Hedy Gan y Yu vs CA

No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.

Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:

Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven
by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching
the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a
consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the
parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other
parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered
damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision
convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.

Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o
tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple
imprudence resulting in Homicide.

Gan v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard on July 4, 1972. There were 2 vehicles parked
on the right side of the road. As the petitioner approached the place where the vehicles were parked, a
vehicle from the opposite direction tried to overtake another vehicle and encroached the lane of her car.
To avoid collision, the petitioner swerved to the right and hit a pedestrian. The pedestrian was pinned to
the rear of the parked jeepney, and died on arrival to the hospital. Petitioner was found guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence by the trial court. The Corut of Appeals modified the decision and found her
guilty of homicide through simple imprudence.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is negligent as to hold her guilty for the death of the pedestrian

Held:

We reverse.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. A corollary rule is what is known in the
law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of
Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that
such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation
she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for
appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action
would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others. The appellate court is asking too much
from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to
extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle.
Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal
conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She
had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-
preservation.

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 115024    [February 7, 1996]

Facts:

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd.,
she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that
her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked along
the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix
the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of
her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM
Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh
(above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an
artificial leg.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.

2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.

3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.

Held:

 1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the
general direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the
windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car.
Moreover the witness declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the center of the right lane.
2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule.

Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered
to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her
lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not
of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only
negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident.

3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations
were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the
driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its
company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions as Assistant
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to
perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company
clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both
social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.
therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by
providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES v. C & A CONSTRUCTION, GR No. 156034, 2003-10-01

Facts:
On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines,
Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo
oil tank.
At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain
Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan[5] that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila[6] in about eight (8) hours.
At approximately 8:35 in the morning of
October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area
because it was already congested.
At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a
Napocor power... barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high.
Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the
Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.
He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was
maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.
The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
46, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner claimed... that the damage
was caused by a fortuitous event.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent;
(2) If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the quasi-
delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to
transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994.
As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in
Japan[19] that a typhoon was going to hit Manila[20] after 8 hours.
This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to
seek shelter at the North Harbor,... which unfortunately was already congested.
The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the
North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision
that determines the... existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and
appropriate action under the circumstances.
Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the... danger where Capt. Jusep
found himself was caused by his own negligence.
Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee.
There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the employer
of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty
The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of
Capt. Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner.
It should be stressed, however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to
the selection, but also to the supervision of employees.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the
proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored
compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should... therefore be held liable for the
negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
Allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an... employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.
Principles:
It should be stressed, however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to
the selection, but also to the supervision of employees.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the
proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored
compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should... therefore be held liable for the
negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
 SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA FORNILDA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001

Facts:

Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the settlement of the latter’s
estate. On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On January
20, 1965, Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated
to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969, after the
taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and
terminated. When Pasamba and Formilda passed away, Formilda was succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez.
On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the closure of the two lots alleging the non-payment of attorney’s
fees. The herein respondents denied the allegation, but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.

Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able to buy the lots by auction
where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders
were implemented for the demolition of structures in the said lot, including herein respondents’ house. On
September 27, 1985, David Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the suspension of the
demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already been demolished. A complaint for damages
was filed by respondents, which was denied by RTC but granted by CA, thus this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to respondents.

Ruling:

Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of
a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which the law gives no remedy,
saying he is not liable for damages. The precept of Damnum Absque Injuria has no application is this case.
Petitioner did not heed the TRO suspending the demolition of structures. Although the acts of petitioner
may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to
an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. This must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’
house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of
such right. The petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.

Spouses Custodio vs. CA

GR No. 116100
February 9, 1996

FACTS:
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables.
When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property, and there were
supposed two different passageways. First passageway with an approximate 1 meter wide and 20 meters
distance to P. Burgos Street. The second about 3 meters wide and 26 meters away.

When Mabasa went to see the premises after one of the tenants vacated, he saw that there had been built
an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower.  The Santoses first
constructed the said adobe fence . Defendant Morato constructed her own adobe fence and even extended
said fence that entirely closed the said passage way. The remaining tenants vacated thereafter.

The case was brought to the trial court and ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a
permanet ingress and eggress to the public street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for
damages.

Issue:
1) Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way
2) Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages.

Ruling:
1) Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is
usually applied.

2) Yes. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.
An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is damage.
Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid
exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as
provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1)
defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be
willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this
case.
As a general rule, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful
and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as
such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the
general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in
this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use
can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
 

—
damnum absque injuria (Latin for “loss or damage without injury”) is a phrase expressing the principle of
tort law in which some person (natural or legal) causes damage or loss to another, but does not injure
them. (source)
Posted

OARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs.HEIRS OF MAXIMO M. KALAW

FACTS: Kalaw is the General Manager and Board Chairman of NACOCO(National Coconut Corporation). In
1947, NACOCO contracted to sell coconut product with several buyers. That year, there were four
typhoons that hit Phil. Coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Copra production
decreased. When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable Kalaw submitted them to the
board for approval. Which was approved by the Board. As was to be expected, NACOCO but partially
performed the contracts.the buyers filed a case for the full performance of the Contract. settlements were
paid. NACOCO seeks to recover from Kalaw the said paid settlements. For bad faith and/or breach trust for
having approved the contracts.According to Kalaw he did so acted for the best interest of the Corp.Trial
Court decided for Kalaw.
ISSUE: Is Kalaw liable?

HELD: judgment affirmed.

RATIO:Kalaw is not liable. the trial court correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque injuria.
Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the
other is wanting. Kalaw all along thought that he had authority to enter into the contracts; that he did so in
the best interests of the corporation.