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1. Thank you for your e-mail sent Tue, Dec 21, 2010 8:38 am to which the undersigned is
directly responding:
Disposition
No hearing after timely filed objections[Darlene M. Muszynski] The docket correctly reflects
that no hearing took place on 9/2/10 & 12/6/10. The 9/2/10 minutes reflect that the hearing was
cancelled. The Notice of Cancellation of the 12/6/10 hearing was filed on 12/7/10 and the
minutes reflect that there was no appearance of the parties.
YES, following said 08/12/2010 disposition, “no hearing took place on 9/2/10 and 12/6/10”,
and/or could have been properly scheduled, and Jennifer Franklin-Prescott had not consented
to any magistrate hearing and/or hearing after said disposition.
YES, the “9/2/10 hearing was cancelled”, and over and over, Franklin-Prescott had objected
to any magistrate and/or other hearing in this disposed case:
Here, “The Notice of Cancellation of the 12/6/10 hearing” referred to a non-scheduled and
fictitious hearing, because no hearing had ever been scheduled for “12/6/2010 at 3:00 PM”.
Importantly, the fictitious and non-existent “motion for summary judgment” had never been
filed, noticed, and/or served in this disposed case. See Docket.
Here, WHICH attorney allegedly filed the fictitious motion?
Furthermore here, none of the attorneys of record (“Paskewicz; Rose”) had any authority to
schedule any hearing and/or move for summary judgment after said 08/12/10 disposition.
Here, BankUnited itself had fired Attorney Paskewicz and law firm Camner Lipsitz.
According to the communications of record, Rose has not been representing BankUnited.
No hearing was ever scheduled on the purported “reopen date” of 12/6/10 or thereafter.
Here, Jennifer Franklin-Prescott had not scheduled any hearing, and no hearing had ever
taken place.
No reopen reason(s)[Darlene M. Muszynski] The case was reopened on 12/6/10 with a
MOTION TO COMPEL & QUIET TITLE BY JENNIFER FRANKLIN-PRESCOT There are
only two allowable reasons for a reopen Modification and Other. This motion falls into the
Other category.
3. Here, Jennifer Franklin-Prescott objected and properly responded to the unauthorized and
fictitious hearing. Here, Prescott reported and objected to “BankUnited’s” fraud on the
Court. Prescott’s objection to the unauthorized hearing did not “reopen” the disposed
frivolous action.
Here, e.g., Jennifer Franklin-Prescott had filed her “Emergency Objection” on 2010 DEC. 6,
12:43 PM prior to the unauthorized hearing. See Clerk’s 2010 DEC. 6, 12:43 PM stamp:
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If in each disposed case a non-prevailing plaintiff and/or party could simply schedule an
unauthorized and fictitious hearing for improper purposes of re-opening the disposed
case, the floodgates of fraud would open even wider. Here to start with, BankUnited had
alleged the unknown loss and/or destruction of the purported note. Here, no note had ever
been assigned to “BankUnited” as indisputably evident from the Collier County public
records on file. See, e.g., Complaint. Accordingly, “BankUnited” had no right to sue
No BankUnited assignment of any loan, note, and/or mortgage [Darlene M. Muszynski] the
file reflects that on 12/2/10 Plaintiff filed the Original Mortgage.
4. NO, no genuine “original mortgage” was filed nor could have possibly been “filed”. No
mortgage and/or note was assigned to “BankUnited”. Here, bankrupt BankUnited, FSB, had
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No “BankUnited” mortgage and/or assignment appears in the Collier County public records:
Said seizure of BankUnited, FSB, made impossible any negotiated and/or contractual
Statutes; see Ch. 673, F.S. Here, there could not have possibly been any breach of contract,
known and recorded absence of any chain of assignment to “BankUnited”. See Complaint:
Hon. Clerk Dwight E. Brock is the custodian of Collier County records and has known that
on “12/2/10” the purported “plaintiff” “BankUnited” did not “file the original mortgage”
Here, “BankUnited” is neither in possession of any genuine authentic instrument and/or note
5. Here, BankUnited knew that defunct BankUnited, FSB, had been lawfully seized (F.D.I.C.)
and that the purported “plaintiff” could not have possibly (re) established any admittedly lost
and/or destroyed note under Florida law. See State Street Bank v. Lord, 851 So.2d 790
(Fla. 4 Dist. 2003); and Federal and F.D.I.C. Bank seizure reports on file.
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6. Here, no instrument and/or note was assigned to “BankUnited” after said seizure. The
“plaintiff” had asserted the “unknown” loss and/or destruction of the purported “note”,
which “was the result of a lawful seizure” (F.D.I.C.), Section 673.3091, Florida Statutes. See
also § 90.953, Fla. Stat. Therefore, “plaintiff” knew that it could not have possibly met the
7. “BankUnited” never satisfied the requirements and/or conditions precedent for a lis pendens.
“BankUnited” as indisputably evidenced by the Collier County public records on file. At the
time of the fraudulent recording of the purported lis pendens, “BankUnited” asserted the
unknown loss and/or destruction of a note. See OR 4471 PG 592; instrument 4318185
(7/10/2009).
8. In the record absence of any note assignment to “BankUnited” and/or possibility to establish
any “BankUnited” note, the lis pendens was fraudulent. See “Notice of Release and
Discharge of Fraudulent lis pendens, Ch. 48, F.S.”; OR 4600 PG 2601, instrument 4470323
(9/1/2010).
Here, there had been no legal basis for any lis pendens, and “BankUnited” had no right to
sue Prescott.
9. Fla.R.Civ.P. Rule 1.130(a) requires a Plaintiff to attach copies of all “bonds, notes, bills of
exchange, contracts, accounts, or documents upon which action may be brought” to its
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complaint. Here, the unauthorized plaintiff(s) failed to attach a copy of the purported
promissory note. Therefore here, the non-meritorious claim had no base and was disposed.
10. The original document required to be filed with the court in a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding is the promissory note. A promissory note is a negotiable instrument within the
definition of section 673.1041(1), and either the original must be produced, or the lost
document must be reestablished under section 673.3091, Florida Statutes. See Mason v.
Rubin, 727 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); see also Downing v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake
City, 81 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1955); Thompson v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 673 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.
5th DCA 1994); Figueredo v. Bank Espirito Santo, 537 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
Here after lawful F.D.I.C. seizure of plaintiff defunct bank, re-establishment was legally &
factually impossible. Furthermore, seizure is not any transfer by delivery in the ordinary
course of business. Accordingly, the Disposition Judge disposed the frivolous action.
11. The Evidence Code provides the rationale for the above conclusion and demand. Section
90.952, Florida Statutes (2002), indicates that original documents are required to prove the
contents of a writing, unless otherwise provided by statute. Here pursuant to Section 90.953,
Florida Statutes, Jennifer Franklin has been raising genuine questions as to the
12. After said 08/12/2010 disposition, Jennifer Franklin-Prescott has been in, e.g., Dubai,
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Under American law, a Florida homeowner should not have to worry each and every time
she leaves her home that BankUnited is perpetuating its fraud scheme and fraud on Court.
WHEREFORE, Jennifer Franklin-Prescott objects to said fraud on the Court and demands that
• Disposition of the facially frivolous action by BankUnited, which is not any “successor
in interest” after said seizure of bankrupt BankUnited, FSB pursuant to the warrant on
record;