JANUARY 11, 2020, SATURDAY

Elements of Arbitrary Detention:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.

1. CASTILLO vs NAPOLCOM

Facts:
The petitioner was accused of arresting without legal cause, on May 10, 1979, the private respondent and two
others, all waiters at the Ang Tunay na Pansit Malabon Restaurant  situated at Timog Avenue, Quezon City; of
handcuffing, slapping, and boxing on the chest the private respondent and forcing him and his two fellow waiters into the
police car; and of detaining them in the police precinct for eight hours without charges.
Pfc. Rogelio Castillo, the petitioner, a public officer, arrested without a warrant on May 10, 1979 the private
respondent and his companions and detained them on the mere suspicion that they had committed "qualified theft" and
"oral defamation" in February and April 1979. The fact, however, is that the illegal arrest was perpetrated after the
petitioner with two other policemen had taken their snacks and after talking to the cashier of the restaurant. The fact that
the petitioner and his two other policemen companions did not effect the arrest immediately upon or soon after entering
the restaurant strongly indicates that the complained subsequent action of the policemen was to accommodate or please
the restaurant owner, a certain Mrs. del Rosario.
xxx xxx xxx
... [M]oreover, that the respondent had the intention to arrest complainant and those against whom Mrs. Del
Rosario had a complaint is also manifested by the prior agreement that policemen will go to the place on May 10th,
according to respondent's witness, Trinidad de Guzman. The said Trinidad de Guzman further testified that her aunt, the
restaurant's owner, did not like the existence of the labor union in her restaurant. The President, Vice-President and
Sergeant-at-Arms of the said newly organized labor union happened to be complainant and his two companions, Rodolfo
Ramirez and Israel Boranque respectively. 

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of arbitrary detention.

Held:
Since from the start the detention was without legal grounds, the arrest having been made without a warrant, an
subsequent proceedings were consequently tainted with illegality; hence, the question as to how many hours may the
police complete its investigation and release the suspect under investigation without violating the law is obviously
irrelevant.

2. MILO vs SALANGA

Facts:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza
and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy,
all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio
captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without
legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain
Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and
lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the
information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention,
respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.

Issue:
Is a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.

Held:
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges
or mayors.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio
captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them
as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain
include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and
the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the
general welfare of the barrio; to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to
organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order
within the barrio.
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the
above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public disorder
therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what can the
barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive measures like placing
the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may
subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make
arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like
judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime.22 A perusal of the powers and
function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the
latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are
given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held
liable for Arbitrary Detention.

3. ASTORGA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 154130, October 01, 2003

Facts:
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government's campaign against illegal logging. The
team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and
Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. [3]
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like boats
being constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain
Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay. [4]
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in the vicinity
of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan
and Militante disembarked from the DENR's service pump boat and proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There,
they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching
Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga.[5]
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try
and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who
exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya
ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim back to Tacloban.
Don't you know that I can box? I can box. Don't you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) [6] Mayor Astorga then
ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived
bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they
promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members. [7] At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose
of his team's mission.[8] He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the
DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the team's whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon's radio,
saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig ."
(It's better if you have no radio so that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help).
[9]
Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha
Samar kay diri kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate
it here.)[10] Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they
would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to Daram. [11]
Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon
madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to
confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender
mine.)[12] Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga,
who angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya ." (You cannot
go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to discuss there.) [13]
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team had dinner
with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. [14] After dinner,
Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the barangay.[15] On
the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave.
[16]
 Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to
the filing of the above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.[17] At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their
Joint Affidavit.[18] However, the presentation of Simon's testimony was not completed, and none of his fellow team
members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit
of Desistance.[19]

Issues: whether or not the team was actually detained

Held:
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the
complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. [37] This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of
almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons
pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. [38] Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian's
statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga's orders. [39] It was not just the presence of the armed men, but
also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the
departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

4. SAN AGUSTIN vs PEOPLE

Facts:
Subject SAN AGUSTIN was subpoenaed to appear before the NBI-AOCD to controvert allegations filed against
him for kidnapping by Ms. Luz Tan. He was enjoined to come with his Counsel and bring the logbook of the Barangay.
When Subject appeared at the NBI, he presented at once the logbook of the Barangay. It was noted at the said logbook
that there was no entry on June 19, 2002 that Victim RICARDO TAN was arrested or transmitted to any law enforcement
agency or proper authority.4
State Prosecutor Elizabeth L. Berdal conducted an inquest investigation on June 27, 2002 and came out with a
Resolution, on the same day, affirmed by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, finding probable cause against the
petitioner for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.5
On June 28, 2002, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, charging the petitioner
with kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail recommended. The case was raffled to Branch 258 of the court
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-0759.
On July 1, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that he was illegally
arrested and subjected to an inquest investigation; hence, he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. He
also prayed that he be released from detention and that, in the meantime, the NBI be ordered to refile the complaint
against him withthe Office of the Parañaque City Prosecutor and for the latter to conduct a preliminary investigation. On
July 4, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, this time, on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute the felony of kidnapping/serious illegal detention. He claimed that he was a barangay
chairman when the private complainant was allegedly detained; hence, he should be charged only with arbitrary
detention, the most severe penalty for which is reclusion temporal.
The prosecution opposed the petitioner's motion to quash the Information on the ground that when he
detained the private complainant, he acted in his private capacity and not as a barangay chairman.6
On July 24, 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation within a non-
extendible period of forty-five (45) days.7 Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo Medina was assigned to conduct
the reinvestigation. The petitioner opposed the reinvestigation contending that the prosecutor should conduct a regular
preliminary investigation since the inquest investigation was void. He refused to submit a counter-affidavit.

Issue:
Is there a liability of arbitrary detention?

Held:
No. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without a warrant of arrest against
him for kidnapping/serious illegal detention.
Furthermore, warrantless arrest or the detention of petitioner in the instant case does not fall within the
provision of Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has been committed and he has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112."
considering that petitioner only went to the Office of the NBI to answer the subpoena it issued which was seven (7) days
after the supposed turning over of the custody of Ricardo Tan to petitioner who was then the Barangay Chairman of La
Huerta, Parañaque City, and his locking up in the barangay jail and, thereafter, he was already arrested and detained.
Certainly, the "arresting" officers were not present within the meaning of Section 5(a) at the time when the
supposed victim, Ricardo Tan, was turned over to petitioner. Neither could the "arrest" which was effected seven (7)
days after the incident be seasonably regarded as "when the turning over and locking up in the Barangay jail had in fact
just been committed within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the person to whom the custody of the victim Ricardo Tan was turned
over and who locked up the latter in the Barangay jail. The information upon which the "arresting" officers acted upon
had been derived from the statements made by the alleged eyewitnesses to the incident which information did not,
however, constitute personal knowledge.
Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to a preliminary investigation before an Information may be filed against
him for said crime. The inquest investigation conducted by the State Prosecutor is void because under Rule 112, Section
7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully
arrested without a warrant.

Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the
next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. In every case, the person detained shall be informed
of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).

Elements in the Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons:

a. That the offender is a public officer or employee;
b. That he has detained a person for some legal ground;
c. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within:
a. Twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; or
b. Eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent;
or
c. Thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.

5. IBP vs DOJ, G.R. No. 232413; July 25, 2017

Facts:
This is a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus with a petition for declaratory relief filed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)  Pangasinan Chapter Legal Aid, pursuant to its purpose, as stated in "In the Matter
of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines," issued by the Supreme Court on January 9, 1973, and the provisions
under Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (Guidelines on Legal Aid).

The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal Aid Program, as well as a
series of consultations with the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the extant condition of detention prisoners, it was
discovered that several detention prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case being filed in court by the
prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the existence or nonexistence of probable cause.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of writ of habeas corpus is proper even if the case is already moot and academic.

Held:
The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the failure
to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse
resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes
public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In case the detention is without legal ground, the person
arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to
the possible filing of an action for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested without a warrant opts for the
conduct of preliminary investigation. The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State
the right to detain a person indefinitely.
The Court answers in the negative.
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely
incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The
waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.

Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a person  ad
infinitum.  Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC
does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by reason of the
dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration,
reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere
operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this must be all the more
followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable cause.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released to avoid violation of the
constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of
violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where
the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the
subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal
automatically results in a prima facie  finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a
person.

The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this time when the present
administration aggressively wages its "indisputably popular war on illegal drugs." As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that
the security of the public and the interest of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the
constitutional rights of the detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.

6. PEOPLE VS MABONG

Facts:
In the afternoon on May 20, 1955, in the barrio of Rizal municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao, Rufo Verano,
who was a rural policeman, heard some people shouting that one Dionisio Nabong went berserk. Verano went out of his
house armed with a club and saw Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a bolo. After pursuing and attacking his victim,
Mabong faced Verano who told him to drop his bolo, and when he refused, Verano clubbed him on the face which
caused him to stumble to the ground. Thereupon, Verano grabbed the bolo of the accused, tied him with a rope and
brought him on a small boat to Lianga where he delivered him to the chief of police.
On May 23, 1955, after proper investigation, Mabong was charged with murder in two separate informations by
the chief of police before the Justice of the Peace of Lianga. When the, latter conducted the corresponding preliminary
investigation, Mabong pleaded guilty, whereupon the Justice of the Peace forwarded the two cases to the court of first
instance. In due time, the provincial fiscal filed against the accused the informations required by law, and when the
court set the same for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash and a petition for habeas corpus alleging as
main ground that his detention by the local authoritieds illegal upon the expiration of the period of eighteen (18) hours
without having been proceeded with in accordance with law, and that the filing later on of the two criminal complaints
against him by the chief of police did not have the effect of validating his detention. From the denial of said motion and
petition, the accused took the present appeal.
The law on which the accused relies in claiming the illegality of his detention is article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The penalties
privided in the next preceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any persons to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.

Issue:
Whether or not the argument of Mabong is tenable.

Held:
No. It is true that the accused was detained in the municipal jail of Lianga for more than thrree (3) days before
criminal charges were preferred against him before the justice of the peace court, and that since his detention no
warrant of arrest has been issued by the court as a result of said charges, but the absence of such warrant can have no
legal consequence it appearing that when the charges were filed he was already under the custody of local authorities.
As the Solicitor General well observes, "no practical good will come out of quashing the information presented and
setting the appellant free. That will only mean a complaint will have to be filed anew against him, that the justice of the
peace of Lianga would issue a warrant for his arrest and start all over again with the case. In any event, . . . with the filing
on May 23, 1955 of the corresponding criminal complaints against appellant, the detention there after of the accused
became legal and justified; and that the issuance of an of formality and had already become  functus oficio."
Hence, Verano cannot be punished under Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code.
 7. SORIA vs DESIERTO

Facts:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections 3 ),
petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the
penalty of prision correccional  in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal.
revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the
Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant
of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were brought to the
residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against
them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the
petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-
Affidavit" was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon the order of
Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back
and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the
time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and
an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista’s arrest for alleged
illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista
with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N,
respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No.
4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states: ****************************

Issue:
Whether or not there was a delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.

Held:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on
applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the
period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-
office day." In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14,
2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria].
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against
him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for
Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an
Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his
continuous detention.
Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.

8. IBP vs DOJ

Facts:
 9. PEOPLE vs REYES ***

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution
On June 28, 2005, a confidential informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office in
Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando City, La Union and reported to SPO1 Rene Acosta (SPO1Acosta) that appellant was
selling shabu. SPO1 Acosta relayed the information to his superior officer, Senior Inspector Reynaldo Lizardo (Sr. Insp.
Lizardo), who formed a buy-bust team and designated SPO1 Acosta as poseur-buyer. The CI contacted appellant by
cellular phone and introduced SPO1 Acosta as a buyer of shabu. SPO1 Acosta then talked to appellant and they agreed
to meet at around 6:00 a.m. the next day at the monument located in Barangay Madayedeg, San Fernando City.
On June 29, 2005, SPO1 Acosta and PDEA Agent Ellizier Ignacio (Ignacio), who would act as back-up, arrived in
the designated area at 5:30 a.m. Ignacio positioned himself 10 meters away from SPO1 Acosta. Appellant arrived after
20 minutes with the CI and approached SPO1 Acosta. The CI then introduced SPO1 Acosta to appellant as the buyer of
shabu. SPO1 Acosta asked appellant if he was the same person he talked to over the phone the previous night. When
appellant answered in the affirmative, SPO1 Acosta asked him if he has the stuff and if SPO1 Acosta could see them.
Appellant thus handed over to SPO1 Acosta two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. SPO1 Acosta then
made the pre-arranged signal by removing the towel from his shoulder to indicate the completion of the transaction.
Ignacio thus rushed to SPO1 Acosta and together, they arrested appellant.
Anent the seized items, SPO1 Acosta took possession of the same up until they were brought to the police
station. Thereat, he marked them with his initials "RA." On the same day, Sr. Insp. Lizardo prepared and signed a
Request for Laboratory Examination 5 that SPO1 Acosta delivered together with the seized plastic sachets to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office in La Union. Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (P/Insp. Laya) conducted a qualitative
examination on the contents of the plastic sachets and confirmed the same to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. 6
Appellant calls attention the failure to provide him with a counsel immediately after his arrest, and his detention
for more than 24 hours. According to appellant, these considerations disqualify the arresting officers from enjoying the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.

Held:
There was no unlawful delay in the filing of charges against appellant since the police officers had 36 hours from
detention to bring him to the proper judicial authorities. The police officers complied with this requirement since SPO1
Acosta testified that appellant was detained only for more than 24 hours. Notably, neither proof nor allegation exists on
record that appellant was detained for a period longer than allowed by law. Moreover, it is worth stressing that while a
delay in the delivery of appellant to the proper judicial authorities is a violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, it does not affect the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of the police officers in
the absence of criminal charges against them.

Section Two.  -  Violation of domicile

Article 128.  Violation of domicile.  - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of
the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or
having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.
If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not
returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.

Acts punishable under Article 128:

1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof; or
2. By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner; or
3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously (secretly) entered said dwelling and after having
been required to leave the same.

Elements common to three acts:

a. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
b. That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a search therein for papers or
other effects.

10. GEROCHE vs PEOPLE

Facts:
 Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14,
1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep when petitioners, who were
not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him,
striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his
airgun. Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and corroborated
his testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President Roxas Police
Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness stand for the prosecution.
Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma
on the left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip region, and back portion at the right side of
the scapular region as well as abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region.  Dr.
7

Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days.  For the defense, petitioners denied the
8

crime charged, declaring in unison that they were in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They
alleged, however, that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other
barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area.
According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential
element of Article 128 of the RPC.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused are public officers and must be punished under Article 128 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Held:
The prosecution who has that onus proband failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime; on the
issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were named CVO’s and the
other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such
an admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and
convincing evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a
doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favorof the
accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of
moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; x x x.  Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial
10

court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be convicted for Less Serious Physical
Injuries, the Court of Appeals still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial
admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil).
The court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

11. JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEM CORP vs JUDGE LIDUA SR. ******

(Can’t find any other issue besides Prescription under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code)

Facts:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell
personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the
respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the
clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang.
Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the
clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of
₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car
with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the
prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly
removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is
₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not paid by the
respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell
filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was
eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto
Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
 In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the
wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged
further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family
could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of
evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City
Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.
Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements
of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.

Issue:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents.

Held:
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of
the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also
has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it
is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought
to be corrected.