CHU VS MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE – SECURITY GUARD

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority.14
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only
when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time
that substituted service may be resorted to.15 Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report
indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.16
Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that
efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts
have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence,
may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that
authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in
behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence
that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of
service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be
considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service. (No mention of it in the Return)

ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL, Petitioners, vs. ROMEO CARLOS,

Respondent.
Unlawful Detainer Case
On record - 3 occasions of personal service were made but unsuccessful.
Respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position paper
submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on record. The MTC
ruled in favor of respondent. The MTC issued a writ of execution. petitioners
filed a petition for relief from judgment with the MTC. Respondent filed a
motion to dismiss or strike out the petition for relief. Subsequently,
petitioners manifested their intention to withdraw the petition for relief after
realizing that it was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Issue:
Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the RTC erred in dismissing their
petition for relief from judgment.
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC
because it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners
cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC.
Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment of the MTC.
The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for certiorari
with the RTC under Rule 6518 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of petitioners in view of the absence of
summons to petitioners. Here, we shall treat petitioners’ petition for relief
from judgment as a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in
personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation on the
defendant for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore
physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of
reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.19 In an
action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case.20 Jurisdiction over the
defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court.21 If the defendant does not
voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or
substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, which state:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.22
The 23 August 2004 Decision of the MTC states:
Record shows that there were three attempts to serve the summons to the
defendants. The first was on January 14, 2004 where the same was unserved.
The second was on February 3, 2004 where the same was served to one Gary
Akob and the last was on February 18, 2004 where the return was duly served
but refused to sign.23
A closer look at the records of the case also reveals that the first indorsement
dated 14 January 2004 carried the annotation that it was "unsatisfied/given
address cannot be located."24 The second indorsement dated 3 February 2004
stated that the summons was "duly served as evidenced by his signature of
one Gary Acob25 (relative)."26 While the last indorsement dated 18 February
2004 carried the annotation that it was "duly served but refused to sign"
without specifying to whom it was served.27
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and
only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted
service be availed of.28 In Samartino v. Raon,29 we said:
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying
availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service;
why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and
circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot
be upheld.30
In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and personal service
on petitioners was rendered impossible. It failed to show the reason why
personal service could not be made. It was also not shown that efforts were
made to find petitioners personally and that said efforts failed. These
requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to
bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such
action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only
presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. Failure to faithfully,
strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements of substituted
service renders such service ineffective.31
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case was
it shown that Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted service of summons
was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in
petitioners’ residence. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,32 we said:
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it
should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing
therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the
age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is
defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice
and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how
to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons,
and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the
defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate
action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the
receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person
found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said
receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons.33 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his
relationship to petitioners and to ascertain whether he comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to
petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt of summons.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DPWH) VS ALBERTO A. DOMINGO

In essence, the primary issue that must be resolved in the instant petition is
whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed by the Republic.

In the petition at bar, the Republic argues that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the former. The Republic reiterates that the service of
summons upon the DPWH Region III alone was insufficient. According to the
Republic, the applicable rule of procedure in this case is Section 13, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, which mandates that when the defendant is the Republic of
the Philippines, the service of summons may be effected on the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). The DPWH and its regional office are simply agents of
the Republic, which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.
The Republic posits that, since it was not impleaded in the case below and the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 333-
M-2002 are null and void.
On the other hand, Domingo argues that the DPWH Region III is part of the
DPWH itself; hence, a suit against the regional office is a suit against the said
department and the Republic as well. Domingo stresses that the case he filed
was against the Republic, that is, against the DPWH Region III, and it was clear
that the summons and a copy of the complaint was duly served on the said
regional office. Likewise, Domingo submits that the Republic is estopped from
raising the issue of jurisdiction in the instant case given that he has filed two
other civil actions for specific performance and damages against the DPWH
Region III and, in the said cases, the OSG formally entered its appearance for
and in behalf of the Republic. Domingo alleges that the foregoing action of the
OSG proved that it recognized the validity of the service of summons upon the
DPWH Region III and the jurisdiction of the trial court over the said regional
office.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons
issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary appearance or
submission to the court.29
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in
case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may
be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law
or the court may direct. (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the
Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The
BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge
of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone systems to
government offices. It also provides its services to augment limited or
inadequate existing similar private communication facilities. It extends its
services to areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the
private sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing and
maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of
the Republic, and summons should have been served on the Solicitor General.
Likewise, copy of the Summons and Complaint was served upon defendant
Bureau of Telecommunications at the address indicated in the Summons, a
copy of the same was received by a certain Cholito Anitola, a person employed
thereat, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge
receipt thereof."
It is incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to
prove that all requirements were met in the service thereof. We find that this
burden was not discharged by the petitioners. The records show that the
sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor
General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and
all proceedings therein are null and void.
As held by the appellate court, the other civil cases presumably pertained to
transactions involving Domingo and the DPWH Region III, which were totally
different from the contracts involved in the instant case. The fact that the OSG
entered its appearance in the other civil cases, notwithstanding that the
summons therein were only served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing
in the case now before us. All this indicates is that, despite the improper
service of summons in these other civil cases, there appeared to be notice to
the OSG and voluntary appearance on the latter’s part.

PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. VS PNOC EXPLORATION CORP.

SUMMONS BY REGISTERED MAIL
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003.
He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He
imputed the following errors to the trial court: taking cognizance of the case
despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to
furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, particularly the September
11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.
Propriety of Service By Publication
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.
– In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of
court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in
personam and claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an
action in rem. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or
quasi in rem.12
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section
19,13 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
… an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of
the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by
an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address."
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section
19,13 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
… an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of
the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by
an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address."
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his
answer on time. That was in fact why he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." But respondent moved only
for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner
in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the trial court stated:
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of
evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that "despite and notwithstanding service
of summons by publication, no answer has been filed with the Court within the
required period and/or forthcoming.["] Effectively[,] that was a finding that the
defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in default for failure to file an
answer or any responsive pleading within the period fixed in the publication as
precisely the defendant [could not] be found and for which reason, service of
summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the
defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the reality
that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his
whereabouts unknown – thus the publication of the summons. In other words,
it was reasonable to expect that the defendant will not receive any notice or
order in his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to send any notice
or order to him. Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of the
order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant at his last known
address but it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to
permitting respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an
order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of
default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.15 Since no
motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have
been issued.
To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who
has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens
if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known or he
cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sent
to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not
require that the impossible be done.16 Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility.17 Laws and rules must be
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense,
reason and practicality.
ASIAVEST LIMITED VS. COURT OF APPEALS
In issue is the enforceability in the Philippines of a foreign judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In an action in personam wherein the defendant is
a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.—In an action in personam wherein
the defendant is a nonresident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of
service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he
is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was
laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-resident was served with
summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was
his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him;
moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.—In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must
be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Thus,
where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines and
(1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates
to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of
the defendant from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or
(4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines—service
of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country;13 however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations
have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.14
his Reply (to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), 38 HERAS argued that the
lack of jurisdiction over his person was corroborated by ASIAVEST's allegation
in the complaint that he "has his residence at No. 6, 1st St., New Manila,
Quezon City, Philippines." He then concluded that such judicial admission
amounted to evidence that he was and is not a resident of Hong Kong.
Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations
of facts, among which was that "the residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is
New Manila, Quezon City." 39
We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement
of the Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in issue. He never
challenged the service of summons on him through a security guard in his
Quezon City residence and through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his
Motion to Dismiss, he did not question the jurisdiction of the Philippine court
over his person on the ground of invalid service of summons. What was in
issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was concerned. We
therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a resident of New
Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time
jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With
that stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident
of Hong Kong at the time.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action
against him was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the
Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment
cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no
longer so in November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of summons was
attempted to be made on him. As declared by his secretary, which statement
was not disputed by ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in October 1984 "for
good." 40 His absence in Hong Kong must have been the reason why summons
was not served on him therein; thus, ASIAVEST was constrained to apply for
leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable
action on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez &
Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the Philippines.
In Brown v. Brown, 41 the defendant was previously a resident of the
Philippines. Several days after a criminal action for concubinage was filed
against him, he abandoned the Philippines. Later, a proceeding quasi in rem
was instituted against him. Summons in the latter case was served on the
defendant's attorney-in-fact at the latter's address. The Court held that under
the facts of the case, it could not be said that the defendant was "still a
resident of the Philippines because he ha[d] escaped to his country and [was]
therefore an absentee in the Philippines." As such, he should have been
"summoned in the same manner as one who does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines."
Similarly, HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with
summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong.
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service
will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we
apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant
who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if HERAS be
considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he
left Hong Kong not only "temporarily" but "for good."
PALMA VS GALVEZ
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint,
praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the
PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent
Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.
On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of
summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the
amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent
thru her Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private
respondent was out of the country.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss6 on the ground that the RTC had
not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with
summons, since she was temporarily out of the country; that service of
summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed her Opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that a
substituted service of summons on private respondent's husband was valid
and binding on her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was
not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service, i.e., by personal
or substituted service.
Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid
service of summons on private respondent.
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the former.16 Private
respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines
at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is
governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. – When an action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines,
but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also
effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
he preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which
speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. ─ When the defendant does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section
6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and
for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any
order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the
service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the
country; thus, service of summons may be made only by publication.
We do not agree.
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses
the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of
summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer
on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a
resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following
modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in
section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the
country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of
court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
In Montalban v. Maximo, we held that substituted service of summons under
the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam
against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the
normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court
over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in
providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents
temporarily out of the Philippines.
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be
left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between
the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore,
assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way
give him notice thereof.23
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the
country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her
husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and,
therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's
behalf.
Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place where
the summons was served was her residence, though she was temporarily out
of the country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the
notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer
submitted by private respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's Return
by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his service
was engaged by respondent's husband. In his motion for another extension of
time to file answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a draft of the
answer had already been prepared, which would be submitted to private
respondent, who was in Ireland for her clarification and/or verification before
the Philippine Consulate there. These statements establish the fact that
private respondent had knowledge of the case filed against her, and that her
husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of
her counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel
entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification
and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even
filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private
respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over
her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer be
granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court

LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CA

In summary, it is our considered view, as we now so hereby express,
that —
(1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is
pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The
assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
(2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any
time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that
rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in
character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as
hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.
In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable,
given the nature of the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the
court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no
agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute
ordains that the court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to
proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the
court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the
proceeding shall be dismissed." The proceedings are summary in nature.
ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS VS LICAROS
For his part, on June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced Civil Case No. 91-1757, for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on
psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita was then
residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially
moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier
Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons
be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of
the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at
the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign
Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days
after publication to file a responsive pleading.

First Issue: Validity of the Service of Summons on Margarita

Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was
never validly served with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit
voluntarily to its jurisdiction.
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991,
Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982
together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition
affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized
extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the
relations between husband and wife.14
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not
found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service
in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under
any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the
court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with
leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of
summons to be effected on Margarita in the following manner:
x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time,
furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the corresponding
Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry
Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all
at the expense of petitioner.15 (Emphasis ours)
The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under
the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third
mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."
The Process Server’s Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons
addressed to Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were sent
by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt.
The Process Server’s certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence
of the facts as set out in the certificate.Before proceeding to declare the
marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated
in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that "compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements hav(e) (sic) been duly established." We hold that delivery to the
Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After
all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to
effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service
pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.
RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ORLANDO VILLA and
LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s
voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi
and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either
by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.7 (italics and
underscoring supplied)
In their first Motion to Lift the Order of Default8 dated January 30, 2006,
respondents alleged:
xxxx
4. In the case of respondents, there is no reason why they should not receive
the Orders of this Honorable Court since the subject of the case is their multi-
million real estate property and naturally they would not want to be declared
in default or lose the same outright without the benefit of a trial on the
merits;
5. It would be the height of injustice if the respondents is [sic] denied the
equal protection of the laws[;]
6. Respondents must be afforded "Due process of Law" as enshrined in the
New Constitution, which is a basic right of every Filipino, since they were not
furnished copies of pleadings by the plaintiff and the Order dated May 3, 2005;
RESPONDENTS DID NOT, IN SAID MOTION, ALLEGE THAT THEIR FILING
THEREOF WAS A SPECIAL APPEARANCE FOR THE PURPOSE ONLY TO QUESTION
THE JURISDICTION OVER THEIR PERSONS. CLEARLY, THEY HAD ACQUIESCED TO
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN D. SORONGON and VALENTIN FONG, Respondents.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause
of action only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test
is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on
the facts alleged and the prayer asked for.
In this case the complaint alleges that:
x x x at the time he served notice of assignment to defendant FBDC there was
only one notice of garnishment that the latter had received and there were
still sufficient residual amounts to pay that assigned by defendant Maxco to
the plaintiff. Subsequent notices of garnishment received by defendant FBDC
could not adversely affect the amounts already assigned to the plaintiff as
they are already his property, no longer that of defendant Maxco.16
From this statement alone, it is clear that a cause of action is present in the
complaint filed a quo. Respondent has specifically alleged that the undue
preference given to other creditors of Maxco over the retention money by
petitioner was to the prejudice of his rights.
Petitioner next asserts that the appellate court erred in not ruling that the
claim of respondent was extinguished by payment to the other garnishing
creditors of Maxco. The assignment of this as an error is misleading as this is
precisely one of the issues that need to be resolved in a full blown trial and
one of the reasons that respondent impleaded Maxco and petitioner in the
alternative.
The final error raised by petitioner that the other judgment creditors17 as well
as the trial court that issued the writ of garnishment and CIAC should have
been impleaded as defendants in the case as they were indispensable parties
is likewise weak. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for
the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is defined as
one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest.18 The other judgment creditors are entitled to the fruits of the final
judgments rendered in their favor. Their rights are distinct from the rights
acquired by the respondent over the portion of the retention money assigned
to the latter by Maxco. Their interests are in no way affected by any judgment
to be rendered in this case.1avvphi1
GR 157477 (NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA VS. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 157447,
APRIL 29, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)
Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue"23 and "the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action"24 are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two
different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between "the lack of legal
capacity to sue" from "the lack of personality to sue" is a fairly common
mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:25
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack
of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack
of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case,
or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand,
a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff
is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term
"lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general
disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack
of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the
latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest.
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on
the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as
a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or
does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the
character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded
on failure to state a cause of action.  The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be
confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the
fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas
the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the
complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. (NEMENCIO C.
EVANGELISTA VS. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 157447, APRIL 29, 2005, CHICO-
NAZARIO, J.)

NAVARRO VS MBTC
A perusal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780, which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177, tells that the complaint therein
was dismissed not on the ground of non-joinder of Belen as an indispensable
party, but rather on the ground of laches. Indeed, what is clear from the said
decision is that the dismissal of the case was due to Clarita’s unjustifiable
neglect to timely initiate the prosecution of her claim in court -- a conduct that
warranted the presumption that she, although entitled to assert a right, had
resolved to abandon or declined to assert the same.
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not
barred by the statute of limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches
from bringing such action at the first instance has already been settled by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the proceedings, the
Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of laches vis-à-vis
the imprescriptibility of Clarita’s cause of action because the said decision is
not the one on appeal before us. But more importantly, the Court takes notice
that the decision rendered in that case had already become final without any
motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom.
Thus, we are left with no other recourse than to uphold the immutability of the
said decision.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them.
Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing
litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck
down.
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine of laches is
embraced in the broad provision in Section 133 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, which enumerates the various grounds on which a motion to dismiss
may be based. Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language
of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words "abandoned" and
"otherwise extinguished" to the phrase "claim or demand set forth in the
plaintiff’s pleading" is broad enough to include within its ambit the defense of
bar by laches.
The principle of res judicata denotes that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in
their former suit.40 It obtains where a court of competent jurisdiction has
rendered a final judgment or order on the merits of the case, which operates
as an absolute bar against a subsequent action for the same cause.
Petitioners furthermore raise that the constitution of the mortgage was the
result of the fraudulent act committed by MBTC’s branch manager and Belen,
and for that reason the proceeds derived from it did not redound to the benefit
of their conjugal partnership.44 But because this issue is factual in nature and
hence, not appropriately cognizable in a Rule 45 petition where only questions
of law may generally be raised, the Court is left with no other option than to
decline to rule on the same. Anent the question raised by MBTC of whether
Clarita had timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals, we find no necessity to expound on the matter since in
view of the foregoing, the petitions at bar must be denied in any event.
EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) SPA VS OCAMPO
In the present case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service upon Ocampo
through her uncle, who was the caretaker of Ocampo's old family residence in
Tanauan, Batangas. The CA held that substituted service was improperly
resorted to. It found that since Ocampo' s "whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry x x x service may be effected only by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be served personally
on the defendant. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be
resorted to. When the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, the rules allow
summons to be served by substituted service. Substituted service is effected
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. 21
When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of
summons by publication.22 As an exception to the preferred mode of service,
service of summons by publication may only be resorted to when the
whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown, but cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means that there
must be prior resort to personal service under Section 7 and substituted
service under Section 8, and proof that these modes were ineffective before
summons by publication may be allowed.23 This mode also requires the
plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to effect service of summons
by publication, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his
behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application.
We agree with the CA that substituted service is improper under the facts of
this case. Substituted service presupposes that the place where the summons
is being served is the defendant's current residence or office/regular place of
business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor holds office in the
address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be resorted to.
BDO Remittance's reliance on Palma v. Galvez31 is misplaced for the simple
reason that the case involved service of summons to a person who is
temporarily out of the country. In this case, however, Ocampo's sojourn in Italy
cannot be classified as temporary considering that she already resides there,
albeit her precise address was not known. Modes of service of summons must
be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. The purpose of this is to afford the defendant an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.32 BDO Remittance is not
totally without recourse, as the rules allow summons by publication and
extraterritorial service.33 Unlike substituted service, however, these are
extraordinary modes which require leave of court.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of a
defendant's constitutional right to due process. As a rule, if a defendant has
not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person,
and a judgment rendered against him is void.34 Since the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo, the judgment rendered by the court
could not be considered binding upon her.
Consequently, it is no longer necessary to delve into the other issues raised in
the petition. These issues can be resolved by the trial court upon acquiring
jurisdiction over Ocampo and giving her an opportunity to be heard. It is in a
better position to receive and assess the evidence that may be presented by
Ocampo, including the decree dated June 29, 2010 issued by the High Court of
Turin, to the effect that her liability has been extinguished. While such claim
would tend to render the case moot, we refuse to consider the argument at
the first instance on two grounds: first, we are not a trier of facts; and second,
the document submitted has not been authenticated in accordance with the
rules on evidence.

DOLINA VS VALLECERA
This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an
unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a
temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father.
Filed ra 9262 case but just wanted to claim support for child.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the
entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation
between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the
alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and
whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already
water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This
omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of
the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand
in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be
resolved in an appropriate case.
REPUBLIC (PCGG) VS DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ ET AL
Dismissal of Civil Case No. 0014 for Petitioner's Failure to Appear
Petitioner asserts that, save for the absence of Falcon due to the termination
of her contract with the PCGG, she was diligent in attending the hearings and
in submitting the requirements of the Sandiganbayan. Likewise, Puertollano
was responsible in pursuing G.R. No. 154560. Thus, their inability to send
representatives for the Republic in the 1 October 2007 hearing can only be
appreciated as mere inadvertence and excusable negligence, which cannot
amount to failure to prosecute.
This Court rules in favor of the Republic.
As worded, Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the court
may dismiss a complaint in case there are no justifiable reasons that explain
the plaintiff's absence during the presentation of the evidence in chief.
Generally speaking, the use of "may" denotes its directory nature,20 especially
if used in remedial statutes that are known to be construed liberally. Thus, the
word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, operates to confer on
the court the discretion21 to decide between the dismissal of the case on
technicality vis-à-vis the progressive prosecution thereof.
Here, the Sandiganbayan appears to have limited itself to a rigid application of
technical rules without applying the real test explained above. The 1 October
2007 Order was bereft of any explanation alluding to the indifference and
irresponsibility of petitioner. The Order was also silent on any previous act of
petitioner that can be characterized as contumacious or slothful.
Firstly, based on the records, petitioner's counsels have actively participated
in the case for two decades. The Sandiganbayan has not made any remark
regarding the attendance of petitioner, save for this single instance. Secondly,
after the latter received the assailed Order, it duly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. These circumstances should have easily persuaded the
Sandiganbayan that the Republic intended to advance the ill-gotten wealth
case.
More importantly, respondents' imputation of lack of interest to prosecute on
the part of petitioner becomes a hyperbole in the face of its explanation, albeit
belated.
Respondents harp on the fact that since Falcon agreed to set the hearing on 1
October 2007 and Puertollano, being a counsel of record, may have also known
of the schedule, petitioner has no excuse to be absent. But even if we concede
to respondents' arguments, the most that they can say is that petitioner had
an instance of absence without an excuse. Juxtaposing this lapse against its
long history of actively prosecuting the case, it would be the height of rigidity
to require from petitioner complete attendance, at all times.
Respondents are correct in saying that courts have a right to dismiss a case
for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute. Still, we remind justices, judges and
litigants alike that rules "should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or
in isolated abstraction, but in light of surrounding circumstances and
attendant facts in order to afford justice to all."25
We underscore that there are specific rules that are liberally construed, and
among them is the Rules of Court. In fact, no less than Rule 1, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court echoes that the rationale behind this construction is to promote
the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan obviated the speedy
disposition of the case when it chose to dismiss the case spanning two
decades over a technicality and, in the same breath, rationalized its cavalier
attitude by saying that a complaint for ill-gotten wealth should be reinstituted
all over again.
Here, we find it incongruous to tip the balance of the scale in favor of a
technicality that would result in a complete restart of the 26-year-old civil case
back to square one. Surely, this Court cannot waste the progress of the civil
case from the institution of the complaint to the point of reaching the trial
stage. Not only would this stance dry up the resources of the government and
the private parties, but it would also compromise the preservation of the
evidence needed by them to move forward with their respective cases. Thus,
to prevent a miscarriage of justice in its truest sense, and considering the
exceptional and special history of Civil Case No. 0014, this Court applies a
liberal construction of the Rules of Court.
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORP VS EXPLORER MARITIME CO. LTD
On February 14, 2001, the trial court issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No.
95-73340 for failure of petitioner to prosecute for an unreasonable length of
time. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal on March 20, 2001, PCIC allegedly
realized that its Motion to Disclose was inadvertently filed with Branch 38 of
the RTC of Manila, where the similar case involving the vessel M/V "Taygetus"
(Civil Case No. 95-73341) was raffled to, and not with Branch 37, where the
present case (Civil Case No. 95-73340) was pending.
In affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-73340, the Court of Appeals held
that PCIC should have filed a motion to resolve the Motion to Disclose after a
reasonable time from its alleged erroneous filing. PCIC could have also
followed up the status of the case by making inquiries on the court’s action on
their motion, instead of just waiting for any resolution from the court for more
than three years.
The basis for the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 95-73340 is
Section 3, Rule 17 and Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which
respectively provide:
Section 3. Dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court.
HELD
In this case, there was no justifiable reason for petitioners' failure to file a
motion to set the case for pre-trial. Petitioners' stubborn insistence that the
case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is erroneous. Although petitioners state that
there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a liberal application of the
rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that there are
compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on
petitioners, and they have not adduced any such compelling reason.
The only explanation that the PCIC can offer for its omission is that it was
waiting for the resolution of its Motion to Disclose, which it allegedly filed with
another branch of the court. According to PCIC, it was premature for it to move
for the setting of the pre-trial conference before the resolution of the Motion
to Disclose.
We disagree. Respondent Explorer Maritime Co., Ltd., which was then referred
to as the "Unknown Owner of the vessel M/V ‘Explorer,’" had already been
properly impleaded pursuant to Section 14, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant – Whenever the identity or
name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner, heir,
devisee, or by such other designation as the case may require; when his
identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended
accordingly.
In the Amended Complaint, PCIC alleged that defendant "Unknown Owner of
the vessel M/V ‘Explorer’" is a foreign corporation whose identity or name or
office address are unknown to PCIC but is doing business in the Philippines
through its local agent, co-defendant Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc., a
domestic corporation.10 PCIC then added that both defendants may be served
with summons and other court processes in the address of Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc.,11 which was correctly done12 pursuant to Section 12, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant is
a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or
agents within the Philippines.
As all the parties have been properly impleaded, the resolution of the Motion
to Disclose was unnecessary for the purpose of setting the case for pre-trial.
ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC. and TREBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC vs. BANCO DE
ORO UNIVERSAL BANK
For failure of the petitioners to appear despite due notice at the scheduled
pre-trial conference on January 12, 2004, the case was ordered dismissed.15 In
their motion for reconsideration, petitioners’ counsel claimed that his failure
to attend was due to his accidental falling on the stairs of his house in the
morning of January 12, 2004, due to which he had to be attended by a "hilot".
In an Order dated May 7, 2004, the trial court reconsidered the dismissal and
scheduled anew the pre-trial conference on June 29, 2004, which date was
subsequently reset to August 3, 2004 for lack of proof of service upon
petitioners’ counsel.16
Since petitioners again failed to appear on the re-scheduled pre-trial
conference on August 3, 2004, the trial court issued the following Order:
When this case was called for pre-trial conference, only counsel for the
defendants appeared. There was no appearance on the part of the plaintiffs,
despite the fact that as early as June 29, 2004, they were notified for today’s
hearing.
The petition has no merit.
Under Section 3,24 Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
the failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply
with any order of the court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of the complaint
either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. The failure of a plaintiff to
prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period
of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to
obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his complaint; hence, the court is
authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its own motion or on
motion of the defendants. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive
because the plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal,
may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure.25 The burden to
show that there are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the
case unjustified is on the petitioners.26
Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, it
is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed, to
promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. On August 16, 2004,
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial
Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that:
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails
to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice
of pre-trial.
However, despite the trial court’s leniency and admonition, petitioners
continued to exhibit laxity and inattention in attending to their case. Assuming
domestic problems had beset petitioners’ counsel in the interregnum, with
greater reason should he make proper coordination with the trial court to
ensure his availability on the date to be chosen by the trial court for the long-
delayed conduct of a pre-trial conference. Petitioners themselves did nothing
to get the case moving for nine months and set the case anew for pre-trial
even as BDO was already seeking their judicial ejectment with the
implementation of the writ of possession issued by Branch 143. Such
circumstance also belies their pretense that the parties were then still
negotiating for a settlement. We have held that a party cannot blame his
counsel when he himself was guilty of neglect; and that the laws aid the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non
dormientibus jura subveniunt.29
JAZMIN L. ESPIRITU and PORFIRIO LAZARO, JR VS VLADIMIR G. LAZARO ET AL
On June 29, 2007, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the case.14 Citing Olave v.
Mistas,15 the CA stressed that it is plaintiff’s duty to promptly set the case for
pre-trial, and that failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the case.
According to the CA, petitioners should not have waited for a supplemental
answer or an order by the trial court and done nothing for more than 11
months from the receipt of the last pleading.
The petition has no merit.
In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with
utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the
relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court
dockets.19 Parallel to this is the defendants’ right to have a speedy
disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their
defenses from being impaired.
Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty
to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under
Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the said duty makes the case
susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of
time or failure to comply with the rules.
Respondents Lazaro filed the Cautionary Answer with Manifestation and
Motion to File a Supplemental/Amended Answer on July 19, 2002, a copy of
which was received by petitioners on August 5, 2002. Believing that the
pending motion had to be resolved first, petitioners waited for the court to act
on the motion to file a supplemental answer. Despite the lapse of almost one
year, petitioners kept on waiting, without doing anything to stir the court into
action.
It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even absent
any allegation and proof of the plaintiff’s lack of interest to prosecute the
action, or of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the rules.20 The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the
action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give
rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining the relief
prayed for.21
In this case, there was no justifiable reason for petitioners’ failure to file a
motion to set the case for pre-trial. Petitioners’ stubborn insistence that the
case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is erroneous. Although petitioners state that
there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a liberal application of the
rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that there are
compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on
petitioners, and they have not adduced any such compelling reason.