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454, MARCH 31, 2005 541 the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga is fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and
Garcia Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process of making
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005. *
a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child;
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely
CATINDIG, petitioner. as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both with a legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the
of personal as well as public interest that every person process of making a child, whether related or not to
must have a name.—For all practical and legal the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to
purposes, a man’s name is the designation by which a legitimate child. It is a
he is known and called in the community in which he _______________
lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is *
THIRD DIVISION.
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
542
label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal ANNOTATED
as well as public interest that every person must have
a name. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual Garcia
has two parts—the given or proper name and the juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
surname or family name; The given name may be between two persons a relationship similar to that
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the which results from legitimate paternity and
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.— filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given merely as an act to establish a relationship of
or proper name and (2) the surname or family paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows
name. The given or proper name is that which is given the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed,
to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State
him from other individuals. The surname or family Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
name is that which identifies the family to which he initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The that adoption is impressed with social and moral
given name may be freely selected by the parents for responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared
to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of
1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the provides that: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or
adopted. application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled 543
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 543
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.— In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it Garcia
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights making body intended right and justice to prevail.”
provided by law to a legitimate child without This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right
the surname of her father and her mother, as and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law injustice which may apparently be authorized by some
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino way of interpreting the law.”
custom that the initial or surname of the mother Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law
should immediately precede the surname of the prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father. father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
Same; Same; Same; Statutory the Court finds no reason why she should not be
Construction; Adoption statutes, being humane and allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is a settled rule father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
should be liberally construed to carry out the not be allowed to do so.
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br.
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill 13.
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Code which presumes in the interpretation of Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
application of law that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail was intended to strengthen
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil Code
natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue grant of this petition would redound to the best
raised in the instant case. interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy
The facts are undisputed. Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her
birth up to the present constitute more than enough
herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
1
surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
surname. of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the
3 name.
_______________
assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence Annex “F”, Id., at pp. 41-43.
3
presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any Rollo at pp. 42-43.
4
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the Annex “G”, Id., at pp. 44-48.
5
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor We find merit in the petition.
General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons: For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain is the designation by which he is known and called
Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code
words by which a person is distinguished from provides the substantive rules which regulate the
other individuals and, also, as the label or use of surname of an individual whatever may be
10
appellation which he bears for the convenience of his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as
8
married woman or a previously married woman,
well as public interest that every person must or a widow, thus:
have a name. “Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) principally use the surname of the father.
the given or proper name and (2) the surname or Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear
family name. The given or proper name is that the surname of the adopter.
xxx
which is given to the individual at birth or at
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
The surname or family name is that which the surname of the father.
identifies the family to which he belongs and is Art. 370. A married woman may use:
continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the 1. (1)Her maiden first name and surname and add
child, but the surname to which the child is her husband’s surname, or
entitled is fixed by law. 9
2. (2)Her maiden first name and her
_______________ husband’s surname or
3. (3)Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word
7
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
8
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No.
97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am. Jur., Name Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the
594-595. wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
9
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil may resume her maiden name and surname. However,
Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. she may choose to continue employing her former
I, 1993 ed., 672.
husband’s surname, unless:
547
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 547 1. (1)The court decrees otherwise, or
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga 2. (2)She or the former husband is married again
to another person.
Garcia
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
the wife shall continue using her name Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to what
and surname employed before the legal separation. middle name a child may use.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased The middle name or the mother’s surname is
husband’s surname as though he were still living, only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
in accordance with Article 370. case there is identity of names and surnames
_______________ between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mother’s surname
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
10
shall be added.
_______________
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 11
“Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
Garcia illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through
the younger person shall be obliged to use such the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. admission in a public document or private handwritten
Art. 375. In case of identity of names instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
and surnames between ascendants and descendants, right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
and other direct male descendants shall either: child.”
surname of the mother should immediately trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
precede the surname of the father so that the
to establish a relationship of paternity and
second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
really the Filipino way. The Committee approved with a legitimate status. This was, indeed,
17
law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18. the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures 19
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall adopted child are of primary and paramount
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
consideration, hence,
26
every reasonable mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
intendment should be sustained to promote and should not be allowed to do so.
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
the law. 27
assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
that: mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her middle name.
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of Let the corresponding entry of her correct and
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended complete name be entered in the decree of
right and justice to prevail.” adoption.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, SO ORDERED.
“is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-
of right and justice when the law is doubtful or Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
obscure. It will strengthen Petition granted.
_______________
Notes.—A person may be known by several
25
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. aliases, irrespective of his knowledge or consent
No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2 Am. Jur. to the use thereof. (People vs. Bergonio, Jr., 340
2d, Adoption, 865. SCRA 269 [2000])
26
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id.,
citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 910.
Since the use of initials, instead of a given
27
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., name, before a surname, has become a practice,
citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA the necessity that these initials be all given and
485 (1986). correctly given in court proceedings has become
554 of importance in every case, and in many,
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED absolutely essential to a correct designation of the
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga person intended—a middle name is very
Garcia important or even decisive in a case in which the
the determination of the courts to avoid an issue is as between two persons who have the
injustice which may apparently be authorized by same first name and surname, did the act
some way of interpreting the law.” 28
complained of, or is injured or sued or the like.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting (United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ramos, 415
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, SCRA 596 [2003])
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
——o0o——
_______________
555
341
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 341
third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and separate transfer certificates of title were issued
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid). On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
certain properties which he acquired when he was Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended
still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their
common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as
the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed
they (children of the third marriage) were by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. "The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
deceased father and annulment of the deed of enjoyment and possession of status of children of their
extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas,
342
Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of
status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to
Appeals on the ground that the trial court
the partition of the parcels of land as well as the
committed an error "x x x in not finding that the
accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record
parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and
on Appeal, p. 4).
Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an
holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate
answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
children of their said parents, thereby divesting
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to
them of their inheritance x x x." (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
On December 24,1980, the Court of Appeals
and prescription. They specifically contended that
rendered a decision declaring all the children and
the complaint was one for recognition of natural
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including
children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to
appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of
dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order
the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real
defendants are of erroneous application to this case. properties who eventually acquired transfer
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of
merit. reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
"SO ORDERED." (Ibid, p. 37). Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of
innocent third persons are not prejudiced
otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse
the said heirs the fair market value of their status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
shares; and directing all the parties to submit to relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and
the lower court a project of partition in the net in accordance with the law on intestate
estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares
other government charges and outstanding legal in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 &
obligations. 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui
reconsideration of said decision but it was denied and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
given due course by the court on December 7, A perusal of the entire allegations of the
1981. complaint, however, shows that the action is
The petitioners submit to the Court the principally one of partition. The allegation with
following issues: (a) whether or not prescription respect to the status of the private respondents
barred private respondents' right to demand the was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of
whether or not the private respondents, who Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the
belatedly filed the action for recognition, were nature of an action filed in court is determined by
able to prove their successional rights over said the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the
estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
however, on the resolution of the preliminary 282 [1988]).
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by It has been held that, if the relief demanded is
the private respondents. not the proper one which may be granted under
The complaint alleged, among other things, the law, it does not characterize or determine the
that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which
spouses Lupo Mariategui x x x and Felipa plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by
Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and demanded, is what determines the nature of the
confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, action (1 Moran, p. 127,1979 ed., citing Baguioro
in turn, have continuously enjoyed such vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
343 With respect to the legal basis of private
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 343 respondents' demand for partition of the estate of
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held
that the private respondents are legitimate Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v.
children of the deceased. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of
alleged to have been lawfully married in or about Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of
1930. This fact is based on the declaration Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who Courts look upon the presumption of marriage
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he with great favor as it is founded on the following
was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) rationale:
mother were able to get married before a Justice "The basis of human society throughout the civilized
of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
deported themselves as husband and wife, and not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
were known in the community to be such. institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
Although no marriage certificate was introduced
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption
that no record of the marriage exists does not or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married.
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for The reason is that such is the common order of society
its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 and if the parties were not what they thus hold
SCRA 106 [1984]). themselves out as being, they would be living in the
344 constant violation of decency and of law x x x." (Adong
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA
230 [1985]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
So much so that once a man and a woman have
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of
woman, deporting themselves as husband and
their being married must be admitted as a fact
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
The Civil Code provides for the manner under
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
which legitimate filiation may be proven.
board is legitimate; and that things have
However, considering the effectivity of the Family
happened according to the ordinary course of
Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be
nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5
decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set
(z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v.
of rules because the parties have been overtaken The nagging fact is that for a considerable length
by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941,
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No 76873, October 26, the private respondents and Lupo lived together
1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that
there are only two classes of children—legitimate even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana
various types of ille- Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein,
345 that "x x x Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 345 ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama x x x" (Exh. M,
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
gitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. In view of the foregoing, there can be no other
Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]). conclusion than that private respondents are
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui
filiation of legitimate children may be established and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
by the record of birth appearing in the civil Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
register or a final judgment or by the open and inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription
continuous possession of the status of a does not run against private respondents with
legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the respect to the filing of the action for partition so
legitimate filiation of the private respondents. long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence repudiated the coownership. In other words,
which tends to disprove facts contained therein prescription of an action for partition does not lie
was adduced before the lower court. In the case of except when the co-ownership is properly
the two other private respondents, Julian and repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]
any of the documents required by Article 172 but citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their prescription
brother Jacinto. 346
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies 346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
to certain dates and names of relatives with whom the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
their family resided, these are but minor details. repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 petitioners fraudulently withheld private
SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria
55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the
partition may be seen to be at once an action for property left by their deceased father and had
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the to worry because they will get some shares. As a
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
118 [1988]). constructed a house where he now resides on Lot
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
the co-ownership when they executed the Petitioners' registration of the properties in
extrajudicial partition excluding the private their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
respondents and registered the properties in their repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs.
own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the Court held:
the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming 347
petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 347
was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
prescription had not yet set in when private "Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of
respondents filed in 1973 the present action for co-ownership, must have been preceded by
partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]). repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
In their complaint, private respondents averred repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1)
that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except a coowner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an
act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other
the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed
co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
and refused to acknowledge and convey their conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by of the property for the period required by law."
the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was x x x x x x x x x
never successfully refuted by them. Put "It is true that registration under the Torrens system
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been
knowledge of their relationship to private our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title."
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties
in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation
(Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months
after learning that petitioners had registered in
their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez,
Jr. (Chairman), Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied; decision affirmed.
Note.—The status of an illegitimate natural
child is no longer recognized under the Family
Code. (People vs. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811.)
——o0o——
348
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, should not prevent the adoption. One is by
nature, while the other is by fiction of law.
Same; Same; Relationship established by
adoption is limited to adopting parents.—The
VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 379 relationship established by the adoption is limited to
the adopting parents and does not extend to their
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic other relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
No. L-22523. September 29, 1967. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
MINOR,EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA.LUIS E. adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which
SANTOS,JR.and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners- they may have after the adoption, except that the law
appellants vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
oppositor-appellee. adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted
Civil law; Adoption; Relatives by blood or affinity considered as descendants of the adopter.
are not prohibited from adopting another.—There is no
provision in the law prohibiting relatives, by blood or APPEAL from a decision of the Juvenile and
by affinity, from adopting one another. To say that Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Juliano-
adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and Agrava, J.
the adopted are related to each other, except in those
cases enumerated in Article 338 of the Civil Code, is to The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
preclude adoption among relatives, no matter how far A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.
removed or in whatever degree that relationship might Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
be, which is not the policy of the law.
Same; Interest and welfare of child to be adopted ANGELES, J.:
should be paramount consideration.—The interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be of An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being Domestic Relations Court, in Special Proceeding
humane and salutary and designed to provide homes, No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the
care and education for unfortunate children, should be
spouses Luis R.
construed so as to encourage the adoption of such 380
children by persons who can properly rear and educate
them.
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Elder sister may adopt a younger brother. Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
—The fact that the adoption in this case will result in Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption
dual relationship between the parties, that the of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a
sister may adopt a younger brother. The trial child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who
court dismissed the petition reasoning thus: are the common parents of the petitioner-wife
“A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos,
parents of the minor to be adopted are also the Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile
parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,
the latter’s legitimate brother. and is the general manager of Medry, Inc. and the
“In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an
secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His
incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a
legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be
income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-
her son. In the opinion of the court, that incongruity, petitioner-wife
381
not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein,
should prevent the adoption.” VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 381
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal. is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly
The facts are not disputed. earning of about P300.00.
The above-named spouses filed the petition It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza
before the court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a
that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, sickly child since birth. Due to the child’s
be declared their (petitioner’s) son by adoption. impairing health, his parents entrusted him to the
Evidence was presented that the order setting the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the
case for hearing has been duly published, Exhibit years thereafter, and as a result, there developed
A. There having been no opposition registered to between the petitioners and the child, a deep and
the petition, the petitioners were permitted to profound love for each other. The natural parents
adduce their evidence. of the minor testified that they have voluntarily
It was established that the petitioners are both given their consent to the adoption of their son by
32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of the petitioners, and submitted their written
Manila. They were married in 1957 and have consent and conformity to the adoption, and that
maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do they fully understand the legal consequences of
not have a child of their own blood. Neither the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, We are not aware of any provision in the law,
illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or and none has been pointed to Us by the Solicitor
natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of General who argues for the State in this case, that
them been convicted of a crime involving moral relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited
from adopting one another. The only objection article 338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That
raised is the alleged “incongruity” that will result may have been the reason why in the old Code of Civil
in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding
adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by a step-
father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the
who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will
general authorization in section 765 extended to any
also be her son by adoption. The theory is, inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child.
therefore, advanced that adoption among people The same argument of surplusage could plausibly have
who are related by nature should not be allowed, been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say,
in order that dual relationship should not result, section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous because
reliance being made upon the views expressed by without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child
this Court in McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29, anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not
1954, 94 Phil. 820. entirely without reason. It seems to be an established
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. principle in American jurisprudence that a person may
McGee, married to a Filipina by whom he had one not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is
child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of unnecessary to establish a relationship where such
already exists (the same philosophy underlying our
two minor children of the wife had by her first
codal provisions on adoption). So some states have
husband. The lower court granted the petition of special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such
McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On as a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father
appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We adopting his illegitimate or natural child.”
said: Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a
‘The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship study of American precedents would reveal that
of paternity and filiation where none existed before. there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in
Where therefore the relationship of parent and child
different jurisdictions regarding the matter of
already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the
case of illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a
unnecessary and superfluous to establish general proposition that the adoption of a blood
382 relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED many states of the Union, no restriction of that
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic sort is contained in the statutes authorizing
and superimpose another relationship of parent and adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction
child through adoption. Consequently, an express expressly provide that adoption may not take
authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not place within persons within a certain degree of
to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any relationship (1 Am. Tur. 628629). Courts in some
and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, states hold that in the absence of express
statutory restriction, a blood relationship between and child between them by nature. To say that
the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption should not be allowed when the adopter
adoption of one by the other, and there may be a and the adopted are related to each other, except
valid adoption where the relation of parent and in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to
child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). preclude adoption among relatives no matter how
Principles vary according to the particular far removed or in whatever degree that
adoption statute of a state under which any given relationship might be, which in our opinion is not
case is considered. It would seem that in those the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of
states originally influenced by the civil law the child to be adopted should be of paramount
countries where adoption originated, the rules are consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane
liberally and salutary, and designed to provide homes,
383 care and education for unfortunate children,
VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 383 should be construed so as to encourage the
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic adoption of such children by person who can
construed, while in other states where common properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord’s
law principles predominate, adoption laws are Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
more strictly applied because they are regarded With respect to the objection that the adoption
to be in derogation of the common law. in this particular case will result in a dual
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those relationship between the parties, that the adopted
persons who may not adopt, and it has been brother will also be the son of the adopting elder
shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not sister, that fact alone should not prevent the
among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by
of the same code names those who cannot be fiction of law. The relationship established by the
adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is adoption is limited to the adopting parents and
under consideration, is not one of those excluded does not extend to their other relatives, except as
by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
the adoption of a natural child by the natural child cannot be considered as a relative of the
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by ascendants and collaterals of the adopt-
their father or mother, and of a step-child by the 384
step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of 384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
course, necessary to remove all doubts that Ramirez vs. Ramirez
adoption is not prohibited even in these cases ing parents, nor of the legitimate children which
where there already exist a relationship of parent they may have after the adoption except that the
law imposes certain impediments to marriage by © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the reserved.
adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p.
652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and
Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177;
Munoz, p. 104). So even considered in relation to
the rules on succession which are in pari
materia, the adoption under consideration would
not be objectionable on the ground alone of the
resulting relationship between the adopter and
the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result
under our law on marriage when persons who are
already related, by blood or by affinity, marry
each other. But as long as the relationship is not
within the degrees prohibited by law, such
marriages, are allowed notwithstanding the
resulting dual relationship. And as We do not find
any provision in the law that expressly prohibits
adoption among relatives, they ought not to be
prevented. For all the foregoing considerations,
the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
petition for the adoption of the subject minor,
granted. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando.
JJ., concur.
Decision set aside and petition for adoption
granted.
______________
plaintiff's own adulterous act of infidelity as
defense against her claim for support and in
not exempting him from the obligation to give
such support? The obligation to support shall
cease "when the recipient has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance" (Article
303, new Civil Code). A spouse may be
disinherited when "she has given cause for
legal separation" (Article 921 [4], supra). One of
the causes for legal separation is "adultery on
the part of the wife and concubinage on the
part of the husband" (Article 97, supra), as
defined in the Penal Code. If the plaintiff was
the only one who committed adultery,
defendant's theory would be correct. In the
instant case defendant is still bound to support
his wife because (1) plaintiff and defendant
were guilty of infidelity, but before the filing of
the action defendant had pardoned plaintiff's
unfaithfulness; (2) the law on support (Title IX,
Book I, Articles 290-304, Civil Code) contains no
provision squarely applicable to the present
case in which both parties had committed
[No. L-10028. May 23, 1958]
infidelity; neither is there a provision to the
HIPOLITA ALMACEN, plaintiff and
effect that when both spouses committed
appellee, vs. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR, defendant
marital offenses against one another, one can
and appellant.
no longer ask support from the other; and (3)
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First
there is the general principle that when two
Instance of Manila ordering appellant to pay
persons acted in bad faith, they should be
appellee a monthly support of P50.00 beginning
considered as having acted in good faith, which
August 1955. The case was directly appealed to
principle may be applied to the present case to
this Court because the appellant raises purely
the effect that plaintiff and defendant being
questions of law. Did the court err in not taking
in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the
adultery of the former as defense to evade the ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO,
obligation to give her support. Did the court err VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH
in finding that the evidence on record was ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, respondents.
sufficient to establish a condonation of
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals;
plaintiff's adulterous act and reconciliation It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right
between plaintiff and defendant? The plaintiff's and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
testimony and documentary evidence showing members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
that the defendant had given money to plaintiff common law partner.—It is undeniable that the law
on several occasions through third persons are simply
sufficient to show condonation or reconciliation. 1
The act of giving money to an erring wife and _______________
* EN BANC.
the fact that no action was taken against her
before the courts of justice are sufficient to 2confines the right and duty to make funeral
establish forgiveness amounting to arrangements to the members of the family to the
condonation, for "condonation is the exclusion of one’s common law partner. In Tomas
forgiveness of one of the married parties of an Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 (1990), a petition
offense which he knows for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters
1148
of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas
the other has committed against the other." Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her
and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she
(Words & Phrases, 8A, pp. 19-20.) At any rate,
already died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pardon or condonation does not require sexual pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of
intercourse and it may be express or implied. the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
costs against the defendant. Endencia, J., husband.
ponente. Same; Same; Same; The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
___________ considered as having been waived or renounced,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.—It
reserved. is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
G.R. No. 182894. April 22, 2014.* surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she
FE FLORO VALINO, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO D. was living separately from her husband and was in the
ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. United States when he died has no controlling
significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that
or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be
duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering
not be considered as having been waived or this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory is the law that supplies the presumption as to his
proof of conduct indicative of a free and intent. No presumption can be said to have been
voluntary intent to that end. While there was created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
their children when he was still alive, the Court also Same; Same; Same; Should there be any doubt as
recognizes that human compassion, more often than to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the
not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a legitimate family.—It cannot be surmised that just
family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time when she died, he had already renounced her right to
in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty
interment for a few days so they could attend the to make funeral arrangements will not be considered
service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as having been waived or renounced, the right to
as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury
the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, the remains of her deceased husband should not be
1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon
contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
express their request, but to no avail. free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that
Same; Same; Same; Considering the ambiguity as end. Should there be any doubt as to the true
to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that intent of the deceased, the law favors the
supplies the presumption as to his intent. No legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to
presumption can be said to have been created in exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the
3Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was
relationship with Atty. Adriano.—Valino insists that the joined by the children in this case.
expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized
prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased
Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish should be established by some form of testamentary
to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon disposition.—Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result
the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code
provides: Art. 307. The funeral shall be in persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This
accordance with the expressed wishes of the quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes
religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the them to take possession of the dead body for purposes
funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or
4funeral shall be decided upon by the person to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory
obliged to make arrangements for the same, after of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This
consulting the other members of the family. From its is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to having this right may recover the corpse from third
prescribe the “form of the funeral rites” that should persons.
govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals;
305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even View that Article 305 of the Civil Code should only be
if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the considered when, first, the deceased left no explicit
place of burial among those on which the wishes of the instructions on how he wishes to be interred,
deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. and second, when none among the deceased’s
Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil surviving relations are willing to make the funeral
law, commented that it is generally recognized that arrangements and a conflict
any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased 5arises.—I am of the opinion that Article 305
should be established by some form of should only be considered when, first, the deceased
testamentary disposition. As Article 307 itself left no explicit instructions on how he wishes to be
provides, the wishes of the deceased must interred, and second, when none among the
be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, deceased’s surviving relations are willing to make the
such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent funeral arrangements and a conflict arises. In these
his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing situations, the conflict must be settled according to the
once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. order of preference stated in Article 199. In any other
Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, case, it should be the express wishes of the deceased
no other evidence was presented to corroborate it. which should take precedence.
Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that Same; Same; Same; View that Article 307 of the
the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of Civil Code should be interpreted to mean that the right
man.—It is generally recognized that the corpse of an to determine one’s funeral, including the right to
individual is outside the commerce of man. However, determine how and where one wishes to be buried,
the law recognizes that a certain right of possession remains with the deceased, and it is only in the
over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent absence of his express wishes, or in the absence of his
burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is doubt as
to his wishes, that other persons may assume the right to control how one wishes to be memorialized, and
to decide the funeral arrangements.—It is such right should remain with the deceased. It is only
the ponencia’s opinion that the wishes of the deceased when the deceased has not left any express
contemplated in Article 307 only governs the “form of instructions that the right is given to the persons
the funeral” and that the duty and, more specifically, specified under the law.
the right to make arrangements for the funeral
remains with the persons specified in Article 305 in PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
relation to Article 199. It is my submission, however, and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
that Article 307 should be interpreted to mean that the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
right to determine one’s funeral, including the right to
determine how and where one wishes to be buried, Pizarras & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
remains with the deceased, and it is only in the
Ching, Mendoza, Quilas and Associates Law
absence of his express wishes, or in the absence of his
religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is doubt as Firm for respondents.
to his wishes, that other persons may assume the right MENDOZA, J.:
to decide the funeral arrangements. This right, like
other rights pointed out by the ponencia, must not be Challenged in this petition is the October 2,
considered waived or renounced except upon clear 2006 Decision[1] and the May 9, 2008
and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
and voluntary intent to that end. There is neither
G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1,
indication nor have there been any allegations that
Atty. Adriano did not freely and voluntarily relay his
1998 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court,
last wishes to his common-law wife, petitioner Fe. Atty. Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that
Adriano, therefore, did not waive his right to petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to
determine where he should be buried, in favor of the the remains of the decedent.
persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to Article The Facts
199. Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner
Same; Same; Same; View that part of life is the in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office,
ability to control how one wishes to be memorialized, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on
and such right should remain with the deceased. It is November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons,
only when the deceased has not left any express Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters,
instructions that the right is given to the persons
Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1)
specified under the law.—It is unfortunate that
the ponencia would rather uphold the adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
_______________
6wishes of his estranged family rather than give
the deceased his final request. Part of life is the ability
[1] Rollo, pp. 36-46; Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and
Roxas with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.
that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
[2] Id., at p. 65. transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross
[3] Id., at pp. 127-131. Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
7
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more
however, turned sour and they were eventually than twenty (20) years before he courted her.
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano Valino claimed that throughout the time they were
courted Valino, one of his clients, until they together, he had introduced her to his friends and
decided to live together as husband and wife. associates as his wife. Although they were living
Despite such arrangement, he continued to together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his
provide financial support to Rosario and their obligation to support the respondents. She
children (respondents). contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical
emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the expenses when he got seriously ill. She also
United States spending Christmas with her claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano
children. As none of the family members was was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the
around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the United States. According to Valino, it
8was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be
funeral and burial expenses for Atty.
Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the
her husband, she immediately called Valino and Manila Memorial Park.
requested that she delay the interment for a few Valino further claimed that she had suffered
days but her request was not heeded. The damages as result of the suit brought by
remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be
mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila awarded moral and exemplary damages and
Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attorney’s fees.
attend the interment. Decision of the RTC
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance The RTC dismissed the complaint of
to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he respondents for lack of merit as well as the
was buried and that his burial at the Manila counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have
Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, not been sufficiently proven.
respondents commenced suit against Valino The RTC opined that because Valino lived with
praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very
well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Code, it was the considered view of the appellate
Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact court that the law gave the surviving spouse not
that Rosario left for the United States at the time only the duty but also the right to make
that he was fighting his illness, the trial court arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For
concluded that Rosario did not show love and care the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on
for him. Considering also that it was Valino who the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty.
performed all the duties and responsibilities of a Adriano at the time of the latter’s death,
wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
presumed that he wished to be buried in the Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award
Valino family mausoleum.[4] damages in favor of respondents due to the good
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased
exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty. a decent burial when the wife and the family were
Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy in the United States. All other claims for damages
Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon were similarly dismissed.
City, would not serve any useful purpose and so The Sole Issue
he should be spared and respected.[5] The lone legal issue in this petition is who
Decision of the CA between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RTC decision and directed Valino to have the The Court’s Ruling
remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what
of respondents. It likewise directed is now Article 199[6] of the Family Code, specifies
_______________ the persons who have the right and duty to make
[4] Id., at pp. 129-130.
[5] Id., at p. 131.
funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make
9respondents, at their expense, to transfer, arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
transport and inter the remains of the decedent in accor-
_______________
the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in [6] Formerly Article 294(a) of the New Civil Code.
Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA 10dance with the order established for support, under
explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was Article 294. In case of descendants of the same
entitled to the custody of the remains of her degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall
deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New
have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon that the law simply confines the right and duty to
the following persons in the order herein provided: make funeral arrangements to the members of
(1) The spouse; the family to the exclusion of one’s common law
(2) The descendants in the nearest partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,[7] a
degree; petition for habeas corpus was filed by the
(3) The ascendants in the nearest brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas
degree; and against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a) that the latter forcibly took her and confined her
[Emphasis supplied] in his residence. It appearing that she already
died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy,
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides: Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the
interred, disposed of or exhumed without the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and husband.
305. [Emphases supplied] In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
Administrative Code provides: notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should
burial.—The immediate duty of burying the body of a be considered a “spouse” having the right and
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for
duty to make funeral arrangements for his
the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
herein below specified: common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
(a) If the deceased was a common law marriages. A man and woman not
married man or woman, the legally married who cohabit for many years as
duty of the burial shall devolve husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
upon the surviving spouse if he public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
or she possesses sufficient husband and wife in the community where they live
means to pay the necessary may be considered legally married in common law
expenses; jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
x x x x. [Emphases supplied] While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside
the fact that such relationships are present in our
11
society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living separately from her husband and was in the
living together must not in any way be incapacitated United States when he died has no controlling
to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect,
a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
impediment which disquali-
_______________ right and duty to make arrangements for the
[7] 263 Phil. 1149; 185 SCRA 425 (1990). funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral
12fied him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice
arrangements, like any other right, will not be
Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support considered as having been waived or
of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of renounced, except upon clear and
Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted, however, satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
that with respect to ‘spouse,’ the same must be free and voluntary
the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).” _______________
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised [8] Id., at pp. 1158-1159; p. 435.
Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces common law 13intent to that end.[9] While there was
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario
liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. and their children when he was still alive, the
The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction Court also recognizes that human compassion,
between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by more often than not, opens the door to mercy and
a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband forgiveness once a family member joins his
and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the
the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a
to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to few days so they could attend the service and
a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded view the remains of the deceased. As soon as
spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
the morning of December 19, 1992 (December
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
[8] [Emphases supplied]
20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents
immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to
gives the right and duty to make funeral no avail.
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the vein that the right and duty to make funeral
deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to arrangements will not be considered as having
Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the
buried in their family plot is being relied upon remains of her deceased husband should not be
heavily. It should be noted, however, that other readily presumed to have been exercised, except
than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the
evidence was presented to corroborate such deceased to that end. Should there be any
claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims doubt as to the true intent of the deceased,
that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the the law favors the legitimate family. Here,
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and
apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. obligations accorded to the legal wife was even
Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the
this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the children in this case.
deceased, it is the law that supplies the Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty.
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino
be said to have been created in Valino’s family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result
_______________
[9] See Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. v. Court of
remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code
Appeals, 402 Phil. 356, 369; 349 SCRA 321, 330-331 (2001). provides:
See also Thomson v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 761, 778; 298 Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance
SCRA 280, 294 (1998); Gatchalian v. Delim, G.R. No. 56487, with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 126, 132; Yepes v. Samar Express absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
Transit, 123 Phil. 948, 949; 17 SCRA 91, 93 (1966); Andres v. affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
The Crown Life Insurance Co., 102 Phil. 919, 924 (1958); Lang
v. Acting Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, 93 Phil. 661, 669 (1953);
doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon
and Fernandez v. Sebido, 70 Phil. 151, 159 (1940). by the person obliged to make arrangements for the
same, after consulting the other members of the
14favor, solely on account of a long-time family.
relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307
because Rosario was unavailable to bury her simply seeks to prescribe the “form of the funeral
husband when he died, she had already rites” that should govern in the burial of the
renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements In this case, the wishes of the deceased with
reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in respect to his funeral are limited by Article
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article
Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to
place of burial among those on which the those charged with the right and duty to make the
15wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. proper
Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent _______________
authority on civil law, commented that it [10] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, p.
is generally recognized that any inferences 657, citing Sheeban v. Commercial Travelers, 283
as to the wishes of the deceased should be Mass. 543, 186 N.E. 627; Lindh v. Great Northern, 99
Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823; Kyles v. Southern Ry Co.,
established by some form of testamentary
147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278.
disposition.[10] As Article 307 itself provides, the [11] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, p.
wishes of the deceased must 657, citing Sacred Heart of Jesus v. Soklowski, 159
be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred Minn. 331, 199 N.W. 81; Wilson v. Read, 74 N.H. 322,
lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. 68 Atl. 37; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 20 Pa. 313, 56 Atl.
Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. 878.
It bears stressing once more that other than
16arrangements to bury the remains of their
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence loved-one. As aptly explained by the appellate
was presented to corroborate it. court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino
At any rate, it should be remembered that
that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that
the wishes of the decedent with respect to his he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the
funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of
wrote: the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in express wish of the deceased to be interred at the
relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and
They must not violate the legal and reglamentary the right to decide what to do with the remains to the
provisions concerning funerals and the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D.
disposition of the remains, whether as regards the Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to
time and manner of disposition, or the place of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in
burial, or the ceremony to be observed. the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that
[11] [Emphases supplied] her intentions may have been very commendable. The
law does not even consider the emotional fact that
husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been
separated-in-fact and had been living apart for more proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed
than 30 years.[12] be unkind to assess actual or moral damages
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on
in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty.
the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who,
Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated
remains in a place other than the Adriano family in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of
plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was
his family. It does not only violate their right alive and even took care of his remains when he had
provided by law, but it also disrespects the family died.
because the remains of the patriarch are buried in On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are
the family plot of his live-in partner. not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-appellee Fe
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the
individual is outside the commerce of man. remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife
and family were all in the United States and could not
However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
attend to his burial. Actual damages are those
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss
of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to
dead, also authorizes them to take possession of justify award of actual damages.
the dead body for purposes of burial to have Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral
_______________ and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be
[12] Rollo, p. 43. recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily
prove the existence of the factual basis for the
17it remain in its final resting place, or to even damages and its causal connection with the acts
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of complained of because moral damages although
the dead may receive the respect of the incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to
living. This is a family right. There can be no impose a penalty but to compen-
doubt that persons having this right may recover _______________
the corpse from third persons.[13]
13
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, p. 654, citing 1-I
Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 548 fn; 1 Valverde 239-240 fn.
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds
laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. 18sate for injury sustained and actual damages
Adriano during his final moments and giving him a suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants,
nor was any intended by anyone in this case.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be [14] Id., at pp. 43-45.
awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to [15] Report of the Code Commission, p. 49.
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory 19
damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements Abad, J., I join Justice Leonen’s Dissent.
to sustain an award for either of these damages would Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
appear to have been adequately established by
plaintiffs-appellants. DISSENTING OPINION
As regards the award of attorney’s fees, it is an
accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of LEONEN, J.:
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and We will all die. But what may matter to many of
counsel’s fees are not to be awarded every time a
us is how we live and how our life is kept in the
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil memories of those we leave behind. This case is
Code demands factual, legal and equitable not about whether a common-law wife has more
justification, without which the award is a conclusion rights over the corpse of the husband than the
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to latter’s estranged legal spouse. This case is about
speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have which between them knows his wishes.
searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants’ suit Therefore, I respectfully disagree with
that justifies the award of attorney’s fees. [14] the ponencia in denying this petition.
Finally, it should be said that controversies as I vote to set aside the decision of the Court of
to who should make arrangements for the funeral Appeals dated October 2, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
of a deceased have often aggravated the 61613, which directs petitioner Fe to have the
bereavement of the family and disturbed the remains of Atty. Lope Adriano exhumed, and
proper solemnity which should prevail at every orders respondents to transfer, transport, and
funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such inter, at their expense, the remains of the
controversies that the Code Commission saw it decedent from Manila Memorial Park to the family
best to include the provisions on “Funerals.”[15] plot in Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Quezon City. I vote to sustain the decision dated
SO ORDERED. October 1, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Quezon City, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. Q-93-
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, 15288, dismissing respondents’ complaint for
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, damages.
JJ., concur.
_______________
I disagree with the position that in the affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
determination of how Atty. Adriano should be doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon
buried, “the law gives the right and duty to make by the person obliged to make arrangements for the
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the same, after consulting the other members of the
family. (Emphasis supplied)
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano,” [1] in
accordance with Article 305[2] of the Civil Code in It is the ponencia’s opinion that the wishes of
relation to Article 199[3] of the Family Code. the deceased contemplated in Article 307 only
governs the “form of the funeral” and that the
[1] Ponencia, p. 12. duty and, more specifically, the right to make
[2] Article 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral remains with the
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be persons specified in Article 305 in relation to
in accordance with the order Article 199. It is my submission, however, that
_______________ Article 307 should be interpreted
[1] Ponencia, p. 12.
_______________
[2] Article 305. The duty and the right to make
established for support, under Article 294. In case of
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
accordance with the order
oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal
20 shall have a better right.
[3] Article 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged
I am of the opinion that Article 305 should only to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
be considered when, first, the deceased left no persons in the order herein provided:
explicit instructions on how he wishes to be (1) The spouse;
interred, and second, when none among the (2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
deceased’s surviving relations are willing to make (4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
the funeral arrangements and a conflict arises. In
these situations, the conflict must be settled 21to mean that the right to determine one’s
according to the order of preference stated in funeral, including the right to
Article 199. In any other case, it should be the determine how and where one wishes to be
express wishes of the deceased which should take buried, remains with the deceased, and it is only
precedence. in the absence of his express wishes, or in the
This view, in fact, is embodied in Article 307 of absence of his religious beliefs and affiliations, or
the Civil Code, which states: if there is doubt as to his wishes, that other
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance persons may assume the right to decide the
with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In funeral arrangements.
the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
This right, like other rights pointed out by 22society, and that they produce a community of
the ponencia,[4] must not be considered waived or properties and interests which is governed by law,
renounced except upon clear and satisfactory authority exists in case law to the effect that such form
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated
intent to that end. There is neither indication nor
to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has
have there been any allegations that Atty. Adriano a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
did not freely and voluntarily relay his last wishes impediment which disqualified him from even legally
to his common-law wife, petitioner Fe. Atty. marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the
Adriano, therefore, did not waive his right to Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of
determine where he should be buried, in favor of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
the persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property)
Article 199. stated: “Be it noted however that with respect to
Accordingly, it was improper to cite in ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’
the ponencia Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez. (not common-law spouses…).”
[5] In Eugenio, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. claimed the There is a view that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces
right to bury his common-law wife, arguing that
common law relation for purposes of exemption from
he should be considered a “spouse” under Article criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
305 in relation to Article 199. The assertion led malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
this court to expound on the interpretation of spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 and conclude distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
that: sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another
x x x. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize who are husband and wife de facto. But this view
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
married who cohabit for many years as husband and hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
wife, who represent themselves to the public as expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully
and wife in the community where they live may be wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
considered legally “married” in common law lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. [6]
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside
the fact that such relationships are present in our
_______________ In the present case, petitioner Fe has not
[4] Ponencia, pp. 12-13. asserted that she be considered a “spouse” under
[5] 263 Phil. 1149; 185 SCRA 425 (1990) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 with the right
and the duty to make funeral arrangements for type. He doesn’t want that people will
Atty. Adriano. What she asserts is that she was step on his grave.
Atty. Adriano’s constant companion for a long Q: What happened to this
time who was constantly by his side, showing him request if his lawn type lot to be
the love and devotion as a wife would have, who upgraded to estate type?
took care of him in his final moments A: It did not take long. I had it
_______________ upgraded.” (TSN, May 7, 1997, pp. 4-
[6] Id., at pp. 1159-1160; p. 435. See also ponencia, pp. 11-
12.
5; underscoring supplied)
This crucial fact remained unrefuted.
23and gave him a proper burial. As such, there is a Moreover, considering the very, very long time
presumption that she would be in the best that the defendant and the deceased lived like
position to relay his final wishes. husband and wife prior to his death, it can be
The trial court in its decision dated October 1, reasonably assumed that it is the defendant who
1998 reached the same conclusion, thus: really knows the wishes of the deceased. And it
appears that it was the express wish of the
Atty. Lope Adriano’s wish was established at deceased that he be interred at the Manila
the trial and shown in the following testimony of Memorial Park.[7]
the defendant, to wit: _______________
[7] Rollo, p. 129.
“ATTY. PIZARRAS:
Madam witness, what was the wish 24The ponencia also noted there was
of Atty. Lope Adriano regarding “animosity” between Atty. Adriano and
his burial? respondents when he was still alive. He and his
WITNESS: legal spouse, respondent Rosario, have been
He wanted to be buried at Manila separated-in-fact for more than thirty (30) years,
Memorial. and he has not been in contact with his children,
Q: Why do you say that? the other respondents, for about the same period
A: We have discussed it long of time. They did not even visit him when he fell ill
before. and was on his deathbed; it was only after he died
Q: When did you first discuss that they came, asserting their rights to his
this? remains.
A: The first time we went to It is unfortunate that the ponencia would rather
Manila Memorial. He wanted that his uphold the wishes of his estranged family rather
lawn type lot be upgraded to estate than give the deceased his final request. Part of
life is the ability to control how one wishes to be the claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626,
memorialized, and such right should remain with as amended, which was filed after the lapse of 10
the deceased. It is only when the deceased has years by the therein petitioner who had earlier
not left any express instructions that the right is filed a claim for death benefits,
given to the persons specified under the law. had not prescribed. (Mesa vs. Social Security
Given the circumstances, the remains of Atty. System, 584 SCRA 183 [2009])
Adriano should remain in the Floro family ——o0o——
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
The law reaches into much of our lives while we
live. It constitutes and frames most of our actions.
But at the same time, the law also grants us the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
autonomy or the space to define who we are.
Upon our death, the law does not cease to respect
our earned autonomy. Rather, it gives space for
us to speak through the agency of she who may
have sat at our bedside as we suffered through a
lingering illness.
I am of the view that it is that love and caring
which should be rewarded with the honor of
putting us in that place where we mark our
physical presence for the last time and where we
will be eternally remembered.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition should
be GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61613, reversing the
October 1, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, must be SET
ASIDE.
Petition denied.
25
Note.—In Buena Obra v. SSS (401 SCRA 206
[2003]), the Supreme Court, speaking through
then Associate, now Chief Justice Puno, held that
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and
protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of
rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation
and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
As regards parental authority, “there is no power, but
a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.”
Same; Same; Same; Parental authority and
responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized
by law.—Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached
to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 407 godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals temporary custody and it does not constitute a
G.R. No. 113054. March 16, 1995. *
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-
same.
appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES Same; Same; Same; The father and mother,
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents- being the natural guardians of unemancipated
appellees. children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
Civil Law; Family Code; Parent and Child; The their custody and company.—The father and mother,
right of custody accorded to parents springs from the being the natural guardians of unemancipated
exercise of parental authority.—The right of custody children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
accorded to parents springs from the exercise of their custody and company. The child’s welfare is
parental authority. Parental authority or patria
always the paramount consideration in all questions over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws
concerning his care and custody. without permission, should not be sufficient reason to
strip him of his permanent right to the child’s custody.
_______________ While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
THIRD DIVISION.
*
construed as abandonment.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Only in case of the parents’
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
parental authority be exercised by the surviving Elam Law Offices for petitioner.
grandparent.—The law vests on the father and mother
Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondents.
joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of
ROMERO, J.:
either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
In this petition for review, we are asked to
parental authority be exercised by the surviving overturn the decision of the Court of
grandparent. Appeals granting custody of six-year old
1
From the time the boy was released from the Branch 29, Judge Ricardo P. Galvez, presiding.
hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in 410
the care and custody of his maternal 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
grandparents, private respondents herein, Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel, trial court issued an order on the same day
Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter’s awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. 3
alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
well as the subsequent support of the boy Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
4
because petitioner could not afford to do so. respondent appellate court affirmed the trial
The boy’s mother, Julia-Bedia-Santos, left for court’s order. His motion for reconsideration
5
the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner having been denied, petitioner now brings the
6
alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts instant petition for review for a reversal of the
and his efforts to locate her in the United States appellate court’s decision.
proved futile. Private respondents claim that The Court of Appeals erred, according to
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
sending financial support to them for her son. grandparents and not to himself. He contends that
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his since private respondents have failed to show that
two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father,
three-year old Leouel, Jr. was staying. Private substitute parental authority granted to the boy’s
respondents contend that through deceit and grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is
false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
the private respondents in having custody over ation is what is best for the happiness and welfare
the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have
of his natural and legal right to have custody. amply demonstrated their love and affection for
On the other hand, private respondents aver the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the
that they can provide an air-conditioned room for best position to promote the child’s welfare.
the boy and that petitioner would not be in a The issue to be resolved here boils down to who
position to take care of his son since he has to be should properly be awarded custody of the minor
assigned to different places. They also allege that Leouel Santos, Jr.
the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the The right of custody accorded to parents
boy’s support and maintenance. When the boy springs from the exercise of parental authority.
was about to be released from the hospital, they Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
were the ones who paid the fees because their Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
daughter and petitioner had no money. Besides, rightfully assume control and protection of their
Julia Bedia-Santos, their daughter, had entrusted unemancipated children to the extent required by
the boy to them before she left for the United the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and
7
States. Furthermore, petitioner’s use of trickery obligations which the law grants to parents for the
and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after purpose of the children’s physical preservation
being hospitably treated by private respondents, and development, as well as the cultivation of
does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as their intellect and the education of their heart and
a parent. senses. As regards parental authority, “there is no
8
The Bedias argue that although the law power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
recognizes the right of a parent to his child’s of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
custody, ultimately the primary consider- welfare of the minor.” 9
5
Penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, with Justices being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
Vicente V. Mendoza and Jaime M. Lantin, concurring; Rollo, p.
21. parental authority only in cases of adoption,
6
Resolution dated November 16, 1993, Rollo, p. 34. guardianship and surrender to a children’s home
411 or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
11
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 411 the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend
or godfather, even in a document, what is given is substitute parental authority be exercised by the
merely temporary custody and it does not surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in
18
constitute a renunciation of parental the case at bench is one where the mother of the
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
12
minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States
manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present.
Not only are they physically apart but are also
_______________ emotionally separated. There has been no decree
7
Puig Peña, cited in I J. REYES AND R. PUNO, AN OUTLINE OF of legal separation and petitioner’s attempt to
THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL LAW, 295 (4th ed., 1964). obtain an annulment of the marriage on the
8
Reyes v. Alvarez, 8 Phil. 732; 2 Manresa 21; cited in I A. ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILS., COMMENTARIES AND failed. 19
his conduct in the past. Moreover, the fact that Rollo, pp. 31-32.
21
petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully Bacayo v. Calum, (CA) 53 O.G. 8607.
22
254
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
“the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which the writ of habeas corpus.
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which Indeed, Rule 102, §1 makes no distinction
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from between the case of a mother who is separated
the person entitled thereto.” from her husband and is entitled to the custody of
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
observed, that the determination of the right to child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
the custody of minor children is relevant in cases authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of
where the parents, who are married to each other, her child.
are for some reason separated from each other. It The fact that private respondent has
does not recognized the minor child may be a ground for
86
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213
David vs. Court of Appeals of the Family Code, “no child under seven years of
follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other age shall be separated from the mother unless
situation. For example, in the case of Salvaña v. the court finds compelling reasons to order
Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus
1
otherwise.” 3
_______________
THIRD DIVISION.
*
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Miguel
mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity.
Same; Same; Same; The fine distinctions among
the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code.—The fine distinctions
among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are
only two classes of children—legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children
conceived and born outside a valid marriage are PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
status.
Same; Same; Same; The recognition of an 457
illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 457
ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody Briones vs. Miguel
of the child.—The recognition of an illegitimate child by
the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law Manuel T. Molina for petitioner.
explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority Joaquin L. De Los Santos for respondents.
over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority PANGANIBAN, J.:
over the minor. Of course, the putative father may
adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the An illegitimate child is under the sole parental
child shall be considered a legitimate child of the authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
adoptive parent. authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her
Same; Same; Same; Only the most compelling of company. The Court will not deprive her of
reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise custody, absent any imperative cause showing
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
parental authority and the award of custody to The Case
someone else.—Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the
The Petition for Review before the Court seeks to
1
as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental No. 69400. The dispositive portion of the assailed
4
concurrence of Justices Ruben T. Reyes (Division chairman) and Philippines so that he could take care of him and send
Renato C. Dacudao (member); Id., pp. 23-30. him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the
Annex “B” of the Petition; Rollo, p. 31.
3 petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
4
Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City,
additionally impleading Loreta P. Miguel, the minor’s mother, as where he finished the nursery course.
one of the respondents. “According to the petitioner, his parents, who are
458
both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED him in taking care of the child.
Briones vs. Miguel “On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and
“Acting on the petitioner’s ‘Urgent Motion for a Hold Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner
Departure Order’, and finding it to be without merit, in Caloocan City on the
the same is DENIED.” 5
The Facts 5
CA Decision, p. 7; Id., p. 29.
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case 459
in this wise: VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 459
“On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Briones vs. Miguel
Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents
pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to
requested that they be allowed to bring the said child
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
for recreation at the SM Department store. They
“On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended
promised him that they will bring him back in the
Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the
afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However,
minor, as one of the respondents.
the respondents did not bring him back as promised by
“A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court
them.
on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to
“The petitioner went several times to respondent
produce before this Court the living body of the minor
Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he
Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00
was informed that the child is with the latter’s mother
o’clock in the afternoon.
at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there,
“The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P.
respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael The custody of the child, according to respondent
Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City. Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioner’s parents
“He sought the assistance of the police and the while they were both working in Japan. She added that
Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to even before
bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile. 460
“Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition 460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Briones vs. Miguel
Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. the custody of the child was given to the petitioner’s
However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte. parents, she has already been living separately from
“The petitioner prays that the custody of his son the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly
Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until
father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to his deportation.
support and educate him. “She likewise stated in her Comment that her
“On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of
Comment, in compliance with the May 2, 2002 availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in
Resolution of this Court. Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send
“In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She
denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the further stated that she has no intention of staying
one who brought their child to the Philippines and permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the
stated that she was the one who brought him here Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she
pursuant to their agreement. could.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies “Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the
petitioner’s allegation that respondents Maricel P. custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes
Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article
the child from the petitioner or the latter’s parents. 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.”
She averred that she was the one who took Michael
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to
the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family
consented. Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent
sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that
deported from Japan under the assumed name of petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and
Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or considering the trouble and expense he had spent
committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She in instituting the legal action for custody, it
further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived nevertheless found no compelling reason to
in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed.
separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner, mother would have custody when she is in the
however, was granted visitorial rights. country. But when she is abroad, he—as the
Hence, this Petition. 6
biological father—should have custody.
Issue According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take
“ultimate” issue as follows: “x x x [w]hether or not care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is
[he], as the natural that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated
_______________ May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary
8
6
The case was deemed submitted for decision on August 4,
custody over the minor.
2003, upon this Court’s receipt of respondents’ Memorandum, At present, however, the child is already with
signed by Atty. Joaquin L. de los Santos. Petitioner’s his mother in Japan, where he is studying, thus 9
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Manuel T. Molina, was received rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the
by this Court on July 8, 2003.
461
Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before
VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 461 the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an
“Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure
Briones vs. Miguel
Order,” alleging therein that respondents were
10
whenever she leaves for Japan and during the Having been born outside a valid marriage, the
period that she stays there. In other words, he minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
wants joint custody over the minor, such that the and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
12 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439, 448, March 19,
14
1985.
“illegitimate children shall use the surname and Article 269, New Civil Code.
15
shall be under the parental authority of their See Article 269 in relation to Article 287, Ibid. See
16
463
regardless of whether the father admits
paternity. 13
VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 463
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Briones vs. Miguel
Code, illegitimate children were generally to legitimate children applied. In other words, in
classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether the latter case, parental authority resided jointly
actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, in the father and the mother. 18
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to children—legitimate (and those who, like the
marry each other. On the other hand, a spurious
15 legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
child is one born of parents who, at the time of children) and illegitimate. All children conceived
conception, were disqualified to marry each other and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
on account of certain legal impediments. 16 unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. 20
Parental authority over recognized natural Article 54 of the Code provides these
children who were under the age of majority was exceptions: “Children conceived or born before
vested in the father or the mother recognizing the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of
them. If both acknowledge the child, authority
17 the marriage under Article 36 has become final
was to be exercised by the one to whom it was and executory shall be considered legitimate.
awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, Children conceived or born of the subsequent
the rule as marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be
legitimate.”
_______________ Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all
illegitimate children are generally placed under
See CA Decision, p. 29; Rollo, p. 107.
11
natural child remains an illegitimate child. considered a legitimate child of the adoptive
Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,’’ parent. 25
under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing There is thus no question that Respondent
in the records showing that his parents were Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the parental authority over the minor, is entitled to
time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is have custody of him. She has the right to keep
26
their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to him in her company. She cannot be deprived of
27
Article 176, that right, and she may not even renounce or
28
18
Garcia v. Pongan, 89 Phil. 797, August 31, 1951. Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family
19
Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under
Annotated (15th ed., 2002), Vol. I, p. 645 (citing Castro v. Court seven years of age shall be separated from the
of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656, May 31, 1989). mother, except when the court finds cause to
20
Article 165, Family Code.
21
See Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561, March 25, order otherwise.
1992. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as
22
See Article 177, Family Code. the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental
464 authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED authority and the award of custody to
Briones vs. Miguel
parental authority over him resides in his mother, _______________
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s 23
250 SCRA 82, 86, November 16, 1995.
recognition of him. 24
See Article 185, Family Code.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the23 25
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals, supra.
recognition of an illegitimate child by the father 26
David v. Court of Appeals, note 23.
27
Article 220, Family Code.
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give 28
See Ibanez de Aldecoa v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30
support to, but not custody of, the child. The law Phil. 228, 238, March 23, 1915.
explicitly confers to the mother sole parental 29
Article 210, Family Code. The law allows a waiver of
authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children’s home or an orphanage; Sagala-Eslao
only if she defaults can the father assume custody v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 286, 293; 266 SCRA 317, 323,
and authority over the minor. Of course, the January 16, 1997.
putative father may adopt his own illegitimate 465
VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 465 Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969.
31
Briones vs. Miguel March 15, 1995; Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575, January
someone else. In the past, the following grounds
30
27, 1989; Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17,
have been considered ample justification to 1980.
Child welfare as an overriding consideration in custodial
33
deprive a mother of custody and parental award has been shown in several cases decided by the
authority: neglect or Supreme Court: Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra; Cervantes
abandonment, unemployment,
31 v. Fajardo, supra; Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
32
SCRA 7, June 18, 1985; Unson III v. Navarro, supra; Medina v.
Makabali, supra; Lozano v. Martinez, et al., 36 Phil. 976,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction October 10, 1917.
with a communicable disease. 275 SCRA 604, 609, July 17, 1997; see also Bondagjy v.
34
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best Bondagjy, 371 SCRA 642, 653, December 7, 2001.
Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution.
interest of the minor as the controlling factor, we
35
33
466
hold that the CA did not err in awarding care,
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
custody, and control of the child to Respondent
Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit Briones vs. Miguel
to take charge of him. However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of contemplates a situation in which the parents of
Appeals, the Court sustained the visitorial right of
34
the minor are married to each other, but are
an illegitimate father over his children in view of separated either by virtue of a decree of legal
the constitutionally protected inherent and separation or because they are living separately
natural right of parents over their children. Even 35
de facto. In the present case, it has been
when the parents are estranged and their established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta
affection for each other is lost, their attachment to were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA
and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Decision allowing the child to choose which parent
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to to live with is deleted, but without disregarding
suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
to the wellbeing of the child. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the
_______________ MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the
child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to
Perez v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 661, 668, March 29,
30
choose which parent to live with is DELETED for
1996; Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, et al., 133 Phil. 884, 895; 24
SCRA 837, 847, August 30, 1968. lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed with
modification.
Note.—The due recognition of illegitimate
children in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required, but where a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment. (De Jesus vs. Estate of
Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA
499 [2001])
——o0o——
467
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while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or resolution denying reconsideration, holding
streets.—Incidentally, there was no question that the petitioner liable for damages arising from an
registered owner of the vehicle was respondent accident that resulted in the death of a student
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this who had joined a campaign to visit the public
fact. We have held that the registered owner of any schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would The Facts
primarily be responsible to the public or to third The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle follows:
was being driven on the highways or streets.” Hence, “Claiming damages for the death of their only son,
with the overwhelming evidence presented by Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against
accident occurred because of the detachment of the James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva
but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Court of Dipolog City.
Carpitanos. “On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
the Court of Appeals. “ ‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment
is hereby rendered in the following manner:
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner. 1. 1.Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City,
Peter Y. Co for respondents Daniel and is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Villanueva. Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following
Feliciano M. Maraon for respondents sums of money:
Carpitanos.
475
1. a.FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) being in order as earlier discussed in this
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
Carpitanos; IT IS SO ORDERED.’ ”
2. b.FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).”
plaintiffs for burial and related expenses; “From the records it appears that from 13 to 20
3. c.TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s
attorney’s fees; Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
4. d.FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
costs. from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
_______________ was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on
the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
In CA-G.R. CV No. 56728, promulgated on February 29,
1
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
2000, Reyes, Jr., J., ponente, Martin, Jr. and Brawner, JJ.,
concurring.
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
476 Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep
was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle.
1. 2.Their liability being only subsidiary, “Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries
defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel he sustained from the accident.” 2
are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy
amount of damages above-stated in the event appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 3
of insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals
Academy of Dipolog City;
promulgated a decision reducing the actual
2. 3.Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at
the time of the commission of the tort and who damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming
was under special parental authority of the decision a quo in toto. 4
Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents; Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56728.
3
3. 4.Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 52-70.
4
over a minor child while under their Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those exercising
_______________ special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
Petition, Annex “B”, Rollo, pp. 72-73.
5
Petition filed on July 17, 2000, Rollo, pp. 9-48. On July 16,
6 omissions of the unemancipated minor under their
2001, we gave due course to the petition, Rollo, pp. 202-203. supervision, instruction, or custody. 10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must In this case, the respondents failed to show that
be a finding that the act or omission considered as the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury cause of the death of the victim.
caused because the negligence, must have a Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
causal connection to the accident. 11
admitted that the immediate cause of the
“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, accident was not the negligence of petitioner or
however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
recovery is sought must be the legitimate detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
consequence of the wrong done; the connection jeep.
between the negligence and the injury must be a
In their comment to the petition, respondents
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. documentary exhibits establishing that the cause
For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot of the accident was the detachment of the
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the
of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
which the result would not have occurred.’ ” 12
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the
_______________
report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the
Handbook On The Family Code Of The Philippines, Alicia V.
9 detachment of the steering wheel guide that
Sempio-Diy (1997), p. 344. caused the jeep to turn turtle.
The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Rufus B.
10
Hence, liability for the accident, whether accident was not attributable to petitioner.
caused by the negligence of the minor driver or For the reason that petitioner was not directly
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as
accident. Between the remote cause and the part of damages is the exception rather than the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the rule. The power of the court to award attorney’s
15
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
wheel guide of the jeep. factual, legal and equitable justification. Thus, 16
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for In Civil Case No. 4924.
19
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