Introduction

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is widely regarded as a major

success and as a model for future non-governmental organisation (NGO) campaigns1.
With the signing of the Ottawa Convention2 in December 1997 it seemed the world had
united to eradicate a humanitarian scourge, as a conventional weapon in common use was
outlawed for the first time. The success of the ICBL has been heralded as unprecedented
for reasons such as its speed and the unusually close cooperation between NGOs and pro-
ban states, which allowed the former a unique degree of access to the treaty negotiations.
Furthermore the convention was concluded entirely outside of traditional arms control
negotiating structures and went ahead without the backing of three major world powers
and arms manufacturers, namely the United States (US), Russia and China. Finally the
fact that NGOs had succeeded in influencing global policy on a ‘national security’ issue
was regarded as highly unusual. At its height the enthusiasm for the ICBL’s success was
such that Jody Williams, the ICBL Coordinator, referred to the alliance between NGOs
and small and medium states which promoted the Ottawa Convention as a ‘superpower’
(Bleicher, 2000: 73). Some commentators have provided less positive interpretations of
the ICBL’s success however, claiming that it succeeded only because of a particular
coincidence of external circumstances and issue-specific factors which enabled NGOs to
generate common interest with states (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1998). Consequentially
it is not seen as setting a precedent for other NGO campaigns to follow. Another view is
that the ICBL mirrors the success of previous NGO campaigns which took place at
historical junctures similar to that of end of the Cold War, and hence is not unique or
unprecedented (Rutherford, 1999), (Hubert, 2000: 40).

1
<http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1997/press.html> (7/9/04).
2
Its official title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction.

1
The small arms3 issue was chosen as a comparative case study because initially it seemed
similar enough to landmines4 to assume that some of the tactics used by the ICBL
could be reproduced in this new context. Indeed this has been a common assumption,
with the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the
Japanese Foreign Minister both suggesting at the Ottawa Conference that small arms
should be the next target for an NGO campaign (Bleicher, 2000: 75). On closer
examination of the literature on small arms, it was discovered just how different the
two issues are however. The first major difference is the scale and extent of the
problem, which far exceeds that of landmines. Approximately 639 million guns are
currently in circulation, causing roughly 500,000 deaths a year (Small Arms Survey,
2003: 132), compared to 26,000 for anti-personnel mines (Price, 1998: 618). Small
arms are the main weapons used in conflicts today and are also one of the favoured
tools of crime. Their multipurpose utility makes them relevant in more contexts,
touching on arms control, human rights, crime and development among others. But
perhaps the central difference in terms of regulating small arms is that they are just
too useful to be banned. This has obvious repercussions for the sort of arguments
small arms campaigners need to make and the sort of regulation which will be
required, necessitating greater complexity and sophistication. Besides these issue-
based differences, the international environment in which the small arms campaign is
now operating differs from that pertaining during the landmines campaign.

The aim of this dissertation is to discover whether aspects of the successful NGO
campaign leading to the international ban on landmines can be replicated in the context of
other issues. The methodology used will be a comparative analysis of the campaigns
around landmines and small arms. The intention is to single out the factors which made
the ICBL a success, and to examine whether they apply to the small arms campaign5, and
3
Small arms will be used throughout as synonymous with small arms and light weapons, which includes
items such as portable rocket launchers, as well as conventional firearms.
4
For stylistic reasons, ‘landmines’ and ‘anti-personnel mines’ will be used interchangeably, although it is
acknowledged that only anti-personnel mines are affected by the Ottawa Convention.
5
Whereas the ICBL represented almost all NGOs working on landmines and can be used as shorthand for
describing NGO activity on the issue, NGOs working on small arms are less organised into a single
umbrella organisation. The phrase ‘small arms campaign’ will therefore be used to refer to the International
Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)— the main NGO coalition in the area— as well as other groups

2
by extension to NGO campaigns on other issues. This in turn will hopefully help to
elucidate the role of NGOs within the current international system, and how they
influence international politics. Has the leverage of NGOs increased in recent years, or
was the ICBL’s success exceptional?

Methodology

In preparing this dissertation, I relied initially on the literature on landmines as a means

of isolating the main factors behind the ICBL’s success. The next step was to consult the
theoretical background on which the landmines literature had been based which involved
theories on globalisation (Held et al., 1999), global governance (Weiss & Gordenker eds.,
1996), (O’Brien at al., 2000), transnational civil society (Smith et al., eds., 1997),
(Kaldor, 2003) and international norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), (Nadelmann,
1990). In researching the small arms issue, use was made of primary sources, such as
NGO and United Nations (UN) websites, as well as secondary sources evaluating the
activities of the small arms campaign. This research helped to identify which factors from
the landmines literature were also relevant to the small arms campaign. The end result
was the construction of an analytical framework, which examined the two campaigns
under several headings, taken from the literature on landmines and its theoretical
background, and contained in Table 1. These headings were chosen because they
constituted common factors influencing both campaigns, and therefore served to facilitate
a comparative analysis. They are divided into external and internal factors, as it became
increasingly clear that neither campaign could be properly understood without examining
factors external to the campaigns, such as the geopolitical conditions in which they took
place, as well as internal factors, such as the tactics used by NGOs. This framework and
its application to the two campaigns form the structure of the rest of the dissertation.

working on small arms which do not participate in IANSA.

3
Structure

Chapter One will set up the theoretical framework of the dissertation by delineating the
external and internal factors which influenced the effectiveness of the two campaigns.
Chapter Two will detail the characteristics of landmines as weapons which made them
amenable to prohibition, before examining how the aforementioned external and internal
factors interacted to produce a successful result for the ICBL. Chapter Three will apply
the same theoretical framework to small arms and also illustrate how issue-specific
factors make them harder to regulate. The conclusion will attempt to extrapolate from the
two case studies some general hypotheses about how NGOs operate within the
international system, and which conditions are conducive to them successfully
influencing international policy.

4
 1. Factors Influencing the Success of
NGO Campaigns

The ability of NGOs to influence international politics is largely contingent on the

existence of conducive political opportunity structures (Smith, 1997: 57)— in other
words whether the environment in which NGOs operate facilitates or hinders their ability
to influence global policy. For landmines and small arms regulation, the environment has
been shaped by the international geopolitical context, globalisation and the attitude of
other actors in the international system. These will be referred to as external factors. The
success of an NGO campaign will also be influenced by internal factors, such as how
they frame the issue and how they contest normative space. In order for a campaign to
succeed it is argued that NGOs must adapt their tactics to take advantage of the
opportunities provided by their environment. This chapter will examine these external
and internal factors in order to establish the framework of analysis which will later be
applied to the landmines and small arms campaigns. A table summarising these factors is
provided below. A final obvious determinant of an NGO campaign’s success is the
difficulty and complexity of the particular issue it is dealing with, which in the case
studies under examination here is largely a result of the nature of landmines and small
arms as weapons. These issue-specific elements will be examined in Chapters Two and
Three.

5
Table 1: Factors Influencing the Success of the Landmines and Small Arms
Campaigns

External Factors Geopolitical Conditions

Globalisation

Attitude of Other Actors in the

International System
Internal Factors Framing

Contesting Normative Space

Geopolitical Conditions

The geopolitical context of the landmines and small arms campaigns has been shaped by
the end of the Cold War and the War on Terror. The landmines campaign got underway
in 1992 and culminated in the signing of the Ottawa Convention in December 1997. The
small arms issue was slower to emerge, first becoming a prominent issue on the
international agenda in 1995 with Boutros Ghali’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace
(Batchelor, 2002: 37). A coordinated NGO campaign did not emerge until August 1998
when IANSA was set up (Hubert, 2000: 52), although individual NGOs had been
working on small arms since the mid-1990s (Batchelor, 2002: 37). Although both
campaigns have shared a post-Cold War background, the consequences of the end of the
Cold War have differed for the two issues. The War on Terror is obviously only relevant
for the small arms campaign as the Ottawa Convention was concluded long before
September 11th 2001.

The geopolitical context for the ICBL and the beginning of the small arms campaign is
best characterised as post-Cold War. The end of the Cold War had several important
consequences for the environment in which NGOs were operating. The ideological divide

6
which had previously polarised international politics disappeared, allowing greater
consideration of the merits of individual policy proposals, rather than automatic reversion
to supporting one or other of the two blocs (Kaldor, 2003:13, 39, 79), (Hubert, 2000: 30).
This sudden lack of a great divide in international politics allowed small and medium
states a freedom they had previously lacked to adopt positions of their own. The climate
of mutual suspicion which had existed between the two sides during the Cold War had
discouraged the participation of NGOs in international politics, as there was a tendency to
suspect them of being fronts for one side or the other. This obstacle to NGO participation
was largely removed with the fall of Communism. Coupled with this was a new
flexibility in international negotiations. Consensus-based decision-making in
international fora had only become the norm during the Cold War in order to avoid
excluding large blocs (Rutherford, 1999: 39-40), whereas prior to the Second World War
majority voting had been the norm. With the end of the Cold War it became possible to
advocate majority voting again. This was an important development as the use of
majority voting is more conducive to speedy progress on issues, avoiding the lowest-
common denominator results associated with consensus-based negotiations.

The benign international security environment ushered in by the end of the Cold War led
to a decline in emphasis on national security. This created more space on the global
agenda for so-called ‘soft’ issues (Thakur & Maley, 1999), such as humanitarianism and
development— areas in which NGOs were regarded as experts and legitimate
participants. This provided an opportunity for NGOs to exert a greater influence on
global policy than had hitherto been possible (Kaldor, 2003: 114), (Thakur & Maley,
1999). It also facilitated the promotion of the concept of human security, which redefined
security in terms of individuals, rather than states. The Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy summed up this changing attitude as follows:

7
…with the end of the Cold War, the threat of major conflicts between states has
lessened... Threats to human security—human rights abuses, inter-ethnic tension,
poverty, environmental degradation and terrorism have grown, fueling recurring cycles of
violence. Civilians are their primary victims. In these circumstances, to safeguard
individual citizens, it is no longer enough to ensure the security of the nation, Security is
found in the conditions of daily life . . . rather than primarily in the military strength of
the state6.

Conceptualising security in this way de-emphasised the concerns of ‘high politics’, such
as preserving the military balance of power between states and controlling weapons of
mass destruction (WMD)— measures aimed at protecting national security. Instead the
focus shifted to defending human security by controlling conventional weapons like
landmines and small arms, which cause more casualties than WMD, but had not
previously attracted much international attention because they were not regarded as
posing a threat to the security of whole states.

Reinforcing this individualisation of security was a broader trend of the relaxation of

state authority. In the immediate post-Cold War period, this manifested itself as a severe
breakdown in law and order in former Communist countries, leading to the looting of
government arms stockpiles, with obvious consequences for weapons proliferation. A
longer-term manifestation was the spread of free market ideology around the globe, with
the privatisation of state industries and the removal of trade barriers transforming all
aspects of the global economy, including the arms industry. The relaxation of state
authority also changed the nature of war, with some commentators positing the
emergence of so-called ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2003: 120-123), which tend to be intrastate
rather than interstate, involving non-state actors and higher civilian casualty rates
(Muggah, 2001: 72). These new wars generally take place in developing countries and,
unlike the proxy wars of the Cold War era, are usually not of much strategic interest to
the West. Along with their disproportionate impact on civilians, this facilitates the

6
<http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/97_state/97_057e.htm> (7/9/04).

8
framing of new wars in a humanitarian, rather than a national security, context (Hubert,
2000: 30), helping NGOs to have a greater influence on relevant policies.

Since September 11th 2001, the geopolitical context has been transformed from a post-
Cold War situation to a context dominated by fear of terrorism and national security
concerns. This applies not only to the US, but to most other Western countries as well.
The Bush Administration hugely increased military expenditure after September 11th,
from $310 billion in 2001 to a budget request of $420.7 billion for 20057, and many
European Union countries are undergoing extensive rearmament and military
modernisation programmes (Small Arms Survey, 2004: 3) Overall world military
expenditure increased by 18% between 2001 and 2003, making up the largest bloc of
world spending8. Pursuing arms control measures in such a climate is going to be far
more difficult than under the conditions of Western peace and optimism that prevailed in
the mid to late 1990s, which involved decreasing military expenditure9. By its reaction to
September 11th, the US has demonstrated that force is still crucial to international
relations, contradicting any post-Cold War claims to the contrary (Karp, 2002: 184).

The increased concern with national security has left less room for ‘soft’ issues on the
international agenda (Small Arms Survey 2003: 151) and bears some similarities to the
Cold War situation. As the focus has shifted back from human security to national
security, there has been a corresponding increase in emphasis on WMD (Laurance &
Stohl, 2002: 43) as opposed to conventional weapons. The prospect of small and medium
states playing an independent role in international politics, particularly in areas deemed
relevant to national security, may also have been dealt a blow by the War on Terror.
There seems to have been an almost conscious US effort to return to the bipolarity of the
Cold War era, with Bush’s famous ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’
speech10. The renewed polarisation of the international system is also not conducive to

7
<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp> (16/06/04)
8
<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp> (16/06/04)
9
Military expenditure decreased from $1.2 trillion in 1985 to $809 billion in 1998. For 2003, it stood at
$950 billion. <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp>(16/06/04)
10
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (7/9/04).

9
the participation of NGOs in international politics, particularly with regard to national
security issues.

But the new geopolitical context also has some positive ramifications for arms control.
The focus on combating terrorism has led to improved border controls (Small Arms
Survey 2003: 61), increased scrutiny of international financial transactions (UN, 2003:
18) and better enforcement of international arms embargoes in some instances11. Because
the War on Terror has shifted the focus away from humanitarian issues to national
security, it has also provided some new framing opportunities for NGOs. If an issue can
be presented as relevant to combating international terrorism, there is more chance of it
being picked up by the global media and mobilising public support.

Globalisation

Another aspect of the environment in which NGOs currently operate is the ongoing
process of globalisation. Although globalisation is an intensely contested concept, there is
general agreement that at a minimum it refers to increasing global interconnectedness. An
important characteristic of contemporary globalisation is that it refers not just to
increasing international connections between states, but also to increasing transnational
connections between firms, individuals, and civil society groups, which take place
outside of interstate channels. Globalisation could therefore be described as a process of
transnationalisation as well as internationalisation (Held et al., 1999: 52-9). Depending on
the issue area, different aspects of the globalisation phenomenon will be relevant for
different NGO campaigns. Outlined below are some aspects of globalisation which have
a bearing on landmines and small arms, and also some aspects which enable NGOs to
gain more influence in global policy formation and campaign more effectively.

Economic globalisation has been encouraged by the worldwide spread of

communications media like the Internet, but the main impetus was the creation of a

11
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook%202004/2004%20press%20kit-chap.08.pdf> (7/9/04)

10
global free trading system after 1945, which hugely increased the volume of international
trade and financial transactions (Held et al., 1999: 164-7). Crucial elements of this free
trading system are the ongoing deregulation of international trade and finance,
privatisation and the transnationalisation of industry. All of these elements have
transformed the nature of the global arms trade, making it more difficult to regulate. At
the same time the regulatory capacity of the state has been reduced (Muggah, 2001: 71),
particularly in the South. Neoliberal policies such as privatisation and the slimming down
of the state— promoted by intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and many governments—have been largely
responsible for this. After decades of Structural Adjustment Programmes and crippling
debt repayments, many developing countries simply do not have the resources to provide
security for their citizens, increasing the demand for arms as a means of self-defence.

Many commentators have noted the tendency of globalisation, at least in its current
neoliberal form, to increase inequality both between and within countries (Thomas, 2001:
159-160), (McMichael, 2000: 469), (Muggah, 2001: 71), (Beier & Denholm Crosby,
1997: 274). Proof of the former is the widening of the income gap between north and
south from 31:1 in 1960 to 74:1 in 2000 (McMichael, 2000: 469). One reason for this is
the ideology behind neoliberalism, which privileges individualism and economic growth,
while downplaying the importance of social capital (Thomas, 2001: 167). This is a
worldview where inequality is seen as a spur to economic growth (Thomas, 2001: 168),
rather than an injustice. An alternative view of inequality sees it as a factor in rising rates
of crime and civil conflict (UNDP, 1999) (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1997: 274). This
hypothesis is borne out by the fact that Latin America, the region of the world with the
highest rate of inequality (Kirby, 2003: 109), also has some of the highest rates of crime.
Neoliberal policy prescriptions like social expenditure cutbacks also contribute to the
other main risk factors for social violence and conflict: systemic poverty, social
marginalisation, and persistent unemployment (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 8), thereby
increasing insecurity and fuelling the demand for small arms.

11
From a civil society perspective, communications globalisation and cheaper, faster
international transport have encouraged the quantitative and qualitative development of
transnational connections between individuals and NGOs in different parts of the world.
Coupled with this is an increasing awareness that problems are shared by the globe as a
whole, rather than confined to nation states or regions; a process which has been
encouraged by the spread of global media. This sense of global interconnectedness has
been dubbed ‘globality’ (Scholte, 2000: 85, 195), (Kaldor, 2003: 112) and is a factor
behind the tentative emergence of ‘transnational civil society’. The transnationalisation
of civil society involves the formation of new transnational political communities and the
strengthening of pre-existing ones, representing the development of an alternative form of
political identity, which is issue-based, rather than territorial, and exists alongside the
still-hegemonic political identity of nationalism. It has been suggested that NGOs provide
‘institutional homes’ for these new political communities in the same way as states do for
nationalism (Peter Spiro quoted in Weiss & Gordenker eds., 1996: 25). This ability of
NGOs to ‘aggregate interests across national boundaries’ (Smith et al., 1997: 69) has
increased their ability to influence global policy, enabling them serve a useful role within
the emerging system of global governance, known as complex multilateralism.

The importance of IGOs has increased in recent years due to aspects of globalisation such
as deregulation at state level and the transnationalisation of trade and finance, which have
created a need for re-regulation at global level. Increasing recognition of the
interconnectedness of global problems has also encouraged the delegation of more
matters to the intergovernmental level. But global governance has come to involve as
actors not just states and IGOs, but also non-state actors. This emerging new form of
global governance has been described as complex multilateralism (O’Brien et al., 2000)
and can include as participants the media, ‘experts’, business, and especially civil society
organisations and NGOs. Complex multilateralism is a useful concept for explaining how
NGOs can influence global policy (O’Brien et al., 2000: 208). The role NGOs play
within this system is reliant on their ability to utilise ‘soft power’, as they lack the ‘hard
power’ of states and business, due to a lack of coercive abilities or large financial

12
resources (O’Brien et al., 2000: 120). NGOs’ ‘soft power’ consists of their ability to
persuade the holders of ‘hard power’ to support their viewpoints, either through direct
lobbying or by mobilising the public to exert pressure on them (Weiss & Gordenker,
1996: 38-9), (Chatfield, 1997: xiii-xvi).

NGOs have been allowed to participate in global governance because they serve several
useful functions for IGOs. Although the problems IGOs are tasked with solving affect the
lives of millions of people around the world, there is no direct democratic input into their
deliberations, unlike with national governments in representative democracies. IGOs
have attempted to remedy this ‘democratic deficit’ (Nye, 2001) by involving NGOs, who
are seen as providing a link with the public, thereby serving a democratising purpose by
increasing public oversight of global governance (O’Brien et al., 2000: 22). It follows
from this that NGOs will be more successful at the intergovernmental level if they are
perceived as representing public opinion (Smith, 1997: 49). As well as increasing public
oversight, NGO participation provides an alternative to representation by a state official,
who may be motivated more by other national interests than genuine concern for the issue
at hand. In contrast to the divided attentions of state representatives, who must cater to a
multitude of different interest groups, the ability of NGOs to focus exclusively on one
issue area can make them more effective (Clark, 1995: 510, 513). Kaldor emphasises ‘the
parcellization of authority not on a territorial basis but on the basis of issues’ (Kaldor,
2003: 141) as a defining characteristic of IGOs, and the fit between the issue-based
natures of IGOs and NGOs provides further explanation for the emergence of complex
multilateralism.

One commentator summarises how the IGOs see NGOs thus: ‘actors within IGOs value
transnational organizations for their ability to aggregate interests across national
boundaries and to help generate options for resolving conflicts, thus facilitating
intergovernmental policy-making’ (Smith et al., 1997: 69). This highlights the fact that
NGOs will be more influential if they are part of a transnational organisation or network
of organisations (Smith, 1997: 44), and that their ability to aggregate interests into a
transnational political community around a particular issue is an advantage they possess

13
over the territorial outlook of state representatives. NGOs can increase their power by
occupying ‘linking pin’ positions in international networks of states, NGOs and IGOs,
whether formal or informal (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996: 35), through which they can
disseminate their viewpoints. Through acting as linking pins, they can help to facilitate
interstate cooperation on issues (Alger, 1997: 264).

The formation of transnational coalitions also enables NGOs to influence different layers
of governance from the local to the global (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996: 213), modifying
their persuasive techniques to adapt to the particulars of each situation, and exerting
coordinated multi-layered pressure for change. The efficiency of NGO networks in
disseminating information between their different branches and coordinating their actions
is a crucial factor determining success or failure. Coordinating transnationally gives NGO
coalitions an advantage in the age of globalisation, enabling them to exert far greater
influence than if they all operated independently (Smith, 1997: 44).

A further important way in which NGOs play a role within the emerging system of
complex multilateralism is by accumulating expertise on particular issues. Pervasive
underfunding of intergovernmental bodies has meant that some NGOs have access to
greater financial resources and expertise than the relevant IGO in their area. This is
particularly true in the field of human rights, where the budget of Amnesty International
exceeds that of the entire UN human rights apparatus (Clark, 1995: 517) and UN human
rights bodies have come to rely on information provided by NGOs in order to monitor the
implementation of human rights treaties. Expertise is also a crucial factor in the ability of
NGOs to gain state support for their campaigns, with government officials often relieved
to have a new issue summed up for them in the easily digestible form of an NGO report.
As NGOs come to command greater financial resources, expertise and experience, their
ability to influence global policy formation and increase their stature within the new
system of complex multilateralism should only increase.

In summary the consequences of globalisation for the ability of NGOs to achieve their
aims have been quite ambivalent. Deregulation of international trade and finance,

14
privatisation and transnationalisation of industry and the weakening of the regulatory
power of the state have made many of the issue areas which NGOs seek to influence
harder for states to regulate, while growing inequality has exacerbated many of the
problems they seek to remedy. At the same time however, a nascent system of global
governance is emerging, within which NGOs can play a greater role, due to the new
opportunities afforded them through transnationalisation.

The Attitude of other Actors in the International System

A crucial factor in the success or failure of any NGO-led campaign is the attitude of other
actors in the international system. These include states, business, IGOs and other civil
society groups. With the emergence of complex multilateralism, the latter three actors
have taken on a greater role, but states still remain the most important. In order for a
campaign to succeed in influencing global policy, it needs to gain the support of states,
whose attitude to particular issues will change as governments change. An obvious
difference between the political climate prevailing during the landmine campaign, and
that of the present, is that many governments have been replaced. The most significant
regime change is probably the replacement of Bill Clinton by George W. Bush as US
President. International political leadership has also been altered since 1997 by the
decline of Third Way politics. Third Way politicians were a driving force behind the
emergence of complex multilateralism (O’Brien et al., 2000: 9), being more predisposed
to involve NGOs in international policy discussions, even if they didn’t genuinely take
their concerns on board (O’Brien et al., 2000: 9). The Third Way has also been identified
as ‘the impulse behind many of the most important humanitarian initiatives of recent
years, small arms among them’ (Karp, 2002: 185). In terms of opposition to a campaign,
it is important to note that states are not monoliths: some sectors of a national
bureaucracy can support a campaign, while others oppose it. Similarly in a civil society
context, NGOs garner most of their support from the public, but elements of the public
and other NGOs can also be their most formidable opponents. The views of IGOs are also
relevant to the success of NGO campaigns. Although bodies like the UN are officially

15
neutral and are not supposed to adopt organisational positions on issues, institutional
attitudes of bureaucrats can have an influence on whether an issue is prioritised. Within a
system of complex multilateralism, the attitude of all the various actors involved is
significant in determining whether an NGO campaign will succeed.

Having examined the external factors which influence the success of an NGO campaign,
the focus will now shift to the factors internal to a campaign which have the most bearing
on its effectiveness. These include how the issue is framed, which is of prime importance
as it determines the context in which the issue is viewed, as well as which actors are
regarded as possessing the necessary expertise to merit an input in policy formation.
Framing is also important for defining an issue as a problem, which generates a perceived
need for solutions. Where a new norm is proposed as a solution to the problem—as was
the case with the landmines campaign—success will hinge on the ability of campaigners
to overcome contradictory norms and create links with supportive norms. By successfully
contesting normative space in this manner, they can strengthen the case for the
introduction of their new norm.

Framing and Contesting Normative Space

Both the landmines and small arms campaigns could be described as processes of norm
generation, whereby a concerted effort is made to generate new norms governing the
behaviour of individuals and states. A norm has been defined as ‘a standard of
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:
891), and both campaigns represent attempts to change these standards. The actors whose
behaviour is targeted for modification are in the first instance states, but also non-state
actors and individuals. From an international law perspective, this can be achieved only
through the enforcement power of states, which will translate states’ international legal
commitments into domestic laws regulating the behaviour of individuals in their
jurisdiction. From a normative perspective however, the new norm operates by exerting
a moral compunction to comply on both states and individuals, through stigmatising the

16
newly inappropriate behaviour. It is this feeling of moral obligation, generated by a
shared sense among ‘actors with a given identity’ that a norm is just and should be abided
by, which gives a special potency to norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891), exceeding
that of other types of international standards, such as technical regulations. This
‘oughtness’ of norms can be so powerful that it may obviate the need for the strict
verification procedures usually involved in arms control regimes.

Finnemore and Sikkink have described the process of development of a norm from initial
proposal to general acceptance as the ‘norm life-cycle’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).
The first stage of ‘norm emergence’ involves the framing of issues by ‘norm
entrepreneurs’ (concerned individuals and NGOs) and attempts to persuade states to
adopt their proposed new norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 896-901). How norm
entrepreneurs contextualise an issue within a particular discourse, define it as a problem
and propose solutions — a process referred to here as framing — is crucial to the success
of this phase (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 897). Context largely determines which actors
are allowed to participate in policy formation and therefore which solutions can be put
forward. Problematising the issue generates a perceived need for solutions, with the way
in which the problem is defined and the context in which it is situated making particular
solutions seem appropriate. In other words the construction of new cognitive frames
creates new ‘logics of appropriateness’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 897), in the context
of which the proposed new norm will appear a fitting solution. Therefore it is often
necessary to wage a lengthy framing contest before an effective campaign advocating
specific normative solutions can be run.

Because NGOs rely on forms of ‘soft power’ such as their ability to mobilise broad
public support (O’Brien et al, 2000:12) and to persuade influential individuals in
positions of power within IGOs and state governments of their arguments (Weiss &
Gordenker, 1996: 38-39), success depends on their ability to construct frames which
appeal to large numbers of people in different cultural contexts, as well as frames which
seem persuasive to the holders of hard power. The concept of ‘frame alignment’ has been
used to explain how people will not support a campaign unless it ‘rings true’ to them:

17
‘individuals will not participate … unless their own experientially based perspective
corresponds to the interpretive orientation of the organization’ (Warkentin & Mingst,
2000). In other words a frame must be constructed out of pre-existing cultural materials
(McCarthy, 1997: 245), a process which is obviously more difficult in transnational
contexts as the frame must resonate in a range of different cultural settings (McCarthy,
1997: 245). Where the issue does not obviously resonate with a particular cultural
background, a conscious process of ‘frame bridging’ must be undertaken (McCarthy,
1997: 245), with differing emphasis in different cultural contexts. Effective frames do not
remain static. As the experience of an individual changes over time, the frames which
align with that experience also change, with some being discarded as no longer relevant
and replaced by new interpretations. On a macrolevel, as geopolitical conditions change,
the frames used by NGOs must adapt so as to remain relevant. Simply replicating the
frames used by the landmines campaign will not be enough to guarantee the small arms
campaign’s success, as besides the fact that the issues involved differ, geopolitical
conditions have changed significantly in the intervening years.

Another vital element of the norm emergence phase is how norm entrepreneurs relate the
proposed new norm to pre-existing norms (Price, 1998), (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:
908): in other words how they contest and fight for ‘normative space’. This can involve
discrediting opposing norms, highlighting or creating links with supportive norms, and in
situations where a potentially obstructive norm is too powerful to overcome, justifying
the new norm in terms of that norm or pleading its irrelevance. These especially powerful
norms will be referred to here as übernorms, and would include strongly internalised
norms like market exchange and state sovereignty (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 904).
From a legal perspective, the field of international law in which pre-existing supportive
norms are embedded will serve as the framework into which the new norm will be
inserted, while campaigners will need to disassociate the issue from unsuitable legal
frameworks and precedents.

Once the norm has completed the ‘norm emergence’ phase, a ‘tipping point’ occurs
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 901), after which the norm becomes generally accepted by

18
most states and enters the ‘norm cascade’ phase (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 902-4).
The tipping point usually requires participation by a third of relevant states (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998: 901), but it is also important that ‘critical states’— the identity of whom
will vary from issue to issue— adopt the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 901). The
role of norm entrepreneurs becomes less significant from this point on, as socialisation
processes come to play a greater role, with states wanting to conform to the new norm in
order to be seen as respectable members of the international community (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998: 902-4). Reaching the tipping point could therefore be used as a barometer
for measuring the success of an NGO campaign. The ICBL succeeded in reaching this
point, whereas the small arms campaign is still at the earliest phase of norm generation,
where a framing contest is being waged prior to the possible emergence of strong norms.
Whether or not a tipping point comes about depends on how well NGOs do their job in
framing the issue and contesting normative space, but also on external factors such as
geopolitical conditions and the strength of opposition to the new norm. The interplay of
these internal and external factors will be examined in detail in the next two chapters.

19
 2. The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines

The success of the landmines campaign was largely due to a combination of convenient
external conditions and the ICBL’s skill in conducting its campaign. The post-Cold
War geopolitical background in which the campaign took place provided a window
of opportunity for civil society input into ‘national security’ issues. Globalisation
also shaped the environment in which the ICBL operated, creating new possibilities
for transnational co-ordination and multilayered campaigning at the same time as an
emerging system of complex multilateralism offered NGOs the chance to play a
greater role in global governance. The ICBL was fortunate too that the opposition of
other actors in the international system was not as strong or as widespread as it might
have been. Another important element which will be examined in this chapter is the
nature of landmines as weapons, which meant that simple prohibition could be an
effective
solution, making the ICBL’s task easier than if it had to mobilise public support for a
range of complicated regulations. Crucial to generating that support was how it
framed the landmines issue in a humanitarian context and how it contested the
normative space into which the ban was to be introduced.

Characteristics of landmines as weapons

The landmine is a single-use weapon. It is sown in the ground and is ‘used’ only once
when a victim steps on it. Although in some cases mines have been dug up and resown12,
this is a dangerous activity, unlikely to be lightly undertaken and fails to alter the fact that
mines are only detonated once. Many ‘old’ landmines are in the ground and can be
destroyed through demining efforts. Consequently, second-hand trade is not a major issue

12
During the Vietnam War for example, the Vietcong excavated US mines and turned them against their
original owners.

20
for controlling landmines (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 18), making them easier to ban
than more easily re-saleable weapons. The relative insignificance of anti-personnel mines
to the profitability of the arms industry (Roberts & Williams, 1995: 34) meant that there
was less opposition to a ban than might have been expected if they were more lucrative.
These factors combined to make the trade in landmines more controllable by
governments, than is the case with small arms.

Landmines are also largely a single-purpose weapon. The only purpose of landmines
which was recognised as legitimate under official military doctrine prior to the ban was
as a ‘force multiplier’ in order to slow enemy encroachments onto a warring party’s
territory during an armed conflict (ICRC, 1996). Other uses, such as terrorisation of
civilians and forced depopulation of areas, were illegal under international law, and hence
could not be used by states to justify the retention of anti-personnel mines. In this sense,
mines were a single-purpose weapon, meaning that if their utility in achieving that single
military purpose could be called in question, no other purpose to fulfil would remain,
opening the door to a ban. The ICBL concentrated on questioning the military utility of
landmines for this reason. Another aspect of the single purpose nature of landmines is
their lack of peacetime utility13, which meant they were not commonly in civilian
possession, and therefore easier for governments to control. This also explains the
absence of civil society opposition to prohibition. Developing countries have been the
location of almost all conflicts over the last fifty years so the problems caused by anti-
personnel mines have been largely confined to the Third World14. Along with their
exclusively wartime utility, this facilitated the framing of landmines in a humanitarian
context. The fact that the West was unaffected by landmines meant that, unlike gun
control, it was not a political issue there, a factor which probably contributed to the
campaign’s success. This chapter will now examine the geopolitical conditions which
facilitated the promotion of a ban.

13
One exception is Cambodia, where they are used in fishing and to protect private property (Rutherford &
Matthew, 2003).
14
For example, 95% of all conflicts between 1989 and 1995 took place in developing countries (Muggah &
Griffiths, 2002: 8).

21
The End of the Cold War and a New Emerging Security Architecture

The sudden lack of a great divide in international politics with the end of the Cold War
allowed small and medium states a freedom they had previously lacked to adopt positions
of their own and form single-issue coalitions with likeminded states; an essential factor
behind the landmine ban’s success. During the Cold War, for a state to take action on an
issue associated with national security like landmines, without first securing the support
of its military allies would have been unlikely. Unilateral measures such as the Belgian
ban on landmines and the US export moratorium, which helped to build momentum in
the early days of the campaign, may not have been possible (Hubert, 2000: 30). New
opportunities were also opened up by the decline in emphasis on consensus-based
international decision-making, and the use of majority voting in the Ottawa process15 was
crucial (Hubert, 2000: 57), as it avoided action being blocked by recalcitrant states.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US found itself in an unprecedented
position of global dominance. This may have contributed to its slow reaction to the
Ottawa process, which it failed to take very seriously until the convention was almost
negotiated (Rutherford & Matthews, 2003: 44). Given the history of the Cold War, the
Americans were unaccustomed to their allies taking independent policy steps, and, with
their new role as the only superpower, may have believed it would be pointless to
conclude the treaty without them (Rutherford & Matthews, 2003: 44). This led to a
situation whereby US influence was paradoxically undermined at the very moment when
it ought to have been at its height, with its own allies and most other states conspiring
successfully to negotiate a major international treaty without it.

The end of the Cold War led to a change in emphasis from national to human security.
Landmines, which had historically been seen through the lens of national security and
thus were not deemed suitable topics for non-state actors to engage with, could now be
considered in a new ‘softer’ light, where the views of NGOs could be taken into account.
The Canadian government was one of the foremost proponents of human security
(Hubert, 2000: 61) and used it as the basis for its support of the landmine ban. Human
15
The Ottawa process refers to the Ottawa Convention’s negotiation between likeminded states outside of
UN auspices between October 1996 and December 1997.

22
security and humanitarian concerns were also increasingly being applied to the ‘new
wars’ in the Third World (Hubert, 2000: 30), some of which had their origins in proxy
Cold War conflicts but were no longer of much strategic interest to the West. Coupled
with the eruption of ethnic conflicts in many countries after the collapse of Communism,
this led to an increase in UN peacekeeping operations in countries like Cambodia and
Bosnia. As UN troops fell victim to landmines in the course of their duties (Hubert, 2000:
30), the problem was given further publicity in the media, whose growing global reach
formed part of the ongoing process of globalisation examined below.

Globalisation, Transnational Civil Society and a New System of Global

Governance

Trends associated with economic globalisation such as the deregulation of international

trade and finance, privatisation and transnationalisation of industry, and the weakening of
the regulatory power of the state are factors which make it more difficult to control the
global arms trade. However, because landmines are not re-saleable and have relatively
low profit margins, economic globalisation did not see a huge jump in the volume of
international trade in landmines. Nor did the weakening of state regulatory power and
rising rates of crime and social violence associated with deepening inequality lead to
civilians arming themselves with anti-personnel mines. Aspects of globalisation which
are more relevant to the landmines issue include the development of transnational civil
society and complex multilateralism.

The development of transnational civil society has been encouraged by the increasing
perception of the world as a single place. Public awareness of the humanitarian crises
caused by ‘new wars’ has been increased by daily media coverage; a factor which has
facilitated the generation of support for humanitarian causes such as a ban on landmines.
The success of the ICBL would not have been possible without the recognition that
landmines were a global problem, which could only be solved by global action. The
ICBL was able to build global awareness of landmines by campaigning simultaneously in

23
numerous countries and at various levels of governance, whether national, regional or
global (Williams & Goose, 1998). It held international conferences attended by
government and NGO officials, as well as landmine victims, from seemingly disparate
parts of the globe. This helped to create a transnational community around landmines,
with individuals in different countries linked by their mutual concern about the issue.
Besides the international conferences, the landmines community was sustained by
technological globalisation, with activists communicating via telephone, fax and email
(Warkentin & Craig, 2000). Creating a transnational landmines community was a
necessary precondition for mounting an effective campaign, but its ability to influence
global policy outcomes was assisted by the broader geopolitical context of the post-Cold
war era as well as by internal factors, such as framing and norm entrepreneurship.

In their work on complex multilateralism, O’Brien et al. conclude that NGO

representation at IGOs like the IMF has merely modified the policy-making process,
without resulting in substantive changes in policy (O’Brien et al., 2000:3). In the case of
the landmines campaign however, NGOs succeeded in bringing about a genuine
transformation in policy. The ICBL was able to drive policy on landmines by exercising
its ‘soft power’. It established itself as the foremost expert on landmines, and exploited
the NGO advantage of being able to focus narrowly on one issue (Clark, 1995: 510, 513).
The Ottawa Convention can be seen as a successful example of complex multilateralism,
involving most of the actors identified as involved in this new system of global
governance, including states, IGOs, and non-state actors such as NGOs, the media and
‘experts’. Although arms companies did not favour a ban, the public pressure generated
by the campaign persuaded states such as Italy to institute moratoria on production and
export by manufacturers in their jurisdiction. Crucial to this was the support given to the
Italian campaign by workers at Valsella Meccanotecnica—one of the world’s biggest
mine producers (Williams & Goose, 1997: 29), illustrating how pressure from the level of
civil society can generate change from above.

The terms of access for NGOs to the CCW Review Conference, which took place under
UN auspices in 1996, failed to reflect the growing power of the ICBL, excluding it from

24
participation—even as an observer— and restricting activists to lobbying outside the
conference (Hubert, 2000: 13). Despite this the ICBL succeeded in hijacking the
conference as a vehicle for promoting their interpretation of the landmines issue. This
was achieved through giving regular briefings on the proceedings— which included
criticisms of the gaps between government rhetoric and their actual negotiating positions
— to both delegates and the media (Williams & Goose, 1997: 31). This helped the ICBL
to establish its expertise and strengthen relationships with likeminded governments
(Williams & Goose, 1997: 31), resulting in an increase in the number of pro-ban states
from fourteen before the conference to 41 by its end (Williams & Goose, 1997: 33).
Having identified this pro-ban bloc, the ICBL succeeded in generating momentum for an
independent negotiating process outside of the UN. Despite the sidelining of the UN, the
attitude of the organisation to the Ottawa process was largely helpful, as illustrated by the
incorporation of UN machinery in the convention16. It could be said that the landmines
campaign was a one-off success for NGOs within the complex multilateralism system,
which took both IGOs and opposing states by surprise. This interpretation is borne out by
the pre-emptive approach adopted by states and IGOs to the small arms issue, which will
be examined later.

Strong Support and Weak Opposition from International Actors

A crucial factor behind the success of the ICBL was the attitude of other actors in the
international system towards it. The campaign succeeded in generating strong support
from small and medium states and the absence of any civil society opposition meant that
all the NGO pressure favoured prohibition. Even the opposition of powerful states like
the US, Russia and China was not as stiff as it might have been. The ICBL was also
fortunate in the composition of international political leadership at the time. The
Canadian government was crucial to the success of the campaign, and its foreign minister
Lloyd Axworthy gave it a huge boost by challenging all the states present at a 1996
16
States must report on implementation to the UN Secretary-General who is responsible for disseminating
reports among the states parties (Article 7), overseeing the interstate complaints procedure (Article 8),
convening meetings of the states parties (Articles 11 & 12) and receiving instruments of ratification
(Article 21).

25
conference on landmines in Ottawa to return the following year to sign a treaty (Williams
& Goose, 1997: 34). This unorthodox step contravened diplomatic protocol and would
not have been taken by a less personally committed politician— illustrating the
importance of individual national leaders in promoting the ban. In 1996-7 when the
Ottawa Convention was concluded, Third Way politics was on the rise in the aftermath of
the election of New Labour in Britain. As the driving force behind complex
multilateralism (O’Brien et al., 2000: 9), Third Way politicians favoured involving NGOs
in international policy discussions which undoubtedly worked to the ICBL’s advantage.
In Britain, Tony Blair’s government was the first to support a ban on landmines, and the
same applied for the new government in France, also elected in 1997. As major
producers, the support of these two states was critical (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 901)
and may not have occurred if different personnel had been in power. The recent collapse
of apartheid in South Africa was also important, as once the new government announced
its support, Nelson Mandela’s personal reputation helped to convince African leaders to
sign the treaty (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 901).

In the US, although the Clinton administration opposed the Ottawa Convention, its
outlook was more multilateral than that of the current Bush government. Clinton himself
had a keen personal interest in foreign policy, as illustrated by his enthusiastic
participation in the Northern Ireland peace process, and the US paradoxically encouraged
progress on landmines eradication by sponsoring a UN resolution calling for states to
implement export moratoria (Williams & Goose, 1997: 27). Other opposing states
included Russia and China, who might be thought of as ‘critical states’, given their status
as major weapons producers. With the end of the Cold War however, neither of these two
states was able to exert sufficient pressure on other countries to join them in a bloc, and
compared to a leader like Mandela their moral influence was non-existent. Opposing
states were also circumvented by the Ottawa process whereby states selected themselves
for participation on the basis of whether they agreed with the objective of a complete ban
(Hubert, 2001: 37). States not in favour of a complete ban could only take part as
observers. The simplicity of the landmine campaign’s aim meant that determining state

26
support was easy, involving a simple yes or no answer to the question of whether a state
favoured a ban.

The non-monolithic nature of states means that one sector of a state’s bureaucracy can
oppose a new measure, even as most of the government supports it. In the case of
landmines it was the national security sector that opposed the ban due to its belief in their
military necessity, but also because of institutionalised opposition to limitations on the
right of the state to defend itself. Gradually the landmines campaign, and in particular the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was able to persuade an influential
portion of the military (Hubert, 2000: 15) that the military utility of mines was
questionable. They were fortunate that the military did not possess studies of its own
disproving this claim (Hubert, 2000: 37). Once the military utility of landmines was
thrown into question, the influence of the national security sector on government policy
lessened, making politicians more open to NGO influence and public pressure.

Another actor within the complex multilateralism system which might have been
expected to oppose the Ottawa Convention was business. In practice however the major
arms companies were not vociferously opposed to a ban (Warkentin & Craig, 2000) due
to the relative insignificance of anti-personnel mines for the industry. Landmines were
not very profitable; retailing at between only $3 and $30 (Beier & Denholm Crosby,
1998: 280). In fact, given that removing a mine from the ground can cost from $300 to
$1000 (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1998: 281), demining will arguably be a more
profitable activity for the arms industry than landmine production (Beier & Denholm
Crosby, 1998: 281). In the light of this, large arms firms were unlikely to pose a threat to
the ICBL campaign. It was estimated in 1995 that the trade in landmines accounted for
less than $100 million of the $20 billion a year global arms trade (Roberts & Williams,
1995: 34), so landmine sales were not proportionally significant. They also tended to be
manufactured by small contractors (Hubert, 2000: 37), rather than large arms companies
who would wield more influence over governments.

27
Overall the ban campaign was fortunate that the landmines issue did not generate
stronger opposition from other international actors. Despite the non-participation of states
like the US, China and Russia, none of them outright opposed the ideal of eventually
eradicating landmines. This was reflected in the passing by a vote of 156-0 of a UN
General Assembly Resolution in December 1996 urging states to pursue a ban (Benesche
et al., 1999). Indeed during a landmines conference held at the signing of the Ottawa
Convention, all three states indicated they would eventually comply with most of its
provisions (Benesche et al., 1999). This lack of tough opposition was partly due to the
characteristics of landmines as weapons, but also to the strength of the emerging norm of
prohibition, which meant that no state could openly oppose banning landmines. Although
the US ostensibly favoured eventual prohibition, the demands it made at the Oslo
conference in September 1997, such as that all the permanent members of the UN
Security Council be included for the ban to enter into force and that the treaty should be
abrogable during wartime (Malanczuk, 2000: 85-86), revealed that in reality it wanted to
prevent a ban emerging at all. The fact that states could not openly admit their
opposition to a ban was testament to the success of the ICBL in generating a taboo
around landmines. How this was achieved will be examined next by looking at the ways
in which the campaign framed landmines as a humanitarian issue and delegitimised their
use.

Framing: A Humanitarian Crisis

Prior to the landmine ban campaign, anti-personnel mines were seen as a legitimate
weapon forming an essential part of states’ national security arsenal. They had been in
widespread use for many years and there was no precedent for the banning of a common
conventional weapon. The traditional procedure for arms control within this context was
for consensus-based negotiations under the auspices of the UN Conference on
Disarmament (CD), which moved at a glacial pace. The ICBL recognised that the terms
of reference for the landmine debate must be shifted away from this national security
context, as this was traditionally regarded as the exclusive domain of states (Price, 1998:

28
613) and not as an area that NGOs should influence. Indeed for NGOs to raise the
possibility of a ban in this context could be perceived as a threat to the state (de Larrinaga
& Turenne Sjolander, 1998: 370) and would be unlikely to succeed. The national security
context was not conducive to civil society participation nor to the ICBL’s solution of a
complete and speedy ban. Their first objective was therefore to change that context.

The traditional sphere of the NGO is humanitarian, whether providing famine relief or
tending to wartime refugees. In order for NGOs to be seen as experts on landmines, and
for their views to be taken seriously by states, they needed to frame the issue in their field
of humanitarian expertise. They did this by focusing on the human impact of landmines,
rather than the security reasons why they had been put in place. This was achieved
through commissioning studies and publishing research which illustrated the extent of the
problem from a humanitarian perspective. In this way, ‘Statistics help to create new
social issues which were previously invisible’ (Price, 1998: 617). In addition to
accumulating statistical and academic evidence, members of the ICBL, particularly the
Landmine Survivors Network, were able through their field operations to accumulate
emotive images of amputees and personal testimonies of landmine victims which made
military arguments about the defensive need for mines seem callous. This enabled them
to move away from the detached, objective-sounding language used by states to discuss
national security issues to the franker, more emotionally-charged language of
humanitarianism (Warkentin & Mingst, 2000). Landmines are conducive to this as they
often maim rather than kill, thereby producing a visibly injured victim able to tell his
story firsthand. An example was the delivery by landmine victims of a petition calling for
a ban to the president of the CCW Review Conference (Williams & Goose, 1998: 32).
The power of first-hand, graphic accounts of human tragedy is something that even the
most hardened government employees would find hard to ignore, particularly when there
is an obvious and simple chain of cause and effect (Price, 1998: 623).

The victims featured in ICBL campaigns were usually women and children, rather than
men (de Larrinaga & Turenne Sjolander, 1998: 376). This would be unremarkable if it
merely reflected the demographic makeup of landmine victims, but in fact the opposite is

29
true. The World Health Organisation estimates that only 40% of landmine victims are
women and children (de Larrinaga & Turenne Sjolander, 1998: 376). However for
cultural reasons images of injured women and children have a more emotive impact than
images of injured men, generating gut-level empathy and also effectively depoliticising
the issue. New norms which seek to protect innocents from bodily harm have been
identified as among the easiest to popularise (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 907)
(Nadelmann, 1990: 525), so this was an effective strategy for the ICBL to adopt. Using
images of women and children served as pictorial shorthand to illustrate the point that
landmines were maiming and killing civilians rather than combatants, and were therefore
a humanitarian law issue. All of this contributed to the framing of landmines as an
apolitical humanitarian matter, allowing the ICBL to avoid accusations of bias or political
motivation and shifting the focus from away from national security concerns.

Framing the landmine issue in a humanitarian context facilitated its portrayal as a crisis,
requiring urgent resolution. Whereas states are reluctant to intervene in matters of
national security and change in that context is slow, in situations of humanitarian crisis an
expectation of rapid multilateral action has evolved (Price, 1998: 639). Despite the fact
that landmines had been an ongoing problem for many years, the ICBL managed to
engineer a sense of urgency through extensive advertising campaigns and generating
statistics which illustrated the extent of the problem. While NGOs are adept in creating a
sense of crisis in order to facilitate the rapid raising of funds or deployment of
humanitarian assistance, using the perception of a humanitarian crisis in order to bring
about a treaty was a more innovative use of the motivational power of crisis. Some
international relations theorists argue that ‘the perception of a crisis or shock is a crucial
factor in precipitating ideational or normative change’ (Price, 1998: 622), and this seems
to have been recognised by the ICBL. The contrast between their rhetoric of crisis and
the slow plodding nature of international legal negotiations at the CCW Review
Conference and the CD was obvious and created a perceived need for an alternative ‘fast-
track’ process. The framing of the landmine issue in a humanitarian context also liberated
states from the necessity of pursuing a treaty through institutions like the CD, as would
have been expected if the matter had remained contextualised as a national security issue.

30
Now that the ICBL had established landmines as a humanitarian crisis, the next step was
to popularise their proposed solution of a new norm prohibiting anti-personnel mines.

Contesting Normative Space: Establishing a Global Prohibition Norm

In order for a new norm to emerge, it is often necessary to overcome alternative norms. In
the case of landmines, the norms which had to be superseded were those of legitimate use
and military utility. Opponents of prohibition, while not disagreeing with the ICBL’s
characterisation of the situation as a humanitarian crisis, argued that irresponsible use,
rather than the weapon itself, was the real cause, and that better regulation of landmines
could mitigate the humanitarian crisis. Essentially they were arguing for the continuation
of the pre-existing norm of legitimate use, but with more conditions attached. The ICBL
would not even comment on proposals made after the first session of the CCW Review
Conference to distinguish between different types of mines, since ‘to lobby on those
issues is to acknowledge the continued legitimate use of landmines’ (Steve Goose,
Human Rights Watch, cited in Price, 1998: 630). Instead they focused on demonstrating
the failure of previous attempts to solve the landmine problem that had been anchored in
the norm of legitimate use, by flooding the international media with emotive images of
victims and statistics about civilian casualties. Through its presentation of the landmines
issue as a humanitarian crisis which had ‘literally exploded under the very watch of the
CCW’ (Price, 1998: 631), the ICBL undermined the notion of legitimate use on which it
was based, clearing the way for the new global prohibition norm.

Another means of contesting the norm of legitimate use was to situate the landmine itself
as the problem (Beier, 2002: 316). Landmines were positioned as independent agents of
destruction, lying in wait for their victims, beyond human control. This conveniently
distanced the issue from the governments that laid the mines and the states whose
military industries produced them. Situating agency in the landmine allowed the ICBL to
avoid engaging in any wider interrogation of the rights and wrongs of war, the military-
industrial complex (Beier, 2002: 316) or national security norms (Beier & Denholm

31
Crosby, 1997: 276). In avoiding issues of human agency and state responsibility, the
ICBL ended up implying that what made landmines bad was the fact that they could kill
in the ostensible absence of human intention. Intentional killing with other weapons was
not questioned and thereby implicitly accepted (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1997: 277),
but for a landmine to kill became a moral outrage. Siting agency in the landmine itself
played on the familiar man/machine dichotomy and the science fiction fear of machines
taking over and wiping out the human race. The landmines problem became the fault of
the landmines themselves: ‘The machine is the author of the humanitarian crisis, against
which humanity (and states) must stand united’ (de Larrinaga & Turenne Sjolander,
1998: 380). This was an effective strategy as it ruled out the possibility of a norm of
legitimate use and led to the conclusion that only a complete ban could solve the
problem. It also had the secondary desirable effect of helping the ICBL to enlist the
support of states, as it provided a means of framing the landmines issue without
antagonising states through emphasising their culpability.

A second norm which the ICBL needed to overcome was that of military utility. They
achieved this by publishing several documents which argued that landmines were not
very useful for regular state armies and were not essential to national security. The most
influential of these was Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? A study of the
Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-personnel Mines, published by the ICRC in 1996.
The simultaneous discrediting of the norm of legitimate use meant that possible military
utility had now to be balanced against an emerging norm of landmines as an intrinsically
inhumane weapon. This shifted the balance between military utility and suffering
involved in the concept of proportionality; an essential tenet of international humanitarian
law (IHL) which is used to determine whether or not a weapon should be permitted. In
this way the validity of two old norms underpinning the use of landmines was contested,
opening up space for a diametrically-opposed new norm.

Another aspect of contesting normative space is to link the proposed new norm with pre-
existing supportive norms, as a new norm is more likely to successfully emerge if it is
anchored in a pre-existing normative discourse (Price, 1998: 630) or has a legal

32
precedent. In the case of landmines, this was done by highlighting the (by now) fairly
self-evident relevance of international humanitarian law. More ‘artificial’ links were also
created between anti-personnel mines and chemical weapons, which were already the
subject of a global prohibition regime. This demonstrates how ‘the linkages between
existing norms and emergent norms are often not obvious and must be actively
constructed by the proponents of new norms’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 908).

Framing the landmine problem as a humanitarian crisis allowed the ICBL to situate its
hoped-for new norm within the legal framework of IHL This enabled it to avoid the other
available legal framework of arms control treaties, which are notorious for taking decades
to conclude. A key difference between arms control treaties and IHL is that the former
work by establishing rigid verification procedures, which often constitute major sticking
points for states suspicious of any outside interference in their national security policy,
thus slowing progress. IHL on the other hand works by establishing a new norm and
exercising a moral compunction on states to abide by it, through a process of
stigmatisation of the prohibited behaviour (Thakur & Maley, 1999: 89). IHL is concerned
with minimising the suffering caused by war on both civilians and combatants. In the
context of landmines the chief concern was their impact on the civilian population. The
two main principles of IHL are the prohibition of indiscriminacy and the prohibition of
means and methods of warfare which cause unnecessary suffering. The task of the ICBL
was to point out that landmines contravened existing IHL and to argue for strengthening
an obviously ineffective legal prohibition through a specific ban.

In order to promote a ban, the ICBL explicitly linked the landmines issue to the pre-
existing normative discourse of global prohibition regimes, such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). What the ICBL took from the CWC was not its legal
framework, which lay firmly in the arms control camp, but its establishment of a taboo
around a whole category of weaponry. Although the differences between chemical
weapons and landmines are many, the very existence of a taboo with regard to one
category of weapons made the possibility of creating a landmines taboo seem less
outrageous (Price, 1998: 629). But parallels had still to be drawn between landmines and

33
chemical weapons. The ICBL did this by portraying landmines as causing so much
indiscriminate death and suffering that they ought to be considered as WMD ‘”in slow
motion”’ (Price, 1998: 629). Another link between chemical weapons and landmines was
the cowardly connotations of a weapon which strikes silently— without warning or
obvious human agency. Through this process of comparing landmines and chemical
weapons, the powerful stigma associated with the latter was transferred onto the former,
making it difficult for states to argue against prohibition.

A final aspect of contesting normative space was for the ICBL to demonstrate that its
proposed new norm would not pose a threat to the most important and internalised norms
of the current international order or status quo. The two main übernorms of relevance to
landmines were national security and economic rationality. The first— national security
— is more properly defined as an institution or collection of norms, than a single norm.
Its essence is that states are the subjects of security (rather than individuals) and have the
right to use military force to protect themselves and their interests. Although this norm
had been declining in importance in the post-Cold War era, it was still very much a
fundamental tenet of the international system. Rather than attempt to vanquish the
national security übernorm, the ICBL opted for the less ambitious tactic of justifying the
landmine ban within national security terms. This was achieved through disproving the
military utility of landmines in order to illustrate that banning them would not adversely
affect national security. This was accepted by signatory states, but recalcitrant states
refused to sign because they did not accept the argument that a ban would not interfere
with national security, arguing that there were no available substitutes for the role played
by landmines in military operations (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1997: 276). Neither of
these two state positions challenged the national security übernorm and the ICBL has
been criticised for using ‘strategies that reinforced … state-centric security ideas in
general’ (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1997: 276).

A second übernorm which needed to be addressed, but was not targeted for supercession,
was that of economic rationality. The ICBL did not argue that the humanitarian disaster
of landmines was so severe that the profit motive should be disregarded, rather it argued

34
in terms of the profit motive itself, that landmines were uneconomic. They rendered
agricultural land unusable, increased healthcare costs in affected countries and
permanently reduced productivity in their maimed victims. Banning them would not
significantly affect the profits of major arms companies, as their cheapness meant they
did not represent a large proportion of arms industry profits. Augmenting these
arguments was the possibility that demining could be more profitable for powerful arms
industry interests than selling landmines (Beier & Denholm Crosby, 1998: 281).

Conclusion

Whether a new norm reaches a tipping point depends on how well norm entrepreneurs
frame the issue and contest normative space, as well as external factors such as
geopolitical conditions and the strength of the opposition. In the case of landmines, the
relaxed security environment of the immediate post-Cold War era made national security
concerns seem of less primacy to states, and the ICBL hedged their bets by
simultaneously discrediting the role of antipersonnel mines as protectors of national
security. All of these factors combined to make it possible for a tipping point to be
reached, after which a cascade occurred. Finnemore and Sikkink identify the tipping
point as occurring when Britain and France came on board (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:
1), with their status as major producers of mines meaning their support was regarded as
critical.

At the present moment, the landmine ban norm has cascaded to a large extent, counting
three-quarters of the world’s states as signatories17 to the Ottawa Convention, but it has
still not gained universal acceptance. The level of compliance with the convention
provides a good indicator of its effectiveness in actually alleviating the humanitarian
crisis caused by anti-personnel mines. Compliance seems to be quite high, with the
Landmine Monitor Report 2003 finding that the number of governments using anti-
personnel mines decreased from thirteen in 2001 to six in 200318. Even the number of
17
<http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members> (29/8/04)
18
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/findings.html> (29/8/04)

35
countries in which non-state actors used mines decreased from fourteen in 2002 to eleven
in 200319. The same report also found that the annual number of landmine casualties had
been reduced from a pre-Convention level of 26,000 to between 15,000 and 20,00020. The
successful establishment of a strong norm around landmines partly explains the high
degree of compliance, but the simplicity of the landmine ban has also facilitated its
‘enforcement’ through NGO monitoring, which is carried out by the ICBL’s Landmine
Monitor group21. This complements the existing state-based reporting and compliance
mechanisms established by the Ottawa Convention which are deliberately non-intrusive
in order to encourage state participation. As the more complex small arms issue cannot be
resolved through the introduction of a single strong norm, introducing regulations which
rely on stigmatisation and NGO monitoring as a means of enforcement may not be
possible, meaning that stricter verification measures may be required. The consequences
of this will be examined in the next chapter on the small arms campaign.

19
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/findings.html> (29/8/04)
20
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/findings.html> (29/8/04)
21
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/> (29/8/04)

36
 3. The Small Arms Campaign

In contrast to the favourable geopolitical conditions enjoyed by the ICBL, the small arms
campaign has to contend with a less encouraging international context dominated by
the War on Terror. Even external conditions which the campaign shares with the
ICBL, such as the end of the Cold War and globalisation, have had more negative
consequences for small arms proliferation. It also faces stiffer opposition from a
broader variety of actors in the international system. In addition, the more complex
nature of the issue has made framing and transnational coordination more difficult,
limiting the effectiveness of the campaign.

Characteristics of small arms as weapons

The most basic difference between landmines and small arms is the scale of the problem,
which is largely due to the re-usability and multipurpose utility of small arms. Small arms
can be re-used and re-sold many times, so one of the major difficulties in attempting to
control proliferation is that even if new supplies are properly regulated, there would still
be a thriving black market in second-hand guns. Small arms also serve more purposes in
war and peacetime than anti-personnel mines. During war, they are the most common and
essential tool of combatants, whether highly equipped American troops or rebel factions.
In peacetime, guns are used for hunting, crime, suicide and self-defence, meaning they
are in civilian possession to a far greater extent than landmines and proliferation is just as
common in the North as in the South (Small Arms Survey 2003: 57-95). Estimates of
civilian ownership range from 59%22to 80% (Cukier, 2002: 263) of world firearms.
Regulating them will therefore have a significant impact on civilians and has already led
to civil society opposition as well as support. The impact of small arms on Western
civilians is a unique element of small arms which could be exploited by the campaign in
order to mobilise more public support. The multipurpose utility of small arms also means
22
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook%202002/EngPRkitCH2_11.06.02.pdf> (7/9/04)

37
they touch on more issue-areas, including such diverse subjects as development, domestic
violence and terrorism, and makes choosing a frame for the campaign more difficult.

Because of the unquestionable military and civilian utility of small arms, the idea of
prohibition would be immediately dismissed as impossibly utopian. Small arms
campaigners must try instead to delegitimise certain forms of use; a more complex
undertaking. As yet there is no international consensus over which forms of use should be
delegitimised, or in what order. The same applies for trade regulation. Much of the
industry is legal and will remain so, meaning that campaigners will have to engage with
producers and brokers in a way which was unnecessary for the ICBL. The consequences
for the norm generation process of seeking regulation rather than prohibition are
significant, as regulation implies different legal forms to a prohibitory regime, and uses
different methods of ensuring compliance. It may also be more difficult to generate
public support for complex regulations than a simple outright ban. In addition to these
issue-specific difficulties however, the small arms campaign also has to contend with a
less encouraging external environment.

Regulating Small Arms in a Post-Cold War climate

Some of the positive effects of the end of the Cold War on landmines regulation also
applied to the early years of the small arms campaign. The relaxation of national security
concerns in favour of soft issues and the lack of an international ideological divide
facilitated NGO participation in global politics and greater freedom of movement for
small and medium states such as Canada, which hoped to reprise its earlier role by
pushing for small arms regulation (Smith, 2000: 39). The element of surprise exploited
by the ICBL in circumventing state opposition to a ban had dissipated however, with the
US and other opposing states now more aware of the threat posed to their interests by
coalitions between NGOs and like-minded states (Hubert, 2000: 69).

The scale of the problem was also increased by factors stemming from the end of the
Cold War, such as the relaxation of state authority which led to a temporary breakdown

38
in control of arms stockpiles and longer-term liberalisation of international trade. The
latter had the most impact in the former Soviet bloc, but was also relevant throughout the
rest of the world, with the privatisation of state industries and the removal of trade
barriers transforming all aspects of the global economy, including the arms industry.
Small arms became more readily available, with many regions flooded by guns left over
from Cold War conflicts. Originally supplied by the superpowers to their allies through
the ‘grey market’ for use in proxy wars, guns were now recirculating in the black market,
outside of government control. An example is Afghanistan, where the mujahideen
received around $2 billion of US military aid in the 1980s (Cukier, 2002: 271), (Marsh,
2002: 222). The Taliban and Al Qaeda were later to make use of these weapons, as well
as arms left behind by the Soviets (Cukier, 2002: 271). Further global proliferation was
caused by leakage from state stockpiles in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(Smith, 2000: 40). This involved state employees selling weapons, or as in Albania,
public looting of stockpiles (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 12). Cash-strapped Eastern
European states were also eager to get rid of surplus weaponry they no longer needed for
national security purposes. Much of their stock was outmoded, a factor which encouraged
Eastern European countries to sell off old weapons, in order to help finance the
modernisation of their arsenals prior to joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(WCC, 2001). The privatisation of state-owned arms industries further exacerbated the
problem, with newly profit-hungry companies struggling to stay afloat by selling arms
indiscriminately. Brokers also became harder to control during the 1990s, with previously
government-sanctioned operators whom intelligence agencies had used to set up grey
market deals during the Cold War becoming detached from national security interests and
selling to the highest bidder (Wood & Peleman, 1999).

Another consequence of the end of the Cold War was the emergence of ‘new wars’
(Kaldor, 2003: 120-123), which tend to be intrastate rather than interstate, and fuelled by
ethnic or religious tensions rather than ideology. They generally take place between non-
state actors, sometimes without any government involvement, as is the case in failed
states like Somalia. New wars have led to an exponential increase in the civilian casualty
rate (Muggah, 2001: 72). Estimates vary as to the exact proportion of civilian deaths, but

39
range between thirty-five and ninety per cent (Muggah & Batchelor 2002: 17). Further
evidence of the increasing impact of wars on civilians is the huge increase in the number
of refugees, estimated at 12.8 million, and internally displaced people, estimated at 20-25
million (Muggah & Griffiths, 2002: 13). The higher level of civilian casualties associated
with new wars has spurred a greater focus on small arms, which are the weapons of
choice in these conflicts (Hart Ezell, 2002: 309, Muggah, 2001: 72). The proxy conflicts
of the Cold War typically combined the use of small arms with other larger weapons
systems, as they usually involved at least one government, which, with the backing of a
superpower, had the resources to employ more sophisticated weaponry against an
ideologically opposed rebel force equipped only with small arms. Examples include the
Vietnam War and the Eritrean conflict, where first the Americans and then the Soviets
supplied Ethiopia with fighter jets and high-tech precision bombing systems for use
against Eritrean fighters. In contrast, due to a decline in superpower military aid, the
reliance of new war combatants on small arms is more absolute, thus increasing the
humanitarian importance of controlling small arms proliferation. The predominance of
non-state actors as participants in new wars also means that the small arms transfers
which matter most, in terms of their being used to commit atrocities, are often private
rather than interstate transactions, making them more difficult to regulate under
international law. The higher civilian casualties and forced displacement of civilians
involved in new wars facilitates the framing of the small arms issue in a humanitarian
context. Coupled with the declining relevance of these wars for powerful states, this has
enabled NGOs to play a greater role in the formation of global policies dealing with
them.

Whereas for the landmines issue, the end of the Cold War proved largely a positive
geopolitical context, its ramifications for small arms control were more of a mixed bag.
While efforts to regulate small arms certainly benefited from some of the positive aspects
of the post-Cold War international political climate, the extent of the actual problem
worsened during those years, as a result of other factors stemming from the end of the
bipolar world order. As well as leading to increased small arms proliferation, the end of
the Cold War created conditions which mitigated against controlling the trade in small

40
arms, as it came more out of government control and into the hands of non-state actors,
whether arms dealers or insurgents fighting in new wars. Yet concurrent with these
negative outcomes, there was also more room on the international agenda for soft issues
like small arms and more opportunities for NGOs and small and medium states to get
involved, than had existed during the Cold War.

The War on Terror and the Return to National Security

September 11th took place just two months after the conclusion of the UN Conference on
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Small Arms
Conference). Although the conference succeeded in temporarily raising awareness of
small arms, it was overshadowed by the events of September 11th and their repercussions.
The renewed emphasis on national security due to the War on Terror has reduced the
profile of soft issues on the global agenda and returned the focus of arms control
discourse to WMD. In an assessment of the prospects for further small arms regulation,
Laurance and Stohl speculate that combating terrorism and WMD could eclipse the small
arms issue, resulting in diminished funding and progress (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 43).
The current national security bias also tends to reinforce the tendency of states to regard
small arms as a national security issue (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 43-4), undermining the
efforts of NGOs to frame the issue in other contexts, and hence their viability as partners
in small arms control. The renewed primacy of national security concerns has also led the
US to relax human rights-based criteria for arms exports (Human Rights Watch, 2002).
The ‘with us or against us’ attitude of the Bush administration has reduced the freedom of
movement of NGOs and small and medium states, many of whom have been corralled
into various ‘coalitions of the willing’. The American response to France’s opposition to
the war in Iraq is indicative of the kind of treatment any state that disagrees with the US
on a ‘national security’ issue can expect. Anticipation of a negative reaction from the US
might help to explain the failure of small and medium states to form a core group on
small arms issues, despite the absence of substantial progress at the Small Arms
Conference.

41
The War on Terror has also had some positive side effects for small arms regulation
however. Many countries have stepped up border controls due to terrorism fears, with the
result that stockpiles have become harder to move (Small Arms Survey 2003: 62). An
example is improved maritime container security, spurred by US-led bilateral agreements
(Small Arms Survey 2003: 61), which have been linked to an increase in the market price
of small arms (Small Arms Survey 2003: 62), indicating decreased supply. International
financial transactions have also become more open to scrutiny, with the conclusion of
over fifty agreements against money laundering (UN, 2003: 18). This should make it
more difficult for the proceeds of illicit arms deals to be hidden in offshore bank
accounts, thus hindering arms brokering and illicit trade. There have also been individual
instances of better enforcement of international arms embargoes, the prime example
being Somalia, where prior to September 11th, the political will to enforce the embargo
did not exist. Better enforcement of arms embargoes should not be an assumed
consequence of the War on Terror however, as it is likely to be dependent on whether the
country concerned is linked to Islamist terrorism. Otherwise, the political will to enforce
embargoes is even less likely to exist than before, given the international preoccupation
with terrorism.

As the previous examples illustrate, efforts aimed at fighting terrorism can have positive
implications for small arms control. Given that terrorism is the number one issue on the
international agenda, the most likely to picked up by the media, and the hardest for
governments to ignore, an effective strategy for the small arms campaign could be to
stress the links between small arms and terrorism. The speed with which multilateral
action has proceeded against terrorism contrasts strongly with the slow pace of progress
in ‘softer’ issue areas like human rights, strengthening the case for framing small arms in
a terrorism context. On the whole, the War on Terror has recreated some of the negative
conditions which made arms control issues difficult for the NGO community to influence
during the Cold War. However, it has also created the possibility of progress, if the small
arms campaign can capitalise on the opportunities afforded by the current dominance of
terrorism on the global agenda.

42
Globalisation and Small Arms

One aspect of economic globalisation which has made small arms control more difficult
is the deregulation of international trade and finance. The freeing up of international trade
has more relevance for small arms issue than landmines, as the former is a more lucrative
industry. Small arms production is worth approximately $7.4 billion a year (Small Arms
Survey, 2003), with landmines representing only a fraction of that. Muggah describes
arms dealers and brokers as ‘the new venture capitalists. They are reaping the benefits of
globalisation’ (Muggah, 2001: 71), while Smith claims that ‘Physically moving weapons
around the world has never been easier’ (Smith, 2000: 40). Deregulation of the financial
sector has meant that proceeds from illicit arms deals can be easily hidden in offshore tax
havens, making the tracking of international arms deals difficult. This aspect of financial
globalisation has been exploited by criminals and terrorists, fuelling a rise in
transnational organised crime (Muggah, 2001: 74) and international terrorism, and
creating greater demand for guns. The increasing ease of international financial
transactions has meant that diaspora communities can fundraise abroad and help with the
trading of conflict goods (Muggah, 2001; 71), facilitated by the improved
communications infrastructures of technological globalisation. Conflicts are also being
prolonged by combatants’ easy access to global markets, enabling them to trade conflict
goods like diamonds or drugs in exchange for small arms (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002:
11).

In line with trends in other sectors of the global economy, the arms industry has become
increasingly privatised and transnationalised. As mentioned earlier the end of the Cold
War resulted in the privatisation of state arms industries and the delinking of arms sales
from governmental control. This trend has been exacerbated by the transnationalisation of
production and brokering. 1,249 firms in over ninety countries are currently involved in
small arms production (Small Arms Survey 2004), due to improved technology transfer
to the developing world (Hart Ezell, 2001: 308). Western defence industries are

43
becoming more export-oriented, as with the decline of state subsidisation in many
countries, exporting has become the only way for many of them to survive. Indeed
governments have come to view competition by national arms companies in export
markets as a means of sustaining their national defence industry base (Held et al., 1999:
114). Brokers can also locate different aspects of their operations in different countries to
exploit advantageous local conditions; capitalising on arms surpluses in one part of the
world and high demand in another, or conducting their business in weak states with poor
regulation and corrupt officials to circumvent what few international controls exist
(Smith, 2000: 40).

At the same time as economic globalisation is fuelling the arms trade, the ability of states
to regulate small arms proliferation has been undermined (Muggah, 2001: 71). Neoliberal
policies promoting fiscal rectitude in the form of expenditure cuts and high levels of debt
repayment have left many developing countries without the resources to combat small
arms proliferation. With the state spending less money on policing and the judicial
system, there is increased reliance on private security companies by the rich, and
vigilante groups by the poor (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 11). The global private security
industry was estimated to be worth $100 billion in the 1990s, and this is expected to
increase to $400 billion by 2010 (Small Arms Survey, 2001: 220). Reliance on private
security undermines the state security apparatus, and contributes to a spiral of civilian
armament. Another factor behind the increase in private security is the globalisation of
media saturated with alarmist local crime reports which can create perceptions of
insecurity, even when actual rates of crime are not that high (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002:
10).

The inequality associated with globalisation was identified in the opening chapter as one
of the root causes of crime and conflict today. These root causes need to be dealt with in
order to reduce the demand for small arms. Muggah and Batchelor conclude that ‘There
is a growing consensus around the idea that a lack of opportunity and perceived injustice
and inequality compels some people to take up arms’ (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 7).
Neoliberal policies such as privatising state industries without providing alternative jobs

44
for workers whose jobs are cut has caused unemployment, while reduced social
expenditure has meant less educational opportunities for the young in developing
countries, and hence less job prospects. Joblessness is a major factor in the decision of
young men to turn to crime, and members of that demographic group are recognised as
the main perpetrators and victims of small arms violence (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002:
17). With greater availability of guns due to global free trade, this is unfortunately
becoming an easier option.

On a more positive note, the same globalising factors which facilitated the creation of a
transnational landmines community still exist in the context of small arms. Media
globalisation has helped raise awareness of the problem and technological globalisation
has facilitated communication between NGOs in different countries campaigning on the
issue. Despite this, the small arms campaign has been less successful than the ICBL in
coordinating its activities, partly as a result of framing difficulties, which will be
examined later and partly because IANSA failed to adopt a strong advocacy role from the
outset (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 22), confining itself to information sharing between
NGOs, rather than identifying a collective position (Hubert, 2000: 60). In the early days
IANSA aimed for breadth rather than depth of support (Hubert, 2000: 53) and even
included a disclaimer on its documents saying that the views expressed were not
necessarily shared by all its participants (Hubert, 2000: 53). Human rights and
humanitarian NGOs were said to have felt excluded due to the failure of the UN
Programme of Action to even mention their concerns and operated largely independently
of IANSA (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 30). Better coordination will be needed to take
advantage of the multilayered campaigning opportunities offered by the
transnationalisation of civil society and there are some signs that this is now happening.
In 2002 IANSA appointed a new director with the aim of providing ‘strategic and
dynamic leadership to a network of NGOs’ (IANSA, 2002: 23) and launched the Control
Arms Campaign as a joint venture with Oxfam and Amnesty International in October
200323 with a day of coordinated global action. The Control Arms Campaign has adopted
a strong advocacy role and corresponds more closely than IANSA to the definition of

23
<http://www.controlarms.org/events/launch_summary.htm> (7/9/04)

45
NGO campaigns as ‘deliberate efforts to coordinate movement actions around a
particular policy or event’ so as to spread a message to the general public (Smith et al,
1997: 65). Now that improved coordination is finally taking place, the small arms
campaign may prove more effective.

The emerging system of complex multilateralism which was exploited by the ICBL is
still in existence but may not be so easy for the small arms campaign to utilise. The UN
seems determined to avoid a repetition of its circumvention by the Ottawa process, and is
making sure that it remains the only negotiating forum for the small arm issue (Hubert,
2000: 54). Its territorial attitude leads Hubert to conclude that ‘within the UN, the
Department of Disarmament Affairs has until recently done more to inhibit than to
promote coalition building’ (Hubert, 2000: 61). The sidelining of the UN was a crucial
factor in the success of the landmines campaign, and if intergovernmental action on small
arms remains confined to the machinery set up under the Small Arms Conference, it
cannot hope to achieve significant progress. Like the CCW Review Conference, the
Small Arms Conference represented an opportunity for NGOs to influence global policy
formation. The terms of access for NGOs were better for the Small Arms Conference,
allowing them limited speaking time (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 18). Despite this, the
small arms community did not replicate the success of the ICBL in using the venue as a
launching pad for a fast-track campaign, perhaps illustrating a degree of co-optation
through its incorporation in the conference. Ironically, the ICBL may have benefited from
its exclusion from the CCW Review Conference, as it helped to dramatise the fact that
states were excluding humanitarian concerns from consideration. By incorporating
IANSA within the conference, the UN succeeded both in maintaining control of the
process and possibly in diluting the vehemence of NGO advocacy. The result was that the
Small Arms Conference failed either to come up with radical, binding regulations or to
generate any momentum for an independent negotiating process. The reasons for this
failure owe a lot to internal factors within the campaign, which was less coordinated than
the ICBL, but also relate to the aforementioned determination of the UN to maintain
control over the process (Hubert, 2000: 54), and to the learned wariness of opposing
states towards negotiations outside of traditional channels. The fact that small arms is

46
being dealt with by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly has resulted in its
pigeonholing as a national security and arms control matter (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 28)
and while the process remains under UN auspices it is unlikely to overcome this
compartmentalisation. The consensus-based negotiating procedures involved are also not
conducive to rapid progress and the outcome of the 2003 First Biennial Meeting of
States24 which merely commented on the implementation of existing policy illustrates the
stagnation which has affected the process.

Although globalisation has presented some opportunities for the small arms community
to promote non-proliferation measures, so far these have been outweighed by
countervailing forces of globalisation which exacerbate both the supply and demand sides
of the problem. On the supply side, privatisation and transnationalisation have made the
arms trade harder for states to monitor and control, but regulatory responses have been
inadequate to dealing with the problem, leading to growing privatisation of security.
Demand for small arms has also been fuelled by the increasing inequality associated with
globalisation. For its part, the small arms campaign has so far failed to fully exploit the
opportunities afforded it by the transnationalisation of civil society. The greater
opposition of other actors in the international system will be examined next.

Strong Opposition and Weak Support from International Actors

The main international actors involved in the small arms issue are states, especially their
national security sector, the UN, the arms industry and civil society. The small arms
campaign shares some common opponents with the ICBL, but faces greater quantitative
and qualitative opposition. State support is weaker, while the UN’s attitude is arguably
more territorial than helpful. The instigation of the Small Arms Conference by states and
the UN could be regarded as an attempt to control agenda-setting in order to avoid a
repetition of the NGO-driven landmine ban campaign. Opposing states have been largely
the same as for landmines, with the US, Russia, and China all attempting to limit small
24
The UN First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

47
arms regulation, but one major difference is that opposing states are now better prepared
and have pursued a strategy of pre-empting regulatory efforts from the beginning. An
example was the participation of major small arms producing nations like the US, Britain
and France in an early meeting of supposedly likeminded states and NGOs in Oslo in
July 1998. Not suprisingly the meeting ended up endorsing existing measures rather than
proposing anything radically new (Hubert, 2000: 51). The participation of opposing states
in the Small Arms Conference also contrasts with the Ottawa process (Hubert, 2000: 37),
as does the use of consensus-based decision making rather than majority voting. As a
result the Programme of Action agreed at the conference was largely defined by the
lowest-common denominator positions of recalcitrant states. Even though the vast
majority of states agreed that sales of military-style weapons to civilians should be
banned, the issue failed to make it on to the Programme of Action due to US opposition
(Batchelor, 2002: 39), while China steadfastly opposed any references to human rights
(Laurence and Stohl, 2002: 32) and was instrumental in blocking greater NGO
participation (Batchelor, 2002: 39).

The ideological orientation of many governments has swung to the right since 1997, with
Third Way politicians losing power in many countries (Karp, 2002: 185), but perhaps the
most significant change in state attitudes has come from the US. The Bush administration
has at times appeared almost ideologically opposed to multilateralism, This has been
demonstrated by refusals to support the Kyoto Protocol, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty and the International Criminal Court, as well as the invasion of Iraq. A disregard
for multilateralism, global governance and international law is clearly not conducive to
the development of new global small arms norms and regulatory frameworks. In addition
to this, the Republicans strongly support the gun lobby in the US, leading one observer of
the Small Arms Conference to conclude that ‘the NRA [National Rifle Association]
emerged as a greater force than all the 180 other NGOs there combined, dominating the
American delegation to a degree few had previously imagined possible’ (Karp, 2002:
186).

48
Another aspect of states’ attitudes is that even seemingly supportive states vary in their
level of enthusiasm for different aspects of small arms regulation, supporting some while
opposing others. For example, many developing countries support marking and tracing,
weapons destruction and monitoring measures, but oppose export controls and
conditionality (Laurance & Stohl, 2002: 32). Hubert has highlighted the dangers of NGOs
allying themselves with governments too early in a campaign, before their respective
positions have been clearly established and NGOs can be certain of their full support. He
notes that the ICBL was careful not to form an alliance with states until they had fully
committed to supporting a ban and that the small arms campaign should follow its
example (Hubert, 2000: 62). Whether IANSA can claim to be independent of state
influence, even at this early stage in the campaign, is dubious, given its funding by
Britain, Belgium, Sweden and Norway25.

One of the failings of the Small Arms Conference was that almost all the government
delegates came from a national security background (Laurance and Stohl, 2002: 26),
which mitigated against recognising the multidimensionality of the problem (Laurance &
Stohl, 2002: 34). It also situated the issue in an unhelpful context where the dominant
norm is the right of states to defend themselves, rather than humanitarian considerations.
Unfortunately for the small arms campaign, there is no possibility of reconstructing the
premise of lack of military utility which was a factor in building an alliance between
states and the ICBL and the military is likely to be hostile to the notion of small arms
regulation if it is perceived as a threat to their supplies. On the other hand, focusing on
illicit trade, which often involves sales to insurgents and terrorists, is something the
military might be expected to support. Military attitudes therefore help to explain the
emphasis on combating illicit trade at the Small Arms Conference and the reluctance of
states to tackle the licit trade.

Intelligence agencies are another important part of the national security sector and their
opposition to small arms regulation is largely motivated by the desire to maintain secrecy
over clandestine transfers to clients. An example is the use by the Central Intelligence

25
<www.iansa.org/aboutiansa.htm> (7/9/04).

49
Agency of dodgy brokers to provide cover for ‘grey market’ deals to clients (Marsh,
2002: 221-3), allowing them to deny knowledge of morally dubious arms transfers
(Austin, 2002: 209). Retaining the option of using these brokers, who often also act as
informants, can be deemed important enough strategically to justify allowing them to
continue their illicit operations. This attitude has been identified as an impediment to
efforts to regulate brokering (Austin, 2002: 209) and may explicate the lack of progress
in that area.

Another salient difference between the landmines and small arms issues is the attitude of
the major arms companies. The value of the legal trade in small arms is estimated at $4-6
billion a year, (Small Arms Survey 2001: 145), and thus represents a significant
proportion of world weapons transfers26. As a result, the arms industry is more vocal
about small arms regulation and the economic importance of military industries
undoubtedly influences state positions, even when they ostensibly support better
regulation. An example is Belgium, which despite being a major funder of IANSA, is
home to FN Herstal, a company in the top five of world producers of rifles, machine guns
and small arms ammunition27. The arms industry, through the Manufacturers’ Advisory
Group (MAG), was also one of the major backers of the World Forum on the Future of
Sports Shooting Activities (WFSA) (Batchelor, 2002: 38) which participated as an NGO
at the Small Arms Conference. Despite MAG’s engagement with the issue, one study
found that the industry had not implemented any of its own recommendations for self-
regulation (Laurance & Stohl, 2002; 27), lending credence to the view that its objective
has been to dissuade governments from taking action, rather than to propose alternatives
(Batchelor, 2002: 38). The arms industry has suggested limiting the discussion of small
arms to fully automatic military-style weapons (Glock, 2002: 16), which would exclude
the vast majority of civilian-owned guns from regulatory efforts. Another part of its
strategy is to differentiate between licit and illicit trade, in order to encourage
governments to target only the latter. As the line between licit and illicit trade is
notoriously blurred (Muggah & Griffiths, 2002: 3), it comes as no surprise that the arms

26
Using the figure of $20 billion for the total global arms trade in 1995 (Roberts & Williams, 1995: 34),
small arms would therefore constitute approximately 25% of this total, as compared to 0.5% for landmines.
27
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook%202003/yb2003_en_presskit_ch1.pdf> (7/9/04).

50
industry is opposed to transparency measures, which could expose the linkages between
the two trades. The global illicit trade in small arms is estimated at less than $1 billion a
year, but at 10-20% (Muggah & Griffiths, 2002; 4) (Marsh, 2002: 220) this represents a
high proportion for a supposedly legitimate industry. Citing business confidentiality as
essential to profits is a means by which the industry has attempted to avoid the
implementation of transparency measures (Haug et al, 2002: 11), and so far this has been
largely accepted by governments.

Civil society groups represent a formidable opponent for the small arms campaign which
did not exist for the ICBL. The most prominent opponent is WFSA which represents
nearly thirty organisations in thirteen countries, including hunting and sports shooting
groups, as well as small arms manufacturers28. Their most prominent member is the
NRA, a lobby group which is very powerful in the US. Its influence on the American
delegation to the Small Arms Conference was huge (Karp, 2002: 186), ensuring that no
references to controlling transfers to civilians or non-state actors were included in the
final Programme of Action. While the arms industry opposes small arms regulation in
order to protect its profits, groups like the NRA represent an additional set of norms for
the small arms campaign to overcome. Central among these is the right to self-defence—
a tenet of world religions from Islam to Christianity (Small Arms Survey, 2004: 181)—
and expressed as the right to bear arms by the gun lobby. It is no coincidence that the
Christian right in the US is among the foremost proponents of the right to bear arms, and
overcoming a norm which is embedded in religious belief will be a difficult task for the
small arms campaign to accomplish.

28
<http://www.wfsa.net> (29/8/04).

51
Framing Small Arms as a first step towards Norm Generation

52
In contrast to the landmine ban norm, the small arms issue is still at the first stage in
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle— that of norm emergence. There is no
general agreement within the campaign about which norms should be prioritised,
with proposed norms including bans on sales of small arms to non-state actors29 or to
situations where they are likely to be used in human rights abuses30, prohibiting
civilian possession of military weapons, as well as conventions in marking, tracing31
and brokering32 which, due to their complexity, are difficult to distil into a single
normative principle. The reason for this proliferation of competing norms is that the
small arms campaign has not settled on a single frame for the issue, making solutions
stemming from a number of contexts appear equally valid. The campaign could be
described as still involved in a framing contest, with different NGOs competing to
establish their particular field of expertise as the context of the issue. Although it is
advisable for NGOs to highlight different aspects of the issue depending on their area
of interest, so as to make best use of their various skills and knowledge, the
campaign would arguably be more effective if it emphasised one particular context
and one particular definition of the problem in its advocacy work. Emphasising one
particular frame could help small arms campaigners to get a clearer, stronger
message across, which, in the contemporary world of the media soundbite, can be
crucial for generating publicity and momentum. Lack of agreement on frames has
prevented coordinated advocacy; a shortcoming which has lessened the impact of the
campaign. The greater complexity of the small arms issue has made selecting a
frame more difficult however, as it touches on a greater number of contexts than
landmines and using one frame could therefore risk accusations of irrelevance to
other contexts.

29
Proposed by Canada prior to the Small Arms Conference.
30
Proposed by a coalition of NGOs including Amnesty International, the British-American Security
Information Council, the Arias Foundation, Oxfam, the Federation of American Scientists, Project
Ploughshares, Saferworld and the Friends Committee.
31
Draft Convention on the Marking, Registration and Tracing of Small Arms and Light Weapons, drawn up
by Groupe de récherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP).
32
Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms
Brokering, <http://www.grip.org/bdg/g2055.html > (7/9/04).

53
There is also a lack of agreement on which aspects of the small arms issue to
problematise. Due to their multipurpose utility, the norm of legitimate use cannot be
contested by small arms campaigners, so instead the focus must be on re-defining the
meaning of legitimate use. In what circumstances is use by civilians and non-state
actors legitimate? How is government misuse to be defined? Is small arms
proliferation in general the problem, or only small arms in the hands of particular
groups? The ICBL avoided these sorts of questions by siting agency in the landmines
themselves and problematising all use of all anti-personnel mines. Because small
arms need people to operate them, siting agency in guns is not a possibility, and
defining small arms proliferation per se as the problem becomes more difficult. The
slogan ‘guns don’t kill, people do’, encapsulates the inherent difficulties of weapons-
centred discourse. Exacerbating the problem definition difficulties is controversy
over which weapons should be included under the heading of ‘small arms’ for the
purposes of international regulation. Gun industry advocates suggest that only fully
automatic ‘weapons of war’ should be included (Glock, 2002: 16), while IANSA
wants coverage of ‘all those SALW [Small Arms and Light Weapons] categories,
which are recovered in the context of armed conflict and crime’ (IANSA, 2004: 2-3).
The UN Programme of Action avoided this issue by the simple device of never
defining what it meant by small arms.

The only aspect of the small arms issue which a majority of states agree is a problem is
illicit trade. Critics would argue that separating the illicit and licit trades is not possible,
and that even if it were, no proof exists as to which causes more damage in terms of
contributing to war and repression around the world (Muggah & Griffiths, 2002: 19). As
the number of illicitly-manufactured guns is known to be small (Cukier, 2002: 271-2), it
follows that virtually all illegally-held small arms started out in the legal market (Marsh,
2002; 223). The approach of the Small Arms Conference in targeting illicit trade has been
described as promoting ‘government regulation of small arms exports, not to block them,
but to insure that they are legal’ (Karp, 2002: 183). The conference’s failure to define
new normative standards for arms exports means that under the UN Programme of
Action a government can sell weapons to an armed group which it knows is massacring

54
civilians, provided there is no UN embargo and the sale is legal under domestic law.
Nowhere in the document is there any mention of IHL or human rights-based export
control criteria. Until there is widespread agreement within the small arms campaign
regarding which other aspects of the issue to problematise and which frames to use to
facilitate this, broadening the focus from illicit trade will be a difficult task, and singling
out norms to promote even more so.

The small arms campaign must select a frame which can encompass as many aspects of
the issue as possible, while situating it in a context where NGOs are seen as experts and
legitimate participants in policy formation. The chosen frame must also be capable of
galvanising popular support for urgent action through ‘frame alignment’ (Warkentin &
Mingst, 2000). As was mentioned earlier, a frame will attract more support if it adapts to
changing geopolitical conditions. The context in which the issue is framed will suggest a
particular set of normative solutions, which can be linked to pre-existing supportive
norms or disassociated from opposing norms as part of the process of contesting
normative space. The small arms campaign is faced with stronger opposing norms than
the ICBL was. Central among these is the right to self-defence which is used by the gun
lobby as justification for opposing small arms control and finds backing in Christian and
Islamic theology. Similar to this is the national security übernorm, the basic premise of
which is the state’s right to defend itself. Small arms are the most basic tool of combat
and cannot be readily substituted by other weapons, so their use in defence is essential.
Contesting the self-defence norm will mean strengthening its delegation to police, rather
than attempting to argue against it in principle. This will be easier in some countries than
others. The right to bear arms as a means of self-defence seems strongest in states like the
US and South Africa, while in Europe, legitimate gun use is based more on hunting and
sports than self-defence. This is reflected in the higher percentage of long-guns owned in
Europe, compared to the US where handguns are more popular (Small Arms Survey
2003: 66-67). Another aspect of contesting normative space is linking new norms to
supportive norms and how this is done largely depends on the particular frame being
used. Given the political sensitivity of the small arms problem, a further consideration
when choosing a frame is whether it can depoliticise the issue.

55
Frames which have been proposed by NGOs include humanitarianism, human rights,
development, public health and crime control. All of these are areas in which NGOs have
an input in policy formation, so they are more suitable from the small arms campaign’s
perspective than the current national security/arms control framework within which the
UN Programme of Action is situated. Each frame suggests different types of solutions,
and is more relevant to the some of the contexts in which small arms used than others, as
well as drawing on varying constituencies and quantities of support. Besides these ‘soft’
frames, it is also argued here that a terrorism frame could be utilised as a means of
gaining media attention and mobilising rapid state action. The discussion will now turn to
examining a sample of possible frames to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages
associated with each.

Humanitarianism
At first glance, framing small arms as a humanitarian issue seems an obvious choice.
Humanitarian campaigns have a good track record of creating a sense of crisis and once a
situation is defined as a humanitarian crisis there is an expectation of speedy intervention
(Price, 1998: 639), which does not apply in other contexts. IHL provides a legal
precedent for regulation of weapons use, with the possibility of linking new small arms
norms to those precedents. Depoliticisation is another useful consequence. But there are
also some disadvantages to using a humanitarian frame. IHL only applies to situations of
armed conflict, whereas small arms use is equally common in peacetime. Once an issue
has been defined within a certain context, it can be difficult to break out of that normative
discourse and expand the agenda to other contexts. Adopting a solely humanitarian
approach could risk irrelevance to aspects such as the use of small arms in crime, which
is the most obvious facet of the small arms problem in the West. As conflicts are now
mostly confined to developing countries (Muggah & Griffiths, 2002: 8), a humanitarian
approach could risk situating small arms as a purely Third World problem and overlook
the opportunities for mobilising public support afforded by the effects of gun crime on
Western civilians. Mass shootings in particular can have an immediate effect on attitudes
to gun control, as happened in Britain with the banning of civilian possession of

56
handguns after the Dunblane massacre (Small Arms Survey 2004: 188-9). Although
situating small arms as a humanitarian issue could be useful in promoting measures such
as preventing transfers to zones of conflict where IHL is breached, it may not be a
suitable frame for reducing the total quantity of guns in circulation; a measure which is
seen by the Small Arms Survey as necessary to reduce their overall impact (Small Arms
Survey 2001). Tackling only one aspect of the problem in this manner could leave it
essentially unaffected.

Human Rights
Human rights has been identified by at least one commentator as the field in which NGOs
have the most influence in drawing up treaties and monitoring compliance (Ritchie, 1996:
185), so in terms of choosing a frame which allows NGOs to seen as legitimate
participants in policy formation, it would seem to possess an advantage. In contrast to
humanitarianism, a human rights approach can apply to conflict and peacetime contexts
and to both the North and South. It comes with a ready-made legal framework of
supportive norms to which new small arms norms could be linked, anchoring them to a
pre-existing normative discourse and thereby increasing their chance of success (Price,
1998: 630). The UN Special Rapporteur on Small Arms has suggested developing the
norm of ‘due diligence’ in order to obligate states to regulate the availability and use of
small arms as a means of protecting the right to life (Frey, 2002: 21). In the context of
controlling the trade in small arms, various NGOs have produced a Framework
Convention33 which would expand the norm of state responsibility to make states
accountable if they assist in committing internationally wrongful acts by exporting small
arms to locations of widespread human rights abuse.

Rights discourse also places a strong emphasis on attributing responsibility for violations
and on defining the content of states’ obligations to protect human rights. This could be a
useful track to pursue as, unlike with landmines, the focus of the small arms campaign is
illegitimate use rather than delegitimising the weapon. Focusing on illegitimate use
necessitates blaming individuals or states, which the ICBL avoided by attributing blame
33
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/images/ul/_/_user_My_Documents_Amnesty_Work_control_arms_Framew
orkConvention.pdf > (7/9/04).

57
to the landmine itself. Adopting a blaming approach could be counterproductive
however, as it would make it more difficult for NGOs to persuade states to adopt new
norms. A related disadvantage of a human rights frame is that it lacks the perceived
‘neutrality’ of humanitarianism, possibly because naming names and attributing blame
are essential components of the work of human rights NGOs, but also because human
rights is sometimes regarded as a western-imposed ideology, with less resonance for
other cultures. As frame alignment is essential for individuals to support a campaign, the
ability of human rights-based norms to generate cross-cultural support may be less than
that of humanitarian norms. In terms of creating a sense of crisis, a rights-based approach
may lack the emotive appeal of humanitarianism, as rather than emphasising the
protection of innocents, human rights stresses the dignity and autonomy of the individual;
a perspective which is arguably less conducive to intervention. The current trend towards
fusion between humanitarian and human rights law (Frey, 2002: 18) could augur well for
a campaign combining humanitarian and human rights frames however.

Public Health
The public health approach involves likening small arms-related injuries to a disease
epidemic, with causes and impacts analysed in a scientific, seemingly neutral manner
(Cukier, 2002). This avoids attributing blame to the individuals responsible for inflicting
small arms injuries, by viewing such injuries as statistical occurrences, with the goal
being to reduce their incidence. Just as reducing exposure to viruses helps to control the
spread of disease, reducing access to guns is seen as a means of reducing the number of
small arms injuries (Cukier, 2002: 262). This returns the focus to the weapon itself, rather
than the person pulling the trigger, and for this reason has attracted the ire of gun
advocates (Glock, 2003: 18) The public health approach also advocates a primary or
preventive healthcare approach of addressing the root causes of violence (Cukier, 2002:
261), meaning that it encompasses demand as well as supply-side approaches to the
problem. It can apply to situations of peace as well as conflict, and to developed and
developing countries, breaking down the distinction between firearms used in peace and
small arms used in war. Another advantage is that it can draw on health economics,
involving cost-benefit analyses (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 20), to allow economic

58
arguments for small arms control to be made, by calculating the financial costs of small
arms injuries, lost earnings and so on. This has the added appeal of justifying itself in
terms of perhaps the most powerful übernorm of the current capitalist world system; that
of economic rationality. Some commentators have theorised that a norm is more likely to
succeed if it complies with capitalism (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 907), and if the
public health approach succeeded in defining small arms proliferation as an economic
issue, then speedier and more effective action could be anticipated. It would be difficult
for governments to argue against proof that small arms proliferation did not make
economic sense. More research needs to be done to accumulate the necessary evidence
to back up such arguments, particularly in developing countries where data is often non-
existent. Much of the health economics evidence regarding the financial cost of small
arms injuries comes from the US, where they are estimated to cost the economy $100
billion a year (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 21). The economic effects can be even more
dramatic for developing countries: it is thought that the GDP of Latin America is reduced
by 15-20% a year as a result of small arms violence (Muggah & Batchelor, 2002: 6). A
possible disadvantage of the public health approach is that, unlike humanitarianism or
human rights, it has no international legal framework, which may make the linking of
public health-based new norms with pre-existing supportive norms more difficult.
However as the grafting of the chemical weapons taboo onto landmines illustrates, links
with supportive norms can be created where they are not immediately obvious. Indeed the
lack of a specific international framework could even prove advantageous, avoiding the
restriction of small arms regulation to a single area of international law, such as IHL.
This could make it easier to draw on legal precedents from other fields such as
international trade law, which enjoy better compliance levels. A possible disadvantage of
using the public health frame is that its dry scientific approach may not be as effective in
galvanising public support as the emotive appeal of humanitarianism. If small arms
injuries can be likened to a public health crisis and a ‘health scare’ created however, there
could be a strong basis for popular support. The overall advantage of the public health
frame is its versatility which has led to its proposal as a sort of lowest common
denominator which to unite the various strands of the small arms issue (Muggah, 2001:
76).

59
Terrorism
Although terrorism is not a subject in which NGOs are regarded as possessing expertise,
its dominance on the current international agenda means that ignoring the links between
small arms and terrorism would represent a missed opportunity to gain media attention
and pressurise governments into faster action. The speed with which states signed up to
the twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions after September 11th (UN, 2003: 18) illustrates
how quickly the international community can act when it wants to, and contrasts with the
slow pace of progress on soft issues. Most of the progress on combating illicit trade
reported by the BMS related to anti-terrorism measures, further illustrating how effective
a terrorism focus could be. In order to avoid restricting the debate to illicit trade
however, the small arms campaign would have to emphasise that as the licit and illicit
trades cannot be meaningfully separated, regulation of the entire arms trade is needed to
prevent small arms getting into the hands of terrorists. Campaigners could publicise the
fact that SALW, rather than WMD, are the weapons actually used by terrorists. For
example they were the main tools used by Al Qaeda against the US-led coalition in the
war in Afghanistan (Small Arms Survey 2003: 73) and the skills acquired by Al Qaeda
members as a result of training in the use of small arms have been described as ‘the
operational heart of the organization, the curriculum all its activists were expected to
master’ (Small Arms Survey 2003: 73). If these facts were more widely known, it could
result in increased public pressure for supply-side regulation of the small arms trade. In
order to combat the demand side of the equation, the link between underdevelopment and
terrorism could be emphasised, capitalising on the contemporary perception of ‘failed
states’ as ‘breeding grounds’ for terrorists (Small Arms Survey 2003: 150). Although the
links between underdevelopment, violence and terrorism are generally recognised, as yet
the idea of combating terrorism through development has attracted more lipservice than
funding (Small Arms Survey, 2003: 151). An obvious disadvantage with adopting a
terrorism frame is that NGOs are not regarded as experts in the field and it is seen as very
much as a national security matter, which NGOs should not be able to influence. Despite
this the very prominence of terrorism as an international issue means that framing small
arms in a terrorism context must play a role if the campaign is to succeed.

60
Conclusion

All the above frames possess advantages and disadvantages for the small arms campaign,
as they involve different frameworks of supportive norms and emphasise different
aspects of a very multidimensional problem. By examining a sample of possible frames it
was intended to illustrate the consequences of framing choices for the eventual success of
an NGO campaign. The external conditions in which a campaign takes place will also
influence which frames will be suitable for mobilising public support and media
attention, so both external and internal factors need to be considered in tandem. A final
matter to consider is whether the small arms norms which eventually emerge will attract a
high level of compliance. Whereas the landmines problem was resolvable through the
promulgation of a single, simple, prohibitory norm, which could exert a strong moral
obligation to comply and be relatively easy for NGOs to monitor compliance with, the
more complex small arms issue cannot be resolved in this manner. More complex
regulations are required, the very complexity of which could be expected to lessen the
normative pull towards compliance, as well as making compliance more difficult for
NGOs to monitor. The CCW provides evidence of the failure of a complex regulation
system in the absence of strict compliance procedures. It follows therefore that small
arms regulation would require more stringent verification procedures, which would need
to be enforced by states. An example of the sort of enforcement mechanisms which might
be required can be found in the intrusive verification procedures contained in
international arms control treaties such as the ABM Treaty. Unfortunately persuading
state to support such measures is going to be far more difficult than securing agreement
to a normative treaty, and requiring strict verification procedures returns the small arms
issue to the national security/arms control format which campaigners have been trying so
hard to escape.

61
 Conclusion

The preceding chapters have outlined the external and internal factors which influenced
the ability of the NGO campaigns around landmines and small arms to influence global
policy formation. It was suggested that in order for a campaign to succeed, it is necessary
for favourable political opportunity structures to exist (Smith, 1997: 57). External factors
influencing whether such favourable conditions exist include geopolitical conditions and
the strength of opposition to a particular campaign. The focus on geopolitical conditions
was intended to illustrate that regardless of internal factors like how well a campaign is
run, or the characteristics of the issue itself, whether an issue will come to prominence is
largely dependent on wider forces outside of campaigners’ control. It was concluded that
the current geopolitical climate is not conducive to small arms regulation in the same way
as the end of the Cold War was to the prohibition of landmines, and that ongoing forces
of globalisation have tended to exacerbate small arms proliferation while the emerging
system of global governance has so far proved inadequate to dealing with the problem.

Also examined were the internal factors of framing and norm generation which determine
a campaign’s efficacy. Because NGOs do not possess any ‘hard power’, they are reliant
to a much greater extent than other actors in the international system on the tools of ‘soft
power’, namely persuasion and expertise, which they use to popularise their frames for
issues. NGO campaigns cannot succeed without the support of other actors in the
international system, particularly states. Measures which powerful states regard as
seriously counter to their interests are unlikely to succeed and if states are preoccupied
with other issues such as the War on Terror, they are less likely to support an NGO
campaign on issues they regard as irrelevant to this overriding concern.

The first conclusion stemming from this is that NGOs must frame issues in ways that
make them seem of interest to states and relevant to their concerns, even if this involves
the forging of quite artificial connections. Due to changing global conditions, it is not

62
sufficient for campaigners to simply replicate the tactics of earlier successful campaigns.
The difficulty for the small arms campaign is that the frames or contexts in which NGOs
are perceived as having the most expertise, and therefore the most right to participate in
global policy formation, are not those which currently dominate international discourse,
commanding state and media attention. NGOs are not generally regarded as experts in the
fields of national security and terrorism, but opportunities to gain media attention for
their campaign will be missed if they ignore these areas. Ironically, whereas the
landmines campaign worked hard to de-link the issue from the context of national
security, the small arms campaign’s ability to attract attention and generate support, may
hinge on its ability to link the issue to terrorism, and hence to the national security
concerns which dominate the contemporary international agenda. Therefore it is
suggested that as well as presenting the small arms issue in the light of NGOs’ fields of
expertise, whether humanitarian or public health-based, the small arms campaign must
also highlight the links between small arms and terrorism. It will be difficult to strike the
right balance between framing the issue in an area of NGO expertise and linking it to
terrorism however. They may find that establishing the relevance of small arms to
terrorism could result in the issue being categorised as a matter which NGOs should not
influence.

This leads to a second conclusion— that the success of the ICBL was largely a result of
the ‘interwar’ climate in which it took place. Similarities exist between the role played by
the ICBL in successfully lobbying for a landmine ban, and the extensive involvement of
NGOs in international politics during the interwar period of the 20th century (Kaldor,
2003: 87). Further parallels have been drawn between NGO participation in the Ottawa
process and the lobbying of Tsar Nicholas II by NGOs to convene the 1899 and 1907
Hague conferences (Rutherford, 1999: 45). If Hubert is right that ‘the 1990s can be
characterized as a neo-idealist period with strong parallels to the decades preceding each
of the two world wars.’ (Hubert, 2000: 70), then it may turn out that the 1990s come to be
regarded as another ‘interwar’ period in which a temporary window for civil society
participation in global policy formation opened, before being shut with the advent of the
‘War on Terror’. The current national security-dominated climate seems largely to have

63
returned NGOs to their previous Cold War position of relative impotence, although the
new opportunities for transnational coordination and multilayered campaigning offered
by globalisation may go some way to offsetting this reversal. The ‘phony war’ nature of
the War on Terror may eventually lead to a return to a more peacetime political context,
and a corresponding increase in room for soft issues on the international agenda, or
alternatively it may prove an ideal substitute for the Cold War.

A third conclusion is that NGO campaigns will be most successful when they have a
simple clear message to promote. This was the case for the ICBL, but not for the small
arms campaign. A corollary to this is that problems in need of more complex solutions
may not be suitable issues for NGO campaigns to tackle. As the small arms problem is
not amenable to solution by means of a simple prohibitory norm, it will be more difficult
for NGOs to generate support and monitor compliance. This is due to the fact that NGOs
generate soft power by mobilising public support, which is easier to do behind a simple
clear moral message than behind a more nuanced call for complicated technical
regulations. Although NGOs are now able to play a greater role in international politics,
because of emergence of new forms of global governance like complex multilateralism
and the improved opportunities for transnational cooperation provided by
communications globalisation, their power is still very much circumscribed by external
conditions and the limitations imposed by the ways they generate support. NGOs are
largely dependent on the media to mobilise public support for their campaigns, as well as
their ability to persuade states to support their positions, something which is also
dependent on prevailing geopolitical conditions. Although globalisation has increased
NGO power by increasing their ability to exert simultaneous pressure for change from
different levels and locations of governance, the success of the ICBL should be regarded
as the exception rather than the rule of NGO participation in international politics.
Although the ICBL has been rightly praised for the efficient way it conducted its
campaign, the landmine ban could not have occurred without a coincidence of external
conditions and issue-specific characteristics which cannot easily be replicated.

64
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