The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy

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What is philosophy?

W.R. Boyce Gibson

To cite this article: W.R. Boyce Gibson (1933) What is philosophy?, The Australasian Journal of
Psychology and Philosophy, 11:2, 88-98, DOI: 10.1080/00048403308540999

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Published online: 17 Jan 2008.

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 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 1

By W. R. BoYcE GIBSON,
Prolessor of Philosophy, University ot Melbourne.

P~ttJ.OSOPHY, like everything else, has m a n y definitionl

and shows this or t h a t facet of its many-sided n a t u r e according
to the viewpoint from which it is regarded. F o r the student
interested in Courses it is a subject of questionable eligibility
in the Arts curriculum; for the Orphic and Stoic in ancient
days i t was a religion a n d a way of life. How, then, can we
reach its essential idea T
L e t us first look into w h a t is nearest to us, n a m e l y ourselves.
Philosophy is at any rate nothing foreign to us, a stranger to
whom we need to be introduced. No one of us who has ever
wondered at the mysteries of existence or grown dizzy over the
meaning of his own Ego can pretend to be an outsider in tho
m a t t e r of philosophy. There is something in us which we feel
to be in intimate and sympathetic contact with the nature of
things, linking us intimately and indisseverably with the
universe as a whole. I n this insight indeed lies the whole
promise of philosophy. L e t this, then, be our first t h o u g h t
concerning its essential meaning. The active, living source of
philosophy is in our own personality. I t only needs tapping
and releasing.
If, on this point, we seek further explanation, the reply is
clear. The essence of philosophy is Reason, and with all our
follies we are at heart rational beings, with a more or less strongly
developed intellectual curiosity. This m a y figure at first as
mere wonder. We look a b o u t us in some cool m o m e n t of reflection
and wonder w h y we are here a t all, or what sort of ending there
can be to Time, Space and Self. B u t wonder soon fatigues if
n o t supported b y thought, and it is in proportion as we give
this support and dig assiduously into all these mysteries with
a view to distilling out the soul of reason in t h e m t h a t we become
philosophers, for Philosophy is just the ~pirit of Reason in Human
37ature. T h a t is its central m~aning and the secret of its vast
significance for life.
I wish to emphasize from the outset this essential and
intimate connexion between Reason and Philosophy. W h e t h e r
Philosophy proves valuable to us or not depends on the value we
l A paper read before the Melbourne University Philosophical Society on 27th March. 193S.
 WHAT 18 PHILOSOPHY~ 89

set upon Reason and being reasonable. I t is not so much the

assured possession of Wisdom itself as the love of Wisdom a n d
the quest after it which characterizes the philosopher. The
v e r y name " P h i l o s o p h y " bears witness to this. And so does
the early H i s t o r y of Philosophy. Socrates, like P y t h a g o r a s
before him, would not allow t h a t he was wise except in the sense
t h a t he was wise enough to know t h a t he wasn't wise. I t was
in this sense t h a t he interpreted the Delphic Oracle proclaiming
him the wisest of men, and it was in this sense t h a t he interpreted
Philosophy's first requirement. H e held t h a t as the first essential
of Philosophy there must be a negative movement, a repudiation
of all fancied wisdom, of all mere opinion t h a t could not stand
the test of honest examination : this radical self-criticism was
to him the essential preface to the positive philosophic task
of seeking real definitions of the virtues and other realities
capable of weathering all criticism and so giving us real know-
ledge in place of ungrounded opinion. So Socrates. And the
father of Modern Philosophy, Ren~ Descartes, shared this
conviction with him. Once at least in a lifetime each one of us,
if philosophy means anything to him, will, he says, deliberately
seek to doubt all his so-called knowledge, and will not rest
content till he has discovered some logically indubitable minimum
upon which he can t h e n erect with assurance a fabric of real
knowledge.
Now it is significant t h a t in both these two great historic
e~ses the a d v e n t u r e of the Reason in its search for knowledge
consisted essentially in the vigorous application of a definite
method. Socrates aimed at securing rigorously tested definitions
through the earnest co-operation of relentlessly critical minds
with others in whom knowledge was b u t a thin, though an
aspiring, flame, whilst Descartes elaborated a definite m e t h o d
for raising knowledge on to an indubitable foundation. On
one occasion, being called upon to speak after a meeting of a
certain philosophical society at which a distinguished visitor
had been giving a philosophical address, he remarked t h a t it was
all very nice indeed, and t h a t he had enjoyed it all immensely,
b u t t h a t it was not philosophy at all, since it lacked the two
philosophic essentials : method and standard. The speaker h a d
not supplied a n y touchstone or test for distinguishing between
false and true, and had supplied no m e t h o d for directing the
mind in its search after the t r u t h s he h a d been discussing.
We see, then, t h a t the philosophic reason requires a
preliminary purifying of the mind from all its irrational cant
and rubbish, the fixing of a t r u s t w o r t h y starting-point, and the
development of the truth-quest from t h a t starting-point accord-
ing to strict m e t h o d and in the light of definite and appropriate
standards. The m e t h o d m a y be v e r y simple, it m a y consist
of just a few rules : quite enough, Descartes assures us, so long
90 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY~

as one applies t h e m methodically with u n r e m i t t i n g fidelity.

B u t there m u s t be a rational method, and sincerity, honesty
a n d fidelity in its application.
I m a g i n e yourself c o m m i t t e d to carry out w i t h o u t d e m u r
w h a t e v e r l~cason requires of y o u : imagine yourself the faithful
s e r v a n t of Reason, a n d y o u will t h e n be filled with t h e true spirit
of philosophy, you will k n o w the meaning of Philosophia Militans
as Socrates first understood it. You will k n o w the inner meaning
of t h e Socratic p r e c e p t : Virtue is Knowledge. T h a t precept
h a d w h a t we m i g h t fairly call a religious foundation. I t arose
f r o m solicitude concerning the salvation of the soul. W h a t is
it t h a t can purify a n d save the soul ? The answer given was
t h a t t h e soul's proper purification was t h r o u g h knowledge,
t h r o u g h the quest of Philosophy. The soul is rational in its
essence, and therefore Reason alone can save it. Hence the
fervour p u t into philosophic analysis b y the initiates of the
P y t h a g o r e a n Order who held to this belief, a n d a m o n g whom
Socrates was, in all probability, a p r o m i n e n t figure.
A t a somewhat later period B.c. the Stoics spoke of the
Reason as the Christian speaks of God. Reason was t h e F a t h e r
of us a l l - - o u r sole concern is to foster and develop the l~eason
within us, and to s m o t h e r mercilessly all the excited concern
our lower n a t u r e is a p t to show in obtaining m e r e a d v a n t a g e s
such as riches or good health, and avoiding the corresponding
d i s a d v a n t a g e s : p o v e r t y , sickness, death. W h a t h a v e mere
a d v a n t a g e s or disadvantages to do with our r a t i o n a l integrity ?
No ! O u r emotional life m u s t be wholly dedicated to the service
of Reason, and its whole enthusiasm concentrated on the p a t t e r n
of the wise man.
I n a n o t h e r direction, with P l a t o a n d with Aristotle, we h a v e
the d e v e l o p m e n t of a rational Ethics, the essential note of which is
balance, order, measure, proportion, the h a p p y m e a n between
excess a n d defect, serenity a n d b e a u t y of behaviour, the control
of all partial desires in the interest of the life as a whole ; and
showing, over and a b o v e all this, strict adhesion to the Socratic
m a x i m t h a t the u n e x a m i n e d life is not w o r t h living, and the
free acceptance of the Spirit of purifying Reason as the one a n d
only m o t i v e of the good life.
W o r d s w o r t h could say t h a t he knew nothing so fair as the
smile u p o n the face of D u t y . The philosopher, in a similar
spirit a n d manner, would be p r e p a r e d to s a y t h a t he knew
n o t h i n g so fair as the smile u p o n the face of Reason. But, ff
we are to see the smile, we m u s t not i n t e r p r e t Reason too
a b s t r a c t l y . W i t h P l a t o it was a love and a quest as well as t h a t
a c t i v e contemplation b o r n of wonder and curiosity which
connects all things t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t and searches out the
grounds of all things. Philosophy has been defined as " r e a s o n e d
t r u t h ", and the stress laid on the reasoned a r g u m e n t through
 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY:~ 9!

which positions are explained a n d defended. The emphasis

is indeed well placed. Plato himself launches forth in the
Phmdo against t h e haters of reasoned discourse, the misologists,
as he calls t h e m . W e m u s t be r e a d y as philosophers to sustain
t h e a r g u m e n t a n d abide b y the reasoned conclusion. And as
for Truth, which is the Ideal S t a n d a r d of all Reasoning, let us
listen to Hegel when he says : " T r u t h is a noble word, and t h e
thing is nobler still. So long as m a n is sound a t h e a r t and in
spirit the search for T r u t h m u s t a w a k e all the enthusiasm of his
n a t u r e . " And yet, with all this respect for w h a t is closely
reasoned, we m u s t n o t identify reason with reasons. Reason is
a far deeper a n d b r o a d e r thing t h a n the reasons of inference a n d
proof, and has ramifications t h a t e x t e n d far b e y o n d the Reason
of Philosophy. Science certainly gives reasons, b u t N a t u r e
gives none ; a n d y e t reason is present in both. The Reason in
N a t u r e shows itself in the discoverable n a t u r a l Order, and in
the laws upon which t h a t order depends. I t does not express
itself in the conceptual t e r m s of knowledge, b u t as physical
m o v e m e n t s a n d changes in accordance w i t h orderly patterns.
So there is a Reason in A r t t h a t ~s deeper and more a u t h e n t i c
t h a n all the reasons of 2Esthetics, a Reason in Religion deeper a n d
more a u t h e n t i c t h a n all the reasons of Theology, a Reason in t h e
T r u t h of things m o r e authentic and f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n all t h e
reasons of all t h e philosophical systems.
I d o n ' t wish to discuss these profundities, or to defend
m y theses against K a n t i a n criticism. I wish only to point o u t
as m y own conviction t h a t if the conception of philosophy as
the Spirit of R e a s o n in Man is t a k e n seriously, a n d proper account
t a k e n of the m a n y avenues in a n d t h r o u g h which such Reason
m a y operate, it m u s t be recognized t h a t Philosophy in its
f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g pervades the whole of our life a n d
experience, and is present wherever, in Art, Religion, Statecraft,
t h a t spirit is present which a t once purifies from disorder a n d
inspires developing things with the orderliness needed for their
proper development. A great s y m p h o n y or sonata is a master-
piece of ordered b e a u t y , and its composer, i m b u e d with the spirit
of Reason, m u s t be welcomed as essentially philosophical in his
feeling for order a n d measure. Philosophy in this sense is in all
w i t h o u t being itself all ; for A r t with its ideals of b e a u t y a n d
expressiveness m a k e s similar invasion into science and philosophy,
a n d is everywhere the creative impulse t h a t vitalizes and renews.
W h e n Poincar~ tells us t h a t it is t h e expressive b e a u t y of
m a t h e m a t i c a l a r g u m e n t , set down symbolically, which serves
him as m o t i v e a n d s t a n d a r d in m a t h e m a t i c a l discovery, we
realize how b u s y the artist is even in the r e m o t e a n d icy regions
of the higher calculus. And there is also a b e a u t y of conduct
a n d a b e a u t y of holiness. And it would, I think, be easy to
show how the sense of the presence of something divine, present
92 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY~

like the Ideals of Beauty, Truth and Goodness in all our experi-
ence, and yet significantly transcending it at every point, brings
religion in its most fundamental and least official form into
all the highways and byways of our rational life, invading
and inspiring Art, Philosophy, Morality. So Philosophy is
certainly not All. Its religious ideal is Truth, not Beauty n o r
Virtue. And its Ideal is Truth, first in a wider, and then in a
narrower and more specific sense. In its widest philosophic
sense there is truth in every region of aspiration : in art, morality
and religion as well as in the quest for knowledge. There is
t r u t h in beauty of line and of phrase, in all the balanced propor-
tions of beautiful things ; there is t r u t h in life t h a t conforms to
its own laws of development, or brings some fresh order and
balancing into the social world ; there is truth in ordered scales
of moral preferences and in the sincerity which, as we say,
rings true.
B u t in a narrower and more familiar sense, the Truth Ideal
is restricted to the region of Theory, and is figured exclusively
in terms of propositions expressed in conceptual form. In
this narrower sense Philosophy is not the immanent Spirit of
Reason, but the Spirit of Reason working through t h e reasoning
intellect and clothed in the raiment of language. I t is at this
point t h a t it becomes necessary to distinguish it from Science,
for Science, too, works through the Intellect and expresses itself
in technical speech. The standpoint of Science, I take it, is
t h a t of ordinary sense-perception. The sensa---colours, sounds,
scents, and so forth--serve as signs indicating a reality beyond
themselves, an external world independent of the observer and
all his subjective dispositions--a causally-ordered world in
space and time. The scientist, approaching nature from the
outside, can only make guesses concerning the precise form
assumed in any given context by the underlying causal order
which he postulates ; he makes hypotheses and tests them, and
in this way the sciences of nature are gradually and inductively
built up. In dealing with living organisms the externality of
the standpoint may be somewhat modified. We are still at
liberty to treat organisms merely as mechanisms in which the
action of any part is held to be completely determined by the
actions upon it of adjacent parts in space and in time, and this
m a n y biologists do. B u t other biologists hold t h a t in the
sciences of life the functional viewpoint must dominate the
mechanical. According to the functional viewpoint the action
of the part is determined in relation to the needs of the organism
as a whole, and something akin to explanation in terms of ends
and means is accepted as the characteristic method of interpreta-
tion. However, this teleological type of explanation can be
ultimately justified only through our own direct experience
of ourselves as conscious beings. Being free to take the inner
 VC'HAT IS PHILOSOPHY~} 93

viewpoint and to observe ourselves reflectively we know at first

hand, and as a m a t t e r of immediate experience what it means to
be striving towards an end and utilizing existing causal connec-
tions to serve as means for the fulfilling of t h a t end. We are
not only living~ b u t purposive, beings, and through our own self-
consciousness we can observe our own activities directly~
searching out from within their motives, functions and aims.
F o r a n y central and direct appreciation of individuality, t h e
inner viewpoint is essential, and to the e x t e n t to which this is
the case, the standpoint of study becomes primarily philosophical.
We m a y p u t it thus : The vision which is at once inward
and synoptic, grasping experience inwardly instead of n a t u r e
outwardly, and grasping it as a whole and in relation to what is
personal and u l t i m a t e - - t h i s is specifically philosophical as
distinguished from scientific vision, and it is part of a philo-
sophical training to acquire it. We must release and enjoy
new sources of intuition. Sense-intuition is b u t one form of
direct relation to reality. The intuition of motion is already
something different---so, too, the intuition of the spatial a n d
the tantalizing intuition of time. Self-intuition, again, and
with it the intuition of purposive activities, the intuition of
Ideals, Values and real possibilities--of all this we have direct
experience, as so m a n y different contacts with r e a l i t y - - a n d it is
the function of philosophy to awake and train our intuitional
capacity, so t h a t we see not with our eyes only, b u t with the
mind in all its totality of receptive functions. The intuition of
Ideals and their distinctive values, and of ourselves in relation
to these m a y be referred to as spiritual vision. We use our
eyes, and we see forms, colours and varied lights and shades.
B u t it is a new light t h a t graces the visual field when we see these
forms and colours as beautiful. Such transfiguring light is not
peculiar to the world of Art. The world of conduct is also
spiritually lit with its own transfiguring vision of goodness and
affection. Philosophy differs, then, from Science through its
extended vision, through its more varied and deeper contact
with reality. Science is concerned only with the interpretation
of Nature, Philosophy with t h a t of Experience, and of the selves
and worlds which t h a t experience serves to reveal. With regard
to Psychology we m a y a t any rate say this, t h a t in so far as it
respects the u n i t y and continuity of the individual's immediate
experience---the experience of beings capable of the Consciousness
of worlds and of reverencing Ideals of Art, conduct and thought,
it is essentially a philosophical discipline sharing the inner
viewpoint and the varied vision.
I t is a further question whether under these conditions t h e
methods of philosophical study can be as rigorous and thorough
as those of science. T h e y cannot of course be as exact as the
sciences which are regulated mathematically or experimentally,
94 re'HAT IS PHILO$OPHY~

b u t in one sense t h e y will be m o r e thoroughgoing, inasmuch as

it is the function of philosophy, in one or other of its aspects, to
criticize the assumptions which the sciences make~ b u t leave
unconsidered. All sciences assume the active presence of the
personal observer and reasoner, b u t do not m a k e his personal
n a t u r e p a r t of their s u b j e c t - m a t t e r . They assume t i m e and
space or time-space, b u t t h e y h a v e no theory of Time or Space,
for t h e y are not interested in these as lived or experienced, b u t
only as measured. Philosophy stung b y a sense of the Infinite
c o n t e m p l a t e s the m e t h o d i c a l exploration of t h e Universe as a
whole a n d of all its m a i n regions. I t is interested n o t only in a
m u c h wider reality t h a n Science affects, b u t also in those v a s t
p r o b l e m s of Knowledge a n d Valuation wherein subject a n d object
are m o s t i n t i m a t e l y linked together. Philosophy is therefore
m o r e thoroughgoing t h a n Science in the sense t h a t it thinks
things out further and m o r e comprehensively, a n d it is certainly
no less logical, if necessarily less exact~ in its estimates and less
precise in its verifications. B u t we m u s t m a k e a distinction
here within the realm of philosophy itself. There is the
philosophy which aims a t a comprehensive synopsis of the m a i n
p r o b l e m s of life and of the Universe as a whole. I t aims at a life-
view or world-view, as the expression goes. I t has f u n d a m e n t a l
affinities with p o e t r y which is also like itself a criticism of life~
a n d it allows full scope to the speculative imagination. Of
these philosophical systems there are as m a n y different kinds
as there are different kinds of philosophers or different angles of
philosophical vision. B u t there is another t y p e of philosophy,
a t y p e which eschews p o e t r y a n d has affinities with science, and
indeed seeks to outdo science in rigour and precision. I t would,
like science, eliminate all personal equation a n d fix all its findings
in a f o r m t h a t admits of being indefinitely continued and
amplified from one generation of thinkers to another, so t h a t
philosophers shall all consolidate their c o m m o n labour instead
of b r e a k i n g out into i n d e p e n d e n t speculation v i t i a t e d b y some
purely personal idiosyncrasy, each setting up his own separate
s y s t e m against the rest. The P h e n o m e n o l o g y of ttusserl and
his followers aims at this thoroughgoing rigour, a n d it regards
the speculative world-views a n d life-views as amateurish,
subjective, unphilosophical. W e need not be so extreme.
The logical and the phenomenological foundations of philosophy
are certainly m o s t i m p o r t a n t , b u t so are its contacts with life
a n d conduct and the rigidity required of the one m a y be deadening
to the other. L e t us t h e n accept this twofold conception of
philosophy as inwardly related to p o e t r y a n d religion, on the
one hand, and to science a n d m a t h e m a t i c s on the other. The
philosophic Reason is b r o a d enough for both. A n d we m a y now
t u r n as we eventually m u s t if we hold philosophy as we do to be a
criticism of life and t h o u g h t , to the m o r a l a n d political
 WHAT iS PHILOSOPHY.~ 95

philosophies, the m a i n function of which is to relate h u m a n life

and its social problems to f u n d a m e n t a l principles and intrinsic
values.
I hope no one will imagine t h a t philosophy as the Theory
of Practice, and in virtue of the pressing n a t u r e of things
practical and their inseparability from the issues of right and
wrong, m a y forget its fealty to t h e Reason, a n d probe, exhort,
denounce in the spirit of the p r o p h e t or open propagandist.
Socrates no d o u b t did this, a n d so h a v e others like the late Rudolf
E u c k e n of Jena. B u t there was the Socratic m e t h o d , the m e t h o d
of definitions, a n d E u c k e n had his own no61ogical dialectic.
I n b o t h eases the philosophy as such m u s t a n d will be judged
b y its principles a n d methods and its faithfulness to these.
Our practical needs m a y set the problems for our m o r a l and
political philosophies, b u t t h e y can prescribe neither their
methods nor their principles. To a n y call for practical assistance
philosophy, whether theoretical or practical, can respond only
in its own way. To give assistance and t h a t speedily is human,
b u t it is not as philosophers t h a t we m e e t emergencies. The
practical disciplines, in so far as philosophical, are concerned
n o t to foster or to realize the good, b u t to present it in a true
light. Like all organs of the conceptual Reason the practical
disciplines aim p r i m a r i l y at presenting the Truth, and of present-
ing it clearly and consistently. Morality, of course, is directly
concerned with t h e spread and practical realization of Moral
Values in the actual conduct of life, b u t Ethics or Moral Theory
is n o t itself Morality, b u t as a theory is concerned with the truth
of all this and its presentation in verbal form.
This does n o t m e a n t h a t there is no essential difference
between those t y p e s of philosophy which a i m a t the organizing
of knowledge and t h e practical disciplines concerned with the
conditions of action a n d production, a n d with value-judgments
of a practical kind. The difference is indeed i m p o r t a n t . The
m o v e m e n t s of the m o o n are not in a n y w a y affected b y a n y ideas
astronomers m a y h a v e regarding g r a v i t a t i o n : the m o o n is not
troubled b y the differences between ~ e w t o n a n d Einstein. On
the other h a n d the activities of h u m a n minds m a y be v e r y much
affected b y ideas of an ethical or msthetieal character. Morals
m a y be guided or misguided, and t h a t m o s t effectively, b y moral
or immoral ideas. ~ o n e the less moral philosophy is limited to
searching and setting out systematically the facts and truths
concerning conduct and its standards. Others, no doubt, will
concentrate on the realizing of their ideas in actual practice,
b u t it will be as social a n d political workers, not as moral or
political philosophers. The philosophy m a y be greatly assisted
b y such action, being b r o u g h t t h e r e b y into living, fruitful contact
with present-day facts ; b u t it remains philosophy only so far
as it remains faithful to its own methods. These will be the
96 WHAT IS PHILOSOPH¥~

m e t h o d s proper to t r u t h - e n q u i r y a n d be d e t e r m i n e d b y t r u t h -
ideals a n d b y logical standards. T h e y will n o t be those proper
to the realization of some practical object. The practical
object has concrete individuality a n d needs to be established as a
going concern in the world of affairs. I n establishing it we do
n o t a s k whether it is true, b u t whether it is useful a n d right t h a t
it should be so established, a n d we concentrate on the practically
effective ways of bringing it into existence. All this has a great
deal to do with the proper conditioning of practical life, b u t
philosophy is something different. E v e n as a search or a quest,
it is a search or quest for t r u t h : as such it is an essential activity
of our spiritual life, in b r i e f - - a f o r m of life, b u t a f o r m with a
clearly-marked ideal a n d with methods of enquiry determined
exclusively in their m a i n direction b y this ideal. No question
in philosophy is more f u n d a m e n t a l t h a n the question : W h a t is
T r u t h ? I n philosophy the usefulness of a n idea depends on
its t r u t h - p r o d u c i n g power : ideas are useful in p r o p o r t i o n as t h e y
are t r u e and not true because t h e y are useful or successful in
practice.
I t is i m p o r t a n t in this connection not to confuse Ethics with
Morality. Morality is p r i m a r i l y a n d essentially a m a t t e r of the
will--the will being the whole personality considered as active
in certain specific ways, in control, deliberation, preference,
decision, resolute action. I n deliberation again we weigh
a l t e r n a t i v e courses against each other, not to decide which is the
m o r e true (as in the balancing of scientific hypotheses), b u t
which is the better, a n d in last resort which is best, i.e., morally
best. As moral agents our concern is n o t to weigh mere
a d v a n t a g e s against mere disadvantages on the one h a n d or on
the other to compare our ideas with existing facts. The moral
j u d g m e n t posits this as rationally b e t t e r or worse t h a n that, or
this as right and t h a t as wrong. B u t m o r a l philosophy or
ethics, on the other hand, to which all moral j u d g m e n t s are mere
d a t a , is essentially concerned with conceiving the m o r a l situation
truly: like science its leading categories are the t r u e a n d the
false. Ethics aims a t being as true as possible to the complex
facts of the m o r a l life, t r u e to its phenomena, to its values, and
to the intricacies of its u l t i m a t e problems, like those of freedom
a n d of evil. I f we say t h a t a n ethical discussion is valuable we
m e a n t h a t it is valuable t h r o u g h its truth, t h r o u g h its insight
into the facts of the m o r a l situation, through its clear grasp of
m o r a l principles, and t h r o u g h the e x p l a n a t o r y power it reveals
in relation to the perplexities of moral experience. As moral
philosophers we are therefore f u n d a m e n t a l l y theorists, though
o u r concern is with t h e practical, with j u d g m e n t s concerning
w h a t is b e t t e r a n d w h a t is worse in the scale of m o r a l values.
Briefly, we are concerned with m o r a l issues, b u t our concern is
to reach the t r u t h a b o u t t h e m , so far as t h a t is theoretically
 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY~ 97

possible. The enacting of our best insight m a y be a m o r a l

requirement, b u t it is e m p h a t i c a l l y not one t h a t can be exacted
of a n y kind of philosophy.
An objection m a y here be raised. As agents in a m o r a l
aituation, it m a y be asked, under circumstances where choice is
required and decisions m u s t be made, are we n o t rational beings,
using our reason to choose and decide ; a n d if we thus use our
reason, are we n o t acting as philosophers should do, t h a t is,
acting rationally ? Certainly we are, for e v e n philosophers are
m o r a l beings, b u t we are not acting as philosophers should do
qua philosophers. The will has its own logic, the logic of practice.
Unlike the intellect which condemns ideas if t h e y do not agree
with facts, it condemns facts if t h e y do n o t fit in with a p p r o v e d
ideas. I t thinks only in the interests of action and reform, a n d
seeks n o t t r u t h b u t always some f o r m of b e t t e r m e n t , whereas
the only kind of action t h a t is properly philosophic is the a c t i v i t y
of reflection, the a c t i v i t y of Reason directed towards the discovery
of Truth.
There is indeed a wide sense of the t e r m " p r a c t i c a l " which
permits the inclusion of the theoretical interest under the
practical interests of h u m a n life. Underlying all intellectual
reflection is the Will in its special f o r m of t h e Will to Know, the
Will to know the Truth. H e r e the leading idea to which facts
m u s t s u b m i t is t h a t facts are sacrosanct a n d t h a t all ideas which
the facts refuse to endorse s t a n d t h e r e b y condemned. The
postulates of scientific enquiry, as distinguished f r o m specific
hypotheses, are forms of the Will to K n o w , a n d as t h e y form an
integral and indispensable p a r t of every science and specify the
categories and forms of explanation which can alone be regarded
as relevant a n d legitimate, we see t h a t Science as a T r u t h - q u e s t
rests on the Will a n d is governed b y the I d e a of the Good. A n d
t h e same holds good of Philosophy. It, too, rests on the Will to
k n o w the Truth, a n d has its postulates which, as such, are neither
t r u e nor false, b u t good or bad, serviceable or unserviceable.
To this e x t e n t the Will always holds the Intellect in fee. T r u t h
is one of the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l forms which the Willed Good
can take. The I d e a of good to which facts are called on to s u b m i t
takes, in science a n d philosophy, the f o r m of the I d e a of complete
subordination of concept to fact.
B u t within the limits of the Will to Know, Philosophy
remains a function of the Reason, exclusively concerned to dis-
cover the t r u t h a b o u t the Universe as it is, a n d to display a t e v e r y
point the requisite vision or intuition. Moreover, w h a t e v e r the
special form of intuition involved, the general capacity to view
a n y t h i n g s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y a n d synoptically, inwardly a n d as a
whole is philosophically vital. B u t this a t t i t u d e gives the first
i n t i m a t i o n only, the i m p a c t on our sensibility. The interpreting,
B
98 WHAT IS PHILO$OPHY:~

t h e inferring, the connecting, the critical regress, t h e establishing,

t h e j u s t i f y i n g - - t h i s is the special work of the Reason.
B u t let us not view the Reason a b s t r a c t l y or identify Reason
with reasons or even with the mere giving of reasons. Reason
is n o t only the a r g u m e n t b u t the aspiration which ideally directs
it. I t n o t only knows, b u t loves. I t is a lover of the t r u t h and a
h a t e r of lies. Such indeed was Plato's conviction. I t is this
complex unity of intuition, intellect~ aspiration a n d love, as
united in the quest for Truth t h a t we h a v e in m i n d w h e n we insist,
as well we m a y , t h a t Philosophy is the v e r y Spirit of Reason in
Man, a n d t h a t it is with the Reason t h a t its last word rests.