3. Bloodstains were found at the abandoned house
where [Villegas] used to sleep. [The] [v]ictim's slippers were
also found there. [Villegas'] dark blue bag which contained his
tattered birth certificate, among others, [was] also found
there. That bag was seen by prosecution witness Felicidad
Bornales being carried by [Villegas] while he was together
with the victim at the [vicinity of the] jetmatic pump. The
white T-shirt owned by x x x Villegas, Jr. which he was wearing
when they were seen by prosecution witness Felicidad
Bornales at the jetmatic pump was also found in the
abandoned house along with the blood-stained yellow slippers
of the victim, [AAA]. Again, by inference, the commission of
the crime took place in that abandoned house;
4. The last person seen in [the] company of the victim
was x x x Villegas, Jr. It was 5:30 in the afternoon and then
five (5) hours later the dead body of the victim was found. 35
The trial court opined that the victim's body was dumped in
the muddy portion of the rice field to avoid timely discovery.
Furthermore, it ruled that it was not physically impossible
for Villegas to be at the vicinity where the crime was committed
since the place was very accessible by any mode of transportation.
Similarly, it noted that Villegas' defense of alibi was only
corroborated by his close relatives, which should be taken with
caution. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing, the court hereby
finds the accused Noli Villegas, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and hereby imposes
 upon him a penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with
accessory penalties, to pay the heirs of [AAA] P50,000.00 as
death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
Accused['s] entire period of detention shall be deducted
from the sentence herein imposed.
SO ORDERED. 36
Aggrieved, Villegas appealed 37 before the CA and assigned
these errors:
I
The trial court erred in relying solely and purely on the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the Prosecution
inspite [sic] its questionability and insufficiency to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.
II
The trial court erred in not giving due weight and
credence to the defense of the Accused-Appellant of alibi
which prevails over and above the alleged circumstantial
evidence presented by the Prosecution. 38
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its assailed September 24, 2014 Decision, 39 held

that Villegas may still be pinned down as the perpetrator in view of
the overwhelming circumstantial evidence, viz.:
One, hours before she went missing, AAA had asked
permission from her mother to accompany [Villegas] to [the
neighboring barangay] and although BBB did not permit her
to go, she was last seen conversing with [him] at the water
pump that same afternoon. 
Two, hours before [AAA's] body was found, [Villegas]
was overheard to have twice invited AAA for a walk to the
mountain but he was refused by AAA.
Three, [Villegas] was seen wearing a white shirt and
maong pants and carrying a dark blue bag the same day AAA
went missing.
Four, a similar white shirt, denim pants and dark blue
bag were discovered inside and/or near the abandoned hut
where [Villegas] admittedly resided x x x.
 Five, the dark blue bag which contained the torn birth
certificate of [Villegas] was bafflingly found [two] 2 meters
outside the hut near the Indian mango tree, instead of inside
the abandoned hut where [Villegas's] belongings should have
been.
Six, the yellow slippers which BBB claimed to be owned
by AAA were found at the abandoned house/hut where BBB
also [noticed] blood stains on the bamboo floor.
Seven, when BBB told Eva [Catalan] — [Villegas's] own
aunt — about the blood stains they found at the abandoned
hut, Eva [Catalan] had spontaneously remarked, "Ay, pinatay
niya gid gala" (["]Ay, he really killed her").
Eight, Felicidad [Bornales] testified that AAA's body was
recovered more or less 30 meters away from the well and
jetmatic pump where AAA and [Villegas] were last seen
together. Based on the ocular inspection of the trial court, the
jetmatic pump is across the road from Eva's [Catalan's] house
and Eva's [Catalan's] house, as admitted by [Villegas], is 10
meters away from the abandoned hut.
Nine, Dr. Lebaquin reported that AAA had a "fleshy type
hymen with deep fresh laceration at 6 o'clock and shallow
fresh laceration at 7 o'clock" which could have been caused
by the forcible insertion of any hard blunt rigid or semi rigid
object, like [an] erect penis. He also declared in his report that
his "findings [were] compatible to [AAA's] recent loss of
virginity" which [was] inconsistent with [Villegas's] claim of
"countless" sexual encounters with AAA.
Ten, when AAA's body was discovered, she was wearing
the same clothes she was last seen [wearing] when she was
together with [Villegas] hours prior, except that the left side of
AAA's shorts [was pulled down] on her hips exposing her bare
skin around the pelvic area. 
Eleven, AAA's lifeless body was found in an unnatural
position with her arms raised and bent at the shoulders, and
her legs slightly opened and bent at the knees, which is not
unlike the position of one who has been forcibly restrained
with both arms pinned down.
Twelve, several contusions and abrasions marred AAA's
body and according to Dr. Lebaquin, these contusions
especially [in] the head were fatal. In his expert opinion, he
testified that the contusion [in] AAA's head was caused by any
hard blunt object, possibly and most probably a fist while the
abrasions were caused by rubbing against a hard or rough
 surface, possibly due to the victim struggling or wrestling or
possibly during the dragging of the [victim's body]. He further
testified that the totality of AAA's injuries, the contusions and
lacerations taken together, were sustained within 24 hours
from the time AAA went missing." 40 (Citations omitted)
According to the CA, these circumstances, when appreciated
as a whole, point to Villegas as the perpetrator of the felony beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that findings
of fact of the trial court deserve respect and that it found no reason
to deviate from such findings since these were supported by law
and evidence. Also, it held that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses deserve credit in the absence of ill motive.
Apart from these, the CA found Villegas' defenses of alibi and
denial unconvincing given that there was a possibility that he could
have been in the vicinity when the felony was committed. Likewise,
it found Villegas' story that he was sent out on an errand
questionable since the testimonies of the defense witnesses were
contradictory and riddled with discrepancies. Also, Villegas' self-
serving assertion that he and AAA were sweethearts was not
supported with convincing evidence.
The appellate court affirmed the RTC's ruling
finding Villegas guilty of rape with homicide, but modified the
penalty imposed by the trial court in that he is not eligible for parole
and the monetary award to conform with recent jurisprudence, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
present appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed 15 December
2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66 in
Barotac, Viejo, Iloilo in Crim. Case No. 2004-2544 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.
Accordingly, the accused-appellant is sentenced the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
Php100,000 as civil indemnity; Php75,000 as moral damages;
Php30,000 as exemplary damages; and Php25,000 as
temperate damages, all with interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until
fully paid. 
SO ORDERED. 41
 Discontented, Villegas appealed 42 his case before Us raising
the main issue of whether or not he is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Villegas argues that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence
fell short of the required quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. He asserts that suspicion cannot give probative force to a
testimony which in itself is insufficient to establish an inference or a
fact. 43 He likewise points out the inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Moreover, Villegas questions why his
defense of alibi was not given merit and why the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense were not considered. 44 He posits that
when the circumstances shown to exist yield at least two inferences
— one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and
the other with a finding of guilt — the Court must acquit the accused
because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty to
support a judgment of conviction. 45
Plaintiff-appellee counters that the circumstances surrounding
the case established the elements of rape with homicide and lead to
no other conclusion than that Villegas was guilty of the crime
charged. 46 Moreover, it argues that Villegas' defenses of denial and
alibi should not be considered given the possibility that he was in
the vicinity of the crime scene, and thus he could have committed
the crime especially since he admitted that he was with AAA on the
day and time she disappeared. 47
It is a known criminal law concept that rape with homicide is a
special complex crime or "two or more crimes that the law treats as
a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a
single criminal impulse." 48 The said felony is penalized by Articles
266-A, paragraph (1), and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
follows:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape
is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
 c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. 
Art. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. 49
The elements of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide are as follows: "(1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of
a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means
of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of
such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the
appellant killed a woman." 50
In this case, the post-mortem examination of AAA's body
revealed that she had lacerations on her private parts and that she
recently lost her virginity, which more likely meant that the
assailant had carnal knowledge of her. Moreover, the contusions,
abrasions, and injuries on her body, and more importantly the head
injury, signify that such carnal knowledge was achieved by means of
force and intimidation which eventually led to AAA's death. The
testimonies of the medico-legal as well as those of the other
prosecution witnesses, when considered together, inevitably lead to
the conclusion that Villegascommitted the felony.
Also, "[j]urisprudence is replete with cases where the Court
ruled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be
addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the
appellate courts." 51 Hence, as the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses corroborated each other on material points, these should
be given great weight since the trial court found these testimonies
more convincing. Consequently, the Court sees no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court (and the CA) absent any
indication that it committed any error in its appreciation of the
evidence that Villegas was guilty of the charge. 52
 With regard to Villegas' defenses of denial and alibi, it is
settled that "both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as
between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one
hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must
be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or
its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident." 53 In the case at
bench, while Villegas maintained that he was at the house of Ronilo
when the crime was committed, there was no dispute that the
abandoned house was accessible via public (or private)
transportation and that it would have only taken around ten (10) to
fifteen (15) minutes to traverse the distance. Since there was a
great possibility that Villegas was in the vicinity at the time of the
commission of the felony, his defense of alibi fails. In the same way,
his denial of the charge was negated by the circumstantial evidence
which already established his guilt. 
As for the penalties, the CA correctly affirmed the imposition
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in light of the
proscription on the imposition of the death penalty as mandated
by Republic Act No. 9346. However, pursuant to recent
jurisprudence, the awards for moral damages and exemplary
damages should be increased to PhP100,000.00 each. 54In addition,
temperate damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00 should be
awarded to the heirs of AAA. 55
In conclusion, We hereby affirm Villegas's conviction for rape
with homicide as it was proven beyond reasonable doubt through
circumstantial evidence. However, the appropriate modifications to
the penalty and monetary awards should be made in order to
conform to recent jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed September 24, 2014 Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01553, finding accused-appellant
Noli L. Villegas, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that the awards for moral damages and
exemplary damages are increased to PhP100,000.00 each. In
addition, temperate damages of PhP50,000.00 is awarded. 
 SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. Villegas, Jr. y Lacrete, G.R. No. 218210, [October 9, 2019])
 [G.R. No. 240441. December 4, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. XXX, * accused-appellant.

DECISION

A.B. REYES, JR., J  :

p

In a criminal case where the life and liberty of the accused are
at stake, every qualifying circumstance alleged in the Information
must be proved as much as the crime itself. Thus, in the crime of
rape and lascivious conduct under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610, 1 an allegation that the accused is the common-law spouse of
the victim's mother must be sufficiently established. Equally
noteworthy, the terms "common-law spouse" and "step-parent" are
distinct terms bearing different legal meanings, which may not be
used interchangeably.  TIADCc

This treats of the Notice of Appeal 2 under Section 13 (c), Rule

124 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
5-03-SC filed by accused-appellant XXX, seeking the reversal of the
Decision 3 dated January 25, 2018, rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08224, which affirmed the trial court's
ruling convicting him of the crimes of Violation of Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610; Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1
(d) of the Revised Penal Code(RPC); and Rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC.
The Antecedents
XXX was charged in three separate Informations with Violation
of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, Statutory Rape, and
Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, committed as
follows:
Criminal Case No. IR-7893
That in the afternoon of December 2, 2006, inside their
house at __________________ Iriga City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, in total disregard of the minority and naivety of the
complainant, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit an act of lascivious conduct upon one
 BBB, 4 a 14-year old girl, by then and there pulling and
removing the latter's blanket, placing his hand under the said
minor's shirt, and caressing her breast and legs while
whispering to the latter words in the dialect "sige na," thereby
causing psychological injury, fear, trauma and shock to the
minor-complainant, to the latter's damage and prejudice in
such amount as may be proven in court. 
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Criminal Case No. IR-7957
That sometime in August 1998 at around noontime and
at the banana plantation in __________________ Iriga City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, the step father of the complainant, taking
advantage of the latter's minority, and armed with a bolo, by
means of force and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his
stepdaughter AAA who was then 8 years old and a minor at
the time of the incident, by inserting his penis into her vagina
against the latter's will, to the damage and prejudice of the
said AAA in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Criminal Case No. IR-7958
That sometime in April 2002 in the evening and at the
coprahan in __________________ Iriga City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, the step father of the complainant, taking advantage
of the latter's minority and armed with a bolo, by means of
force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his
stepdaughter AAA who was then 13 years old and a minor at
the time of the incident, by inserting his penis into her vagina
against the latter's will, to the damage and prejudice of said
AAA in such amount as may be proven in court.  AIDSTE

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

XXX pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter. 8
The antecedent facts reveal that AAA and BBB are daughters
of CCC, a widow. In January 1997, CCC and XXX started living
together in Iriga City. 9
Sometime in August 1998, XXX ordered AAA to bring his bolo
to the banana plantation in Iriga City. AAA was then 10 years old.
When AAA handed over the bolo, XXX took hold of her, directed her
to remove her clothes, and ordered her to lie down on the
ground. XXX threatened to kill her, should she refuse to obey his
command. Out of fear, AAA obliged. Then, XXXremoved his own
clothes and positioned himself on top of AAA. He forcibly had carnal
knowledge of her. The rape lasted for about an hour. AAA cried the
whole time. Then, XXX told AAA to get dressed and warned her not
to tell the incident to anyone, or else he will harm her family. 10
Sometime in April 2002, at around 11:00 p.m., AAA was
sleeping inside their house when XXX woke her up. He told her to
quietly go outside the house. Fearful of what he might do to her
family, AAA obliged. 11
XXX took AAA to the coconut kiln. There, he ordered AAA to lie
down on the floor. He removed her underwear, then took off his own
clothes and laid on top of her. After which, he inserted his penis
inside her vagina and made several push and pull movements.
When he finished, he directed AAA to dress up and go back home. 12
Sometime in December 2006, while BBB was sleeping in her
room, she suddenly felt someone tugging her blanket. Upon waking,
she saw XXX beside her. XXX inserted his hands under her shirt,
mashed her breasts, and caressed her legs. She refused XXX's
advances, which angered him. He warned her against talking back
to him. 13
Fearful that XXX might rape her, BBB reported the matter to
their neighbor DDD. 14
On December 8, 2006, AAA likewise reported the rape incident
to the police authorities. Thereafter, AAA was referred to the City
Health Office for medico-legal examination. The findings revealed
that AAA had deep, healed lacerations in several positions on her
hymen. 15
XXX vehemently denied the charges leveled against him. He
related that he started living with CCC when AAA was already 10
years old. As such, AAA's claim that she was raped when she was
only 8 years old was untrue. Neither could he have raped her in
April 2002, because at that time, CCC was already living in their
house and would have thus immediately found out about the
incident. 16
Likewise, XXX averred that BBB's claim was untrue,
considering that he no longer lived with them at the time of the
alleged incident because he left after Typhoon Reming destroyed
their house. 17
Ruling of the RTC
On January 26, 2016, the RTC rendered a Joint
Judgment 18 convicting XXX of the crimes of violation of Section 5
(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, Statutory Rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, and Rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC.  AaCTcI

The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding [XXX] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
in Criminal Case No. IR-7893 — for the crime of SEXUAL
ABUSE under Section 5(b), Article III of [R.A. No.] 7610 and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay Private Complainant BBB the following:
Php20,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php15,000.00 as moral
damages, and Php15,000.00 as exemplary damages, with 6%
annual interest from the time of finality of this judgment until
full payment.
in Criminal [Case] Nos. IR-7957 and 7958 — for the
crimes of STATUTORY RAPE and RAPE under ART. 266-A
respectively and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without the possibility of parole for each [crime]. He
is further ordered to pay Private Complainant AAA the amount
of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral
damages, and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with 6%
annual interest from the time of finality of this judgment until
full payment.
SO ORDERED. 19
Aggrieved, XXX filed an appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On January 25, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, 20 affirming with modification the conviction meted by the
RTC.
The CA held that XXX may only be convicted of simple rape in
Criminal Case Nos. IR-7957 and IR-7958, considering that the
allegation in the Information that XXX was AAA's stepfather was
never actually proven during the trial. What was established was
simply that XXX was the common law spouse of the victim's
mother. 21
Also, the CA increased the awards of exemplary damages from
P30,000.00 to P75,000.00; while maintaining the awards of civil
indemnity of P75,000.00; and moral damages of P75,000.00. 22
As for Criminal Case No. IR-7893, for violation of Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the CA held that the aggravating
circumstance of relationship may not be considered, as the said
circumstance was not alleged in the Information. Accordingly,
absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty
shall be applied in its medium period, which is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period. 23
As for the damages awarded, the CA affirmed the awards of
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages of
P75,000.00 each. In addition, the CA ordered XXX to pay a fine of
P15,000.00. 24
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
DENIED. The assailed January 26, 2016 Joint Judgment of the
[RTC], Branch 34, Iriga City, is MODIFIED, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. IR-7957 and 7958, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is sustained for each count but the
phrase "without the possibility of parole" is REMOVED
pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC; while the award of
exemplary damages is INCREASED to Php75,000.00 EACH
count; and EcTCAD

(2) In Criminal Case No. IR-7893. The appellant is

SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal minimum, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum; and he is
further ORDERED to pay a FINE of Php15,000.00.
The rest of the assailed Joint Judgment STANDS.
SO ORDERED. 25
Aggrieved, XXX filed a Notice of Appeal 26 under Rule 124,
Section 13 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Issue
 The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt XXX's guilt for
the crimes charged.
XXX assails the credibility of AAA and BBB, alleging that their
testimonies are inconsistent and incredible. 27 Particularly, he points
out that in AAA's direct testimony, she claimed that she was first
raped in August 1998, when she was just 8 years old. However, on
cross-examination, AAA contradicted herself, and stated that she
was 10 when she was first raped. 28 He avers that it was impossible
for him to have committed the crime, as he started cohabiting with
CCC when AAA was already 10 years old. 29
In the same vein, XXX alleges that AAA's behavior after the
purported rape renders her tale questionable. It was strange that
AAA did not even bother to wake up her siblings, or seek help,
despite knowing XXX's plan to rape her. Instead, she willingly
walked with him to the coconut kiln. Also, it was odd that after the
purported rape incident, AAA simply returned to their house and
went back to sleep as if nothing terrible happened. XXX urges that it
is beyond comprehension that AAA still stayed with him, and still
treated him as her stepfather, if he indeed defiled her. 30
In addition, XXX contends that AAA's reason for reporting the
rape incident was suspect, as she admitted that she filed the case
out of fear that XXX will rape her sister BBB. According to XXX, this
proves that she was merely coaxed by DDD to file charges against
him. Added to all this, it took nine years from the first rape incident,
and five years from the second incident, for AAA to report the
rape. 31
Similarly, XXX surmises that the lacerations in AAA's hymen
could have been caused by other factors. 32
Furthermore, XXX points out that the prosecution failed to
prove the elements of force and intimidation. AAA admitted that he
did not force or intimidate her into committing the sexual acts.
Although she claimed that XXX threatened her, these threats were
allegedly done after the commission of the rape, and thus, could not
have been sufficient to subdue her. 33  HSAcaE

Anent BBB's accusation, XXX claims that he could not have

sexually abused her on December 2, 2006, considering that at that
time, BBB was already living with DDD, while he was living alone in
a makeshift house in Iriga City. 34
 XXX likewise claims that the prosecution failed to prove all the
elements for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
BBB did not claim that XXX forced her or intimidated her, or
subdued the free exercise of her will. 35
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the prosecution sufficiently
proved XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG maintains
that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements for the
crimes charged, and the testimonies of the victims AAA and BBB
were worthy of credence. 36
Ruling of the Court
The instant appeal is bereft of merit.
The Prosecution Established
Beyond Reasonable Doubt the
Guilt of XXX for the Crimes of
Rape under Article 266-A, 1 (a)
and 1 (d)
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, 37 defines the crime of rape as follows:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is
committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: 
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
Accordingly, to sustain a conviction for rape through sexual
intercourse, the prosecution must prove the following elements
beyond reasonable doubt, namely: (i) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (ii) that said act was accomplished a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or b) when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or d) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. 38
In the instant case, the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. IR-
7957 and IR-7958, charge XXX with raping AAA twice.
The first rape incident took place in April 1998, when AAA was
merely 10 years old. AAA's age was sufficiently established from her
testimony, and confirmed through the presentation of her birth
certificate, which indicates that she was born on February 19,
1988. 39 This proves that she was in fact 10 years old in April 1998.
It cannot be gainsaid that "sexual congress with a girl under
12 years old is always rape." 40 In statutory rape, force and
intimidation are immaterial, and the only subject of inquiry is the
age of the child and whether carnal knowledge in fact took place.
The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of
her own on account of her tender years. In the same vein, the
child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern evil from good. 41  HESIcT

The fact of carnal knowledge was proven through the credible

testimony of AAA, viz.:
Prosecutor Nonna Beltran:
Q: After giving to [XXX] the bolo, what happened?
A: He take [sic] hold of me.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: He instructed me to remove my clothes and he asked me to
lie down on the ground.
Q: Did you follow the instruction of your stepfather to remove
your clothes?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Why did you obey that instruction of [XXX] to remove your
clothes?
A: I obeyed to [sic] the instruction given to me by [XXX]
because he said that if I will not obey him, he will kill my
family.
Q: When [XXX] was uttering those words, where was then the
bolo which you delivered to him?
A: The bolo was beside him.
xxx xxx xxx
 THE COURT:
Q: The question is what [XXX] did to you and not what you did.
A: [XXX] raped me already.
Prosecutor Beltran:
Q: When [XXX] raped you, what was your position.
A: I was lying down on the ground. 
Q: And what was then the position of your legs?
A: Open legs.
Q: And when you said you were already lying down and your
legs were open, where was [XXX] in relation to you?
A: He was on top of me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When [XXX] laid down on top of you, what did he do in
relation to your vagina?
xxx xxx xxx
A: [XXX] inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q: And what did you feel when [XXX] inserted his penis to your
vagina?
A: I felt pain, ma'am.
Q: And after [XXX] was able to insert his penis to your
vagina, what movement did he do if any?
A: He made a push and pull movement. 42 (Emphases
ours)
XXX assails AAA's credibility by claiming that she made
inconsistent statements regarding her age in April 1998. XXXpoints
out that, during AAA's direct examination, she claimed that she was
8 years old when XXX first raped her. However, she later on stated
during her cross examination that was already 10 years old when
she was first raped.
XXX's argument fails to persuade.
"In statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to
prove that the victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense." 43 Thus, what matters in the
instant case is the fact that the prosecution established that AAA
was definitely short of 12 years when she was raped.  caITAC
 Anent the charge of rape through force and intimidation, AAA
credibly narrated that sometime in April 2002, XXXordered her to go
with him to the coconut kiln. AAA was left with no choice but to
obey XXX, out of fear that he will kill her family if she refuses to give
in to his advances. 44 Undoubtedly, XXX succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with AAA by intimidating her into submission.
Added to this, AAA, being a child of tender years easily
succumbed to XXX's intimidation and coercion. It must be
remembered that AAA looked at XXX as her "Tatay." 45 XXX's moral
ascendancy as common-law spouse of the victims' mother takes the
place of force and intimidation as an element of rape. 46 It is well-
settled that the term "intimidation" may also include moral
intimidation and coercion, 47 which are precisely what XXX used to
overpower AAA.
AAA's Behavior After the Rape
Incidents, and Her Failure to
Timely Report the Abuse She
Experienced Do Not Destroy Her
Credibility
XXX cannot attack AAA's credibility by claiming that her
behavior and actuations after the rape incident are atypical of a
rape victim. To begin with, there is no such thing as a typical
reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims. The workings of
the human mind when placed under emotional stress is
unpredictable. Some victims may shout, some may faint, while
others may be shocked into insensibility. Not every victim can be
expected to act with reason or conformably with the usual
expectation of mankind. 48 Certainly, it is unfair to expect and
demand a rational reaction or a standard behavioral response from
AAA, who was confronted with such startling and traumatic
experience. Her failure to shout, or seek for help does not negate
rape. Neither shall her refusal to get angry at XXX or leave her
residence be taken against her. 
Furthermore, AAA's credibility is not affected by her delay in
reporting the rape incident.
In People v. Gersamio 49 and People v. Velasco, 50 the Court
emphasized that the victim's failure to report the rape to other
persons does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all
baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is
not an indication of a fabricated charge, 51 and does not necessarily
cast doubt on the credibility of the victim. 52 This especially holds
true if the victim faces the threat of physical
violence. 53 Unfortunately for the victim, pain and ignominy are
better than risking having the offender make good his threats of
retaliation. 54 In fact, "it is not uncommon for a young girl to be
intimidated and cowed into silence and conceal for some time the
violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat against her
life." 55 In AAA's case, she was cowed into silence by XXX, who
threatened to kill her family should she report the rape incident.
The Prosecution Sufficiently
Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt
that XXX is Guilty of Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610
Committed against BBB
Essentially, Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 states in no
uncertain terms that:
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse. 
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
To sustain a conviction under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610,
the prosecution must establish that: (i) the accused commits an act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (ii) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (iii) the child is below 18 years old. 56
Parenthetically, "'lascivious conduct' means the intentional
touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of
the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person." 57 cDHAES

Furthermore, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual

abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. 58
XXX's acts of inserting his hands inside BBB's t-shirt, mashing
her breasts, and caressing her legs to gratify his sexual desire,
undoubtedly fall under the definition of lascivious conduct under
Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7610.
XXX used his moral ascendancy over BBB, the daughter of his
common-law spouse, in order to perpetrate his lascivious conduct.
BBB lived with XXX during her formative years, and had always
regarded him as her father. Added to this, BBB was afraid of him
because he usually beat her and her family whenever he was in a
bad mood. 59
Finally, as established through BBB's testimony and birth
certificate, she was only 14 years old when XXX molested her. BBB
was born on September 11, 1992, 60 which makes her 14 years old
when she was molested on December 2, 2006.
The following exchange reveals BBB's harrowing experience:
Prosecutor Nonna Beltran:
Q: Miss Witness, do you recall where were you in the early
morning of December 2, 2006.
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Where were you?
A: I was then in the room sleeping.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you said you were sleeping, what happened?
 A: I was awakened when I felt the blanket was being pulled
away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After you were awakened, what happened next?
A: As I have said, after I was awakened, I saw [XXX] on my side
and I noticed that he inserted his hand under my shirt.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said that [XXX] inserted his hand inside your shirt. What
did he do?  TCAScE

A: He mashed my breast and legs.

Q: Both your two (2) breasts?
A: Yes, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you do, Miss Witness, during that time when [XXX]
was mashing your breasts?
A: I told him not to do that to me, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did [XXX] tell you?
A: [XXX] was angry and he said, "di mo ko pag orag-oragan."
Q: What did you feel when [XXX] uttered those words to you?
A: I felt afraid.
Q: When he said, "orag-oragan," what did [XXX] meant by that?
A: To my understanding, he might harm me, ma'am." 61
Against this factual backdrop, all that XXX offers are the weak
defenses of denial and alibi. In addition, he claims that BBB's
testimony is questionable, as she was uncertain on whether the
rape took place on December 2 or December 6.
These contentions fail to persuade. 
The defenses of denial and alibi are always viewed with
disfavor as they can easily be concocted. Besides, these defenses
easily falter against BBB's positive and categorical identification
of XXX as her defiler. 
Anent BBB's alleged uncertainty as to the precise date of the
sexual molestation, it bears stressing that the precise date and time
of the commission of the offense is not an essential element of
lascivious conduct. Regardless of whether the abuse took place on
December 2 or 6, is immaterial, considering that BBB was able to
prove that it in fact took place, and that she was 14 years old when
she was abused.
The Proper Penalty for Criminal
Case Nos. IR-7957 and IR-7958
for Rape
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the supreme penalty of death
shall be imposed against the accused if the victim of rape is below
18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. However, to justify the imposition of the death penalty, it is
essential that the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship are properly alleged in the Information and duly proven
during the trial. 62
The RTC convicted XXX of qualified rape, in view of the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship — XXXbeing
the common law spouse of AAA's mother. A perusal of the
Informations, however, reveal that what was alleged was
that XXX was the "stepfather" of AAA. Because of this, the Court
agrees with the CA that XXX may only be convicted of simple rape,
due to the absence of proof that he was in fact AAA's stepfather. It
does not help that the prosecution was able to establish
that XXX was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, as this
circumstance was not alleged in the Information.  cTDaEH

It cannot be gainsaid that the terms "stepfather" and

"common-law spouse" are two distinct terms that may not be used
interchangeably. In People v. Hermocilla, 63 the Court explained that
"a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by previous marriage,
while a stepfather is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a
marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken is the
offspring." 64 As such, the allegation that the victim is the
stepdaughter of the accused requires competent proof and should
not be easily accepted as factually true. The bare contention that
the accused was married to the victim's mother is not enough, in
the same manner that the victim's reference to the accused as her
stepfather will not suffice. 65 Remarkably, in People v. Abello, 66 the
Court stressed that the best evidence of such relationship will be the
marriage contract. This stricter requirement is only proper as
relationship is an aggravating circumstance that increases the
imposable penalty and hence must be proven by competent
evidence. 67
Notably, the cases of People v. Barcela, 68 and People v.
Salvador, 69 bear similar factual moorings with the instant case.
In Barcela, the Information stated that the accused was the
stepfather of the rape victim, but what was proven during the trial
was that the accused was merely the common-law spouse of the
victim's mother. The Court refused to apply the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, considering that the relationship
alleged in the information was different from that actually proven
during the trial. The Court held that a contrary ruling will run
counter to Barcela's right to be informed of the charge lodged
against him. 70
The same circumstances existed in the case of Salvador,
where the Information filed against therein accused-appellant
charged him with raping his stepdaughter, but a perusal of the
records showed that therein accused-appellant was only the
common-law husband of the victim's mother. In this case, the Court
stated that even if it was proven that therein accused-appellant was
indeed the common law spouse of the victim's mother, this cannot
be appreciated, since the information did not specifically allege it as
a qualifying circumstance. 71
Applying the foregoing, pronouncements to the instant case,
the qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot be used
against XXX. The allegation in the Information that he was AAA's
stepfather was not proven during the trial, and hence, shall not be
used against him. In the same vein, although the prosecution
proved that he was in fact CCC's common-law spouse, this too shall
not be appreciated against him, as this circumstance was not
specified in the Information. Accordingly, the CA correctly
downgraded the offense to simple rape for both Criminal Case Nos.
IR-7957 and IR-7958. 
The Proper Penalty for Criminal
Case No. IR-7893 for Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that the imposable
penalty for lascivious conduct 72 shall be reclusion temporal, in its
medium period, to reclusion perpetua. 73
 It must be noted that the RTC erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, as the Information for
Criminal Case No. IR-7893 failed to specifically allege the
relationship between XXX and BBB.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, XXX shall be
sentenced with a penalty consisting of a maximum term, which is
the penalty under the RPC properly imposed after considering any
attending circumstance, and a minimum term that is within the
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for
the offense committed. Accordingly, the CA correctly imposed the
penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
The damages awarded by the CA must be modified to conform
with the Court's recent pronouncement in the case of People v.
Tulagan. 74 XXX shall be liable for P50,000.00 civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 moral damages; and P50,000.00 exemplary damages. In
addition, XXX shall pay a fine of P15,000.00 as provided for in
Section 31 (f) of R.A. No. 7610 and as affirmed in People v. Ursua. 75
Finally, the CA correctly ordered the payment of interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum, which shall run from the date of
finality of this Decision until full satisfaction. 
cSaATC

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal

is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 25,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08224,
convicting accused-appellant XXX of Rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, Rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, is AFFIRMED
with modification, in that, in Criminal Case No. IR-7893 for
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No.
7610, XXX is declared liable to pay BBB P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, in addition to a fine of P15,000.00.
All amounts due shall earn a legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full
satisfaction.
All other aspects of the CA decision are affirmed. 
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 240441, [December 4, 2019])
 [G.R. No. 224212. November 27, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. ROMEO DE CASTRO DE GUZMAN, accuse
d-appellant.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J  : p

This is an appeal under Rule 124 1 of the Rules of

Court challenging the May 26, 2015 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06680, which affirmed with
modification the January 20, 2014 Joint Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Crim. Case Nos. 11-
0400 and 11-0540, finding accused-appellant
Romeo De Castro De Guzman (De Guzman) guilty of two counts of
Qualified Rape. HTcADC

The Antecedents
De Guzman appeals his conviction for two counts of qualified
rape. He denies the charges and argues that his guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In two separate Informations both dated May 11,
2011, De Guzman was charged with Qualified Rape in relation
to Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, the accusatory portions of which
read:
In Criminal Case No. 11-0400 (Qualified Rape in relation
to RA 7610):
That on or about the 9th day of May 2011, in the City of
Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge [of AAA], 4 a fifteen (15)
[-]year old minor, without her consent, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy over her, he being her step-parent, thereby
subjecting her to sexual abuse; the act complained of is
prejudicial to the physical, psychological and moral
 development of the said minor, and which degrades or
demeans her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
In Criminal Case No. 11-0540 (Qualified Rape in relation
to RA 7610):
That sometime in year 2003, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge [of AAA], an eight (8)[-]year old minor, without her
consent, by means of force, threat and intimidation, and by
taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over her, he being
her step-parent, thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse; the
act complained of is prejudicial to the physical, psychological
and moral development of the said minor, and which
degrades or demeans her intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
During his arraignment, De Guzman entered a plea of "not
guilty." 7
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: a)
jurisdiction of the court; b) identity of the accused; and c) the victim
was still a minor at the time of the alleged incidents. 8
The pertinent facts, as stated in the Appellee's Brief
(represented by the Office of the Solicitor General), are as follows:
AAA was born on January 20, 1996. After the separation
of her mother BBB 9 with her biological father, BBB cohabited
with appellant, who acted as his stepfather. Appellant also has
two (2) biological children with BBB.
Sometime in 2003, when AAA was only eight (8) years
old, appellant who was then at the small extension of their
house at x x x asked AAA to join him. At that time[,] BBB was
out of their house doing laundry. AAA's siblings were also
asleep.
AAA approached appellant who made her lie down on
the floor and removed her shorts and underwear. Appellant
then inserted his penis [into] AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but
did not shout because prior to this, appellant warned AAA
against reporting the incident to anyone, including her
mother. Appellant also told AAA not to make any noise. Out of
fear, AAA did not report the rape to her mother.
 AAA was repeatedly raped on separate occasions, which
she did not also report to her mother. In order to avoid
appellant, AAA often spent time with her friends outside of
their house. Meanwhile, AAA's mother did not appreciate this
so she shaved AAA's head. At this point, AAA also stopped
studying.
Thereafter, AAA transferred to the house of her aunt,
[CCC], 10 x x x where she continued her studies. While living
with her aunt [CCC] sometime in March 2011, she disclosed to
her aunt [CCC] that appellant raped her.
Another incident of rape occurred when AAA returned to
their new house x x x. On May 9, 2011, at around 2:00 p.m.,
appellant approached AAA while [she was sorting out] her
younger brothers' toys. He immediately removed AAA's shorts
and underwear, and instructed AAA to lie down on the floor.
Appellant then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA did
not shout because she was scared. No one was home at the
time of the said incident because AAA's mother was doing
laundry at her employer's house, while her brothers were
playing outside. 
aScITE

The following day, or on May 10, 2011, at around 11:00

a.m., AAA's aunt [DDD] 11 went to their house x x x when she
learned from [CCC] about what happened. Afterwards, [DDD]
brought AAA to her own house where she confronted AAA
regarding the sexual abuse committed by appellant. AAA then
confirmed that appellant indeed raped her.
Soon after, AAA and her aunt [DDD] went to her uncle
[EEE]. 12 They then proceeded to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) and to the Las Piñas Police
Station for purposes of reporting AAA's rape. 13 (Citations
omitted)
During trial, AAA's birth certificate 14 was presented which
revealed that she was only around seven years old (not yet eight
years old as indicated in the Information) when the first rape was
committed against her in 2003, as she was born on January 20,
1996. AAA was 15 years old when she was raped on May 9, 2011.
The prosecution likewise established that AAA submitted
herself to a medical examination wherein the attending medico-
legal officer found that she had both shallow and deep healed
hymenal lacerations, which confirmed that there was a prior blunt
force or penetrating trauma to the area. This was affirmed by the
Initial Medico-Legal Report 15 dated May 10, 2011 and the
subsequent Medico-Legal Report No. R11-748 16 dated May 13,
2011.
Police Chief Inspector Editha Martinez, who conducted the
medico-legal examination, affirmed the findings in the medico-legal
report during her testimony. She stated that a possible cause of the
lacerations would be any hard blunt object that penetrated the
hymen, which could include an erect penis. 17 On cross-
examination, though, she admitted that it was possible that the
trauma caused on the hymen could have been self-inflicted. 18
Significantly, AAA, during her testimony, affirmed
that De Guzman is her stepfather. 19 She also narrated
how DeGuzman took advantage of her during the 2003 incident, as
follows:
[Pros. Sylvia I. Butial]:
Can you tell the Court of any incident that transpired in
2003, inside your house x x x?
[AAA]:
My mother was not at home then. She was doing the
laundry and my siblings were then asleep when this
incident happened, Ma'am.
Q: Do you recall the [month] when this incident happened?
A: No more, Ma'am.
Q: What happened when your mother was not at home and
your siblings were then sleeping?
A: My stepfather who was then at the small extension of our
house called me, Ma'am. 
Q: Can you tell me the name of your stepfather?
A: Romeo De Castro De Guzman, Ma'am.
Q: What did you do when Romeo De Castro De Guzman called
you x x x?
A: I approached [him], Ma'am.
Q: What happened when you approached
Romeo De Castro De Guzman?
A: He made me lie down on the floor and removed my shorts
and panty, Ma'am.
Q: What happened after he removed your shorts and panty?
A: He inserted his penis [into] my vagina, Ma'am.
 Q: How did you feel when he did that to you?
A: It was painful, Ma'am.
Q: Did you shout when he did that to you?
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: Why did you not shout?
A: Because before he did that to me, he told me not to report to
my mother nor to anyone and not to make any noise,
Ma'am.
Q: What else did he tell you before he inserted his penis [into]
your vagina?
A: That's all, Ma'am.
Q: Did you tell your mother [about] what the accused did to
you?
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: Why not?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Because I was scared, Ma'am. 20
Likewise, AAA narrated what De Guzman did to her during the
May 9, 2011 incident, as follows:
[Pros. Sylvia I. Butial]:
Can you also tell the Court if there was any unusual
incident that transpired on May 9, 2011?
[AAA]:
Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What was that incident?
A: That same day, he again did the same thing he was doing to
me, Ma'am.  HEITAD

Q: Who is that person you are referring to?

A: Romeo De Guzman, Ma'am.
Q: Can you tell the Court what exactly did
Romeo De Guzman do to you?
A: He removed my shorts and my panty and he inserted his
penis [into] my vagina, Ma'am.
Q: How old were you then?
A: I was 15 years old, Ma'am. 21
 AAA stated that she was alone at the time and while she was
sorting the toys of her siblings, De Guzman approached her.
Thereafter, he immediately removed her shorts and panty and
instructed her to lie down on the floor. She did not do anything
because she did not know who to ask help from in case she had the
chance to do so. Moreover, she explained that she did not shout
because she was scared, and that she did not tell her mother about
what happened. After the harrowing experience, AAA stayed at her
cousin's house. Afterwards, AAA's aunt, DDD, asked AAA about the
rape incidents. AAA then relayed to DDD that De Guzman raped her.
In turn, DDD told her brother EEE about what happened to AAA.
Together, they brought AAA to the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) to report the crime. 22
On cross-examination, AAA averred that her brothers were
sleeping when the 2003 incident occurred. She likewise revealed
that she had earlier told her aunt CCC about what De Guzman did to
her. 23
AAA further narrated that in April 2010, her mother sent her to
stay with her aunt CCC. AAA explained that at the time, she would
usually go out with her friends to avoid staying at home
with De Guzman. Unaware of the reasons for such display of
attitude, she caught the ire of her mother causing the latter to
shave her head and to force her to discontinue her studies. 24 Even
so, AAA revealed that she was terrified to tell her mother about the
rape incidents because she feared that her mother would only scold
her and not support her. She likewise claimed that there were other
rape incidents. 25
DDD, BBB's sister and AAA's aunt, testified that she asked for
the transfer of custody of AAA to the DSWD-Marillac Hills because
BBB was trying to convince AAA to desist from pursuing the case. 26
The defense presented De Guzman as its lone
witness. De Guzman denied the accusations against him. He alleged
that AAA was a problematic child and even joined a gang so much
so that her mother shaved her head. Due to this, DeGuzman and
BBB sent AAA to live with her aunt CCC in Montalban. He likewise
claimed that AAA was angry at him because he always scolds her,
especially since AAA was seeing her boyfriend. He claimed that
AAA's aunts, the ones who helped AAA file the case, were averse to
him. He reiterated that there was no truth in the allegations. 27
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
 In a Joint Decision 28 dated January 20, 2014, the RTC ruled
that the victim's testimony established the existence of the
elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. It found that AAA's
testimony positively and categorically demonstrated
that De Guzman succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. It
added that in an incestuous rape of a minor, there is no need to
prove employment of actual force or intimidation since the
overpowering moral influence of the father (supposedly in this case,
stepfather) would suffice. The trial court further held that AAA's
accusations cannot be dismissed and treated as a mere concoction
since a child of such a young age who willingly underwent medical
examination and the rigors of a public trial to seek justice cannot be
deemed as someone who was merely making up the accusations.
The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship. The RTC noted that AAA was only eight years old
during the 2003 rape incident and 15 years old during the 2011
rape incident. Moreover, the RTC held that the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, i.e., that De Guzman was the victim's
stepparent, was established by the admission
of De Guzman himself. 29 Meanwhile, De Guzman's denial and claim
that the victim's aunts harbored anger towards him were not
considered by the trial court, his denial being self-serving and
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the
victim. Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Joint Decision
reads: 
ATICcS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered, finding accused
ROMEO DE CASTRO DEGUZMAN, GUILTY as
charged in Criminal Case Nos. 11-0400 and 11-0540,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, for each case, and to pay the private complainant
AAA, the amount[s] of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P75,000.00), as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 30
Aggrieved, De Guzman appealed 31 before the Court of
Appeals and assigned this sole error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED DESPITE
 THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 32
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its assailed May 26, 2015 Decision, 33 likewise held

that the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender concurred and raised the offense to
qualified rape. It likewise found the testimonies of AAA and the
other prosecution witnesses to be more credible. Additionally, it
accorded great weight to the findings of fact of the trial
court. 34 Hence, the appellate court affirmed the RTC's ruling
finding De Guzman guilty of two counts of qualified rape with
modification on the award of exemplary damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the RTC Joint Decision dated January 20,
2014 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of
exemplary damages, which should be reduced from FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 35
Discontented, De Guzman appealed 36 his case before Us.
Thus, the main issue is whether or not he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Qualified Rape.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
De Guzman argues that since AAA's testimony was unnatural,
inconsistent and unconvincing, her credibility was doubtful. He
contends that it should not be assumed that AAA's hymenal
lacerations resulted from rape incidents as these may have been
caused by something else. Moreover, even if the lacerations were
caused by forcible sexual intercourse, it does not automatically
mean that De Guzman was the perpetrator considering that she has
a boyfriend. Finally, De Guzmanvehemently denies the charges
against him. 37
The People counters that De Guzman exercised moral
ascendancy over AAA as he assumed parental authority over her
during her formative years. Hence, actual force or intimidation need
not be employed when the influence of De Guzmanover her already
suffices. Moreover, due to AAA's minority at the time of the
commission of the felonies, the trial court correctly qualified the
offense of rape pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of
the RPC. 38 Moreover, it insists that De Guzman's defense of denial
was inherently weak and could not prevail over AAA's positive
testimony, which was supported by the medico-legal report and the
testimony of the examining physician. It emphasizes that the trial
court correctly ruled that her testimony deserved merit, as it was in
the best position to assess the deportment of the witnesses during
trial. This is notwithstanding the alleged inconsistencies in her
testimony, which even erased the suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony and manifested her innocence and spontaneity in relating
her story despite the rigors of a public trial. It likewise argues that
AAA's failure to physically resist should not be construed against her
credibility as it did not negate the commission of rape against her
especially when intimidated and instilled with fear by the
offender. 39
Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the RPC reads as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape
is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
xxx xxx xxx 40 (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, Rape under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. However,
rape is considered qualified and the death penalty shall be imposed
—
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim[.] 
TIADCc
 Relevantly, the elements of qualified rape are: "(1) sexual
congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent;
(4) the victim is under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the
rape; and (5) the offender is [either] a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted), [ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent] of the victim." 41 The minority of
the victim and his or her relationship with the offender
should both be alleged in the Information and proven beyond
reasonable doubt during trial in order to qualify the rape charge as
these circumstances have the effect of altering the nature of the
rape and its corresponding penalty. Otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed upon the offender. 42
In this case, AAA's minority was properly alleged and
indisputably proven during trial. She was below 18 years old at the
time the crimes were committed against her. Moreover, it was
proven by evidence that De Guzman forced AAA into engaging in
sexual congress by using threats and intimidation and without her
consent, in addition to his moral ascendancy over her.
Corollarily, it was alleged in the Informations
that De Guzman was AAA's "stepfather." A "stepfather" is the
"husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to
that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. It presupposes a
legitimate relationship between the appellant and the victim's
mother." 43
However, during trial, the prosecution failed to establish this
stepparent-stepdaughter relationship between DeGuzman and AAA.
No proof of marriage was presented in order to
establish De Guzman's legal relationship with BBB. In other
words, De Guzman cannot be considered as the stepfather of AAA
as alleged in the Informations. On the contrary, records show
that De Guzman was actually the common-law spouse of BBB as he
was not legally married to her. Since DeGuzman's relationship with
AAA as alleged in the Informations was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, De Guzmancannot be convicted of Qualified
Rape, only Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape. Stated
differently, "the crime is only simple rape, although the State
successfully proves the common-law relationship, where the
information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of
relationship between the accused and the female. This is because
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is inviolable." 44
According to People v. Begino, 45 the "qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the
same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if not
pleaded. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and consequently, a denial of
due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of
its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged
in the indictment on which he was arraigned." 46 Since the
qualifying circumstance of relationship was not properly pleaded
and proved in the case at bench, De Guzman should only be
convicted of Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC.
To reiterate, AAA was below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the crimes against her. The evidence showed
that De Guzman had carnal knowledge of the victim on two
occasions by using threats and intimidation and his moral
ascendancy over her. Upon assessment, the manner by which AAA
narrated the commission of the felonies, which was corroborated by
the medico-legal officer, confirmed that De Guzman was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Statutory Rape in Crim. Case
No. 11-0540 and Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 11-0400. Indeed,
"[i]t is settled that when a rape victim's account is straightforward
and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, the testimony is sufficient to support a
conviction." 47 Definitely, AAA's positive and categorical testimony
prevails over DeGuzman's self-serving denial without sufficient
proof, as well as his attempt to cast doubt upon the motives of
AAA's aunts to pursue the case. 48 This Court has consistently
emphasized that "'a young girl's revelation that she had been raped,
coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and
willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily
dismissed as mere concoction.'" 49 AIDSTE

Based on Our evaluation, the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses should be accorded great weight since the trial court
found the said testimonies more convincing as these corroborated
each other on material points. Absent any indication that the trial
 court committed errors in its appreciation of the evidence, We see
no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court
that De Guzman had carnal knowledge of AAA on two instances, as
charged in the Informations. 50
In conclusion, the Court finds accused-
appellant De Guzman guilty of simple statutory rape in Crim. Case
No. 11-0540 and Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 11-0400 under
paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of
the RPC as amended by RA No. 8353. In Crim. Case No. 11-0400,
AAA was 15 years old when the rape occurred while in Crim. Case
No. 11-0540, she was below 12 years old. To
stress, De Guzman cannot be held liable for qualified rape since the
prosecution failed to properly designate in the Informations
that De Guzman is actually BBB's common-law husband (which was
proven during the trial) and not AAA's stepfather.
Nevertheless, De Guzman should still suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape. 51 Also, the
awards for damages should be modified to conform to recent
jurisprudence. Thus, the proper amount of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages should all be increased to
PhP75,000.00 each for both offenses. 52 Furthermore, the monetary
awards should be subject to the interest rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of the Decision until fully paid. 53
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
May 26, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
06680 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that accused-
appellant Romeo De Castro De Guzman is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Statutory Rape in Crim. Case No. 11-
0540 and Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 11-0400 and is thus
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
offense. Moreover, the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages shall be increased to PhP75,000.00 each
for every offense. Lastly, all amounts due shall earn legal interest of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this
Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 224212, [November 27, 2019])
 [G.R. No. 229677. October 2, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. XXX, accused-appellant.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J  : p

The commission of rape offends social fabric. It is an affront to

human dignity and if tolerated or dealt with leniency, even
encourages criminality. No court of law should take an accusation of
rape lightly; at the same time, however, it has the duty to protect
the Constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
unless proven otherwise. When a woman cries rape, the Court is
bound to balance the natural inclination to commiserate with the
victim, with logic and legal precepts. In doing so, the Court reviews
the allegations in its entirety, probing for consistency, sufficiency,
and credibility of evidence vis-à-vis the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until otherwise proven. For the Court is
beholden, at all times, to safeguard the social fabric and human
dignity without compromising fundamental legal rights.  HTcADC

The Case
This appeal assails the Decision 1 dated September 27, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06208
entitled People of the Philippines v. XXX, affirming appellant's
conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
The Charges

Appellant XXX was charged with rape in two (2) separate

Informations, viz.:
Criminal Case No. C-6350
That on or about the 17th day of October 2000, at
around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay
_____________, City of Calapan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire, by means of force
 and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie,
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA, * against
her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to R.A. 7659 & 8353. 2
Criminal Case No. C-6358
That on or about the 17th day of October 2000, at
around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, at
Barangay ______________, City of Calapan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire, by means
of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the AAA,
against her will and without her consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to R.A. 7659 & 8353. 3
The cases were raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 40,
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the trial,
the prosecution presented complainant AAA, her mother BBB, her
sister CCC, and Dr. Angelita C. Legaspi. On the other hand, the
defense presented appellant and his neighbor DDD. 
The Prosecution's Version

AAA ** testified that she first met appellant sometime in

February 2000, in a restaurant in Calapan City where she used to
work. On October 9, 2000, they crossed paths again in an appliance
store where she had assumed another job. Appellant inquired if they
were selling low-cost appliances. During their conversation, he
asked if she was looking for an apartment because he had a spare
room for rent. She told him to return the next day because she
needed to inform her sister first.
On October 13, 2000, appellant came back and asked her if
she had decided to rent the room he offered. She agreed to transfer
to appellant's room although they did not agree on the rental rate
yet. 4 On even date, she moved to appellant's two-storey apartment
in Calapan City. The room which appellant rented out to her was
located at the second floor next to appellant's room.
On October 16, 2000, she went to her sister's house because
her parents were there. She informed her parents she was renting a
room in appellant's apartment. On that same night, she went back
to appellant's apartment together with her parents. She introduced
them to appellant, who invited them to sleep in his room. Appellant
made the offer because her room was still in disarray and she was
only sleeping in a folding bed. They talked about the apartment and
a firearm which appellant showed her father. Appellant and her
father had some drinks up to 10 o'clock in the evening. Around
thirty (30) minutes later, she and her mother decided to sleep
ahead in appellant's room. 5
Around 6 o'clock the following morning, October 17, 2000, she
and her mother got up. Her parents left around 7 o'clock in the
morning. By 9 o'clock, appellant asked her to fix the bedding in his
room to which she obliged. While she was fixing the bedding,
however, he suddenly barged, closed the door, and held her
shoulders. She tried to wrestle away but appellant covered her nose
with his hand which emitted an odor that made her weak and
dizzy. 6 
aScITE

She felt him laying her down and removing her short pants and
undergarments. Appellant then mounted her, held her body, thrust
his penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions. She tried to
resist but every push and pull was painful. After satisfying his lust,
appellant put on his clothes and left. She weakly put on her clothes,
sat on the edge of the bed, and cried. She tried to escape but the
door was locked from the outside. 7
Around 2 o'clock of the same day, appellant came back and
poked a firearm on her. He forced her to lie down, removed her
clothes, and lowered his pants down to his knees. She tried to kick
him but his full weight weakened her. Again, he inserted his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. He held her
breast and kissed her neck. After the act, he warned her not to tell
anyone. He left and locked the door again. 8
She was locked inside the room the whole night. The next day,
October 18, 2000, around 8 o'clock in the morning, her mother BBB
was able to unlock the door and take her home. Still gripped with
fear, she was unable to talk to her mother about the incident. It was
only the following day, October 19, 2000, when she was able to
muster the courage to confide the incidents to her mother. 9
On October 20, 2000, she and BBB together went to the
Victoria Municipal Police Station where they reported the rape
incidents. But the police officers advised them instead to proceed to
Calapan City Police Station. So they went back home and found
appellant waiting for her there. He asked her hand in marriage but
she rejected his proposal. On October 23, 2000, they reported the
incidents, this time, to the Calapan City Police Station. 10
BBB testified that on October 16, 2000, she and her husband
went to Calapan City to visit AAA in her new apartment. They
arrived there around 7 o'clock in the evening. Appellant invited
them to sleep over. She had a short conversation with appellant.
When she later felt sleepy, she asked her daughter if she could take
a rest already. She and her daughter slept ahead of appellant and
her husband who were still drinking at that time. The following day,
October 17, 2000, she woke up around 6:30 in the morning, and left
together with her husband thirty (30) minutes later.
On October 18, 2000, while resting at home, her husband told
her about his gut feel that their daughter might be in danger. She
then rushed to the apartment and found that AAA was not in her
room. She knocked on appellant's room around three (3) times,
after which, appellant opened the door. She asked for her daughter.
Appellant told her AAA was inside. She went inside and opened the
door leading to an inner room. There, she saw her daughter looking
frightened. She told her to pack her things because they were going
home. 11
At home, AAA complained her stomach was aching so they
went to a quack doctor. After the treatment, they returned home.
AAA then confided to her about the rape incidents. The following
day, on October 20, 2000, they went to the Victoria Municipal Police
Station to report the rape incidents but they were instructed to
report them instead to the Calapan City Police Station. They went
home and found appellant there. He proposed marriage to AAA but
the latter rejected his proposal. On October 23, 2000, they reported
the rape incidents to the Calapan City Police Station. 12
CCC testified that appellant went to their house on October 20,
2000 and proposed marriage to AAA, but AAA refused his proposal.
She also testified that AAA forewarned her against believing
appellant should he claim they were sweethearts. 13
Dr. Angelita C. Legaspi, the Rural Health Physician of Calapan
City Health and Sanitation Department testified that based on her
examination of AAA, the latter sustained old healed complete
hymenal lacerations at 7 and 12 o'clock positions and old healed
partial lacerations at 4 o'clock position. These lacerations could
have been caused by penetration, insertion of a hardened penis,
trauma, any hard object, or by accident. She concluded that AAA
may have had sexual experience in the past. 14
The prosecution offered the following exhibits: 1) Sworn
Statement of AAA; 2) Sworn Statement of BBB; and 3) Medical
Certificate of AAA. 15
The Defense's Version

Appellant testified that he first met AAA sometime in February

2000 in a restaurant at Victoria, Oriental Mindoro. In May 2000, he
met AAA the second time in the same place. On September 30,
2000, he went to an appliance store to look for low-cost appliances.
There, he chanced upon AAA who then worked as sales lady in that
store. They had a short conversation during which he courted her.
Before the day ended, they were already a couple. He told her he
was renting an apartment and gave her his address. Thereafter,
AAA, together with a mutual friend visited his apartment. 16
On October 13, 2000, AAA started sleeping in his rented
apartment. They made love twice during her stay there. After their
first sexual intercourse AAA gave him a personal note written on a
Jollibee table napkin where she wrote "Pa, Napakaswerte mong
lalake ikaw ang nakauna sa akin. Love, _____." On October 18, 2000,
before she left the apartment, she instructed him to retrieve her
undergarments from the clothesline and put them in his bag. 17
On October 19, 2000, he went to AAA's house and proposed
marriage to her. He was not able to personally propose to AAA since
she was in her room. It was her mother who met and talked to him
in their living room. The latter informed him that AAA rejected his
proposal. Dismayed, he yelled "Pag di ka pumayag, di na ako
babalik." Knowing that AAA was madly in love with him, he left her
money and a ring worth P3,000.00. 18
He denied having drugged and raped AAA. It was unlikely that
the so-called rape incidents took place inside his apartment because
there were other people in the area. In fact, his room and his drug
testing clinic manned by four (4) people were both on the same
floor. 19 It was his earlier statement "Pag di ka pumayag, di na ako
babalik" 20 which caused AAA to file the rape cases against him. 
HEITAD

On cross, he clarified that during the pendency of the case,

AAA's family offered to withdraw the charges against him in
exchange for P150,000.00, allegedly to help out a relative in need.
But knowing he is innocent, he refused the offer. 21
DDD, the carinderia owner on the first floor of appellant's
apartment, testified that AAA and appellant were sweethearts.
Whenever she delivered food to appellant's room, they were
oftentimes lying in the bed side by side, watching television while
caressing each other. She also saw them go to the market every
afternoon. Appellant usually laid his arms around AAA's shoulders.
One day, when AAA came to her carinderia, she asked her if
she had a relationship with appellant. AAA confirmed to her that she
and appellant in fact had a relationship. AAA revealed that appellant
courted her for two (2) weeks until they became sweethearts. 22
The defense offered the following exhibits: 1) A 2 x 2 picture
with love note and signature of AAA on the dorsal side, it
reads: "This picture is for you so keep this as a simple remembrance
from me, AAA;" 2) Jollibee table napkin with inscription and
signature of AAA; 3) AAA's undergarments and blouse; and 4)
Photos of the apartment. 23
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Joint Decision dated November 24, 2011, 24 the trial court
found appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape, viz.:
For all that have been said, this Court finds that the
constitutional presumption of herein accused XXX has been
overcome by his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
ACCORDINGLY, finding herein accused XXX guilty by
direct participation of two (2) counts of Rape punishable
under Article 266-A (a) of the Revised Penal Code, said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWO (2)
RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties as
provided by law. The accused is hereby directed to indemnify
the private complainant [AAA] the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for each count of Rape as civil
indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for each
count of Rape as moral and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 25
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
 On appeal, appellant asserted that he and AAA were actually
lovers and their sexual congress was consensual. He also pointed
out the multiple irreconcilable inconsistencies in AAA's testimony. 26
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) essentially countered:
(1) other than appellant's bare allegations, he failed to support his
sweetheart theory; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding AAA's
testimony on how appellant had sexually abused her was clear and
straightforward. 27
The Court of Appeal's Ruling
By Decision dated September 27, 2016, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in the main but modified the award of damages. It ruled
that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of rape, including the use of force or intimidation. This,
despite appellant's stance that AAA's testimony was replete with
unexplained and material inconsistencies and improbabilities. Its
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the Appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision, rendered by Branch
40 of the Regional Trial Court in the City of Calapan on 24
November 2011 convicting [accused-appellant] for two (2)
counts of rape in Crim. Case Nos. C-6350 and C-6358,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to damages.
Consistent with the ruling in People v. Frias, accused-
appellant is directed to indemnify private complainant with
the following amounts: PhP50,000.00 for each count of rape
as moral damages, PhP50,000.00 for each count of rape as
civil indemnity, and PhP30,000.00 for each count of rape as
justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public
example or correction for the public good.
SO ORDERED. 28
The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and
prays anew for his acquittal.
In compliance with Resolution dated April 17, 2017, 29 both the
OSG and appellant manifested 30 that, in lieu of supplemental briefs,
they were adopting their respective briefs before the Court of
Appeals.
Issue
 Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellant's conviction
for rape?
Ruling
We acquit.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review. 31 Thus, the Court may review the circumstances of this
case to determine if AAA was raped through force or intimidation as
opposed to appellant's assertion that their sexual congress was
consensual because they were in fact sweethearts. In fine, the Court
is confronted with one crucial question: which between the two
opposing factual narrations is more credible? 
Rape is defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, 32 viz.:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape
is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 266-A (1) (a), rape requires the following
elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) the offender accomplished such act through force, threat, or
intimidation. 33
Appellant does not deny the fact that he had carnal knowledge
of AAA twice. He maintains though that when these happened, AAA
was his girlfriend and they both consented to it. We now focus on
whether force or intimidation was employed by appellant as means
by which he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the
accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 34 We,
therefore, scrutinize AAA's testimony, viz.:
On Direct-examination:
Q: Now eventually, Miss Witness, were you able to rent that
house which was offered you by accused XXX?
A: When he returned on October 13, 2000, XXX again offered
his house, sir.
Q: And what did you do after XXX again offered to you his
house?
A: I agreed to rent the house.
Q: And eventually you were able to rent that house?
A: No, sir, because XXX did not right away tell me how
much is the rental of the house, sir.  ETHIDa

Q: And were you able to transfer to that house offered

by the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when did you transfer to that house offered to
you by the accused?
A: On the night of October 13, 2000, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, aside from you, who were the other persons, if
any, occupying the second floor?
A: XXX's brother, a student and myself, sir.
Q: How about XXX, where was he staying at that time?
A: Also in that house, sir. 35
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And who talked about your stay in the same house?
A: My parents and XXX, sir.
Q: And what were they talking about relative to your stay in
that house?
A: Aside from talking about my stay in the house, XXX showed
to my father a gun since my father was at that time
looking for a gun, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Aside from talking about your stay in that house and later on
about the gun which was shown by the accused to your
father. What more did the accused and your father do, if
any?
A: My father and XXX had a drinking spree, sir.
Q: And up to what time did they had a drinking spree? Up to
what hour?
A: Until almost ten o'clock in the evening sir.
Q: Now during that particular night, Miss Witness, what time did
you go to sleep?
A: 10:30 in the evening, sir.
Q: And where did you go to sleep?
A: In the room of XXX together with my mother, sir. 36
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, after your parents left to go home to Victoria, what
happened, if any?
A: When my parents left that morning, XXX requested me to fix
the cover of his bed in his room and that was around nine
o'clock in the morning. 37
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, when XXX requested you to fix the beddings inside his
room, what did you do, if any?
A: I fixed his beddings and thereafter, XXX entered the room
and closed its door, sir. 38
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said that while you were fixing the beddings inside
the room of accused XXX, he entered the room and
closed the door. Now, after that, what happened, if any?
A: He held me by my two shoulders and so, I struggled and I
also smelled something from his hand, sir.
Q: When were you able to smell something on his hand?
A: When he placed his hand on my nose, I felt dizzy after that.
Q: After the accused placed his hand on your nose and you
smelled something and you felt dizzy, what happened
next?
A: He laid me down on the bed and I felt that the accused
started removing my short and panty, sir.
Q: Now, while accused was removing your short and panty,
what did you do, if any?
A: I could not do anything. I could not even shout. I felt weak at
that time and I noticed that he always placed his hand on
my mouth.
Q: Now, you said that he removed your short and panty. Now,
was he able to remove your short and panty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After removing your short and panty, what did he do, if any?
A: I felt that the accused place himself on top of me and he
inserted his sexual organ into my sexual organ. 39
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Why did you not go out of the room?
A: Because he locked me inside that room, sir.
Q: And how did you know that you were locked inside that
room?
A: Because I tried to open the room but I failed to do so, sir.
COURT:
Q: What was the lock of the door? A door knob?
A: I can no longer remember, Your Honor. 40  cSEDTC

xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the incident, what happened?
A: He again raped me at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
the (sic) that same day, sir.
Q: By the way, in the first incident, what time was that?
A: More or less 9:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.
Q: After the first incident at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning
up to the time of the second incident that happened at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, where did you stay?
A: I was inside the bedroom, sir.
Q: Why did you not leave that room?
A: I heard that the accused lock(ed) the door of that bedroom
then I tried to open the same, but I could not do so, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: On the second incident you said that the accused tried to
insert his penis into your vagina. How did you know it was
the penis of the accused that was inserted into your
vagina during the second time?
A: Because I saw what he was doing to me for the second time,
sir.
Q: You mean to say that you saw the actual penetration of the
penis of the accused into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And after he raped you what happened next?
A: After that second incident, the accused warned me not to tell
to (sic) anybody, sir.
Q: And after that he left the room and left you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you not immediately (go) out of the room after the
second incident?
A: Because the accused was poking a gun at me, sir. 41
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the first incident at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning
up [t]o the time of the second incident that happened at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, where did you stay?
A: I was inside the bedroom, sir. 
Q: Why did you not leave the room?
A: I heard that the accused locked the door of that
bedroom then I [t]ried to open the same, but I
could not do so, sir.
Q: What kind of lock was placed on that door?
A: I can't remember anymore, sir. 42
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At the time that XXX was doing that to you during the
[s]econd time, was the door closed?
A: I can't remember anymore, sir.
 Q: You can't remember anymore, but definitely, do you
agree with [m]e that the door was not closed,
because there was no lock on it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You will agree with me that here was no lock in the
room outside that door?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that time that the accused was molesting you
for the first and second time, people might see you
because there was no lock inside?
A: Yes, sir. 43
xxx xxx xxx
On Sur-rebuttal:  SDAaTC

Q: Did you ever go to the comfort room that evening?

A: I did not.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: There were people outside the house in the neighborhood?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: There is a window in that room where you slept in
that evening of October 17, 2000?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That window is open? You can open that window? Is it
not?
A: Yes, sir. 44 (Emphases supplied)
We find AAA's testimony to be replete with material
inconsistencies and improbabilities. She testified she was locked
inside the room although on cross, she backtracked and said the
room was not locked. In fact, she admitted she could not even
remember whether the door had a lock at all. Granting the room
was locked from the outside, she neither knocked nor shouted for
help. Too, AAA confirmed that the windows in appellant's room were
open; thus, she could have easily asked for help
from people outside. But she did not. More, AAA did not testify that
she was denied the capacity to move or even shout while she was
left alone in appellant's room. For sure, AAA had the opportunity to
call for help and a chance to escape. But she did nothing.
 More, when AAA was allegedly rescued by her mother, she
never disclosed to her about the supposed rape incidents. It was so
unnatural for a rape victim who claimed to have been detained
overnight by her rapist not to have immediately if not spontaneously
uttered a single word to her mother right after she got rescued.
The time-honored test in determining the value of the
testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge,
observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is
repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and
experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial
cognizance. Consistently, the Court has ruled that evidence to be
believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself as to hurdle the test of
conformity with the knowledge and common experience of
mankind. 45 Here, AAA's testimony is by itself highly incredible not
only for being replete with material inconsistencies but also for
being contrary to the common experience of man and the natural
course of things.
It was not only AAA's testimony which burrowed holes on her
charges against appellant, her mother BBB's testimony as well. The
latter gave a markedly different version of how she was able to
rescue her daughter: 
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Upon arriving at the boarding house of [AAA] on that day,
the eighteenth day of October 2000, what happened, if
any?
A: I knocked at the door of XXX's boarding house for more or
less three times before accused opened the door, sir.
Q: After the accused opened the door for you, what did you do?
A: I asked him where my daughter [AAA] was, sir.
Q: What was the answer of XXX to your query as to the
whereabouts of your daughter?
A: XXX told me that [AAA] was in the room, sir.
Q: What happened after that, Madam Witness?
A: When I opened the door, I saw my daughter in the room
of XXX, sir. 46
As it was, BBB's testimony sharply contradicted AAA's
testimony that she was locked inside her room and appellant freed
her only when her mother came. BBB revealed she was the one who
opened the door of the room where AAA claimed she was locked in.
In fact, it was appellant who let BBB in, led her to the room, and
freely allowed her and AAA to leave. Surely, the individual
testimonies of AAA and BBB lead to these indubitable conclusion:
AAA was not detained and as between AAA and her mother, only
one was telling the truth, the other one was lying.
What is more baffling was, after the supposed rape incidents,
appellant went to AAA's house to propose marriage to her on
October 20, 2000. He was allowed to enter the house without BBB
showing any sign of anger toward him. AAA's sister CCC testified,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Since you were very near two (2) meters according to you,
from your mother and XXX, you could have seen other
persons if XXX had other companions?
A: It was the accused XXX whom I saw entered the house.
Q: In what part of the house where he talked with your mother?
A: In the sala.
COURT:
Q: The accused was able to enter your house?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Your mother was talking to XXX who was seated in
the sala of your house?
A: I know that he was seated at that time. 47
CCC likewise revealed that AAA had apparently anticipated
appellant's visit after AAA left his apartment. In fact, AAA even
forewarned her not to believe appellant if he ever told her they were
romantically involved, viz.:  acEHCD

xxx xxx xxx
On Direct-Examination:
PROS. SEÑOREN:
Q: You said that XXX was claiming to be the sweetheart
of your sister [AAA], how did you know that?
A: When my sister [AAA] and I had a conversation, my
sister told me that the accused XXX would tell that
they were sweethearts.
Q: What more did your sister tell you?
 A: My sister [AAA] told me or warned me not to
believe XXX because my sister [AAA] was threatened
by XXX. 48
xxx xxx xxx
On Cross-Examination:
Q: You testified that while you were conversing with [AAA], she
told you that XXX will tell your mother that she is his
girlfriend, did I get you correct on that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did she tell you when XXX has not yet arrived in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, [AAA] anticipated that XXX will be coming to
your house on that date October 20, 2000?
A: I did not know.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You thought that AAA knew that on that day, XXX would go
to your house and propose marriage to your sister [AAA]?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: But you know that your sister [AAA] has been staying in the
house of the accused XXX before October 20, 2000?
A: Yes, sir. 49
We further consider the following uncontroverted
evidence, viz.: 1) a 2x2 picture from AAA with her handwritten
note: "This picture is for you so keep this as a simple remembrance
from me, [AAA];" 50 2) AAA's message written on a Jollibee table
napkin: "Pa, Napakaswerte mong lalake ikaw ang nakauna sa akin.
Love, [AAA];" 51 and 3) appellant even left an engagement ring and
cash with BBB to be given to AAA. 52  EcTCAD

DDD, an impartial witness, testified that in many instances she

witnessed on her own the sweet romantic gestures of appellant and
AAA toward each other, thus:
On Direct-Examination:
Q: So Madam Witness, where was [AAA] living at that time?
A: We do not know where [AAA] was living at that time but I
just saw her upstairs where XXX was occupying whenever
I delivered food for them at that time, sir.
Q: How many times have you seen [AAA] in the place of XXX?
A: We used to see her in XXX's place everytime I delivered
food, sir. 53
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Everytime that you were delivering food at the apartment of
the accused and according to you, you used to see the
private complainant, was the private complainant with
companions?
A: [AAA] had no companion at that time, I just used to see them
while lying down while watching TV program, Your Honor.
Q: Who was lying down at that time?
A: The private complainant and the accused watched TV
program, Your Honor.
Q: In what place they were lying?
A: They were lying in a room with the door open, Your Honor.
Q: What was the position when you saw them lying?
A: They were just lying down while caressing with each other,
Your Honor.
Q: They were lying beside each other?
A: They were happily lying down and they were laughing at the
program they were watching, Your Honor. 54
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, Madam Witness, how many times have you seen
the accused and XXX, inside the apartment rented by the
accused?
A: Almost everyday, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: According to you, the accused and the private complainant
were sweethearts, aside from the fact that you saw them
lying side by side while watching TV program, every night
that you were bringing food that the accused ordered
from, what else did you see wherein which you presumed
that they were sweethearts? 
A: There were times that I saw [AAA] hanging clothes at XXX's
apartment, Your Honor.
Q: And she was hanging her own clothes?
A: [AAA] was hanging not only her clothes but also
accused XXX's clothes and there were times, they resort
to have their clothes washed by somebody else, Your
Honor. 55
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Aside (for) seeing them in a room, do you know of any
activity done by the two together?
A: They were both doing the marketing every afternoon, sir.
Q: When they go to the market every afternoon, how did they
go to the market?
A: Both of them were buying fruits and I observed that the
accused's arm was placed at the shoulders of the private
complainant and they were laughing at each other, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How did you come to know that the name [AAA] is [AAA]?
A: When XXX saw me, he stood up and introduced to me [AAA]
as the girl he would soon be marrying and the girl was his
sweetheart, sir. 56
xxx xxx xxx
On Cross-Examination:
COURT:
Q: Do you entertain in your mind at that time that the private
complainant and the accused were sweethearts?
A: They were sweethearts, You Honor, because I had the
chance to ask her.
Q: When was the time that you asked the private complainant
as to whether she and the accused were sweethearts?
A: One time [AAA] bought from my carinderia, sir.
Q: And you inquired from the private complainant as to whether
she and the accused were sweethearts what was the
reply of the private complainant?
A: That she was courted for barely two (2) weeks and they
became sweethearts, Your Honor.
Q: And how about the accused, did you confirmed (sic) that
from him?
A: One time when she (sic) delivered food to the accused I saw
him and the private complainant watching television and
they were happy watching the program and that I asked
 the accused who was the private complainant and he told
me that the private complainant will be his future wife,
Your Honor. 57 HSAcaE

Notably, the prosecution failed to refute these exculpatory

pieces of evidence including the credible testimony of DDD, an
impartial witness. The prosecution's deafening silence to react
toward these vital pieces of evidence speaks volumes of the
weakness of the charges against appellant.
Time and again, we have ruled that the existence of a
romantic relationship between two (2) persons does not discount
the commission of rape for it can be committed by one spouse
against the other. But here, AAA's credibility is seriously being put in
question vis-à-vis the testimony of her mother BBB, her sister CCC,
and DDD, an impartial witness together with her two (2) handwritten
messages to appellant — plainly indicating she was not honest after
all about the rape charges she initiated against appellant.
In light of the foregoing considerations, appellant's defense of
consensual sexual intercourse was likely to be true than not.
A final word. When a witness is untruthful, any other statement
that he or she utters becomes doubtful. For that matter, where the
doubt hinges on the guilt or innocence of the accused, the Court is
compelled to acquit and uphold the Constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. So must it be.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 27, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
06208 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered, ACQUITTING XXX of two (2) counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. C-6350 and C-6358.
The Court ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City to immediately release XXX unless he is being
detained for some other cause; and to submit his
compliance report within five (5) days from notice. Let entry
of judgment immediately issue.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 229677, [October 2, 2019])
 [G.R. No. 229677. October 2, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. XXX, accused-appellant.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J  : p

The commission of rape offends social fabric. It is an affront to

human dignity and if tolerated or dealt with leniency, even
encourages criminality. No court of law should take an accusation of
rape lightly; at the same time, however, it has the duty to protect
the Constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
unless proven otherwise. When a woman cries rape, the Court is
bound to balance the natural inclination to commiserate with the
victim, with logic and legal precepts. In doing so, the Court reviews
the allegations in its entirety, probing for consistency, sufficiency,
and credibility of evidence vis-à-vis the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until otherwise proven. For the Court is
beholden, at all times, to safeguard the social fabric and human
dignity without compromising fundamental legal rights.  HTcADC

The Case
This appeal assails the Decision 1 dated September 27, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06208
entitled People of the Philippines v. XXX, affirming appellant's
conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
The Charges

Appellant XXX was charged with rape in two (2) separate

Informations, viz.:
Criminal Case No. C-6350
That on or about the 17th day of October 2000, at
around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay
_____________, City of Calapan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire, by means of force
 and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie,
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA, * against
her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to R.A. 7659 & 8353. 2
Criminal Case No. C-6358
That on or about the 17th day of October 2000, at
around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, at
Barangay ______________, City of Calapan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire, by means
of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the AAA,
against her will and without her consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to R.A. 7659 & 8353. 3
The cases were raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 40,
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the trial,
the prosecution presented complainant AAA, her mother BBB, her
sister CCC, and Dr. Angelita C. Legaspi. On the other hand, the
defense presented appellant and his neighbor DDD. 
The Prosecution's Version

AAA ** testified that she first met appellant sometime in

February 2000, in a restaurant in Calapan City where she used to
work. On October 9, 2000, they crossed paths again in an appliance
store where she had assumed another job. Appellant inquired if they
were selling low-cost appliances. During their conversation, he
asked if she was looking for an apartment because he had a spare
room for rent. She told him to return the next day because she
needed to inform her sister first.
On October 13, 2000, appellant came back and asked her if
she had decided to rent the room he offered. She agreed to transfer
to appellant's room although they did not agree on the rental rate
yet. 4 On even date, she moved to appellant's two-storey apartment
in Calapan City. The room which appellant rented out to her was
located at the second floor next to appellant's room.
On October 16, 2000, she went to her sister's house because
her parents were there. She informed her parents she was renting a
room in appellant's apartment. On that same night, she went back
to appellant's apartment together with her parents. She introduced
them to appellant, who invited them to sleep in his room. Appellant
made the offer because her room was still in disarray and she was
only sleeping in a folding bed. They talked about the apartment and
a firearm which appellant showed her father. Appellant and her
father had some drinks up to 10 o'clock in the evening. Around
thirty (30) minutes later, she and her mother decided to sleep
ahead in appellant's room. 5
Around 6 o'clock the following morning, October 17, 2000, she
and her mother got up. Her parents left around 7 o'clock in the
morning. By 9 o'clock, appellant asked her to fix the bedding in his
room to which she obliged. While she was fixing the bedding,
however, he suddenly barged, closed the door, and held her
shoulders. She tried to wrestle away but appellant covered her nose
with his hand which emitted an odor that made her weak and
dizzy. 6 
aScITE

She felt him laying her down and removing her short pants and
undergarments. Appellant then mounted her, held her body, thrust
his penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions. She tried to
resist but every push and pull was painful. After satisfying his lust,
appellant put on his clothes and left. She weakly put on her clothes,
sat on the edge of the bed, and cried. She tried to escape but the
door was locked from the outside. 7
Around 2 o'clock of the same day, appellant came back and
poked a firearm on her. He forced her to lie down, removed her
clothes, and lowered his pants down to his knees. She tried to kick
him but his full weight weakened her. Again, he inserted his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. He held her
breast and kissed her neck. After the act, he warned her not to tell
anyone. He left and locked the door again. 8
She was locked inside the room the whole night. The next day,
October 18, 2000, around 8 o'clock in the morning, her mother BBB
was able to unlock the door and take her home. Still gripped with
fear, she was unable to talk to her mother about the incident. It was
only the following day, October 19, 2000, when she was able to
muster the courage to confide the incidents to her mother. 9
On October 20, 2000, she and BBB together went to the
Victoria Municipal Police Station where they reported the rape
incidents. But the police officers advised them instead to proceed to
Calapan City Police Station. So they went back home and found
appellant waiting for her there. He asked her hand in marriage but
she rejected his proposal. On October 23, 2000, they reported the
incidents, this time, to the Calapan City Police Station. 10
BBB testified that on October 16, 2000, she and her husband
went to Calapan City to visit AAA in her new apartment. They
arrived there around 7 o'clock in the evening. Appellant invited
them to sleep over. She had a short conversation with appellant.
When she later felt sleepy, she asked her daughter if she could take
a rest already. She and her daughter slept ahead of appellant and
her husband who were still drinking at that time. The following day,
October 17, 2000, she woke up around 6:30 in the morning, and left
together with her husband thirty (30) minutes later.
On October 18, 2000, while resting at home, her husband told
her about his gut feel that their daughter might be in danger. She
then rushed to the apartment and found that AAA was not in her
room. She knocked on appellant's room around three (3) times,
after which, appellant opened the door. She asked for her daughter.
Appellant told her AAA was inside. She went inside and opened the
door leading to an inner room. There, she saw her daughter looking
frightened. She told her to pack her things because they were going
home. 11
At home, AAA complained her stomach was aching so they
went to a quack doctor. After the treatment, they returned home.
AAA then confided to her about the rape incidents. The following
day, on October 20, 2000, they went to the Victoria Municipal Police
Station to report the rape incidents but they were instructed to
report them instead to the Calapan City Police Station. They went
home and found appellant there. He proposed marriage to AAA but
the latter rejected his proposal. On October 23, 2000, they reported
the rape incidents to the Calapan City Police Station. 12
CCC testified that appellant went to their house on October 20,
2000 and proposed marriage to AAA, but AAA refused his proposal.
She also testified that AAA forewarned her against believing
appellant should he claim they were sweethearts. 13
Dr. Angelita C. Legaspi, the Rural Health Physician of Calapan
City Health and Sanitation Department testified that based on her
examination of AAA, the latter sustained old healed complete
hymenal lacerations at 7 and 12 o'clock positions and old healed
partial lacerations at 4 o'clock position. These lacerations could
have been caused by penetration, insertion of a hardened penis,
trauma, any hard object, or by accident. She concluded that AAA
may have had sexual experience in the past. 14
The prosecution offered the following exhibits: 1) Sworn
Statement of AAA; 2) Sworn Statement of BBB; and 3) Medical
Certificate of AAA. 15
The Defense's Version

Appellant testified that he first met AAA sometime in February

2000 in a restaurant at Victoria, Oriental Mindoro. In May 2000, he
met AAA the second time in the same place. On September 30,
2000, he went to an appliance store to look for low-cost appliances.
There, he chanced upon AAA who then worked as sales lady in that
store. They had a short conversation during which he courted her.
Before the day ended, they were already a couple. He told her he
was renting an apartment and gave her his address. Thereafter,
AAA, together with a mutual friend visited his apartment. 16
On October 13, 2000, AAA started sleeping in his rented
apartment. They made love twice during her stay there. After their
first sexual intercourse AAA gave him a personal note written on a
Jollibee table napkin where she wrote "Pa, Napakaswerte mong
lalake ikaw ang nakauna sa akin. Love, _____." On October 18, 2000,
before she left the apartment, she instructed him to retrieve her
undergarments from the clothesline and put them in his bag. 17
On October 19, 2000, he went to AAA's house and proposed
marriage to her. He was not able to personally propose to AAA since
she was in her room. It was her mother who met and talked to him
in their living room. The latter informed him that AAA rejected his
proposal. Dismayed, he yelled "Pag di ka pumayag, di na ako
babalik." Knowing that AAA was madly in love with him, he left her
money and a ring worth P3,000.00. 18
He denied having drugged and raped AAA. It was unlikely that
the so-called rape incidents took place inside his apartment because
there were other people in the area. In fact, his room and his drug
testing clinic manned by four (4) people were both on the same
floor. 19 It was his earlier statement "Pag di ka pumayag, di na ako
babalik" 20 which caused AAA to file the rape cases against him. 
HEITAD

On cross, he clarified that during the pendency of the case,

AAA's family offered to withdraw the charges against him in
exchange for P150,000.00, allegedly to help out a relative in need.
But knowing he is innocent, he refused the offer. 21
DDD, the carinderia owner on the first floor of appellant's
apartment, testified that AAA and appellant were sweethearts.
Whenever she delivered food to appellant's room, they were
oftentimes lying in the bed side by side, watching television while
caressing each other. She also saw them go to the market every
afternoon. Appellant usually laid his arms around AAA's shoulders.
One day, when AAA came to her carinderia, she asked her if
she had a relationship with appellant. AAA confirmed to her that she
and appellant in fact had a relationship. AAA revealed that appellant
courted her for two (2) weeks until they became sweethearts. 22
The defense offered the following exhibits: 1) A 2 x 2 picture
with love note and signature of AAA on the dorsal side, it
reads: "This picture is for you so keep this as a simple remembrance
from me, AAA;" 2) Jollibee table napkin with inscription and
signature of AAA; 3) AAA's undergarments and blouse; and 4)
Photos of the apartment. 23
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Joint Decision dated November 24, 2011, 24 the trial court
found appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape, viz.:
For all that have been said, this Court finds that the
constitutional presumption of herein accused XXX has been
overcome by his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
ACCORDINGLY, finding herein accused XXX guilty by
direct participation of two (2) counts of Rape punishable
under Article 266-A (a) of the Revised Penal Code, said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWO (2)
RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties as
provided by law. The accused is hereby directed to indemnify
the private complainant [AAA] the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for each count of Rape as civil
indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for each
count of Rape as moral and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 25
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
 On appeal, appellant asserted that he and AAA were actually
lovers and their sexual congress was consensual. He also pointed
out the multiple irreconcilable inconsistencies in AAA's testimony. 26
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) essentially countered:
(1) other than appellant's bare allegations, he failed to support his
sweetheart theory; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding AAA's
testimony on how appellant had sexually abused her was clear and
straightforward. 27
The Court of Appeal's Ruling
By Decision dated September 27, 2016, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in the main but modified the award of damages. It ruled
that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of rape, including the use of force or intimidation. This,
despite appellant's stance that AAA's testimony was replete with
unexplained and material inconsistencies and improbabilities. Its
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the Appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision, rendered by Branch
40 of the Regional Trial Court in the City of Calapan on 24
November 2011 convicting [accused-appellant] for two (2)
counts of rape in Crim. Case Nos. C-6350 and C-6358,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to damages.
Consistent with the ruling in People v. Frias, accused-
appellant is directed to indemnify private complainant with
the following amounts: PhP50,000.00 for each count of rape
as moral damages, PhP50,000.00 for each count of rape as
civil indemnity, and PhP30,000.00 for each count of rape as
justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public
example or correction for the public good.
SO ORDERED. 28
The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and
prays anew for his acquittal.
In compliance with Resolution dated April 17, 2017, 29 both the
OSG and appellant manifested 30 that, in lieu of supplemental briefs,
they were adopting their respective briefs before the Court of
Appeals.
Issue
 Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellant's conviction
for rape?
Ruling
We acquit.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review. 31 Thus, the Court may review the circumstances of this
case to determine if AAA was raped through force or intimidation as
opposed to appellant's assertion that their sexual congress was
consensual because they were in fact sweethearts. In fine, the Court
is confronted with one crucial question: which between the two
opposing factual narrations is more credible? 
Rape is defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, 32 viz.:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape
is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 266-A (1) (a), rape requires the following
elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) the offender accomplished such act through force, threat, or
intimidation. 33
Appellant does not deny the fact that he had carnal knowledge
of AAA twice. He maintains though that when these happened, AAA
was his girlfriend and they both consented to it. We now focus on
whether force or intimidation was employed by appellant as means
by which he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the
accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 34 We,
therefore, scrutinize AAA's testimony, viz.:
On Direct-examination:
Q: Now eventually, Miss Witness, were you able to rent that
house which was offered you by accused XXX?
A: When he returned on October 13, 2000, XXX again offered
his house, sir.
Q: And what did you do after XXX again offered to you his
house?
A: I agreed to rent the house.
Q: And eventually you were able to rent that house?
A: No, sir, because XXX did not right away tell me how
much is the rental of the house, sir.  ETHIDa

Q: And were you able to transfer to that house offered

by the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when did you transfer to that house offered to
you by the accused?
A: On the night of October 13, 2000, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, aside from you, who were the other persons, if
any, occupying the second floor?
A: XXX's brother, a student and myself, sir.
Q: How about XXX, where was he staying at that time?
A: Also in that house, sir. 35
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And who talked about your stay in the same house?
A: My parents and XXX, sir.
Q: And what were they talking about relative to your stay in
that house?
A: Aside from talking about my stay in the house, XXX showed
to my father a gun since my father was at that time
looking for a gun, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Aside from talking about your stay in that house and later on
about the gun which was shown by the accused to your
father. What more did the accused and your father do, if
any?
A: My father and XXX had a drinking spree, sir.
Q: And up to what time did they had a drinking spree? Up to
what hour?
A: Until almost ten o'clock in the evening sir.
Q: Now during that particular night, Miss Witness, what time did
you go to sleep?
A: 10:30 in the evening, sir.
Q: And where did you go to sleep?
A: In the room of XXX together with my mother, sir. 36
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, after your parents left to go home to Victoria, what
happened, if any?
A: When my parents left that morning, XXX requested me to fix
the cover of his bed in his room and that was around nine
o'clock in the morning. 37
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, when XXX requested you to fix the beddings inside his
room, what did you do, if any?
A: I fixed his beddings and thereafter, XXX entered the room
and closed its door, sir. 38
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said that while you were fixing the beddings inside
the room of accused XXX, he entered the room and
closed the door. Now, after that, what happened, if any?
A: He held me by my two shoulders and so, I struggled and I
also smelled something from his hand, sir.
Q: When were you able to smell something on his hand?
A: When he placed his hand on my nose, I felt dizzy after that.
Q: After the accused placed his hand on your nose and you
smelled something and you felt dizzy, what happened
next?
A: He laid me down on the bed and I felt that the accused
started removing my short and panty, sir.
Q: Now, while accused was removing your short and panty,
what did you do, if any?
A: I could not do anything. I could not even shout. I felt weak at
that time and I noticed that he always placed his hand on
my mouth.
Q: Now, you said that he removed your short and panty. Now,
was he able to remove your short and panty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After removing your short and panty, what did he do, if any?
A: I felt that the accused place himself on top of me and he
inserted his sexual organ into my sexual organ. 39
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Why did you not go out of the room?
A: Because he locked me inside that room, sir.
Q: And how did you know that you were locked inside that
room?
A: Because I tried to open the room but I failed to do so, sir.
COURT:
Q: What was the lock of the door? A door knob?
A: I can no longer remember, Your Honor. 40  cSEDTC

xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the incident, what happened?
A: He again raped me at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
the (sic) that same day, sir.
Q: By the way, in the first incident, what time was that?
A: More or less 9:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.
Q: After the first incident at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning
up to the time of the second incident that happened at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, where did you stay?
A: I was inside the bedroom, sir.
Q: Why did you not leave that room?
A: I heard that the accused lock(ed) the door of that bedroom
then I tried to open the same, but I could not do so, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: On the second incident you said that the accused tried to
insert his penis into your vagina. How did you know it was
the penis of the accused that was inserted into your
vagina during the second time?
A: Because I saw what he was doing to me for the second time,
sir.
Q: You mean to say that you saw the actual penetration of the
penis of the accused into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And after he raped you what happened next?
A: After that second incident, the accused warned me not to tell
to (sic) anybody, sir.
Q: And after that he left the room and left you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you not immediately (go) out of the room after the
second incident?
A: Because the accused was poking a gun at me, sir. 41
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the first incident at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning
up [t]o the time of the second incident that happened at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, where did you stay?
A: I was inside the bedroom, sir. 
Q: Why did you not leave the room?
A: I heard that the accused locked the door of that
bedroom then I [t]ried to open the same, but I
could not do so, sir.
Q: What kind of lock was placed on that door?
A: I can't remember anymore, sir. 42
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At the time that XXX was doing that to you during the
[s]econd time, was the door closed?
A: I can't remember anymore, sir.
 Q: You can't remember anymore, but definitely, do you
agree with [m]e that the door was not closed,
because there was no lock on it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You will agree with me that here was no lock in the
room outside that door?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that time that the accused was molesting you
for the first and second time, people might see you
because there was no lock inside?
A: Yes, sir. 43
xxx xxx xxx
On Sur-rebuttal:  SDAaTC

Q: Did you ever go to the comfort room that evening?

A: I did not.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: There were people outside the house in the neighborhood?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: There is a window in that room where you slept in
that evening of October 17, 2000?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That window is open? You can open that window? Is it
not?
A: Yes, sir. 44 (Emphases supplied)
We find AAA's testimony to be replete with material
inconsistencies and improbabilities. She testified she was locked
inside the room although on cross, she backtracked and said the
room was not locked. In fact, she admitted she could not even
remember whether the door had a lock at all. Granting the room
was locked from the outside, she neither knocked nor shouted for
help. Too, AAA confirmed that the windows in appellant's room were
open; thus, she could have easily asked for help
from people outside. But she did not. More, AAA did not testify that
she was denied the capacity to move or even shout while she was
left alone in appellant's room. For sure, AAA had the opportunity to
call for help and a chance to escape. But she did nothing.
 More, when AAA was allegedly rescued by her mother, she
never disclosed to her about the supposed rape incidents. It was so
unnatural for a rape victim who claimed to have been detained
overnight by her rapist not to have immediately if not spontaneously
uttered a single word to her mother right after she got rescued.
The time-honored test in determining the value of the
testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge,
observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is
repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and
experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial
cognizance. Consistently, the Court has ruled that evidence to be
believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself as to hurdle the test of
conformity with the knowledge and common experience of
mankind. 45 Here, AAA's testimony is by itself highly incredible not
only for being replete with material inconsistencies but also for
being contrary to the common experience of man and the natural
course of things.
It was not only AAA's testimony which burrowed holes on her
charges against appellant, her mother BBB's testimony as well. The
latter gave a markedly different version of how she was able to
rescue her daughter: 
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Upon arriving at the boarding house of [AAA] on that day,
the eighteenth day of October 2000, what happened, if
any?
A: I knocked at the door of XXX's boarding house for more or
less three times before accused opened the door, sir.
Q: After the accused opened the door for you, what did you do?
A: I asked him where my daughter [AAA] was, sir.
Q: What was the answer of XXX to your query as to the
whereabouts of your daughter?
A: XXX told me that [AAA] was in the room, sir.
Q: What happened after that, Madam Witness?
A: When I opened the door, I saw my daughter in the room
of XXX, sir. 46
As it was, BBB's testimony sharply contradicted AAA's
testimony that she was locked inside her room and appellant freed
her only when her mother came. BBB revealed she was the one who
opened the door of the room where AAA claimed she was locked in.
In fact, it was appellant who let BBB in, led her to the room, and
freely allowed her and AAA to leave. Surely, the individual
testimonies of AAA and BBB lead to these indubitable conclusion:
AAA was not detained and as between AAA and her mother, only
one was telling the truth, the other one was lying.
What is more baffling was, after the supposed rape incidents,
appellant went to AAA's house to propose marriage to her on
October 20, 2000. He was allowed to enter the house without BBB
showing any sign of anger toward him. AAA's sister CCC testified,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Since you were very near two (2) meters according to you,
from your mother and XXX, you could have seen other
persons if XXX had other companions?
A: It was the accused XXX whom I saw entered the house.
Q: In what part of the house where he talked with your mother?
A: In the sala.
COURT:
Q: The accused was able to enter your house?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Your mother was talking to XXX who was seated in
the sala of your house?
A: I know that he was seated at that time. 47
CCC likewise revealed that AAA had apparently anticipated
appellant's visit after AAA left his apartment. In fact, AAA even
forewarned her not to believe appellant if he ever told her they were
romantically involved, viz.:  acEHCD

xxx xxx xxx
On Direct-Examination:
PROS. SEÑOREN:
Q: You said that XXX was claiming to be the sweetheart
of your sister [AAA], how did you know that?
A: When my sister [AAA] and I had a conversation, my
sister told me that the accused XXX would tell that
they were sweethearts.
Q: What more did your sister tell you?
 A: My sister [AAA] told me or warned me not to
believe XXX because my sister [AAA] was threatened
by XXX. 48
xxx xxx xxx
On Cross-Examination:
Q: You testified that while you were conversing with [AAA], she
told you that XXX will tell your mother that she is his
girlfriend, did I get you correct on that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did she tell you when XXX has not yet arrived in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, [AAA] anticipated that XXX will be coming to
your house on that date October 20, 2000?
A: I did not know.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You thought that AAA knew that on that day, XXX would go
to your house and propose marriage to your sister [AAA]?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: But you know that your sister [AAA] has been staying in the
house of the accused XXX before October 20, 2000?
A: Yes, sir. 49
We further consider the following uncontroverted
evidence, viz.: 1) a 2x2 picture from AAA with her handwritten
note: "This picture is for you so keep this as a simple remembrance
from me, [AAA];" 50 2) AAA's message written on a Jollibee table
napkin: "Pa, Napakaswerte mong lalake ikaw ang nakauna sa akin.
Love, [AAA];" 51 and 3) appellant even left an engagement ring and
cash with BBB to be given to AAA. 52  EcTCAD

DDD, an impartial witness, testified that in many instances she

witnessed on her own the sweet romantic gestures of appellant and
AAA toward each other, thus:
On Direct-Examination:
Q: So Madam Witness, where was [AAA] living at that time?
A: We do not know where [AAA] was living at that time but I
just saw her upstairs where XXX was occupying whenever
I delivered food for them at that time, sir.
Q: How many times have you seen [AAA] in the place of XXX?
A: We used to see her in XXX's place everytime I delivered
food, sir. 53
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Everytime that you were delivering food at the apartment of
the accused and according to you, you used to see the
private complainant, was the private complainant with
companions?
A: [AAA] had no companion at that time, I just used to see them
while lying down while watching TV program, Your Honor.
Q: Who was lying down at that time?
A: The private complainant and the accused watched TV
program, Your Honor.
Q: In what place they were lying?
A: They were lying in a room with the door open, Your Honor.
Q: What was the position when you saw them lying?
A: They were just lying down while caressing with each other,
Your Honor.
Q: They were lying beside each other?
A: They were happily lying down and they were laughing at the
program they were watching, Your Honor. 54
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, Madam Witness, how many times have you seen
the accused and XXX, inside the apartment rented by the
accused?
A: Almost everyday, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: According to you, the accused and the private complainant
were sweethearts, aside from the fact that you saw them
lying side by side while watching TV program, every night
that you were bringing food that the accused ordered
from, what else did you see wherein which you presumed
that they were sweethearts? 
A: There were times that I saw [AAA] hanging clothes at XXX's
apartment, Your Honor.
Q: And she was hanging her own clothes?
A: [AAA] was hanging not only her clothes but also
accused XXX's clothes and there were times, they resort
to have their clothes washed by somebody else, Your
Honor. 55
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Aside (for) seeing them in a room, do you know of any
activity done by the two together?
A: They were both doing the marketing every afternoon, sir.
Q: When they go to the market every afternoon, how did they
go to the market?
A: Both of them were buying fruits and I observed that the
accused's arm was placed at the shoulders of the private
complainant and they were laughing at each other, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How did you come to know that the name [AAA] is [AAA]?
A: When XXX saw me, he stood up and introduced to me [AAA]
as the girl he would soon be marrying and the girl was his
sweetheart, sir. 56
xxx xxx xxx
On Cross-Examination:
COURT:
Q: Do you entertain in your mind at that time that the private
complainant and the accused were sweethearts?
A: They were sweethearts, You Honor, because I had the
chance to ask her.
Q: When was the time that you asked the private complainant
as to whether she and the accused were sweethearts?
A: One time [AAA] bought from my carinderia, sir.
Q: And you inquired from the private complainant as to whether
she and the accused were sweethearts what was the
reply of the private complainant?
A: That she was courted for barely two (2) weeks and they
became sweethearts, Your Honor.
Q: And how about the accused, did you confirmed (sic) that
from him?
A: One time when she (sic) delivered food to the accused I saw
him and the private complainant watching television and
they were happy watching the program and that I asked
 the accused who was the private complainant and he told
me that the private complainant will be his future wife,
Your Honor. 57 HSAcaE

Notably, the prosecution failed to refute these exculpatory

pieces of evidence including the credible testimony of DDD, an
impartial witness. The prosecution's deafening silence to react
toward these vital pieces of evidence speaks volumes of the
weakness of the charges against appellant.
Time and again, we have ruled that the existence of a
romantic relationship between two (2) persons does not discount
the commission of rape for it can be committed by one spouse
against the other. But here, AAA's credibility is seriously being put in
question vis-à-vis the testimony of her mother BBB, her sister CCC,
and DDD, an impartial witness together with her two (2) handwritten
messages to appellant — plainly indicating she was not honest after
all about the rape charges she initiated against appellant.
In light of the foregoing considerations, appellant's defense of
consensual sexual intercourse was likely to be true than not.
A final word. When a witness is untruthful, any other statement
that he or she utters becomes doubtful. For that matter, where the
doubt hinges on the guilt or innocence of the accused, the Court is
compelled to acquit and uphold the Constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. So must it be.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 27, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
06208 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered, ACQUITTING XXX of two (2) counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. C-6350 and C-6358.
The Court ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City to immediately release XXX unless he is being
detained for some other cause; and to submit his
compliance report within five (5) days from notice. Let entry
of judgment immediately issue.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 229677, [October 2, 2019])
 [G.R. No. 229084. October 2, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLLYBERT OROPESA y
DOE, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J  :
p

The Case
This appeal assails the 21 July 2016 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07328 affirming with modifications
the 19 January 2015 Joint Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 57, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, which found appellant
Rollybert Oropesa y Doe 3 (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 
The Facts
Appellant and co-accused Honeyval Latonero y Doe (Latonero)
were charged with two counts of rape in two separate Informations
which read:
Criminal Case No. L-2058
That on or about February 12, 1998[,] at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening[,] [in the] Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping one another, with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, did[,] then and there[,]
willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously, took turn[s], one after
the other[,] in having carnal knowledge with AAA, then 17
years of age and being the sister-in-law of accused Rolly
Bert Oropesa y Doe, against her will and to her damage and
prejudice.
Criminal Case No. L-2059
That on or about February 12, 1998[,] at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening[,] [in the] Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
 mutually helping one another, with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, did[,] then and there[,]
willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously, took turn[s], one after
the other[,] in having carnal knowledge with AAA, then 17
years of age and being the sister-in-law of accused Rolly
Bert Oropesa y Doe, against her will and to her damage and
prejudice. 4
In an Order dated 2 September 1998, the Regional Trial Court
of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 57, issued a warrant of arrest
against appellant and Latonero. However, the arrest warrant was
returned unserved since appellant and Latonero could not be found.
As a result, the cases were archived on 23 June 1999.
On 12 August 2002, Latonero was arrested by the Philippine
National Police in Sipocot, Camarines Sur. The trial court ordered the
revival of the cases, and arraigned Latonero who pleaded not
guilty. 
On 1 October 2002, the trial court dismissed the cases against
Latonero after AAA 5 executed an Affidavit of Desistance dated 4
September 2002. In her Affidavit of Assistance, AAA stated that she
was no longer interested in further prosecuting the case because at
the time that she filed the cases, she was simply overwhelmed with
emotions and she was not able to reflect the consequences or legal
effects of the filing of the cases. 6 AAA also stated that she no longer
wanted to be reminded of the past and wanted to live peacefully
with her family free from any scandalous circumstances. 7
Meanwhile, appellant was arrested on 7 January 2010. He was
arraigned on 1 February 2010 and pleaded not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
AAA and Dr. Francia Aquino, the Rural Health Physician of Rural
Health Unit, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, who examined AAA. The
defense presented the testimonies of appellant, Latonero, and
Roger Oropesa (Roger), appellant's father.
The prosecution's version of the events, as narrated by the
Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On February 12, 1998, AAA, then seventeen (17) years
old and a high school student, left her parents' house without
their knowledge, in order to avoid her brother-in-law, the
Accused-Appellant, who already took sexual advantage of her
in December 1997. AAA decided to go to Manila with some
classmates/friends. However, at around 10:00 p.m., while AAA
and her friends were on their way to the railroad track at
Barangay Manangle, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, they met the
Accused-Appellant and his "compadre," Latonero. AAA's
friends then left her alone.
The Accused-Appellant went to AAA, held her by the
arm and, together with Latonero, brought her inside an
empty kubo located near the road. There, the Accused-
Appellant removed AAA's skirt uniform and underwear, laid
her on the grassy ground, and pressed her left thigh. The
Accused-Appellant then mounted AAA and inserted his penis
inside AAA's vagina while Latonero held and raised AAA's
hands parallel to her head. The Accused-Appellant then let
Latonero take his turn in having carnal knowledge of AAA,
telling him (Latonero), "Sige na padi gamiton mo na yan to
akong bahala sa imo." AAA asked for help from the Accused-
Appellant but the latter merely laughed at her. At the time of
the incident, the Accused-Appellant poked a pair of scissors at
AAA's side and threatened to kill her parents if she said
anything to them about what happened.
Thereafter, AAA, the Accused-Appellant, and Latonero
put on their clothes. The Accused-Appellant then brought AAA
to his parents' house in Barangay Tara, Sipocot, Camarines
Sur, where they stayed until dawn. AAA left when her brother
came to fetch her there. 
When she revealed to her parents that the Accused-
Appellant and Latonero raped her, AAA underwent medical
examination on February 23, 1998.
Dr. Aquino, the Rural Health Physician of Sipocot,
Camarines Sur, found "normal looking external genitalia, with
scanty pubic hair, with recently healed hymenal laceration at
9 o'clock position. According to Dr. Aquino, the finding of a
healed hymenal laceration is consistent with sexual
intercourse but the date of which could not be ascertained. 8
The version of the defense is as follows:
The Accused-Appellant denied the charges against him
and stated that AAA was only used by BBB, his mother-in-law
and AAA's mother, in filing the complaint because he did not
like him as a son-in-law and she wanted him to separate from
his wife and AAA's sister, CCC. He testified that on the date
and time of the alleged incident, he did not meet Latonero
because he was in his parents' house at Barangay Tara,
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, parents, siblings, and
 two (2) children. He added that the cases against Latonero
were dismissed because the latter gave Twenty Thousand
Pesos (PhP20,000.00) to AAA's family who asked for money to
settle the same. For his part, he did not give money to AAA's
family since he did not commit the offense charged against
him. He testified further that Barangay Tara and Barangay
Manangle are only two (2) Barangays apart.
Latonero corroborated the Accused-Appellant's
testimony and confirmed that his parents gave money to
AAA's family because they wanted to settle the case amicably
though Latonero was innocent of the offense charged. He
testified that he knew both the Accused-appellant and AAA
but he was not with them on the date and time of the alleged
incident. He explained that he did not immediately submit
himself to the authorities but left Barangay Manangle because
he feared that he would be incarcerated despite his
innocence.
Roger, the Accused-Appellant's father, testified that his
son was charged because his balae, BBB, was angry at the
Accused-Appellant since he and CCC stayed in Barangay Tara
instead of Barangay Manangle where BBB wanted them to
live. He further testified that BBB wanted the Accused-
Appellant and CCC to separate. He claimed that AAA's family
asked Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) to settle the case
but he did not give in to the demand. He, however, admitted
on cross-examination that he had no knowledge as to how the
charges against his son transpired. 9
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 19 January 2015, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment
convicting appellant for one count of rape. The dispositive portion of
the Joint Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court finds
accused ROLLYBERT OROPESA y Doe GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. L-
2058 and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and the
further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages. The prosecution not being able to prove the guilt of
accused in Criminal Case No. L-2059 as in fact no evidence
was presented relative to the latter case, said case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED and accused is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
 SO ORDERED. 10
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision dated 21 July 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed
appellant's conviction for rape. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed RTC
Decision dated January 19, 2015 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that the award of civil indemnity from Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) is increased to One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PhP100,000.00) and the award of moral
damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) is increased
to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP100,000.00). The
Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay exemplary damages to
the victim AAA in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(PhP100,000.00). All damages shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 11
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals
found that all the elements of rape, as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are present in
this case. Appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA and appellant
employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. The Court
of Appeals rejected the defense's claim that there was no resistance
and no involuntariness on the part of AAA when the alleged rape
took place. The Court of Appeals likewise disagreed with the
defense that AAA's testimony was "riddled with inconsistencies."
The Court of Appeals found appellant's denial and alibi as weak and
self-serving. Further, the Court of Appeals found incredible
appellant's attribution of ill motive against AAA and her family. In
addition, according to the Court of Appeals, the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by AAA in favor of Latonero was executed "not
because he did not rape her but because she was merely hasty in
deciding to drop the case against him." 12 The Court of Appeals also
pointed out that appellant's flight indicated his guilt for the crime
charged. 
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape, as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
 The Ruling of this Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Elements of Rape
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the
elements of rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is
committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
In this case, the prosecution accuses appellant of raping AAA.
AAA was 17 years old when the alleged rape happened. There was
no allegation that AAA was deprived of reason or was unconscious.
Therefore, the prosecution must establish that appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA through force, threat, or intimidation.
In People v. Tionloc, 13 the Court emphasized that the element
of force, threat or intimidation must be established to convict the
accused of rape, thus:
x x x. "In rape cases alleged to have been committed by
force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the
prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on
the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution
must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed
by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so
is fatal to its cause."
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to
consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind. On
the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
something would happen to her at that moment or even
thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports
 the incident. "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear
caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol." 
Aside from examining the presence of all the elements of the
crime charged, the Court is guided by the following principles in
reviewing rape cases, thus:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but
to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused
may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the
private complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 14
No force, threat, or intimidation
In this case, there is no evidence to prove that appellant used
force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress with AAA.
The trial court noted that AAA testified that on the date and
time of the alleged rape incident, she was leaving home without
asking permission from her parents, because she wanted to avoid
appellant's threats. 15 Yet, despite these supposed threats, "AAA
went with accused voluntarily in going to the hut where the
incident complained of happened." 16 AAA's alleged reason was that
"[s]he thought accused would not do it to her again." 17 In fact, AAA
testified that she did not ask appellant where they were going that
fateful night because she trusted him. 18
In convicting appellant despite the lack of force, threat or
intimidation, the Court of Appeals explained that "[AAA] went with
accused voluntarily [because] she thought that accused would not
do it to her again." 19 The Court of Appeals merely speculated on
AAA's reason for going with appellant voluntarily. The Court of
Appeals stated that AAA "could have been afraid of
accused." 20 There is nothing in AAA's testimony which even
remotely hints of AAA's fear of appellant.
The prosecution pointed out that "[i]n a prosecution for rape,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things, as in this case." 21
 On the contrary, the testimony of AAA is incredible,
unconvincing, and inconsistent with human nature and the normal
course of things. If indeed AAA planned to leave home and run away
due to appellant's alleged threats, it is inexplicable why AAA went
voluntarily with appellant. At the time of the incident, AAA was with
her friends, whom she could have asked for help or whom she could
simply have continued to accompany, and she could have easily
evaded appellant and Latonero. Instead, when AAA and her friends
were allegedly about to go to the railroad track and saw appellant
and Latonero, she and her friends separated ways and AAA went
with appellant and Latonero. Further, during cross-examination, AAA
had no answer when asked that despite the fact that she had
previous sexual contact with appellant, she went with him
voluntarily because she trusted him, to wit: 
ATTY. ABOGADO:
   I will say my question again. Was that the first time that you
had sexual contact voluntarily or involuntarily?
COURT:
Answer.
A: No, sir.
Q: What do you mean by no, sir?
A: He did that to me for several times already but I cannot tell it
to my parents, sir.
Q: For several times already before the incident of February 12,
1998, is that what you mean?
A: I cannot really remember, sir.
Q: You had previous sexual contact with the accused you said a
while ago and yet a while ago also you told us that you
went with him voluntarily because [you] trust him, right?
A: No answer. 22
Clearly, despite the alleged previous sexual advances made by
appellant, AAA still voluntarily went with him because she trusted
him. AAA's voluntary acts of separating from her friends and going
with appellant because she trusted him negate the presence of
force, threat, or intimidation in the commission of the alleged rape.
In People v. Amarela, 23 the Court acquitted the accused for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court could not completely rule out the probability that
the victim voluntarily had sex that night, thus:
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or
intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is also
committed without force or intimidation when carnal
knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her
consent. Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is
not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is
capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent. The female
must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time
prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if
accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents
the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and
free of initial coercion. 
Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual
intercourse as a defense, We must bear in mind that the
burden of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. Whether the
accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal
case. It is fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.
xxx xxx xxx
Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the RTC and
the CA's rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts which
are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict an
accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to
an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Similarly, in this case, where the prosecution gravely failed to
establish the element of force, threat or intimidation in the
commission of the crime charged, the Court acquits appellant of
rape.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal. The
Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 21 July 2016, affirming with modifications the Joint
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
Branch 57 which convicted appellant Rollybert Oropesa y Doe for
rape. Appellant Rollybert Oropesa y Doe is ACQUITTED for failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
 and ORDERED immediately released from the New Bilibid Prison
unless he is detained for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of
the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The said Superintendent
is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. Oropesa y Doe, G.R. No. 229084, [October 2, 2019])