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I N T E R N A T I O N A L

Water Power & DAM CONSTRUCTION

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OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 30
Digital edition only UK£243.22 30 Sayano Shushenskaya accident – presenting a
possible direct cause
Published by Global Trade Media,
The cause of a fatal accident that occurred on 17 August
a trading division of Progressive Media
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2009 at the Sayano Shushenskaya Dam and powerhouse
Progressive House, 2 Maidstone Road, in Southern Siberia has never fully been revealed. In this
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peer-reviewed paper, F A Hamill presents a hypothesis
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NOVEMBER 2010 3
 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Sayano Shushenskaya accident

– presenting a possible direct cause
The cause of a fatal accident that occurred on 17 August 2009 at the Sayano Shushenskaya
Dam and powerhouse in Southern Siberia has never fully been revealed. In this peer-reviewed
paper, F A Hamill presents a hypothesis of the underlying direct cause of the accident

I
T has now been over a year since the catastrophic accident Above, from left to right: Figure 1 – Sayano Shushenskaya Dam and
at the huge Sayano Shushenskaya Dam and Hydroelectric Powerhouse (1, 8); Figure 2 – Powerhouse from downstream (8)
Station in southern Siberia which cost the lives of 75 people Below: Figure 3 – Sectional elevation through the dam and powerhouse (2)
and nearly destroyed the 6400MW powerhouse.
Initially, the accident was lightly reported in the west, both in the
mainstream and the technical press. Over the ensuing months, the T HE ACCIDENT
early internet postings of photographs, videos and narratives from
witnesses and technical experts in Russia [references 1 through 8] At 08:13 and 25 seconds local time on 17 August 2009, Unit 2
were supplemented with studies, opinions and speculations about experienced a load rejection, which was followed immediately
causes from writers both inside and outside of Russia. by a loud bang heard in the administration and control build-
So far, this writer has not seen a complete and credible explanation ing adjacent to the powerhouse. The load rejection precipitated
of how this accident, with its very violent sequence of events, could a massive failure involving the lifting of runner, shaft, head
have been caused. Both the official reports issued after the incident, cover, turbine and generator bearings vertically upward into the
and several technical discussions that followed, have drawn very gen- umbrella generator rotor spider, destroying it. Full penstock
eral conclusions that attributed the incident to heavy vibration and head was then released into the turbine pit, resulting in an enor-
poor maintenance associated with failed studs in the turbine head mous geyser and massive destruction. [9, 10]
cover of Unit 2 in the plant. This article has been prepared to offer At least a half minute
a hypothesis as to the underlying direct cause of the accident. This after the geyser blew the
is done in the interest of promoting safety awareness among owners, roof away, another very
engineers, managers and operators of hydro plants everywhere. loud bang was recorded
This hypothesis is that the explosion was caused by water by a cell-phone video
column separation in the draft tubes of the destroyed units. This which showed events as
condition can readily be caused by a too-rapid wicket gate clo- seen from a substantial
sure during unit load rejection. Adjustment of governor times to distance downstream from
unsafe values to achieve fast response to operating load changes the powerhouse. [11]
may have occurred in recent times in response to a need to improve Three units (2, 7 and
grid frequency control. This, combined with compromised stud 9) were totally destroyed.
connections due to poor maintenance, can explain the extreme The rest of the units were
violence of this accident. severely damaged, with
Complete and detailed technical data, such as drawings and data the exception of Unit 6,
sheets, have not been available to support a full-scale technical paper which was under refur-
on this subject. Therefore, the conclusions presented in this article bishment and not in
are speculative. The importance of the safety issue to the profession operation. [10] Seventy-
and the industry, however, is such as to dictate that this analysis be five people died in the
presented, however incomplete. flooded powerhouse. [9]

30 NOVEMBER 2010 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION


Generator bearing housing Generator rotor Above: Figure 4 – Interior of
Shaft
the powerhouse; Left: Figure 5
Generator stator
– Cutaway model of the generat-
Head cover studs ing unit (2, 15); Right: Figure
Gate levers 6 – Section through the turbine
(15). 1. Head Cover; 2. Guide
Vane (Wicket Gate); 3. Guide Vane
Head cover Servomotor; 4. Bearing hous-
Flow ing; 5. Bearing seal; 6.Turbine
Spiral case
Wicket gates shaft; 7. Thrust bearing support;
Runner 8. Stay ring; 9. Spiral case; 10.
Lower ring; 11. Support ring; 12.
Draft tube
Labyrinth seal; 13. Runner crown;
14. Runner cone; Studs indicated
at red arrows. Head cover lower
surface highlighted in blue
B ACKGROUND
Seventy percent of the load on the East Siberian grid consists of four
very large aluminium smelters. [12] The Bratskaya hydro plant
(4500MW) was normally the lead plant on the grid, with the respon-
sibility of following load and contributing to grid frequency control.
Sayano Shushenskaya was normally base loaded, and not following
load swings.
Beginning in 2002, the owner of the grid and most of the gener-
ating plants, RusHydro, ordered an improvement in the quality of
grid frequency control, which had been poor, due to the seriously
fluctuating smelter loads, which are difficult to follow due to their
lack of rotating inertia. The objective was to serve growing non-
smelter loads, and to permit interconnection with other adjacent
power grids, in particular the Russian Far East power intercon-
nection, which is predominantly based on thermal generation. In
support of improving frequency stability, RusHydro mandated that
automated joint load control systems be installed in the Siberian
plants under its control. Previously, the unit load control had been
manual in all the plants. Automated joint load control was suc-
cessfully placed into commercial operation at Sayano Shushenskaya
during the first half of 2009. [12, 13]
Due to a fire at Bratskaya on the day before the accident, all that
plant’s load, and its load following requirements were transferred to
Sayano Shushenskaya by the grid load dispatcher. [9, 10]
During the night of 16-17 August 2009, Sayano Shushenskaya
experienced large and rapid load swings, with the total varying from
2800 to 4400MW. Unit 2 at the plant, with both a new governor
and a new automated joint load control system, had been set as the
lead unit, and experienced the largest load swings. [10] The accident
itself followed in the morning.
Very soon after the event, the Russian industrial safety agency,
Rostekhnadzor, studied the accident and attempted to determine its
causes. It issued an extensive report on 3 October 2009 in which it
attributed the cause to heavy vibration of Unit 2 in the plant, which,
combined with lax maintenance and inspection practices, resulted
in fatigue failure of the studs securing the turbine head cover to the
unit stay ring. Although two other units in the plant were similarly
destroyed, the Rostekhnadzor report did not address these failures,
nor did it identify any other issues that may have contributed sig-
WWW.WATERPOWERMAGAZINE.COM NOVEMBER 2010
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
nificantly to the accident. [10] It is understood that Rostekhnadzor
released its report only about six weeks after the accident took
place. They noted that it was an interim report, and that additional
work would follow. As of this writing, Rostekhnadzor has not
modified its conclusions that the accident was caused by fatigue
failure of the head cover studs.
The Sayano Shushenskaya project (1, 10, 14, except as noted)
The 6400MW Sayano Shushenskaya installation is one of four
very large hydroelectric generating stations that, at a total of
20,700MW, comprise over two thirds of the generating capac-
ity in the East Siberian electrical grid. The general arrangement
and size of the facilities at Sayano Shushenskaya are displayed in
the photographs in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 3 is a reproduction
of a drawing showing a vertical cross section through dam, pen-
stock and powerhouse. It shows the relative locations and sizes of
intakes, penstocks, turbines, generators, transformers and power
take-off facilities. Figure 4 is an interior view of the machine hall
looking across Unit 2 towards Units 3 through 10. Figure 5 is a
photograph of a cutaway model of one of the turbine generator
units showing its main components. Figure 6 is a cross section
drawing through a turbine. It contains some key dimensions, and
it clarifies the arrangement of the head cover, its structural support
for the thrust bearing, and the location of the studs connecting the
head cover to the upper stay ring.
O CTOBER REPORT OF R OSTEKHNADZOR
The Rostekhnadzor report was an extensive evaluation of the event and
the conditions which led up to it. Considering the short time available
to prepare it, the report was thorough, although its scope was clearly
limited, concentrating on Unit 2. It attributed the destruction of Unit 2
to fatigue failure of many of the 80 8cm diameter studs which held the
head cover in place. The report did not identify the exact location of
the studs, nor the manner in which they were loaded. [10]
Other information (see Figure 6) has indicated that these studs
were located at the extreme outer edge of the head cover, where
it rests on a narrow flange which is part of the upper turbine stay
ring. Both mating flanges at the location of the studs are narrow
and relatively thin, as evidenced in the photographs (Figures 8 and
9). At full strength, the studs could be expected to carry a substan-
tial load. Assuming a mild steel material, each 8cm diameter stud
may be expected to carry a design load of 60 tonnes or more. It
is likely, however, that these studs were primarily for the purpose
of obtaining a seal where the head cover flange met the stay ring
flange. The joint probably contained a gasket, which was held by
the studs. From the available graphics (Figures 5 and 6, and some
in Reference 10), it appears that the main structural support of
the head cover in resisting uplift came from the conical structure
connecting the head cover to the generator bearing housing above
it. This structure comprised the unit thrust bearing support, so
31
 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
the entire weight of rotating parts and the hydraulic thrust on
the runner were supported by the turbine head cover, and would,
therefore, resist most, if not all of the hydraulic uplift. This is
confirmed by the photographs. [15, 5 through 8]
The stud fatigue failure was attributed to the large vibration which
had plagued Unit 2 for a very long time, both before and after the
refurbishment in the first quarter of 2009. It appears that the runner
repairs that year were made in place, without removal of the head
cover, so the studs would not have been replaced. [10, 14]
The Unit 2 operating zones were defined in the report as acceptable
between 0 and 265MW (Zone 1), unacceptable between 265 and
570MW (Zone 2), acceptable between 570 and 640MW (Zone 3),
and prohibited above 640MW (Zone 4). The loads carried during
the nine hours leading up to the failure indicate that the rough zone
(Zone 2) was transited by the machine several times, and it was in
that zone at the time of the load rejection and failure. [10]
The report contains several interesting facts taken from logs and
automatic recording equipment. It notes that the Unit 2 load changed
12 times between midnight and 0230 on 17 August, and the range of
total plant load was 2800 to 4415 MW. Unit 2 was known to have
passed through its rough operating zones some six times in the few
hours preceding the failure. (10)
Some sample times and Unit 2 loads before and after midnight on
16-17 August (10) are shown in the table below:
Sample times
Time Load (MW) Time Load (MW)
2315 50 0730 170
2317 110 0730 to 0745 170 to 260
2330 200 0746 610
2331 165 0747 to 0800 605
2344 to 0015 600 0812 575
0030 135 0813 475
0030 to 0703 10 to 255 0813 25secs 0 rotor, and all associated structure of Unit 2 to be forced upward with
0703 to 0729 600
At the time of the load rejection and failure, the load on Unit 2
was apparently being reduced. At 0800, Unit 2 was reported to be
carrying a 605 MW load, with a turbine flowrate of 312m3/sec and a
gate setting of 72.5%. At 0813, Unit 2 was carrying 475MW, with a
flow of 256m3/sec at an opening of 69%. Twenty-five seconds later,
the load was recorded as zero, indicating a sudden load rejection from
475MW. It should be noted that the load at 0813 was in the middle
of Zone 2, and considerable vibration should have been occurring,
based on previous experience with the machine. [10]
W HAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THIS ACCIDENT ?
Early hypotheses
An early analysis [1] that was distributed via the internet only a week
after the accident postulated causes for the Unit 2 failure including
ingestion of debris and a broken governor oil pipe. The failures of
Units 7 and 9 were attributed to runaway of the units under flooded
conditions. As photographic evidence subsequently showed (Figures
10, 11, and 12), these explanations are not consistent with the events
that have been shown to have occurred.
Another early hypothesis was that one of the draft tube piers col-
lapsed causing a blockage of the draft tube. This seemed not to be
credible at the outset, and the Rostekhnadzor report makes no men-
tion of such a scenario, which would have left a clear set of evidence,
had it occurred.
An early hypothesis by a Russian engineer and hydraulic turbine
specialist, B. Kolesnikov [21], was that the accident was caused by the
seizure of either the turbine bearing or the upper runner seals causing
a very large twisting force to be transmitted to the head cover. The
32
fact that the studs were not sheared off eliminates this possibility, as
was pointed out by B. Kolesnikov in a later note written after addi-
tional photographs became available.
Hypotheses by Rostekhnadzor and a later writer
Rostekhnadzor attributed the accident to fatigue failure of the head
cover studs caused by the heavy vibrations that had plagued Unit 2
over considerable time.
An October 2009 presentation by E. Kolesnikov [19] expanded on
the Rostekhnadzor conclusions somewhat. He similarly attributed
the failure of Unit 2 to the fatigue failure of the head cover studs due
to the severe vibration the machine was experiencing, and he pointed
out that the vibration monitoring equipment on the unit was out
of service at the time of the failure. Neither he nor Rosteknadzor
alluded to a source of the large upward force necessary to lift the
machine, however. He did not attribute the failure to a load rejection
situation, implying that the failure occurred during an operating load
change. This does not seem likely, since, during even part load opera-
tion, there is a very significant hydraulic down thrust exerted on the
runner (estimated to be of the order of 7500 tonnes) that is resisted
by the thrust bearing, which, in turn, is supported on the head cover.
This, combined with the weight of the parts supported by the thrust
bearing, would have left no load to be carried by the studs.
B. Kolesnikov (21) hypothesized early that the event may have been
caused due to a seizure of the turbine bearing or the upper runner
seals causing a large torsional load on the head cover, but he later
rejected these ideas since, as shown in the photographs in Figure 13,
the studs failed in tension; not in shear.
D ISCUSSION AND A NEW HYPOTHESIS
Unit 2 essentially exploded. The fatigue failure of the head cover studs
during operation of the machine, as suggested by Rostekhnadzor
and E. Kolesnikov, does not lead to a source for the enormous and
sudden upward force necessary to achieve this violent explosion.
That upward force caused runner, shaft, head cover, wicket gate
upper trunnions and operating arms, both bearings, the generator
enough violence to crush the rotor spider and destroy the stator. It
had to be triggered by something that occurred suddenly and vio-
lently (Figures 7, 8, and 9).
Although the compromised condition of the head cover studs cer-
tainly contributed to the failure of Unit 2, stud fatigue failure alone
seems very unlikely to have occurred in all three failed units (Units 2,
7 and 9) at the same time. In the absence of any stud failure at Units 7
and 9, it is very difficult to envision what could have caused the damage
that is clearly visible in the photographs (Figures 10, 11, and 12). Thus,
it is likely that the studs of Units 7 and 9 did fail, but their failure was
caused by an upward force on the head cover of each unit.
Each rotor weighed 920 tonnes. Each runner weighed 156 tonnes.
The entire assembly as supported by the thrust bearing weighed about
1500 tonnes, not including the downward hydraulic thrust on the
runner or the resistance of the various mechanical connections associ-
ated with the gate trunnions and any generator guide bearing lateral
supports. [1, 9, 10] Each head cover was exposed to draft tube head,
plus a contribution from penstock head, which was exerted on the head
cover annulus outside of the upper runner seal, and particularly that
part outside the wicket gate trunnion circle (Figure 6). [15] This could
have provided enough upward force to lift the cover during a full shut
down if the studs were truly so weak as to contribute little or nothing
to the resistance to upward load, the down thrust on the runner had
become negligible at full flow stoppage, and no significant resistance
was exerted by trunnion connections or any connections of the gen-
erator guide bearing to its lateral bracing. The tables and diagrams
in the Rostekhnadzor report suggest that the static tailwater load on
the head cover at the time would have been about 10m. [10] This is
equivalent to about 350 tonnes of upward force on the gross area of the
head cover inside the runner seal ring under static conditions; however,
during operation, and particularly during a load reduction, this upward
load would have been reduced substantially due to the effects of the
NOVEMBER 2010 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION
 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

velocity head at the draft tube throat. Since the unit had experienced
considerable cavitation during operation, it is possible that the upward
load on the head cover from the draft tube was actually negative at
large turbine loads. [10] It is estimated that the static penstock pressure
load (neglecting penstock head losses) on the outer annulus of the head
cover amounted to something on the order of 2000 tonnes upward.
This compares with the machine weight of 1500 tonnes exerted down-
ward. During operation, there would also be the significant hydraulic
thrust downward on the runner (7500 tonnes), which would have been
supported by the head cover. It is likely, therefore, that the head cover
would not have lifted during operation even if the studs carried no load
at all. Instead, the hydraulic thrust would have to have been reduced or
eliminated prior to the failure, implying a shutdown. A full shutdown
would generate a waterhammer pressure rise in the penstock associated
with the reduction of velocity. Assuming a rapid governor time of five
seconds for full stroke, and a round trip pressure wave travel time in
the penstock of about 0.4 seconds (based on the penstock length of
about 200m), it is expected that the waterhammer pressure rise in the
penstock would amount to about 70m, equivalent to 33% of static
head – a relatively high, but not unreasonable waterhammer ratio for
a hydro plant. This would result in a peak pressure of about 290m on
the outer annulus of the head cover, which is equivalent to an upward
force of some 2550 tonnes on the 8.9m2 annular area, or about 550
tonnes above static conditions.
The pictures show that the Unit 2 turbine lifted as a unit, and the
failed stud connection at the edge of the head cover is not marked by
any visible clues (Figure 9). The head cover flange through which the
studs passed appears to be completely undamaged by the failure of
the studs, suggesting that all studs failed simultaneously allowing the
head cover to rise vertically without distorting the flange. The conical
steel thrust bearing support connected the head cover structurally to
the generator bearing housing. This conical structure must have trans-
mitted an enormous upward force to the bearing housing, which then
lifted from its position, along with everything it supported, during
the failure. Had all this occurred due to stud failure, with only some
500 tonnes of unbalanced upward force (or less, if there was nega-
tive pressure under the center of the head cover), it seems likely that
the studs would have failed sequentially, and, when the flanges at the
failed studs parted, the resulting flow into the turbine pit would have
substantially relieved any upward load associated with waterhammer
effects in the penstock. Moreover, lifting of the head cover on one
side would have caused the shaft, both bearings, and all parts con-
nected to them to tilt to the other side, causing the generator rotor to
collide with the stator windings before all of the head cover studs had
failed. Judging from the photographs of the damaged machine after
the pit was dewatered (Figure 9), the head cover flange was undis-
torted. This suggests that some additional transient loading occurred
at the time of the stud failures, since the photographic evidence sug-
gests a very sudden event and a very massive and completely vertical
upward acceleration, at least initially. [5 through 8]
Rostekhnadzor did not speculate as to the causes of the failures of
Units 7 and 9. They may take this up in their further analyses of the
accident. It is highly unlikely that they would have suffered simple
stud failures due to fatigue during the same incident that destroyed
Unit 2. The character of the damage as shown in the photographs
(Figures 10, 11, and 12) is not consistent with simple overspeed due
to governor failure. Both units appear to have moved vertically. Both
also appear to have tilted so that the generator rotors collided with
the stators, as shown by the stator damage clearly visible in Figure
13. Since the shaft alignment of each of these machines was gov-
erned by the turbine bearing and the generator guide bearing, both
of which were quite rigidly supported by the turbine head cover, the
only mechanism that could result in a tilt of that axis is the lifting of
the head cover itself. It is unlikely that the governors would have
failed soon enough to prevent wicket gate closure and allow a runa-
way, since some time would have passed between the electrical load
drop and the flooding of the powerhouse spaces near Units 7 and 9.
Moreover, wicket gates are usually designed to drift closed (but not to
slam) upon complete loss of oil pressure. The damage could not have
been caused by a short circuit, as E. Kolesnikov hypothesized, since a
short circuit would not have caused a movement of the rotor axis.
New hypothesis: water column separation and its effects
Each draft tube is long enough (about 35m) to suggest that a rapid
load rejection from a heavily loaded condition (e.g. 475MW, or 74%
of rated maximum) may have elicited water column separation in
the draft tube, followed by an extremely violent pressure rise as the
water column rejoined under the head cover. This could have caused
the explosion that occurred. [2, 10] The Rostekhnadzor report, E.
Kolesnikov’s presentation, and B. Kolesnikov’s commentaries do
not discuss the possibility of column separation and rejoining as the
mechanism responsible for the explosion. [10, 19, 22]
The Unit 2 turbine was known to have suffered from extensive

Below: Figure 7 – The machine hall on 17 August 2009 after closure of the head
gates (18); Right,top: Figure 8 – Unit 2 on 17 August (18); Right,bottom: Figure
9 – Unit 2 Damage After Dewatering on 3 September (18)

WWW.WATERPOWERMAGAZINE.COM NOVEMBER 2010 33

 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
cavitation damage to its runner. This suggests that the local pressure
in the vicinity of the draft tube throat was fairly near vapor pressure
during steady state operation. This is to be expected in a region
where the velocity profile is extremely nonuniform, and there is a sub-
stantial whirl component of velocity. A sudden load rejection would
have caused a drop in pressure at the draft tube throat as the draft
tube water column was decelerated by the action of the closing wicket
gates. If the gate closure were fast enough, the draft tube pressure
would have been reduced to vapor pressure, leading to the formation
of a vapor cavity in the draft tube throat. This is a credible sequence
of events, as indicated by an approximate analysis of this condition
for various assumed governor gate closure times. [20] This analysis
indicates that column separation may be expected for governor times
faster than full stroke in about six seconds. The analysis was based
on mass surge assumptions and draft tube geometry reflecting uni-
form area increase from the throat to the exit. It does not account for
the whirl component of velocity and related low pressure in the draft
tube associated with operation well off the machine design point, and
it is, therefore, probably not conservative in this instance.
As a result of the same gate closure, a simultaneous waterhammer
pressure rise in the penstock and spiral case would have been pro-
duced. This pressure rise, however, would have been simultaneous
with the pressure drop to vapor in the draft tube, and would have
preceded the collapse of the vapor cavity by an interval.
During the time that the vapor cavity persisted in the draft tube,
the transient flow condition between the throat and the draft tube
exit would have approximated a slow mass surge under the influ-
ence of the unbalanced head between vapor cavity and tailwa-
ter. As a result, it is likely that several seconds passed between
column separation and column rejoining at the collapse of the
vapor cavity. The waterhammer pressure rise in the spiral case
would have been relieved quite quickly due to the relatively short
penstocks. The penstock round-trip pressure wave travel time of
about 0.4 seconds was substantially shorter than the draft tube
mass surge time. A simplified mass surge analysis of the draft
tube flow during this postulated column separation indicates that
the time between opening and reclosing of the vapor cavity would
have been of the order of 2 ½ seconds. It further indicates that
the upward water velocity at vapor cavity closure would have been
approximately 2.4% greater than the initial downward velocity
when the separation began. This simplified analysis assumed
instantaneous draft tube inflow interruption at the time of column
separation, so the results must be viewed as indicative only.
At a load of 475MW, the wicket gate setting was reported to be
69%, and the machine flow was 256m3/sec. [10] The average ver-
tical velocity across the draft tube throat at that condition would
have been 8.3m/sec. [15] If water column separation occurred at
that point, and the vapor cavity persisted until the gates were com-
pletely closed, then the mass surge analysis indicates that the velocity
34
Above, left to right: Figure 10 – Unit 7 on 18 August (18); Figure 11 – Unit 9
on 18 August (18)
attained after the flow in the draft tube reversed and just at the point
of the vapor cavity volume reaching zero would have been 8.5m/sec
upward. The instantaneous head rise resulting from the collision of
the water column with the head cover, according to the fundamental
waterhammer equation [21], will be:
∆H = - (a/g)(∆V),
where a is the celerity of an elastic pressure wave, g is the acceleration
of gravity, and ∆V is instantaneous change of flow velocity, -8.5m/
sec. This will amount to -(900/9.81)(-8.5), or about 780m. This head
rise multiplied by the area of the head cover inside the wicket gates of
49m2 (see Figures 6 and 13), is equivalent to about 38,000 tonnes of
upward force. This is based on a very simplified analysis, so the value
must be taken as indicative of an upper limit, however, even a small
part of this force would have been very destructive.
The time that this force would exist would, of course, be very brief.
Based on a 35m draft tube length, it is estimated that the pressure spike
would last about a tenth of a second. Assuming the parts of the machine
that were lifted weighed 1500 tonnes, this pressure spike could have
lifted the machine a meter and a quarter during the tenth of a second
duration. This is about as close to a true explosion as it is possible to get
with an incompressible fluid. It would explain the nature of the damage
that is visible in the photographs of Unit 2 (Figures 7, 8, and 9).
If the 80 studs holding the head cover to the stay ring were all
intact and in good condition, assuming that the stud material had an
ultimate strength of 550 MPa, they would have all failed under an
uplift force of about 23,000 tonnes. This implies that Unit 2 might
have failed even if the studs were new.
Between late August and early December 2009, B. Kolesnikov
posted several internet commentaries on the Rosteknadzor report and
various publications in the mass media. [22] He accompanied his
posts with three figures which included photographic evidence that
strongly supports the column separation hypothesis presented here,
although he did not mention column separation as a possible cause.
His figures are reproduced in Figure 13. The photographs show that
the wicket gate stems were all broken off at the tops of the gates,
while the bottom trunnions were undamaged. This could have hap-
pened only if the gates had been lifted vertically until the trunnions
were fully out of the lower bushings before the 300mm diameter
stems were snapped off. Moreover, the pictures show that the gates
were forced outward toward the spiral case; not inward toward the
runner, because the runner blades show no evidence of the physical
damage that would be expected from collisions with the broken gates.
The pictures also show some of the studs remaining in the stay ring
flange, which demonstrate that they were not sheared off, but failed
NOVEMBER 2010 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION

in tension. This set of conditions can be explained only by a very
large pressure exerted upward from the draft tube. B. Kolesnikov
stated that there had to have been a large upward force on the head
cover, but he did not speculate as to its cause. His information and
observations have been very helpful.
In summary, the photographic evidence of the sequence of failure
events seems to be very powerful. That the wicket gates were blown
outward after their lower trunnions were pulled out of their bushings
seems very clear from the pictures. Thus, it seems unavoidable to
conclude that the very large pressure spike originated on the inside
of the gate ring, which leads to the hypothesis that it started in the
draft tube.
Units 7 and 9 apparently had sudden load rejection conditions
imposed on them as a result of the Unit 2 failure. It appears that
both Units 7 and 9 experienced draft tube water column separation
followed by powerful uplift, causing severe damage to the generators
and surrounding structure.
The evidence from the photographs and video recorded sounds
suggests that Units 7 and 9 were similarly forced upwards, but with
less violence than in the case of Unit 2. Since it is likely that the
head cover studs on these two machines were in better condition
than those of Unit 2, any upward force would have been resisted
to a greater extent than in the Unit 2 case. It is possible, therefore,
that the studs of Units 7 and 9 failed sequentially, causing the rotat-
ing parts to tilt as they were being thrust upwards. This would
result in a collision between rotor and stator before the rotating
parts had moved far enough upwards to release penstock pressure
into the turbine pits.
The photographs (Figures 10, 11, and 12) indicate that Unit 7 was
somewhat more severely damaged than Unit 9. This is interesting,
since the Rostekhnadzor report shows that at 0813, Unit 7 was car-
rying only 85MW, while Unit 9 was carrying 570MW. Although
Unit 7 was carrying the lightest load in the plant at the time of the
accident, the sudden load rejection by Unit 2 would have caused Unit
7, with its very light load, to start to accept the load dropped by
Unit 2 when its breaker opened. Thus, during the period between
the Unit 2 load rejection and the Unit 7 load rejection, Unit 7 would
have experienced a significant load acceptance transient. When the
massive electrical disturbances that followed the destruction of Unit 2
caused Unit 7 to shut down, it could have been from a heavily loaded
condition, with substantial transients remaining in its hydraulic pas-
sages. [5 through 8, 10]
New hypothesis: potential causes of water column separation
Observations at hydroelectric installations over the past 40 years have
indicated that plant operators sometimes try to improve the responsive-
ness of their generating units by various adjustments to the equipment.
One such adjustment is to modify the orifice control of the wicket gate
servomotor oil pressure system in order to speed up the wicket gate
movement. Occasionally, this has resulted in cases where draft tube
column separation has occurred causing loud banging sounds, pres-
sure spikes, and sometimes damage to the machines. Normally, gov-
ernors are designed with considerable margin allowance in the sizing
of oil piping, leaving the speed control up to the orifice plates (or needle
valves in some cases) that are installed to limit the velocity of oil flow.
How much margin is allowed is determined by the governor designer,
but oil piping is normally not a large portion of the cost of a governor,
so designers can be conservative with piping sizes and remain com-
petitive. Thus, it is often possible for governor speeds to be changed
significantly by replacing orifice plates with larger ones.
The fact that Unit 2 at Sayano Shushenskaya had had a new gov-
ernor installed in early 2009 is suggestive, as is the fact that this par-
ticular unit, in spite of its vibration problems, was chosen as the lead
load-following unit and was under the control of the new joint load
control system. It is possible that the governor had been adjusted to
increase the speed of wicket gate movement, which would have been
expected to improve the machine’s load-following capability. This
would have been consistent with the very fast load changing capa-
bilities of the joint load control system installed in June. It has been
reported that the joint load control was set to change unit loads at the
WWW.WATERPOWERMAGAZINE.COM NOVEMBER 2010
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
rate of 30MW/sec. [13] It is likely that the governors were set to an
even faster rate. If the governor gate speed were too fast, the transient
pressure drop in the draft tube accompanying a load rejection would
have caused water column separation as described earlier.
Unfortunately, the lack of data on these machines and the nature
of the complex pressure and velocity fields in the draft tubes make
it technically infeasible to predict analytically the governor time that
would cause column separation in the draft tubes. Normal water-
hammer assumptions of uniform velocity distribution simply do not
come close to actual draft tube conditions. Turbine designers require
extensive physical model testing to determine draft tube behavior.
Moreover, wicket gate position versus turbine flow behavior is quite
non-linear. The last part of a closing stroke changes flow very dra-
matically compared with conditions near full load. Thus, it is pos-
Sayano Shushenskaya – key facts
Initial operation date: 1978
Dam: Concrete gravity-arch, 245m high, 1066m long at crest
Reservoir: Sufficient storage for regulation over a full year
Powerhouse:
t Installed Capacity: 6400MW
t Annual Generation: 23.5TWh (42 % Plant capacity factor)
t Number of Units: 10
t Turbine Type: Francis
t Rated Capacity: 650MW (turbine), 640 MW (generator)
t Rated Discharge: 358.5m3/sec. per unit
t Rated Speed: 142.86 rpm (50 Hz)
t Rated Net Head: 194m
t Submergence: approximately 10m.
t Runner Diameter: 6.77m
t Runner Weight: 156 tonnes
t Rotor Weight: 920 tonnes
t Generator Type: synchronous, umbrella-type [16]
t Joint Load Control load-change rate: 30MW/second [13]
Particular turbine features:
t Generator thrust bearing structurally supported on turbine head cover [15]
t Each of 20 wicket gates supplied with an individual hydraulic servomotor [16]
t Draft tubes 27.3m long (horizontal projection) and 16.9 m high. [16] Total
hydraulic length about 35m.
t All units had narrow ranges of satisfactory operation, with large rough-
running zones
t Due to rough zones, the units were not suitable for load-following operation,
therefore plant was normally operated as a fixed base loaded installation
t All units initially sized to accommodate overloads up to 750MW [13]
t Field tests showed draft tube pulsation resonance with penstocks at loads
over 640MW, therefore operation above 640MW forbidden [13]
Special issues related to turbine unit 2:
t Fitted with new speed governor during first quarter 2009
t Had runner cavitation damage weld repairs first quarter 2009
t Runner was not rebalanced after weld repairs
t Experienced severe vibration problems both before and after runner repairs
t Connected with automated joint load control in June 2009 [13]
t Selected as lead unit due to recent repair and new governor
35
 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
sible to effect load changes in operation without producing the same
transient conditions that would accompany a complete load rejection.
Also, many operating load changes may be gradual enough that the
governors are not saturated, or operating at maximum speed, while a
load rejection will always saturate a governor to minimize overspeed
of the generator.
The character of the damage to Units 7 and 9 suggests that they,
too, may have had their governors speeded up, which could have
caused column separation upon load rejection.
36
Left, top: Figure 12 – Unit 7 generator after dewatering on 30 August (6)
Left, bottom: Figure 13 – Unit 2 damage details (22)
The reports of severe vibration in Unit 2 suggest possible causes
for the initial load rejection that apparently precipitated this mas-
sive failure. There may have been a protective relay that respond-
ed to excessive vibration, as is often the case in large rotating
electrical equipment. It has been reported, however, that the Unit
2 vibration monitoring equipment may have been disabled. [19]
Excessive vibration could also have caused heavy loads on the
guide bearings, which might have caused overheating and pre-
cipitated a trip. Also, if the powerhouse relay panels dated from
the 1970’s, and the relays were not of the more modern solid-
state types, vibrations carried through powerhouse structure to
the relays in the panels could have caused the contacts mounted on
the delicate carriages of an electro-mechanical relay to have closed
inadvertently. There are, of course, many other possible causes for
a load rejection to have occurred.
C ONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this article are based on an analysis that is specula-
tive, since complete technical information on the machines and their
governors and other ancillary and control equipment has not been
available to the writer. Nevertheless, the importance of this incident
to the safety of hydroelectric installations everywhere demands that
this evaluation, however imperfect and incomplete, be made available
to everyone in and around this industry.
1. The fundamental conclusion from this examination is that the explo-
sion of Unit 2 and the destruction of Units 7 and 9 were very prob-
ably caused by water column separation in the turbine draft tubes
during unit load rejection. This hydraulic transient phenomenon
was probably caused by turbine governors that had been speeded up
(probably unknowingly) to an unsafe level in an attempt to improve
frequency stability under changing electrical loads.
2. This project serves to re-emphasize the need to stress both model
and field testing of hydraulic turbomachinery. Although the rough
operating zones of the Sayano Shushenskaya turbines were able
to be identified in the laboratory, the problem of resonance in the
penstocks as excited by draft tube pulsations at overload condi-
tions could only be identified in the field under full scale operat-
ing conditions. Such testing was done early on and established
limits to safe operating zones which prevented resonance prob-
lems in operation. Had these limits not been established or been
violated in practice, consequences as dire as those experienced on
17 August could have occurred. Fortunately, they did not, due
to adequate field testing and implementation of results. Much
progress has been made in recent times in the field of computa-
tional fluid dynamics (CFD), however, the fluid mechanics of tur-
bomachinery, especially in unsteady flow regimes, still remains
beyond the abilities of present day CFD modeling.
3. If the turbine governors in this plant were adjusted in recent
times to increase wicket gate operating speed above safe levels,
this may have been done in good faith by operations person-
nel who were not familiar with hydraulic transient phenomena,
and the attendant limitations that the design of this installation
imposed on operation.
4. This sort of adjustment has been observed on other plants, both
in the USA and in other countries. Operators, left to their own
devices, will attempt to maximize the output of their plant, while
ensuring that it reacts to load changes in the fastest way possi-
ble. In this case, the plant operators were clearly under pressure
from the owners and grid operators to improve system frequency
stability, and, therefore, load following capability. Starting with
the first implementation of automated and fast joint load control,
the operators of this plant had a strong incentive to speed up
NOVEMBER 2010 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION