Advanced Technologies Combating Terrorism in the EU: The

Psychological Warfare Aspect

Darya Bazarkina
Department of the International Security and Foreign Policy of Russia, National Security
Faculty, Institute of Law and National Security, Russian Presidential Academy of National
Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia
School of International Relations, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg,
Russia
Bazarkina-icspsc@yandex.ru

Abstract: At present, work with big data is becoming particularly relevant in the security sphere. It helps, for example, to
track terrorist propaganda on the internet and social media. Special programs are required to process large amounts of
information. In this regard, the development of artificial intelligence, capable of creating analytical products in the field of
security, is discussed by many researchers. The Strategic Research Agenda for Robotics in Europe 2014–2020 says the
significant opportunities for robotics will be in (among others) the area of security (EU Robotics, 2014). The implementation
of various technical solutions in the security field is often perceived ambiguously: law enforcement agencies may be accused
of unjustified espionage. This often gives rise to a new round of public debates, in which provocateurs from terrorist groups
can attack the reputation of law enforcement structures, accusing the state of repression. Along with these traditional
challenges, new ones are emerging in the framework of psychological warfare. The generation of news items according to
data received during the above-mentioned processes will also be increasingly generated by task automation bots. The
possible use of such equipment by terrorist organisations will allow them to create, at certain moments, a quantitative
predominance of terrorist propaganda. The author of the present paper used the methods of case studies, system and
situation analysis. The research question was formulated as follows: how do the advanced technologies in EU counter-
terrorism influence psychological warfare? We concluded that the European Union and Member States today turn to the
active use of advanced technologies in combating terrorism and its propaganda. Despite undoubtedly positive effects, the
practice of outsourcing in this field can meet obstacles if the interests of high tech companies contradict those of the
authorities. This problem offers a perspective for further research, as does the spectrum of problems inherent in general in
the counteraction of terrorism using advanced technologies.

Keywords: advanced technologies, counter-terrorism, communication, psychological warfare, European Union

1. Introduction
The use of strategic communication by terrorist groups in their communication with target audiences has
become a significant threat both to the international and European security. In the 21st century, terrorism has
foremost an organisational character. Whereas terrorist groups in the 20 th century were still clearly
distinguishable, in the 21st century, terrorists are preparing and performing terrorist acts backed by cells in
different countries of the world, of which many are formed in Europe. Over the course of time, these cells are
becoming less dependent on the leading centre among others in financial terms, which is related to the surge of
lone-wolves who are not directly connected to the groups that have inspired them to carry out terrorist attacks.
At the same time, the escalation of economic, political and social crises has allowed terrorist organisation to
manipulate the protest moods of potential and real followers in their messages with the help of pseudo-Marxist
and Nazi conceptions, which has significantly broadened their social and membership base.

2. Terrorist propaganda’s new level: Strategic communication elements in IS’ modus

operandi
Since 2014-15, related to the emergence of the IS on the political stage, and along with a strongly asserting and
internationally structured terrorist network, a hierarchical organisation has emerged, imitating the system of
state bodies and controlling a vast geographical area. The earnings from natural resources facilitate the training
of terrorists, the purchase of arms and ammunition and not in the least the formation of units responsible for
communication (DDR Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, Abteilung Verfassungsschutz, 2008; Wolska-
Liśkiewicz, 2016; Sundiev, Smirnov and Kostin, 2014; Cantlie, 2015, p. 47). Due to these circumstances, the IS
threat is becoming a priority not only within the context of problems related to quasi-religious organisations,
but also against the background of other branches of terrorism.

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Terrorist organisations use contemporary means of communication in their propaganda in order to skilfully
manipulate their target audience’s opinion with the help of well-conceived messages. The development of
communication technologies (internet, mobile communication, social networks, satellite television, etc.) has
significantly eased the spread of messages among (potential) followers of terrorist organisations. Recruiters for
IS have their own web-sites, social media accounts, mobile applications, computer games. The prevention of
proliferation of such materials through censorship has become nearly impossible, because a new copy of a
website appears in the internet almost immediately after its closing. In the face of these threats, new tasks have
arisen for the EU governing bodies and its member states, and one of these tasks is the eradication of internal
contradictions of its own policy, including contradictions within the sphere of public communication.

An important component of terrorism is the ideological colouring of terrorist acts. Terrorism is a means for
obtaining economic and political interests and can use (wholly, as in the case of Nazism, or in a reduced, distorted
form) any ideology until the moment it helps in achieving the goals. Despite this fact, in the public consciousness,
terrorism is particularly associated with ideology (due to the mass media and politicians) and with the problem
of self-identification, as expressed in political, religious and cultural doctrines. Herein lays one of the main
reasons why terrorist cells and organisations are so quickly finding new followers and often win in the
psychological warfare: terrorism has been recognized as an expression of ideology, an alternative to inefficient
or unfair political and economic courses, and thousands of people have become consumers of extremist
literature and internet content.

IS is showing a completely new level of communication skills among the terrorist organisations of the quasi-
religious branch, applying the elements of strategic communication and transmitting a central message that IS
is a state, not an underground terrorist group (see, for example: Cantlie, 2015; Vice News, 2014). The “actions”
that IS is projecting into the collective consciousness are the foundations of bodies similar to state bodies. They
have a hierarchical structure, make administrative decisions and symbolically represent terrorist acts by
murdering their hostages as the punishment of criminals. The image of a state is not only created by real practice,
but also through IS’ media products which have proven to enlarge the international network of the terrorist
organisation.

The terrorist attacks carried out by IS are characterized by their provocative effect. Terrorists have imitators
among young people. Their attacks also contribute to the fuelling of fear that can result in a decline of confidence
in power institutions. The EU experience confirms the conception of creating chains of communication
management. Terrorist attacks always trigger the response mechanism of government and security services. In
first instance, it puts attention to the terrorists, strengthening their organisation’s brand. Secondly, it sets forth
a task (besides, of course, the neutralisation of terrorist organisations) in front of the power bodies, that is, (1)
to prevent panic in society and (2) to mobilize the citizens for participation in the fight against terrorism. This
participation can be implemented in the sphere of communication (for instance, via public events showing the
condemnation of terrorism) or in the operational area.

The attacks of quasi-religious terrorists are provoking the spread of anti-Islam movements, such as Pegida
(Johnson, 2015; Jordans, 2015; Stokes, Wike and Poushter, 2016), which, in turn, could create risks for the
maintenance of European democratic values in the near future. In this situation, there is a need for promptly
taken measures aimed at narrowing down the social and membership base of organisations such as IS. Once
again, this points to the significant role of communication support in the fight against terrorism.

3. European approach to countering terrorist propaganda: expert knowledge sharing,

disruption and counter-narratives
Experts and politicians note that the “proliferation of extremist content on enormously popular online platforms
such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube means that vulnerable people can easily be exposed to messages of
hate” (Sikorski, 2017). Europol asserts in its Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) report that
“counter-terrorism investigations in Europe have shown that the use of the internet is an integral component in
any terrorist plot” (Europol, 2017, p. 52). Analysts of agency consider that the most widespread cases of terrorist
recruitment on the internet are “cases when the recruiting agent was previously known to recruits through
sharing the same social networks” (Ibidem). Internet and encrypted social media platforms such as Telegram
provide the relatively safe environment of the internet to terrorists, who proceed to conduct their activities.
“Despite the noise created by counter-messaging and disinformation campaigns, major terrorist groups such as

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the so-called Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ) still manage to get their propaganda messages through to a
wide variety of audiences” (Ibidem). The use of encrypted instant messaging services by terrorists provides
certain guarantees for the terrorist OPSEC (operational security), and even the absence of any major cyber-
attacks by terrorist organisations is interpreted by Europol only “as the result of not enough technical skills on
their side, at least for the present time” (Europol, 2017, p. 53 – 54).

A very important question in this case is whether traditional censorship works in the digital society, where
disrupted extremist/terrorist materials can be published fast on many alternative platforms (mirror websites,
social media accounts, etc.), especially when the ‘state’ bodies in IS maintain this publishing more effectively
than other terrorist groups. At the same time, the counter-narrative to replace the terrorist content should be
addressed to the target audiences, taking the public interest into account.

Following our analysis of counter-terrorist communication provision in the European Union from 2001 to the
present days, we can highlight some undoubted achievements. Europol, being founded in 1998, has acquired its
current functions and authority just after 2001. As of now, Europol is coordinating the collaboration of all EU
member states’ police services, actively synchronising information exchange among the national subdivisions.
The agency’s publications (Europol, 2007 – 2018) created using big data are important analytical data sources
for other European structures (in particular for Eurojust (Devoic, 2012, p. 44). Europol, Eurojust and the EU
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator have formed an extensive analytical database being established at the very
beginning of its creation.

Despite the limited power the Coordinator and agencies have in the operational sphere, they have big
opportunities in the sphere of communication. The achievement of the EU anti-terrorism activities in
communication provision at the level of European bodies is the combination of significant practical tools of
strategic communication: (1) information collection and systematisation; (2) analytical work (the first two
functions are particularly done by the EU INTCEN, Europol, nets ENER – The European Network of Experts on
Radicalisation – and RAN – The Radicalisation Awareness Network); (3) multi-channel communication with
specialized agencies of the member states and third countries (conferences, seminars, open access analytical
publications) (Eurojust, 2007); and (4) communications with the broader public, focused on counter-terrorism
agencies’ reputation (ranging from press services, their presence in social media to the availability of feedback
forms on their official websites). The organisational character of expert advisory bodies (ENER and RAN) is useful
in the scholarly discussion related to the search for practical solutions in the fight against terrorism. The principle
of member states’ representation in the European agencies can enhance both the expression of national
governments’ interests and the distribution of separate tasks among countries in the fight against terrorism.

Regardless its undisputed advantages, the communication provision of the EU counter-terrorism agencies has
also definite disadvantages.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment and a
number of elements in the 2015 European Agenda for Security emphasize close attention that has been paid to
the communication provision of counter-terrorism during the period under review (see: Council of the EU, 2005,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2014; European Commission, 2015, 2016). However, the escalation of terrorist threats, a
process that has started in 2015 and is still ongoing, clearly demonstrates the insufficiency in this field. Along
with clear advantages of the structured counter-terrorism system, it is possible to highlight a number of factors
constraining the development of communication provision. These factors appeared in the reviewed period or
were historically inherent in counter-terrorism structures. As an historical factor, we can observe the inflexibility
of intelligence agencies in their evaluation of opposition parties and movements, far-left parties in particular.
Such situation, in our perspective, is conditioned by the inertia of the Cold War. Consequently, this prevented
the construction of a dialogue in the fight against terrorism.

The political factors leading to the inefficiency in the counter-terrorist agencies’ communication include: (1)
geopolitical rivalry among the nation states, leading to competition among their intelligent agencies; (2) strategic
communication subdivisions’ concentration on geopolitical tasks (for example, their participation in the
information warfare with Russia), leading to a loss of attention to the communication provision of counter-
terrorism activities; (3) opportunism in politicians’ behaviour that imperils the national security (the Spanish
government’s communication the after the terrorist attack in Madrid is a telling example).

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For analysis of the countering of IS in social media, it is useful to apply the classification given by Reed, Ingram
and Whittaker (2017, p. 27). Among the methods they offer in the EU are:
ƒ Disruption – preventing the terrorist propaganda from reaching its target audience. “In particular, this has
focused on taking down propaganda from social media and delete offending accounts”;
ƒ Redirection – “it seeks to redirect viewers to different messages in an attempt to ‘nudge’ their behavior ...
the project redirects those searching for jihadist material to counter-messaging”.
ƒ Campaign and message design – developing communication campaigns, “typically based on counter-
narrative or alternative-narrative approaches”.
Unfortunately one more method—synchronising message and action—which is at the core of the strategic
communication concept is not presented in the EU experience research, and this is reflected in the countering
of IS in social media. There are measures in the EU media sphere concentrating mainly on censorship
mechanisms. Counter-narrative dissemination is implemented mainly within outsourcing programmes by IT
companies, NGOs and social services, but the strategic communication needs a logically consistent message
from supranational governing bodies. Unfortunately, we cannot find such a message in the European Union
nowadays. In comparison with the EU, IS shows a completely new level of communication skill among the
terrorist organisations of the quasi-religious branch, applying elements of strategic communication and
transmitting a central message (see, for example: Cantlie, 2015; Vice News, 2014) that IS is a state, not an
underground terrorist group.

Disruption implemented by Europol is a leading method in countering IS online propaganda. The most actual
events in this direction (at the time of this research) were two Referral Action Days (14/15 March 2018), in which
Europol’s European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) took part with officers from the national referral units
of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, “targeting terrorist content located on
WordPress.com, a blogging service, and VideoPress, a video-hosting service for WordPress sites”. The campaign
identified over 900 items of branded terrorist propaganda that were swiftly flagged to the platform moderators
for further review and eventual removal (Europol, 2018).

We are agreed that “many actors may consider the removal of content a blunt instrument for all problematic
content on the internet for ethical and practical reasons—such as where one draws the line between extremist
content and political speech” (Reed, Ingram and Whittaker, 2017, p. 31). Alternative are initiatives offering
counter-speech via online advertising. The redirect method has been piloted by Jigsaw, an initiative by Google,
in partnership with Moonshot CVE, Quantum Communications and a team of counter-narrative researchers. The
project was realized in three steps:
ƒ Interview IS defectors and ‘jihadi brides’ to glean insights into our audience’s online behaviors.
ƒ Map the major narratives used by IS in their media to draw people in and mobilize them to action.
ƒ Survey YouTube for existing and authentic videos that are effective at countering those narratives (The
Redirect Method, 2018).
The final list had videos sourced from 83 different YouTube creators. This method can be criticized because
assessment of the results does not show its efficiency in terms of de-radicalization, only quantitative indicators
of web page visits. However, it may be the first step in the EU to “socialisation and techniques; using big data in
order to analyse the information related to the communication practices of violent radicalisation” (European
Commission, 2016, p. 4) even under the circumstances of Brexit (one of the partners in the redirect method
project, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, is located in London).

The Radicalisation Awareness Network – RAN – implements the method of campaign and message design in
delivering alternative narratives through trainings, internet sites and social media content created by the
partners of the network (mainly NGOs and independent think tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation). One of
RAN’s practical cases is the campaign #NotAnotherBrother, a “counter-speech campaign aimed to reach
potential foreign terrorist fighters, and their networks, in order to dissuade from extremism and terrorism by
challenging ISIS’ utopia narrative”. The campaign was launched in July 2015 on its own website
(https://notanotherbrother.wordpress.com) and YouTube channel, with an accompanying Twitter account
(RAN, 2017, p. 413). After the first month, the content disseminated by NGOs was taken into schools and other
workshops and used to stimulate discussion about radicalisation (Ibidem). However, unfortunately, there is no

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active feedback from society in this case. The video “Negotiate – #RejectISIS” placed within Not Another
Brother’s profile, which had only 150 subscribers on 10 June 2018, gathered only nine ‘Likes’ and one ‘Dislike’ in
two and a half years (from October 2015 to June 2018) (NotAnotherBrother, 2015). This is just one illustration,
but it serves to show how the dissemination of counter-narratives needs technical and PR support.

The organisational factors leading to a decrease in the efficiency of communication during the fight again
terrorism in the EU are
ƒ the dependency of the Coordinator and European agencies on the national governments’ interests (which
is apparent, for example, in the selection of intelligence data that are voluntarily transferred to the
European bodies) and, as its consequence and
ƒ the absence of an adequate level of communication with and an insufficient representation of the agencies’
effective work for society.
The latter inevitably affects the quality of anti-terrorist campaigns. For example, the collection of intelligence
data by various structures (by the European Counter Terrorism Centre at Europol and the EU Intelligence
Analysis Data) helps to accumulate a large amount of timely information. However, in open access publications
there are contradictions indicating the lack of strategic planning of communication. We can find the examples,
in particular, in the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT): although far-left terrorist groups are
condemned, Europol calls their agenda “anti-authoritarian” (see, for example: Europol, 2007 – 2018). The term
“authoritarianism” has a strong negative connotation (Council of the EU, 2015, p. 9) that automatically gives
additional legitimacy to the “anti-authoritarian” fighters.

These examples, and a quantity of other data, show that the priority in the application of advanced technologies
in the EU’s counter-terrorism propaganda remains the disruption of extremist content. The redirect method is
at the very beginning of implementation in practice and seems to be very promising. With the automatic
inclusion of a number of extremist and terrorist sites in the list of redirection links, it is possible to create a
significant quantitative superiority of the content aimed at combating terrorism in the target audience.

Unfortunately, the advantage conferred by contemporary means of communication is significantly offset by

objective shortcomings of the counter-narrative. With the careful development of content aimed at teenagers
and young people, the rhetoric of counter-terrorism itself is not fully developed, as can be seen from the official
publications from Europol.

Implementation of robotics in counter-terrorism seems to be the EU’s future. “Robots … can provide relentless
security and will prove invaluable in civil security, border protection and the patrolling of plant and facilities”
(EU Robotics, 2014). The implementation of artificial intelligence can also be useful in countering terrorist
propaganda, but the human component is fundamental in the formation of programs that define extremist
content and create counter-messages. This is the objective difficulty of preparing self-learning programs for
communication with young people from risk groups, which are primarily targets of terrorist recruitment. Such
developments require the involvement of a wide range of specialists in various fields (political science,
information technology, psychology, history, etc.). The European Union is taking confident steps in this direction,
but even in developed countries, the use of advanced technologies in the fight against terrorism in the context
of information warfare has not been established on a permanent basis.

At present, the nature of the psychological warfare between terrorists and law enforcement agencies is
influenced rather by the content of messages in the media. The very facts of the arrests of suspected terrorists,
the elimination of terrorist cells and military victories over ISIS in their own territory are more convincing
messages to a mass audience than the unfinished rhetoric of counter-terrorism spread during special campaigns.

Without an important content component, the quantitative predominance of anti-terrorist messages can be
overcome if the terrorists of the future acquire technologies similar to those used by the special services today.
Public-private partnership in the development of such products helps, on the one hand, to attract qualified
civilian personnel. On the other hand, there is always a risk of technology leakage. Recall that of those who
carried out the failed attack on the United States Embassy in Paris, one man served in an elite army battalion,
two were labourers and another was a programmer working for the local government. One way or another, the

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implementation of advanced technologies in counter-terrorist propaganda today is auxiliary and catching up in

relation to the fight for meanings and hearts and minds.

4. Conclusion
With the development of technical means of communication, the operations within asymmetrical information
warfare are becoming significantly easier. For instance, the analysis of target audience’s interests is simplified
by the possibility to automatically consider web page traffic, comments and likes of social media users’
messages. The generation of news items according to the data received during above-mentioned processes will
also increasingly become automated by means of task-specific robots that are already used by some news
agencies and analytical editions, including the EU. The possible use of such equipment by terrorist organisations
will allow them to create, at certain moments, a quantitative predominance of terrorist propaganda. In these
conditions, the measures of counterpropaganda or censorship for the sake of protection of state and society are
insufficient. The high level of resistance by citizens, especially by security officials, to informational and
psychological impact is necessary. In other words, there is a need for adequate staff’ training from relevant
agencies in order to cope with the communication threats related to terrorism.

The European Union today is turning to the active use of ICT in countering IS propaganda in social media, but
censorship (disruption) remains the most popular practice in supranational bodies. This problem seems a likely
perspective for further research, along with the general spectrum of problems inherent in the counteraction of
terrorist propaganda.

The use of new information communication technologies in the fight against terrorist propaganda is necessary,
and is recognized as a necessity by governing bodies and law enforcement agencies. At the same time, automatic
means of monitoring the internet space and social networks, and means of blocking dangerous or suspicious
content, should be carried out with constant consideration of the interests of civil society. Both national and
supranational governments face a difficult task to win over various social groups, including ethnic and religious
communities, in the fight against terrorism and terrorist propaganda. Without this condition, the counter-
narratives developed by anti-terrorist bodies and non-state actors will not be as widespread as is necessary for
a quantitative and qualitative change in the information environment, and for the marginalization of terrorist
narratives.

Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges Saint-Petersburg State University for a research grant 26520757.

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for the research group that was mainly involved in research for the South African National Defence Force and
Government sectors on Cyber Defence. Her research is focused on cybersecurity and government policy. She
has presented talks at national and international forums and has also been invited as keynote speaker at
international conferences.

Biographies of Contributing Authors

Dr Abdullahi Arabo is a Senior Lecturer in Computer Networks and Mobile Technology at the University of the
West of England. Dr Arabo is currently a reviewer for EPSRC grants/proposal application and British Council
Newton Fund applications. Dr Arabo has successfully lead the development of an MSc Cyber Security which has
been provisionally certified by the National Cyber Security Centre UK (NCSC), the public-facing body of the
GCHQ. Dr Arabo served as a faculty member of Oxford Internet Institute (OII) and was also a member of the
Oxford University Cyber Security Centre. In the past, he was employed as a Cyber Security consultant by BT and
a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford where a lead a research on the security of connected home
futures.

Stacey Omeleze Baror obtained her B.sc Hon and Masters in Computer Sci., from the Computer Science
Department, University of Pretoria. She is currently studying towards a Doctorate with the Computer Science,
University of Pretoria. Her research areas is focused on Public cloud, Digital forensic readiness in the cloud,
Cloud forensics, Cybercrime, Machine learning and Natural language processing techniques for cybercrime and
Information Security.

Peter Barrett is a manager and senior engineer with Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering
Institute. A former US Marine, Peter has 15 years of experience in intelligence and cyber operations in support
of the US Department of Defense. His interests include cyber training, learning technologies, and large-scale
cyber exercises.

DSc Darya Bazarkina is a professor at the Department of the International Security, Russian Presidential
Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, and a senior researcher at the School of
International Relations, Saint Petersburg State University, Russia. Darya is an author of more than 70
publications on communication aspects of the counter-terrorist activity.

Lieutenant Clint Bramlette is a Master’s student at the Air Force Institute of Technology studying Cyberspace
Operations. Previously, he worked in cybersecurity at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. He has
Bachelor’s in Wireless Engineering from Auburn University.

Kimo Bumanglag is a cyber security engineer and exercise developer at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software
Engineering Institute. He has spent over ten years working with the Defense Department in the field of cyber
operations. He is also a doctoral student at Dakota State University.

Peter Chan is a researcher at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) South Africa, working in
the Cyber Operations group within the Defence Peace Safety and Security department. His research interest
are network simulation, security and formal methods of computing.

Dr. Jim Q. Chen, Ph.D. is Professor of Cyber Studies in the College of Information and Cyberspace (CIC) at the
U.S. National Defense University (NDU). His expertise is in cyber warfare, cyber deterrence, cyber strategy,
cybersecurity technology, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. Based on his research, he has authored
and published numerous peer-reviewed papers, articles, and book chapters on these topics. He has also taught
courses on these topics.

Mercy Chitauro is a lecturer in the department of Computer Science at Namibia University of Science and
Technology. She is a PhD candidate in computer science at the same university. Her main research areas are in
cyber security, critical infrastructure security, network security and child online protection.

Captain Luis Cintron is an engineer pursuing a master’s degree at the Air Force Institute of Technology, USA.
Captain Cintron has a B.S. in computer engineering from the University of South Florida. His previous

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