ETHICS DIGESTS

1. In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534 March 18, 1954

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:

WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid?

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
2. In re: Lanuevo AC No. 1162-1164, August 29, 1975 (66 SCRA 245)
FACTS:

This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the
1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the
same bar exam, in his confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later
identified as Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting
upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their
sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by
Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner
explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained in all subjects
by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and
low grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass.
In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam
of the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation also
revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did
not revealed the information in his application to take the bar examination.

ISSUE:

WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the examination
result of a bar candidate.

RULING:

The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner
individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior
authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination
notebooks after they are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of
the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the
candidate themselves. With the facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the
exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence
given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys.
Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in his
application for the bar exam while under oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar
examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties
with due care

3. In re: Al C. Argosino, B.M. No. 712, July 13, 1995 (246 SCRA 14)
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino
was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with
homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years
imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr
probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to
allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in
mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of
justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished
to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

4. In re petition for leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission
to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice.

5. In re: Maquera, BM No. 793, July 39, 2004

Facts:

Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward Benavente who obtained
judgment in a civil case. Castro’s propery was sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation, but Castro
retained the right to redemption over said property.

In consideration for Maquera’s legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered into an oral agreement that
he would assign his right of redemption to Maquera.

Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for $320,000.

He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for

• Obtaining an unreasonably high fee for his services

• Did not comply with Guam’s “Model Rules” by entering into a business transaction with a client
or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully
disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing”

Issue:

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?

Ruling:

It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence only.

The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court:

“[…]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.”

Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 of the civil code which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring
by assignment the client’s property which is the subject of litigation. It extends to legal redemption.
Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and be
mindful of the trust and confidence In him; and rule 1.01, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has the right to explain why he should and should not
be suspended/disbarred on those grounds. Suspension/disbarment is NOT automatic

NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for the non-
payment of his IBP dues from 1977.

6. In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 985

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino
citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and
finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by
the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and
finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to
practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees
and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is
entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.

Rulings:

1. The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Applicant is a Filipino
citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of
his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.

2. Article I of the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State
in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession which have the force of law, and Section 1
of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, require that before anyone can practice
the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and

3. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines.

7. Alawi vs Alauya 268 SCRA 639

Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso
wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds
was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself
a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

8. Tan vs Sabandal, BM No. 44 Feb. 24, 1992

Facts: Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to finally take oath
and practice the law profession after considering his plea for forgiveness and showing willingness to
reform along with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which is a testimonial by the
IBP Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its President, a counsel for
the in-laws of Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members. The court allowed the IBP
to manifest testimony to certify as to the good moral character of the respondent and asked for a
comment from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested that they see no
impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the RTC Judge informed the court of the civil
case against the respondent concerning the mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which
turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a free patent. The civil case
however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged of any crime. Subsequently, Tan
already forgave the respondent and withdrew her opposition for the taking of oath of office of the
respondent while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide.

ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office

RULING: The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed the
civil case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together
with the testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending case
against him. The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent.
Although there were testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without any
knowledge of the case against him. The commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty. With the
practice of law a matter of privilege and not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member of the
law profession therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the respondent to take oath.

9. Burbe vs Magulta AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Dominador P. Burbe filed a complaint for disbarment, suspension or any disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Respondent agreed to legally represent the petitioner in a money claim
and possible civil case. He prepared the demand letters and other legal papers; however, he later on
suggested that the petitioner must file the necessary complaint. Petitioner paid an amount of P25, 000
for lawyer’s fees and amounts for filing the case. Months had passed but there was still no feedback
regarding the petitioner’s case. Petitioner would frequently inquire yet respondent would repeatedly
tell him to wait. To prove that the case was already filed, respondent brought the petitioner to the Hall
of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City. He made the petitioner wait for hours at the prosecutor’s
office and came back with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. Petitioner personally
went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and found out that the case was not filed. A confrontation took
place wherein the respondent denied the allegation. It was only when the certification was shown that
Atty. Magulta admitted that he spent the money for his own purpose and offered to reimburse the
Burbe.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Alberto C. Magulta should be disbarred?

HELD:

The Court adopted the Integrated Bar of the Philippine’s recommendation. It is evident that the
petitioner deposited an amount of P25, 00 for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. There was a
lawyer-client relationship established since the respondent agreed to legally represent the petitioner.
There’s an obligation on the part of the respondent to file the complaint within the time frame. In
addition to that, there was misappropriation of funds of the client. His actions caused damages and
prejudice to his clients. His conduct was dishonest thus unsuitable to be a member of the legal
profession. He was not disbarred; nonetheless, he was suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year.

10) Soriano vs Dizon, AC 6792, January 25, 2006

FACTS:

Atty. Dizon was driving his car on his way home. Soriano, taxi driver overtook his car driven by Dizon
who was under the influence of liquor. Dizon tailed Soriano until the latter stopped. Dizon stopped his
car held Soriano by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the Soriano forced open his door causing the
accused to fall to the ground. Soriano got out of his car to help him get up. But Dizon, by now enraged,
attempted twice to deal Soriano with a fist blow twice. Dizon went back to his car and got his revolver
and shot Soriano. Soriano survived but sustained a spinal cord injury which disabled him for his job as a
taxi driver. Dizon filed an application for probation which was granted on the condition that he satisfy
the civil liabilities imposed by the court in favor of Soriano. Dizon failed to comply with this undertaking
and even appealed the civil liability. IBP recommended that Dizon be disbarred from the practice of law
for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Atty. Dizon violated Canon 1 of the CPR.

2. Whether Atty. Dizon should be disbarred from the practice of law.

HELD:

1. YES. It is glaringly clear that respondent violated Canon 1 of the CPR through his illegal possession of
an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. He has thus violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in
even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the court when it suspended his sentence
and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation,

2. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is
a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. Moral
turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." The totality
of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed
his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic
incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. When lawyers are
convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the mere fact of their conviction –
would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar. Atty. Dizon is DISBARRED.

11. In the matter of Disbarment Proceedings vs Narciso N. Jaramillo, AC NO.

229
The respondent was prosecuted for and convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
and, on appeal, was finally sentenced by the Court of appeals to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
two months and one day of arresto mayor to one year and one day of prision correccional in its decision
promulgated on April 17, 1954. On August 5, 1955, while the respondent was serving sentence for said
conviction, the Solicitor General filed in this Court the present complaint for respondent's disbarment.

In his answer respondent contends that his conviction was a judicial error; that it was unfortunate on his
part that the trial court did not believe his explanation of the loss of the amount involved in the criminal
case; that his imprisonment and the sufferings and mental anguish he has suffered since the
commencement of the criminal of the criminal case constitute more than sufficient punishment; that for
this Court to further disbar him is excessively inhuman, humiliating and cruel.

There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No
elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
protect the administration of justice.

Wherefore, the respondent is hereby disbarred and ordered to surrender to this Court, within fifteen
days from notice hereof, the lawyer's certificate heretofore issued to him. So ordered.

12) Villasanta vs Peralta, April 30

Facts:

Respondent Hilarion, who was already married to Rizalina, courted Lilian who fell in love with him.To
have carnal knowledge of Lilian, Hilarion procured the preparation of a fake marriage contractwhich was
then a blank document and made Lilian sign it. A week after, Hilarion brought the document back to
Lilian with the signatures of the judge, the civil registrar and two witnesses. Since they livedtogether as
husband and wife. Sometime later, Lilian insisted on a religious ratification of theirmarriage. The two
went to a priest who, relying on the falsified marriage contract, solemnized themarriage. Lilian later
discovered that Hilarion was previously married; whereupon, she filed thecriminal action for a violation
of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code and a complaint for immorality before the Supreme Court,
seeking to disqualify Hilarion, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from beingadmitted to the bar.

Held:

Respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding

respectand dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent
incontracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife
isstill alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency,
andmorality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent
ishereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar

32) Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

FACTS:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer
the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court
granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following
acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and
Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for
a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971
for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered
by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from
the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on
June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales]
defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:

The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to
pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide
for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous [citation omitted].
Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to
carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute [citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between
the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

33) Pineda vs De Jesus et al GR 155224

APPLICABLE RULE: Canon 20.04- A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

FACTS:

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner
Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by
respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano. During the pendency
of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their minor
child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by the petitioner and both
parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial
court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between the petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared
null and void. Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were wellcompensated. They including
their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioner’s dermatology
clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million which
the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million
as “full payment for settlement.” Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court a motion for
payment of lawyers’ fees for P50 million. On April 14, 2000, trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5
million to Atty. De Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty.
Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether the lawyers are entitled to additional legal fees? RULING: NO. The professional engagement
between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum meruit which means “as
much as the lawyer deserves.” The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case,
where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is a legal
mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal
services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the
lawyer himself.