1

The Age of Austerity: a New European Security Rises

By Jack Detsch

Introduction

When the Czech Republic, ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a new era in

European security, defense and diplomacy dawned. The treaty reformed the EU’s

bureaucracy by expanding the powers of the European Parliament and the Council of

Ministers, consolidating the EU’s legal personality, and allowing the Union to be an

official signatory on treaties. Lisbon gave greater policymaking authority to EU

institutions, created a long-term President of the European Council (who can be elected

to two 2.5-year terms), and strengthened the position of High Representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy, and created the new EEAS (European External Action

Service) diplomatic corps. In addition, Lisbon made the European Charter of

Fundamental Rights binding to all member states.

Though the treaty had its critics, there was unanimous agreement among

European experts that Lisbon would allow the European Union to project its far more

widely than before. Some even believed the treaty would catapult the EU to global

superpower status.

But economic conditions soon called those assumptions into question. The

financial crisis in the United States, led to a global financial meltdown, which stifled

Euro-zone markets, as the EU is a net creditor to the United States. Among member

stages, a consensus began to emerge that to stabilize markets and promote growth in the
 2

Euro-zone, states would have to drastically cut grossly inflated public sector spending.

A new generation of European leadership is leading the charge, particularly

President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Prime Minister David Cameron of Great

Britain, who are attempting to narrow the scope of domestic governance with drastic

pension reforms and other significant austerity measures. Mr. Cameron initially

recommended budget cuts of up to 25% for almost all domestic ministries.1

This will cause serious stress to European defense budgets at a time when

Brussels is attempting to assert itself in the global arena. For the last decade, Europe has

already been trimming the fat from its militaries. According to the European Defense

Agency, between 2007 and 2008, the EU saw further reductions in spending on military

and civilian defense personnel, as civilian numbers were reduced an additional 5.2%,

and military personnel another 2%.2 These numbers preface the collapse of America’s

financial sector in 2008 and the subsequent European debt crisis of 2009 and 2010.3

With significant bloc-wide cuts made to European navies, whatever shape EU military

power takes on in the next several years, it will largely consist of land forces and air

transport. In order to keep its substantial clout in the global arena, the EU will have to

use all of its institutional strength to convince member states to make sound decisions on

defense policy.

Although the Lisbon Treaty called for Europe to expand its role in the world, and

created institutional infrastructure for it to do so, the financial recovery represents an

1
Liam Fox, “Defence cuts: Liam Fox’s leaked letter in full,” The Telegraph UK, September 28, 2010,
accessed, September 30, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8031385/Defence-cuts-Liam-Foxs-leaked-
letter-in-full.html
2
Ibid.
3
Werner Roeger and Jan in ‘t Veld, “Fiscal stimulus and exit strategies in the EU: a model-based
analysis,” European Commission, Directorate-General, November 6, 2010, accessed November 18th,
2010, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2010/pdf/ecp426_en.pdf
 3

existential moment for bloc foreign policy. With defense cuts looming throughout the

European Union, member nations must necessarily pool and share military resources,

bilaterally and multilaterally, using key institutions such as NATO, the European

External Action Service, and the European Defense Agency in order to maintain its

force projections, common security, and global influence.

Franco-British Entente

How will European countries coordinate deep defense cuts? If properly

orchestrated, such cuts need not create a capabilities deficit: Britain and France, the

model example, have only bolstered their potential force projections in the near future

because of their recent bilateral defense treaty.

The landmark agreement, signed in November of 2010, includes “the joint use of

aircraft carriers, a 10,000-strong joint expeditionary force and unprecedented new levels

of co-operation over nuclear missiles,” allowing Paris and London to maintain hard

power quotas while protecting their shaky finances.4 There has also been talk of ordering

a joint Franco-British air transport vehicle to assist with military missions in the

European theater. The agreement will enable the British government to safely cut troops

and civilian defense personnel by 42,000, decommission the Royal Navy's flagship

aircraft carrier early, and forfeit its ability to launch fighter jets from sea until 2019. In

addition, expensive Harrier fighter jets are being eliminated entirely. The planned

Nimrod MRA4 Reconnaissance aircraft, which was believed to be an important anti-

4
Patrick Wintour, “Britain and France sign landmark 50 year defence deal,” The Guardian UK,
November 2, 2010, accessed November 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/02/britain-
france-landmark-50-year-defence-deal
 4

terror craft, will also be scrapped.5

According to the Institute for Security Studies, Britain and France are

responsible for 43 percent of European Defense spending,.6 This November treaty

should be a baseline for how Europe conducts security matters from now on: small

groupings of symmetrical EU states must team up to make coordinated cuts to their

defense budgets, by pooling and sharing resources.

But European politicians should be rightly wary: austerity is undoubtedly a

political gamble. In betting that their citizens want to bolster military capabilities as well

as right deficits, both Cameron and Sarkozy have come under fire. As a private letter

leaked to the press from UK Defense Minister Liam Fox to his Prime Minister showed,

European Conservatives may have little tolerance for the impending pains coming in the

defense sector, which could clearly threaten the individual strategic interests of EU

member states.

The defense secretary argued that the Strategic Defense Review could have

“grave political consequences for [Downing Street], destroying much of the reputation

and capital you, and we, have built up in recent years”7, particularly as the United

Kingdom wraps up its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cuts will total 8% of

Britain’s defense budget, less than the 10% that Chancellor George Osborne had hoped

for, partially because of fiery rhetoric from Washington,. When asked by the BBC if

5
Anthony Faiola, “Britain announces major military cutbacks,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2010,
accessed November 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101904810.html
6
Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn, “ISS Policy Brief: Strength in Numbers? Comparing EU
military capabilities in 2009 and 1999,” EU Institute for Security Studies (December 2009): 3.
7
Liam Fox, “Defence cuts: Liam Fox’s leaked letter in full,” The Telegraph UK, September 28, 2010,
accessed, September 30, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8031385/Defence-cuts-Liam-Foxs-leaked-
letter-in-full.html
 5

Britain’s defense spending cuts were prompting worry in Washington, Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton responded: "It does, and the reason it does is because I think we do have

to have an alliance where there is a commitment to the common defense…each country

has to be able to make its appropriate contributions."8

Washington wants to see their traditional allies in London, Paris, and Berlin as

equal military partners, as opposed to hesitant collaborators. "My worry is that the more

our allies cut their capabilities, the more people will look to the United States to cover

whatever gaps are created," U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told Bloomberg in

Brussels in October. "At a time when we are facing stringencies of our own, that's a

concern for me."9

This terse diplomacy, at least in the short term, will negatively impact further

military integration among EU member states. As the United States supplies much of

NATO’s artillery and manpower and does not want to be held liable for Europe’s

security at large, the European Union will need to be authoritative in affirming its

foreign policy agenda with the United States, and assure Washington that defense cuts

can be coordinated effectively to eliminate redundancy and increase efficiency. As

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former Prime Minister of Denmark and current Secretary-

General of NATO rightly noted in a speech at the German Marshall Fund on October 8th,

2010:

“We have to avoid cutting so deep that we won’t, in future, be

able to defend the security on which our economic prosperity
rests. And we cannot end up in a situation where Europe cannot
pull its weight when it comes to security. The result would be that
the EU Lisbon Treaty, which I strongly support, would be a

8
Nicolas Watt, “Hillary Clinton ‘worried’ by UK defence cuts,” October 15, 2010, accessed October 31,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/oct/14/hillary-clinton-uk-defence-cuts
9
Ibid.
 6

hollow shell. And the United States would look elsewhere for its
security partner. That is not a price we can afford.”10

Europe cannot, and should not become a protectorate because of these heavy defense

spending cuts, but Brussels will have to be politically clever in politically coordinating

cuts among member states in order to maintain force projections.

Political willpower, the chief intangible likely to derail bloc military pooling of

any sort in the European Union, seems to be in place. However, with political changes

inevitable in Europe in the next several years, the staying power of this thinking could

certainly lapse over the next several years. As of November 2010, French President

Nicolas Sarkozy looks likely to be defeated in an upcoming election11 Although the

Lisbon Treaty will give Brussels formidable control over the direction of the bloc’s

foreign policy, the ebb and flow of domestic elections could erode support for military

pooling.

EU Battle Groups & the ESS

The Lisbon Treaty provides significant structural pretext for military pooling

among EU member states, containing mutual defense clauses that very much mirror the

NATO pact: “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the

other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the

means in their power.”12 Given the vast political, social and economic asymmetry of

European Union member states, however, the clause may be extremely difficult to

10
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “ ‘The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defence,”
(speech at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels, Belgium, October 8, 2010).
11
Bagehot, “France and Britain think the unthinkable on defence,” October 19, 2010, accessed October
20, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2010/10/britain_and_france
12
Dr. Gerrard Quille, “ ‘The Lisbon Treaty & its implications for CFSP and ESDP,” (Presented before the
European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium on February 4, 2008).
 7

enforce in certain circumstances, as some member states may have very limited defense

capabilities. However, some nations may have little choice on the matter. Overall, the

European public overwhelmingly wants to see Europe take greater command of foreign

policy, as 67 percent of respondents in a 2007 Euro Barometer opinion poll said they

would like to see more defense and foreign affairs decisions made jointly within the

European Union.13

In order to accomplish this, especially since the EU seems willing to work

bilaterally with NATO on security issues, the EU should expand on the Battle Group

concept that has been used to bolster humanitarian and peacekeeping missions under the

framework of the CDSP. Battle Groups are small bilateral or multilateral clusters of

troops that number 1,500 each are coordinated regionally to not create structural interest

battles within the European bloc. These forces can be deployed to a crisis zone within

ten days for a thirty day commitment, and the EU recommends that two such groups

remain on standby for a six month period. Deployment (groups are supposed to be

available within 15 days), which can be extended to 120 days if properly resupplied.14

EU Battle Groups are “combat trained” and their “full potential would be best realized in

tasks of crisis management, bearing in mind their limited size.”15 Although the Battle

Group concept provides a flexible framework for disparate EU member states to

participate in peacekeeping and defense, as their composition can be strategically set to

the scope of any mission. As CSDP documents note:

13
“European Consolium,” last modified December 7, 2010,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index.en.htm
14
“European Union Common Security and Defense Policy: EU Battle Groups,” last modified July 2009,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720-Factsheet-Battlegroups_EN.pdf
15
Ibid.
 8

“The battlegroup package has no fixed structure and thus

provides member states with the necessary flexibility to form
their own battlegroup package. This could lead, for instance,
to battlegroups with a mountain or amphibious capability.
This flexibility aims at facilitating smoother force generation
and a broader spectrum of capabilities.”16

Thus expansion of the Battle Group concept could not be structurally rigid in character,

and it would need to include opt-out clauses, to ensure support among all 27 European

Union member states.

Battle Groups have allowed the EU to project power more densely and rapidly in

the past. Their structure provides member nations flexibility in bloc defense, allowing

nations to pool resources while substantially reducing defense costs for fledgling

member states. Currently, Battle Groups have carried out over 16 successful missions

outside of Europe, mostly in Africa.17 Because of the foreign policy centralization of the

Lisbon Treaty, High Representative Ashton has the ability to initially authorize a Battle

Group mission, which will be set in motion upon approval from the Council of

Ministers. This will improve the EU’s ability to act unilaterally. The 2003 European

Security Strategy was also important in establishing an agenda for the EU Battle Groups,

as well as other CFSP and CSDP missions going forward. It argued that:

“Security is a precondition of development.  Conflict not only

destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also
encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal
economic activity impossible. A number of countries and
regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and
poverty.”18

16
“European Union Common Security and Defense Policy: EU Battle Groups,” last modified July 2009,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720-Factsheet-Battlegroups_EN.pdf
17
Ibid.
18
“A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” last modified December 12, 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
 9

The European Security Strategy also seeks to promote the principles of “good

governance” through military and civilian missions, particularly to fight the rise of

terrorism in Africa and organized crime in the Balkans. Because of its adaptability to a

variety of crisis environments, the Battle Group concept is perfectly designed to

accommodate the ESS, which explicitly states that “none of the new threats is purely

military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means.” A battle group contains the

necessary “a mixture of instruments…” to be effective even in failed states, where

“military instruments may be needed to restore order, [and] humanitarian means to

tackle the immediate crisis”. In addition,  “economic instruments serve reconstruction,

and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government.”19 Because, as a whole, it

possesses multifaceted capabilities, the EES allows the European Union to respond crisis

situations.

However, in many ways, the European Security Strategy is a largely

ineffective document. Although it outlines many of the important foreign policy

challenges that will face Europe in the 21st Century, the “repetition of terms such as

‘strategic’ could not hide a gaping absence of strategic thought.”20 There is no vision for

a collective European grand strategy, which seems essential given the strategic obstacles

that face the bloc will face in the near future.

Some analysts still wonder why the Battle Group concept has not been more

successful since its official inception in the Helsinki Headline Goal of 2003, which

recommended that 50,000 to 60,000 EU member-state troops readily available to carry

19
“A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” last modified December 12, 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
20
Charlemagne, “Waiting for the big call,” September 16, 2010, accessed November 20, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/17043430
 10

out tasks set out in Article 17(2) of the Maastrict Treaty.21 The European Union has been

hampered by insufficient troop deployments by member nations on many missions,

which will likely persist as member states continue to rein in fiscal deficits.

Indeedsmaller than expected troop deployments have recently been a cause of friction:

“Only this summer…a senior French figure grumbled mightily about how Britain was

failing to keep its side of the bargain when it came to allowing much more ambitious

EU-flagged defense initiatives.”22 Though frustrations has calmed between the two sides,

without a serious mandate for cooperation, it will be difficult to get member states to

commit resources to CSDP missions.

Although EU Battle Group missions have been underway since 2004, only a

few are staffed with more than 1,000 personnel, even though the explicit minimum is

supposed to be at least 1,500 deployed in theatre.23 Battle Groups are still in their test

stages, and strict operational perimeters significantly limit their scope. Missions are

supposed to be conducted only “under a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)”

although certain specific “operations could be envisaged where a UNSCR would not be

necessary (e.g. for evacuation of citizens).”24 Also, in many cases, except within

permanent structured cooperation, bloc unanimity is required to undertake action,25

which could prove a significant hindrance to the effectiveness of EU Battle Groups in

the near future.

21
“Headline Goal 2010,” last modified June 17-18, 2004,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf
22
Bagehot, “France and Britain think the unthinkable on defence,” October 19, 2010, accessed October
20, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2010/10/britain_and_france
23
“European Union Common Security and Defense Policy: EU Battle Groups,” last modified July 2009,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720-Factsheet-Battlegroups_EN.pdf
24
Ibid.
25
Dr. Gerrard Quille, “ ‘The Lisbon Treaty & its implications for CFSP and ESDP,” (Presented before the
European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium on February 4, 2008).
 11

The success of the Battle Group concept depends on the reemergence of

Eurozone. Though the area returned to growth in the 2010 fiscal year, and is expected to

continue to grow above 2% GDP-per-annum in 2011, the recovery is moving slower

than initially hoped for many European countries. This has caused Britain, France, and

Spain to come under significant political pressure for budget cuts that will reduce the

size of the public sector. Pooling military resources will be necessary to cut rising

administrative and departmental costs, which will reduce deficits in the short term.

EEAS

Because of the creation of the EEAS under the Lisbon Treaty, the European

Union will broadly increase its diplomatic scope in the near future. Former Commission

Delegations, formerly the Brussels’ representation abroad, “will now be transformed

into EU Delegations and put under the authority of the EU foreign minister and her

diplomatic staff.”26 The European Union will have a diplomatic presence in every

recognized nation. In bilateral talks, it will likely be treated in a similar fashion to a

normalized nation-state, allowing the EU to centralize foreign policy like never before.

As Jan Gaspers notes, “EU delegations will almost inevitably become diplomatic

heavyweights…the new Action Service will be in charge of liaising with host

government and act as a chief negotiator for the Union on virtually all foreign policy

matters.”27

Although they undoubtedly have enormous potential to expand the EU’s scope

as a regional actor, so far, neither High Representative Ashton nor the EEAS are off to a

26
Jan Gaspers “Putting Europe First,” The World Today.org (January 2010): 2, accessed December 2,
2010, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15589_wt011020.pdf.
27
Jan Gaspers “Putting Europe First,” The World Today.org (January 2010): 2, accessed December 2,
2010, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15589_wt011020.pdf.
 12

particularly good start. Underrepresented blocs in the 27-member organization are have

threatened to block the EEAS budget unless more is done to correct an observed

geographical and gender imbalance within the body: “The EEAS must not become a

Western European old boys club,” European MEP Franziska Bratner has said. “Ashton’s

first staffing decisions could hardly be worse – not even one out of 10 ambassadors

would be female. This is in stark contrast to her promise that gender equality would be a

priority for her.”28

The EEAS project has also been harangued for its lack of fiscal prudence in a

time of economic recovery, particularly as the austerity movement has gained steam in

Europe. Initially expected to be “budget neutral,” the EEAS currently faces a costs

overrun of over 34 billion euro.29 The European Commission has been criticized for

rubber-stamping 236,000 euro bullet-proof limousines for diplomats at all postings, as

well as for assigning diplomats to disparate locations such as Barbados and the tiny

Pacific island of Vanuatu, which seemingly have little relevance in EU foreign policy at

large. “We were told that the EU’s new foreign service would be ‘budget neutral’ but

this promise has been broken in its first year.” Complains Stephen Booth, of the think

tank Open Europe. “At a time of widespread austerity, taxpayers shouldn’t be asked to

pay for the EU’s pretensions to global power status.”30 Despite its good intentions, the

European Commission still has a lot of work in convincing its citizens of the validity of

28
Martin Banks, “EU diplomatic service a ‘Western European old boys club,’” The Telegraph UK,
September 1, 2010, accessed September 1, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7976094/EU-diplomatic-service-a-Western-
European-old-boys-club.html
29
Martin Banks, “Baroness Ashton’s new envoys ‘playing at James Bond’ in £32m of bullet-proof
limos,” The Telegraph UK, October 31, 2010, accessed November 3, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8100192/Baroness-Ashtons-new-envoys-playing-
at-James-Bond-in-32m-of-bullet-proof-limos.html
30
Ibid.
 13

the EEAS project.

Future of NATO

The European Union will rely on NATO to conduct most of its military

operations in the foreseeable future, and forgo the CFSP and CSDP or expanding Battle

Groups. The expansive 2006 Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the European

Union re-affirms this, with the alliance explicitly guaranteeing that the “EU has access

to NATO planning…subsequently, should the operation take place with the use of

NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will provide the operational planning required.”31

In addition, Berlin Plus formally allows the European Union to “request that

NATO make available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military

operation,” as well as “command elements determined by the EU, such as the EU Force

Commander and EU Force Headquarters deployed in theatre or the EU Component

Commands, may either be provided by NATO or by EU Member States.”32 Given these

three important clauses, even if Europe does not lead to greater pooling of military

resources under the auspices of the European Union, NATO will be used by the EU to

conduct military operations on its behalf.

The advantages of using NATO as a military partner are twofold: First, by

committing to explicit military action, the European Union could destroy its reputation

as a neutral actor in the international community. Second, using NATO would allow the

European Union to circumvent its own tangled bureaucracy and deploy troops to their

area of operations more efficiently.

31
“EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus,” last modified March 17, 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note
%20BL.pdf
32
Ibid.
 14

NATO and the European Union have already proved effective partners in military

and civilian operations, working together in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Although

formal negotiations between the two Brussels-based organizations have stagnated, in its

2008 European Security Strategy, the EU deemed it vital to strengthen its “strategic

partnership [with NATO] in service of our shared security interests, with better

operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each

organization, and continued work on military capabilities.”33 Operation Concordia,

initiated in Macedonia upon the request of President Trajkovski and the United Nations

Security Council, was the first EU military mission ever to be deployed, from March

31st, 2003 to December 15th, 2003, following the NATO-led Allied Harmony, using

“NATO military assets and capabilities”34 in order to operate effectively.

Concordia relied on a vast degree of military interoperability between the EU and

NATO, as the operation commander Admiral Rainer Feist “was also the NATO Deputy

Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) and there were several joint NATO-EU

positions within the mission headquarters staff,” as well as participation from

approximately 400 soldiers from 26 countries, including 13 EU member states, six

NATO members not in the EU, and seven countries that were not directly affiliated with

either body. In the seven years since Concordia, the seven states that were not directly

affiliated with the EU or NATO have gained membership in one organization, while the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland now enjoy EU membership in addition to their

active participation in the Atlantic alliance. Issues of asymmetry aside, increased

33
“Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing
World,” last modified December 11, 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf
34
“Peace Operations Factsheet Series: Review of EU Field Operations,” last modified March 2004,
http://apps.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Factsheet_EUFieldOperations.pdf
 15

cooperation will allow the EU and NATO to increase their effectiveness as global

players, even in light of impending defense austerity.

According to the analysis of Colonel Pierre Augustin, EUFOR’s deputy chief of

logistics in Operation Concordia, the mission was successful because “the deployed

resources were well dimensioned for the operation.”35 Concordia, although unrelated to

the Helsinki Headline Goals, set the framework for what a successful Battle Group

mission should look like, as peacekeepers faced off against “armed groups, originally

the main cause of instability,” who had cleverly and successfully “reorganized

themselves into criminal elements linked to illegal trafficking fostered by a varied

clientele and the law of supply and demand.”36 To maintain operational and deterrence

capabilities among the force’s ranks, troops “regularly [exercised] with all the required

advertising for the benefit of observers from the international community.” In addition,

“to even out differences in qualifications, age, ranks and experience, EUFOR instituted

an intensive training program (weekly firing exercises and drill about various rescue

scenarios) that increased homogeneity throughout each nation. This training has been a

true force multiplier.”37

Perhaps the most important part of the 2006 Berlin Plus agreement is that “the

EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities,” however, limited to “a first

list of its assets and capabilities that, in strong likelihood, NATO would decide to make

available to the EU should the EU need them.”38 While this agreement, gives the
35
Colonel Pierre Augustin “Lessons Learned: Operation Concordia/Altaïr in Macedonia,” Doctrine
(March 2005): 2.
36
“Peace Operations Factsheet Series: Review of EU Field Operations,” last modified March 2004,
http://apps.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Factsheet_EUFieldOperations.pdf
37
Colonel Pierre Augustin “Lessons Learned: Operation Concordia/Altaïr in Macedonia,” Doctrine
(March 2005): 2.
38
“EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus,” last modified March 17, 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note
 16

European Union a particularly strong say in the direction of NATO’s foreign policy, it

does come with important limits, including “financial and legal considerations

applicable to the release of its assets and capabilities to the EU.” This will require “a

specific EU-NATO agreement setting out the conditions for use of NATO assets and

capabilities” to be drawn up for each individual operation, and would include “a possible

recall of assets due to unforeseen circumstances.”39 Perhaps in the future, NATO will be

able to cooperate with Battle Groups on CSDP missions if certain operational perimeters

are removed.

Regardless, Europe’s military dependence on NATO, and by extension, the

United States is highly demonstrative of its weaknesses as a foreign policy actor. Unless

EU member states continue to integrate military resources to make up for their

shortcomings in capabilities, their weaknesses could be potentially exploited. Although

Berlin Plus is a landmark document, as long as the United States is responsible for most

of the troops currently serving under NATO purview, Washington will continue to

dictate the agenda of the alliance.

However, it stands to reason that the EU, “is not really in the business of

punching at all,” and was built to stay “mostly out of diplomacy and security; that was a

matter for NATO.”40 Be that as it may, this status quo is entirely unsustainable. While

peacekeeping missions and large amounts of foreign aid” will be important in further

building upon the EU’s strong global reputation, at some point, it will have to learn “the

art of bluffing, threatening, and cajoling others to get its way in the world” that it has
%20BL.pdf
39
“EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus,” last modified March 17, 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note
%20BL.pdf
40
Charlemagne, “Waiting for the big call,” September 16, 2010, accessed November 20, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/17043430
 17

never really mastered. There are signs that Brussels is beginning to play the game: using

the heightened purview of the Lisbon Treaty to conduct its Foreign Policy, the EU has

increased its global role as a “significant security actor” in unstable states such as

Georgia, through the deployment of programs such as the CSDP EU Monitoring

Mission in Georgia (EUMM).41

NATO will be effective in facilitating Europe’s education. NATO’s new

Strategic Concept, first publicly released and affirmed by member nations at the Atlantic

alliance’s Lisbon Summit on November 19-20th of 2010, is an excellent document that

effectively outlines a new European security architecture, celebrating the “common

values,” of the alliance and the EU, as well as “the importance of a stronger and more

capable European defense.” In addition, the document welcomes “the entry into force of

the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to

address common security challenges.”42 The stakes for effective collaboration could not

be higher, and fortunately, both Brussels and the Atlantic alliance are committed to a

proactive security strategy that will yield results.

However, on a state-by-state basis, European countries are also changing the

way that they behave in the international arena. Old powers, particularly France and

Germany, have an increasingly flouted NATO’s authority and pursued comprehensive

bilateral agreements with outlying states on their own. France recently proposed creating

a “single zone of security and economic cooperation”43 with Russia, which could
41
Secretariat of the Council, “ ‘2009 Annual Report from the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspect and basic choices of
the CFSP” (Presented before the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, June 2010).
42
“Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of Members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,” last
modified November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
43
Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, “Sarkozy to Propose New Bond with Russia,’” The New York
Times, October 1, 2010, accessed October 1, 2010,
 18

directly undermine NATO’s diplomatic power at a crucial moment, particularly as the

body hopes to forge a stronger relationship with Moscow.44

But the EU’s perception as a neutral actor in foreign affairs and efforts to

improve its international standing are at risk. The EU’s attempt to get the same speaking

rights as a nation-state at the United Nations General Assembly in September drew the

ire of developing nations in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and in the Arab

world, who saw the move as overreach. A representative of Nauru, a small island nation,

rightly argued, "the UN charter is based on the membership and equality of sovereign

states and we need to ensure that this draft resolution upholds these fundamental

principles,” as smaller states worried that enabling EU speaking privileges at the UN

would adversely affect their own standing, and over represent of Europe in the body.45

The European Defense Agency

If European Union member states multilaterally engage in systematic budget

cuts,: effectively pooling military resources while paring down largesse; both political

cohesion and security infrastructure in Europe will be significantly strengthened. The

European Defense Agency (EDA), in which all EU members except Denmark

participate, has been successful in promoting a stronger bloc-wide Defense Equipment

Market, negotiating fair prices for arms for member states, and interstate cooperation on

defense research and deployment. The maintenance of this system will be wholly

necessary to pool Europe’s military resources, and the EDA has so far been an important

tool in ascertaining bloc defense.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/world/europe/02france.html?_r=1
44
“Secretary General in Moscow to prepare the Summit,” last modified November 3, 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_67695.htm
45
Ibid.
 19

Since its inception in July of 2004, the EDA has championed pooling military

resources to reduce defense expenditures and redundancy in military capabilities. As

Javier Solana, the former European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy notes, “pooling resources on research, technology development and the

acquisition and maintenance of equipment” is essential to maintaining a viable European

defense market, and is “the only way our armed forces will get interoperable equipment

at a price they can afford,” allowing for the “strengthening of Europe’s defense

technology and industrial base to compete effectively on a global basis with US defense

companies.”46

Solana observes that one of the key purposes of pooling resources is

specialization: allowing nations to collaborate more effectively on a myriad of military

and civilian missions, such as peacekeeping and rapid response missions designed for

EU Battle Groups. Indeed, The Council of the European Union’s 2008 Declaration on

Strengthening capabilities called for “establishment of a European air transport fleet,

creation of a multinational unit of A400M aircraft, and early establishment of a

European airlift command…a European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative

involving an aircraft carrier, carrier air groups and escort vessels; development of a

concept for the projection of an airbase for a European force.”47 The EU has made

progress on all of these areas. These are decisive steps to increase interoperability

throughout the bloc.

In attempts to improve force projection in military and civilian operations,

46
Javier Solana, “Europe should pool its defense resources,” Financial Times, May 23, 2005, accessed
October 22, 2010,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/84903.pdf
47
“Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities,” last modified December 11, 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf
 20

especially to be more effective in actions of crisis management and peacekeeping, the

EDA has been particularly successful: the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF)

“provides an innovative framework for European cooperation through mutualization of

services and aircraft such as A400M or C130…open to any interested EU Member

State.”48 The project’s stated goal is to “develop concrete solutions to better use existing

and future military airlift assets usable for meeting national, EU, NATO and other

frameworks operational requirements” in order to compensate for “a clear lack of

European military airlift capabilities to perform [military and civilian] missions.”49

For nations who do not wish to directly participate in the program, “the EATF

project will take into account any future contribution of A400M Member States for

basing, maintenance and training,”50 allowing each member state to take an equal role in

the maintenance of European security. Like the EU Battle Group concept, the EATF is a

flexible system, allowing member states to participate in a number of ways, including

making available military transport aircraft, purchasing, providing or exchanging flying

hours, allowing all states to benefit from shared or pooled support functions. Indeed,

“The EDA is the best hope to ensure that defense budgets are spent to better effect. It is

ideally positioned to identify the intersection of economic and operational imperatives. It

48
“EATF Declaration of Intent,” last modified November 10, 2008, http://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=v&q=cache:Hdvj4mqr3h8J:www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx%3Ffileid
%3D468+EATF+declaration+of+intent&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiBGusQvPZiJaQAcfLiH
TvniVa5MB7RFhMsoQnC9ZuJ8tD0AfWHX9jKd-nMVen2I_qer2-
uUaALxwvoWIRG0vJBzTagjqMaA0VkyIr2UYp_-
nwe1oKok9wqyns_U2rZ4XyxEGFl&sig=AHIEtbSQdc5nHR1PgkzDib907Nxla1glXQ
49
“Declaration of Ministerial support for the European Defense Agency’s work on improving helicopter
availability,” last modified May 19, 2008, http://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=v&q=cache:9lJ2Trgr4acJ:www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx%3FFileID
%3D416+Declaration+of+Ministerial+support+for+the+European+Defence+Agency+work+on+improvin
g+helicopter+availability&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShJyDNxU-
QElDwjCpAGWCjLP33A6Pn4sZEr98ZiiLx6psxG4YJfp1pB5OA4I28RAiF3DpVSLAofeCqkfnKLsOYq
LFYsv1eLdy-72PhJPtsfpRtoL2hRn-CEvTEMgStvjBYsg3Oc&sig=AHIEtbR0HKEZXPCZzH-
mcB2akxfmoXbF0w
50
Ibid.
 21

provides both a forum and a catalyst for member states to look at common problems and

develop shared solutions.”51

With domestic navies being decimated by budget cuts, an effective and efficient

EATF, which member states can use to expedite EU Battle Group will enable the EU to

bolster its image in tumultuous regions of the world. Remarkably, EU member state

defense expenditure increased by almost a third between 1999 and 2009 among the 27

member states, as Europe collectively bolstered numbers of transport planes and

helicopters, transport choppers, coastal patrol vessels, and amphibious vehicles.52 The

2008 ESS rightly notes that the EDA is probably the European Union’s best tool is

correcting these significant, and potentially damaging shortfalls:

“For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble

trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise,
deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre
over the long term. We need full interoperability between
national contingents. In support of this, Member States
have committed to draw up national strategies to make
experts available, complemented by more deployable staff
for mission support, including budgeting and procurement.
The ways in which equipment is made available and
procured should be made more effective to enable timely
deployment of missions.”53

The success of the EDA may actually leade to a larger research and development budget

next year. This came on the heels of a report entitled “Restructuring Europe’s Armed

Forces in Times of Austerity,” released by four European think-tanks, argued that

51
Javier Solana, “Europe should pool its defense resources,” Financial Times, May 23, 2005, accessed
October 22, 2010,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/84903.pdf
52
Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn, “ISS Policy Brief: Strength in Numbers? Comparing EU
military capabilities in 2009 and 1999,” EU Institute for Security Studies (December 2009): 3.
53
“Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing
World,” last modified December 11, 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf
 22

“coordinating restructuring efforts and exploiting the options of pooling and sharing

capabilities would enhance the potential of European armed forces,”54 a process best

handled by the EDA. Europe is going to need a serious facelift in military capabilities

and force projections, the EDA, from all empirical evidence, is the institution most

capable of conducting it:

“The scale of the transformation required is huge. A radical shift

of investment must be made from heavy metals and high
explosive to the supporting and enabling capabilities that
effective crisis management operations demand. We need the
equipment and technology to allow peacekeeping troops to be
rapidly deployed, undertake their tasks with the highest degree
of protection and to be resupplied and supported for operations
that may last for months.”55

Another major initiative that could determine the future of defense pooling in

Europe is the capability development plan, a joint project of the EDA, EUMC, and EU

member states, which aims to provide “[states] with information which could facilitate

their decision-making in the context of national capability choices, stimulate their

cooperation and facilitate the launching of new joint programs which overcome present

and future EU shortfalls.”56 In addition, “it aims to provide guidelines for future work in

the fields of research and technology, armament and industry and forms the cornerstone

of the EDA’s activities.”57 Although the European Union insists that “the CDP is not a

supranational plan: it is created by and for the Member States,”58 it is clear that the

54
Ibid.
55
Javier Solana, “Europe should pool its defense resources,” Financial Times, May 23, 2005, accessed
October 22, 2010,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/84903.pdf
56
“Development of European Military Capabilities,” last modified September 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080905FactsheetcapacitesmilitairesEN.pdf
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
 23

cluster of “joint programs” that it advocates could eventually lead to a greater pooling

European Union military resources.

Conclusion

Although defense cuts will inevitably limit the size of the domestic armies of

EU member states and the scope of their military capabilities, Europe need not concede

its ambitious foreign policy and security goals. Through effective use of its institutional

might, particularly through institutions such as NATO, the EEAS, the EDA, and

CSDP/CFSP, Brussels must cajole its member states to make sound decisions on

defense spending in order to protect its strong international standing. In addition to

drastic cuts to British and French budgets, Germany plans to cut its defense budget by

8.3 billion euros by 2014, shrinking its standing army by a third, to 165,000 troops.59

Spain and Italy appear ready to follow suit, cutting defense expenditures by 9% and 10%

in 2010 and 2011 respectively.60

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