CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

2
CASE DIGESTS
(Right to Privacy, Habeas
Corpus, Writ of Amparo)

Submitted:
WILLY C. DUMPIT
FIRST YEAR - LLB
 OPLE v. TORRES
GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998

FACTS:
On December 12, 1996, A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos
re: "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System". Petitioner
prays to invalidate thereto on two important constitutional grounds, viz: 1. It is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; 2. it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Respondents counter argued the following: 1. The
instant petition is not a justiciable case; 2. A.O. No. 308 was issued within the Executive
and Administrative Powere of the President; 3. The funds necessary for the
implementation of the identification reference system may be sourced from the budgets
of the concerned agencies; and 4. A.O. No. 308 protects an individual’s interest in
privacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not A.O. No. 308 is a violation of Right To Privacy?

HELD:
No. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources; governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer,
only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
Thus, the petition was granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
 VIVARES vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

FACTS:
 
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile. Julia and Julienne, both minors, were
graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. At STC,
Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Then Julia, Julienne and other students
involved were barred from joining the commencement exercises. Petitioners, who are
the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data. However, RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors?

HELD: 

No. The respondent STC is clearly aware of incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct. Also, it is
not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it
important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenship in their respective
programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time
they participate in online activities. Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber
world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a
good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. As such, STC
cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be
responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace. It is, thus, incumbent upon
internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must
not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief
from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. 
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights.
In light of the foregoing, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the RTCs ruling.

MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013

FACTS:

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a
warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the
entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in
accordance with the prevailing rules. After conducting a preliminary examination of one
of the complainants, the judge ordered the arrest of Mangila and others without bail, and
the records transmitted to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings in accordance
with law. Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus, averring that the Judge had no
authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and the issuance of the warrant was
without any justification or probable cause. She argues that habeas corpus is available
to her, as she had no adequate remedy in law since the records of the case were
already forwarded to the Office of the City Prosecutor who had no authority to recall the
warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus the proper remedy in this case?

HELD: 

No. First, the petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which
she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a
failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation
of her constitutional rights. Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn
the issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all
consider the necessity of determining the existence of probable cause. And, lastly, it
was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review
by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule,
Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her
release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities
attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant
for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor. CA, therefore, that the writ of
habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy. Hence,
the Court affirmed the resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November 19,
2003.

In Re: SHANG KO VINGSON YU

UDK NO. 14817, January 13, 2014

FACTS:

On September 23, 2011, petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko
Vingson Yu (Shang Ko), her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home. On November
2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of information that
Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer
in that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the
help of the NBI to rescue her child. An NBI agent informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no
longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids.
Pura told her, however, that the child was fine and had been attending school. This
prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent
Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA).
In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012, the CA denied the petition for its failure to
clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas corpus may
not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a
means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of
such person. The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is available in this case?

HELD:
Yes. The Rules of Court under Section 1, Rule 102, the writ of hebeas corpus is
available, not only in cases of illegal detention by which person is deprived of his liberty,
but all in cases involving custody over minor. The general rule is that parents should
have custody over their minor children. But the government has the right to intervene
when parents treat their children cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-
being and leaving them emotional scrs that they carry throughout their lives unless they
are liberated from such parents and properly counselled. Thus, the Supreme Court ses
aside the CA Resolutions and the custody case was forwarded to the Family Court of
Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants. This means that
until such court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson in the custody of
Calvary Kids.

CALLO vs.  MORENTE

G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

FACTS:

On 15 January 2013, Danielle Tan Parker was charged for deportation for being
an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. It was alleged that Danielle
Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an
outstanding arrest warrant issued against her. Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, a
Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known
as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that she arrived in the
Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of
a period of one year. On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City She was then taken to the
Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. On 23 March 2017, Callo filed
this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate
Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo argues that Parker is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of
Immigration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by the
respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently the award
of the interim reliefs?

HELD:

No. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide

relief to violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. The Court contended that we see no enforced or involuntary
disappearance, or any threats thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ
of amparo. In this case, Parker lias not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently
justified by the Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending
criminal case against her. Moreover, Moreover, while "any person" may file a petition for
the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on
who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation
nor proof that Parker had no immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant,
or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Hence, the
interim reliefs sought are denied. A petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper
action to resolve such issues.

RODRIGUEZ vs. ARROYO

G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011

FACTS:

On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez was forcibly taken by four men forced him to
get inside a car. The men inside the car started punching Rodriguez, and forced him to
confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army. Rodriguez remained silent until
they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army. Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the
Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member
and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. On September 17,
2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him accompanied by members of
the CHR. On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The
petition was filed against former President Arroyo and other petitiooners. Respondents
contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels. CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and
found other petioners for his abduction and torture. On President Arroyo, the case was
dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of

amparo and habeas data cases?

HELD:
 Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his
rights. Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal,
civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure. Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial
evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable
for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise
failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan. Hence, SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications.