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G.R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
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CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
1
From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217,
Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. 2 Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft for the unlawful
taking of a Dae-
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286
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“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
4
Upon arraignment on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted
by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following
version is established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who
manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father,
hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a
Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed
that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00
p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport’s
garage and remit 5
the boundary fee in the amount of
P780.00 per day.
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported
for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the
same day as he was supposed to.
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288
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that
he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was
short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not
abandon
12
the taxi but actually returned it on January 5,
1997; and that13
on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount
of P2,000.00 to his wife whom he instructed to remit 14
the
same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee and to
tell the latter that he15could not return the taxi as he still
had a balance thereof.
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him
that when she went to the garage to remit the 16
boundary fee
on the very same day (December 27, 1996), 17
Cipriano was
already demanding the return of the taxi.
Appellant maintains though that he returned 18
the taxi on
January 5, 1997 and signed the record book, which was
company procedure, to show that 19
he indeed returned it and
gave his employer P2,500.00 as partial payment for the
boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996
to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a
balance in20 the boundary fee, he left his driver’s license with
Cipriano; that as he could not drive, which was the only
work he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and
with the obligation to pay the
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9 Ibid.
10 Id., at pp. 9-10.
11 Id., at p. 10.
12 TSN, October 9, 2000 at p. 8.
13 Ibid. On cross-examination however, appellant later claimed that the
amount he gave was P2,500.00.
14 TSN, October 9, 2000 at p. 18.
15 Id., at p. 8.
16 Id., at p. 21.
17 Id., at p. 20.
18 Id., at p. 9.
19 Ibid.
20 Id., at p. 26.
289
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I.
II.
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21 Id., at p. 29.
22 Id., at p. 30.
23 Ibid.
24 Records at p. 93.
25 Rollo at p. 40.
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26 People vs. Salvador, 398 SCRA 394, 412 (2003); People vs. Napalit,
396 SCRA 687, 699 (2003); People vs. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195, 204 (2003).
27 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended defines motor vehicle
as follows:
“Motor vehicle” is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power
using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and
cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracts,
and tractors, trailers and reaction engines of all kinds used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or
intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as
separate motor vehicle with no power rating. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
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291
32
jurisprudence,
33
as this Court explained in City of Naga v.
Agna, viz.:
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292
of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily
reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
belonging to another is taken without the latter’s consent.
However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft
and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it
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36 Id., at p. 364.
37 People v. Napalit, supra at p. 700; People vs. Calabroso, 340 SCRA 332, 342
(2000).
38 People v. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002).
39 People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 132788, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 84;
People vs. Sia, 370 SCRA 123, 134 (2001); People vs. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, 334
(2000).
40 323 SCRA 30 (2000).
41 388 SCRA 417 (2002).
293
has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner’s consent,
whether the taking was done with or without the use of force
upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either
theft or robbery42which was certainly the case before the enactment
of said statute. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted.)
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42 People vs. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002); People vs. Tan, 323
SCRA 30, 39 (2000).
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43 Vide Izon v. People, 107 SCRA 118, 123 (1981) where this Court said
the following:
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Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, “The principal distinction between
the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there
may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto
possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes
theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of
the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. (Emphasis and italics supplied;
citation omitted)
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296
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not
agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without
first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January
1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew
already that the company was not agreeable to
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297
55
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission which was
reiterated in Association of Baptists for World
56
Evangelism,
Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., Justice Claudio
Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft
clause of an insurance policy, explained that, when one
takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s
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In one robbery case, it was held that there must be permanency in the taking, or in the
intent for the asportation, of the stolen property (People v. Kho Choc, CA, 50 O.G. 1667).
In several theft cases, there were divided opinions, one line of cases holding that the
intent of the taking was to permanently deprive the owner thereof (People v. Galang, CA, 43
O.G. 577; People v. Rico, CA, 50 O.G. 3103, cf. People v. Roxas, CA-G.R. No. 14953, Oct. 31,
1956). The contrary group of cases argued that there was no need for permanency
in the taking or in its intent, as the mere disturbance of the proprietary rights of
the owner was already apoderamiento (People v. Fernandez, CA, 38 O.G. 985; People v.
Martisano, CA, 48 O.G. 4417).
The second line of cases holding that there need be no intent to permanently
deprive the owner of his property was later adopted by the Supreme Court, in
construing the theft clause in an insurance policy, and ruling that there was criminal
liability for theft even if the car was taken out only for a joyride but without the owner’s
knowledge or consent. (Villacorta v. Insurance Comm., et al., G.R. No. 54171, Oct. 28, 1980,
100 SCRA 467; Ass’n of Baptists for World Evangelism v. Fieldmen’s Ins. Co., Inc., G.R. No.
L-28772, Sept. 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 618). (Emphasis supplied)
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constitutes
58
gain and Cuello Calon who calls it “hurt de
uso.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; citation omitted)
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A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record
book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s
license with them, sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you
were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over any
money to your employer when you returned the taxi?
A: I gave them [an] additional P2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was
your short indebtedness (sic) or short boundary (sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay
P4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of
payment for this P4,500.00?
A: They were the ones having the record of my
payment, and our agreement was 62
that I have to
pay the balance in installment. (Emphasis
supplied)
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Just like appellant Williams, she sought to buttress her aforesaid contention by
lamenting the alleged failure of the State to present in the trial court her baggage
declaration and the confiscation receipt involving these pieces of her baggage. In
the first place, it was not the duty of the prosecution to present these alleged
documents on which she relies for her defense. And, just as in the case of
appellant Williams, it is a source of puzzlement why she never sought to
compel either the prosecutors to produce the aforesaid documents which
were allegedly in the possession of the latter or the customs office where
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574 (1994)], this Court said that when an offense is defined and punished
under a special law but its penalty is taken from the Revised Penal Code,
then the provisions of the said Code would apply suppletorily. In the case
at bar however, appellant is not being charged with qualified or
aggravated carnapping, but only carnapping under the first clause of the
anti-carnapping law. Since the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not
less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4
months, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied
suppletorily.
68 SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.—Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than
sev
302
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enteen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when
the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation
of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
69 SECTION 1. Hereinafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punishable by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis
and italics supplied).
70 People v. Panida, 310 SCRA 66, 99 (1999).
303
SO ORDERED.
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