The Role And Character Of The Ruling Elite And The Ongoing Conflict

Between The Crown And The Nobility During The Sultanate Period.

What could be called the most distinguished and novel idea making breakthrough into the Indian
subcontinent with the coming of Turks was the institution of Mamluks. To Peter Jackson the Delhi
Sultanate could be designated as a ‘Mamluk Sultanate’ because it was founded by a mamluk of the
numerous military slaves of Ghurid Mu‘izz al-Din. Later, Delhi Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish’s
(1210-36) military slaves had a large impact upon the political system of the Sultanate, for the
better part of the thirteenth century. These mamluks not only had a major say in the political state
of affairs in the heyday of Sultanate as the aristocracy but these mamluk amirs claimed power and
became Sultan by virtue of their abilities, achievements, and the acceptance of their leadership by
their peers.

The ubiquitous presence of military slaves has been a distinguishing feature of the armies and the
political systems of the Abbasid Caliphs and the succeeding Sultanates in Islamdom. In the middle
ages, the Seljuqid wazir, Nizam al-Mulk Tusi and the scholar, Ibn Khaldun had separately
commented on the virtues of the system of ‘recruiting’ slaves to consolidate the political strength of
a monarch. We also have ample amount of literature to support this view. In fact, many of the
Sultans were also these military slaves. Scholars familiar with the phenomenon of agrestic slavery
in the southern United States, find the usage of slaves as military notables (bandagin) highly
unusual in Islamdom. In particular, the commodification of the slave, where the bandah possessed
no social status, contrasted sharply with his apparent political standing as a military commander.

The mamluks showed a certain ambiguity in their attitude toward the Sultanate including its rules
of succession and the ruler’s source of power. P.M. Holt, a scholar who worked extensively on
Egyptian mamluk institution, writes in his work “The Position and Power of the Mamluk Sultan”
that it was convenient for the Shamsi bandagin to have a nominal Sultan to act as a façade for the
oligarchy of the amirs. Peter Jackson perceived the Egyptian mamluk institution as a paradigm of
military slavery against which the north Indian system could be measured. I. Habib, in his work not
directly addressing the Shamsi bandagin, argues that they were an important part of the ruling elite
of the Sultanate. He also declares that the nature and character of the ruling elite was ever changing
as he traces changes in Shamsi, Post-Shamsi and Khalji periods.
The dialogue over the role of the ruling elite in state of affairs necessitates establishing the nature of
the Sultanate. Whether it was a state of ‘feudal’ nature or was it a centralized state? Though many
scholars view it in ambiguity but first we must consider the political institutions and other agents of
power before assigning it a ‘feudal’ or ‘centralized’ status. The institution of Mamluks is mentioned
earlier here but another institution of prime importance is the ‘Iqtadari’ system. It was not just a
revenue assignment but also an administrative post given to the ruling elite by the Sultan. In the
course we would see how these two institutions turn out to be the most defining archetype of the
Sultan’s power and nature of the Sultanate.

Together with the iqta, Habib argued that the character of the ‘ruling elite’ was the other
distinguishing feature of the Sultanate, and he traced the changes which had occurred amongst the
elites from the Shansabanid, to the Shamsid, the post-Shamsid, into the Khalji period. For Habib,
however, ‘the substance of power and wealth was, of course, represented not by the titles but by
the iqtas or revenue and military charges.’ For Habib, the institution of the iqta and the rulers
remained the agents that enforced ‘centralization’, a measure which was from time to time resisted
by the notables. The primacy of action, however, remained with the energetic Sultan, and in a
variation of the well-worn theme, if an ambitious, capable monarch sought to impose his will upon
his subordinates, he relied upon the iqta.

The capacity for intervention in Sultanate politics was not gained overnight by the Shamsi
bandagin. Already during their master’s reign, senior military slaves possessed political power
together with the ability to exercise it without constant supervision. The key to understanding how
the slaves could be deployed as useful subordinates, therefore, lies in the contrary virtues ingrained
in their unfree status. On the one hand, they lacked the freedom to choose their own areas of
service, but on the other, the mere act of deployment implied that the Sultan trusted them with
considerable local initiative.

Before delving into the study of the nature and character of the ruling elite in reigns of different
rulers we must know that using the term nobility would be a controversial feat here. Professor
Sunil Kumar feels it should be used as a borrowed term because of the altogether diverse milieu it
puts forward. The manner in which these scholars understood the term ‘noble’ was clarified by
Athar Ali, who suggested that the term should be removed of its European feudal connotations, and
be taken to mean the officers of the king, a superior class in the political order. As he admitted, this
had been the conventional translation of the term Umara. The term we find for the ruling elite in
the Sultanate literature is bandagin-i khass or chihilgani.

Since the term ‘noble’ refers to a politically superior class created by the arbitrary whim of the
despotic Delhi Sultan, no further reflection concerning why specific groups of people were
empowered was deemed necessary. As a result, the history of the ‘nobility’ does not progress
beyond a mechanical review of a conflict between political competitors, either ‘old and new nobles’
or the ‘crown and nobility’ (it means that here nobility was not hereditary).

Court chroniclers and other writers like Juzjani, Barani and Fakhr-i Mudabbir go a long way to talk
about the acquisition of slaves, how they were purchased and how they were later incorporated
into the political structure of the Sultanate. Even Qutubuddin Aibek, Yalduz and Iltutmish were
purchased very young and went through training (religious and cultural) before getting raised up to
military ranks. The loyalty of these slaves was attained by promises of giving them great wealth and
high offices. But we hardly know the precise point as and when a slave was manumitted. This in
turn questions the very meaning of a slave status in the Sultanate times.

Thus, bandagin were given responsibilities, and with it the capacity to take independent decisions,
only after the Sultan was assured that the independent initiatives of the slaves would coincide with
the interests of the master. The commodification of the slave, his alien status in local society, the
process of bonding through parwarish, and tarbiyat, the rewards of increase in rank and
responsibility gradually distinguished the bandagin-i khass from the larger cadre of military slaves.

Gavin Hambly was the first scholar to understand the chahilgani as a privileged cadre of slaves
within the larger retinue of bandagan-i Shamsi. Sunil Kumar views that in a political culture where
a large number of the elite were slaves, or freemen who sought to appear as slaves, the term ‘noble’
is either a misnomer or in need of a dramatic redefinition. He emphasizes that the bonds which tied
the slaves with their masters was partly in an effort to explain how the unfree could be given
command over the free. The relationship of subordination, nourishment and loyalty which bonded
masters and slaves together, allowed bandagin to play crucial, strategic and unsupervised roles
within the Sultanate.
Sultan Iltutmish is said to have established the administrative framework of the Sultanate. For some
scholars the importance of the military slaves in the framework of Delhi Sultanate continues from
the fact that these military slaves were favored subordinates of Iltutmish precisely because they
were not ‘nobles’. He fashioned a band of forty loyal slaves known as Turkgan-e Chihilgani. Stanley
Lane-Poole inspects this band of forty, the chihilgani, as quite simply, overweening Praetorians.
Another fact which involves a critical sift is that the earlier chroniclers like Minhaj nowhere
mentions about this chihilgani.

But as we gather from the sources that it was formed to serve as a support base to the Sultan and
the dynasty but how contradicting is the fact that from Iltutmish’s death till Balban’s accession to
throne, almost three decades, they were one to create political instability in the Sultanate. This
opposing fact now invokes more serious queries into their nature and role played and more
importantly, the accurate reason behind its creation. Another scholar Ibn-Hasan opines that this
band of forty loyalists was built to keep a check on the ambitious military chiefs. But another
scholar Habibullah puts forward that these Shamsi slaves like Qutubi slaves had no other interest
than to serve the master but this view is not confirmed by contemporary evidence.

In his attempt to define this chihilgani, K.A. Nizami sees it as a cohesive group of slave commanders
within a larger ruling elite, bound together by a mutual concern lest their monopoly of office be
threatened either, on one hand, by the intrusion of free-born Central Asian immigrants fleeing into
India in the wake of Mongol holocausts, or, on the other hand, by the emergence of an indigenous
elite born and bred in the subcontinent. “It was probably the growing assertion of the Indian
elements in the body politic”, he suggests, “which led the Turkish maliks to organize themselves
into a corporate body known as chihilgani”.

After looking through different texts and also considering the various opinions put forward by the
scholars, there isn’t any agreed opinion on the nature of this group called chihilgani. We are even
not sure about the number of this group. Barani refers to, in most of his works, important maliks or
mamluks during the reigns of different rulers and the number is always fluctuating. Somewhere we
find a mention of 25 important men or officers, loyal to the Sultan. Therefore, this number 40
should also be considered with certain amount of caution. Often we get evidences that even these
chihilgani members or bandagan-i khass possessed their own slaves amounting to the number of
40 mamluks.
Barani begins the history with the reign of Balban, where he shows the domination of Shamsi slaves
which came to Delhi during Iltutmish’s rule. Though many scholars hold this view that only the
Turkish slaves enjoyed the monopoly of political authority in the Sultanate but it was not actually
so. During the Sultanate times, being a Turkish slave was something different (considered higher)
but as the political institutions evolved and got infused with Indian elements, the composition of
the ruling elite also changed.

Nevertheless, the Turkish ‘nobility’ attempted to retain its political monopoly, but they had to share
it with different groups at different times. Free-born immigrants, Khalaj tribesmen, non-Turkish
slaves, Indian converts to Islam, the Afghans and later “Neo-Muslims” along with the non-Muslims
also came to join the ruling elite. Also we see that how different rulers used different power groups
to consolidate their rule.

The three most important elements of Sultanate administration during the Ilabari (slave dynasty)
were – Crown, Umara (ministers) and Ullama (religious authority) and the last being local
intermediaries. Though Iltutmish acquired a legal letter of legitimacy from the Caliph, but the
running theme during his reign in the Sultanate period was the conflict between the crown and the
ruling elite. It was even more visible after his death. During Aibak’s rule legitimacy was not a
problem because the Sultanate was not in its very nascent stage away from the central
administrative structure. That is why there is no mention of any sharp conflict between the crown
and the elite.

Historians even consider the fact that the “State” in Aibak’s time was in a form of military camp
where his ‘nobles’ were in charge of different campaigns. The State being young was still struggling
to establish itself and hence the ruling elite’s interests were often tied with the military success of
their rulers. Even Aibak was more or less a military commander and not a ‘ruler’ for the ruling elite,
and so, he does not face any bitter opposition.

Its only when the administrative structure of the Sultanate gets defined that the ruling elite turned
into a feudal bureaucracy. This in turn led to sharp conflicts within the ruling elite as well as
between the ruling elite and the crown. Iltutmish consolidated his own authorities by introducing
Iqtadari system which controlled the ruling elite, constituted his own chihilgani and transformed an
armed camp into a proper bureaucracy. We often see that the causation behind the conflict
between the crown and the nobility came from the fact that it was difficult for the members of the
ruling elite to accept a fellow slave as their master.

This conflict is directly linked to the rise of monarchical institution, but the members of which still
harbored tribal-traditional sentiments. Turks came from the tribal background where their leader
was considered only to be the first amongst the equals. They all held an equal share of power and
the leader was only a commander of military campaigns. Therefore, this conflict between crown
and ruling elite was a resultant of the clash between tribal traditions and monarchical institutions,
placing the king above all and investing certain amount of absolute power in him. Iltutmish had
shown great deference to the Turkish ruling elite and the Turkgan-e Chihilgani after his death,
drunk with power and arrogance wanted to install a puppet monarch.

After Iltutmish, Balban came to power and he adopted a policy of getting support from the Ullama.
He endowed them with land and other possessions for maintaining peaceful relations. He even tried
to win over the ruling elite by giving them large iqtas and also kept them divided. He ensured it that
the chihilgani never becomes a single political entity and thereby, never getting a chance to
jeopardize his authority. He often resorted to harsh and undesirable methods. Himself being a
member of the chihilgani, he was aware of the rebellious possibilities of such a strong group. But
without a doubt, with his accession to throne there began an era of strong, centralized government.
Himself being a member of the chihilgani, he was aware of the rebellious possibilities of such a
strong group.

Balban constantly sought to increase the prestige and power of the monarchy, because he was
convinced that this was the only way to face the internal and external dangers facing him. To
compound his political sovereignty, he also took help of encompassing divine rights and thus put
forth his “theory of kingship”. It was an age in which the authority and power was supposed to be
the privilege of those born in noble houses or those who could boast of an ancient pedigree. Balban,
while claiming to act as a champion of the Turkish ‘nobility’, was not prepared to share his power.
To emphasize on that the ruling elites were not his equals, he insisted on the ceremony of sajda and
paibos.
Balban was determined to finally break the power of the chihilgani and to exalt the power and
prestige of monarchy. He didn’t even shy away from using force when it came to control the ruling
elite or as and when someone challenged his authority. Balban too like previous rulers formed a
loyalist group which was called ‘Balbani nobles’. But these ‘Balbani nobles’ were inexperienced in
terms of having served the State also contributing to the fall of the Ilabari dynasty. Balban is
undeniably the main architect of the Sultanate particularly its form of government and institutions.
By asserting the powers of monarch, he strengthened the Delhi Sultanate. He was the first Sultan to
even nominate his successor.

After Balban’s times, the rule didn’t only shift into new hands but also a change in the dynasty was
realised. The Ilabari, Mamluk or slave dynasty came to end with the coming of Khaljis. Early
historians termed it as “Khalji Revolution”, for the crown was captured by power and not on the
considerations of hereditary rights. Jalaluddin Khalji ruled for a while but the important ruler of
this dynasty was Alauddin Khalji. But here, we see not only change in dynasty but also
militarization of the State. Attempts were made to geographically expand and regulate the
economy. They even faced the most severe of the Mongol attacks and most of the military and
economic policies of Alauddin Khalji, one would realise, were directed against the Mongol threat.

Alauddin Khalji was a mighty military commander and had been successful in Deccan, procuring
huge wealth too. With his coming to throne, the composition of the ruling elite grew broader. He
made it certain that no one group becomes dominating and hence, he threw open the State to talent
and loyalty. In a nutshell, he controlled the ruling elite by each possible way whether it be his
economic policies, controlling the salaries, taking the most permissible land tax or strict imposition
of Iqtadari system. He banned social congregations and drinking of wine was prohibited. Though it
came in a religious cover, but its ulterior motive was only to stop the elite from conspiring against
the Sultan. Even marriage alliances, amongst the ruling elites, were to be granted the monarch’s
permission.

He dreams and tries to raise the authority of the Sultan to the highest by making the ‘nobility’ sub-
servants of the monarch. He even laid emphasis on austere behavior of the elite and resented
accumulation of wealth, whereby smartly curbing their financial authority. His policies gave birth to
Khalji imperialism – horizontally, by bringing more and more territories under control and
vertically, curtailing the powers of the rebellious ‘nobles’, Iqtadars and Ullamas. Khalji rule became
synonymous to centralization and Sultanate entered into a new phase where the Sultan didn’t
require a certain backdrop to reach to the epitome of Sultanate but a sheer military strength was
also justified.

During Alauddin Khalji’s rule, the State took measures to reach to the masses, thus weakening the
intermediaries. He took care of all the decentralizing forces, and hence ushering the Sultanate into
another extreme phase after Iltutmish’s and Balban’s reigns. He even relies on the military for
larger portion of internal or external problems. He made the capital into an over-all encampment.
Peter Jackson refers to Sultanate of his times as a ‘military State’. But what we do notice is that
throughout the Sultanate there is lack of institutionalization of authority.

To bring to a close, the best approach to understand this conflict and role of the ruling elite would
be to look at the way Sultanate was established and eventually how it grew from tribal polity into
monarchical form of politics is the only reason one can think of when the question of the conflict
between the crown and the ruling elite comes up. During Aibak’s and Iltutmish’s rule, the interests
of the ruling elite more or less coincided with those of rulers and thus, the conflict doesn’t acquire a
harsh form. But when consolidation process is completed and certain bureaucratic structure has
surfaced, the struggle for power and hunger for wealth is conspicuously seen amongst the ‘nobility’
and so are monarchs seen to strictly control them.

Balban’s regime made it completely clear that the position of the crown was secure and strong only
till the point he could undermine the ruling elite. Even the degree of centralization, in the context of
administration and nature of State too, depended on the personality of the monarch. Yes, whenever
the monarch was able to handle the ‘nobility’ and stringently impose the Iqtadari system the State
acquired centralization but in the cases other way around, the ruling elite turned into a parasitic
‘feudal’ aristocracy and State decentralized. And this answers our earlier question of the nature of
State.

Alauddin Khalji tries to achieve centralization as well as to gain complete control over the ruling
elite by the Iqtadari system and his other policies. The conflict between the crown and the ruling
elite is not ever solved because of the institutionalized authority deficit to control the ruling elite
except for the monarch. Even the composition of this ruling elite keeps altering but it always had a
part in shaping the institutional contours of the Sultanate politics.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The Emergence of the Delhi Sultanate Prof. Sunil Kumar

2. When Slaves Were Nobles Prof. Sunil Kumar
3. The Mamluk Institution in Early Muslim India Peter Jackson
4. The Ignored Elite Prof. Sunil Kumar
5. The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate Amalia Levanoni