ON THE PROBLEM OF

METHODOLOGY AND THE

NATURE OF POLITICAL THEORY

RICHARD ASHCRAFT
University of California (Los Angelesj

aphorism about the owl of Minerva taking flight at dusk that the decline o
political theory should be accompanied by a heightened interest in ho\i
political theory should be studied. Having laid the tradition of substantive
political philosophy to rest, we now find ourselves preoccupied with thc
problem of how to go about digging amongst the dusky remnants of the
past. Methodological issues dominate the current literature of political
science, since it is generally agreed that ‘grand’ political theory in the
nianner of Plato, Aristotle, hlachiavelli, Hobbes, or Locke n o longer
springs forth from the heads of twentieth-century thinkers.
Of course, I d o not mean t o imply that previous political philosophers
were unconcerned with problems of methodology. They devoted considcr-
able attention to the subject, and some of their recorded insiglits
invariably find their way into any serious contemporary discussion of
methodology. Nor d o I mean to deny the importance of the question
itself; that is, how and why we should make the effort t o understand the
‘classic’ works of political theory. Nevertheless, in their treatment of those
works, contributors to the current controversy have greatly overempha-
sized tlie problem of ‘understanding’ to the exclusion of other purposes
underlying the activity of theorizing. The effect of this upon our
P O L I T I C A L THEORY, Vol. 3 No. 1, February 1975
0 1 9 7 5 Sage Publications. Inc.

151

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I61 POLITICAL THEORY f FEBRUARY 1975

conception of political theory will, I hope, become evident as the

argument of the essay proceeds. Briefly, I want to suggest that the
preoccupation with methodology has made it appear that all the important
issues concerning political theory can be stated within the framework of
the ‘problem of knowledge’.
Now there is much to recommend this viewpoint, and, when critically
examined, it does indeed lead to the perspective I wish t o defend.
However, it should be clear that the debate over methodology cannot itself
be divorced from the question of whether and/or to what extent political
plulosophy is t o be regarded as a medium of knowledge or as an
instrument of social change. For how we approach the study of political
theory, and what importance we grant t o the ‘truths’-whether historicist
or trans-historical-to be derived from such a study will be very much
affected by our attitude toward the role played by political theory in the
process of social change. If, for instance, we believe that political
philosophy has a purpose more important than that of providing an
‘account’ of political reality, then we shall be less inclined to allow our
methodology for studying political theory to be tied to the abstractness of
the propositions contained in a given text, or to be bound by the degree to
which we can ascertain the author’s intentions. If, in other words, as a
function of what we conceive political theory to be, we seek neither to
discover increasingly abstract principles nor t o limit the political t o the
intentions of a particluar theorist, it would be a mistake to formulate our
methodological strategy in such a way that it is priiitarily designed to
achieve either of those objectives.

Let me approach the problem from a slightly different angle. The

debate over methodology focuses upon the question of how the historian
of ideas should read the texts of traditional political philosophy. But this
question cannot be considered apart from an assessment-in evaluative
terms-of the role of ‘tradition’ vis-a-vis the activity of political theorizing
in the present. With respect to the range of attitudes, there are a few
extremists whom, with a slight terminological injustice, I will label
behaviorialists and traditionalists. The former tend t o reject the tradition
of political philosophy, and hence the value of studying it, as a means for
formulating theoretical solutions to our political problems. From this
standpoint, since what Aristotle thought is of marginal importance in

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 Ashcraft I PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY 171

devising a policy to deal with the difficulties ofcontcmporarysociety, any

discussion of the proper way to read his writings must appear otiose and an
ill-advised expenditure of time and mental talent. For the traditionalists,
on the other hand, it is precisely the point to learn what previous
philosophers-and especially Plato and Aristotle-have to say about
politics. The essential-perhaps even the whole-truth of political life is
presumed t o lie embedded in the classics. This means that knowing how t o
study traditional political theory is the most important aspect of
theorizing about political problems in the present. Unless one reads the
text properly, he will be irrevocably cut off from the wisdom which it
contains. The task of the student of political theory, therefore, is not to
construct a new political theory, but rather, to preserve the tradition
passed on t o him by those wiser than he. Thus, the behaviorialists disnuss
the study of the history of political philosophy because they have severed
that activity from the concerns of the political present. The traditionalists
subsume present concerns entirely within the framework of traditional
political philosophy and premise an understanding of that tradition upon
adoption of the proper methodological approach to political theory.
Now most political scimtists, including those who teach political
theory, are grouped near tlie middle o f this spectrum. That is, they believe,
with more or less conviction, that there must be soiize value t o studying
traditional political theory. As a consequence, they are willing to grant
some importance to the controversy over how one should read the texts of
political philosophy. Nevertheless, the ambiguity which characterizes this
perspective presents its own difficulties. Since one cannot simply subsume
present problems under tlie categories-let alone the substantive pro-
posals-of traditional political theory, it must at least be possible for a
contemporary political thinker to offer a theoretical solution to a political
problem which is independent of that tradition. Hence, the study of
political philosophy may or may not have a utilitarian value, depending
upon the particular policy issue (e.g., Aristotle may not have considered
the matter) and the extent to which what was said can be applied in the
present circumstances (e.g., what Aristotle said about the stability of
middle-class democracy may be relevant as far as his treatment of the topic
goes, but there are special features of post-industrial, middle-class
democracy which increase the complexity of theorizing about contem-
porary political life).
The commitment to the tradition of political theory is therefore an
unstable one for this group. It cannot be said with assurance that a
traditional political philosopher is relevant to our contemporary situation

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181 POLITICALTHEORY / FEBRUARY 1975

on purely practical grounds (i.e., as the source of a solution to tlie political

conflict amongst groups in our society), but, at the same time, there is a
reluctance t o view tlie tradition of political philosophy in strictly
‘cash-value’ terms. Thus, it is maintained tliat studying tlus tradition niay
help us to ‘understand’ our problems, employing ‘understand’ in the
broadest possible sense. In this way it is neither necessary t o translate
Aristotle into empirically testable propositions and prove hjs direct relevance
to tlie problem of the political power exercised by trade unions, nor
necessary to insist that Aristotle’s definitions and understanding of politics
must be accepted as the basis for our discussion of political life. It is just at
this point that we come upon tlie debate over methodological approaches
to traditional political theory.
For, what does it mean t o say that the study of that tradition helps us
to ‘understand’ our political situation? Unfortunately, avoidance has been
tlie characteristic response of those who write about or teach the history
of political philosophy. Indeed, it is precisely the absence of critical
discussion of the vagueness of ‘understanding’ past political theory
which has helped to perpetuate that genteel consensus of moderation
amongst those who eschew tlie extremist labels, beliaviorialist or tradi-
tionalist. Yet, it should be obvious tliat since tlie study of political theory
falls within the knowledge-gathering process, the plulosopliical problem
cannot be avoided. The meaning and value of ‘tradition’ as applied to
political theory cannot be divorced from a particular pliilosoplucal view of
knowledge a i d how it is acquired. If we regard the tradition of political
theory as the raw empirical material from which we may fashion abstract
eternal truths in light of whicli our present political problems are to be
understood, then tradition stands to truth as sense-experience stands to
conceptual knowledge. If, Iiowever, tradition is viewed 3s a self-contained
framework of particular events that occurred in a particular sequence, then
our objective is not to abstract from the particular, but rather to immerse
ourselves within tlie tradition in sucli a way as t o preserve the (Iiistorical)
particularity of tlie plienomena.
In the first instance ‘tradition’ tends t o be transformed into timeless
universals so that ‘what was’ merges imperceptibly into ‘what always is’.
In the second case ‘tradition’ is defined in terms which make its
relationship to the present highly problematical; the more the specificity
of the past is insisted upon in thB natne of empirical accuracy, the less it is
clear what tradition means t o us. The question faced by the teaclier of
political theory, stated in concrete terms, is whether Locke’s statements
on ‘property’ should be regarded as ‘part of a n analytical construct called

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 Ashcraft I PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY 191

p p e r t y ’ , related to but independent of Locke’s use of the word, or

\V]ietlier Locke’s statements on the subject are in an irreducible empirical
Sense the ‘property’ of Locke. It may be poor tactics t o pose this
p1liIosophical problem within an ironical framework, but the irony is
intentional. What I have tried to indicate is that the answer t o the
question, whether ideal types stand ‘above’ historical evidence or whetlier
the latter is the final arbiter of the validity of ideal types, depends upon
our purposes in employing ideal types. Of course, this does not decide tlie
issue of how or why we come to have the viewpoint wC do, but it does
preclude tlie possibility of tlie questioner abstracting himself from this
question. I will return t o this point later in tlie context of my conclusions
about tlie nature of political theory and the problem of methodology. For
the present I am merely concerned with sketching the philosophical
parameters of the controversy.
Thus far I have argued that the debate over methodological approaches
to the study of political theory is inextricably rooted in epistemological
presuppositions. This is true whether we accept the givenness of the
current methodological debate ‘as a starting point or begin by attempting
to define the tradition of political philosophy in relation to our present
circumstances. In the former instance, from a consideration of 1iow certain
methodological rules help us t o understand past political theory, we are
led through reflection upon the meaning of ‘understand’ to a philosophical
(episteniological) problem: how do these methodolo@cal rules ensure that
our study of political philosophy leads us t o a ‘knowledge’ of politics? in
the latter instance, how we characterize the ‘tradition’ of political theory
will depend upon the metliodological rules we have devised for the
acquistion of knowledge, since tradition as ‘experience,’ ‘history,’ or ‘fact’
will fmd its place of importance within our conceptualization of
knowledge depending upon the relationship between expxience, fact, and
the like, and our epistemological presuppositions. T h s , one either follows
the path of the historian, placing great weight upon the intentions of the
theorist, the linguistic conventions employed by his contemporaries, the
historical events that influenced and shaped his existence, the empirical
connections between the text lie produced and the attitudes and activities
of the ‘audience’ who received it and so on, or one follows the path of the
philosopher, ‘reconstructing’ the text, situating it with respect to the
‘perennial problems’ of political theory, focusing upon a key concept
contained in tlie work in order to elaborate upon its definition, or using to
text as a means for enlightening us with regard to ‘the liilman condition.”
The first approach employs an essentially empiricist metliodology,
treating ideas, however generally formulated, as data; the second. adopts

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[lo] POLITICAL THEORY 1 FEBRUARY 1975

an analytic methodology, considering historical facts as ‘elements’ of an

abstraction. The problem of how to study the history of political tlieory
thus parallels in many striking respects the ‘problem of knowledge’ as it
appears in tlie history of Western pliilosopliy since the seventeenth
century. It is precisely the history of political philosophy which presents
this problem to tlie student of political theory, since it is a necessary
condition of his intellectual endeavor that lie attempt to forge a link
between history and plulosopliy, empiricism and analysis, in order to
understand the classic text before him.
In other words, the methodological and epistemological presuppositions
of those wlio teach political theory gravitate toward reliance upon analytic
or empiricist criteria for tlie definition of knowledge. I express tliis as a
tendency because, as I have already indicated, most commentators are
grouped in the middle of tlie spectrum, wvhicli means not only that they
intend to rely upon both analytic constructs and empirical references in
discussing political theory, but also that they d o not feel the need to
formulate in pliilosophical terms the relative value of tlie criteria which
underlie their methodological treatment of political ideas. The result is a
rather unconscious-or, less pejoratively, common-sense-consideration of
the history of political philosophy. I t is not difficult, as Quentin Skinner’s
devastating critique proves, to ferret out the confusions, logical rrrors, and
pliilosopliical absurdities which abound when one adopts uncritically a
nie thodology whose philosopliical premises liave not been self-consciously
stated and defended.* Of course, tliis is not true of those such as Skinner,
Pocock, or Wolin, who do address themselves to the issues raised here.
My disagreement with them 3s to the study of political theory, therefore,
begins on a different level.
Nevertheless, I want to make it clear before proceeding to tlie area of
my disagreement with them that Skinner, Pocock, and others liave
performed a positive service in making us aware of tlie fact that tlie debate
over tlie nature of political theory must be conceptualized, in part, as an
epistemological controversy. However, insofar as the appeals t o evidence in
relation to tlie necessity of formulating general rules or abstractions are
nterely applied to the historical data classified as ‘political theory,’ the
ground upon which such methodological disputes are to be resolved
remains that of pldosopliy. The question of how and why one should read
a classic text of political theory is simply an incorporated part of a
long-standing philosophical controversy over tlie rules by which knowledge
may be acquired. Yet, in thus shifting the conflict over methodology to
the level of pliilosophical consciousness-an advance over previously

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 Ashcraft I PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY 1111

uncritical approaches-recent writers have not thereby ‘resolved’ the

p]li]osophical problem. Rather, the historical depth and the scope (defined
in terms of consciousness) of the conflict have merely been i n ~ r e a s e d . ~
In short, what remains problematical is the relationship between this
increased consciousness of methodological presuppositions and the pur-
poses of political theory. If it were not accepted as self-evident that tlie
real difficulties of political theory are rooted in ‘understanding’ how to
approach the subject, the task of philosophical clarification might appear
woefully insufficient as a way of ordering and changing political relations
amongst groups within society. Especially since, unlike Plato, contempo.
rary writers about political theory not only do not supply a schema for
establishing the connection between the practice of philosophy and the
problems of political life, they seem unwilling even to raise the question of
such a connection.
It is not merely the practical difficulty of recruiting philosophers to
Serve as rulers that is at issue; rather, it is the tenuous social significance of
contemporary philosophy as a medium for interpreting and assessing
political phenomena which poses a dilemma for the teacher of political
theory. Does he remain faithful to the tradition of philosophy, retaining
its methodology and its presuppositions as a way of viewing political life,
despite its current sociological irrelevance, or does he accept assumptions,
procedures, terminology, and the like, with greater contemporary signifi-
cance even if this necessitates a ‘break’ with the tradition of political
philosophy or its radical reinterpretation? In the second section of the
essay, I want to indicate briefly the shortcomings of those who have
attempted t o steer political theory down the latter path.

II
Let us consider all that has been said thus far in the context of a
contemporary fact: namely, that methodological disputes generally assume
the form of an argument about scientific methodology. I have already
suggested that such disputes can be directly related t o the tradition of
philosophy, and specifically to the complex of issues treated by past
philosophers under ‘the problem of knowledge.’ There is no contradiction
here, however, between that standpoint and the second axis for viewing
the current debate. For, in our age, the methodology of science provides
the philosophical structure within which epistemological questions w e to
be answered. Thus, i n the current literature, a theory of knowledge is
stated and defended in terms of the canons of scientific methodology.

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1121 POLITICALTHEORY / FEBRUARY 1975

That this should be so can hardly be regarded as a surprising fact, given

that almost all philosophers since the seventeenth century have adopted
‘science’ as a normative model for the resolution of philosophical-and
political-problems. But whether we accept by definition or as a
consequence of liistorical development that all ‘knowledge’ is ‘scientific,’ it
can hardly be denied that, expressed as the self-consciousness of
contemporary society, science is the all-embracing framework within
wluch the issues of epistemology, methodology, theory construction, and
politics take on their ‘meaningful’ c l ~ a r a c t e r . ~
Put another way, we could say that a shift in emphasis or perspective
with respect to one aspect of this framework will make its repercussions
felt in the other areas. A dramatic example of this interconnectedness is
provided by Thomas Kuhn’s ?lie Stnrcttrre of Scieiitific Revolirtions
which, within a very short period of time, Iias exerted a considerable
influence upon thinkers concerned with the study and formulation of
political theory. In his consideration of scientific methodology, Kuhn
makes the historical development of science a necessary premise for an
understanding of its procedural rules. This premise is normally regarded as
alien to the models of science constructed in accordance with the
analytical-empirical criteria of scientific methodology. In other words, Kuhn
introduced a genetic conception of science into a discussion which had,
until then, dismissed that viewpoint as materially irrelevant or as IogicaIIy
mi~conceivcd.~
Wliat Kulin’s book presented as a possibility was a different assessment
of scientific mctliodology, one which moved away from a definition of
science in terms of the thought processes of individual scientists or
philosophers of science to one framed in terms of the historical activities
of groups of scientists within a ‘scientific community.’ The importance of
this redefinition of methodoiogy is twofold: first, it emphasizes the fact
that science is a social activity in a context of social activities, and it
suggests that any definition of science which clainis to relate itself to the
empirical activities of scientists cannot fail to take into consideration the
larger context within wluch that empirical activity occurs, and from
which, in part, it derives its self-conceivcd meaning; and second, it asserts
that the decision-making process with respect to the theoretical-metliodo-
logical development of science cannot itself be framed in ‘scientific’
(analytical-empirical) ternis, but rather must be approached from a
standpoint capable of assigning ultimate importance to the practical-and
perhaps, ‘irrational’4nterests of those who constitute the scientific
community. In short, Kulin sugested that science could be defined in

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 Ashcraft 1 PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY (131

terms of sociology, politics, and history, rather than logical analysis or

plilosoplly. Instead of constructing a model of science which is then used
to explain political phenomena from the standpoint of the scientist, what
was needed was a political model to explain the activities of scientists
,itllin the scientific community.6 To paraphrase hlarx, it is the social
existence of men which determines their activities as scientists, not their
activities as scientists which determines their social existence.
Indeed, it is necessay to interject at this point, lest the influence I have
attributed to Kuhn’s book be overweighted, that much of the reexamina-
tion of tlie canons of scientific methodology owes its origins not t o a
particular intellectual product (e.g., Kuhn’s work), but to the social-politi-
wl events and movements of the 1960s. A challenge to the existing social
structure by political groups in America and in various Western European
and Third World countries carried in its wake a challenge to the theoretical
presuppositions which were perceived as being supportive of that social
structure.
I have referred to Kuhn’s book in order to show the interconnectedness
of definitions of science and the methodology of political theory, and
specifically, the relevance of a social-historical approach to the methodo-
logical problems of the theory-construction process. Wiile I believe that
most of those who have made use of Kuhn’s work in their characteriza-
tions of political theory have recognized the flzeorefical importance of
these points, that recognition has remained strangely divorced from the
‘political’ implications of TIie Strrtctrire of Scietitific Revoltrfioits.
According to J. G. Pocock, for example, “the exciting thing about
Kuhn’s methodology . . .is that it treats a branch of the history of thought
as a process both linguistic and political.”’ But because Pocock defines
paradigms in purely linguistic terms, “it does not follow that a
paradigmatic revolution.. .will entail the occurrence of a political
revolution.”’ What interests Pocock is the notion of a ‘politics of
language.” This, in practice, amounts to equating politics with “the
political speech of society.” Focusing upon a paradigm as “a reference
point within tlie structure of consciousness,” thus allows one to interpret
:he history of political theory as ‘a verbal tennis match’; that is, as a
struggle over the forms and substance of political speech.’
Sheldon Wolin has also made considerable use of Kuhn’s terminology in
’
his writings on political theory.’ And, in one sense, he does draw our
attention t o the political aspects of that terminology. Unlike the scientist
who hopes by means of his theory to transform the outlook of the
members of the scientific community, Wolin argues that the political

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[141 POLITICALTHEORY 1 FEBRUARY 1975

theorist speaks to a broader community. hloreover, “the aim of many

political theorists has been t o change society itself; not simply to alter the
way men look at the world, but t o alter the world.”’ * This response on
the part of political theorists is not merely a subjective peculiarity of those
who happen t o theorize about politics; rather, the political theory is a
product of ‘a crisis in the world.’’
Having linked paradigmatic theorizing to an existential crisis independ-
ent of the particular theorist, \Volin proceeds to characterize political
society itself as a paradigm, i.e., as an ‘ensemble of practices and
beliefs.’14 Thus, a breakdown in the old social paradigm leads to a new
theoretical paradigm (political theory). Such a view would appear to place
historians of political theory under a definite obligation to provide an
account for paradigm change which focuses directly upon the causal
conditions of social-political change as a necessary prerequisite for the
characterization of a particular political theory in Kuhnian terminology. It
would seem, in other words, that Wolin has incorporated the political
implications of Kuhn’s view of scientific methodology into his definition
of political theory.
Yet, a closer examination of the argument shows that this is not the
case; or rather, that the ‘political’ never achieves more than a metaphorical
status. What we are offered is the proposition that political theories arise
out of the process of political change within society. But who would deny
this? hlore important, what is ‘political’ about such a recognition? To what
definite perspective on the issue of social-political change does it coinmit
us? The answer, of course, is that no such commitment is required or even
implied by this abstract application of Kuhn’s terminology.’
In part, this tendency to define politics as lying within a ‘structure of
consciousness’ or as an abstract reading of history is a reflection of Kuhn’s
own failure to treat the actual social and historical conditions under which
scientific revolutions occur. The result is that the latter are described in
political lartgtmage, but their acutal relationship to political, social, and
economic developments is omitted from this ‘historical’ account of
science.’ And it is precisely this metaphorical characterization of science
which thosc who write about political theory have adopted as their own.
The actual historical relationship of political theory to a political struggle
within a particular society may be pointed out as a fact, but that
relationship is not perceived as a way of structuring our conception of
political theory. The latter would require not only a more specific
arrangement of historical data placed in the context of a theory about
social-political change, but also, it would have to reflect our needs for

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 Ashcraft / P R O B L E M OF METHODOLOGY [15] ,
theorizing about political phenomena with reference to the problems of ~

contemporary society-
Kuhn, however, is not wholly responsible for this deemphasis of the I
political dimension of ‘scientific methodology’ applied to political theory.
political scientists have their own reasons for factoring politics out of
discussions of scientific models. By accepting, as both Wolin and Pocock
do, the ‘giveness’ of the debate over methodology which predominates in
any discussion of political theory, they naturally view Tlze Strzicttrre of
Scieittific Revoliitioia as a contribution t o this debate. Now there is a
sound basis-the preoccupation with ‘science’ as the normative model for
tlleoretical endeavor-for this viewpoint, as I have tried to indicate.
Nevertheless, what we are concerned with is not the problem iii abstract0
of formulating a theory, theorizing ‘as such’; rather, the issue before us is
what must we know and do in order to understand and to formulate a
palitical theory. And, insofar as we treat this as a specific question,
metaphorical constructions-e.g., paradigms-divorced from an empiri-
ally-grounded perspective of social-historical change are of little value for
understanding the political conflict amongst groups within any specific
society. In pursuing the ‘scientific’ approach to political theory, therefore,
what the followers of Kuhn have omitted from their redefinition of
political theory are precisely those aspects which make it ‘political.’
It has become a commonplace in the literature that while political
scientists fiddle amongst themselves about the problems of methodology,
the political society around them is erupting with political problems-
racism, poverty, war, and riots. Apparently, these disruptions in the ‘social
paradigm’ have not produced for the followers of Kuhn a new theoretical
’
paradigm.’ This fact will appear less surprising once we recognize that
the task of redefining political theory utilizing Kuhnian terminology
presupposed the importance of the debate over methodology as a way of
understanding political theory, and that this presupposition necessarily
dictated that contemporary social problems be placed in brackets.
In the concluding paragraphs of his essay, “Paradigms and Political
Theories,” Wolin notes the compatibility between ‘behaviorism’ as a
conceptual framework and the operational paradigm of liberal democracy.
To this observation he appends a vague warning that the prevailing
paradigm may be in trouble.’ Is this warning meant to s u g e s t that the
methodology of behaviorism needs to be replaced and that this will
produce a paradigm change, or is it Wolin’s position that liberal democracy
needs to be replaced and that this will produce a paradigm change? If we
suppose it to be the latter-as his own formulation of the relationship

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[I61 POLITICAL THEORY I FEBRUARY 1975

between social and theoretical paradigms seems t o suggest-then is it not

the task of political theory to provide for a specific restructuring of
existing social institutions even if this means-as it most certainly
does-that the debate over methodology is bracketed while we address
ourselves to the real social problems? What is really needed, in other
words, is a paradigmatic political perspective. Such a position would
undoubtedly raise methodological questions, but it is surely 3 mistake to
believe that from a consideration of the latter any paradigmatic political
theory will arise.
The contemporary literature on political theory advises us, I have argued,
to approach political theory as though it existed within the philosophical
framework of the problem of knowledge or as though it were a
subcategory of the dispute over scientific methodology. Not that political
theory is not in substance concerned with matters outside the range of
either of these debates; that, of course, is recognized by everyone. Rather,
it is a question of priority. Only if these epistemological-methodological
issues are properly grasped, it is maintained, will it be possible to proffer
substantive political recommendations. Yet, even this conclusion is not a
constituitive part of the discussion of political theory, which remains
preoccupied with ‘understanding’ political theory, apparently as an end in
itself. It is this primary objective which has guided historians, philos-
ophers, and political scientists alike in their study and interpretation of
traditional political theory. The latter thus stands or falls on the scale of
relevance to the culturally determined values which guide our investiga-
tions into history or social phenomena (Weber) according t o the tradition’s
illumination of our knowledge of political theory or the procedures by
which that knowledge may be acquired. Given these preoccupations on the
part of those who teach and write about political theory, can we
reasonably expect that students will not adopt an epistemological-method-
ological approach as the ‘meaningful’ framework for theorizing about
political problems and for assessing the value of past political theories?
Suppose, however, that the emphasis were reversed. We might then
insist that our knowledge and understanding of traditional political
theory-as well as the relevance of the current debate over methodology-
was dependent upon our having alrcady formulated a definite political
perspective with respect to the major political problems of contemporary
society. In other words, our assessment of previous political theory and
our approach to the study of it would depend upon how we viewed that
political theory (i.e., its substantive proposals, methodological precepts,
and historical importance) in relation to the problem of political change

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 Ashcratt / PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY 1171

within our society. It is this third, political, dimension that is lurking in

the shadows of the debate over the nature of political theory, which, 1
want to suggest in the final section of the essay, ought to be made central
to the problem of how to ‘understand’ a political theory.

II1
So long as one adheres t o the boundaries of the ‘political’ established
by the methodological controversy over how t o approach political
phenomena-including political theory-it is inevitable-that the criteria of
validity drawn from philosophy or premised upon a paiticular model of
science will serve to filter out important elements of political life.
Sometimes this is accomplished simply by omitting substantive factors
such as inequalities arising from class, race, or social position. More often,
it is the methodological rules of theory formulation which, while taking
cognizance of the existence of such facts, denies their importance-not to
a theory of politics, but to a definite political theory, i.e., a theory whose
imminent purpose is to bring about a restructuring of a particular political
society.
John b c k e begins his discussion of politics in the Secoud Treatise with
the declaration that political power is

a right of making laws, with penalties of death and, consequently, all less
penaltics for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the
force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defense of
the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public
good.’

When Robert Dalll faces the same task in his book, Alodeni Political
Analysis, he ‘boldly defines’ a political system as “any persistent pattern
of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule,
or authority.”2o Dahl’s definition is ‘bold,’ perhaps, because he fears that
some analytically minded studeni will ask him what he means by
‘significant.’ But, of course, such a student would have a field day with
Lacke’s prolix definition. By itself, the phrase, ‘the public good,’ is a
guarantee of full employment for scores of Oxford philosopliers for
decades to come. Yet, despite his wordiness, there is a directness about
Locke’s approach to politics which throws us immediately into a world of
death, the preservation of property, the force of the coni~nunity,and
penalties, that is missing from Dahl’s sterilized characterization of political

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[18) POLITICALTHEORY I FEBRUARY 1975

life. Tlus is not because Dahl is unacquainted with Locke’s defrnition of

political power, but simply, we must suppose, because he finds it more
‘useful’ or ‘accurate’ to state his ideas about politics in this particular
form.
Naturally, 1 do not wish t o saddle Skinner, Pocock, IVolin, or anyone
else with the approach of Dahl or Easton t o politics. At least, not directly.
But now let us ask, how much more enlightening is it to read Locke as a
contributor to our understanding of ‘the human condition’?* Or should
we imagine that the association of politics, death, and property are merely
those of the historical personage, Locke, growing out of the ‘linguistic
context’ within which he happened to have written?22 in other words,
that the sense in which politics is about such things is just part of our
understanding of ‘history.’ Or, assuming this historical context, should we
be content to read Locke’s political theory as the expression of a social
and a tlieoretical paradigm?” Or, perhaps, as the replacement of a
mysterious and esoteric form of ‘political speech’ with a more prosaic
political language.24 Doubtless, politics is about the human condition,
history, paradigms, and political speech, just as it is about rule, power, or
authority. But in their discussion of political theory, Skinner, Parekh,
Wolin, Pocock, and others are certainly closer to Dahl in his discussion of
politics than any of them are to Locke’s discussion of Filmer or politics.
There is less distance separating the defenders of the tradition of
political philosophy from its behaviorialist critics than is at first apparent
from a consideration merely of the types of evidence or books cited in the
debate itself. The same tendencies toward analytic constructs, clarifica-
tion, the generation of universal laws, and model-building, on the one
hand, or toward the recording of the subject’s opinions, his socioeconomic
status, group associations, physical surroundings, and historical back-
ground, on the other, appear in the literature, whether its subject matter is
democratic theory, Hobbes’ Leviatliuir, community power structure, Greek
political theory, or voting studies. The consensur upon the propriety of
structuring one’s approach to politics according to the assumptions
underlying this analytical-empirical model-regurdless of the conflict
between its opposiiig teiideircies-is overwhelming. hloreover, if one were
to consider the charges frequently levelled at behaviorial poIitical scientists
by the defenders of political theory, namely, the conservative bias of the
behaviorialists, their preoccupation with trivial questions, their strained
endeavors to tell us something which is already widely known, their
inability to derive from their activities as political scientists solutions to
the major political problems of society, and so forth, it would also become

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 Ashcraft / PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY [191

evident that every one of these charges applies with equal force to those
~ v h oare presently the effective custodians of the tradition of political
theory. In short, some of the responsibility for the divorce of traditional
political theory from the present concerns of political life rests squarely
with those teachers of political theory who have encapsulated the meaning
of politics within the frozen worlds of ‘analysis’ or ‘history.’
Suppose, having cited it, we wished t o know, what is the ‘intended
illocutionary force’ of Locke’s definition of politic^?^' That is not a
purely historical question, since, by raising it, the interpreter of political
theory gives it a specific illocutionary force within the ‘intended range of
meaning’ available to his audience. And one of those possible meanings is
certainly that politics is about such things as who lives and who dies, who
Owns property, and how it is regulated. Interpreting the tradition of
political theory is an activity performed in the present, with consequences
that can only be ‘understood’ with respect to the present. But what is the
nature of that ‘present’? And how does it relate to ‘political theory’?
These are questions which are neither reducible to philosophical defini-
tions, nor to one set of niethodological techniques; nor is there only one
empirically grounded answer to them. The inadequacies of a general
retreat to philosophy, scientific methodology, or history as a response t o
the political problems of the present is painfully evident. But it is only so
long as the treatment of political theory is divorced from these problems
that any of these approaches appears to function as a sufficient strategy
for understanding what political theory is.
Everyone believes that political theory is important, but philosophers
only want to analyze it, historians t o describe it, and empirical political
scientists to test it. Naturally, to carry out their specific aims, they all turn
to the tradition of political theory. If such attitudes were not simply the
specific manifestations of a specific form of society in a specific historical
period, as they are, but were instead assumed to be ‘natural’ or present
from the beginning of Western civilization, is it not obvious that there
would be no ‘tradition’ of political philosophy?
How do those who instruct us that to analyze a political theory or to
describe its historical character is very different from taking a practical
political stand on issues propose to construct the bridge between the two
activities?26 hlore important, how d o they propose to teach others to do
so, to see the connection between the tradition of political theory and
theorizing about the problems of the actual political society in which thcy
must live? In short, who accepts the responsibility for not teacliiiig
individuals how to theorize about politics? Tliorstein Veblen sunimcd lip

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[201 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1975

indictment of the education process in universities a half century ago

by observing that the goal of education seemed to be a mind with a
‘trained incapacity’ to theorize. At least, with respect to politics, there is
precious little to wliich one could point as evidence for denying the
prescience of that remark.
Let us return to Locke once more. What makes his theory political is
not the philosophical cogency of his definition of political power; nor is it
the textual consistency of his use of terminology; nor, finally, is it the
empirical accuracy of his account of the origins of political power or the
institution of property. It is, simply, the relevance of Locke’s argument
about the exercise of political power t o an existent political movement
within his society. A theory is political, in other words, only relation to
the maintenance or furtherance of the social, political, and economic
objectives of a specifically identifiable group within society. To say that
political theory is ideology, of course, opens up a complicated set of issues
which cannot be explored here. I have raised the point polemically in
order to place in the foreground of the debate about methodological
approaches to political theory this proposition: that only an ideologically
grounded approach with respect to current political problems can provide
a bridge between the tradition of political philosophy and the perception
of what counts as ‘political’ phenomena in our understanding of
contemporary political life.
To those whose objection to the identification of political theory with
ideology rests upon some principled defense of the former as being
somehow ‘higher’ and more removed from the tawdry conflicts of
day-to-day political life than the latter, I pose the questions: What
epistemological presuppositions must be accepted a priori in order to
guarantee the priority of knowledge, philosophy, objectivity, or timeless
truth over the merely existentially conflicting opinions and interests which
characterize political life? How is it even possible for these epistemological
presuppositions to stand apart from the very conflict they propose to
‘study’ and are assumed to transcend?
As I have tried to indicate, the very conceptualization of political
theory and the methodological procedures adopted for ‘understanding’
political theory in its present or past forms are inextricably tied t o a
particular set of epistemological presuppositions. Nevertheless, the parti-
sans in this philosophical debate have retained their detachment from
political conflict precisely because primary importance is granted to the
~ f e g u a r d i n gof t!ieir epistemological presuppositions from the ‘political’
contamination that would inevitably result if political conflict were

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 Ashcraft / PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY [21]

perceived as a generic framework through which assumptions about

knowledge, philosophy, methodology, and the like, had to be filtered.
it is not as though the philosophical arguments against a ‘presupposi-
tionless’ epistemology or a value-free social science are unknown to most
practitioners of political science, including those who teach political
theory. Nor is it unnoticed that no one has yet produced a single empirical
example of an- actual thinker wvlio was able to conform to these ‘ideal
types’ in his expression or treatment of political ideas. Yet it seems, in
Weber’s words, that it is precisely the ‘violence’ such a prescriptive model
of epistemology or methodology does to ‘historical reality’ that appears to
be its chief virtue.” Consider, for example, Weber’s declaration that “all
knowledge of cultural reality is always knowledge from particirlar poiitts
ofyieiv.’” Moreover, as Weber saw,

Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our

vdue-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant
because it reveaIs relationships which are important to us duc to their
connection with our values. Only because and to the extent that this is the
case is it worthwhile for us to know i t in its individual features. \Ve cannot
discovcr, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a “presupposition-
less” investigation of empirical data. Rather, perception of its meaningfulness
2 9-
to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of invcstigation.

hlost historians, philosophers, and political scientists accept that they

are in this sense rooted in the historical present which constitutes an
existentially necessary starting point, whatever the subject matter of their
investigations. But, once admitted, this factual presupposition is immedi-
ately ‘set aside’ so that they can ‘get on with’ their discussions of voting
behavior, the meaning of Rousseau’s concept of the general will, or the
virtues of polyarchal democracy. Yet, if one asked-as Weber does
not-how ‘value-conditioned interests’ come to be formed in society, and
to be formed in different ways for different social groups, and what it
would mean to establish the ‘connection’ between the way we think about
social phenomena and such value-conditioned interests, it certainly would
not be self-evident how the mere confession of such values had either (1)
‘set aside’ the constellation of interests and activities which produced
them, or (2) altered the patterns.of thought associated with such interests.
Only by dissociating political objectives from these value-conditioned
interests arid by exempting ‘scientific methodology’ from the infection of
perspectivistic values was it possible for Weber to preserve his methodo-
logical ideal type of the social scientist arid to employ it as a polemical
weapon against the ‘partisanship’ of a Marxist approach t o social

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[22] POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1975

phenomena. In this wvay, Weber’s methodological presuppositions served as

an ideological defense of a particular approach to social-historical
phenomena even while they also served as tlie basis for denying the
relevance of ideologically tainted perspectives to the process of knowledge-
gathering. Tlus strategy has not changed within the social sciences in the
fifty years since Weber’s death.”
It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts to begin from a specific
political standpoint formulated with respect to the restructuring of the
social-economic-political inequalities of present society (e.g., hlarxism)
encounter tremendous resistance from those who want to prevent tlie
dissolution of social science into tlie anarchic conflict of warring
ideologies, while, incidentally, preserving their present Hobbesian insti-
tutional and intellectual dominance of political life (the latter resting upon
the ideological justification framed in terms of their methodological
presuppositions). Tlius, within an epistemological-methodological frame-
work (the analytical-empirical model of pliilosophy/science) which tlie
defenders of tlie tradition of political philosophy and behaviorial political
scientists share, but apply to different substantive materials, tlie ‘great
debate’ goes on, with one group drifting more or less toward one pole of
this bifurcated model in its evaluation of evidence while criticizing those
grouped near the opposite pole for having paid insufficient attention to
the criterion wliicli they themselves have emphasized. Both groups agree,
however, that our knowledge of political theory is to be found within this
framework, and that ‘ideological’ positions can only serve to inhibit this
process of knowledge-gathering-paradoxically, it must be said in the case
of political theory, because the adoption of an ideological standpoint as a
wvay of ‘understanding’ political theory would itself serve to ‘politicize’ the
issues of methodology, theory formation, and knowledge. The paradox lies
not only in the disclosure of tlie deeply rooted connection between
political and intellectual objectives which such a defense against tlie
intrusion of ideology displays, but also in the fact that political conflict is
necessarily presupposed as a generic (though lower) field of human
interaction than the knowledge-gathering process itself.
Those whose works I have cited in this essay have sought to raise the
level of consciousness of those who teach or write about political theory;
and, in tliis regard, their efforts have been stimulating and beneficial to
others. Yet, if they have not demonstrated how, through their activities
(teaching and writing) in relation to tlie tradition of political philosophy,
one can proceed from ‘history’ or ‘philosophy’ to the activity of theorizing
about political life as one experiences it in the present, then i t is time to

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 Ashcraft I PROBLEM O F METHODOLOGY [23]

s y openly and bluntly that they are not discussing ‘political’ theory at all,
but something else parading under that label.

NU TES

1. See, for example, Quentin Skinner, “hleaning and Understanding in the

History of Ideas,” History arid Theory, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1969), 3-53, and Bhiku
and R. N. Berki, “The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner’s
hfethodology,” Jouriml of the History ofIdeas (hiarch/April 1973), 163-184; also, B.
c. Parckh, “The Nature of Political Philosophy” in Politics and Experience: Essays
fiesenfed to hlicliael Oakesliott cds. B. C. Parekh and Preston King (Cambridge
University Press, 1968), pp. 153-207.
2. Skinner, op. cit.
3. Both Skinner and Parekh maintain that the objective to be attained through
the adoption of their respective approaches to political theory is ‘self-consciousness’
or ‘understanding.’ Parekh, “The Nature of Political Philosophy,” op.cit., PP.
161-162, 164, 167;Skinner. op. cit., p. 53.
4. One of those who has undertaken to explore systematically those connec-
tions is Jurgen Habermas. See especially Knoivlcdge arid Ihrnari Interests (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968); Theory and fiactice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973); ‘Tech-
nology and Science as ‘Idcology’ ” in Toward n Rational Society (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1970). pp. 81-122.
5. “The depreciation of historical fact is deeply, and probably functionally,
ingrained in the ideology of the scientific profession.” Thomas Kuhn, The Strctirre
of Scientific Revohrtiori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962), p. 137. It was
Kuhn’s point to ask, “llow could history of science fail to be a source of phenomena
to which theories about knowledge may legitimately be asked to apply?” Ibid., p. 9.
6. Ibid., pp. 91-97. The “issue of paradigm choice can never be unequivocally
settled by logic and argument,” p. 93.
7. J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Larigitage and Time (New York: Atheneum, 1973),
p. 14.
8. Ibid., p. 19.
.
9. A paradigm is “a conceptual constellation.. in the political speech of a
society.” Ibid., p. 271.
10. Ibid., pp. 280,282, 287.
11. Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Anzerican Political Science
Review, Vol. LXII, No. 4 (December 1969), 1062-1082; “Paradigms and Political
Theories,” in Parekh and King, op. cit., pp. 125-152.
12. “Paradigms and Political Theories,” op. cit., p. 144.
13. Ibid., P. 147-148.
14. Ibid., p. 149.
15. I have stated this point very sharply, and those whose works I am discussing
may believe, unfairly. Wolin observes, for examplc, that “a society may find the
paradigm being challenged” because “new social classes may have emerged; new
economic relationships may have developed; or new racial or religious patterns may
h v e appeared.” True, but how do we strrccture the relative importance of these

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[241 POLITICALTHEORY I FEBRUARY 1975

different expressions of “the new developments brought by change” in order to

understand the history of political theory or the problem of political change as it
appears in our society. Wolin’s brief historical examples of the types of paradigm
change, and his omission of ‘the problem of revolution as a species of paradigm
change,’ in which a discussion of just this point would prove crucial, leaves these
questions unanswcred. Ibid., pp. 149-150. Pocock, on the other hand, does attempt
to say something about sochl experience as ‘articulated in political speech,’ and even,
in some scnse, to provide ‘historical verification’ for his viewpoint. Op. cit., pp. 33,
36. Yet, Pocock does not undertake to “establish correlations between the saying of
certain things by certain men and the occupation by those men of certain places in a
social structure and of certain moments in its history.” He concedes that this is a
legitimate procedure, though he apparently believes that it is a highly problematic
undertaking bound up with the metaphysics of an ‘idealist/materialist dichotomy’ (p.
37; cf. pp. 105, 237). Self-reflectively, Pocock recognizes the ‘conservative’ and
‘idealist’ bias of his own position; see espechlly pp. 3-41, and the concluding chapter,
“On the Non-Revolutionary Character of Paradigms: A SelfCriticism and After-
piece,” pp. 273-291. The conscquence is that while Pocock recognizes the virtual
identity of the ideologist and the historian (p. 253), and the opposing ideological uses
of paradigms (pp. 261 ff.), and his own conservative ideological bias, these
insights-divorced from the attempt to draw the correlations between ideological
positions and specific sochl groups in the social structure, which he rejects-appar as
unconnected contingencies with respect to understanding the history of political
theory or its connection to the processes of political change in contemporary society.
16. Kuhn, of course, acknowledges this point. “1 have said nothing about the role
of technological change or of external sochl, economic, and intellectual conditions in
the development of the sciences.” Preface, op. cit., p. xii.
17. Naturally, this does not reflect my position, since I regard hlarxism as just
such a paradigm. \\‘oh sees hlarxism 3s “one of the most extraordinary paradigms in
the history of Western political thought.” “Paradigms and Political Theories,” op.
cit., p. 143. Nevertheless, it is unclear from what paradigmtic perspective this
observation is made. Is hlarxism just one amongst a number of such paradizms and
hence, from this standpoint, only a supplier of interesting questions or puules which
the social scientist with his liberal paradigm can take up, or is it, rather, the
paradigmatic starting point for understanding contemporary society and the history
of political theory? The fact that Marxism can be characterized as a paradigm quite
obviously docs not answer this question.
18. Ibid., p. 152.
19. John Locke, Two 7keutisesof Govcrtztneiit, ed. Peter Laslett (hfentor, 1965);
Second Treatise, par- 3.
20. Robert Dah1,Moderri PoliticuZAnalysis (Prentice-IIall, 1963) p. 6 .
21. Parekh and Berki, op. cit., p. 173.
22. Skinner, op. cit.
23. Wolin, op. cit.
24. Pocock, op. cit.
25. For Skinner’s application of this concept to political theory, see op. cit., pp.
46 ff.
26. This, of course, is a pxaphrase of Weber’s statement in his essay, “Science as
a Vocation.” Frotn Elax Il’cber: Essoys in Sociology cds. H. 11. Gerth and C. Wright
hlills (Oxford University Press, 1958) p. 145.

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 Ashcraft I PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY 1251

27. ‘Ideal types’ d o ‘violence to historical reality’ at the expense of trying to

achieve clarity. The Pratestant Eiliicand the Spkit of Capitalism (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1958) p. 233. “In order t o penetrate t o the real c a u ~ l
interrelationships, we construct u n r d ones.’’ The Afetlzodology of the social
sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949) p. 185-186 (italics given); cf. pp. 90, 94 ff.
Indeed, the greater the ‘unrealistic nature’ of the ideal type, the ‘better is it able to
perform its methodological functions in formulating the clarification of terminology.’
Basic Concepts in Sociology (New York: Citadel Press, 1964) p. 54.
28. filetliodology. p. 81 (italics given).
29. Ibid., p. 76 (italicsgiven).
30. So, for example, the assumption Ihat twentiethcentury ~ z e t l ~ o dof s
philosophy or historiography may be applied to our ‘understanding’ of the past, but
not twentieth-century poriticul perspectives, represents a specific application of the
\Veberian viewpoint, and, in the context of writing within the sochl sciences, scrve~
the =me ideological function vis-a-vis a hlarxist approach. Not surprisingly, it would
prove rather embarrassing to the adherents of Weberim methodological precepts if
they were to read the hferfiodology-as they do not-in the context of Weber’s
political writings. Or, more recently, if Karl Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discopery
were to be read in conjunction with his Tlze Upeti Society and Its Enemies.

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