Hegel, Death and Sacrifice

Hegel, Death and Sacrifice
Author(s): Georges Bataille and Jonathan Strauss

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 9-28
Published by: Yale University Press
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GEORGES BATAILLE
Hegel, Death and Sacrifice'

The animaldies.Butthedeathoftheanimalis thebecomingof
consciousness.
I. DEATH
Man's Negativity
In the Lecturesof 1805-1806, at the momentofhis thought'sfull

maturity, duringthe periodwhenhe was writingThe Phenomenol-
ogyofSpirit,Hegel expressedin thesetermsthe black characterof
humanity:
"Man is thatnight,thatemptyNothingness, whichcontainsev-
erything in itsundividedsimplicity:thewealthofan infinite number
ofrepresentations, of images,not one ofwhichcomes preciselyto
mind,or which [moreover], are not [there]insofaras theyare really
present. It is the night,theinteriority-or-theintimacyofNature
whichexistshere:[the]purepersonal-Ego. In phantasmagorical rep-
resentations it is nighton all sides:heresuddenlysurgesup a blood-
spatteredhead; there,another,white,apparition;and theydisappear
just as abruptly. That is the nightthatone perceivesifone looks a
man in the eyes: then one is delvinginto a nightwhich becomes
terrible;it is thenightoftheworldwhichthenpresentsitselftous."2
1. Excerptfroma studyon the-fundamentally Hegelian-thoughtofAlexander
Kojeve.Thisthoughtseeks,so faras possible,tobe Hegel'sthought,sucha contempo-
raryspirit,knowingwhatHegeldidnotknow(knowing, forexample,theeventsthat
haveoccurredsince 1917and,as well,thephilosophy ofHeidegger),couldgraspit and
developit. AlexanderKojeve'soriginality and courage,it mustbe said, is to have
perceivedthe impossibilityof going any further, the necessity,consequently,
ofrenouncing the creationofan originalphilosophyand,thereby, theinterminable
whichis theavowalofthevanityofthought.This essaywas firstpub-
starting-over
lishedin Deucalion 5 (1955).WithpermissionofEditionsGallimard? 1988.
2. G. W. F. Hegel, Jenenser Philosophiedes Geistesin SamtlicheWerke,ed.
Johannes Hoffmeister,(Leipzig:FelixMeiner,1931),vol.20 180-81.CitedbyKojevein
YFS 78, On Bataille,ed. Allan Stoekl,C) 1990byYale University.

10 Yale FrenchStudies
Ofcourse,this"beautifultext,"whereHegel'sRomanticism finds
expression, is nottobe understood loosely.IfHegelwas a romantic, it
was perhapsin a fundamentalmanner(hewas at anyratea romantic
at thebeginning-inhisyouth-, whenhe was a commonplacerevo-
lutionary),buthe didnotsee in Romanticism themethodbywhicha
proudspiritdeems itselfcapable ofsubordinating the real worldto
thearbitrariness ofitsowndreams.AlexanderKojeve,in citingthem,
says of these lines thattheyexpress"the centraland finalidea of
Hegelianphilosophy," whichis "theidea thatthefoundation andthe
sourceofhumanobjectivereality(Wirklichkeit) and empiricalexis-
tence(Dasein) aretheNothingness whichmanifests itselfas negative
or creativeAction,freeand self-conscious."
To permitaccessto Hegel'sdisconcerting world,I havefeltobliged
to mark,bya carefulexamination,bothits violentcontrastsand its
ultimateunity.
For Kojeve, "the 'dialectical' or anthropologicalphilosophyof
Hegel is in thefinalanalysisa philosophyofdeath (or,whichis the
same thing,ofatheism)"(K, 537; TEL, 539).
Butifmanis "deathlivinga humanlife"(K,548; TEL, 550),man's
negativity, givenin deathby virtueof the factthatman's deathis
essentiallyvoluntary (resultingfromrisksassumedwithoutnecessi-
ty,without biologicalreasons), nevertheless
is theprincipleofaction.
Indeed,forHegel,Actionis Negativity, and NegativityAction.On
theone hand,theman who negatesNature-by introducing intoit,
like a flip-side,the anomalyof a "pure,personalego"-is present
withinthatNature'sheartlike a nightwithinlight,like an intimacy
withintheexteriority ofthosethingswhicharein themselves-like
a phantasmagoriain which nothingtakes shape but to evanesce,
nothingappearsbut to disappear,wherenothingexistsexceptab-
sorbedwithoutrespitein the annihilationof time,fromwhich it
drawsthe beautyofa dream.But thereis a complementary aspect:
thisnegationofNatureis notmerelygivenin consciousness-where
that which existsin itselfappears(but only to disappear)-; this
negationis exteriorized, and in beingexteriorized, really(in itself)
changestherealityofNature. Man works and fights;he transforms
the given;he transforms Nature and in destroying it he createsa
totheReadingofHegel,(Paris:Gallimard,1947),573.(TELedition[Paris:
Introduction
citedin thetext,as K; TEL).
Gallimard,19801,575.) Henceforth

GEORGES BATAILLE 11
world,a worldwhichwas not. On the one handthereis poetry, the

destructionthathas surgedup and diluted a
itself, blood-spattered
head; on the otherhand thereis Action,work,struggle.On the one
hand, "pure Nothingness,"whereman "differs fromNothingness
onlyfora certaintime"(K,573; TEL, 575).On theother,a historical
World,whereman's Negativity, thatNothingnessthatgnawshim
fromwithin,createsthewholeofconcretereality(atonce objectand
subject,real world changedor unchanged,man who thinksand
changestheworld).
Hegel'sPhilosophyis a PhilosophyofDeath-or ofAtheism3
The essential-and theoriginal-characteristicofHegelianphiloso-

phyis to describethe totalityofwhat is; and,consequently,at the
same timethatit accountsforeverything whichappearsbeforeour
accountofthethoughtandlanguagewhich
eyes,to givean integrated
express-and reveal-that appearance.
"In my opinion,"says Hegel, "Everything dependson one's ex-
pressingandunderstanding Truthnot(only)as substance,butalso as
subject."4
3. In thisparagraph, andthefollowing, I repeatin a differentformwhathas been

saidbyAlexanderKojeve.Butnotonlyin a different form;essentially I havetodevelop
thesecondpartofthatsentence,whichis,atfirstglance,difficult tocomprehend inits
concreteaspect: "The beingor theannihilationofthe 'Subject'is thetemporalizing
annihilationofBeing,whichmustbe beforethe annihilatedbeing:thebeingofthe
'Subject'necessarily a beginning.
has,therefore, Andbeingthe(temporal) annihilation
ofthenothingness in Being,beingnothingness whichnihilates(insofar as Time),the
"Subject"is essentiallynegationofitself:therefore it has an end."In particular,
I have
followed forthis(asI havealreadydoneinthepreceding paragraph) thepartofIntroduc-
tionto theReadingofHegel whichconcernsparts2 and3 ofthepresentstudy,i.e.,
AppendixII, "The Idea ofDeath in thePhilosophyofHegel,"Kojeve,527-73. (TEL,
529-75.) [Translator'snote:This appendix,fromwhichall ofBataille'sreferences to
Kojevearetaken,remainsuntranslated in English;it is notincludedin AllanBloom's
reedition(andabridgment) ofKojeve'sIntroduction totheReadingofHegel(NewYork:
BasicBooks,1969).J
4. Cf.,G. W.F. Hegel,The Phenomenology ofSpirit,trans.A. V. Miller(Oxford:
OxfordUniversity Press,1977),9-10. In his footnotes, BatailleattributestheFrench
versionshe uses ofHegel to JeanHyppolite'stranslation of The Phenomenology of
Spiritand oftenalso citesthepagesfromIntroduction a la lecturede Hegel where
AlexandreKojevequotesthesamepassages.However, Kojeve'sversiondiffers fromthat
ofHyppoliteandBataille'sfromboth.It is thelatterthatI havetranslated. Pagerefer-
enceswillhereafter be giventotheEnglishtranslation byA. V.Miller,whichis oftenat
significantvariancewiththequotationsas I haverendered them.[Translator's note.]

In otherwords,naturalknowledgeis incomplete,it does notand
cannotenvisageanybutabstractentities,isolatedfroma whole,from
an indissolubletotality, whichalone is concrete.Knowledgemustat
the same time be anthropological:"in additionto the ontological
bases ofnaturalreality," Kojevewrites,"[knowledge] mustfindthose
ofhumanreality,whichalone is capable ofbeingrevealedthrough
Discourse"(K,528; TEL, 530).Of course,thisanthropology does not
envisageMan as do themodernsciencesbutas a movementimpossi-
ble to isolatefromtheheartofthetotality. In a sense,it is actuallya
theology, whereman has takentheplace ofGod.
ButforHegel,thehumanrealitywhichhe placesat theheart,and
center,ofthetotalityis verydifferent fromthatofGreekphilosophy.
His anthropology is thatoftheJudeo-Christian tradition,whichem-
phasizes Man's liberty,historicity, and individuality.Like Judeo-
Christianman, the Hegelian man is a spiritual(i.e., "dialectical")
being.Yet,fortheJudeo-Christian world,"spirituality" is fullyreal-
ized and manifestonlyin thehereafter, and Spiritproperly speaking,
truly"objectively real"Spirit,is God: "an infinite andeternalbeing."
Accordingto Hegel,the "spiritual"or "dialectical"beingis "neces-
sarilytemporaland finite."This meansthatdeathalone assuresthe
existenceof a "spiritual"or "dialectical"being,in the Hegelian
sense. If the animal which constitutesman's naturalbeingdid not
die,and-what is more-if deathdidnotdwellinhimas thesourceof
his anguish-and all themoreso in thathe seeksit out,desiresitand
sometimesfreelychoosesit-there would be no man or liberty, no
historyorindividual.In otherwords,ifhe revelsin whatnonetheless
frightens him,ifhe is the being,identicalwithhimself,who risks
(identical)beingitself,thenmanis trulya Man: he separateshimself
fromtheanimal.Henceforth he is no longer,likea stone,an immuta-
ble given,he bearswithinhimNegativity;andtheforce,theviolence
ofnegativity casthimintotheincessantmovementofhistory, which
changeshimandwhichalonerealizesthetotalityoftheconcretereal
throughtime.Onlyhistoryhas thepowertofinishwhatis,tofinishit
in the passageoftime.And so theidea ofan eternaland immutable
God is in thisperspectivemerelya provisionalend,whichsurvives
while awaitingsomethingbetter.Only completedhistoryand the
spiritoftheSage (ofHegel)-in whomhistoryrevealed,thenrevealed
in full,the developmentofbeingand the totalityofits becoming-
occupya sovereignposition,whichGod onlyprovisionally occupies,
as a regent.

GEORGES BATAILLE 13
The Tragi-Comic Aspect ofMan's Divinity
This way of seeing thingscan with justice be consideredcomic.

Besides,Hegel neverexpressedit explicitly.The textswhereit is
implicitlyaffirmed are ambiguous,and theirextremedifficulty ulti-
matelykeptthemfromfullconsideration. Kojevehimselfis circum-
spect.He does notdwellon themandavoidsdrawingpreciseconclu-
sions. In orderto expressappropriately the situationHegel got
himselfinto,no doubtinvoluntarily, one wouldneed thetone,or at
least,in a restrainedform,the horrorof tragedy. But thingswould
quicklytake on a comic appearance.
Be thatas itmay,topassthrough deathis so absentfromthedivine
figurethat a mythsituatedin the traditionassociateddeath,and
the agonyof death,withthe eternaland unique God of the Judeo-
Christiansphere.The deathofJesuspartakesofcomedytotheextent
thatone cannotunarbitrarily introducetheforgetting ofhis eternal
divinity-whichis his-into the consciousnessof an omnipotent
andinfiniteGod.BeforeHegel's"absoluteknowledge," theChristian
mythwas alreadybased preciselyon thefactthatnothingdivineis
possible(inthepre-Christian senseofsacred)whichis finite.Butthe
vague consciousnessin whichthe (Christian)mythofthe deathof
God tookformdiffered, nonetheless,fromthatofHegel: in orderto
misrepresent a figureofGodthatlimitedtheinfinite as thetotality,
it
was possibleto add on, in contradiction withits basis,a movement
towardthefinite.
Hegelwas able-and itwas necessaryforhim-to addup thesum
(theTotality)ofthemovementswhichwereproducedin history. But
it is
humor, seems, incompatiblewith workand its necessaryas-
siduity.I shall returnto thissubject;I havemerely, forthemoment,
shuffledcards.... It is difficultto pass froma humanityhumiliated
by divine grandeurto that... of the apotheosizedand sovereign
Sage,his prideswollenwithhumanvanity.
A Fundamental Text
In whatI havewrittenup to thispoint,onlyonenecessityemergesin

a precisefashion:therecan be authenticWisdom(absoluteWisdom,
orin generalanything approaching it)onlyiftheSageraiseshimself,
ifI can put it thisway,to the heightofdeath,at whateveranguish
to him.

A passagefromtheprefaceto thePhenomenology ofSpirit5force-
fullyexpressesthe necessityof such an attitude.Thereis no doubt
fromthestartofthe "capitalimportance"ofthisadmirabletext,not
onlyforan understanding ofHegel,butin all regards.
"Death,"writesHegel,"-if we wishso to namethatunreality-
is themostterriblethingthereis and to upholdtheworkofdeathis
thetaskwhichdemandsthegreateststrength. Impotentbeautyhates
thisawareness,becauseunderstanding makesthisdemandofbeauty,
a requirement whichbeautycannotfulfill.Now,thelifeofSpiritis
not thatlifewhichis frightened ofdeath,and sparesitselfdestruc-
tion,butthatlifewhichassumesdeathandliveswithit.Spiritattains
its truthonlybyfindingitselfin absolutedismemberment. It is not
that(prodigious) powerbybeingthePositivethatturnsawayfromthe
Negative,as when we say of something:thisis nothingor (thisis)
falseand,having(thus)disposedofit,pass fromthereto something
else; no, Spiritis thatpoweronlyto thedegreein whichit contem-
platesthe Negativefaceto face(and)dwellswithit. This prolonged
sojournis themagicalforcewhichtransposesthenegativeintogiven-
Being."
The Human NegationofNatureand oftheNaturalBeingofMan
In principle,I oughttohavestartedthepassagejustcitedat an earlier

point.I did not want to weighthis textdownby givingthe "enig-
matic"lineswhichprecedeit.ButI shall sketchout thesenseofthe
omittedlinesbyrestating Kojeve'sinterpretation, withoutwhichthe
consequences,in spite of an appearanceof relativeclarity,would
remainclosed to us.
ForHegel, it is both fundamentaland altogetherworthyof as-
tonishmentthathumanunderstanding (thatis, language,discourse)
should have had the force(an incomparableforce)to separateits
constitutiveelementsfromthe Totality.These elements(thistree,
5. Cf.,Hegel,ThePhenomenologyof trans.A. V.Miller,19.CitedbyKojeve,

Spirit,
538-39. (TEL,540-41.) Kojeve,Hyppolite,andBatailleall translatetheGerman"Zer-
rissenheit"by "dechirement," whichI in turnhavegivenas "dismemberment," the
same wordwhichappearsin Miller'stranslation to notethat
ofHegel.It is important
theword"dechirement" has themeaningsof "shredding" and "tearing"and,unlike
"dismemberment," doesnotimplya disarticulationintopredetermined units.InL'Ex-
p6rienceint6rieure, forexample,Bataillespeaks of himselfas leftin "lambeaux"
(shreds,as ofclothorpaper)whichhis "inabilitytorespondachevaitde. .. d6chirer,"
(Paris:Gallimard,1954),19).[Translator's
note.]

GEORGES BATAILLE 15
thisbird,thisstone)arein factinseparablefromthewhole.Theyare
"bound togetherby spatial and temporal,indeed material,bonds
whichare indissoluble."TheirseparationimpliesthehumanNega-
tivitytowardNatureofwhichI spoke,withoutpointingout its de-
cisive consequences.Forthe man who negatesnaturecould not in
any way live outside of it. He is not merelya man who negates
Nature,he is firstofall an animal,thatis to say the verythinghe
negates:he cannottherefore negateNaturewithoutnegatinghim-
self.The intrinsictotalityofman is reflected in Kojeve'sbizarreex-
pression,thattotalityis firstofall Nature(naturalbeing),it is "the
anthropomorphic animal"(Nature,theanimalindissolubly linkedto
thewhole ofNature, and which supportsMan). Thus humanNega-
tivity,Man's effective desireto negateNaturein destroying it-in
reducingit to his ownends,as when,forexample,he makesa toolof
it (andthetoolwill be themodelofan objectisolatedfromNature)-
cannotstopat Man himself;insofaras he is Nature,Man is exposed
to his own Negativity.To negateNature is to negatethe animal
whichpropsup Man's Negativity. It is undoubtedlynot the under-
standing, breakerofNature'sunity,whichseeksman'sdeath,andyet
the separatingActionof the understanding impliesthe monstrous
energyofthought,ofthe "pureabstractI," whichis essentiallyop-
posed to fusion,to the inseparablecharacterofthe elements-con-
stitutiveofthewhole-which firmly upholdstheirseparation.
It is the veryseparationof Man's being,it is his isolationfrom
Nature,and,consequently, his isolationin themidstofhis ownkind,
whichcondemnhim to disappeardefinitively. The animal,negating
nothing,lostin a globalanimalityto whichit offers no opposition-
justas thatanimalityis itselflostin Nature(andin thetotalityofall
that is)-does not truly disappear... No doubt the individual fly
dies,but today'sfliesare the same as thoseoflast year.Last year's
have died? . . . Perhaps, but nothinghas disappeared. The flies re-
main, equal to themselveslike the waves of the sea. This seems
contrived:a biologistcan separatea flyfromtheswarm,all it takesis
a brushstroke. Buthe separatesitforhimself,he does notseparateit
forthe flies.To separateitselffromthe othersa flywouldneed the
monstrousforceoftheunderstanding; thenit wouldnameitselfand
do what the understanding normallyeffectsby means oflanguage,
which alone foundsthe separationof elementsand by foundingit
foundsitselfon it,withina worldformedofseparatedand denomi-
nated entities.But in this game the human animal findsdeath; it

findspreciselyhuman death,the onlyone whichfrightens, which
freezes-but which only frightens and transfixes
the man who is
absorbedin his futuredisappearance,
to theextentthathe is a sepa-
ratedand irreplaceablebeing.The onlytruedeathsupposessepara-
tionand,through thediscoursewhichseparates,theconsciousnessof
beingseparated.
"ImpotentBeautyHates the Understanding"
Up to thispoint,Hegel's textpresentsa simpleand commontruth,

but one enunciatedin a philosophicalmannerwhich is, properly
speaking,sibylline.In the passage fromthe Prefacecited above,
Hegel,on the contrary, affirms and describesa personalmomentof
violence-Hegel, in otherwordsthe Sage, to whom an absolute
Knowledgehas conferred definitive satisfaction.
This is not an un-
bridledviolence.WhatHegel unleasheshereis not the violenceof
Nature,it is the energy, or theviolence,oftheUnderstanding-the
NegativityoftheUnderstanding-opposing itselfto thepurebeauty
ofthe dream,whichcannotact,whichis impotent.
Indeed,thebeautyofthedreamis on thatsideoftheworldwhere
nothingis yetseparatedfromwhatsurrounds it,whereeachelement,
in contrastto the abstractobjects of the Understanding, is given
concretely, in space and time.But beautycannotact. It can onlybe
and preserveitself.Throughactionit would no longerexist,since
actionwouldfirstdestroywhatbeautyis: beauty,whichseeksnoth-
ing,whichis, whichrefusesto moveitselfbutwhichis disturbed by
theforceoftheUnderstanding. Moreover,beauty does not have the
powerto respondto therequestoftheUnderstanding, whichasks it
to upholdandpreservetheworkofhumandeath.Beautyis incapable
ofit, in the sense thatto upholdthatwork,it wouldbe engagedin
Action.Beautyis sovereign, it is an end,orit is not: thatis whyit is
not susceptibleto acting,whyit is, evenin principle,powerlessand
why it cannotyield to the activenegationof the Understanding,
whichchangestheworldand itselfbecomesotherthanit is.6
6. Here myinterpretation differs
slightlyfromKojeve's(146 [TEL, 1481).[Trans-
lator'snote: thispassagetoo is missingfromBloom'sabridgment ofKojeve,which
startsonlywiththelecturesgivenin 1937-38. (The passagein questionis fromthe
1936-37lectures.)IKojevesimplystatesthat"impotent beautyis incapableofbending
to therequirements oftheUnderstanding. The esthete,theromantic, themystic,flee
theidea ofdeathandspeakofNothingness whichis." Inparticular,
itselfas something
he admirablydescribesthe mysticin thisway.But the same ambiguity is foundin

GEORGES BATAILLE 17
This beautywithoutconsciousnessofitselfcannot thereforereal-
ly-but notforthesamereasonas life,which"recoilsin horror from
death and wantsto save itselffromannihilation"-beardeathand
preserveitselfin it.This impotentbeautyat leastsuffers fromfeeling
thebreakupoftheprofoundly indissolubleTotalityofwhatis (ofthe
concrete-real).Beautywould like to remainthe sign of an accord
of the real with itself.It cannot become conscious Negativity,
awakenedin dismemberment, and the lucid gaze, absorbedin the
Negative.This latterattitudepresupposestheviolentand laborious
struggleof Man againstNatureand is its end. That is the historic
strugglewhereMan constituteshimselfas "Subject"or as "abstract
I" ofthe "Understanding," as a separatedand namedbeing.
"Thatis to say,"Kojeveclarifies,"thatthoughtand thediscourse
whichrevealsthe real are bornofthe negativeActionwhichactu-
alizes Nothingnessbyannihilating Being:thegivenbeingofMan (in
the Struggle)and the givenbeingofNature(through Work-which
results,moreover, fromthereal contactwithdeathin theStruggle.)
That is to say,therefore,thatthehumanbeinghimselfis noneother
thanthatAction:he is deathwhichlivesa humanlife"(K,548; TEL,
550).
I wantto insiston the continualconnectionbetweenan abyssal
aspectand a tough,down-to-earth aspectin thisphilosophy,theonly
one havingtheambitionto be complete.The divergent possibilities
ofopposedhumanfiguresconfront eachotherandassemblein it: the
figureofthedyingman and oftheproudone,who turnsfromdeath,
thefigureofthemasterand thatofthemanpinnedto his work,the
figureoftherevolutionary and thatoftheskeptic,whose egotistical
interestlimitsdesire.This philosophyis not onlya philosophyof
death.It is also one ofclass struggleand work.
ButwithinthelimitsofthisstudyI do notintendto envisagethis
otherside. I would like to comparethatHegeliandoctrineofdeath
withwhatwe knowabout "sacrifice."
philosophers (inHegel,in Heidegger),

at leastultimately.
In truth,
Kojeveseemsto me
wrongnot to have envisaged,beyondclassicalmysticism, a "consciousmysticism,"
consciousofmakinga BeingfromNothingness, and,inaddition,defining
thatimpasse
as a Negativitywhichwouldno longerhavea fieldofaction(attheendofhistory). The
atheisticmystic,self-conscious,consciousofhavingto die and to disappear,would
live,as Hegelobviouslysaid concerning himself,"in absolutedismemberment"; but,
forhim,itis onlythematterofa certainperiod:unlikeHegel,hewouldnevercomeout
ofit,"contemplatingtheNegativerightintheface,"butneverbeingabletotranspose it
intoBeing,refusingto do it and maintaining himselfin ambiguity.

II. SACRIFICE
Sacrifice,on theone hand, and on theother,theGaze ofHegel
Absorbedin Death and Sacrifice
I shallnotspeakoftheinterpretation ofsacrifice
whichHegelgivesin
the chapterofthePhenomenology devotedto Religion.7It no doubt
makessensein thedevelopment ofthechapter, butit straysfromthe
essentialand,fromthepointofviewofthetheoryofsacrifice, itis,in
myopinion,ofless interestthantheimplicitrepresentation whichis
givenin thetextofthePrefaceandwhichI shallcontinueto analyze.
Concerningsacrifice,I can essentiallysay that,on the level,of
Hegel'sphilosophy, Man has,in a sense,revealedandfoundedhuman
truthbysacrificing; in sacrificehe destroyedtheanimal8in himself,
allowinghimselfandtheanimalto surviveonlyas thatnoncorporeal
truthwhichHegel describesand whichmakes ofman-in Heideg-
ger'swords-a beinguntodeath(Seinzum Tode),or-in thewordsof
Kojevehimself- "deathwhichlives a humanlife."
Actually,theproblemofHegelis givenin theactionofsacrifice. In
sacrifice,death,on the one hand,essentiallystrikesthe corporeal
being;and on the otherhand,it is preciselyin sacrificethat"death
livesa humanlife."It shouldevenbe said thatsacrificeis theprecise
responseto Hegel'srequirement, theoriginalformulation ofwhichI
repeat:
"Spiritattainsits truthonlybyfinding itselfin absolutedismem-
berment.It does not attain that (prodigious)powerby being the
Positive that turns away from the Negative. . . no, Spirit is that
poweronlyin thedegreeto whichit contemplatestheNegativeface
to face [and] dwells with it . . ."
Ifone takesintoaccountthefactthattheinstitution ofsacrifice
is
practicallyuniversal,it is clearthatNegativity,
incarnatedin Man's
death,notonlyis thearbitrary ofHegel,butalso thatit
construction
in of
has playeda role thespirit thesimplestmen,withoutanycom-
7. The Phenomenology ofSpirit,chapter8: Religion,B.: Religionin theformof
Art,a) The abstractworkof art (434-35). In thesetwo pages,Hegel dwellson the
disappearanceof objectiveessence,but withoutdevelopingits consequences.On
thesecondpageHegellimitshimselfto considerations properto "aestheticreligion"
(thereligionoftheGreeks).
8. Still,althoughanimalsacrificeseemstopredatehumansacrifice, thereis noth-
ingtoprovethatthechoiceofan animalsignifies theunconsciousdesiretoopposethe
animalas such;manis onlyopposedto corporealbeing,thebeingthatis given.He is,
furthermore, justas opposedto theplant.

GEORGES BATAILLE 19
mon groundscomparableto thosewhichare regulatedonce and for
all by the ceremoniesof a Church-but nonethelessin a univocal
manner.It is striking
to see thatacrosstheworlda communalNega-
tivityhas maintaineda strictparallelismin the developmentof
ratherstableinstitutions,whichhave the same formand the same
effects.
WhetherHe Lives orDies, Man CannotImmediatelyKnowDeath
I shall speak laterof the profounddifferences betweenthe man of

sacrifice,actingin ignorance(unconscious)ofthefullscope ofwhat
he is doing,andtheSage (Hegel)surrendering to theimplicationsofa
Knowledgewhich,in his own eyes,is absolute.
Despite thesedifferences, the questionofmanifesting theNega-
tivestillremains(andstillundera concreteform,i.e.,at theheartof
theTotality, whoseconstitutive elementsareinseparable).
The privi-
legedmanifestation ofNegativityis death,butdeath,in fact,reveals
nothing.In theory, it is his natural,animalbeingwhosedeathreveals
Man to himself,but the revelationnevertakesplace. Forwhen the
animalbeingsupporting himdies,thehumanbeinghimselfceasesto
be. In orderforMan torevealhimselfultimatelytohimself, he would
have to die,buthe wouldhave to do it whileliving-watchinghim-
selfceasingto be. In otherwords,deathitselfwouldhaveto become
(self-)consciousnessat theverymomentthatit annihilatesthecon-
scious being.In a sense,thisis whattakesplace (whatat least is on
thepointoftakingplace,orwhichtakesplacein a fugitive, ungrasp-
able manner)bymeansofa subterfuge. In thesacrifice,
thesacrificer
identifieshimselfwiththeanimalthatis struckdowndead.And so
he dies in seeinghimselfdie,and even,in a certainway,byhis own
will, one in spiritwith the sacrificialweapon.But it is a comedy!
Atleastitwouldbe a comedyifsomeothermethodexistedwhich
could revealto thelivingtheinvasionofdeath:thatfinishing offof
the finitebeing,whichhis Negativity-whichkills him,ends him
and definitively suppresseshim-accomplishes alone and whichit
alone can accomplish.ForHegel, satisfactioncan only take place,
desirecan be appeasedonlyin the consciousnessofdeath.Ifit were
based on the exclusionof death,satisfaction would contradictthat
whichdeathdesignates,ifthe satisfiedbeingwho is not conscious,
not utterlyconscious,of what in a constitutivemannerhe is, i.e.,
mortal,wereeventuallyto be drivenfromsatisfaction bydeath.That

is whythe consciousnessthathe has ofhimselfmustreflect(must
mirror)themovementofnegativity whichcreateshim,whichmakes
a man ofhim fortheveryreasonthatit will one daykill him.
He will be killedby his own negativity,
but forhim,thereafter,
therewill be nothingleft;his is a creativedeath,but if the con-
sciousness of death-of the marvelousmagic of death-does not
touchhimbeforehe dies,duringhis lifeit will seemthatdeathis not
destinedto reachhim,and so the deathawaitinghim will not give
him a human character.Thus, at all costs,man must live at the
momentthathe reallydies,or he mustlive withtheimpressionof
reallydying.
KnowledgeofDeath CannotDo Withouta Subterfuge:

Spectacle
proclaimsthenecessityofspectacle,orofrepresenta-
This difficulty
tionin general,withoutthepracticeofwhichitwouldbe possiblefor
us to remainalien and ignorantin respectto death,just as beasts
apparently are.Indeed,nothingis less animalthanfiction,whichis
moreor less separatedfromthereal,fromdeath.
Man does not live bybreadalone,butalso bythecomedieswith
whichhe willinglydeceiveshimself.In Man it is theanimal,it is the
naturalbeing,which eats. But Man takes partin ritesand perfor-
mances. Or else he can read: to the extentthat it is sovereign-
authentic-, literature prolongsin himthehauntingmagicofperfor-
mances,tragicor comic.
at least,it is a questionofouridentifying
In tragedy,9 withsome
characterwho dies, and of believingthatwe die, althoughwe are
alive. Furthermore,pureand simpleimaginationsuffices, butit has
thesame meaningas theclassicsubterfuges, orbooks,
performances,
to whichthe masses have recourse.
Agreementand DisagreementbetweenNaive Behaviorsand

Hegel's Lucid Reaction
Byassociatingit withsacrificeand,thereby, withtheprimary theme

ofrepresentation in performances),
(inart,in festivals, I have sought
to demonstratethatHegel's reactionis fundamental humanbehav-
ior.It is not a fantasyor a strangeattitude,it is par excellencethe
on.
9. I discusscomedyfurther

GEORGES BATAILLE 21
expressionendlesslyrepeatedbytradition. It is notHegelalone,it is
all ofhumanitywhicheverywhere alwayssought,obliquely,to seize
whatdeathbothgaveand tookawayfromhumanity.
BetweenHegel and the man of sacrificethereneverthelessre-
mainsa profounddifference. Hegel was consciousofhis representa-
tionoftheNegative:he situatedit,lucidly,in a definitepointofthe
"coherentdiscourse"whichrevealedhim to himself.That Totality
includedthe discoursewhichrevealsit. The man of sacrifice,who
lacked a discursiveconsciousnessofwhathe did,had onlya "sen-
sual" awareness,i.e., an obscureone, reducedto an unintelligible
emotion.It is truethatHegelhimself,beyonddiscourse,andin spite
ofhimself(in an "absolutedismemberment,") receivedtheshockof
deathevenmoreviolently. Moreviolently, aboveall,fortheprimary
reasonthatthebroadmovementofdiscourseextendedits reachbe-
yondlimits,i.e., withinthe framework of the Totalityof the real.
Beyondtheslightestdoubt,forHegel,thefactthathe was stillalive
was simplyan aggravation. The man ofsacrifice, on theotherhand,
maintainshis lifeessentially.He maintainsit not onlyin the sense
thatlifeis necessaryfortherepresentation ofdeath,but [also in the
sensethat]he seeksto enrichit.Butfroman externalperspective, the
palpable and intentionalexcitementof sacrificewas of greaterin-
terestthantheinvoluntarysensitivity ofHegel. The excitementof
which I speak is well-known,is definable;it is sacred horror:the
richestandthemostagonizingexperience, whichdoesnotlimititself
to dismemberment but which,on the contrary, opens itself,like a
theatrecurtain,ontoa realmbeyondthisworld,wheretherisinglight
ofdaytransfigures all thingsand destroystheirlimitedmeaning.
Indeed,ifHegel'sattitudeopposeslearnedconsciousnessand the
limitlessorganization ofa discursivethinking to thenaiveteofsacri-
fice,stillthatconsciousnessandthatorganization remainunclearon
one point;one cannotsaythatHegel was unawareofthe "moment"
of sacrifice;this "moment"is included,implicatedin the whole
movementof the Phenomenology-whereit is the Negativityof
death,insofaras it is assumed,whichmakes a man of the human
animal.Butbecausehe didnotsee thatsacrifice in itselfborewitness
to the entiremovementof death,10the finalexperience-the one
10. Perhapsforlack of a Catholicreligiousexperience.I imagineCatholicism
closerto paganexperience;I meanto a universalreligiousexperiencefromwhichthe
Reformation distanceditself.Perhapsa profound
Catholicpietycouldalonehaveintro-
ducedtheinwardsensewithoutwhichthephenomenology ofsacrifice
wouldbe im-

peculiarto theSage-describedin thePrefaceto thePhenomenology
was at firstinitialand universal-he didnotknowto whatextenthe
was right-withwhatprecisionhe describedtheintimatemovement
of Negativity;he did not clearlyseparatedeathfromthe feelingof
sadnessto whichnaiveexperienceopposesa sortofshuntingyardof
the emotions.
Pleasureand the Sadness ofDeath
Itwas preciselytheunivocalcharacter ofdeathforHegelthatinspired

thefollowingcommentary fromKojeve,whichapplies,again,to the
passagefromthe Preface:(K, 549; TEL, 551). "Certainly, theidea of
deathdoesnotheightenthewell-beingofMan; it doesnotmakehim
happynordoes it givehim anypleasure."Kojevewonderedin what
waysatisfaction resultsfroma familiarity withtheNegative,froma
tete--tetewithdeath.He believedithisduty,outofdecency, toreject
vulgarsatisfaction. The factthatHegel himselfsaid,in thisrespect,
thatSpirit"onlyattainsit truthbyfinding itselfin absolutedismem-
berment"goestogether, in principle,withKojeve'sNegation.Conse-
quently,it would even be superfluousto insist.... Kojevesimply
states that the idea of death "is alone capable if satisfying man's
pride." . . . Indeed,the desireto be "recognized," which Hegel places
at theoriginofhistoricalstruggles, couldbe expressedin an intrepid
attitude,ofthesortthatshowsa character toitsbestadvantage."Itis
only,"saysKojeve,"in beingorin becomingawareofone'smortality
or finitude,in existingand in feelingone's existencein a universe
withouta beyondorwithouta God,thatMan can affirm his liberty,
his historicity andhis individuality- uniquein all theworld-and
possible.Modem knowledge,much moreextensivethanthatof Hegel's time,has

assuredlycontributed to thesolutionofthatfundamental enigma(why,withoutany
plausiblereason,has humanityin general"sacrificed"?), butI seriouslybelievethata
correctphenomenological descriptioncould only be based on at least a Catholic
period.
-But at anyrate,Hegel,hostiletobeingwhichdoesnothing,-towhatsimplyis,
and is notAction,-was moreinterested in militarydeath;it is throughsuchdeath
thatheperceivedthethemeofsacrifice (buthe himselfusesthewordina moralsense):
"The state-of-the-soldier,"he statesin his Lecturesof 1805-06, "and war are the
objectively ofthepersonal-I,
realsacrifice thedangerofdeathfortheparticular,-that
contemplation ofhis abstractimmediateNegativity . . A"(inHegel,SdmtlicheWerke,
vol. 20, 261-62. CitedbyKojevein Introduction to theReadingofHegel,558 [TEL,
560]).Nonetheless,religioussacrificehas,evenfromHegel'spointofview,an essential
signification.

GEORGES BATAILLE 23
have thembe recognized.(Ibid.).ButifKojevesetsaside vulgarsatis-
faction-happiness-he now also sets aside Hegel's "absolutedis-
memberment": indeed,suchdismemberment is noteasilyreconciled
withthe desireforrecognition.
Satisfactionand dismemberment coincide,however, in one point,
butheretheyharmonizewithpleasure.This coincidencetakesplace
in "sacrifice";it is generallyunderstoodas thenaive formoflife,as
everyexistencein presenttime,whichmanifestswhatMan is: the
noveltywhichhe signifiesin theworldafterhe has becomeMan, on
the conditionthathe has satisfiedhis "animal" needs.
At anyrate,pleasure,or at least sensualpleasure,is such thatin
respecttoitKojeve'saffirmation wouldbe difficult touphold:theidea
ofdeathhelps, in a certainmanner and in certain cases, to multiply
the pleasuresof the senses. I go so faras to believethat,underthe
formofdefilement, theworld(orratherthegeneralimagery)ofdeath
is at the base of erotism.The feelingof sin is connectedin lucid
consciousnessto the idea of death,and in the same mannerthe
feelingofsinis connectedwithpleasure.11Thereis in factno human
pleasurewithoutsomeirregularity in its circumstances, withoutthe
breakingofan interdiction-thesimplest,and themostpowerful of
is
which, currently thatof nudity.
Moreover, possessionwas associatedin itstimewiththeimageof
sacrifice;it was a sacrificein which woman was the victim.... That
associationfromancientpoetryis verymeaningful; itrefers backto a
precisestateofsensibilityin whichthesacrificialelement,thefeel-
ingofsacredhorroritself,joined,in a weakenedstate,to a tempered
pleasure;in which,too,thetasteforsacrificeandtheemotionwhich
itreleasedseemedinno waycontrary totheultimateuses ofpleasure.
It mustbe said too thatsacrifice,
liketragedy,
was an elementofa
celebration;it bespokea blind,perniciousjoy and all the dangerof
thatjoy,and yetthisis preciselytheprincipleofhumanjoy;it wears
out and threatenswithdeathall who getcaughtup in itsmovement.
Gay Anguish,AnguishedGaiety
To theassociationofdeathandpleasure,whichis nota given,at least

is notan immediategivenin consciousness,is obviouslyopposedthe
11. Thisis at leastpossibleand,ifitis a matterofthemostcommoninterdictions,

banal.

sadnessofdeath,alwaysin thebackground ofconsciousness.In prin-
ciple,consciously, humanity"recoilsin horror beforedeath."In prin-
ciple,the destructiveeffectsofNegativityhave Natureas theirob-
ject.ButforMan's Negativityto drivehimintoa confrontation with
danger,forhim to make ofhimself,or at least oftheanimal,ofthe
naturalbeingthathe is, the objectofhis destructive negation,the
banalprerequisite is his unconsciousnessofthecause andtheeffects
ofhisactions.Now,itwas essentialforHegeltogainconsciousnessof
Negativityas such,to captureits horror-herethehorrorofdeath-
byupholdingand bylookingtheworkofdeathrightin theface.
Hegel,in thisway,is less opposedto thosewho "recoil"thanto
thosewho say: "it is nothing."He seems to distancehimselfmost
fromthosewho reactwithgaiety.
I wantto emphasize,as clearlyas possible,aftertheirsimilarity,
the oppositionbetweenthe naive attitudeand thatof the-abso-
lute-Wisdom of Hegel. I am not sure,in fact,thatof the two at-
titudesthemorenaiveis theless absolute.
I shallcitea paradoxicalexampleofa gayreactioninthefaceofthe
workofdeath.
The IrishandWelshcustomofthe"wake"is littleknownbutwas
stillpracticedat theendofthelast century. It is thesubjectofJoyce's
lastwork,12 FinnegansWake-the deathwatch ofFinnegan(however,
the readingof this famousnovel is difficult at best).In Wales,the
coffinwas placedopen,standingat theplace ofhonorofthehouse.
The dead man would be dressedin his finestsuit and top hat. His
familywould inviteall ofhis friends, who honoredthe departedall
the morethe longertheydancedand the deepertheydrankto his
health.It is thedeathofan other,butin suchinstances,thedeathof
the otheris alwaysthe image of one's own death.Only underone
conditioncould anyoneso rejoice;withthepresumedagreementof
the dead man-who is an other-, thedead man thatthedrinkerin
his turnwill become shall have no othermeaningthanhis prede-
cessor.
This paradoxicalreactioncould be considereda responseto the
desire to deny the existenceof death. A logical desire?Not in
theleast,I think.In Mexico today,deathis commonlyenvisagedon
the same level as the amusementsthat can be foundat festivals:
12. On thesubjectofthisobscurebook,videE. Jolas,"Elucidationdumonomythe

de JamesJoyce" in Critique(July1948):579-95.

GEORGES BATAILLE 25
skeletonpuppets,skeletoncandies,skeletonmerry-go-rounds-but
thiscustomis associatedwithan intensecult ofthedead,a visible
obsessionwithdeath.13
IfI envisagedeathgaily,it is not thatI too say,in turningaway
fromwhatis frightening: "it is nothing"or "it is false."On thecon-
trary,gaiety,connectedwiththeworkofdeath,causesme anguish,is
accentuatedbymyanguish,and in returnexacerbatesthatanguish:
ultimately,gay anguish,anguishedgaietycause me, in a feverish
chill,'4 "absolutedismemberment," whereit is my joy thatfinally
tearsme apart,butwheredejectionwouldfollowjoywereI nottorn
all thewayto the end,immeasurably.
Thereis onepreciseoppositionthatI wouldliketobringoutfully:
on the one hand Hegel's attitudeis less whole than thatof naive
humanity, but thisis meaninglessunless,reciprocally, one sees that
thenaiveattitudeis powerlessto maintainitselfwithoutsubterfuge.
Discourse Gives UsefulEnds to Sacrifice"Afterwards."
I have linkedthe meaningof sacrificeto Man's behavioronce his

animalneedshavebeensatisfied:Man differs fromthenaturalbeing
whichhe also is; thesacrificialgestureis whathe humanlyis,andthe
spectacleofsacrificethenmakeshis humanitymanifest.Freedfrom
animal need,man is sovereign:he does whathe pleases-his plea-
sure.Undertheseconditionshe is finallyable to make a rigorously
autonomousgesture.So longas he neededto satisfyanimalneeds,he
had to actwithan endin view(hehad to securefood,protecthimself
fromthecold).This supposesa servitude, a seriesofactssubordinated
to a finalresult:thenatural,animalsatisfaction withoutwhichMan
properly speaking,sovereign Man,couldnotsubsist.ButMan's intel-
ligence,his discursivethought,developedas functionsofservilela-
bor.Onlysacred,poeticwords,limitedto thelevelofimpotentbeau-
ty,have retainedthe powerto manifestfull sovereignty. Sacrifice,
consequently, is a sovereign,autonomousmannerofbeingonlyto
the extentthatit is uninformed by meaningfuldiscourse.To the
extentthatdiscourseinforms it,whatis sovereign is givenin termsof
13. This cameoutin thedocumentary whichEisensteindrewfromhisworkfora

longfilm:i VivaMexico!The cruxofthisfilmdealtwiththebizarrepracticeswhichI
have discussed.
14. Reading"chaudet froid"for"chaud-froid,"
whichmeansa dishprepared hot
butservedcold.

servitude.Indeedbydefinition whatis sovereigndoes notserve.But
simple discourse must respond to the question that discursive
thoughtasks concerningthemeaningthateach thingmusthave on
the level of utility.In principle,each thingis thereto servesome
purposeor other.Thus the simple manifestation of Man's link to
annihilation,the purerevelationofMan to himself(at themoment
when deathtransfixes his attention)passes fromsovereignty to the
primacyofservileends.Myth,associatedwithritual,had at firstthe
impotentbeautyofpoetry, butdiscourseconcerning sacrificeslipped
intovulgar,self-serving interpretation.Startingwitheffectsnaively
imaginedon thelevelofpoetry, such as theappeasingofa godorthe
purityofbeings,the end ofmeaningful discoursebecametheabun-
danceofrainorthecity'swell-being. The substantialworkofFrazer,
who recallsthoseformsofsovereignty thatwerethemostimpotent
and,apparently, theleastpropitiousforhappiness,generally tendsto
reducethemeaningoftheritualact to thesame purposesas laborin
thefields,and to make ofsacrificean agrarianrite.Todaythatthesis
ofthe GoldenBoughis discredited, butit seemed-reasonable insofar
as thesamepeople who sacrificed
inscribedsovereignsacrificewithin
theframeofa languageofplowmen.It is truethatin a veryarbitrary
manner,whichnevermeritedthecredenceofrigorousreason,these
people attempted,and musthave laboredto,submitsacrificeto the
laws of action,laws to which theythemselvesweresubmitted,or
laboredto submitthemselves.
Impotenceofthe Sage to AttainSovereignty

on theBasis
ofDiscourse
Thus, the sovereignty of sacrificeis not absolute either.It is not

absolute to the extentthat the institutionmaintainswithinthe
worldof efficaciousactivitya formwhose meaningis, on the con-
trary,sovereign.A slippagecannotfail to occur,to the benefitof
servitude.
IftheattitudeoftheSage (Hegel)is not,forits part,sovereign, at
leastthingsfunctionin theoppositedirection;Hegeldidnotdistance
himselfandifhe was unabletofindauthenticsovereignty, he cameas
near to it as he could. What separatedhim fromit would even be
imperceptible werewe not able to glimpsea richerimage through
these alterationsof meaning,which touch on sacrificeand which
have reducedit froman end to a simplemeans. The keyto a lesser

GEORGES BATAILLE 27
rigorousnesson the partof the Sage is the fact,not thatdiscourse
engageshis sovereignty withina framethat cannotsuit him and
whichatrophiesit,butpreciselytheopposite:sovereignty in Hegel's
attitudeproceedsfroma movementwhich discourserevealsand
which,in the Sage's spirit,is neverseparatedfromits revelation.It
cannever,therefore,be fullysovereign;theSage,infact,cannotfailto
subordinateit to thegoal ofa Wisdomwhichsupposesthe comple-
tion of discourse.Wisdom alone will be full autonomy,the sov-
ereigntyofbeing. . . . At least it would be ifwe could findsovereignty
bysearchingforit: and,in fact,ifI searchforit,I am undertaking the
projectofbeing-sovereignly: buttheprojectofbeing-sovereignly pre-
supposesa servilebeing!Whatnonethelessassuresthesovereignty of
the momentdescribedis the "absolutedismemberment" ofwhich
Hegel speaks,therupture,fora time,ofdiscourse.But thatrupture
itselfis not sovereign.In a sense it is an accidentin the ascent.
Althoughthetwosovereignties, thenaiveandthesageones,areboth
sovereignties of death,beyondthe difference betweena decline at
birth(betweena gradualalterationand an imperfect manifestation),
theydiffer on yetanotherprecisepoint:on Hegel'spart,itis precisely
a questionofan accident.It is nota strokeoffate,a piece ofbadluck,
whichwouldbe forever deprivedofsense.Dismemberment is,on the
contrary, fullofmeaning. ("Spirit onlyattains its writes
truth," Hegel
(but it is my emphasis),"by findingitselfin absolutedismember-
ment.")But thismeaningis unfortunate. It is whatlimitedand im-
poverishedtherevelationwhichtheSage drewfromlingering in the
regionswheredeathreigns.He welcomedsovereignty as a weight,
whichhe let go ...
Do I intendto minimizeHegel'sattitude?Butthecontrary is true!
I wantto showtheincomparablescopeofhis approach.To thatendI
cannotveil the veryminimal(and even inevitable)partof failure.
To mymind,it is rathertheexceptionalcertainty ofthatapproach
whichis broughtout in myassociations.Ifhe failed,one cannotsay
thatit was the resultof an error.The meaningof the failureitself
differsfromthatof the failurewhich caused it: the erroralone is
perhaps fortuitous.In general,it is as an authenticmovement,
weightywith sense,thatone must speak ofthe "failure"ofHegel.
Indeed,manis alwaysin pursuitofan authenticsovereignty. That
sovereignty, apparently,was, in a certainsense,originallyhis, but
doubtlessthatcould not thenhavebeenin a consciousmanner,and
so in a sense it was not his, it escapedhim. We shall see thatin a

numberofwayshe continuedtopursuewhatforever eludedhim.The
essentialthingis thatone cannotattainit consciouslyand seek it,
because seekingdistancesit. And yetI can believethatnothingis
givenus thatis not givenin thatequivocalmanner.
TranslatedbyJonathan
Strauss


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Hegel, Death and Sacrifice

Author(s): Georges Bataille and Jonathan Strauss

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