Yap-Paras vs.

Justo Paras
A.C. # 4947, February 14, 2005

FACTS:Rosa Yap-Paras (Petitioner) filed a case against Atty. Justo Paras (respondent) praying for
the disbarment of the latter, accusing that he committed acts of deceit, malpractice, grave
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter. The
respondent was found guilty by the SC of falsehood and suspended him from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, with a warning that a similar offense committed in the future will yield a
harsher penalty.
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the court as per his suspension. During
its pendency, petitioner filed a Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment under the ground that Atty.
Paras did not heed the SC’s suspension order and was still practicing his legal profession. Eventually,
the MR was denied by the SC and asked respondent to comment on the current motion filed against
him by the petitioner within 10 days. The respondent filed a Manifestation with the court after more
than a year, stating that he has already complied with the 1-year suspension. In response, the SC
issued another resolution that compels respondent to explain why he should not be held in contempt
for failing to comply with the previous resolution. Respondent replied by denying the previous
allegations made by petitioner that he was engaged in the practice of law during his suspension.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred for violating the SC’s suspension order
by practicing his legal profession during his suspension period.
(2) Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred by failing to file a comment on time as
demanded by the SC.

HELD:
(1) NO. The SC found no factual basis on the petitioner’s allegations that the respondent
practiced law during his suspension. Respondent even took the initiative to inform the
lower courts of his one-year suspension from the practice of law, as the SC noted.
(2) NO.While it is clear that resolutions of the SC are not mere requests that can be brushed
aside or partially complied with and that the SC’s authority should always be respected and
observed, the SC held that the respondent’s failing health and surgical operations that he
underwent are reasonable excuses for him to not be able to file his comment on time.
Moreover, the SC took note that respondent expressed his profound regret and
immeasurable sorrow for not being able to comply with the court’s order.
Hence, a REPRIMAND with WARNING was deemed sufficient punishment by the SC for
respondent’s failures, coupled with a reminder that a more drastic punishment shall be
meted out accordingly if such offense shall be repeated by the respondent.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7,1988]
FACTS:
Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special Prosecu
tor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the f
iling of the information against petitioner in criminal case before the Sandigan
bayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in
relation to the proceedings in where respondent is claiming that he is acting a
s Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. A Resolution from the Supreme Court required respondent
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to adm
inistrative sanctions for making certain public statements. Portion of the publi
shed article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that whi
le rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it
is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due cours
e.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges t
hat the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially
correct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke freedom of speech
as a defense.
HELD:
NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
RATIO:
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court i
n facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March
2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term,
however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000,
Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately
ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, HouseSpeaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the  House of
Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against
theopening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank accountunder the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a
spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed
Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistantsecretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. 

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he
was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the
nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a
declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation
of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was
sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues: 
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.  

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express.
It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar,
the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang
Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had
an authoritative window on thestate of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec.
Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and
the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation
of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that
the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In
the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservationabout its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5)
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability
claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both housesof Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.
The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat.
It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.