2013-2014 Cases

UPDATES OF CASES ON
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

2013
Prepared by 1B, 1C, 4B, and 4D
SY 2013-2014
OUTLINE
• Absence of Essential Elements of Marriage [Art. 4 Family Code (FC)]
• Void Ab Initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]
• Psychological Incapacity [Art. 36 FC]
• Bigamous Marriage; Absence or Disappearance of Spouse [Art. 41 FC]
• Collusion in Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Cases [Art. 48 FC]
• Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of Community Property [Art. 96
FC]
• Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime [Art. 99 FC]
• Conjugal Partnership Properties [Art. 117 FC]
• Charges against the Conjugal Partnership of Gains [Art. 122 FC]
• Suit between Family Members [Art. 151 FC]
• Constitution of Family Home [Art. 153 FC]
• Establishing Filiation of Legitimate Children [Art. 172 FC]
• Rights of Legitimate Children [Art. 174 FC]
• Support [Art. 194 FC]
• Demand and Payment of Support [Art. 203 FC]
• Designation of Parental Authority [Art. 213 FC]
• Guardianship
• Interlocutory Orders on Support pendente lite
• Succession
• Republic Act No. 7610
• Republic Act No. 9262
Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 1 1

Submitted to Atty. M. Sta. Maria SY 2015-2016
ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
[ART. 4 FC]
ABBAS v. ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
FACTS
The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony between Pakistani SyedAzhar Abbas and
Filipina Gloria Goo on January 9, 1993. The marriage contract stated that the couple was issued
a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. The copy of marriage license was
apparently presented to the solemnizing officer during the marriage ceremony.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar to secure a copy of the marriage
license in relation to a bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil Registrar
issued a certification declaring that the office has not issued a marriage license to Syed and
Gloria. It further verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and Gloria’s marriage
contract was issued to a different couple.
Syed filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria. He argued that there was
no actual marriage license issued to them prior to the supposed marriage in January 1993. Gloria
maintained, on the other hand, that a valid marriage license existed. She presented their marriage
contract, photographs and testimonies of people present during the marriage ceremony to negate
the certification from the municipal civil registrar. She countered that a certain “Qualin” secured
the marriage license for her and Syed. But she was not able to present a copy of the actual
marriage license.
RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona. CA ruled that there was a valid marriage license because the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value
ISSUE
WON a valid marriage license was issued to Syed and Gloria
HELD
No. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The
fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed, does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)."
This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE NECESSARIO

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
April 2, 2013
FACTS
Due to an administrative case filed on July 6, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
formed a judicial audit team that investigated on irregularities in the solemnization of marriages
in several MTCs and RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit team created went undercover with
another lawyer to see if the allegations were true that there were fixers or facilitators offering
package fees to parties who would like to apply for marriage. After their interviews and
investigation, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the following judges and court employees
generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:
1. Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages with questionable documents even where one
of the contracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit instead of a certificate of legal
capacity from his embassy; and under Art. 34 (one of the contracting parties was a minor
during cohabitation)
2. Judge Acosta – failed to make sure that solemnization fee has been paid and also
solemnized a marriage under Art. 34
3. Judge Rosales – failed to make sure the solemnization fee has been paid and solemnized
marriage between foreigner who only submitted an affidavit; also solemnized a marriage
without the marriage license
4. Judge Tormis – solemnized marriages with questionable documents; failed to make sure
solemnization fee has been paid; solemnized marriage between foreigner who only
submitted an affidavit; solemnized marriage with expired marriage license.
5. Helen Monggaya – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
– prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for giving false information for the purpose of
perpetrating an irregular marriage

6. Rhona Rodriguez – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 by participating in the collection of an
agreed upon additional fee to process the documents, and in one case, received 4,000
pesos to facilitate an irregular marriage
7. Desiderio Aranas and Rebecca Alesna – provided couples who are to be married under
Art. 34 with the required affidavit of cohabitation even if one or both of them were
minors during cohabitation
8. Celeste Retuya, Emma Valencia, Rebecca Alesna – violated Sec. 2 (b), Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct of Court Personnel because they received tips in assisting parties
engaged in the transactions with the Judiciary. Also, they effectively screened all
documents before submitting them to the judges.
9. However, OCA recommended the dismissal of complaints against Judge Econg, Corazon
Retuya and Marilou Cabañez for lack of merit.
10. Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person
ISSUE
WON the Judges and personnel of Cebu MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, gross neglect of duty, or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct
HELD
YES. Judges Necessario, Acosta, Romis and Rosales are guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect
of duty.
Neglect of duty, as defined in Rodrigo-Ebron vs. Adolfo, is the “failure to give one’s attention to
a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of
instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare”.
This is reflected in the evidence submitted: Documents showed evidences of tampering, absence
of receipts to show that solemnization fees were paid, documents submitted by the parties
showed irregularities, testimonies were made regarding solemnization of marriages without
licenses, among others. It was held that the “actions of the judges have raised a very
alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized” as, for instance,
absence of a marriage license would render a marriage void pursuant to Art. 4 of the
Family Code.
SC dismissed the argument of the respondents that it was beyond the scope of duty of the
solemnizing officer to check the validity of the marriage pursuant to People vs. Jansen.
Court finds respondents guilty, orders the dismissal of the judges and employees from service.
The SC through Navarro vs. Domagtoy, established that: “The judiciary should be composed
of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary layman”. Employees are also held liable as established in Villaceran
vs. Rosete, which said “Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the
dispensation of justice… these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurable affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary”.
VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES

[ART. 35 FC]
FUJIKI v. MARINA
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
FACTS
Fujiki a Japanese National married Marinay in the Philippines. Fujiki was not able to bring
Marinay to Japan and they eventually lost contact. Marinay remarried another Japanese national
but claimed she was being maltreated. She contacted Fujiki and they reestablished their
relationship. Fujiki sought judgement from the Japanese courts for nullity of Marinay’s second
marriage on the ground of bigamy which the Japan court granted.
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage). RTC dismissed petition based on Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). This
rule prescribes that the parties who can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are
limited to only the husband or wife.
ISSUES
WON rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage applies
WON the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
HELD
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. The court went
on to cite Juliano-Llave v. Republic wherein the court ruled that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The rule is clear that any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register may file a verified petition for cancellation or correction of entry. Fujiki has the
personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
CAPILI v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 189805
July 3, 2013
FACTS
Respondent charged herein petitioner Capili with the crime bigamy before the Pasig RTC.
Respondents claim that a second marriage was contracted before the first marriage was declared
void. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend alleging that there is currently a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo filed by Karla
Medina-Capili. The arraignment was therefore reset. Ultimately, RTC Antipolo declared the
second marriage void. Because the second marriage was ultimately declared to be void,
petitioner argues that there cannot be any crime of bigamy.
ISSUE
WON Petitioner is liable for bigamy, considering that the second marriage was declared to be
void?
HELD
YES. Petitioner is still guilty of bigamy despite declaration of second marriage as void. The
crime of bigamy exists so long as a second marriage was contracted during the subsistence
of a valid first marriage. This is true even if the second marriage was declared to be a
nullity.
According to the RPC, the elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
1. the offender has been legally married;
2. the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity
In the present case, all the elements are present. At the outset, it is therefore clear that the
Petitioner is liable for bigamy. Additionally, the second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.Even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as
the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated, there is still a
crime of bigamy. Jarillo v. People held that:

1. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated.
2. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 201061
July 3, 2013
FACTS
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged that he was married to Azucena Alegre (Azucena),
where they had three children. However, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally
Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the business owned by Benjamin’s family.
Sometime after Azucena left for America, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and
wife. They sign a purported marriage contract even though Sally knew of Benjamin’s marital
status. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and
Sally’s cohabitation produced two children.
When the relationship ended, Sally went to Canada bringing with her their 2 children. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court.
ISSUE
WON the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid
HELD
No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purported marriage, the marriage between
Benjamin and Azucena was still valid and subsisting. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena was duly
established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract.
Furthermore, the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid marriage license
because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that the Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did
not match the Marriage License series issued for the month of February 1982. The Civil
Registrar also said that it did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 (the alleged Marriage
License of Benjamin and Sally) to the couple. Such certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In
this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. Therefore,
it is clear that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-
existent.
MONTANEZ v. CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 181089
October 22, 2012
FACTS
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On January 24, 1983, while the first marriage has
not yet been judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a petition in 2001 to
annul her marriage with Socrates for psychological incapacity. The first marriage was declared
null and void on 2003
On May 14, 2004, Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, the petitioner and Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed a bigamy complaint against Lourse. Attached to the complaint was a marked
and signed affidavit of Silverio stating that Lourdes concealed her marriage to Socrates.
On July 24, 2007, Lourdes alleged that since her marriage was declared void ab initio in 2003,
there can be no bigamy in the absence of two valid marriage, is therefore wanting. RTC ruled
that bigamy was not committed by the respondent. The subsequent marriage was solemnized in
1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the existing law at that time did not
require judicial declaration of nullity as a condition to remarry. Due to the unsettled state of
Jurisprudence, RTC interpreted the law liberally in favor of the accused.
ISSUE
WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the on for
bigamy filed against her.
HELD
No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not justify the dismissal of the bigamy
case.
In Jarillo v. People, the Court ruled that when an accused contracted a subsequent marriage
without the prior marriage having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated. This is so because the first marriage which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and
subsisting.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
As long as there is no judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage is presumed to be
existing. Therefore, he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage can be prosecuted for bigamy. Yes, what makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
PEOPLE v. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566
July 17, 2013
FACTS
Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in 1980. Thirteen years thereafter, he married
Eleanor. However, his first marriage was declared void ab initio because it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Meanwhile, the second spouse died. Respondent was charged with
bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the information do not charge an offense of
bigamy since his first marriage was void ab initio; hence, there is an absence of an essential
element in the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of bigamy.
HELD
Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157649
November 12, 2012
FACTS
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza met in 1989, as next-door neighbors in the apartelle they were
renting while both were still in college. Arabelle became pregnant with their daughter, Allysa
Bianca. On her eighth month of pregnancy, they got married in civil rites in Pasay. Dominic had
to borrow funds from Arabelle’s best friend to settle the hospital bill for their baby’s delivery.

Thereafter, he remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished
college.
Arabelle took on various job’s to meet the family’s needs. Being the one with fixed income, she
shouldered all of the family’s expenses. On the other hand, Dominic sold encyclopedias after his
graduation, then worked as a car salesman for Toyota. Ironically, he spent his first sales
commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household
expenses and their child’s schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon.
Arabelle discovered Dominic’s illicit relationship with his co-employee. This then affected their
communication and sexual relationship. Dominic gave Arabelle a car as a birthday present, and
told Arabelle to issue him 2 blank checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance. She
later not only found out that he used the check for his personal needs, but also that he did not pay
for the car itself, forcing her to both rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car
and for her to bear the balance. Dominic was later fired from his employment after he ran away
with P164,000 belonging to his employer, and charged and arrested for violation of BP 22 and
estafa.
Dominic subsequently abandoned the conjugal abode. A month later, she refused his attempt at
reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. Arabelle then filed in the RTC a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on psychological
incapacity, which the OSG opposed.
Arabelle presented herself as a witness together with a psychiatrist Dr. Samson and Professor
Jimenez. Meanwhile, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. RTC found
that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability,
as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina), were attendant, establishing Dominic’s
psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and refused to be bound by the
findings and conclusions of Dr. Samson, which were concluded only on the basis of information
given by Arabelle herself. It held that the Arabelle's testimonies failed to establish Dominic’s
psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically
rooted, citing Republic v. Dagdag, Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, and Pesca v. Pesca.
Additionally, the husband's immaturity, sexual infidelity, and being a suspect for estafa and
violation of BP 22 do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
ISSUE
WON CA erred in its refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and evaluation and their
reliance on the Dagdag, Hernandez, and Pesca cases
HELD
NO. The findings of the expert were one-sided, given that Dominic himself was not subjected to
such, and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely
based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by the
petitioner and her witnesses (those whom the petitioner herself referred)
Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat10 10

CA’s reliance in Dagdag, Hernandez, and Pesca were not misplaced. Based on the doctrines
established in these 3 cases, it was not the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that
was crucial but rather the petitioner’s failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden the showing
the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage.
The totality of evidence of proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage
was the crucial consideration. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of
his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent
spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the
marriage.
REPUBLIC v. C.A. and QUINTOS

G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012
FACTS
Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, they were not blessed with a child
because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage. Eduardo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground. He alleged that
Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time
gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that she gambled away all
his remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the conjugal home with her
paramour.
As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuro-
psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina exhibited traits of
a borderline personality disorder that was no longer treatable. Catalina did not appear during trial
but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with different men and abandoning
the conjugal home.
ISSUE
WON Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.
HELD
No. Marriage remains valid. Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.
In Republic v CA(Molina), SC has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage based
on the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the
gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were
not sufficiently established.
Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to
do household chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo
presented no other witness to corroborate these allegations. Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied
on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim. The report was
vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.Even the testimony of Dr.
Reyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not explain the
root cause as to why Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions
or the gravity which constituted the disorder.
What was established was that Catalina was childish and immature. Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had
only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an expert assessment.
From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent
refusal to perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. It
must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that
made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
REPUBLIC v. ENCELAN
G.R. No. 170022
January 9, 2013
FACTS
In 1979, Cesar Encelan married Lolita, and they bore two children. In 1984, Cesar left for Saudi
for work and 2 years later, he found out that Lolita was having an illicit affair with Alvin. In
1991, Lolita left the conjugal home with the children and lived with Alvin. In 1995, Cesar filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
Lolita denies all allegations of infidelity and psychological incapacity. Lolita’s psychological
evaluation report stated that she:
• Was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness

• Had not been able to provide the expectations expected of her for a good land lasting
marital relationship, as she refused to go abroad with Cesar
• Was transferring from one job to the other, which depicts some interpersonal problems
with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions
ISSUE
WON psychological incapacity exists
HELD
NO. Psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling to constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations. Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity and abandonment are
merely grounds for legal separation.
Interpersonal problems with co-workers does not conclude that Lolita, at the time of the
marriage, was psychologically incapacitated. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship. Their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them
to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another.
BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; ABSENCE OR DISAPPEARANCE OF SPOUSE

[ART. 41 FC]
REPUBLIC v. NARCEDA
G.R. No. 182760
April 10, 2013
FACTS
Robert P. Narceda and Marina Narceda got married on July 22, 1987. In 1994, Marina went to
Singapore and never returned or communicated with respondent. The last the respondent has
heard about her is that she’s been living with a Singaporean husband.
For purposes of remarriage, on May 16, 2002 Robert filed a Petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted the petition and declared the
Presumptive death of Marina. Petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals on the
guround that respondent failed to conduct a diligent search of his wife and there was no well-
founded belief that Marina was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, being such the judgments herein shall be
immediately final and executory.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied
hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of Robert Narcedo.
HELD
Art. 41(2) states: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG availed
the wrong remedy when it filed its notice of appeal. The wrong filing did not toll the running of
the period for filing the Petition for Certiorari, which has lapsed. As a result, petitioner's

contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse
is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.
COLLUSION IN ANNULMENT OR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CASES
[ART. 48 FC]
CHAN v. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786
July 24, 2013
FACTS
Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her, claiming that Respondent Husband failed to care for and support his family
and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially
agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth
Claim Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. However, that same form carried a physician’s handwritten note that the Husband
suffered from “methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.”
Based on the physician’s handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requested for the issuance of a
subpoena ducestecumaddressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband’s medical
records. The Husband opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege.
The request of Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration on the
matter was also denied. She then filed a Petitioner for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but
this was also dismissed. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration with the CA was also
denied.
ISSUE
WON CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena
ducestecumcovering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician-patient communication
HELD
Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made the request before trial
started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena ducestecumcovering her husband’s hospital records. It is when those records are

produced for examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
Petitioner Wife’s motion for the issuance of the subpoena ducestecum also cannot be treated as a
motion for production of documents as a mode of discovery because Rule 27, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is only limited to disclosure of documents which are NOT PRIVILEGED.
Petitioner Wife claims that the documents are not privileged because it is the TESTIMONY of
the physician that is supposed to be privileged. This contention is wrong. Section 24(c) of Rule
130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined” regarding their (physician-patient) professional conversation. To allow the disclosure
during discovery procedure of the hospital records (including the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment given)
would, in effect, be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify
on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that her Husband already admitted in his answer that he had been
confined in a hospital. However, as already mentioned above, trial in the case had not yet begun.
Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot be said the Husband had already presented said Philhealth
claim form as evidence. The Husband was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
OWNERSHIP, ADMINISTRATION, ENJOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF

COMMUNITY PROPERTY
[ART. 96 FC]
REPUBLIC v. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 197315
October 10, 2012
FACTS
A parcel of land titled under the names of Spouses Ramoso was inherited by Angel Tinio from
her sister Trinidad Tinio-Ramoso. This was sold to the respondents. However, they were only
given the duplicate OCT. The Registry of Deeds declared the original OCT destroyed. Hence,
the respondents filed a petition for the reconstitution of the original OCT. A notice of hearing
was sent out to the Spouses Ramoso, the Domingos, Angel Tinio and the concerned agencies.
Republic of the Philippines contends that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Heirs
of Spouses Ramoso and a certain Gabaldon were not notified of the proceedings. Their names do
not appear in the duplicate OCT.
ISSUE
WON the heirs of the Spouses Ramoso and Gabaldon were required to be notified of the said
proceedings.

HELD
No, the source of the reconstitution falls under Section 2(a) of RA 26—the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. Hence, the procedure to be followed falls under Sec. 10 in relation to Sec. 9 of
RA 26 and not Sec. 12 and 13 thereof. Sec. 10 states that the notice shall be published in the
manner stated in Sec. 9, which prescribes that the notice shall specify among others: the names
of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title. Since the names of the
heirs and Gabaldon did not appear in the certificate of title, they were not required to be notified.
DISSOLUTION OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY REGIME

[ART. 99 FC]
HEIRS OF DR. INTAC v. CA

G.R. No. 173211
October 11, 2012
FACTS
Ireneo Mendoza was married to SalvacionFermin and had two children: respondents Josefina and
Martina (Salvacion is their stepmother). He was the owner of a property with TCT 001 situated
at Quezon City.
In 1977, Ireneo, with the consent of Salvacion, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property
in favor of Angelina and her husband, Mario (Spouses Intac). TCT 002 was issued in favor of
spouses Intac. Despite the sale, Ireneo and his family continued staying in the premises and
paying its realty taxes.
After Ireneo died intestate in 1982, his widow and respondents remained in the premises. After
Salvacion died, respondents still remained there. They are in the premises up to present time,
paying real estate taxes thereon, leasing out portions of the property, and collecting the rentals.
Meanwhile, however, in 1994, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of
TCT against spouses Intac. It prayed not only for the cancellation of the title, but also for its
reconveyanceon the ground that the sale is simulated, therefore, void. Pending litigation, Mario
died and was substituted by his wife and their children (petitioners).
Respondents alleged that when spouses Intac borrowed the title of the property from Ireneo, it
was to be used as collateral for a loan from a financing institution. Respondents objected to the
request but Ireneo tried to appease them, telling them not to worry because Angelina would not
abuse the situation as he took care of her for a very long time. Lastly, respondents were paying
the real estate taxes over said property.
Spouses Intac countered, among others, that the subject property had been transferred based on a
valid deed and for a valuable consideration and that the action to annul the deed had already
prescribed.

On April 30, 2002, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and against Spouses Intac, ordering
that the Deed of Absolute Sale is an equitable mortgage; and that the RD was to cancel TCT 002
and, in lieu thereof, issue a new TCT in the name of Ireneo.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC erred in first
declaring the deed of absolute sale as null and void and then interpreting it to be an equitable
mortgage. The CA believed that Ireneo agreed to have the title transferred in the name of spouses
Intac to enable them to facilitate the processing of the mortgage and to obtain a loan. This was
the exact reason why the deed of absolute sale was executed.
The nephew of Ireneo testified that the latter never intended to sell the subject property to the
Spouses Intac and that the deed of sale was executed to enable them to borrow from a bank.
The CA further observed that the conduct of spouses Intac belied their claim of ownership
because when the deed of absolute sale was executed, spouses Intac never asserted ownership,
either by collecting rents, by informing respondents of their ownership or by demanding
possession.
ISSUE
WON the sale is null and void on the ground of absence of consideration?
HELD
YES. A contract without consideration is void. In this case, the contract of sale is simulated,
and is void under Art. 1346.
A contract is absolutely simulated if there is a colorable contract but absent substance

because the parties never intended to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is the absence of desire or intent to produce the legal effect of a contract or in
any way to alter the juridical situation of the parties.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of
the parties. If the words of a contract conflict the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall
prevail.
Intention is determined by the following:

• express terms of their agreement;
• contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
The following contemporaneous and subsequent acts of both parties in this case, point to the fact
that the intention of Ireneo was just to lend the title to the spouses Intac:
• testimony that Ireneo personally told him he was going to execute a document of sale
because spouses Intac needed to borrow the title to the property and use it as collateral for
their loan application .

• testimony of Angeline that she and her husband mortgaged the property to finance the
construction of a small hospital and that Ireneo offered the property as he was in deep
financial need.
• Ireneo and family continued to be in physical possession after the sale and up to present.
• Ireneo and family even went as far as leasing the same and collecting rentals.
• complete absence of any attempt on the part of a vendee to assert his right of dominion
over the property.
• spouses Intac failed to show that they had been paying the real estate taxes of the subject
property.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES

[ART. 117 FC]
BEUMER v. AMORES
G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012
FACTS
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was married on March 29, 1980. After
several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of
the former’s psychological incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership and prayed for the distribution of several properties claimed to have been
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.
Amores averred that, with the exception of their 2 residential houses, she and petitioner did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, and that she was able to acquire 4 other
lots out of her personal funds and 2 others by way of inheritance.On the other hand, Beumer
testified that while the 4 other lots were registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit.
ISSUE
WON Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the purchase of the real properties
subject to the dissolution proceedings?
HELD
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered
the subject properties in the latter’s name.

The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever
over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.
This case provides the exception to Art. 117, which provides that, “the following are conjugal
partnership properties:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses; XXX”
CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

[ART. 122 FC]
PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITO, SR.

G.R. No. 164201
December 10, 2012
FACTS
The prosecution accused petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder
before RTC Surigao. The RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the charge
for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of death.The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the
heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of
evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of
temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim to
be paid solidarily by them.
The decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution by the
heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in
the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.

Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued to which petitioner
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash, claiming that the levied properties were
conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE
WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
HELD
Yes, the conjugal properties may be levied and executed in light of the disputed fact that
MeleciaPana has no exclusive properties.
Further, however, the Supreme Court ordered that before the conjugal properties may be levied
and executed the RTC Surigao shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the
conjugal properties of spouses Efren and MeleciaPana for the satisfaction of the indemnities
imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in the criminal cases, the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Article 122 of the FC:”… However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the
support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;
but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.” (Emphasis supplied)
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities “may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered.”
No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122
states that “at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.”
SUIT BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS

[ART. 151 FC]
PEOPLE v. VENTURINA
G.R. No. 183097
September 12, 2012

FACTS
The accused, Venturina assails the decision of the CA in finding him guilty for two counts of
rape committed against his daughter, AAA.
The names of the victim and the relatives mentioned in the case are not identified pursuant to
RA No. 7610, An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And For Other Purposes which states that the identity
of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as
those of her immediate family or household members shall be withheld.
All the arguments raised by the appellant challenges the credibility of AAA. At the center of
appellant’s defense of denial is his assertion that the accusation against him was a mere
concoction. According to him, “AAA” filed the case because she resented being disciplined by
him.
ISSUE
WON the Venturina is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape against his
daughter AAA
HELD
YES. The SC believes that believe that it was appellant instead who concocted his defense. Not
even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own father to the wall as the fall
guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true.
As has been repeatedly ruled, “[n]o young girl x x x would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a
crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination, then subject herself
to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire
to seek justice.” Thus, taking into consideration that the parties are close blood relatives,
“AAA’s” testimony pointing to her father as the person who raped her must stand.
The trial court was thus correct in imposing the penalty of death on appellant. However, since the
death penalty for heinous crimes has been abolished by Republic Act No. 934619 the appellate
court correctly modified the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty by reducing it to
reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for parole.
To justify the imposition of death penalty, however, it is required that the special qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant be properly alleged
in the information and duly proved during the trial. All these requirements were duly established
in these cases. With respect to her relationship to appellant, it was likewise specifically alleged in
the Informations that appellant is “AAA’s” father. During trial, appellant categorically admitted
that “AAA” is his daughter.

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
[ART. 122 FC]
SPS. FORTALEZA v. SPS. LAPITAN

G.R. No. 178288
August 15, 2012
FACTS
The court issued a judgment against Sps. Fortaleza which resulted to the execution of their
conjugal house.
ISSUE
WON he family home can be executed.
HELD
A family home is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code,
provided such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of
the property at public auction. Failure to do so estopps the party from later claiming the
exemption
In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time
after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.
ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

[ART. 172 FC]
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL v. HARPER

G.R. No. 189998
August 29, 2012
FACTS
The alleged widow and the son of the Christian Harpers death in Shangrilla premises wants to
prove in court filiation with the deceased for standing in court. Documents presented were Birth
Certificates of father and son and Marriage Certificate.
ISSUE
W/N the Plaintiffs-Appellees were able to prove with competent evidence the affirmative
allegations in the complain that they are the widow and son of Mr. Christian Harper?
HELD
In this case, the respondents were able to present the mentioned documents, all of which were
presumably regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary
evidence sufficed to competently establish the relationship and filiation under the standards of
our Rules of Court.

DE BELEN v. TABU
G.R. No. 188417
September 24, 2012
FACTS
1. The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 square meter lot situated in
Mariwalo, Tarlac, which was a portion of a property registered in the name of the
late Faustina Maslum.
2. Faustina died without any children and left a holographic will, which was not
probated, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces.
3. One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana who allegedly executed a
Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 square meter
share of the land to LaureanoCabalu.
4. Meanwhile, a Deed of Extra-judicial Succession with Partition was executed by
the legitimate heirs of Faustina. The said deed imparted 9,000 sqm. of land to
Domingo where he sold 4,500 sqm to his nephew EleazarTabamo and the rest of
it was registered under his name.
5. Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent
Renato Tabu wherein the latter subdivided it into two.
6. Laxamanatogether with the heirs of Domingo filed an unlawful detainer action
against Cabalu et. al. against all persons claiming rights under them. The heirs
claimed that the defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their
late father, Domingo, but, when asked to vacate the property, they refused to do
so.
ISSUE
WON the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 sqm property executed
by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu is valid
HELD
No.
1. The sale cannot be deemed valid because, at it was made, Domingo was not yet
the owner of the property.
2. Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future
inheritance as void.
3. In this case, the original owner was Faustina, who during her lifetime, had
executed a will. In the said will, the name of Benjamin, father of Domingo,
appeared as one of the heirs.
4. However, when the deed was executed, Faustina’s will was not yet probated and
the property still formed part of the inheritance of Domingo’s father from
Faustina’s estate.
5. Therefore, Domingo’s status as an heir of Faustina by right of representation
being undisputed, the said property served as the future inheritance of Domingo
from Faustina.

PERLA v. BARING
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012
FACTS
1. Mirasol Baring and her minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio Perla.
2. Petitioners allege that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses
for 2 years and as a result, Randy was born. Antonio subsequently abandoned
them to become a seaman.
3. However, Antonio, who had a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy.
4. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and
Baptismal Certificate and claimed that Antonio supplied the information in the
said certificates. Randy, on his part, claimed that he knew Antonio to be his
father, calling Antonio “Papa” during their first meeting. Also, it was alleged that
Randy lived with Aunt Lelita (Antonio’s relative) for one week who treated
Randy as a relative.
5. On the other hand, Antonio admitted to having sexual intercourse with Mirasol,
but denied having supplied the information in the certificates.
ISSUE
WON Randy is entitled to support from Antonio.
HELD
No.
1. The lower courts failed to establish the illegitimate filiation between Randy and
Antonio since they based their decisions on the certificates of Live Birth and
Baptism, despite the absence of Antonio’s signature on the said documents.
2. In Cabatania v. CA, it was held that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there
is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate.
3. Randy’s testimony of having met his father for the first time and his living with
Aunt Lelita cannot be considered as indications of open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child under Article 172 and 174 of the
Family Code.
4. Lastly, nothing from Mirasol’s testimonies sufficiently prove that she had sexual
intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or 9 months
before the birth of Randy.
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (ART. 174 FC)
ABRIGO v. FLORES
G.R. No. 160786
June 17, 2013
FACTS
A parcel of land was inherited by siblings Francisco and Gaudencia from their deceased parents.
A partition of the land was agreed upon, whereby the western portion shall pertain to Francisco
and his heirs, while the eastern part shall pertain to Gaudencia. However, no actual partition
occurred and heirs of both parties enjoyed and possessed the property as co-owners. During this
time, the heirs of Gaudencia made improvements on the property, which encroached upon the
western portion of the lot.
Eventually, the heirs of Francisco decided to partition the property. The Court ruled for the
partition in accordance with the original agreement and ordered the removal/ demolition of the
improvements encroaching upon the western part of the property.
Heirs of Gaudencia prayed to set aside the order of demolition on the basis of a supervening
event. They alleged that one of the heirs of Franciso- Jimmy Flores, sold his ¼ share of the
western portion of the lot, thereby making them co-owners thereof.
ISSUE
WON the sale by a legitimate heir of his share in the estate qualifies as a supervening event that
will justify setting aside the order of demolition or execution of the partition.
HELD
NO.
A supervening event in order to qualify as exception to the execution as a matter of right of a

final and immutable judgment rule must directly affect matters litigated upon and substantially
alter the rights and relationships of the parties to render the execution unjust. In this case, even
on the assumption that the sale of Jimmy Flores’ share is true, the same does not alter or modify
the judgment on the property at issue. In addition, the appellate court found the whole sale
transaction suspicious and not supported by evidence. The execution has dragged on for 17
years now since order of implementation was given, it is high for the Court to put a stop to
further delays to finally enable the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco to exercise
their rights as legitimate heirs and as winning parties to a final judgment.
SUPPORT (ART. 194 FC)
LIM LUA v. LUA

G.R. No. 175279-80
June 5, 2013
FACTS
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support pendent lite amounting to P500,000.

Respondent on the other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give as much as
75,000 as support.
RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month is sufficient, notwithstanding the
separate medical support for susan when the need arises. However this amount was eventually
reduced by the CA, citing the fact that there was no evidence adduced to show the alleged
millions of income of respondent, and that based on the evidence presented the proper amount to
paid should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any party does it became final and executory.
Issues once again arised, when respondent in complying with its obligation paid only the amount
of P162,651.90 to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he
deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by
the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),
totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum
of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings). On the other hand petitioner
contends that respondent shouldn’t be allowed the deductions he made arguing that under Article
194, support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family,
that in this case the cars and credit card charges are not part of support.
Once again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of execution, however upon appeal
such was decision was reversed and the CA allowed the deductions made by respondent. Hence
the case at bar.
ISSUE
WON the deductions made by respondent including the two automobile and credit card charges
are valid deductions and considered as advances.
HELD
The Supreme Court reversed the CA, and stated that CA should not have allowed all the
expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite.
The amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Here, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for
food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s
scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through
credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed,
as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and
household expenses.
DEMAND AND PAYMENT OF SUPPORT (ART. 203 FC)
GOTARDO v. BULING
G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012
FACTS
Gotardo and Buling were lovers. During their relationship, they had several intimate sexual
encounters resulting to her pregnancy. When told of the pregnancy, he made plans to marry her
but subsequently backed out. Eventually, she gave birth to a son. When he did not show up and
failed to provide support for the child, she sent a demand letter demanding recognition and
support for the child. This was ignored. Hence, she filed for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite. He denies the imputed paternity. However during trial, it was established that she
only had one boyfriend to whom she had sexual relations. The allegation that she had previous
relationships with other men remain unsubstantiated.
ISSUE
WON the court may order Gotardo to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son.
HELD
Yes. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase
of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
DESIGNATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (ART. 213 FC)
BECKETT v. SARMIENTO
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326
January 30, 2013
FACTS
Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to Elseta, a Filipino citizen. Said
marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr. The couple were subsequently divorced and by virtue
of a compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was granted to Geoffrey who took
his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly Christmas visits here. In one of the
Christmas visits, Geoffrey consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the
holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011. However, on the said date, Eltesa did

not return Geoffrey Jr., hence, this prompted Geoffrey to file a petition for violation of RA 7610
and prayer for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus.
Geoffrey relates that, during the conference on the application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr.,
then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying,
not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite
Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directing Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr.
to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey did not materialize.
Hence Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of the Order. But instead of enforcing said
order, Judge Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr.
Geoffrey’s main contention is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional custody to
Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement.
ISSUE
WON Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it granted provisional
custody over the minor child to the mother despite a previously approved compromise agreement
and order granting custody to the father.
HELD
NO.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The
matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,“is not permanent and unalterable
[and] can always be re-examined and adjusted.” And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in
Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as “permanent and unbending,”
the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such
that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest.
Under the Family Code, case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be turned
over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As such, he was very much capable of
deciding, based on his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.
GUARDIANSHIP
ABAD v. BIASON
G.R. No. 191993
December 5, 2012
FACTS
Abad filed for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura, his aunt. Biason opposed
the appointment of Abad prayed to be appointed guardian instead since he was previously
granted power of attorney to manage Maura’s properties. RTC appointed Biason as guardian.
Abad filed a motion and pointed out that Maura chose him to be her guardian. The RTC denied
the motion. Maura’s choice was not given decisive weight because her advanced age. Abad
appealed to the CA. Eduardo then appealed to the SC. During pendency of the case Biason
passed away. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition and terminate the guardianship of
Biason.
ISSUE
WON Guardianship is terminated upon death.
HELD
YES. The case has become moot and academic as there is no longer a justiciable controversy. It
is a well established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by
death. There is no longer any juridical tie between Maura Abad and Leonardo Biason, rendering
it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ON SUPPORT
CALDERON, MA. CARMINIA v. ROXAS, JOSE ANTONIO and CA

G.R. No. 185595
January 9, 2013
FACTS
Complaint of declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Calderon against husband Roxas.
Trial court granted support pendente lite, ordering Roxas to support minor children. Upon
motion, the support was reduced. The order to reduce support was appealed from, but was denied
by CA
.
ISSUE
Whether orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final
HELD
Orders on matters of support pendente lite are interlocutory. It decides an incidental matter but is
not a final decision on the main issue of the case. The proper remedy is a special civil action, not
an appeal of the interlocutory order. Thus, CA properly dismissed appeal.
SUCCESSION
NERI v. UY
G.R. No. 194366
October 10, 2012
FACTS
Anunciacion had 7 children, 2 from her first marriage with Gonzalo and 5 from her second
marriage with Enrique. Anunciacion and Enrique acquired several homestead properties.
Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his capacity and guardian of their minor children,
executed an extra-judicial settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating to themselves the
properties. Thereafter, it was sold to the spouses Hadji and Julpha Uy for P80,000. The children
of Enrique filed an annulment of sale on the ground that it was sold within the prohibited period.
RTC ordered the annulment of said deed.
RTC said that even though the sale was beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, Anunciacion’s
children from her first marriage were deprived of their hereditary rights and Enrique had no
authority to sell the shares of their minor children. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and declared
the extrajudicial settlement and subsequent sale as valid and binding. The minors were deemed
to have ratified the sale when they did not question the same sale upon reaching the age of
majority.
ISSUES
WON CA erred in upholding the validity of extra-judicial settlement of the estate with absolute
deed of sale as far as the shares of the 2 children from the first marriage of Anunciacion were
concerned.
WON CA erred in not nullifying or annulling the extra-judicial settlement of the estate with
absolute deed of sale with respect to the shares of the minor children, depriving them of their
inheritance.
HELD
In the execution of the extra-judicial settlement of the estate with absolute sale, all the heirs of
the Anunciacion should have participated. Since the children from the first marriage were
admittedly excluded, the settlement is invalid and not binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity. Although the settlement of the estate was invalid, the sale of the subject properties
made by Enrique and his children (excluding the minor ones), in favor of the respondents are
valid but only up to the extent of their respective proportionate shares. As guardians of the minor
children, Enrique had no power of alienation with respect to their shares to the estate of their
mother, Anunciacion. He only had powers of administration. Administration includes all acts of
preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing.
SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053
October 10, 2012
FACTS
Upon the death of Cristina Suntay, two of her grandchildren (Isabel, a legitimate grandchild, and
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild) both sought for the issuance of Letters of Administration
in their favor with respect to the settlement of the estate of Cristina. The trial court granted the
same in favor of Emilio III.
The appellate court reversed the trial court and appointed Isabel as the administratrix of the
estate. On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Isabel and Emilio III were both appointed

to the position, the two of them being co-administrators. Isabel filed a Motion for reconsideration
of this decision.
ISSUE
WON the Letters of Administration should be issued to both of them, or to only one of them.
HELD
Isabel should be appointed as the sole administratrix of the estate. In the appointment of an
administrator, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in the estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. Thus, Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for an
order of preference to be followed with respect to whom letters of administration shall be
granted. This notwithstanding, the court in certain circumstances has upheld the appointment of
co-administrators.
In the case at bar, the appointment of both Isabel and Emilio III as co-administrators will not
redound to the benefit of the estate, for the two have a deep aversion for each other. Although the
two of them have an interest in the estate, being grandchildren of Cristina, the mere
demonstration of such an interest does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. The seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously
as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying the
settlement thereof. Moreover, it was shown that Emilio III was remiss in his duties as
administrator. He failed to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with
the end in view of distribution to the heirs.
DE FIGURACION v. FIGURACION-GERILLA
G.R. No. 151334
February 13, 2013
FACTS
Leandro Figuracion died intestate, leaving behind two parcels of land. Petitioner sought an
extrajudicial settlement of Leandro’s estate before prior settlement had been made.
ISSUE
WON there should be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate before partition?
HELD
YES. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses
chargeable to the estate.
CASILANG v. CASILANG-DIZON
G.R. No. 180269
February 20, 2013

FACTS
Libonio Casilang died intestate. He has 8 children. The children made a verbal partition on his
estates. Rosario (daughter of his son Ireneo) sued Jose (son of Liborio) for unlawful detainer on
the lot, where Jose is residing, claiming that her father owns the lot based on a tax declarations.
ISSUE
WON the oral partition was valid.
HELD
Yes, Jose is the rightful owner. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition
is valid and enforceable at law, equity will be considered in proper cases, where it has been
consummated by taking possession and in exercise of ownership by the parties with respect to
their portions. The equity will confirm such partition and decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 is well borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the
claimed verbal partition with his siblings. Actual possession and exercise of dominion are
considered strong proof of an oral partition which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.
GALVEZ v. CA and MONTANO

G.R. No. 157445
April 3, 2013
FACTS
Sps. Eustacio and Segundina are owners of land in Leyte. When they separated, Eustacio sold the
property to their daughter Jovita without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. Jovita
mortgagd property to PNB.
PNB foreclosed property and sold property to Sps. Montaño. They tried to get actual possession
thereof but Segundina refused to vacate which led Montaños to sue for recovery of ownership
and possession and damages in the MTC.
A petition for review was also filed but the court dismissed on the ground that no copies of
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations were
attached as annexes in violation of Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE
W/N failure to attach the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition is a ground for outright dismissal of a petition for review
HELD
No. Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings
and portions of the records to the petition:

First, only pleadings and parts of case records which are relevant and pertinent must accompany
it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material
allegations in the petition.
Second, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another
document already attached to the petition even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the
petition.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve
the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
The Court considers the attachments (i.e. certified true copies of the MTC and RTC Decisions
and Order) already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors even without the
pleadings and other portions of the records. To still deny due course despite the MTC decision
having substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit of the rule to give
sufficient information to the CA.
Since her petition focused only on questions of law (effects of the lack of her consent, ant of
consideration, and the conduct of the foreclosure sale), it was plain that she was not assailing the
propriety of the findings of fact but only the conclusions reached after their appreciation of the
facts. In dealing with the questions of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of
the MTC and the RTC.
HEIRS OF MESINA v. HEIRS OF FIAN

G.R. No. 201815
April 8, 2013
FACTS
The Heirs of Fian refused to acknowledge the sale of 2 parcels of land made by Spouses Fian to
Spouses Mesina and are claiming ownership over the same. Petitioners filed an action for
quieting of title entitled: Heirs of Sps. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v. Heirs of Fian,
represented by Theresa Fian Yray.
The representative of the Heirs of Fian allege that the complaint has no cause of action because it
violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. She contends that the “Heirs of
Mesina” and the “Heirs of Fian” could not be considered as juridical persons or entities
authorized by law to file a civil action. She maintains that all the heirs should be individually
named in the complaint and since this was not complied with, she prays for the dismissal of the
action.
ISSUE
WON the failure to implead the other heirs in the complaint warrants the dismissal of the action.

HELD
No, the issue is about a non-joinder of an indispensable party, not a failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss
the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable.
CATEDRILLA v. LAURON
G.R. No. 179011
April 15, 2013
FACTS
Petitioner Rey is a co-owner, along with other heirs, of a parcel of land. He acquired the land via
succession from his mother. Rey, as a co-owner, filed with the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment
against herein respondents Lauron alleging that through the tolerance of Rey’s co-owners, they
constructed a building in a portion of the land and occupied the same. Demands from the heirs to
vacate the premises were unavailing. One of the defenses raised by the Laurons is that the
complaint should be dismissed because it did not include, as indispensable parties, Rey’s co-
heirs who are co-owners of the land in dispute.
The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Rey, while the CA, reasoning that the co-owners (co-heirs)
are indispensable parties, reversed the RTC’s Decision and dismissed the complaint for
ejectment.
ISSUE
WON co-owners (co-heirs) should be included as indispensable parties in a complaint for
ejectment
HELD
No.
A co-owner (co-heir) can file an action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners as long
as he does not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot. This is because based on Article 487
of the Civil Code, any co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all
the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all.
Here, Rey filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering possession of the land, which would
redound to the benefit of the co-owners. He did not file the action to claim possession of the land
for himself. He was acting on behalf of his co-owners, who were also his co-heirs when his
mother died. Hence, there was no need to implead his co-owners as indispensable parties for the
action to prosper.

GARCIA v. DE CAPARAS
G.R. No. 180843
April 17, 2013
FACTS
Heirs of Makapugay along with heirs of Eugenio filed a complaint with the PARAD of Bulacan
for the nullification of the leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against
Dominga (wife of one of the deceased heirs of Eugenio named Pedro) They are praying that the
1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract between Pedro and Amanda be nullified and that they be
recognized as co-lessees, be allowed to cultivate the land as agreed upon.
Dominga then claimed that petitioners never assisted in the farming of the land and that they
have violated Sec. 38 of RA 3844 because their cause of action has prescribed. Dominga claims
that she has succeeded Pedro’s rights as lessee by operation of law and prays that the complaint
be dismissed.
ISSUE
WON Garcia and Salamat can claim to be co-lessees of the land upon Pedro’s death
HELD
No. The administrator, has the duty to make inquiries and choose within one month from
Eugenio’s death, who would succeed as agricultural lessee pursuant to Sec. 9 of RA 3844
First, there was no proof of the existence of the agreement between Garcia and Salamat with
Pedro that they would have alternate turns in cultivating the land. Though there was a verbal
declaration to Amanda, there was no written memorandum put forward.
Also, the fact that they only brought it 17 years after Pedro was installed, SC upheld PARAD
decision that petitioners slept on their rights and are thus precluded from questioning the
leasehold contract.
The 1996 agreement between Amanda and petitioners are also invalid as it is grounded on
Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission and was entered into without obtaining Dominga’s
consent resulting to undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-in-interest.
Under Sec. 7 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to security of tenure and any modification of the
lease agreement must be done with the consent of both parties (Sec. 16).
CALINGASAN v. RIVERA
G.R. No. 171555
April 17, 2013
FACTS
Husband and wife acquired several parcels of land during their marriage. Wife died, leaving
husband and their 2 children.

Husband waived his rights to the property in favor of his daughters upon the execution of an
extrajudicial settlement of his wife's share in the conjugal estate. Husband reserved the usufruct
to himself. New TCTs were issued in the names of the daughters with the husband's usufructuary
rights annotated at the back of the title.
After 10 years, husband files a forcible entry case against daughter and the daughter's lessee.
Pending the resolution of the case, husband died.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of husband rendered the forcible entry case moot and academic
HELD
A recovery of possession of real property is a real action, hence, it cannot be extinguished by the
death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is
enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased.
NHA v. BAELLO
G.R. No. 200858
August 7, 2013
FACTS
In 1951, Land Registration awarded to Pedro Baello and Nicanora Baello Rodriguez the
registration of land in Caloocan. This land was subsequently exproprited by the NHA during the
Martial Law Period. After the People Power Revolution, Heirs of Baello executed an
extrajudicial partition of Baello's estate including the Baello property, to which NHA opposed.
But court ruled in favor of the heirs.
NHA filed a complaint for nullity of the the O.C.T. During the pendency of the case for nullity,
Baello heirs filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against NHA.
RTC ruled in favor of Baello heirs. It ruled for: (1) the dismissal of the expropriation and
declaration of nullity left NHA with no right to hold possession of Baellos' property. (2)
entitlement of the heirs to compensation equal to the fair rental value of the property as well as
moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the C.A. committed a reversible error in finding that the NHA was a builder or
possessor in bad faith
(2) Whether the C.A. committed a reversible error in awarding damages to respondents
HELD
In determining whether a builder acted in bad faith the rule in Art. 526 of the NCC shall apply.
NHA not only acted in bad faith but violated the Constitution for taking possession of the
property without just compensation and for waiting 14 years before expropriating it. The Dagat-
Dagatan project may have a laudable purpose but the manner of taking it was scary, it was
seizure by the barrel of a gun.
Having established that the NHA acted in bad faith, the C.A. did not err in sustaining the award
of damages and attorney's fees to respondents. It was also not entitled to reimbursement for the
improvement it introduced to the cproperty because of said bad faith (Art. 449).
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610
PEOPLE v. CABALLO
G.R. No. 198732
June 10, 2013
FACTS
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old. The two became sweethearts. Sometime
in 1998, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more incidents of sexual congress.
ISSUE
WON Caballo is guilty of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
HELD
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b)
under coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Consent is not material in cases
under RA 7610.
Moreover, the abuse is punishable whether habitual or not. In the case, Caballo’s actuations of
assuring AAA of his love and promise to marry may be classified as “coercion” and “influence’’
within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. These were meant to influence AAA to
set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, in which he succeeded.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262
DABALOS v. RTC
G.R. No. 193960
January 7, 2013
FACTS
Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City.
The Information indicated that Dabalos was the boyfriend of the complainant. The boyfriend
allegedly used personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s
back, shoulder and left eye. Dabalos averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13,
2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with the complainant; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable. In her affidavit, the complainant admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident.
ISSUE
WON RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused.
HELD
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship.

Case List
Absence of Essential Elements of Marriage [Art. 4 Family Code (FC)]
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, Jan. 30, 2013)
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario (A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691,
April 2, 2013)
Void Ab Initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]
Montañez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)
Fujiki v. Marina (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26, 2013)
Capili v. People (G.R. No. 189805, Jul. 3, 2013)
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan ( G.R. No. 201061, Jul. 3, 2013)
People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)
Psychological Incapacity [Art. 36 FC]
Mendoza v. Republic (G.R. No. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012)
Republic v. C.A. and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594, Nov. 12, 2012)
Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)
Bigamous Marriage; Absence or Disappearance of Spouse [Art. 41 FC]
Republic v. Narceda (G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)
Collusion in Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Cases [Art. 48 FC]
Chan v. Chan (G.R. No. 179786, Jul. 24, 2013)
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of Community Property [Art.
96 FC]
Republic v. Domingo (G.R. No. 197315, Oct. 10, 2012)
Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime [Art. 99 FC]
Heris of Dr. Intac v. CA (G.R. No. 173211, Oct. 11, 2012)
Conjugal Partnership Properties [Art. 117 FC]
Beumer v. Amores (G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)
Charges against the Conjugal Partnership of Gains [Art. 122 FC]
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. (G.R. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
Suit between Family Members [Art. 151 FC]
People v. Venturina [G.R. No. 183097, Sept. 12, 2012]
Constitution of Family Home [Art. 153 FC]
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288, Aug. 15, 2012)
Establishing Filiation of Legitimate Children [Art. 172 FC]
Makati Shangri-La Hotel v. Harper (G.R. No. 189998, Aug. 29, 2012)
De Belen v. Tabu (G.R. No. 188417, Sept. 24, 2012)
Perla v. Baring (G.R. No. 172471, Nov. 12, 2012)
Rights of Legitimate Children (Art. 174 FC)
Abrigo v. Flores (G.R. No. 160786, Jun. 17, 2013)
Support (Art. 194 FC)
Lim-Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)
Demand and Payment of Support (Art. 203 FC)
Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012)
Designation of Parental Authority (Art. 213 FC)
Beckett v. Sarmiento (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013)
Guardianship
Abad v. Biason (G.R.No. 191993, Dec. 5, 2012)
Interlocutory Orders on Support pendente lite
Calderon v. CA (G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 9, 2013)
Succession
Neri v. Uy (G.R. No. 194366, Oct. 10, 2012)
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, Oct. 10, 2012)
De Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334, Feb. 13, 2013)
Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon (G.R. No. 180269, Feb. 20, 2013)
Galvez v. CA and Montano (G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013)
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian (G.R. No. 201815, April 8, 2013)
Catedrilla v. Lauron (G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013)
Garcia v. De Caparas (G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013)
Calingasan v. Rivera (G.R. No. 171555, April 17, 2013)
NHA v. Baello (G.R. No. 200858, Aug. 7, 2013)
Republic Act No. 7610
People v. Caballo (G.R. No. 198732, Jun 10, 2013)
Republic Act No. 9262
Dabalos v. RTC (G.R. No. 193960, Jan. 7, 2013)


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Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 1 1

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 2 2

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE NECESSARIO

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 3 3

VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 6 6

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 7 7

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat 9 9

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat10 10

REPUBLIC v. C.A. and QUINTOS

• Was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness

BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; ABSENCE OR DISAPPEARANCE OF SPOUSE

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat13 13

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat14 14

OWNERSHIP, ADMINISTRATION, ENJOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF

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DISSOLUTION OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY REGIME

HEIRS OF DR. INTAC v. CA

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat16 16

A contract is absolutely simulated if there is a colorable contract but absent substance

Intention is determined by the following:

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat17 17

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat18 18

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITO, SR.

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SUIT BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS

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SPS. FORTALEZA v. SPS. LAPITAN

ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL v. HARPER

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat22 22

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat23 23

RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (ART. 174 FC)

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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262

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