ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIRGIL R.

CASTRO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court.
Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner
befitting their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a Complaint-Affidavit1 with supporting documents2 against respondent Atty. Virgil R.
Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8
and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.3 The charge in the complaint is
summed up as follows:

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva

Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainant's office to inquire
whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v.
Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the
court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be
noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No.
784.

Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this
respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify the Court of Appeals' Decision, the
Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified
true copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, it's in the Rules but
you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing."
Respondent then replied, "Then you should have notified me of the said requirement.
That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you
never bothered to notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you
of the said requirement."

Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record
of the case?" Complainant responded, "No, Sir, I mean, it's not our duty to notify you
that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals' decision." Respondent angrily
declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?"  ("You mean
to say you don't care anymore? Is that the way it is?") He then turned and left the
office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was
so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was
taking place.4

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his
finger at complainant and shouted, "Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo
nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against
my client, don't turn your ire on me!") Complainant was shocked at respondent's words
but still managed to reply, "I don't even know your client, Sir." Respondent left the
office and as he passed by complainant's window, he again shouted, "Ukinnam nga
babai!" ("Vulva of your mother, you woman!")5

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office

of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her
credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command
full respect from her staff.6

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by

an Affidavit7 signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees.
A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on
25 September 2003.8

On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order9 requiring respondent to submit his

answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June 2003.
Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847,
entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al.,  filed with the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower
court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him
of the same.

Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on
5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day.
Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records
had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were
returned to the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September
2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date,
only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for
resolution.11 Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his
non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that
he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with
bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in
the same Manifestation.12

Complainant filed a Manifestation  expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondent's public apology, adding that respondent personally
and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.13

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and

warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with
more severely.14 The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and
approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.15
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil
Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to
present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need
not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court
of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or
certified true copy of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and
there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had
no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No.
784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk
of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered
but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her
subordinates.

As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16 respondent ought to have realized that this sort
of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and
erode public respect for it.17 These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to
wit:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers

conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.18
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of
the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondent's uncharacteristic

behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys.
Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case
against respondent pending before this Court.19 We, however, cannot acknowledge such
allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that
effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not
to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered
cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren.
This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It
emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable
performance of professional duty.20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN

THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for
appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.

Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.

Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's
disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.

The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:

Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L.
Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning
to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United States government as a widow
of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states that the same shall be
irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney
authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at
Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.

On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special
power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the
special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with
damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while
Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on

23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City
post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for
attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to Mandaue City. Upon
motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the
preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to
complainant.

On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the pension
checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but only the
signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without the
participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant
Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that
complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments over a period of
54 months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise
agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on the
following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise
and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either
of them or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished
copies of the same;

8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the
settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a
new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry
about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to
court afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of
everything;

9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;

10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent

complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,

Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty.
Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the compromise
agreement.

Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed that
her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.

Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant stated
that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion
to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly
loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October 1984.
There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to be paid.
The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note was 25% of the
principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.

In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's debt to
Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10) months. This
translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the
compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54)
monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of
mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly
prejudicial to complainant.

With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise agreement, it
is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado.
Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers by giving her the
reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.

There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise
agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged
abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.

Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw an
opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise
agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial
to complainant.

Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

9. Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of

controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should
he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party
not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise
him as to the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H.
Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts constituting
malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence
and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his
receipt of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member of
the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5768               March 26, 2010

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another
lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.

The Facts and the Case

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit 1 with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply
with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper
language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.

2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged
falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized
document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a
lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the
document.

3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the
start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung
laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na
kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."

4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to
check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law,
failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until
proven otherwise.

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his
unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary
of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness;
and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In
October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son
who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice.
When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory
language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:

1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon
filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about because
Atty. Ferrer’s clients filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.

2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her
thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.

3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon,
the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to
stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.

4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was
drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had
received various citations that speak well of his character.

5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still
pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was
forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and
grave threats subject of the criminal cases.

In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on
December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a
collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers. 3 But neither Atty.
Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he
denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also
prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities. 4

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He
belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-
Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes,
Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry
and character of a trial judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and
a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to
this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil
Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the
document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating
Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 6 adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension
to only one year.

Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution 7 of October 19,
2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5,
2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
reconsideration.8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
reconsideration.10

On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of
Resolution No. XVIII-2008.11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment
as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his
comment,12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders
issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred
in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

The Court’s Ruling

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency
and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 14

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:

Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The
evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the
plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the
affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could
have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive
language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to
dismiss:

1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of
documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of
counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a
grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as
member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the
"SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY
the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief
as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications,
sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions." 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.16

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code
provides:

Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly
before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his
denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for
the day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police
blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.

Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na
palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines
Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered these with intent
to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court
personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a
member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.

Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode
public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he
chose to express his indignation. 1avvphi1

Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. 18 So long as the parties are given the
opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with.19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file
countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly.20 Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court,
was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of
law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an attorney with the Office
of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

MARY JANE D. VELASCO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHARLIE

DOROIN ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D.

Velasco on March 31, 1999, against respondent lawyers for forgery
and falsification constitutive of malpractice.1

On June 21, 1999, the Court's Second Division required the

respondent lawyers to comment on the complaint within (10) days
from notice.2

On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents,

filed a Motion for Extension to File Comment praying that an
extension of sixty (60) days from August 16, 1999 be given to them
to file their comment.3

On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension

with a warning that the same shall be the last and no further
extension will be given.4

The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.

On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and their
counsel to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the
resolution requiring the comment. Copies of the resolution dated
June 20, 2001 were returned unserved from Atty. Alcid and Atty.
Centeno with notations "party out/unknown at/party moved out"
and "moved out." Atty. Doroin received the said resolution on July
27, 2001.5

On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the correct

addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty. Charlie
Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply with the show
cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was ordered to submit his
comment.6

Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.

On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show cause
why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her non-
compliance with the said directive and to submit her compliance
within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the fine
imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was increased from Php 500.00 to
Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file his comment on the complaint as
required by the Court, or to suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in
case he fails to pay and to submit his comment on the complaint
within ten (10) days from notice.7

In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed the

Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php 1,000.00.
However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit the comment on the
administrative complaint required of him and has not complied with
the show cause resolution dated April 17, 2002 by submitting the
correct addresses of Atty. Quintin P. Alcid and respondent Atty.
Hector Centeno.8

In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant

submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector
Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant case.9

On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the

compliance of the complainant as well as the latter's manifestation
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days
from receipt of the record.10

On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a Notice of
Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to the case scheduled
on October 26, 2005 with a strict note that "[n]on-appearance by
any of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
participate in further proceedings."11
On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the
complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres Villaruel, Jr.
appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector
Centeno had not filed their comment, they were directed to submit
it within (10) days from receipt of notice. The hearing of the case
was reset on November 30, 2005.12

On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-

fact of the complaint, together with his counsel, Atty. Villaruel,
appeared. The notices sent to respondents were returned to the
Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation "RTS-Moved." As
respondents had not filed their comment on the complaint, they
were declared in default. In an Order dated November 30, 2005,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala submitted her report and
recommendation, viz.13

The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:

x x x           x x x          x x x

In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was

appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No. Q-96-
27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled "In the matter of the Settlement of
the Estate of the Late Eduardo Doroin, Monina E. Doroin,
petitioner." The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January
1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings case,
respondents were collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine
Abarquez.

On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful

means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed
of Partition, allotting complainant the sum of P1,216,078.00 giving
the paramour of complainant's father, Josephine Abarquez, the
share of P7,296,468.00 and also allotting complainant's two (2)
alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a
similar sum of P1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in
accordance with law. But no share was assigned to complainant's
mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainant's share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty.
Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was an alleged
Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of complainant's
father located at Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches,
Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885, Complainant told Atty.
Doroin that she will first consult a lawyer regarding the legality of
the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell before she signs the same.
Eventually, she was not able to sign the said Confirmation because
complainant's lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and negotiate
with Atty. Doroin regarding the same.

When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint

Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed
thereon, but when she visited it again on January 1999, there was
already a four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was
informed by the caretaker at the site that the owner is one
Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also learned later on that
the property, which was one of the properties submitted to the
Court handling the Special Proceedings case in the Inventory of
Property dated 3 April 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline
Reyes-Yonemura [sic], by forging the signature of complainant's
late father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City,
knowing that complainant's father was already dead as of 21
January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale,
that complainant's father appeared before him in Quezon City on 17
January 1997. chanrobles virtual law library

Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document was

filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12
September 2001 and pleaded "not guilty." After the arraignment,
Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared [sic] in court and jumped
bail.14

The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon

1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when they caused
"extreme and great damage to the complainant."15 The
Commissioner also noted that the failure of the respondents to
answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearing set showed
"flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves
disciplinary sanction."16 The Commissioner recommended that the
respondent lawyers be disbarred.

On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline with the
modification that respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitely
instead of being disbarred.

The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation by

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, were submitted to the Court,
through the Director for Bar Discipline, in a transmittal letter dated
January 22, 2007.

The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector
Centeno are guilty of violating their lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would
merit their disbarment.

We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but
modify the penalty to be imposed on respondent Atty. Hector
Centeno.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct."17

Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,

whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at
large,18 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.19 In Marcelo v. Javier,20 we
reminded the members of the legal profession that:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The
bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor
to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege

burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law during good behaviour and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment
of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar
him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.21

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon

the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.22

In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers

forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was "in
accordance with law."

The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a

blatant violation of the lawyer's oath to uphold the law and the basic
tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall
engage in dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in succession law that
compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the
estate by way of legitimes23 and no extrajudicial settlement can
deprive the spouse of said right except if she gives it up for lawful
consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the said
settlement.24 And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must "give
every man his due."25

The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They failed to

answer the complaint filed against them. Despite due notice, they
failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the
claims and allegations of the complainant remain uncontroverted. In
Ngayan v. Tugade,26 we ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer
the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders
of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in
violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court." 27

The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering

that the license to practice law, though it is not a property right,
sustains a lawyer's primary means of livelihood and to strip
someone of such license amounts to stripping one of a career and a
means to keep himself alive, we agree with the modification
submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that an indefinite
suspension would be the more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie
Doroin. However, we cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno
who, aside from committing a dishonest act by depriving a person
of her rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when
he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from the
criminal proceeding against him after having posted bail.

We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and their regional and city chapters to maintain an
updated record of the office and residence addresses of their
members to help facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the
court, lawyers should be readily available upon the Court's
beckoning.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is suspended indefinitely,

and Atty. Hector Centeno is hereby DISBARRED.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and also be placed on the
personal records of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA ELENA MORENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and
nonpayment of debts.

The complaint,1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two
causes of action.   The first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the
Land Registration Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as president
of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177.   The complaint alleged
that almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored.

The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000.  
Moreno alleged that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to
show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest
possible time.   Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same
assurance.   Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in
the aggregate amount of P11,000.  Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first
dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000.   However, when
Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked "Account
Closed."   She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter.   Araneta, however,
ignored the same.

In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him.   To
accommodate her, he allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177,
which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorney's fees, and gave her an additional P323 in
cash.

Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno.   He admitted that he issued the two
undated checks in her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them.   He avers
that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she could show the bank where she
was working that she "had money coming to her."   Araneta further claims that he warned her that the
checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be encashed.   To protect
himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two
"borrowed" checks.   The respondent offered this check in evidence.

Moreno, however, contended2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing
Corporation, which she managed when her father passed away.   She claimed she signed the check in
blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping her
in the management of the corporation.   She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a
desperate bid to turn the tables on her."3

On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.4

The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the
complainant and her counsel appeared.   Araneta was absent despite due notice.   Upon motion,
however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to
23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine o'clock in the morning.   Service of the notice for the new dates
of hearing were effected to the respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973.5   On
23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not appear, so the case was called again the following day,
24 January 1973.

In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with
the complainant, Moreno, taking the stand.6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the
scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense.7 No further hearings appear
to have been conducted thereafter.   A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973,
however, on said date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement with the conformè of Moreno's
lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainant's basic
grievance."

Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta.   On 14 September 1988, records of the case
were forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Two days later, the Commission notified8 both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on
which date neither of the parties nor the complainant's counsel appeared despite due notice.   It
appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address,
and his whereabouts were unknown.   An inquiry9 made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results.  
The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988 at two o'clock in the afternoon.10 Again on
this date, none of the parties appeared.   Thus on the basis of the evidence so far adduced, the case
was submitted for resolution on such date.11

On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report,12 which

reads in part:

The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence.   Be that as it may, it is

worthwhile considering.   The "stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act of Lira,

Inc. and not that of the respondent.   There was a subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia Echaus,

alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to

explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury warrant was done but neither witness appeared

(as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify.   At the dorsal

portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to

be that of the respondent beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the

words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks

Exhibits "G" and "H" do not show definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person,

so there is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as

president of Lira, Inc.   The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same treasury

warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account.   There is no

evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.

There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop payment"

or even any written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the payment of the treasury

warrant having been "stopped" he should reimburse her with what he received as consideration for

this check.

Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the

other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her

way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he issued said checks that his account

with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered from

the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason.

Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act

of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 which he

gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when there

was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with the

complainant to make use of these useless commercial documents to deceive the public.   However

beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent

and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.

The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by

the respondent, belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and

morality.   In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the respondent lacks.

The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of

the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of suspension.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of
suspension from three months to six months.

Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez,
transmitted14 the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the
Rules of Court.15 On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report16 regarding various
aspects of the case.   The Report further made mention of a Resolution17 from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification
of a commercial document.   The Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:

L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta v. Court of Appeals, et. al.) - Considering that the motion of petitioner

Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the

Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which

affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime

of estafa thru falsification of commercial document, was denied in the resolution dated October 17,

1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved:

(a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to require the said

petitioner to SHOW CAUSE   within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.

Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been
archived on 20 November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated
28 May 1973, when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters
amicably between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted
by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino.   However, we disagree with
the penalty sought to be imposed.

Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant,
because by his own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well
that the same were drawn against a closed account.   And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet
been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles the confidence of
the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality."

Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,18 as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.   The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.   Thus, paraphrasing Black's
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes
his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals."19

Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.20

In Co v. Bernardino21 and Lao v. Medel,22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one year's suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon
partial payment of the obligation.23

In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found
guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral
turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."24 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."25

Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise
involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.

In fact, we have long held26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment
of a crime involving moral turpitude.   As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v.
Narciso N. Jaramillo,27 "[t]he review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us.   The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed.   No elaborate argument is necessary to
hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.   Suffice it to
say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of
justice."28

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby dISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.   Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's
record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,.

ELPIDIO P. TIONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Elpidio P.

Tiong against Atty. George M. Florendo for gross immorality and grave misconduct.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are
real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise engaged in the assembly and repair
of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged the services of
respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator
of their businesses whenever complainant would leave for the United States of America
(USA).

Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were
having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed in the afternoon of May 13, 1995
when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the two.
Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love
you, I'll call you later". When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous
involvement with respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to their love
affair that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship. Subsequently,
at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham
Park, Baguio City, respondent and complainant's wife, Ma. Elena, confessed anew to
their illicit affair before their respective spouses.

On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and,
in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena
executed and signed an affidavit[2] attesting to their illicit relationship and seeking their
respective spouses' forgiveness, as follows:

"WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City and of legal age and MA. ELENA
T. TIONG, likewise a resident of Baguio City, of legal age, depose and state:

We committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to May 13, 1995 and we
hereby ask forgiveness and assure our spouses that this thing will never happen again
with us or any other person. We assure that we will no longer see each other nor have
any communication directly or indirectly. We shall comply with our duties as husband
and wife to our spouses and assure that there will be no violence against them. That
any behaviour unbecoming a husband or wife henceforth shall give rise to legal action
against us; We shall never violate this assurance;
We, the offended spouses Elizabeth F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our spouses
and assure them that we will not institute any criminal or legal action against them
because we have forgiven them. If they violate this agreement we will institute legal
action.

This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies and each party has been
furnished a copy and this document shall have no validity unless signed by all the
parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th day of May 1995 at Baguio
City, Philippines.

(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
GEORGE M. FLORENDO ELPIDIO TIONG
(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
MA. ELENA T. TIONG ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO"

Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23,
1995 charging respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer[3],
respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the
defense of pardon.

In the Resolution[4] dated September 20, 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and decision.

Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation[5] dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for one (1) year, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution[6] dated October 19, 2007. Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration[7] therefrom was denied in the Resolution[8] dated June 26, 2011.

Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue - whether the pardon extended by
complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15, 1995 is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral conduct.

After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD except as to the penalty imposed.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus:

"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is
not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to
maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law
practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar.[9] Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it
in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or
disbarment.

In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his
wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their consortium
cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion"[10] considering that it lasted for
two (2) years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone
conversation on March 13, 1995.

Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his
utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession.[11] Likewise, he
violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is
prohibited under Canon 17[12] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably,
therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.[13] Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his
office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned

conduct because he and Ma. Elena had already been pardoned by their respective
spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit[14].

The Court disagrees.

It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant
to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his
conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
[15]
 Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of
desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.[16]

However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year as
recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of
respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of

Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member
of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint1 filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr.

(complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for
resolution are: a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court by not
abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer
penalty for such violation.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a

P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest  per annum. Incidental thereto, respondent
executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105-square
meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
20553 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed was
a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents authorizing her to
apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject property. Complainant and
respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or before
August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of
Deeds (RD).5

Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she
failed to settle her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absolute
Sale with the RD of Naga City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered
the authority of respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it.6

Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, be would not have
approved her loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill
as a lawyer and her moral ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed
that respondent be sanctioned for her infraction.7

In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009, Commissioner Jose I. de la

Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an answer,
and participate in the mandatory conference. He further declared that the SPA
specifically authorized respondent to mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed
that for selling the property, and not just mortgaging it to complainant, who was not
even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority. Having done so, she committed
gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1,9 Rule 1.01,10 and Canon 711 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.

Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 201 1, which sustained the
findings and conclusion of the IBP. The Court nonetheless found the reduction of the
penalty proper, pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case.
Accordingly, it suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months, effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution
upon respondent because its previous copy sent to her was returned unserved. 14 In its
August 13, 2012 Resolution,15 the Court considered the October 5, 2011 Resolution to
have been served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also
returned unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied with finality
respondent's motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution.

Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Naga City, Branch 2 wrote a letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) whether respondent could continue representing her clients and
appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's
suspension, which was downloaded from the internet, constitutes sufficient notice to
disqualify her to appear in courts for the period of her suspension.

According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in
a case pending in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called Judge
Armea's attention regarding the legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel.
Judge Armea added that respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law
since she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's resolution on the
matter.

In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by

reason of such downloaded decision, Judge Armea and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan
Formaran III (Judge Formaran III) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City
disallowed her appearance in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or
judgment cannot be made through the internet. She further claimed that she had not
received an authentic copy of the Court's October 5, 2011 Resolution.

On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5,
2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all courts.18 In response, on January 30,
2013, the OCA issued OCA Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts,20 the Office
of Chief State Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney's Office (PAO), and the IBP informing
them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-35921 dated March 21, 2013, the
IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation22 of
Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint
against respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero, there is no rule allowing the
service of judgments through the internet; and Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III
acted ahead of time when they implemented the suspension of respondent even before
the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her suspension.

Statement and Report of the OBC

In its November 22, 2013 Statement,23 the OBC stressed that respondent received the
August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her motion for reconsideration on the October 5,
2011 Resolution) on November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus,
the effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12,
2013. The OBC also pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere
lapse of the period of suspension. It is necessary that an order be issued by the Court
lifting the suspension to enable the concerned lawyer to resume practice of law.

The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report24 that respondent has no
authority to practice law and appear in court as counsel during her suspension, and
until such time that the Court has lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC
made these recommendations:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended

that:

1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her
suspension, attaching therewith certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of
the court where she practices[h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is
affiliated, that she has ceased and desisted from the practice of law from 12 November
2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately; and

2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be
sanctioned for disciplinary action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359,
dated 21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing this case for lack of merit.25

On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and directed respondent to
comply with the guidelines relating to the lifting of the order of her suspension as
enunciated in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios.27

Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued a

Certification,28 which stated that respondent had been ordered suspended from the
practice of law for six months, and as of the issuance of said certification, the order of
her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint29 for nullity of
clearance, damages, and preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary
restraining order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso).
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.

Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the
practice of law even if the administrative case against her was still pending with the
IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for requiring her to submit a clearance from its office
before she resumes her practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued that
Atty. Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly announcing
the disqualification of respondent to practice law.

In its Answer,30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which
seeks reversal, modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also
stressed that respondent should raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration
in the administrative case, instead of filing a complaint with the RTC. It also stated that
the issuance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in compliance with the Court's directive
to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.

For its part, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015 that during and after
the period of her suspension, without the same having been lifted, respondent filed
pleadings and appeared in courts in the following cases:

x x x (1) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City Assessor of Naga
City, et. al.), (2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063 (Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto
David, et al.), (3) Other Spec. Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O.
Laborado).32

The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the
Court had not yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined
that for failing to comply with the order of her suspension, respondent deliberately
ref1tsed to obey a lawful order of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer
penalty be imposed against respondent.

On June 42015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 2015-0007 for
lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was respondent's motion for
reconsideration.33

Issue

Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the
period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?

Our Ruling

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a
right but a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the
[Court],"34 It is a "privilege burdened with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply
with its rigid standards, which include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of
morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal profession.36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios,37 the Court laid
down the guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension, to wit:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law,
the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that
he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court
during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and
to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by
him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with

the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath
shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as
may be warranted.38

Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October
5, 2011 suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months effective
immediately. Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12,
2012, she received the notice of the denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt
No. 53365.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by

registered mail,39 and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011
Resolution to respondent is not a valid service, the fact however, that respondent was
duly informed of her suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a
motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly
notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus follows that respondent's six months
suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration
on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.

In Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received the Resolution anent

her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law. She filed pleadings and she
appeared as counsel in courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the
practice of law for six months in addition to her initial one month suspension, or a total
of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein, Atty. Lozada, appeared
and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband, during the period of her
suspension from the practice of law. For having done so, the Court ruled that she
engaged in unauthorized practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty.
Lozada's defense of good faith as she was very well aware that when she represented
her husband, she was still serving her suspension order. The Court also noted that Atty.
Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent
her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty. Lozada for six months
for her wilful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.

Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she
continued to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in
courts during the period of her suspension.

It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the
practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the
application of legal knowledge within the period of his or her suspension.42 To stress, by
practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes
performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind
of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”43 In fine, it
will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if a
suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during the pendency of his or her
suspension.44

As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the
period of her suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her
suspension, respondent signed pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly,
such acts of respondent are in violation of the order of her suspension to practice law.

Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is
an order from the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. To note,
in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the
expiration of one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such
statement shall be considered proof of the lawyer’s compliance with the order of
suspension.

In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply with the
guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement
on the matter. However, respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint
(Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with
the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order of the Court, that is, to
comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the order of suspension against her.

To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-fold: 1)

she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her
suspension, and prior to the lifting of such order of her suspension; and 2) she did not
comply with the Court's directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with
the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.
Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, among other grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the
Court's lawful orders by failing to comply with the order of her suspension, and to the
Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing
Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law against
respondent is in order.46

WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for an additional period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension)
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of
this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to the record of
respondent as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5355               December 13, 2011

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

The Case

This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.

In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco, 1 dated 30 August 2000, this Court
ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San
Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and accumulated
leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality
or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court
further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a member
of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court.

The Facts

We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136, 2 as follows:

Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as "Gozun") was in open and adverse
possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His family’s house was erected on
the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and
other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his parents.

The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.

On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96,
stating:

"RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga
do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San
Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic)
as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic).

On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct
Resolution No. 26-96.

On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the
MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition:

"PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

"THE HONORABLE

JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO

"In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good
office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit:

"1. The validity of the attached Resolution.

"2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.

"3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said
Resolution.

"These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health
Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted
(sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang,
our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr.
Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment
of the proposed project.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and
appropriate action for the sake of public interest."

On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the
municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and
ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not
contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may
order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or
implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in
government property is considered a "nuisance per se". Respondent judge ruled:

"With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may
order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of
Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No.
114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours)."

Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the
aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to
implement Resolution No. 34-96.

Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for
declaratory relief.

On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.

On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozun’s wife together with other public school teachers went to the
office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, "Ing
Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi" ("Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should
talk to him").
On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozun’s house,
using respondent judge’s resolution and the mayor’s executive order as basis.

On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the
Court Administrator. He averred that respondent judge’s issuance of the resolution amounts to
"gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence." Complainant Gozun further accused the
municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that "the
respondent judge is in his pocket…because he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent judge) a
lot of things ("dacal naku a regalo kaya").

On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its
consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course.

On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten
(10) days from notice.

On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that
the case be dismissed.

On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a
memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge. 3

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136

Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench

The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M.
No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution
adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had
blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a
Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court. 4 The Court also pointed
out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun,
thus rendering his family homeless.5 It described respondent’s acts as biased and "maleficent" and
ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the service,6 viz:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B.
Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement
or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent
Judge for misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.7
A.C. No. 5355

Disbarment

On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. 8 In its
Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA
charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as
well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his
competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and
that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his
Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment against him.10 On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment
on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment,11 appealing for understanding and asking that the Court
allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for
Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he
was merely rendering a legal opinion "honestly and in good faith"; 12 and that his actions were not
attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. 13 He further pleads for compassion from
this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only
means of livelihood to support his family. 14

On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety
(90) days from receipt of the records of the case.15

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondent’s participation. On 03
October 2003, the investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation 16 finding
justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll
of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there was
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent. 17 She observed
that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She
also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She
further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6)
months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1602 – a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September
1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for
dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the
National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation. 18

On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 of the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his
dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case against him. Thus,
because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have been
deprived of due process.20 In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an
Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and contended
that the case should have been dismissed.21 Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavored to
improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also impressed upon the
IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE).22
On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 23 wherein he implored
the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of
Desistance and the fact that the former had already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as
MTC judge.24 Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first Motion for
Reconsideration.

On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525, 25 which
adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that
respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown
inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the
recommendation to disbar respondent.

On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No.
5355 to this Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011. 26

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.

Gross Misconduct

In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.27 citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,28 this Court
explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful
conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial
to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct
is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.

In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be
affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it
docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the
matter by issuing a Resolution – all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and
hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local
government’s behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his
Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions
were not attended by malice or bad faith. 29

We find his statements hard to believe.

The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part.
Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the
municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious interest in the
outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga,
showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:

COMM. SANSANO:
You don’t remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the
respondent?

WITNESS: (Mr. Batu)

I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any
instance that I was with him.

COMM. SANSANO:

But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the
respondent also in his office?

WITNESS:

There was no other visit, Your Honor.

COMM. SANSANO:

So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?

WITNESS:

Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may
kaso.

COMM. SANSANO:

Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan?

WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor. 30

The testimony of respondent’s own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1,
Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the
observance of judicial independence and its protection from undue influence, whether from private or
from public interests.31

In Edaño v. Judge Asdala,32 we explained the rationale behind this imposition:

As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to
conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the
judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. Integrity
and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper
discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not
only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2,
specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that
independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their
decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so
as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their
actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its
importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:

Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:

In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges
have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid
in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at
all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and with propriety but are also
perceived to be impartial and proper.

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to "the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made." As such, judges must ensure
that their "conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary." In the
same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.

Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be
impartial in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image of
impartiality.33 Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not properly
observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.

Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law

We are appalled by respondent’s ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court
processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others
clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.

A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary
person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed,
because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law that issued it. It had a docket number
and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable question to be
resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no
notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the
issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a "legal opinion," but one
with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory
processes such as notice – especially to Gozun – and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable.
Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context
of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and
always in the context of contested proceedings.

What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent
issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the
property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without
due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench and the bar are sworn
to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission. When
his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not attended by
malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.

As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of
Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because
membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order.
Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and
justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. 34

As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain
a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he
cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts.
Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the
processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the
Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.35 Contrary to this edict, respondent
malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property
without due process of law.

Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure
and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. 36 In this case, however, the opposite happened.
Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice.

Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal
profession? We answer in the affirmative.

In Collantes v. Renomeron,37 we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a
public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an ‘officer of the court’ on whose shoulders rest the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the
only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which, throughout the centuries, have
been compendiously described as 'moral character.'

x x x           x x x          x x x
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice
the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the
highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269,
278).

Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,38 we ruled that because membership in the bar is an
integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the
latter’s moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also
violates the lawyer’s oath.

We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors,
which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his
disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant provincial prosecutor in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as MTC
judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also
complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it approved and
adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays
for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun.

In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the
resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a
reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same defenses against administrative
liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant
unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine
the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the
dispensation of justice – an issue which the complainant’s personal motives have little relevance.
For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment
proceedings motu proprio.39 lavvphil

Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido, 40 we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment
proceedings and their purpose in this wise:

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in
a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or
her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.lawphi1
Thus, despite Gozun’s desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated,
respondent is not exonerated.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:

1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of

Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5655           January 23, 2006

VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio
"Batas" Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon
him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent’s services as counsel
in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana,
respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from
complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the
attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent
refused.

On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by
the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the
respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant
frequented his law office." She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount
of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting
and approving in toto Commissioner Navarro’s Report and Recommendation.

On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.

Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan,
Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial court’s Decision
dated December 6, 2001 holding that "the tax declarations and title" submitted by complainant "are
not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed." Thereupon, respondent filed
a Sworn Affidavit Complaint1 against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 2 and
172,3 and/or Article 1824 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered
evidence.

In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him
for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for
review of a decree.
Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered submitted for decision" as early as August 6, 2001,
or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence,
"he could not have done anything anymore" about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from
doing his job.

And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file
falsification cases against her.

In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of
confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against
her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the
authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to
return her money despite this Court’s directive constitutes contempt.

We deny respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money
from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause.5 From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with
wholehearted devotion.6

Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from
complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the
performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, "there is nothing in the records to show that
he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case
No. 00-044." Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new
petitions.

With ingenuity, respondent now claims that "complainant did not engage his services for Civil
Case No. 00-044" but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously
a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully
disassociate himself as complainant’s counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of
any dereliction of duties.

But respondent’s current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his previous
statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint, 7 he categorically stated that
complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver
Lozano, thus:

4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.

4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright
lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044.

4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano – did not inquire the reason for the
referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty. Oliver
Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute and/or defend
the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.

xxxxxx

5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he
provides her with free legal service.

xxxxxx

5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not
entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver
Lozano.

5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her lawyer
should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein.

5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil Case
No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual and legal
matters surrounding the said case.

5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became even
more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044.

5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she insists in
retaining his services.

5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees.

5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he will have
to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside
form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in court in
connection with the aforesaid case.

xxxxxx

5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano
interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent was
charging the Complainant be reduced.

xxxxxx

5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then
informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondent’s) decision to
reduce the acceptance fee.

5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply because
Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee.

Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondent’s Memorandum8 filed with the
IBP.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This
cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change
of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of
procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. 9 The
present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondent’s previous
admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now
unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been
achieved by respondent’s inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.

At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondent’s services in filing the
two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is
nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that,
in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Pariñas v.
Paguinto,10 we held that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the
client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used
for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand." Per records,
complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.

Neither do we find merit in respondent’s second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was
already "submitted for decision" does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No.
00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple
task. He should have returned complainant’s money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for
doing nothing.

In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to
complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He further
claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without
adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an
implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle
the case.11 As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a
matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of
complainant’s title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite
having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and
taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth
argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-
004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal
services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044,
will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure
in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its
mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule
19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client
to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have
confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses,
then he should terminate his relationship with her.

Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to
his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary
evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his
fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after
complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a
justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he
verified the authenticity of complainant’s title only after the "news of his suspension spread in the
legal community." To our mind, there is absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as
justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.

Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by

vindictiveness.

In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer. 12 It gives rise
to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very
delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. 13 If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with
it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. 14 Indeed, law is an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries
not only intellectual but also moral discipline.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22,
2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
A.C. No. 7199               July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]

FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO,"
filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as
"Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS,
Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB,
for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to
investigating prosecutors.

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:

On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero
and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and
soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.

Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.

Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a
conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded ₱150,000 as
damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in
contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."

Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.

Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or
on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be
August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which complainant
found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the ₱150,000 demand
of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the
Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for ₱50,000, ₱15,000 of which would go to the
Corderos and ₱35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program.

The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before
the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared
the document.

On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant to
advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at ₱15,000 per issue or a
total amount of ₱360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot
buy 15-second TVC at ₱4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at ₱7,700; and (c) season buy [13
episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for ₱130,000.

As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting to ₱45,000 at ₱15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the
television program at ₱7,700 each or a total of ₱23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer, respondent
relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to
proceed with the publication of the articles/columns. 7

On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station
DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which
announcement was transcribed as follows:

"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang
Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at
433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling
liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan
ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa
nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating
tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver
spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light.
Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article
captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13,
2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO." 10

Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in
another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: 11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre
6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277); 13 (c)
"Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread
kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod,"
Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); 19 (i) "CDO guards
pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread
sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); 21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO,"
Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre
21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004
(Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
293).25

In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an

article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread." 26

And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang
Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the "same
baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27

Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time
of the filing of the present administrative complaint. 28

In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent
Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:

xxxx

2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?

xxxx

2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?

2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his
complaint?

xxxx

8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating
prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents
expect justice to be meted to them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in
this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but,
more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;

10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the
willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a
top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products
of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?

11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff
and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their
respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and
relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant,
and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got
when he filed his kidnapping charge here; 30

And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as counsel for
his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:

xxxx

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick
skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32 (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several
others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and
raffled to Branch 75 thereof.

The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent
continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to malign complainant through his television
shows.

Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and
Recommendation:35

I.

xxxx

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order
dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C.
Sison which in part reads:

"Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant
plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an
opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to
maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person
acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation
of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."

Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff
on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December
2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.

Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed
to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of
the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff
and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited
subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the
tabloid "Balitang Bayan –Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

II.

xxxx

In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the
Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:

xxxx

The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the
Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly
assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not
even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of
the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect
[d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y
[o]thers."

III.

The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the
Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. …

xxxx

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
"Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.

However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous
articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004
(Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles
against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him
expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and
submitted them for publication in the tabloids.

Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the
defects of complainant’s products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser
motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainant’s
failure to give in to respondent’s "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television
programs of respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the
true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the
fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself
prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright
when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have
been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges
of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct
contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years.

The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and
comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking
advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.

For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At
the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a
member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities."

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which mandate, viz:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
1awphi1

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring
supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer
to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession." 40
1avvph!1

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s services as "she was
impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality," 42 only to
later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action
was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have
affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration, took
note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges
against the therein complainant.43

To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises,
sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants, v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K.
PALAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint1 for

disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for alleged acts of
defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).2 Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-
Affidavit3 which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, charging
the respondent and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who
introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services
Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading.4 Mr.
Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a minimum
amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to
believe that the said company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it
to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total
contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer loss,
Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal amount including the
monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in
fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal investments.5

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing's promises were false and fraudulent,
and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason "account closed." The
investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketing's office. There,
they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a new
corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly
assumed the rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link
office where they met the respondent. As Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board of
Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the
obligations of the former company.6 To put a semblance of validity to such
representation, respondent signed an Agreement7 to that effect which, again, turned
out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors.8 This prompted the
complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing's officers and directors which
remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa
against the respondent and his co-accused.9

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been
successful in defying the law, to this date.

In an Order10 dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan
required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to
comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants.11 The
case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the
Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the
Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his
position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heard
ex parte.

In his report,12 the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing's executives (which

included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants
by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign
currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing
was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in
such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing's financial
status could not support the investors' demands involving millions of pesos. It also
appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and
to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been
previously suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of
defraudation.13 Considering the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous
administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents

presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the
same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the
land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti
K. Palaña be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the
approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court.14

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Commissioner's report and recommendation.15

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal

system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people's faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined - whether
in their professional or in their private capacity - for any conduct that is wanting in
morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.16

In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital
role, being Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board and Ur-Link's representative. We
quote with approval the Commissioner's findings, thus:

As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, it appears that the
executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to
defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors
to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was
no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly licensed or
authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and General Services
Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital,
at the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records
will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with the hope
that their money would earn interests as promised. However, their company resources
and financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if
a situation such as this would arise.

Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of
their investments, said respondent even formed and made him part of a new company,
Ur-Link Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they met the
respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation.
It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.17

To be sure, respondent's conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him
as a vanguard of the legal profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is
still pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should
note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.18 Besides, it is not
sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to
apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession
during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.19 Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law.20 The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.21

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution
for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of
the bar.22
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an
administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law in
Samala v. Palaña23 and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaña.24 In Samala,
respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial
Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent
committed the same offense by making himself part of the money trading business
when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI was created.
Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.25 Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his continued
refusal to settle his loan obligations.
nrobles virtual law library

The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the
warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates
his offense.27

Finally, we note that respondent's case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for
the charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on,
respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he
participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.28 The Court
has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it
is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.29 Verily,
respondent's failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason
manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.30 As a lawyer, he ought to know that the
compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the
investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in
reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court.31 By his repeated cavalier conduct,
the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the
Court.32

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct
herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-year suspension with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior of
respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed
warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty - - - disbarment.33 Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to
his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.34

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8010               June 16, 2009

KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L.

ESGUERRA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the
Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.

In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and expressed his
interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that
he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an
86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the
property was alienable.

Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his
representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the
preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received a
₱400,000 fee.

Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to Denmark,
entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.

Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant, represented
by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the
property.1 Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold
and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for ₱3.8 million. 2 Respondent also drafted
and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was complainant who
provided the funds for the purchase of the property. 3 Complainant then gave respondent the full
amount of the purchase price (₱3.8 million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment
receipt.4

After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch with
respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However,
respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant’s calls and e-mail
messages.

When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the
Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of
the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under
Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that
the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation. 5 The
CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to disposition or acquisition under Republic Act
No. 141.6

Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact, 7 exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent
for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his annual
dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo City. 8 Search of court records of
cases handled by respondent only yielded his abandoned office address in Olongapo City. 1avvphi1

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondent’s acts of serious misconduct. In particular, he
sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely misrepresenting that a
foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with
complainant’s ₱3.8 million.10

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known
address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD
found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with
complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against him. 11

The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the matter
of land ownership by a foreigner.12 He even went through the motion of preparing falsified and
fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he collected ₱400,000
from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the ₱3.8 million and absconded with it. 13

The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his professional
status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with complainant’s
money.14 Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed by
complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of respondent. 15

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD with the
modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of ₱4.2 million to
respondent.16

We agree with the IBP.

Sufficiency Of Notice Of
The Disbarment Proceedings

We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment
proceedings against him? Yes.

The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled
mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in
Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this
Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere
ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes
on respondent’s office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement
cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.17 The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic,
common sense, reason and practicality.18

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National
Office or their respective chapters19 of any change in office or residential address and other contact
details.20 In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential
address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a
lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.

Respondent’s Administrative Infractions

And His Liability Therefor

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and
uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the
law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.

Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been
found wanting.

Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood. 21 That
oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld
and kept inviolable at all times. 22

Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the laws,
they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of
emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,24 to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands,
including residential lands." The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional policy. 25

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed
disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious
documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa
thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he
falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law. 26

Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally
and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was
alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the
trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled
him into parting with ₱400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by
pocketing and misappropriating the ₱3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the
property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature. 1avvphi1

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after unethical
act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS

DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to
further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule
of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession
stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the
Butcher’s call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged from
the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of ₱4.2
million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution until full
payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount
within ten days from payment.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the appropriate
criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the progress of its
action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the Philippines, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and members and
all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2008-19-SC               August 18, 2010

RE: COMPLAINTS OF MRS. MILAGROS LEE AND SAMANTHA LEE AGAINST ATTY. GIL
LUISITO R. CAPITO

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Gil Luisito R. Capito (respondent), Court Attorney IV at the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT),
was charged with grave misconduct and willful failure to pay just debts by Milagros Lee (Milagros)
and her daughter Samantha Lee.

Atty. Eden T. Candelaria (Atty. Candelaria), Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
in her February 6, 2009 Memorandum,1 summarizes the facts which spawned the filing of the
complaint against respondent as follows:

Mrs. Milagros Lee alleged that sometime in March 2008, Atty. Capito was introduced to her by
neighbors Ma. Cecilia and Ferdinand De Guzman as she needs a lawyer to file a claim for financial
support for her and her children against her husband who is in Hawaii. Atty. Capito is a friend of
Ferdinand De Guzman.

Mrs. Lee again encountered Atty. Capito in the third week of April 2008 when Ms. De Guzman
(a.k.a. Michelle) picked up Mrs. Lee in her house and told her that Atty. Capito is in their
(Michelle[’s]) house and that Mrs. Lee can now consult her problems with Platinum Plans and her
claim for support against her husband. The De Guzman spouses made mention to her that Atty.
Capito specializes in land cases and that he is connected with Senator Loren Legarda. She came to
know also that Atty. Capito is working in the Supreme Court. [Mrs.] Milagros Lee’s marriage contract
and other documents were photocopied by Samantha Lee and were given to Atty. Capito for his
information.

On June 26, 2008, Mrs. Lee had a meeting with Atty. Capito at KFC to discuss the matter
concerning her possible claim for support. After the consultation, Atty. Capito said, "Malabo na daw
makaclaim for support," and he did not do any legal action on the matter.

On June 27, 2008, Atty. Capito went to Mrs. Lee’s house to borrow money. She told him that she
does not have any, and that his (Atty. Capito[’s]) friends, the De Guzman spouses, induced her to
invest money that would earn a lot, but the money was not returned anymore. She was in short,
scammed. She mentioned, however, that she has an existing bracelet which Atty. Capito asked her
to pawn and give him the money so he could redeem his cell phone from the casino. The bracelet
was pawned for ₱7,000.00 and the ₱4,000.00 was allegedly lent to Atty. Capito.

The following day, June 28, 2008, Atty. Capito called Mrs. Lee on the phone and asked the latter if
he can come to her house and stay there for just two (2) weeks. Mrs. Lee consented, but his stay
was prolonged for a month. During his stay in Mrs. Lee’s house, Atty. Capito was treated as a guest.
He told Mrs. Lee that he will pay for the board and lodging. But it did not happen. Not a single
centavo was actually paid to her.

On July 7, 2008, despite the borrowed sum not having been returned yet, Atty. Capito again
borrowed ₱10,000 from Mrs. Lee and promised that he will return the money immediately. Because
he saw the Lees’ kindness, he again borrowed money twice. One was on a date which Mrs. Lee
cannot remember anymore, and another one was on July 23, 2008. Both were in the amount of
₱1,000.00 each. Mrs. Lee alleged that Atty. Capito was in dire need as he has no money for his daily
use. He even asked Mrs. Lee to borrow money for him if she has some other acquaintance or friend
as he had a problem with a case he filed, and proposed to double the payment. His debt with the
complaint allegedly reached to ₱16,000[.]

For several times, Mrs. Lee called Atty. Capito in the OCAT through phone, but she received an
answer "wala pa" until Mrs. Lee told him to give the exact date when to pay her. Mrs. Lee alleged
that Atty. Capito promised to pay her on September 30, 2008. On said date, Mrs. Lee together with
her daughter Samantha, went early to the said office but she was told "wala pa." Mrs. Lee got angry
as they needed the money already that is why they came early to see him at his office. 2 (italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)

When Milagros finally met respondent on September 30, 2008, respondent, in the presence of
several others, told her "Eh kung sabihin ko na sugar mommy kita,"3 adding that "Nagpapakantot ka
naman sa akin."4

Respondent’s side of the case was also summarized by Atty. Candelaria, viz:

In the investigations conducted by this Office, Atty[.] Capito denied having stayed in the house of
Mrs. Lee. He claimed that he is not indebted to Mrs. Lee, and stated that he had already explained
everything in his Affidavit of Explanation and Rejoinder. The said pleadings he filed deny any
indebtedness owing to Mrs. Lee as the alleged indebtedness is not supported by any concrete
evidence and that Mrs. Lee is saying things irrelevant to the complaint not intended to prove the
alleged indebtedness but intended to ruin his honor and reputation. Atty. Capito alleged that it is the
complainants who are in dire need of money  as they even asked him to write a demand letter to the
father of Ferdinand De Guzman for the latter to pay even a small amount of money for their daily
living. The accusations though not true, caused the recurrence of his asthma [rendering] him unable
to report for work for several days[.] He maintains that he is the administrator of the estate of his
father Luis Capito (Former Mayor of Borongan, Eastern Samar for more than twenty [20] years)
whose assets and properties is worth the amount of ₱10,000,000.00. 5 (underscoring supplied)

Leonora F. Diño, Executive Assistant at the OCAT, corroborated complainant Milagros’ account of
the September 30, 2008 incident that respondent, while engaged in a heated argument with
Milagros, loudly uttered: "Nagpapakantot ka naman . . .!"6

Jose Torres, testifying for complainant, related that he one time drove Milagros and respondent to
Pampanga; and that also at one time, while he was buying something at the store of Milagros, he
saw respondent seated in her sala wearing a t-shirt.

Torres’ wife Edeta declared that she once saw respondent knocking at the door of Milagros’ house
while she was at the latter’s store buying some stuff.

Still testifying for Milagros, Toribio S. Balicot, Computer Operator IV, Records Division, OCAT,
declared that respondent’s cellphone number — 09282037934 — which is registered in his
(Balicot’s) cellfone, is the same number claimed by Milagros to be respondent’s cellphone number.

Atty. Candelaria thereupon evaluated the case, parts of which are quoted below:
On the first issue, we give credence to the testimony of complainants that Atty. Capito indeed stayed
in their house, vis-à-vis denial asserted by Atty. Capito. Mrs. Lee’s claim was corroborated by her
fifteen (15) year old daughter, Ms. Samantha Lee[.]

xxxx

Her testimony affirmed her sworn statement. Her personal account was answered in the first person
and not stated as "told to her" or "as instructed to her". No words of uncertainty was reflected in her
testimony of the fact that Atty. Capito stayed in their house. A fifteen (15) year old girl would not
usually lie on her personal knowledge of the incident.

Added to these was the text message presented by Mrs. Lee that came from cellphone number
09282037934[.]

xxxx

. . . Mr. Balicot who works in the same office, confirmed in his testimony that cellphone number
09282037934 belongs to Atty. Capito as the same number is registered in his cellphone in the name
of Atty. Capito. . . .

Moreover, Mr. Torres testified that he saw Atty. Capito either once or twice in the sala of Mrs. Lee
wearing a t-shirt.

On the issue of alleged indebtedness of ₱16,000.00, we are not inclined to recommend favorable
action by the Court . . .

. . . The claim was neither raised and adjudicated in the First Level Court (Metropolitan Trial Court)
nor is the existence and justness of the amount of debt undisputed by the respondent. Atty. Capito
denied that he has any debt owing to Mrs. Lee, hence the latter must thresh out her claim before the
small claims court[.]7 (italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Respondent’s alleged private practice of law was found unsubstantiated. 8

Respondent’s utterance of vulgar words9 was found "uncalled for and totally abhorring" by Atty.
Candelaria given that the words were uttered in the presence of Milagros’ daughter and in public. 10

Atty. Candelaria thus concluded that respondent is liable for gross discourtesy. 11

The Court finds that respondent is indeed guilty of gross discourtesy amounting to conduct
unbecoming of a court employee. By such violation, respondent failed to live up to his oath of office
as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.12

Gross discourtesy in the course of official duties is classified as less grave offense under
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 13 punishable with
suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.14

In recommending the penalty for respondent, Atty. Candelaria found two mitigating circumstances in
his favor: (1) his 17 years of service to the Court and (2) this being the first time that he has been
administratively charged.
Atty. Candelaria thus gave the following recommendations:

(a) The case of willful failure to pay just debts be dismissed for failure of complainant to
substantiate the charge. However, complainant Mrs. Lee is informed that the Court is not a
collection agency. The sum of money representing the respondent’s alleged indebtedness
can be claimed before the regular court as a collection suit;

(b) Respondent . . . be suspended for three (3) months without pay for Gross Discourtesy,
with a warning that a repetition of the same o[r] similar acts . . . will be dealt with more
severely;

(c) For his demeanor which appears to be a violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the same be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
appropriate action.15 (underscoring supplied)

The Court has consistently been reminding officials and employees of the Judiciary that their
conduct or behavior is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility which, at all times, should
be characterized by, among other things, strict propriety and decorum. As such, they should not use
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing and improper language. Their every act or word should be
marked by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. 161âwphi1

It appearing that aside from violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent appears to have also violated Rule 8.0117 of the same Code, the recommendation to
refer the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action is in order.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gil Luisito R. Capito, Court Attorney IV, Office of the Chief Attorney, is, for
Gross Discourtesy, SUSPENDED for Three Months without pay, with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let this case be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action, it appearing that
respondent has also violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO, Complainant, v. ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES, Branch
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 17 (now detailedwith OCC),
Manila, Respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-1612]

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1571-MTJ)

ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES, Complainant, v. JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO, AZCUNA,

and Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA,  J.:

These consolidated administrative cases which are in the nature of a charge and
countercharge sprang from the same incident. In A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Crispin B.
Bravo, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 16, charges
his former branch clerk of court, Atty. Miguel C. Morales, now detailed with the Office of
the Clerk of Court, MeTC, Manila, with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
public officer. In A.M. No. MTJ-1612, on the other hand, Atty. Morales charges Judge
Bravo with grave abuse of authority, slander, harassment, grave ignorance of the law,
inefficiency and grave/serious misconduct.

In his complaint in A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Bravo alleged, in gist, the following:

1. That while serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of MeTC, Manila, Branch 17, he
requested the detail of his branch clerk of court, Atty. Morales, to the OCC, MeTC,
Manila. Later, he recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the
immediate dismissal of Atty. Morales from the service for corrupt practices;

2. That since he made the recommendation, he observed Atty. Morales to have acted
discourteously and disrespectful toward him. He relates that whenever he greets court
employees with a "good morning ladies and gentlemen" after every flag raising
ceremony, as was his usual practice, he noticed Atty. Morales mimicking him in a
squeaky comical voice, obviously to make fun of him;

3. That in the morning of March 22, 2004, before the start of the flag raising rite at the
old MWSS Building in Arroceros, Manila he caught Atty. Morales about to do his
mocking imitating act, prompting him to tell the latter "tumigil ka"; that he then
ordered one of the security guards to arrest Atty. Morales preparatory to charging him
with unjust vexation;

4. That so as not to exacerbate an embarrassing situation, he waited for the flag raising
ceremony to end before apologizing to the crowd for the incident, only to witness Atty.
Morales responding with a shout: "sa akin hindi ka mag-aapology"(sic) 1

5. That he ignored Atty. Morales' outburst and instead instructed the Officer-in-Charge
of the security guards to call the Manila City Hall Police Detachment, which immediately
dispatched PO3 Pacifico Wong and PO2 Jose Rancho; that he briefed both police officers
regarding the flag-raising ceremony incident and about the preceding exchange of
charges and counter-charges filed with the OCA

6. That no arrest was effected on that day owing to the intervention of MeTC Executive
Judge Myra G. Fernandez and 2nd Vice Executive Judge Tingaraan Guiling who
instructed the police officers to maintain the status quo; and
cralawlibrary

7. That Atty. Morales' sympathizers circulated a manifesto 2 on that same day

denouncing his act as a judge and soliciting support for Atty. Morales from the Union of
the Clerks of Court of the MeTC, Manila; that of the twenty-nine union members, only
three supported Atty. Morales, one of the three, Atty. Eusebio Yarra, even pointing to
the provocative act of Atty. Morales as the root cause of the incident adverted to.

At his end, Atty. Morales avers in his counter-complaint that Judge Bravo failed to
behave with due restraint when the judge ordered his arrest. As Atty. Morales argued,
unjust vexation is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, adding that unjust
vexation is not a continuing offense and, ergo, a warrantless arrest could not be
effected therefor, let alone by the responding police officers who have no personal
knowledge, as it were, of the alleged crime.

Upon the Office of the Court Administrator's (OCA's) recommendation, both cases were
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Pursuant to a Resolution of the Court dated December 6, 2004, both parties submitted
separate manifestations in which they indicated their willingness to submit their
respective charges for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Pursuant too
to another Resolution of September 28, 2005, the Court, upon due motion, ordered the
consolidation of A.M. No. MTJ-1612 with A.M. No. P-05-1950.

In its report, the OCA recommended that Judge Bravo be reprimanded for abuse of
authority and Atty. Morales be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for conduct
unbecoming a government officer.

We find the recommendations of the OCA and the premises holding them together to be
well-taken.

At bottom is the sad spectacle of two officials of the judiciary wasting the precious
hours of the Court, including theirs, that could have otherwise been devoted to a more
salutary productive judicial pursuit rather than on petty wrangling that has no place in
the judicial system. They ought to be reminded that the nature and responsibilities of
the men and women in the judiciary, as defined in different canons of conduct, are
neither mere rhetorical words nor idealistic sentiments but working standards and
attainable goals to be matched with actual deeds.3 The Court has repeatedly stressed
that court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public
servants charged with dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility, if not maturity. Their conduct must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with law and
court regulations. They should avoid any act or conduct that would or tend to diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with the dispensation
of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility.4

An examination of the records of these consolidated cases reveals an undeniable

pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales as
evidenced by a number of administrative cases filed by one against the other. In fact,
there are six additional administrative cases filed by Atty. Morales against Judge
Bravo, 5 while there are three more administrative cases filed by the latter against the
former.6 With the strained relations between the two, it was not inconceivable for Atty.
Morales to make fun of Judge Bravo in front of court employees by mimicking the
latter, making the greeting in a squeaky comical voice, and for Judge Bravo to retaliate
instantaneously by ordering the arrest of his erring subordinate even before a criminal
suit is instituted.

On the charge that Judge Bravo abused his authority, the Court agrees with the
inculpatory findings of the OCA. Judge Bravo indeed overstepped the bounds of his
authority when he ordered the arrest of Atty. Morales on the basis of a mere intent to
sue the latter later for unjust vexation. Being a dispenser of justice, it behooves Judge
Bravo to observe the same rules of due process in dealing with his subordinates. He
should have confined himself to filing an administrative complaint or a criminal one and
let the wheels of justice run its course. To be sure, Judge Bravo's actuation was
unbecoming a judge who, needless to stress, is expected to exercise proper restraint
and civility in dealing even with insolent subordinates.

We feel, however, that Judge Bravo's actuation in the premises does not amount to
grave abuse of authority, as urged by Atty. Morales. Provoked as the judge was by
Atty. Morales' insulting conduct, the judge, like any other normal person, must have
been carried away by his emotion. Even then, his conduct as a judge is not totally
excusable. To paraphrase what we said earlier, a judge, even in the face of boorish
behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a
gentleman and a high officer of the court.

The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the fact that all but three members of the
MeTC Clerk of Court circle refused to rally behind Atty. Morales in his tiff with Judge
Bravo, indicating doubtless that the cumulative effect of his provocative remarks and
actions against the judge were what triggered the unfortunate March 22, 2004 incident.

The foregoing notwithstanding, some form of sanction should still be imposed on Judge
Bravo, reacting as he did in a manner disproportionate to what Atty. Morales had done,
however wrong they might have been. There being no showing, however, that Judge
Bravo had been previously charged with and found guilty of the same or similar
administrative offense, a reprimand with a warning appears proper.

We likewise agree with the OCA's finding on Atty. Morales' guilt for conduct unbecoming
a government employee. His insulting act of mimicking the judge, in the presence of
other court employees, a gesture calculated to ridicule, is a behavior unexpected of one
in the judicial service. The ideal is for a court employee to be well-mannered, civil, and
considerate in his actuations, more particularly with respect to his relation to the
presiding judge he is assigned under. Here, Atty. Morales' acts went against the
principles of public service and such unpleasant kind of behavior must not be tolerated
if we are to demand the highest degree of excellence and professionalism among public
employees and to preserve the integrity and dignity of our courts of justice. He failed to
live up to the norms of conduct demanded of his position.

We take this opportunity to remind both Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales that
government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing
justice; civility is never a sign of weakness and courtesy is a mark of culture and good
breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no place in the government service in which
personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.7

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves to:

(a) REPRIMAND Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 16, Manila, for abuse of authority;

(b) Impose a FINE on Atty. Miguel C. Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for
conduct unbecoming a public officer.

Both are hereby STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-06-2177             April 19, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF

ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN
SAMAR

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to
make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-
93.1 We ordered him to pay a fine of ₱10,000 for his transgression. The matter did not end there,
however. Because his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.012 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a
lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in compliance with our
directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in
his career as a government lawyer.

In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash
deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the court’s
safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.

Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly
mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit ₱65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year
was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a breach of his
oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities 3 and of his duties
under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility for
these are a lawyer’s foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding
the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer’s
responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants
of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and
maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of
emulation.4 This, in fact, is what a lawyer’s obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes
entails.

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful
conduct.5 By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. 6 It does not necessarily imply
the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it. 7 Thus, the presence of evil intent
on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule
1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be
called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to gain
and the fact that this is his first offense should temper his culpability considerably. Under the
circumstances, a fine of ₱5,000 should suffice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in violation of the
Attorney’s Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱5,000 within ten days from receipt of
this resolution.

The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to deduct
from Atty. Kho’s accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this resolution and in the resolution dated June 27,
2006.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
A.M. No. P-08-2578               July 31, 2009
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2924-P]

GASPAR R. DUTOSME, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. REY D. CAAYON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Gaspar R. Dutosme (complainant) charged Atty. Rey D. Caayon (respondent), Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu in an affidavit dated August 2, 2006, for
soliciting and receiving the amount of ₱2,500 representing commissioner’s and stenographer’s fees
and not issuing an official receipt therefor.

By complainant’s claim, he went to Branch 61 of the RTC on May 9, 2006 to secure a copy of a
decision in LRC Case No. 61-0053. He was able to secure a copy of the decision alright but only
after respondent asked for and received Two Thousand Five Hundred (₱2,500) Pesos representing
what respondent told him to be commissioner’s and stenographer’s fees. And while respondent gave
him a handwritten receipt of the amount, he did not issue an official receipt.

By 1st Indorsement of August 29, 2006 1, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required
respondent to file his Comment to complainant’s Affidavit.

In his Comment,2 respondent gave his version as follows: On May 9, 2006, complainant was looking
for Belle Garrido (Belle), the stenographer who recorded the proceedings in the LRA case. Since
Belle was unavailable as she was the stenographer on duty that day, he furnished complainant a
copy of the Decision after which complainant tendered to him a handful of money with the request
that the same be given to Belle. Albeit he refused to receive the money, complainant pleaded with
him to accept it so, in good faith, he received the money and prepared the above-stated handwritten
receipt.

Respondent went on to claim that on his instruction, complainant returned later that day so that Belle
could issue a receipt, but when he asked for the handwritten receipt he had earlier issued so he
could give him the receipt prepared by Belle, complainant replied that he had already sent it to his
boss in Cebu City.

In support of his claim, respondent attached a Certification 3 issued by Garrido and Modesto V.
Cuico, both court stenographers of Branch 61, dated September 8, 2006, which stated that they
received the amount of ₱2,500 from respondent representing payment for the TSNs in LRC Case
No. 61-0053.

Complainant in his letter-reply,4 insisted that respondent received the ₱2,500 as commissioner’s fee.

By Resolution of November 12, 2008, 5 the parties were required by the Court to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the matter on the basis of the pleadings. Not one of the parties complied. lawphil

By Report and Recommendation dated August 19, 2008, 6 the OCA came up with the following
Evaluation.
Atty. Caayon should be held responsible for exacting an amount from a party litigant.

Section B, Chapter II of the Manual for Clerks of Court provides: "No Branch Clerk of Court shall
demand and/or receive commissioner’s fees for the reception of evidence ex-parte."

Despite his denial, we do not doubt that Atty. Caayon exacted an amount for commissioner’s
fee from Mr. Dutosme. This fact appears on the face of the acknowledgement receipt that he issued.
It clearly indicates receipt of the amount of ₱2,500.00 "representing payment of
the Commissioner’s fee and Transcript of Stenographic Notes in LRC Case No. 61-0063-LRC."

The comment which Atty. Caayon submitted cannot be given more weight that the affidavit executed
by Mr. Dutosme, considering that the former was not executed under oath unlike the latter. Further,
there was no showing of any motive on the part of Mr. Dutosme to fabricate charges against Atty.
Caayon. On the other hand, the certification dated 8 September 2006 issued by Garrido and Cuico
and the subsequent letter dated 18 December 2006 of Garrido taking full responsibility for the
amount are but attempts to exonerate their superior. All these are self-serving and inconsistent with
the tenor of the more convincing evidence – the acknowledgment receipt issued by Atty. Caayon.

xxxx

Evidently, Atty. Caayon violated the provisions of the Manual for Clerks of Court proscribing the
collection of Commissioner’s fee in ex-parte proceedings.

x x x x (Emphasis and italics in the original, underscoring supplied)

The OCA thereupon recommended that respondent be found liable for misconduct and suspended
from the service for one (1) month without pay with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court finds the Evaluation of the OCA well taken.

Respondent’s claim of having received the P2,500 in trust for Belle representing stenographic fees is
belied by the written acknowledgment receipt he himself issued to complainant stating that the
amount was for "commissioner’s and stenographer’s fees."

In Nieva v. Alvarez-Edad,7 this Court found the therein respondent Clerk of Court guilty of
demanding/receiving commissioner’s fee in violation of Section B, Chapter II and Section D(7),
Chapter IV of the Manual for Clerks of Court and affirmed the OCA’s finding that the respondent
issued a receipt in the guise of collecting payment for TSN in behalf of a court stenographer when, in
fact, part of the amount indicated in the receipt was due her as commissioner’s fee. 8 The Court in
that case referred to the Manual as the "Bible for Clerks of Court." 9

Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service10 imposes a penalty of suspension from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for
a first offense of Misconduct. Considering that this appears to be the first offense of respondent, his
suspension from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Branch Clerk of Court Rey D. Caayon guilty of Simple
Misconduct and suspends him from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay, and
with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the service record of respondent Rey D.
Caayon.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS B.
NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR,
ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action

for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 76911 has
divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election
offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an
information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a
public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben
Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged
in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its
Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of
the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of

the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the
Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and docketed
therein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private

respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben
Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents

Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private
respondent Esbel Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private

respondent Diosdada Amor only.

In an Order2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge

Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu
proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn
and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases
with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that
pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A.
No. 7691,3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over
the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of
the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.
Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:

[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly
charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries
a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six
(6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus
disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the
right of suffrage.

Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

(B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act.
6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in]
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of

city or municipal ordinance committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction; and
 (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and
regardless of other imposable accessory and other
penalties including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof,
Provided, However, that in offenses including
damages to property through criminal negligence,
they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.

In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no

jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the
maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years.

The two motions4 for reconsideration separately filed by the

COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the
COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been
denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October
1997,5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. It
contends that public respondent has erroneously
misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing
that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because
pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and
this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles,
Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election offenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the

Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the

Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant
petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public
respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws
and jurisprudence.
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent
avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents
interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for
and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A.

No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not
more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691
expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders
inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or
modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the
election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment
of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial
Courts.

We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional

Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the
Code except those relating to the offense of failure to
register or failure to vote.6 It reads as follows:

SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. -  The regional trial court

shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of
the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are

those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense
allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by
paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an

election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer
or employee in the civil service, except those holding
political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special
forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and
all other para-military units that now exist or which may
hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes
in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political
activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a
peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election

offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or
failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than one year but
not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject
to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A.

No. 7691, provides as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal

Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses

punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals7 that

by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening
sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal
cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years
(i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor),
jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts
or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the

exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32
are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree
on Intellectual Property;8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972,9 as amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus

Election Code, election offenses also fall within the
exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the

Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated
in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress
has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by
law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard
and determined by one court. Such law would be a special
law and must be construed as an exception to the general
law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a
special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law
intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not
have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial
Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress
never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special
provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not
touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the

opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well
as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of
law,10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity
of the system of the law itself,11 to be faithful to the law, and
to maintain professional competence.12 cräläwvirtualibräry

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of

petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for
his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for
Reconsideration13 he filed with the court below, Atty.
Balbuena stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial

Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is
already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza vs-
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5,
1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that

pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or
MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on
offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that
these provisions stand together with the provisions that any
election offense under the code shall be punishable with
imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not
be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election
Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code
to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a
matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction
over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does
not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election
offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Underscoring
ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto

-vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the
same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and
Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent

Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265
and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all
election offenses punishable under the code and the
Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on
offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that
these provisions stands together with the provision that any
election offense under the code shall be punishable with
imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not
be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election
Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code
to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over
election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on
jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129,
as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129
by Republic Act No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC
jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its
expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known

that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred
to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for
reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition,
but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported
in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the
petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the

petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the
quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little
differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion
is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator
quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge
Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in
Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said
cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to
faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in

the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6705             March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered
it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without
valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,

being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding
the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated
the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an
affidavit to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000
for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved
by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat
for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement
during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened
and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of
retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is
not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for
retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained
counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of
Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was
dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas
("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with
modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent
guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice
of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as
having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt
with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and
related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much
familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client,
the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91
Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to
a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor
Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been
labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel.
But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of
Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in
I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the
very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an
employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto
Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act
of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in
or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing
of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent
conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to
represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to
"engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In
essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned
sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired
through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that
basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to
charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that
he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was
not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit
because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working
as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were
for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
– the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll
of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this
penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER
PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and
JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent,
while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-
Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady
of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later
reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before
the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student,
the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the
amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth
anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng,
a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee
of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before
the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a
lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.3

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11)
baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
which were subsequently dismissed.4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of

Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and
"Novas Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued,6 the complaint
sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son,
Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot
the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave
threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a
libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11)
CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end
view of securing an appointment for herself.9

In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges.10 A
copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation
"Unclaimed."11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court
that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an
authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on
Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to
submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case
heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission
directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the
Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and
the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated
as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as
a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to
extort money from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange
for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her
public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
Commission on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the
future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of
which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used
her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years.13
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her
position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.14 However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents
failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such
a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have
known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for
the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is
further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.16 Respondents demands for
sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions
likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is
clear from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her
office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members
of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said
acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as
gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty
of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended
by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of
attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in
violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues

filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.

Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction

the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for
at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A - "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil

Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B - "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM

Annex C - "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."cralaw virtua1aw library

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts). chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal
in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,

November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the
end thereof, what appears to be respondent’s signature above his name, address and
the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2
dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his
conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent’s "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present." cralaw virtua1aw library

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged: 5

3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and
1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer
a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and
pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe
in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be
voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only
to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and
honest belief in all good faith, to the contrary.
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration
of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999.
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final
action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years." cralaw virtua1aw library

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."cralaw virtua1aw library

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example." cralaw virtua1aw library

x          x           x

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent’s
Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the
years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged
in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since
1992.

Rule 139-A provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter
and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

SECTION 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12

of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association
dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting

to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
virtual 1aw library
chanrob1es

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy
of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas’ personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
 [B.M. NO. 1370 : May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of

IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that

membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual
dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme
Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the
validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray
the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the
Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration
of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination
and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was
to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues
could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members,
which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is

the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment
of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering
that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims
that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to
active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from
1986-2003? cralawlibrary

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of
the offending member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the
Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose
of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to
impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting
from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which

no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists
for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of,
or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In
such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to
pay dues could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is
in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty
bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject
to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants
such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED.
He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees
for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt
of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the
practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 V.C. PONCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. RODOLFO REYES,
JOSE MONASTERIAL, JR., BENJAMIN PENARANDA, JOSE
SAMBO, TEOFILO VIRAY, ANTONIO ALFONSO, CEFERINO
ARICHEA, DAVID BAQUIRIN, JUANITO BEO, ADMIRADO
COMERTA, ALBERTO CORVERA, ROMEO MAPILE, CRESANCIO
MARQUEZ, JR., ALEJANDRO ASANGA, ROSAURO UMALI,
CONRADO VILLAFRANCA (N. LACAMBRA) and HONESTO
VITUG, Respondents.**

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, petitioner V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. assails the October
27, 2005 decision1 and February 3, 2006 resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 97084 and the issuance of individual titles in favor of
respondents by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
109.

This case traces its history to a complaint filed by Eusebia de Leon

vda. de Rodriquez against petitioner in the then Court of First
Instance of Pasay City on January 3, 1963 docketed as Civil Case
No. 455-R. It sought the annulment of the sale of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 97084 she had previously sold to petitioner.
The subject property was already subdivided into smaller lots for
which individual TCTs were issued in petitioner's name.

On October 22, 1971, respondents filed a complaint-in-intervention

in Civil Case No. 455-R. Respondents executed contracts to sell with
petitioner over individual lots comprising the area covered by TCT
No. 97084 prior to the institution of the case. Their complaint-in-
intervention was allowed.

On July 17, 1989, Corazon Rodriguez (as administratrix of the

estate of de Leon) and petitioner entered into a compromise
agreement. Petitioner paid Rodriguez P3,500,000 in exchange for
the release of the lis pendens  annotation on the individual titles of
the properties involved in Civil Case No. 455-R, and the dismissal of
the case without costs. The court approved the compromise
agreement, thereby terminating the case between petitioner and
Rodriguez.

Respondents, however, refused to compromise and the complaint-

in-intervention was tried on the merits. In a decision3 dated
December 6, 1989, the Pasay City RTC ruled in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and

accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors
herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. The Court
hereby orders and declares:

1. The individual Contracts to Sell entered into between the

intervenors and the defendant are hereby declared valid, subsisting
and binding on both parties, particularly the defendant V.C. Ponce &
Co., Inc. and the latter is hereby enjoined to abide by the terms and
conditions thereof subject to the modifications as [hereinafter]
provided and under the same price originally stated therein;

2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered to pay defendant

V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. the balance of the purchase price within a
period of twelve (12) months from finality of this decision to be paid
in twelve (12) equal monthly amortizations;

3. The defendant V.C Ponce & Co., Inc. is hereby given one (1) year
from finality of this decision within which to complete the
construction of the enumerated items in paragraph 5 of the
Contracts to Sell;

4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. is ordered to deliver clean titles
to the individual intervenors upon full payment of the purchase
price;

5. xxx

SO ORDERED.
The Pasay City RTC's December 6, 1989 decision was appealed by
petitioner and it eventually reached the Supreme Court. In a
resolution dated October 21, 1991, respondents' claims were
affirmed when we ruled in their favor.4 Entry of judgment was made
on December 9, 1991.

It was at this point that respondents commenced the tedious

process of trying to execute the Pasay City RTC's December 6, 1989
decision.

On October 2, 1992, the Pasay City RTC issued a writ of execution.

Respondents consigned to the court their payments to petitioner
under their respective contracts to sell, pursuant to the December
6, 1989 decision. But in view of petitioner's obstinate refusal to
comply with the October 2, 1992 writ of execution, the RTC again
directed petitioner to deliver clean titles to respondents after
payment and consignation.5 Petitioner was likewise ordered to
strictly obey the terms and conditions of the December 6, 1989
decision with a stern warning that repeated non-compliance would
be dealt with severely. The RTC also ordered its clerk of court to
receive respondents' cash payments.

On August 5, 1993, the clerk of court was ordered to receive from

respondents' counsel their cash payments to petitioner and deposit
them in the Philippine National Bank. Petitioner was (again) ordered
to comply with the December 6, 1989 decision within ten days from
receipt of the order.

Petitioner (once more) sought a deferment of the enforcement of

the March 8, 1993 and August 5, 1993 orders but the same was
denied. In an order dated August 3, 1994, the Pasay City RTC cited
petitioner in contempt for its refusal to abide by the March 8, 1993
order. The Registrar of Deeds of Parañaque was likewise directed to
cancel petitioner's TCTs over the properties which were already paid
in full and to issue new titles in favor of respondents.

Because of petitioner's continued inaction, an alias writ of execution

dated August 7, 1995 was issued by the Pasay City RTC to enforce
the December 6, 1989 decision.
Respondents then filed an ex-parte  motion for entry of judgment,
praying that the Registrar of Deeds of Parañaque be directed to
divest petitioner of its titles and to issue new ones to them. The
court ordered its clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff to execute
deeds of conveyance in favor of respondents. The Registrar of
Deeds of Parañaque, however, refused to register respondents'
deeds of conveyance because petitioner adamantly refused to
surrender its owner's duplicate TCTs. So, on January 11, 2002, the
Pasay City RTC ordered the Registrar of Deeds of Parañaque to
cancel petitioner's duplicate TCTs. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated
September 13, 2002.

Respondents filed a manifestation and motion seeking a court order

annulling the titles of petitioner over the properties involved in the
case. In response, the Pasay City RTC issued the assailed order
dated January 23, 2003 nullifying and canceling this time TCT No.
97084 (the mother title) and mandating the issuance of individual
titles to respondents. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.

Petitioner questioned the January 23, 2003 order (and that denying
the motion for reconsideration) in the CA via a petition
for certiorari . In denying relief to petitioner, the CA held that the
cancellation of TCT No. 97084 (the mother title) was necessary to
the execution of the trial court's decision, considering the refusal of
the Registrar of Deeds to register the deeds of sale and issue clean
individual titles to respondents.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that the January 23, 2003 order for the
nullification and cancellation of TCT No. 97084 completely changed
the tenor of the December 6, 1989 decision.

We deny the petition.

In general, the essential parts of a decision or order consist of the

following: (1) a statement of the case; (2) a statement of the facts;
(3) the issues or assignment of errors; (4) the court ruling; and (5)
the dispositive portion.6 In a civil case such as this, the dispositive
portion should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or
denied, the specific relief granted and the costs.7

The order of execution must substantially conform to the dispositive

portion of the decision sought to be executed.8 In the event of
variance, the dispositive portion of the final and executory decision
prevails.

The dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989 decision read in

part:

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and

accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors
herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Inc. The Court
hereby orders and declares:

1. xxx

2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered to pay defendant

V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Ince. the balance of the purchase price within a
period of twelve (12) equal monthly amortizations;

3. xxx

4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Inc. is ordered to deliver clean

titles to the individual intervenors upon full payment of the
purchase price; xxx

while the order dated January 23, 2003 stated in part:

C]onsidering the affirmance of the decision of this Court dated December 6, 1989 by both the Court of Appeals and

the Supreme Court, for full satisfaction of the decision, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 97084, Register of

Deeds, Rizal, the original of which is presently on file with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, is hereby

NULLIFIED and CANCELLED and considered of no value and effect conformably with Section 107 of PD 1529 xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City is

hereby directed to issue individual titles to the Intervenors to
complete the satisfaction of judgment/decision of this Court already
partially executed.
The Intervenors are directed to coordinate with the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque City to further hasten the issuance of their
individual titles.

SO ORDERED.

The variance claimed by petitioner allegedly lies in the directive to

the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City to nullify and cancel TCT
No. 97084. Petitioner insists that there was no such order in the
dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989 decision.

Petitioner is wrong.

It is a cardinal rule that the dispositive portion of an order or

judgment prevails over the discussion or the body of the said
decision or order. In this case, the dispositive portion of the January
23, 2003 order merely reiterated the directive for the issuance of
individual titles to respondents by the Registrar of Deeds.

Nevertheless, even if we analyze and compare the body of the

January 23, 2003 order and that of the December 6, 1989 decision,
no substantial variance exists between them. On its face, the
January 23, 2003 order is in harmony with the dispositive portion of
the December 6, 1989 decision. The Registrar of Deeds of
Parañaque City is being directed to issue individual titles to
respondents to complete the satisfaction of judgment/decision of
th[e] [c]ourt partially executed. Reference to the "partially executed
decision" simply stresses that the execution must conform to the
December 6, 1989 decision.

Petitioner admits that TCT No. 97084 is the mother title of the
individual titles of respondents.9 However, it claims for the first
time  that TCT No. 97084 was the subject of another case and that it
was already cancelled by virtue of another court order or
judgment.10 Furthermore, TCT No. 97084 allegedly subsists only
with respect to areas which are not involved in this case.

Petitioner's claims are not only immaterial and undeserving of

favorable consideration; they were also never established with
evidence of such alleged court order or judgment. Thus, there is no
way by which these allegations can be verified. Given petitioner's
propensity to manipulate legal procedures to defeat the just claims
against it, such lapse is fatal to its cause.

The Pasay City RTC was well within its powers when it issued the
January 23, 2003 order. It is the ministerial duty of the court to
order the execution of its final judgment. It has the inherent power
to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.11

Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court12 and Section 107 of PD

152913 provide the procedure to be followed in case of a refusal by
the owner to surrender the duplicate copy of his TCT.

A considerable length of time has passed. It is time to end this

litigation and write finis  to this case. Enough is enough.

We remind petitioner's counsel, Atty. Candice Marie T. Bandong,

that she is an officer of the court who must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must never be unduly impeded, not even
by her client. Her oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to
her duty to her client; its primacy is indisputable.14 In this light, we
are sternly warning her (or any other counsel who might take over
this case) of disciplinary action for any further delay in the
execution of the decision of the Pasay City RTC.

That TCT No. 97084 has been subdivided into smaller lots and that
derivative titles have been issued therefor are of no moment. The
fact remains that, for more than 15 years, petitioner has been
consistently refusing to surrender its owner's duplicate originals of
the derivative TCTs, contrary to lawful orders and in evident bad
faith. We are therefore ordering the cancellation and nullification of
TCT No. 97084 and its derivative titles. Let new certificates of title
be issued (a) in the name of the individual respondents for the lots
covered by their respective fully-paid contracts to sell and (b) in the
name of petitioner for those portions not covered by the claims of
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 27,
2005 decision and February 3, 2006 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77783 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

The Registrar of Deeds of Parañaque City is ordered to cancel TCT

No. 97084 and the derivative titles of the lots covered by
respondents' respective contracts to sell (with petitioner) and issue
clean individual titles to them.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.