Clarebeth R.

Ramos

Government of the United States of America, Represented by the Philippine Department

of Justice vs. Hon. Guillermo Purganan, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila
and Marc Jimenez a.k.a. Marcio Batacan Crespo
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002
Panganiban, J.

I. Doctrine

Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court dismissed the Petition.
The DOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition
alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that Jimenez’s application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested
its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing,
the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 

Issue: Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending
 
Ruling:
No. The court agrees with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.

Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The

constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Contrary to Jimenez’s contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the

extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those present in an
extradition case — call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.  Hence, there is no violation of his
right to due process and fundamental fairness.