TITLE II:

Crimes against the

Fundamental Law of the
State
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO RUFANO,
and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
October 30, 2003 Resolution1 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices - Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable
cause the criminal complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante2 (petitioner)
against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and
PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal search and grave threats; and
the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private
respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one
short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were covered by an
expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999.5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information 6 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution
No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private respondents an
administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct, before
the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG);7 and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search
and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.8
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated how, on May 14,
2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him
in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon after
having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired
police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo
Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the highway in going to
Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before I could call Mr. Plaza, four
policemen in uniform blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino
Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie
Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of
Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at]
me, having heard the sound of the release of the safety lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG
PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN
KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing my waistline when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed
their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding an armalite also
pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told
them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's
statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went
near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any
search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and asked me
of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched
my wallet and gave the asked [sic] document;
8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying anything
bringing with them the firearm;
9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station where I
saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I asked the police
officers including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him also;
10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the armed
civilian person so I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the
armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office, the disarming was done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by Police Chief
Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after
posting a bailbond;
 12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of Illegal
Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of
Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and
PO1 Eddie Degran.9
Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and Percival Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he interposed the
following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of Police/Officer-in-Charge
Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this
fact in his own Complaint-Affidavit;11 and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even though he was not armed with
a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in plain view, was committing a violation of
Comelec Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328 by carrying a firearm in his person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit dated March 25,
2002, which contradicts the statements of private respondent Conde, viz:
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated among
other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on
his waist;"
2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said handgun
was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team leader during the
May 14, 2001 Elections, from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after searching the same; and
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28, 2001 after
we have already affixed our signatures thereon.13
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with both the IAS and
Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that
private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. 14
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, finding all
private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with suspension only. The IAS noted
however that private respondents were merely being "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of
duty." 15
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of Arrest.16 The RTC
granted the same in an Order17 dated August 17, 2001. Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz,
Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001, recommending the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who conducted the
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the
privacy of the accused and the security of his property."18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano
Pag-ong approved said recommendation.19
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order20 dated January 16, 2003.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman Investigation &
Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003 Resolution,
to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for any of the
offenses charged against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the complaint, it
appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest.
The subsequent execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant rendered the
complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt, especially so since it merely exculpated
some but not all of the respondents. These circumstances, coupled with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty, negates any criminal liability on the part of the
respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the above-captioned case
be dismissed for lack of probable cause.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved the October 30, 2003 Resolution. 22
In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the Ombudsman to the earlier IAS
Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC
Order, all of which declared the warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal, 24 which
are contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution declaring the warrantless search
legal.
The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the latter offered "no
new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the reversal or modification"25 of its October 30,
2003 Resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and
Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents) the following acts of grave abuse of discretion:
I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Resolution dated October
30, 2003, public respondents found that the incident upon which petitioner's criminal complaint
was based stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint
despite the fact that:
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private respondents
was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of the instances of valid
warrantless searches.
 B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was arrested and
detained by the private respondents.
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order dated January 20,
2004, public respondents denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a capricious,
whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. 26
In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public respondents acted within the
bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-0109-B given that private respondents committed
no crime in searching petitioner and confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their
duty of enforcing the law against illegal possession of firearms and the Comelec ban against the
carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for himself.29 Private respondents
Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004.30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.31 The Court respects the
relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when
the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman,32 except when the
same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private
respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless
search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other
special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally
procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the
same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where
a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the
absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two
witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather,
he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid
warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, 35 under Article
32, in relation to Article 221936 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975. 37
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for damages with
the regular courts38 or an administrative case with the PNP/DILG, 39 as petitioner did in Administrative
Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a criminal action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore proper, although the reasons public
respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the
finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of
Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. 40 Public respondents
completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as
illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a
groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court
need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of
the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public respondents. To
sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender is a public officer
or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal
grounds.41 The second element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out
by private respondent Conde in his Comment42 and Memorandum,43 petitioner himself identified in his
Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said
affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way
involved in it.44 There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary
detention against private respondents.

Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed out that the same
is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at
him.45 Such bare allegation stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case,
that public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function. 46 The
IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their "enthusiasm in the
conduct of the arrest in line of duty."47 Petitioner expressed the same view when, in his Affidavit of
Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may have been merely following orders when they
pointed their long firearms at him.

All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint against private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001 Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.
Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged with the
crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).4 The Information
dated May 3, 1990 reads:
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL
Alias "TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:
That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay
Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named
accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence,
persons inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with garand
rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the
house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the
occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and then
mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty.6 Thereafter, trial
ensued.
Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep
when petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying
the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They
looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew
who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and corroborated his testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President Roxas
Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness stand for the
prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that
Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip
region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as abrasion on the right side of
the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region.7 Dr. Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted
would heal from seven to ten days.8 For the defense, petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in
unison that they were in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged,
however, that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other
barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen
carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi9 from three unidentified persons who managed to
escape.
On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which
is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:
The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime;
on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were
named CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them
during their testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were public
officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of the
testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a doubt of whether or not all the
accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favorof the accused; that on
this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of
moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; x x x.10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18,
2005, set aside the trial court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be
convictedfor Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile
considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part
of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive portion
of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on hand,
the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-petitioners
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of
arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional] minimum with the
accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a professionor calling
pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is double
jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being
now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to
their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for
acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional right to due process when it Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3 years, 6
convicted them for Violation of Domicile. months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the
We deny. commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.

An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties.12 When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. 13 An
appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 14 The
appellate court may, and generally does,look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.15
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical
Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on doublejeopardy
since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed
judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of
the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the
open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a barangay captain
nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are
considered as public officers/employees.16
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby
sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated June
19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche,
Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty that should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the RPC, the
penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months
and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or
effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the
offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night
and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law17 requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of
the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code.1âwphi1 Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC
is composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 128 are:

Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years

TITLE III:
Crimes against Public
Order
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV,
CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR
FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO
PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of
the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by
the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the
AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members
of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their
aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare
Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the
emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media,
announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as
the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the
State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US
government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded
that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet
members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of
rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures
to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their
weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers.
The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the
explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their
barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the
Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information
for coup d’etat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled
off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati
City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-
2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same
military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the
President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a
superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed
with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over
all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion
praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to
assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of
Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a
general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause
against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly,
the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the
charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial
Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d’etatbefore the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of
the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’
applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed
the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the
Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of
Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP
Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of
complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the
Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that
the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of
War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot
compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which
offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70,
72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the
court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a
service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that
the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that
during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for
purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred the case to the General Court
Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG)
Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the
hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they
were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the
alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed
on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall
end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching
and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly
changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that
petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court martial in its Order dated
September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit.
He alleges that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and
18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present"
and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications
from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to
Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the
term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and shall
be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military
law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and
while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully
called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are
required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural
or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined
before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by
court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or
direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule
that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil
court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment,
has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court
martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines,
in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or
offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of
the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates
the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by
military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military
justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice
system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the
highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in
times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is
nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military
body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all
the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration
as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become
invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in
enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro
Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to
protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and
legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people
and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of
War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps,
cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service
– imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently
intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC
in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of
the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such
declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over
"service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is
only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the
subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional
amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the
courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration
by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against
the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat,
cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a
nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. offenses. x x x.
408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try
Articles 54 to 70: cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment. War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment. shall be tried by the court-martial.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion. Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is
Art. 59. Desertion. worth quoting, thus:
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
Defense. d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer. crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer. deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
Articles 72 to 92: personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service. cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property. to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage xxx
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court. control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed. of War; quoted provisions omitted).
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97: xxx
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and
Art. 97. General Article. only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or
to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never
suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged ‘is absorbed and in
furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if
the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055.
Such is not the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to
say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among
the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters
involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for
prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or
officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to
prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or
power with which they have not been vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in
charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES "NONONG NONOY
ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large, TITING GALI BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO large,
TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a. "NEGRO MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG
DELA CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE LB RANDO
ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG ITCOBANES,"
and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo
(Rey), Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz (Bulldog) seek
liberty from the judgment1 of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila,
which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime ofMurder with Direct Assault in
Criminal Case No. 05-238607.
The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy), 2 Titing
Booc (Titing),3 and Gali Itcobanes (Gali),4 and Orlando Tagalog Materdam (Negro)5 were all charged in
an Information dated July 30, 2004 that reads:
That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary
School,6 Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one FLORO A. CASAS,
while in the performance of his duty being the District Supervisor of public schools, hitting the latter on
the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.7
On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information, 8 which provides:
That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of
Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of Masbate,
the above-named accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR REINARIO "REY"
ESTONILO, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, and with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce their
co-accused, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO AL[I]AS "EDEL ESTONILO[,] " EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES
AL[I]AS "NONONG ITCOBANES[,] " NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI ITCOBANES,
ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM[,]" [and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ
AL[I]AS "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]" who wereall armed with firearms, to attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being
a District Supervisor of public schools, by then and there shooting the latter, hitting said FLORO A.
CASAS on the differentparts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.9 When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which stated, among others:
a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:
1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;
2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the Honorable Supreme
Court asto the transfer of venue;
3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;
4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a District Supervisor of
the Department of Education.
 b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit that Ex-Mayor Carlos
Estonilo, Sr. and Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene ofthe incident during the
incident.10
The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victim’s wife; Felix Q.
Casas (Felix), the victim’s son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health Officer,
Placer, Masbate; Senior Police Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan), Placer Police
Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo (Serapion), employee of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa;
Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of Placer, Masbate; Diego L.Casas (Diego), cousin of the victim;
Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda), a resident of Placer, Masbate; and Servando P. Rosales
(Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr.11 The testimonies of the foregoing witnesses
consisted of the following:
Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down, he
was with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that
they were working on the closing ceremonies to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales
called on Floro and told him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that Floro
and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro
and Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation of 7th Day Adventist that contained the names of
the governor, the congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero), as guests of
the said activity; that Felix asked his father why Cotero’s picture was so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s
name was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied that he cannot help it because Cotero paid
for the program; that the answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos,
Sr. said "you are now for Cotero but you’re only Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the
voucher. This is up to now thatyou will be the supervisor of Celera"; that Floro responded "when are you
a superintendent when you don’t have any scholastic standing. Just look if I will still vote for your son";
that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "let’s see if you can still vote"; and that the following day, Floro was shot
to death.12
But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon invitation of
Nonoy, he joined the latter’s group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they talked about the death
of one Titing Villester; that Nonoy told Felix that "brod, do not be afraid, because others are supposed to
be afraid [of] us because they believe that we were the ones who killed Titing Villester" that afterwards
Felix and the group were fetched at the videoke bar by Edel, a messenger of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that
they were brought to the house of one Bobong Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in Daraga; that
uponarriving thereat, Rey uttered "it’s good that Dodong (Felix’s nickname) is with you; that Nonoy then
said "who would not [be] otherwise, his father would be the next victim after Titing Villester";13 that Rey
then turned to Felix and said, "it’s very important that your father is with us because a District
Supervisor has a big [role] in the Comelec’s choice for those teachers who would become members of
the Board of Election Inspectors"; that Felix clarified that Rey was then the 2004 mayoralty candidate for
Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along with him since he was in Daraga, the bailiwick of the
Estonilos.14
On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on why it
took him a long time to execute an affidavit relative to his father’s killing. Felix explained that he went to
Cebu to stay away from Placer, which isunder the Estonilo’s jurisdiction. 15 The defense confronted Felix
of a criminal case against him for illegal use of prohibited drugs, for which he was out on bail. 16
On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco yPedrano and
SPO4 Restituto Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation offacts relative to
their testimonies.
[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco’s testimony:]
1. That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is expert in
medicine;
2. That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead body of
Floro Casas yBaronda on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;
3. That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post Mortem Examination Report,
marked as Exhibit "F," the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, marked as
Exhibit "F-1";
4. That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit "G" and the Sketch of a
Human Body, marked as Exhibit "H";
5. The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-Mortem
Examination Report; and
6. In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three slugs: the 1
st slug was marked as Exhibit "I," the fragmented slug as Exhibit "I-1," and the metallic object
consisting of two pieces of Exhibit "I-2."
[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.’s testimony:]
1. That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate Police
Station relativeto the shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary
School. Said Police Blotter was requested to be marked by the prosecution as Exhibit "J";
2. That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the blotter
written on the Blotter Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit "J-1"
and the signature of Sr. Police Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit "J-1-a";
3. The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number 325. Said
Police Blotter book page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. "K" and the bracketed
portion thereof as Exh. "K-1."17
According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based
on the sizes of the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The counsel for the
accused waived his cross examination.18
Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal Councilor
candidate Boy dela Pisa on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5, 2004,
he heard gunshots coming from inside the compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he
saw more or less six persons coming out of the school; that he was able to identify three of themas
present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos,
Sr.’s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a house
nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. "mission
accomplished, sir"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did using
two motorbikes towards the direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove
towards the direction of Daraga.19
During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the fact
thathe has a pending criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on bail. 20 Antipolo testified
that on April 5, 2004, he was riding his motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera Elementary
School when he heard gunshots and someone shouted that Floro was shot; that he stopped, alighted
from his motorcycle, went to the gate, and saw four persons holding short firearms; that he identified
Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about seven times; that he identifiedEdel and Nonong as
the two other gun holders; that at that moment, Gali shouted "sir, that’s enough, escape!"; that Gali was
accompanied by someone named Ace, Titing and Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for them to
escape, all of them hurriedly left the school compound; that he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s pick-up vehicle
arrive soon thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the
proceedings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "leave it because it’s already dead"; and that
afterwards, the police officers arrived.21
In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case against him
for homicide of one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that happened on October 30,
2005.22
Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances
surrounding the killing and its discovery, their family background, her husband’s line of work, how she
felt on their loss, and the expenses relative to his killing. She testified that she heard there were people
who were jealous of Floro’s position because he could bring voters to his side during election time;that
Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated medals for the 2003-2004 closing ceremony of the entire
district of public schools; that during the closing ceremony, the donor’s name was announced, which
angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.;23 that when Floro was processing a voucher worth ₱70,000.00, Mayor
Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the same and even threw the voucher on the floor saying "let this be signed
by Vicente Cotero"; and that Floro’s cousin, Diego Casas, helped Floro secure the Mayor’s signature by
ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was for him, and only then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the
voucher.24
Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsa’s testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure Mayor
Carlos, Sr.’s signature on the voucher.25
Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told her
thathe would kill her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus, she went to the
Placer Police Station and reported the incident; that she went to see her husband, who was then
campaigning for mayoralty candidateCotero, and informed him of what happened; and that she went to
Elsa’shouse and informed the latter of the threat.26
Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor Carlos,Sr.
together with said Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias "S" [Ace], Rollie,
Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas"; that
Servando later learned thatthe mayor’s men were unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was no
longer in Barangay Taberna, where they intended to execute the mayor’s order;and that Mayor Carlos,
Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary School on April 4, 2004. 27
During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latter’s Affidavit of Retraction,
which he executed on June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang
Salaysaytaken on May 30, 2004 at the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate City relative to the criminal complaint for direct
assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company. He was also asked about two
criminal charges filed against him in Cebu relative toviolation of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.28 On re-direct examination, Servando narrated that Mayor
Carlos, Sr.’s nephew, Bobong Baldecir, fetched him from his house and he was brought to the house of
Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga; that from there, he was brought to Atty. Besario in Cebu; that Atty. Besario
informed him about the Affidavit of Retraction that he was supposed to sign, which he did not
understand as it was written in English; and that he clarified that the contents of the affidavit was not his
but those of Bobong.29
The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D.
Calipay (Quirino), and the five accused-appellants.
Jesus denied Servando’s allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction. Jesus
narrated that Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that upon their
meeting, Servando told him that he wanted to retract his sworn statement because Mayor Carlos, Sr.
and his company did nothing wrong; that Jesus, Servando and Servando’s wife went to Cebu to meet
Atty. Besario; that while traveling, Servando told him that was evading the men of Governor Go, Vicente
Cotero and Casas because he feared for his life; that during the meeting Atty. Besario prepared the
affidavit and translated it to Cebuano dialect; that afterwards, Jesus, Servando and Servando’s wife
went to the Capitol so that Servando could sign it before the prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario,
Servado and his wife, and Dante Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor Carlos) went to Manila to meet
with the media; that the media asked Servando whether he was forced to sign, or was given money or
reward to sign the affidavit of retraction, Servando replied in the negative; and that the purpose of the
press meeting was to present Servando and show that he was not kidnapped. 30
But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. ishis uncle; that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the kidnapping of Servando;
and that it was Dante (Dante) Estonilo who arranged for the meeting with the media, and who served as
Servando’s and his wife’s companion, while he was with Atty. Besario.31 During his turn, accused-
appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 hewas in a house near the
Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party; that while thereat, he heard successive gunshots
and went out to ridehis vehicle so he could check the source of the gunshots; that when he reached the
school gate someone informed him that Floro was gunned down; that he did not see the victim because
according to the people it was boarded in a jeep and brought to the hospital; and that he and his son,
Rey, confirmed that they were at the school minutes after the incident. 32
During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he learned that
he and his son were suspects in Floro’s killing five months after the incident; that he confirmed that Rey
and Calvin dela Cruz were with him while inquiring about the shooting at the school; and that he denied
having met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing Rosalinda after April 5, 2004, or that Servando was his
bodyguard.33
Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house and was
planning tocampaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to said barangay, he
passed by Celera Elementary School and noticed his father’s vehicle, and that there were several
people thereat; that he stopped and stayed in the school for a few minutes, and then proceeded to meet
his candidates for counselors at Ranio’s house; and that afterwards, they all went to Barangay
Matagantang.34
On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated because his
opponents could not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor.35
Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at their
house located in front of Celera Elementary School’s guardhouse, when they heard gunshots; that they
immediately laid down, while Quirino ran across the road and took cover at the school fence; that he
peeped through the fence and saw three persons firing a gun; that he could not identify them or their
victim because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to 20 seconds, hewent back home; that a certain Joel
Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him to go with them inside the school, once inside the
school, they saw Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go to the police headquarters located
five minutes away; and that when he and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at the school, he noticed
Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near the gate.36
For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged in
a drinking spree in Nining Berdida’s house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that he stayed in her
place until 11:00 p.m.37
During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his
uncle and Rey is his second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s bodyguard, but admitted that
he handled the latter’s fighting cocks; and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away from the
poblacionof Placer.38
Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called him to
go to Ranio’s house in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera Elementary
School and saw that there were plenty of people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that their group
stopped to inquire about what happened, and learned that Floro was gunned down; and that he and his
group stayed for about five minutes and left.39
Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor Carlos,
Sr. and his wife attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they went to the
school to check on what happened and learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay long and
went home to Daraga.40
During cross examination, he deniedthat he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he was
merely accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to work. 41
After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The fallo of its March 30, 2009 Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO,
SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias "EDEL ESTONILO,"
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES alias "NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG
DELA CRUZ" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault
under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all of the Revised Penal Code and each of said
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the accused
are all hereby ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said accused are furthermore
ordered to solidarily pay the said family the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).
The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they have
been denied.
Let this case be archivedas against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and
GALIITCOBANES who have warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large, pending
their arrest/s.
As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM," separate trial
isnecessary considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to the other
accused was already about to end.42
The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of
Serapion, who were both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC
pronounced that the evidence on record showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common
criminal design, that was the killing of Floro. Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen,
while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as backup gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog, and
accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts. 43
The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused to kill
Floro based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus,
the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey
conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident
premeditation among all the accused-appellants.44
The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification of the
prosecution witnesses. The accused appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in Placer,
Masbate when the shooting took place. However, they were not able to establish the physical
improbability of their being in the crime scene at the time of the shooting. The RTC was convinced
thatthe motive for the murder was due to Floro’s support for mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero. Since
the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the RTC convicted the accused appellants of the
complex crime of murder with direct assault.45
All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the RTC erred in concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution evidence
and disregarding the salient points of the defense evidence, and in convicting the accused. 46
In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. 47 The
dispositive part thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30 March
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with modificationin that the
penalty imposed upon accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua with its accessory
penalties and that the award of civil indemnity is increased to Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00).48
The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC considering that
the RTC had observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and deportment of the
witnesses as they testified. The Court of Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained that
reclusion perpetuais an indivisible penalty which should be imposed without specifying the duration.
On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration,49 which the Court of Appeals
denied in its November 8, 2011 Resolution.50 Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants appealed their case
before this Court.51
This Court’s Ruling
The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the
following assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving credence and
weight to the prosecution evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants, and (3) finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the
prosecution evidence.
In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their conviction
for murder with direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
constitute circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants for
murder with direct assault.
The age-old rule is that the task ofassigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the witness stand
and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a
witness testifies before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of
observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 52
This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial and
the appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the
outcome of this case. The trial court and the appellate court did not err in giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who was an eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly
detract from his credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as those who
fired at Floro about seven times, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also
holding their firearms. He also witnessed accused Gali shouting to the gunmen to stop and escape. He
narrated that after all the accused left, Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Materdam arrived aboard the
mayor’s vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said "leave it because it’s already dead." From his direct
and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: 53 (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is
not parricide or infanticide.54
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos,
Sr., Rey, Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution
eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of
Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The
Court finds that the prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point
to the accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floro’s support
for Vicente Cotero, who was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the
prosecution was able to establish that the accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate
occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.’shouse when they
were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas." Third,
Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another witness,
Serapion, who testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he
heard the gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them said "mission accomplished
sir," after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The
testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference. 55 It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.56 Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion.
Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was
executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness account as well as Serapion’s
testimony.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he
was present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning tokill Floro. His
categorical and straight forward narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur: (1)
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by
him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro successively fired at Floro about
seven times – and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close
range giving the latter no chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected
onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms to insure
the success of their "mission" without risk to themselves; and three others served as lookouts. Hence,
there is no denying that their collective acts point to a clear case of treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the positive
identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the
accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.57 The accused-appellants’ alibis that they were at different places at the time of the shooting
are negative and self-serving and cannot be given more evidentiary value vis-à-vis the affirmative
testimony of credible witnesses. The accused-appellants, the victim, and the prosecution witnesses
reside in the same municipality and are, therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that the two
principal accused in this case are prominent political figures. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could
not havebeen mistaken on the accused appellants’ identity including those who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following:
(i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical
impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of
the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away
and could not have been physically present atthe crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime
was committed.58 Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements.
In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were near
the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place. Certainly, the
distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for
them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.
Penalties
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should be held
accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing
atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-
appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an
attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the
accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate, thus,
was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct assault just
because Floro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on
the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty
as the District Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arisesthe complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable
penalty should have been death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant
to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition of
death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly
imposed upon accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Proper Indemnities
As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made
herein.1âwphi1 The award of ₱100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper to
conform with current jurisprudence.59
Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 223060 of the New Civil Code. Thus, conformably
with the above, the legal heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary damages 61 in the
amount of ₱100,000.00.
Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.62
At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison
informed this Court of the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In view
thereof, the case against deceased Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04142, affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 05-238607, finding accused appellants REINARIO
"REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO "EDEL" ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO "NONONG" ITCOBANES, and
CAL VIN "BULLDOG" DELA CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder with Direct Assault, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages is increased
to ₱100,000.00 each, in addition to ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the imposition of 6%
thereon as legal interest upon finality of this Court's Decision.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011
Decision1and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The
assailed issuances affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in
Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest. 4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA)
41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed against
petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that court. The
accusatory portions of the interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the first
offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the
driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the
same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in
violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136.
Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren
Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police
Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual performance of their official duties as
such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and pushing, the hands of said officers while
the latter was placing him under arrest for violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be governed
by, the Rule on Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral
testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos
Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while in the witness box, among which was Exh. "A", with
sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest10executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The
defense’s witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo
Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the CA
decision now on appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and
another officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave.,
Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger
pick up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all inuniform,
flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the
police station situated nearby,before he resumes driving. 11 Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was
smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice,
petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina
mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his
team had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who
put up resistance. Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded
in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to
be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F".
Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition. 12 Petitioner, on the other
hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question, adding in this regard that he has in fact filed
criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his
Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early
morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress,
respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from
on board his pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above.
Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked the
petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive he refused to
heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain
view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar,
as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles
in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles
adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on
the mouth and poked a gun at his head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na
kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and
pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his
wife. The policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing
a medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of
alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the afternoon of
June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for
alcohol breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp.
Aguilar and the other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place the
erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his driver’s license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he
is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN; and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two hundred
fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this case,
stating further the data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1)
according credit to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records custodian of
Ospital ng Maynila was presented to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician, and 2) upholding
the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3
Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing
the first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to
petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would
only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder the Rules of
Court,17 observations of the police officers regarding the petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support
the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state on the day he was apprehended. 18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how many
witnesses it needs to present before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single credible witness as
to the guilt of the accused being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established
jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number as
"[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered." Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 33567. By a Decision dated December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a Resolution of July
18, 2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the RTC,
Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the
police officers; and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey Balucating, in
the absence of his testimony before the Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does
hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic
that an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the
matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like other public
officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which
careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material
appearednot to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm
expected of peace officers. They spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled
him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license orissue
any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec.
29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies
duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license
ofthe driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall
become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.) Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to
answer one or two routinary questions out of respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists’ right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp.
Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when
utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle,
concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was
driving under the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The
remark apparently pissed the police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner
and his companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to
an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this particular
event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan
at sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing
sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang aking
kasama kong waitress na bumaba.
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG" pero iyon
ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE
PA KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang
ang isang pulis ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril. x x x
na matapos suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang
mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang kanilang baril.24
Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers themselves who
admitted that they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its occupants
to a body search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint affidavit:
xxxx
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving under
the influence of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or
about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and
converse with us rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our job.
P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor
that was why we are inviting him to our police station in which our intention was to make him rest for a
moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added.)
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has
not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily
understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a
direct course of action or movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating
that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined
under RA 4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or
without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and
other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger
the property or the safetyor rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage
to the highway.
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To
constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is
required.26 Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone."
Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are
usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third
persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket
for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the
petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then
drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination,
SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the
charged in for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda
ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the accused
swerving, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"
xxxx
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the
police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for
a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin
gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. 28 He may have sounded boorish or
spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the
petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a
reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to
a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience
punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or
seriously disobeys such person or his agent. 29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or
agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising
one’s right against unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in
context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the
RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the
vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and
use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA
4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get
out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no
reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a
"stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to
get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite
him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the
apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of
the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of
the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation aboutbeing physically hurt
before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed
was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done
in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr.
Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact
challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also
because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian
ofthe Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The
trial court, in its decision, merely stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor who
issued it.1âwphi1Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the
Prosecution to testify on the said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the contents of
the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that
the observation of herein private complainants as to the accused’s behavior and condition after the
incident was sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding x x x x
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits
submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the
same."32
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating
issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its
contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers
were acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of
liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to
determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of
RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course
changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586)
which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), 33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e)
as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after
being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the
[DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a
private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood
alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the
influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of
driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond
reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of
intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, 34penal
laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586
expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec.
3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution 35 of November 21, 2006
found, on the strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by
Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical
injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man
handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to
petitioner’s true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time
incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whomhe
accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing lends
credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or
resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could
not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him
and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that
petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police
officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers
under the influence of alcoholand executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the
trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced.
As stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence
that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the
present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled
with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast
doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least
infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary,
that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength
of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby
acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
No pronouncement as to costs.
TITLE IV:
Crimes against Public
Interest
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019
JUVY DESMOPARAN A.K.A. "MASYADOR," PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision and Resolution dated March 14, 20171 and July 20,
2017,2 respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 02680, where the CA
affirmed the Judgment3 dated November 6, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental,
7th Judicial Region, Branch 35, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 21334 which convicted petitioner
Juvy Desmoparan (Desmoparan) of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
The facts are as follows:
On February 27, 2012, Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of P105,000.00 from Cebu
CFI Community Cooperative -Dumaguete City Branch (CFI). He misrepresented himself to be an
employee of the City Engineer's Office, by using the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Chiyenne Mirasol
(Mirasol), loan clerk of CFI. When Mirasol asked for his identification card, Desmoparan presented his
employee's I.D. from the City Engineer's Office with his picture on it, but bearing the name "Rodulfo M.
Cordura." To support his application for loan, Desmoparan submitted the following documents, namely:
a) application for membership form of CFI; b) special power of attorney coupled with interest; c) deed of
assignment; d) certification from the City Human Resource Office; e) certificate of employment from the
City Human Resource Office; f) service record signed by Henrietta N. Zerna; and g) promissory note
dated February 27, 2012. All said documents reflected the name of "Rodulfo M. Cordura" as the loan
applicant and debtor.4
In order to receive the initial cash advance, Desmoparan also presented his purported employee's I.D.,
bearing the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Menerva Perocho (Perocho), Cashier/Teller of CFI.5 Thus,
because of Desmoparan's misrepresentation, Perocho released to him the cash advances amounting to
P20,000.00 on March 2, 2012, an additional P10,000.00 on March 9, 2012, and another P10,000.00 on
March 10, 2012. Upon receipt of the said monies, Desmoparan also signed the name of "Rodulfo
Cordura" in all three cash vouchers.6
However, on March 16, 2012, the real Rodulfo Cordura (Cordura) went to CFI to verify the information
that somebody had fraudulently applied for a salary loan using his name and qualifications. He identified
himself as the real Cordura, a retired government employee previously connected with the City
Engineer's Office. Cordura informed CFI that he discovered the fraud after he received the bill for his
alleged loan transaction from CFI, through their payroll maker. He told them that he did not apply for any
loan nor did he apply for membership with CFI. Cordura then requested an investigation and withholding
of the remaining check in the amount of P69,000.00 as part of the salary loan.7
On the same day, Arden Sinco (Sinco), branch manager of CFI,8 and his team caught one Efrain Baena
Mercado (Mercado) using the name and credentials of a certain Aldrin John Z. Catan to apply for a loan.
During the investigation, Mercado revealed that it was Desmoparan who recruited him to submit bogus
loan applications with CFI.9
In his judicial affidavit, Mercado testified that sometime on March 14, 2012, Desmoparan approached
him at JT's Pocket Billiard Hall and told him that he has a simple job for him. He alleged that
Desmoparan told him that all he needed to do was submit documents to CFI. Desmoparan assured
Mercado that he had already done this twice and was even able to have a check encashed in his favor.
Mercado further alleged that Desmoparan brought him to a carwash shop in Larena Drive, Dumaguete
City, where he was introduced to a certain "Bossing." Desmoparan told his Bossing that Mercado would
be the one to go to CFI since he cannot do it anymore as he had already done it twice. Mercado added
that Desmoparan later brought him to a house in Purok Kalubihan, Barangay Daro, Dumaguete City,
where he saw a number of documents bearing the mark "CFI," as well as several persons practicing
imitation of signatures.10On cross-examination, Mercado admitted all he has stated in his judicial
affidavit.
Desmoparan was eventually apprehended. He was charged with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. The information reads as follows:
That on or about 27 February 2012 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the said accused, JUVY DESMOPARAN a.k.a. "MASYADOR", did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the following documents, to wit:
(1) application for membership of CFI;
(2) special power of attorney coupled with interest;
(3) deed of assignment;
(4) certification from the City Human Resource Office;
(5) Certificate of Employment;
(6) Service Record; and
(7) a promissory note dated 27 February 2012
by making and causing it to appear that one Rodulfo Cordura applied for a salary loan and executed
and filed afore-mentioned documents at Cebu CFI Community Cooperative - Dumaguete Branch when
in truth and in fact, Rodulfo M. Cordura neither applied for any loan at CFI nor execute and file the
afore-mentioned documents and that by virtue of said falsification, false pretenses, deceit, and
fraudulent acts and with intent to cause damage, has been able to obtain and receive from CFI the loan
proceeds/cash advances amounting to a total of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine
Currency, on 2 March 2012 and 9 March 2012 and thereafter converted the same amount to his own
personal gain and benefit to the damage and prejudice of CFI in the said amount of Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Subsequently, Desmoparan was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.12
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Mirasol, Mercado, Perocho, Cordura
and Sinco.
On the other hand, Desmoparan did not present any testimonial evidence.
On November 6, 2015, the RTC of Negros Oriental, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 35, Dumaguete City, in
Criminal Case No. 21334, rendered Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, JUVY DESMOPARAN a.k.a. "Masyador," guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents and there
being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances proven in the trial, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to Nine (9) years of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay FORTY THOUSAND
(Php40,000.00) PESOS for the amount he has taken from Cebu CFI Community Cooperative,
Dumaguete branch with legal interest of six (6%) percent from the filing of this case.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved, Desmoparan filed an appeal and sought the reversal of his conviction before the CA.
However, on March 14, 2017, the appellate court denied his appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated November 6, 2015, of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 35, Dumaguete City, in Crim. Case No.
21334 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant shall suffer indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, eight months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum. The amount of P40,000.00 must earn 6% per annum computed from
finality of the Court's Decision until satisfied.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.14
Desmoparan moved for reconsideration. However, in the assailed Resolution 15dated July 20, 2017, the
CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,16 raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.17
Desmoparan would like to impress upon this Court that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the
one who falsified the loan documents. He claimed that the prosecution witnesses admitted that they
never saw him fill up the loan documents. He argued that, assuming that he personally appeared at CFI,
the only documents that he personally signed were the cash vouchers representing the receipt of cash
advances. Desmoparan, however, insisted that cash vouchers are not commercial documents; thus, he
cannot be convicted of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
The petition lacks merit.
The elements of the crime of falsification of commercial documents under Article 172 (1), 18 in relation to
Article 171,19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 10951, 20 are: "(1) that
the offender is a private individual x x x; (2) that [the offender] committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the [Revised Penal Code]; and, (3) that the [act of] falsification [is]
committed in a x x x commercial document."21
In the instant case, we likewise find that all the above-mentioned elements were sufficiently
established. First, Desmoparan is a private individual; second, the acts of falsification consisted in
Desmoparan's act of causing it to appear that Cordura had participated in the act of applying for a loan
when, in fact, he did not do so; and third, the falsification was committed in a loan application, a deed of
assignment, and a promissory note dated February 27, 2012, which are all commercial documents
considering that, in general, these documents or instruments are "used by merchants or businessmen
to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions."22 Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions,
while a check is a means of payment used in business, in lieu of money, for convenience in business
transactions.23
While Desmoparan alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the perpetrator of the
falsified loan documents, we note that he never denied, however, that he was actually the one who
personally came to CFI to apply for a salary loan using Cordura's name. He also never denied to be the
one in possession of the falsified loan documents which were submitted to CFI to support the loan
application purportedly under Cordura's name. He likewise never denied that he fraudulently used
Cordura's name and qualifications to apply for the salary loan.
It must be likewise stressed that the loan clerks who processed the loan transactions were consistent in
their testimonies that it was Desmoparan, and not Cordura, who: (1) personally applied for the salary
loan; (2) submitted the documentary requirements under the name of Cordura; (3) presented an I.D.
with his photo, but bearing the name of Cordura; (4) received the initial cash advances amounting to a
total of P40,000.00; and (5) signed Cordura's name on the cash voucher. It cannot be said that just
because none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw Desmoparan do the act of falsifying, the latter
cannot be held liable for falsification. Clearly, given the enumerated circumstances, and considering that
Desmoparan had in his possession the falsified loan documents and had actually took advantage of and
profited from them, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
The absence of a direct proof that Desmoparan was the author of the falsification is of no moment for
the rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession falsified documents and uttered or used
the same for his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises.24
This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time
with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. 25
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, as in this case, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. 26
Corrollarily, after the existence of falsification of commercial documents has been established, we also
find that the falsification of loan documents was a necessary means to commit estafa.
In De Castro v. People,31 citing Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court held that in the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the penalty for the graver offense should
be imposed in the maximum period.
However, with the passage of RA 10951,32 the penalties of some crimes which are dependent on the
value of the subject matter of the crimes have been greatly affected, and one of these is estafa. The law
being more favorable to the petitioner, the same is given a retroactive effect. Below is the comparison of
the penalty for estafa under the old provisions of the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951.

In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation Revised Penal Code RA 10951 (August 29, 2017)
is caused to the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any
to his legal injury.27 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any
person who shall defraud another by of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
In the instant case, Desmoparan used the falsified documents bearing the name and qualifications of any of the means mentioned be punished by:
Cordura in fraudulently applying for a salary loan, which resulted in the eventual release and hereinbelow shall be punished by:
withdrawing of the cash advance amounting to a total of P40,000.00 from CFI. Clearly, Desmoparan 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in
employed deceit by falsifying loan documents in order to take hold of the money and, thereafter, convert 1st. The penalty of prision its maximum period to prision mayor in its
it to his own personal use and benefit, resulting in the damage and prejudice of CFI and Cordura. correccional in its maximum period minimum period, if the amount of the fraud
to prision mayor in its minimum is over Two million four hundred thousand
It must be emphasized anew that when the offender commits on a public, official, or commercial period, if the amount of the fraud is pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 17128 of the Revised Penal Code as a over 12,000 pesos but does not Four million four hundred thousand pesos
necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,29 there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may amount exceeds the latter sum, the the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a penalty provided in this paragraph paragraph shall be imposed in its
necessary means for committing another. shall be imposed in its maximum maximum period, adding one year for each
period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000);
In Domingo v. People,30 we have held that falsification of a commercial document may be a means of ESTAFA but the total penalty which may be
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the penalty which may be imposed shall imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
crime of falsification has already been consummated; damage or intent to cause damage not being an not exceed twenty years. In such
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime cases, and in connection with the In such cases, and in connection with the
of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document accessory penalties which may be accessory penalties which may be
to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the imposed under the provisions of this imposed and for the purpose of the other
falsification of the document. Code, the penalty shall be termed provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as be termed prision mayor or reclusion
In this case, Desmoparan could not have succeeded in getting hold of the money without falsifying the the case may be. temporal, as the case may be.
loan documents bearing the name and qualifications of Cordura, and make it appear that he is actually
the real Cordura. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification 2nd. The penalty of prision 2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in
was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to defraud CFI. correccional in its minimum and its minimum and medium periods, if the
medium periods, if the amount of the amount of the fraud is over One million two
PENALTY fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but
exceed 12,000 pesos[.] does not exceed Two million four hundred
thousand pesos (P2,400,000).
Desmoparan is found guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents since the crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa.

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, if such amount is over
Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does
not exceed One million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods, if such amount
does not exceed Forty thousand pesos
(P40,000)[.] (Emphases supplied.)
On the other hand, hereunder is the comparison of the penalties of falsification of commercial
documents under the old provisions of the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951:
Art. 172. Falsification by private
individual and use of falsified ART. 172. Falsification by private
documents. — The penalty of individual and use of falsified
prision correccional in its documents. - The penalty of prision
medium and maximum correccional in its medium and
periods and a fine of not more maximum periods and a fine of not
FALSIFICATION than P5,000 pesos shall be more than One million pesos
OF COMMERCIAL imposed upon: (P1,000,000) shall be imposed upon:
DOCUMENTS
1. Any private individual who 1. Any private individual who shall
shall commit any of the commit any of the falsifications
falsifications enumerated in the enumerated in the next preceding
next preceding article in any article in any public or official
public or official document or document or letter of exchange: or any
letter of exchange or any other other kind of commercial document[.]
kind of commercial document[.]
In contrast, for falsification of a commercial document, the penalty of imprisonment is the same for both
Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (2), of the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951 which is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, albeit, the imposable fine is different. Under the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable fine is not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); while
under RA 10951, the imposable fine is not more than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Thus, the penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter than the penalty
of imprisonment for falsification of commercial documents. Applying then the provisions of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in the maximum period. Thus, the penalty for
falsification of commercial documents should be imposed in the maximum period, being the more
serious crime than estafa. However, the penalty of fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) under the old law should be imposed because this is more favorable to the petitioner than
the penalty of fine of not more than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) under the present law.
We, thus, modify the indeterminate sentence imposable on Desmoparan so that the minimum term
should, come from the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor, maximum, to prision
correccional, minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months), and the maximum term should
come from prision correccional, medium, to prision correccional, maximum, in its maximum period (4
yeeirs, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years).
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of,the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB CR No. 02680 dated March 14, 2017 and July 20, 2017, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon Juvy
Desmoparan should be 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to 5 years of prision
correccional, as the maximum, and to pay a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00),
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Court also ORDERS Juvy Desmoparan to pay to Cebu CFI Community Cooperative - Dumaguete
Branch legal interest of six percent (6%) per annumon the aggregate amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00), to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.

From the given comparisons, both under the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951, the imposable penalty
for estafa is based on the amount of damage. In this case, the amount defrauded is Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00), representing the total amount of money actually released and received by
Desmoparan from CFI. As such, the prescribed penalty as provided under paragraph 4, Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 10951, is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, since the amount does not exceed Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). Meanwhile, under the
old provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is prision correccional, in its maximum
period, to prision mayor, in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Twelve Thousand
Pesos (P12,000.00), but does not exceed Twenty-Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00); and, if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Thus, the penalty for
estafa under the new law should be given retroactive effect, being more favorable to the petitioner.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of
petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended
by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the
Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others
in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in
Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones
then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law
firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the
Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to
personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman.
However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be
required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security
officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name
"Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division,
Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by
writing the name "Oscar Perez."4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who
also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the
person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of
Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner
without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove
that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its
cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the
registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his
conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus
costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by
imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine
of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that
he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name;
neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use
of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar
Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar
Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his
supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that
the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong
law.5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by
petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent
provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was
approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
 competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall
set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial
authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such
authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in
the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As
amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he
was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in
the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of
their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family
name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for
the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded
in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other
than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to
Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of
the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for
Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by
Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended
follow —
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed
receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not
verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or
business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his
true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his
business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm
name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm
name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true
name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such
contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using
fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects
of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in
addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is
known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is
not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known
to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had
encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which
required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for
petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his
real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by
his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court,
argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as
well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he
believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name
following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so
that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for
authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown
satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his
petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly
and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at
birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition
to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended. This is so in the case at bench.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez,"
which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in
the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a
copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar
Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name
"Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required
to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the
Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence
open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an
offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion
and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are
not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind
cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear,
SUPREME COURT and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against
Manila respondent Estrada.3

EN BANC At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the
Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias
G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009 charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G.
vs. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB
SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents. and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato
also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;
DECISION
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that
a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited
BRION, J.: several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name "Jose
Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 to seek the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")
Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.2
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")
THE FACTS
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal
use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")
President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")
order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE
President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")
the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in
signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")

CONTRARY TO LAW. j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")
Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")
26565.

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied
 these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-
62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan
admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003. 4 The accused separately moved to
reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated
Comment/Opposition to the motions. 6 The Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated
November 17, 2003.7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to
evidence in these cases.8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only
granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905
(perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. 10 His demurrer to
evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000),
they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde";
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001
as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October
2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the following
arguments:12
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP
No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of
alias was already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not
BSP Circular No. 302;
2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the
habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this
regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed
in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient
points of the assailed resolution are:
First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence
for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information – i.e., the testimonies and
documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned
out that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or
subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually
taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecution’s
procedural tool to guard against any variance between the date stated in the Information and that
proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does
not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate and
distinct from those that took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior
or subsequent thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from
interpreting the Information any other way.
Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense. The
Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime
punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of
alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case,
the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the
complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved – the alias was used in connection
with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as
amended,14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160. 15
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":
a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after
February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada
under the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the
phrase, "Estrada did … represent himself as ‘Jose Velarde’ in several transactions," standing
alone, violates Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation,
because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding
phrase – "and use and employ the said alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is neither his registered
name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities." Thus, Estrada’s representations before persons other than those
mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the
"Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in the Information. Estrada’s
representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere
communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity
is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the
libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA
 No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and favorably for the
accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a
communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be non-
actionable. Estrada’s use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged
communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the
witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law
cannot be considered as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account
of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be
known by this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity.
Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142
as amended.
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name
"Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature of a numbered account – a perfectly valid banking
transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered
trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to
disclose his real identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a
statement of assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713
together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his
bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the
bank account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute
prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names,
and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in
our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the
prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 –
another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was
opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily
be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every
statute should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the
Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use of
an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made
before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the
coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case
No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose
Velarde" was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando
Chua on 4 February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case
No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose
Velarde" was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case
No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable
under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A.
No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of
the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by
respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier
final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to
the instant case.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local
civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was
registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within
which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the
person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias,
the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry,
and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or
are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias – "a name or names
used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions
in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that
the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth …
[for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended."18
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as
follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade.
Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could
not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias
was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished
under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in
the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from
Estrada’s position in the government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the President
of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient
to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on
the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction,
expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in
fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even
when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of
the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any
distinction we make based on the People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the
Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused
may be.
The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6,
2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the
application of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the
ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the
accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster
Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that
another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In
any case, the amended information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly
employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case
where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that
that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his real name. 22
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua
notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability – a ruling that binds the parties in the
present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its
discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere
interlocutory order – a ruling denying a motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the attributes of finality
and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of
or particular matters in, a case.24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because
its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake
substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest. 25 It is basic remedial law that an
interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a civil
case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res
judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in
question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but
was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final
adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the
fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action
for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a
sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the
case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.28
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the
Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde.
This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of
the prosecution’s case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecution’s evidence was
sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan
may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of
CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no
error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of
Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its
petition that Estrada’s case is different from Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada
used and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada";
(2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the
alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business
transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues
that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and
Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estrada’s use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed positions, we shall now examine
within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence.
The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan
satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an
alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the
coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose
Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction – one that took place on
February 4, 2000 – but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent
thereto; the Information specifically referred to "several transactions" … "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities." To the People, the restrictive finding – that the phrase "prior to or subsequent
thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" – drastically amends the succeeding
main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions
involved and the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship
between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of
"prior to or subsequent thereto," on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase
"prior to or subsequent thereto" into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and
totally unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional
requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the
offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" given in
the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not
need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v.
Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are liberally
interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the
additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the
acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People
thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent Estrada from properly defending
himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in
more than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this
constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. 29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment. 30 The date of the
commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the
precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.31
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth
the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense.32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or
information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused – the primary reader of and the party
directly affected by the complaint or information – of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused [did] … willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE
VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which
IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities."
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information, as this was how the
accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis,
prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information
plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or
subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in
several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on
or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place
only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be
sure, the Information could have simply said "on or about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative
approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the "on or about" already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and
necessary consequence of the use of the "OR" between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that
referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very
different (and would have been clearly in accord with the People’s present interpretation) had the
Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various
transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be
disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to
live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People
claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to
rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another issue
that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information.1avvphi1
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow on the
People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of
an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary practice
or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of
Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to
secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian
and Fernando Chua – when Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a
"public" use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estrada’s
prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the
opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but
not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estrada’s prosecution was supposedly
based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands
charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP
Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is
inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain purposes which
do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in
banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error
for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances
cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing
in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142’s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People
posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at
least related with one another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not
remotely related to one another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act,
governs a different conduct, and covers a different class of persons,33 and there was no need to force
their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of
conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in
the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account
No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the
People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of creditor and
debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust
operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust
funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law
(R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the transaction or communication
was privileged in nature was erroneous – a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405
shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his original
name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank
employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances
enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank
employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and
making public his use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he
made a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers
does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment
of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law
to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The People contends
that the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or
camouflage for the commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted,
understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel –
that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our
close reading of Ursua – particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable
and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more
than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made
openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held
liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who
shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must
be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened
Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as
Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access
to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest
confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his
signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were
also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of
Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention
of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.34 We previously rejected, in
Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank
deposits and trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the
mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does
not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be understood
broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the
same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of
the country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third persons,
then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor
and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the
purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner
and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by
Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was,
therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that
this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could
otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be
understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is
clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is
deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to
apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word.lawphil.net Otherwise, there would have been no
need to add the phrase "or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858. 36
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law)
are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of
signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot
claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We
need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank
officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of
transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the
transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly
manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an
indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.38
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt
to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must
necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application
of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada’s use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that
the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of
privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with
an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A.
No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be
read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent
vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his
indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide
here whether Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was
valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for
the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt
must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability
requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires
that we so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the
assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TITLE V:
Crimes Relative to Opium
and Other Prohibited Drugs
RA 9165: The
Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
January 18, 2017
G.R. No. 215942
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
KUSAIN AMIN y AMPUAN, a.k.a. "Cocoy,", Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is an appeal assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01179,
which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City, in
Criminal Case No. 2004-010. The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 5, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information:
That on January 2, 2004, at 5:40 p.m. more or less, at Landless, Colrai, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without
authority of law, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have in his possession custody and control
one (1) small heated-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance locally known as
shabu with approx. weight of 0.09 gram valued to more or less P100 and sold it to a poseur-buyer of
PNP-CDO for a consideration of P100.00 marked money one (1) pc one hundred pesos bill with serial
number FA246643, well knowing it to be a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Hence,
trial ensued.
On 14 June 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision, 5 the dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the prosecution having established all the elements of the
crime of illegal sale of a dangerous drug, the Court hereby finds the accused, Kusain Amin y Ampuan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, par. 1, Article II of R.A. 9165, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The sachet of shabu described in the Information is ordered confiscated in favor of the Government to
be disposed of in accordance with law and regulations. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: Police Inspector
(P/Insp.) Penel Ramas; and Senior Police Officers (SPOs)2 Ricky Bagas, Jameson Alvior, Jr., and
Benjamin Dacara (Ret.). 7The trial court held that the prosecution had successfully proved the existence
of all the essential elements of the crime, accused-appellant having been "positively identified by the
police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the seller of the shabu presented in the
case."8 Likewise, the prosecution established that the "sale actually occurred and that one sachet
of shahu was sold for the price of ₱100.00." 9 P/Insp. Ramas testified that he was about 10 to 15 meters
away when the confidential informant/poseur-buyer handed the marked money to accused-appellant in
exchange for shahu. 10 After relying on the signal given by the poseur-buyer (i.e. removing his
eyeglasses), they proceeded to frisk accused-appellant and arrest him immediately. They were able to
recover the marked money in the latter’s possession. 11
Moreover, the RTC found that the identity of the dangerous drug was sufficiently proven because the
prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody, from the time it was sold by accused-appellant
to when it was presented in court.12 SPO2 Dacara testified that he had personally received the sachet
of shabu from their poseur-buyer at the place of arrest and brought it to their office later. After making
the appropriate markings (the letter "A" and his initials) on the sachet, he turned it over to SPO2 Bagas
for delivery to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. 13 SPO2 Alvior then identified the
sachet as the same item that he had received on 3 January 2004 from SPO3 Sagas at the PNP Crime
Laboratory Office, and that he later turned over to the examining forensic chemist, Police Senior
Inspector (P/SI) April Garcia Carbajal. 14
In light of the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court gave scant consideration
to the uncorroborated self-serving allegations of accused-appellant that he had been framed. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000) for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs. 15
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision on 16 October 2014, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated June 14, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 40 in Criminal Case No. 2004-010 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 16
In convicting appellant of the crimes charged, the CA disregarded his position that there was no valid
buy-bust operation, because the arresting team had not coordinated the matter with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). 17 The appellate court maintained that neither R.A. 9165 nor its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) required PDEA's participation in any buy-bust operation.
After all, a buy-bust is "just a form of an injlagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court [sic], which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators x x x. A
buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA." 18
On accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the poseur-buyer weakened
the arresting team's testimonies, the CA held that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal only
if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, as held in People v. Berdadero. 19 In any case,
the testimonies of SPO2 Dacara and P/Insp. Ramas, who were both within clear seeing distance,
"presented a complete picture, providing every detail of the buy-bust operation."20
Finally, as regards the failure of the police officers to immediately mark the alleged shabu at the crime
scene (but only at the police station), the CA ruled that "failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1),
Article 11 of RA No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible."21 It further emphasized that "[w]hat is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."22
We now resolve the appeal.
ISSUE
From the foregoing, the sole issue before us is whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses sufficient to warrant appellant's conviction for the
crimes charged.
THE COURT'S RULING
We reverse the appellate court.
While prior coordination with the PDEA is not necessary to make a buy-bust operation valid,23 we are
constrained to reverse the findings of the CA because the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal
to the cause of the prosecution. In People v. Andaya, 24 the importance of presenting the poseur-buyer's
testimony before the trial court was underscored by the Court in this wise:
The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in
flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to
commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. The arresting police
officer or private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State,
and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable
doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in
his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence. 25
In the same case, we emphasized that "[t]here would have been no issue against [the buy-bust
operation], except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the
transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance
from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction." 26 It was even noted in
that case that the "members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged
signal from the poseur-buyer."27
While there is a "need to hide [the poseur-buyers] identit[ies] and preserve their invaluable service to
the police,"28this consideration cannot be applied to this case, because, as in Andaya, the "poseur-
buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the
State did not credibly incriminate [the accused]."29
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO2 Bagas, SPO2 Alvior, Jr., SPO2 Dacara, and P/Insp.
Ramas (who was 10 meters away) cannot be considered as eyewitness accounts of the illegal sale.
There was no indication that they directly saw an illegal drug being sold to the poseur-buyer. In People
v. Guzon, 30 we held that "the police officer, who admitted that he was seven (7) to eight (8) meters
away from where the actual transaction took place, could not be deemed an eyewitness to the crime." 31
At this juncture, We reiterate our point in Andaya:
Secondly, the reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction
between the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay character
of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-bust team
interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the
transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer,
unfairly threatened the libe1iy of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And,
lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the
poseur buyer who supposedly gave it. 32
This interpretation is premised on the legal reasoning that "when the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral ce1iainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." 33 In light of the pronouncements
above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss other issues raised by both parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Decision dated 16
October 2014 in CA-GR. CR-I-LC. No. 01179 affirming the Decision dated 14 June 2013 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 2004-010;
and ACQUITS accused-appellant KUSAIN AMIN y AMPUAN of the crime charged in Criminal Case
No. 2004-010 on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
hereby ORDERED to immediately release accused-appellant KUSAIN AMIN y AMPUAN from custody,
unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the State's
case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-
arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his nonpresentation
must be credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy the
quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not themselves
participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 91651 (RA 9165) was
filed charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya). The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about December 16, 2002 at around 9:50 o'clock in the evening at Brgy. San Jose Sico,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell,
dispense or deliver, more or less 0.09 gram(s) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, which is a clear violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment,3 Andaya pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The CA summed up the versions of the parties, as follows: 4
Five (5) witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: SPO4 Delfin Alea, SPO3 Nelio Lopez,
SPO2 Danilo Mercado, SPO4 Protasio Marasigan and Jupri Delantar.
SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002, their asset
who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived
at their station. Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A team composed
of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and asset
Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of ₱100.00 bills both duly marked "X"
were recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon reaching the
designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different positions where
they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito's house. Pablito came
out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The asset received
something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying consummation of the transaction was
given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers
and arrested accused. He was brought to the police station. The arrival of the team was recorded in the
police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to the asset was sent to the Regional Crime
Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. The specimen was positive for
methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
SPO2 Lopez received the person of the accused, the marked money and the item accused handed to
the asset. Lopez prepared the request for laboratory examination. He also prepared the documents
required for filing of the case with the Public Prosecutor.
SPO2 Danilo Mercado recorded the marked bills in the police blotter before the buy-bust. Upon the
team's return, the marked money and the merchandise from accused were turned over to SPO2
Mercado. He prepared a complaint sheet. Thereafter, he turned over accused and the evidence to the
Police Investigator.
SPo4 Protacio Marasigan received a written request for laboratory examination of the subject
merchandise. He brought the request to the crime laboratory in Laguna.
Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna, conducted the examination.
The merchandise tested positive for shabu.
Accused-appellant denied the charge. He stated that at about 9: 15 in the evening of December 16,
2002 he was at home watching TV with his family when police officers arrived. When he opened the
door, a police officer poked his gun at him. Somebody else held a long firearm. Pablito was handcuffed
and brought outside. He refused to negotiate and asked for a warrant. The policemen searched the
house, turned over the beddings and uncovered their furniture. No gun nor shabu was found. Pablito
was brought to the police station and detained. After three (3) days he was released. He received a
subpoena from the Public Prosecutor afterwards.
His wife Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony. She added having told her husband about the
loss of their cellphone and the money in his wallet. She was asked to produce ₱5,000.00 which she was
unable to do. She was able to raise only ₱2,000.00.
Judgment of the RTC
On February 21, 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City (R TC) rendered its
judgment convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him the penalty of life imprisonment, 5 viz:
In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation conducted on the night of December 16, 2002 is supported by
the police blotter wherein not only was the depaiiure and arrival of the operatives have been duly
recorded but also the two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills. The arrest of the accused was
made after the police asset had given the pre-arranged signal outside his house. The marked money
was recovered from the very hand of the accused while the deck of crystalline substances given to the
asset upon the latter's handing over to the accused the marked money has been turned over to the
police by the asset. The crystalline substance when examined at the police crime laboratory was found The accused may be credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to any.
to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous and prohibited drug and weighed 0.09 gram.
SO ORDERED.6
These foregoing facts have been clearly testified to by the Prosecution witnesses who are members of
the Philippine Integrated National Police Force stationed at Batangas City. No ill-motive has been Decision of the CA
imputed to any of these police officers prior to and at the time the herein accused was arrested on the
night of December 16, 2002.
In his appeal, Andaya contended:
The accused and his wife as a defense denied the sale of shabu that fateful night. There were
allegations in their testimonies that the police demanded money from them. The wife of the accused I.
even testified that she gave P 1,500.00 to the police officer who then eventually released said accused.
And early on, she even claimed money and a cellphone were missing after the accused was arrested in THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
their house. SEARCH AND ARREST AS ILLEGAL.

The testimonies of the accused and his wife are bereft of any corroborating evidence emanating from a
disinterested source. It is no less than self-serving devoid of any credence considering the following
circumstances:
1. Scrutinizing the entirety of the testimony of the accused and his wife Crisanta Andaya, there
are material variances gleaned therefrom. The accused himself never testified that he was
pushed to a chair and yet witness Crisanta Andaya said she saw her husband pushed to a
chair. Also, the accused said there were two guns poked at him when he opened the door but
his wife said only one was holding a gun while another had a long firearm on his shoulder.
2. The testimony of the accused was that only ₱500.00 was taken by the police before his
release. But the wife said ₱1,500.00 was given to the police before the accused was released.
3. The accused and his wife never made any complaint to the proper authorities as regards the
alleged loss of money and cellphone when the accused was arrested on December 16, 2002.
Neither was there any complaint filed by them for the alleged ₱500.00 or Pl1500.00 demanded
from and given by them to the police.
4. The accused was a resident of Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City since the 1980's
why was it that it was at Rosario, Batangas where the accused was arrested. The Defense
gave no evidence to contest the presumption of guilt based on flight.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On February 11, 2008, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the conviction, 8 viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of Branch IV, RTC,
Fourth Judicial Region, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 12771 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Issues
Hence, Andaya appeals, insisting that the search of his house and his person and his arrest by the
police officers violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and that the
Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating
that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

5. It is significant to note also that the accused never bothered to ask who was knocking at his Ruling
door past 9:00 o'clock in the evening. While his family was already lying in bed to sleep he was
still watching T.V. These actuations of the accused tend to support the fact that the police
The appeal is meritorious.
asset had made a deal with the accused for the sale of shabu and was expecting the asset to
come that night.
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of
In the light of all foregoing considerations, the Court is left with no alternative than to find the herein
2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
accused criminally liable for the offense charged in the information.
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that the dangerous
drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. 10
Wherefore, accused Pablito Andaya y Reano is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is therefore sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug
and to pay the costs of this action. The 0.09 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject of this
pusher.11 In such operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the
case is confiscated and directed to be proceeded against pursuant to law.
dangerous drug and paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or delivers the
dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the price or other consideration. Once the
transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is arrested, and can be held to account under the criminal
law. The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is
arrested in jlagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is
attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. 12 The
arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State,
and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable
doubt.13 This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in
his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.14
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-
arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe
how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue
against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the
transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance
from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
The CA did not find anything wrong or odd in the non-presentation of the poseur buyer as a witness
against the accused. In fact, it justified the non-presentation as follows:
Appellant also questioned the failure of the prosecution to present the informer. The court is aware of
the considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. There is
the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. (People v. Khor, 307
SCRA 295 [1999], citing People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995].) Foremost is the desire to protect them
from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known.
(People vs. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004.)
In People vs Lopez (214 SCRA 323), it was held that there was no need for the prosecution to present
the confidential informer as the poseur buyer himself positively identified the accused as the one who
sold to him one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then properly relied
on the testimonies of the police officers despite the decision of the prosecution not to present the
informer.15
The foregoing justification by the CA was off-tangent and does not help the State's cause
any.1âwphi1 It is obvious that the rulings cited to supp01i the need to conceal the confidential
infonnants' identities related to the confidential informants who gave information against suspected drug
dealers. The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those
instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused.
In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were
one and the same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya.
Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes "any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Under the law, selling was any act "of
giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for money
or any other consideration;"16 while delivering was any act "of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to
another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration."17 Given the legal
characterizations of the acts constituting the offense charged, the members of the buy-bust team could
not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer
handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a
sale, it was unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team that what
the poseur buyer handed over were the marked ₱100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur
buyer was the shabu purchased.
Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of the
buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does not
show what the prearranged signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State to be clear
and definite about its evidence of guilt, particularly here where the conviction of Andaya would require
him to spend the rest of his natural life behind bars. Nothing less should be done here. Secondly, the
reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between the poseur
buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay character of the signal
rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted
the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their
interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly
threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the
reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur
buyer who supposedly gave it.
We should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because of what our judicial experience
through the years has told us about unscrupulous lawmen resorting to stratagems of false incrimination
in order to arrest individuals they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the arrest did not emanate from
probable cause, for the formless signal from the anonymous poseur buyer did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165.1âwphi1
In affirming the RTC's conviction of the accused, the CA observed that the defense of frame-up put up
by the accused was discredited by the absence of proof of "any intent on the paii of the police
authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty stands."18 Such outright rejection by the lower courts of Andaya's defense of
frame-up is not outrightly binding. For sure, the frame-up defense has been commonly used in
prosecutions based on buy-bust operations that have led to the an-est of the suspects.19 Its use might
be seen as excessive, but the failure of the accused to impute any ill motives to falsely incriminate them
should not deter us from scrutinizing the circumstances of the cases brought to us for review. We
should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes they have
been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill motive to the lawmen
is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our dutiful vigilance to protect our
citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there have been in the past
many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten our resolve to
strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.
Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the
lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed
regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming
task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of the Government.
Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor
of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a
false accusation of committing some crime. 20 The criminal accusation against a person must be
substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court should steadfastly safeguard his right to be
presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his reputation in his community might
not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction for any crime, least of all one as grave as
drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear, competent and beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor would be rendered empty.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on February 11,
2008; ACQUITS accused Pablito Andaya y Reano for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and ORDERS his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
City.

The Court DIRECTS that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the immediate release
of Pablito Andaya y Reano, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause; and to report his
compliance within ten days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines operation was conducted by the elements of the Batangas City Police Station with the assistance of
SUPREME COURT Police Inspector Danilo Balmes of the CIDG Batangas Province on May 27, 2004 at 11:30 o’clock in the
Manila morning at the Petron Gasoline Station along B. Morada Ave., Lipa City. Using two (2) pieces of marked
₱500.00 bills and boodle money to make the appearance of about ₱24,000.00, the police asset who
SECOND DIVISION posed as a buyer transacted with the alias Gerry upon his arrival atthe gas station. After the exchange
of the marked money and the three (3) plastic sachets of shabu placed in a black plastic box, alias
Gerry was placed under arrest. He was later identified as Gerardo Enumerable y de Villa. The marked
G.R. No. 207993 January 21, 2015 money was recovered from his possession by PO3 Villas who also took custody of the specimen shabu
which he marked EMV 1 to EMV 3. The three (3) sachets of shabu were turned over to the Batangas
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Provincial Crime Laboratory, pursuant to the request for laboratory examination of P/Supt. Fausto
vs. Manzanilla, Jr., Chief of Police, Batangas City PNP on May 27, 2004 at 5:25 p.m. However, that Crime
GERARDO ENUMERABLE y DE VILLA, Appellant. laboratory indorsed the request with the specimens on June 4, 2004 at 2:30 p.m. to the Regional Crime
Laboratory in Calamba City.
DECISION
Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas found the specimens positive for the
CARPIO, J.: presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as shown by Chemistry Report No. D-
566-04, the authenticity and genuineness of which were admitted by accused during the pre-trial.5

The Case
Appellant filed a Comment with Motion for Leave to File Demurrer, 6 which motion was denied by the trial
court for appellant’s failure to adduce any reason therefor.7
On appeal is the 31 January 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04948. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the 15 February 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of Lipa
City convicting appellant Gerardo Enumerable y De Villa for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
9165. decision reads:

The Facts
The Information dated 27 August 2004 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 2004 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning at Petron Gasoline
Station, located at B. Morada Ave., Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver, dispose or give away to a police officer-poseur buyer, 9.88 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, contained in three (3)
plastic sachets.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused GERARDO ENUMERABLE y DE VILLA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of drug pushing as defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby impose on him the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00. The 9.88 grams of shabu are hereby ordered destroyed pursuant to the provisions
of Section 21(4) and (7) of RA 9165.
The period of detention of the accused shall be deducted in his service of sentence.
Let a commitment order be issued for the transfer of custody of the accused from the BJMP Lipa City to
the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City.

Contrary to Law.3
SO ORDERED.8

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 4 Trial ensued.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of appellantfor the
offense charged.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwalberto Villas and Police
Inspector Danilo Balmes. On the other hand, appellant waived the presentation of any defense
evidence. Hence, this appeal.

As found by the trial court,the facts are as follows: The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

From the evidence adduced by the People, the Court finds that based on the information about a dealin In sustaining appellant’s conviction for the offense charged, the Court of Appeals held that the testimony
shabu between the asset of PO3 Edwalberto Villas and a certain Gerry of San Pablo City, a buy-bust ofPO3 Villas identifying the three plastic sachets of shabu as the same onesseized from appellant
rendered insignificant appellant’s allegation that PO3 Villas did not immediately put markings on the
three sachets of shabu at the place of arrest. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the failure of the
arresting officers to conduct a physical inventory and to take photographs of the seized items is not fatal
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, as in this case.
According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution was able to prove the unbroken chain of custody of
the prohibited drug from the time PO3 Villas confiscated the plastic sachets from appellant and marked
them at the place of arrest, to the time PO3 Villas brought the plastic sachets to the police station and
turned them over to the investigator on-duty until the time SPO1 de Castro submitted the marked plastic
sachets to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon for laboratory examination.
The Issue
The issue boils down to whether the prosecution established the identity and integrity of the confiscated
illegal drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against appellant.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the appeal.
While appellant waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, he disputes the identity and
integrity of the illegal drug which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against him. Appellant
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drug which
gravely impairs its identity. Without the identity of the corpus delicti being sufficiently established,
appellantclaims that he should be acquitted.
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal saleof dangerous drug, not only must the essential elements
of the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but likewise the identity of the prohibited drug. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delictiof the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.10
Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from the accused is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit.1âwphi1 In this regard, the prosecution must sufficiently prove the
unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated illegal drug. In People v. Watamama, 11 the Court held:
In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence
of the prohibited drug has to be proved. The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is offered in
evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is the same
substance seized from the accused.
While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of police officers
attending to drugs cases, still, such officers must present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct
and show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Climaco,12 citing Malillin v. People,13 the Court held:
x x x [T]o establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases involving dangerous drugs, it
is important that the substance illegally possessed in the first place be the same substance offered in
court as exhibit. This chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed
concerning the identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the
accused is not the same dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination,
nor the same dangerous drug presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not preserved
due to the broken chain of custody. With this, an element in the criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is not proven, and the accused must then be
acquitted based on reasonable doubt. For this reason, [the accused] must be acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt due to the broken chain of custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from
him.
In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly transmitted to
the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly delivered to the
Regional Crime Laboratory on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence presented how the confiscated
sachets of shabu were stored, preserved or labeled nor who had custody prior to their delivery to the
Regional Crime Laboratory and their subsequent presentation before the trial court. This is evident from
the testimony of PO3 Villas, who stated he had no knowledge on who had custody of the sachets of
shabu from 27 May 2004 until 4 June 2004. PO3 Villas testified thus:
Q But when the accused was arrested on May 27, 2004, records will show that the specimen was
submitted to the crime laboratory on June 4, 2004 which is practically several days after. Am I right?
A It was turned over to the duty investigator.
Q Who brought the specimen to the crime laboratory?
A I don’t know from the duty investigator, sir.
Q So you are not aware who brought the specimen to the crime laboratory?
AYes, sir.
Q But between May 27 and June 4, 2004, who was in custody of the specimen?
A I turned it over to the duty investigator, sir.
Q On what date?
A On May 27 after we turned over the suspect to the investigator, sir.
Q So your statement which says that the accused was released simply because the specimen or the
resultof the examination … would not catch up with the investigation isnot correct because you have not
submitted immediately the specimen to the crime laboratory?
COURT
Q Because it was submitted seven (7) days after the apprehension?
A I was not the one who is concerned with the submission of the specimen to the crime laboratory. We
turned it over to the duty investigator and the duty investigator marked the specimen, Your Honor.
ATTY. GAJITOS
Q But you will agree that the specimen was submitted to the crime laboratory by your investigator only
on June 4, 2004 or practically a week after the apprehension?
A I don’t know, sir. It is onlynow that I came to know, sir.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution attempted to fill the gap in the chain of custody. However, such effort proved futile. On
re-direct examination, PO3 Villas, who earlier testified that he had no knowledge on who had custody of
the illegal drugs prior and during their delivery to the crime laboratories, merely restated the contents of
the 3 June 2004 Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas Police addressed to the Regional Chief,
corresponding to the questions of the prosecutor. In other words, PO3 Villas testified on a piece of
document he had no participation inthe preparation or execution thereof. PO3 Villas testified as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. GAJITOS
Q Do you admit there are no significant markings on this black box for possession or identification more
particularly the signature or initial of the arresting officer?
A No, sir.
ATTY. GAJITOS
No further question, Your Honor.
COURT
Re-direct.
PROSECUTOR
Q During your cross-examination, youwere asked regarding the fact as a reply to the question of the
defense it was after 7 days that the specimen was actually brought to the laboratory for examination,
your answer that was correct?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q I am showing to you a document, the indorsement which came from the Office of the Chief of Police
of Batangas City dated May 27, 2004, can you please go over the same and tell the Court what is the
relevance of that document regarding the delivery of specimen to the crime laboratory?
A This is the request prepared by our investigator dated May 27 in relation to the arrest of Gerardo
Enumerable wherein the subject were three (3) plastic sachets of shabu, it was delivered to Batangas
Provincial Crime Laboratory on the same date, ma’am.
Q How did you come to know it was delivered on the same date?
A There was a stamp receipt by the Provincial Crime Laboratory office delivered by SPO1 De Castro
and received by PO3 Llarena at Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory, ma’am.
Q You likewise identified during the direct examination chemistry report coming from Camp Vicente Lim,
how would you reconcile the fact the specimen was delivered to the Provincial Crime Laboratory and
the result came from Camp Vicente Lim?
A It was the Provincial Crime Laboratory of Batangas PPO who made the indorsements from Batangas
Provincial Police Office to the Crime Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim, ma’am.
Q Do you have proof to show that fact?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q What is that?
A Letter request made by the Batangas Crime Laboratory to the Crime Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim,
ma’am.
Q This is the same request made by the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory addressed to Regional
Crime Laboratory, was there a proof to show that the specimen together with the indorsement was
actually received by the Crime Laboratory Camp Vicente Lim.
A Yes, there was a stamp of the Regional Crime Laboratory office delivered by PO3 Vargas and
received by PO3 Macabasco of the Regional Crime Laboratory, ma’am.
Q What date?
A It was delivered on June 3 and the specimen was received on June 4, ma’am.
Q Why was it necessary for your officeto deliver the specimen to the Provincial Crime Laboratory, why
not directly to the Crime Laboratory of Camp Vicente Lim?
A During that time there was no chemist who examined the specimen in the Provincial Crime Laboratory
so what they did was they delivered the specimen to the Regional Crime Laboratory, ma’am.
Q My question is, why not deliver it directly to Camp Vicente Lim?
A The PNP during that time did not have any budget, ma’am.
Q How much would it needto deliver the specimen?
A It was cheap, sir. The problemwas that the Provincial Crime Laboratory did not have any chemist,
they delivered the specimen to the Regional Crime Laboratory that is why there are many accused who
remained at large, ma’am.
xxxx
Q Who brought the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
A The officer on duty, Your Honor.
Q From Batangas to Camp Vicente Lim, do you know the officer?
A The person who delivered there, it is stated in the document, Your Honor.
Q Who was in custody of this specimen from Batangas PNP to the Provincial Crime Laboratory? A The
officer, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, PO3 Villas had no personal knowledge on (1) how the illegal drugs were delivered and who
delivered the drugs from the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory;
(2) who received the drugs in the Regional Crime Laboratory; and (3) who had custody of the drugs
from 27 May 2004 to 3 June 2004 until their presentation before the trial court. The testimony of PO3
Villas merely attests to the existence of the Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas Provincial
Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory.
While appellant admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due execution of the Chemistry Report,
prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas, this admission merely
affirms the existence of the specimen and the request for laboratory examination and the results
thereof. Appellant's admission does not relate to the issue of chain of custody. In fact, appellant
qualified his admission that the specimens were not taken or bought from him.16 In People v. Gutierrez,
the Court stated:
x x x That the defense stipulated on these matters, viz: that the specimen exists, that a request has
been made by the arresting officers for examination thereof, that a forensic chemist examined it, and
that it tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride has no bearing on the question of chain of
custody. These stipulations, which merely affirm the existence of the specimen, and the request for
laboratory examination and the results thereof, were entered into during pre-trial only in order to
dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist and abbreviate the proceedings. x x x.17
Since the failure of the prosecution to establish every link in the chain of custody of the illegal drug
gravely compromised its identity and integrity, which illegal drug is the corpus delicti of the offense
charged against appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the appeal and ACQUIT appellant Gerardo Enumerable y De Villa based on
reasonable doubt and we ORDER his immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for any
other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 229352, April 10, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LEMUEL GONZALES Y BANARES,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 11, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 06203, denying appellant Lemuel Banares Gonzales' appeal and affirming the
Decision2 dated March 11, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City, in Criminal
Cases No. Q-07-148425 and No. Q-07-148426, convicting appellant of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
The facts follow.
At around 6:00 p.m., on August 8, 2007, a male person appeared at Police Station 11, Quezon City
Police District, informing the officers of an alleged illegal sale of dangerous drugs by one alias "Memel"
at Jollibee, Araneta Avenue corner Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. As such, P/Insp. Alberto Gatus
(P/Insp. Gatus) formed a team composed of PO1 Ronaldo Flores (PO1 Flores), SPO4 Mario Abong
(SPO4 Abong), PO1 Erlin Bautista (PO1 Bautista), PO3 Jonathan Carranza (PO3 Carranza), and a
certain PO1 Ignacio. P/Insp. Gatus instructed PO1 Bautista to prepare the request for coordination with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and also instructed PO1 Flores to act as the poseur-buyer.3
Later, on the same day, at around 8:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the designated place. After PO1
Flores and the informant alighted from the vehicle, the latter pointed towards the appellant who was
standing outside Jollibee, Araneta Avenue. The two approached appellant. The informant and appellant
talked; and then, the latter approached PO1 Flores and asked the latter how much would he get. PO1
Flores replied, "dalawang piso" which meant P200.00 worth of shabu. As PO1 Flores handed appellant
the marked P200.00 bill, the latter, in turn, opened the compartment of his motorcycle and gave PO1
Flores a sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Flores then lit a cigarette, a signal to the
buy-bust team that the sale had been consummated. Immediately thereafter, the rest of the team
approached appellant. SPO4 Abong held appellant and told him to empty his pockets. SPO4 Abong
was able to recover the marked money; he arrested the appellant and apprised him of his constitutional
rights. PO1 Flores then searched appellant's motorcycle and found another sachet containing what
appeared to be shabu, and then properly marked the sachets that were confiscated. 4
Afterwards, the buy-bust team brought appellant to Police Station 11 where an inventory was made, and
the requests for drug test and laboratory examination were prepared. PO1 Flores turned over the seized
sachets to the investigator, PO1 Bautista, who prepared the requests. PO1 Flores brought the seized
sachets and the requests to the Crime Laboratory. Police Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PI Villaraza)
received the seized items and conducted a qualitative examination of the contents of the sachets and
found them positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 5
Thus, two Informations were filed against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
The said Informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-07-148425
That on or about the 8th day of August, 2007 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver[,] transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, zero point zero two gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride[,] a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-07-148426
That on or about [the] 8th day of August, 2007 in Quezon City, accused without authority of the law did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly possess a dangerous drug, to wit: zero point zero two
(0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
During his arraignments for the two Informations, September 3, 20078 for Criminal Case No. Q-07-
148425 and January 31, 20089 for Criminal Case No. Q-07-148426, appellant pleaded "not guilty" on
both instances.10 The trial on the merits ensued, conducting a pre-trial conference.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO4 Abong and PO1 Flores, as well as the stipulated
testimonies of PI Villaraza and PO1 Bautista.
Appellant, on the other hand, presented his own testimony and that of his father, Silvestre Gonzales.
According to appellant, on August 8, 2007 at around 5:00 p.m., he was eating with his father at the
second floor of Jollibee Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City, when it started to rain. Thus, appellant went
down to get his helmet from his motorcycle. Suddenly, two persons grabbed him and told him that
somebody informed them that he was selling shabu. He was then brought to Police Station 11, Galas,
Quezon City, where his cellphone, wallet containing P4,000.00, gold necklace, and key to his
motorcycle were taken. Appellant claimed that the two men who grabbed him were SPO4 Abong and
PO1 Flores. SPO4 Abong told him to cooperate and to leave his motorcycle with them in order for him
to be released. Appellant, however, told the police officers that the motorcycle is owned by his father
and that he has not committed any violation of any law. The police officers then told appellant to give
them P25,000.00 for the settlement of the case. Appellant insisted that he gave the amount of
P25,000.00 to PO1 Flores. Thereafter, the officers brought appellant to the Office of the Prosecutor
located at the Quezon City Hall of Justice. SPO4 Abong and PO1 Flores conferred with the prosecutor,
while appellant remained outside the same office. Appellant's father corroborated the former's
testimony.11
On March 11, 2013, the RTC promulgated its Decision12 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the charges filed against him, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
a) Re: Criminal [C]ase No. Q-07-148425 -The Court finds accused LEMUEL GONZALES Y BANARES
"guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165[.]
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in
the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
b) Re: Criminal Case No. Q-07-148426- The Court finds accused LEMUEL GONZALES Y BANARES
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act.
Accordingly, he is hereby similarly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years as Maximum and to pay a fine
in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (Php300,000.00) Pesos.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency the
dangerous drugs subject hereof for proper disposition and final disposal.
SO ORDERED.13
According to the RTC, the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers is valid. It also ruled that
all the elements for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 were proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the same court held that appellant's bare denial is intrinsically weak.
Appellant elevated the case to the CA, and the appellate court, on August 11, 2015, denied appellant's
appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated March 11, 2013, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City, in Criminal Cases No. Q-07-148425 and Q-07-148426, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, the present appeal after the CA denied appellant's motion for reconsideration.
In his Brief, appellant enumerated the following issues:
I following must be proven before an accused can be convicted:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
TESTIMONY.
xxxx
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
WARRANTLESS ARREST AS ILLEGAL.
xxxx
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS.
xxxx
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE BROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGEDLY
CONFISCATED SHABU.15
According to appellant, the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were not
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant argues that there was no buy-bust operation;
thus, the sachets of shabu that were allegedly recovered in the trunk of his motorcycle may not be
admitted in evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree."16 Lastly, appellant claims that Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with, and that the chain of custody was not proved to be unbroken.
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of
the said violation, the following must concur:
(1) [T]he identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.17 (Citation omitted.)
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that
the procured object "is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs
seized from the accused."18
Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
[1] [T]he accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized by
law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous
drugs.19 (Citation omitted.)
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused
comprise the corpus delicti of the charges.20 InPeople v. Gatlabayan,21 the Court held that it is of
paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt;
and that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is
exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be
produced before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance
recovered from the suspect.22 Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."23
To ensure art unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it
essentially incorporated the saying clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator
Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
to safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of
said section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug
addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts."24 Specifically, she cited that "compliance
with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are
not always available in all corners of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For another,
there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts
apprehended."25 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is
also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were
apprehended."26
Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in
drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing
law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation."27 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local
and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the
capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section
21 (a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for
the proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.
xxxx
Section 21 (a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize
this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the
inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized
illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of
seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a
location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to
be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs
since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to
be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or
confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could
prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of
the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein
there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these
witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a
public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or
scared.28
The foregoing legislative intent had been taken cognizance of in a number of cases. In People v. Wait, which one in the area?
Jovencito Miranda y Tigas:29 A. The markings at the area.

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements COURT:
of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations Q. What was at the station?
(IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide A. The Barangay officials, your Honor.
that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements ATTY.
of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and BARTOLOME:
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are Q. You mean to say, Mr. Witness, the Inventory Receipt was prepared at the
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending
police station?
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso
A. Yes, sir.
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed Q. And you were not the one who prepared this?
that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the A. Yes, sir.
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. Also., in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non- COURT:
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or Q. Who prepared the Inventory Receipt?
that they even exist.30(Citations omitted.) A. The investigator, PO1 Bautista, your Honor.

Under the original provision of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, ATTY.
the apprehending team is required to immediately conduct a physically inventory and photograph the BARTOLOME:
same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or Q. You were present when you prepared this?
seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) a representative from the media and (3) from the DOJ; A. Yes, sir.
and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof. It is assumed that the presence of these persons will guarantee "against planting of Q. Who was the Barangay official who according to you witnessed the
evidence and frame up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination preparation of the inventory?
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."31Now, the amendatory law mandates that the
A. He did not print his name but he is a Barangay official of Barangay San Isidro,
conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the
Galas, Quezon City, sir.
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel; (2) an elected public official; and (3) a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy Q. How about during the preparation of this document was there any
thereof. representation from the media?
A. Media, none, sir. Only from the Barangay.
A perusal of the records of this case shows that during the inventory, there was no indication that it was
witnessed by a representative from the media and the National Prosecution Service, as well as that of Q. How about representative from the DOJ?
any barangay official. Although PO1 Flores, during his testimony, claimed that a barangay official was A. None, sir.
present during the inventory, he did not offer any explanation as to why the said barangay official did not
sign the inventory receipt nor was there any explanation as to the absence of a media representative Q. How about counsel for the accused?
and a representative from the National Prosecution Service, thus: A. None, sir.32

PROS. MINGOA: This Court, in People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.33 mentioned certain instances that could justify the
Are you sure at the place where the accused was arrested? absence of the required witnesses, thus:
A. Yes, sir.
It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain
Q. Was there any Barangay officials when you placed your markings? requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: 1) media representatives are
A. None, sir. That was in the station. not available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the
immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas;
COURT: 2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National
Prosecution Service; 3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the
operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 34 of the Revised
Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in
Section 21 of R.A. 9165.

Also, in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:35

The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses was not obtained
for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of
arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an
elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile
through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before
the offenders could escape. (Citation omitted)

Incidentally, in this case, no explanation, whatsoever, was provided as to the absence of the required
witnesses to the inventory. Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for
non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. 36 It has the
positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the
trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the
requirements of the law.37 Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained
and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules require that the
apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in
their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the
seized item.38 A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is
miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration.39

This Court, therefore, must acquit the appellant for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, discussion of the other issues is no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 11, 2015, denying appellant Lemuel
Banares Gonzales' appeal and affirming the Decision dated March 11, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 82, Quezon City, in Criminal Cases No. Q-07-148425 and No. Q-07-148426, convicting
appellant Lemuel Banares Gonzales of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Lemuel Banares Gonzales is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause. Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate
implementation. Said Director is ordered to report to this Court, within five (5) working days from receipt
of this Decision, the action he/she has taken.

SO ORDERED.
 The Information in Crim. Case No. 10-2008 accused Hilario of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, allegedly
committed as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT That on or about the 22nd day of January, 2008, at about 11 :00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Manila Maguihan, Municipality of Lemery, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully and
FIRST DIVISION unlawfully sell, deliver and give away one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as
specimen A (NBS-1) in Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08, a dangerous drug.3
January 11, 2018
Hilario was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under the Information in Crim.
G.R. No. 210610 Case No. 11-2008, thus:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee That on or about the 22nd day of January, 2008, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
vs. Maguihan, Municipality of Lemery, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
MARILOU HILARIO y DIANA and LALINE GUADAYO y ROYO, Accused Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully have in her possession, custody and control one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic
DECISION sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", weighing 0.03 gram,
referred to as specimen B (NBS-2) in Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08, a dangerous drug.4
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 was similarly worded to that in Crim. Case No. 11-2008,
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario (Hilario) of the Decision1 dated July 18, except that it incriminated Guadayo for illegal possession of "one (1) small heat-sealed transparent
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244, affirming with modification the plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as 'shabu,' weighing 0.04
Decision2 dated August 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5 in gram, a dangerous drug."5
Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 10-2008, 11-2008, and 13-2008. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court
found Hilario guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, in violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act When arraigned on April 29, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. 6
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; but acquitted Hilario
and her co-accused Lalaine R. Guadayo (Guadayo) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized The prosecution presented a lone witness, Police Officer (PO) 1 Nemesio Brotonel de Sagun (de
under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. The RTC had previously convicted Hilario and Sagun) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), then assigned in Lemery, Batangas. PO1 de Sagun
Guadayo of all charges against them. testified that on January 22, 2008, at around 11:00 in the evening, he was with P02 Arnold Magpantay
(Magpantay) and POI Melvin Cabungcal (Cabungcal) in Sitio Bagong Barrio, Barangay (Brgy.)
On January 25, 2008, three Informations were filed before the RTC against Hilario and Guadayo, to wit: Maguihan, Lemery, Batangas, to conduct surveillance and a buy-bust operation. POI de Sagun, in
civilian clothes, acted as poseur-buyer and was able to buy shabu for ₱500.00 from Hilario. Upon
Docket No. Accused Charge consummation of the sale, POI de Sagun personally arrested Hilario and marked the ₱500.00-bill he
paid Hilario as "NBS-1" and the shabu Hilario sold to him as "NBS-2." After the arrest, POI de Sagun
Crim. Case No. 10-2008 Hilario Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs brought Hilario to the Lemery police station and turned over custody of Hilario to the investigator-on-
(Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. duty, but PO1 de Sagun could not recall the name of said investigator. PO1 de Sagun also claimed that
9165) he prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of "Ma'm Orlina" and Sims Garcia,
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively. PO1 de Sagun then
Crim. Case No. 11-2008 Hilario Illegal Possession of Dangerous brought the seized items to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination, and
Drugs (Article II, Section 11 of according to him, the submitted specimen tested positive for shabu. 7
R.A. No. 9165)
PO1 de Sagun further recounted that during the buy-bust operation, Guadayo ran away, so PO2
Crim. Case No. 13-2008 Guadayo Illegal Possession of Dangerous Magpantay had to chase after her. When P02 Magpantay subsequently caught up with Guadayo, he
Drugs (Article II, Section 11 of recovered and confiscated from her another sachet of shabu. PO1 de Sagun, though, admitted that he
R.A. No. 9165) was not personally present when PO2 Magpantay seized the sachet of shabu from Guadayo.

During PO1 de Sagun's direct examination, a brown sealed envelope was presented, and when
opened, it contained two heat-sealed transparent sachets of shabu. When questioned as to why there
were two sachets of shabu, PO1 De Sagun maintained that he confiscated only one sachet from Hilario,
and suggested that the other sachet was the one seized by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo. Between
the two sachets of shabu, PO1 de Sagun identified the sachet marked "NBS-1" as the one which he
confiscated from Hilario.8
When PO1 de Sagun was subjected to cross-examination, he reiterated that he had marked the
₱500.00-bill used in the buy-bust operation as "NBSI" and the sachet of shabu bought from Hilario as
"NBS-2." When pressed further by the defense counsel on the fact that he identified the sachet
of shabu marked as "NBS- I" as the one he seized from Hilario, PO1 de Sagun confirmed the apparent
discrepancies in his testimony.9
Also in the course of PO1 de Sagun's cross-examination, he attested that he, PO2 Magpantay, and
PO1 Cabungcal went to Brgy. Maguihan on January 22, 2008 based on information gathered from
concerned citizens that sale of dangerous drugs was rampant in the area; they prepared a pre-operation
report but he did not have a copy of the same with him at the trial; they did not know nor did they
conduct a surveillance of Hilario and Guadayo prior to January 22, 2008; and when they went to Brgy.
Maguihan, they were not certain of the subject of their buy-bust operation.
The prosecution additionally submitted as evidence the Magkalakip na Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
January 22, 2008 of POI de Sagun and P02 Magpantay; Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08 dated
January 23, 2008 issued by Police Chief Inspector (P/CInsp.) Jupri Caballegan Delantar, Forensic
Chemical Officer, of the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, PNP; the sachet of shabu with
marking "NBS-1 ;" and photocopy of the P500.00-bill with Serial No. 665579 and marking "NBS-1."
Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08 stated that two specimens were seized from Hilario, i.e., Specimens A
(NBSl) and B (NBS-2), weighing 0.04 gram and 0.03 gram, respectively, which both tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
For its part, the defense called Hilario10 and Guadayo11 to the witness stand. Hilario used to live in
Tondo, Manila, but their house was demolished, so she and her family moved to Brgy. Maguihan in
Lemery, Batangas in March 2007. Guadayo lived with and served as a babysitter for Hilario's sister-in-
law.
According to the combined narrative of Hilario and Guadayo, on January 22, 2008, at about 10:00 in the
evening, they were both at Hilario's house. Hilario was tending to her sick 12-year-old daughter, and
Guadayo was there to help Hilario with the laundry. A neighbor, Feliciano Anuran (Anuran), had just
arrived to borrow a DVD, when three police officers entered Hilario's house. Among the police officers,
Hilario already knew PO1 de Sagun at that time because the latter frequented their place. The police
officers demanded that Hilario show them the money and shabu. Hilario replied that she did not have
any money and shabu. Without presenting any warrant, the police officers, particularly, PO1 de Sagun,
then searched Hilario's house, but found nothing. At this point, Anuran ran out of the house and was
chased by the police officers. When the police officers returned, they invited Hilario and Guadayo to the
police station to answer some of the police officers' questions. When Hilario further inquired as to the
reason for the invitation, the police officers told her to just go with them. The police officers brought
Hilario, Guadayo, and even Hilario's sick daughter to the police station, and after only a short stay at an
office in the police station, and without actually being asked any questions, all three were put in jail. On
January 23, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo were subjected to a drug test, and on January 24, 2008, they
were brought to Batangas City for inquest proceedings.
On August 23, 2011, the RTC promulgated its Decision, finding Hilario and Guadayo guilty of all the
charges against them. The RTC highlighted that this was a case of a buy-bust operation and adjudged
that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the offenses charged, to wit, the prosecution
witness, PO1 de Sagun, testified on how the buy-bust transaction took place and properly identified the
poseur-buyer and seller, plus the illegal drug was presented as evidence in court. The RTC sentenced
Hilario and Guadayo as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 10-2008, accused Marilou Hilario y Diana, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 5 of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 11-2008, accused Marilou Hilario y Diana, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 11 of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment;
3. In Criminal Case No. 13-2008, accused Lalaine Guadayo y Royo, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 11 of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment. 12
The Motion for Reconsideration of Hilario and Guadayo was denied for lack of merit by the RTC in an
Order13 dated September 26, 2011. Hilario and Guadayo filed a Notice of Appeal, 14 which the RTC
granted in an Order15 dated October 5, 2011.
The appeal of Hilario and Guadayo before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
05244.
In its Decision dated July 18, 2013, the Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Hilario for illegal sale of dangerous drugs in Crim. Case
No. 10-2008, finding PO1 de Sagun's testimony on the completed buy-bust operation· credible. It was
amply proven by PO1 de Sagun's testimony that a sale of shabu transpired between Hilario as the
·seller and PO1 de Sagun as the poseur-buyer. The appellate court also cited the presumption of
regularity in PO1 de Sagun's performance of his official duties; the absence of proof of ill motive on PO1
de Sagun's part to falsely impute a serious crime against Hilario; and substantial compliance with the
procedure on custody of evidence in drug cases since PO1 de Sagun took custody of the sachet
of shabu seized from Hilario and personally delivered the same to the crime laboratory for examination,
wherein it was tested positive for shabu.
The Court of Appeals though, in the same Decision, acquitted Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 and
Guadayo in Crim. Case No. 13-2008, for the following reasons:
Criminal Case No. 11-2008
On the other hand, this Court disagrees with the trial court in finding accused-appellant Hilario guilty for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
xxxx
In prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
the drug.
Significantly, in the present case, only one sachet of shabu was confiscated from accused-appellant
[Hilario], the one subject of the sale. No evidence was shown that she was further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale. As correctly
argued by the plaintiff-appellee, the accused cannot be convicted for possession of the prohibited drugs
she sold because possession of dangerous drugs is generally inherent in the crime of sale.
In People v. Posada, the Supreme Court ruled that possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is
absorbed in the sale thereof, citing the case of People v. Lacema x x x.
xxxx
To reiterate, only one (1) shabu sold by accused-appellant, Hilario was established. There was no other
evidence that another shabu was found in her possession, not covered by the sale and probably
intended for a different purpose like another sale or for her own use was proven. Accordingly, she
cannot be convicted separately for illegal possession and for illegal sale because in this particular case
possession is absorbed in the act of sale thereof.
Criminal Case No. 13-2008
Anent, accused-appellant, Guadayo, this Court is convinced that the trial court erred in finding the
accused guilty for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant Guadayo was in possession of a sachet
of shabuas testified to by PO1 De Sagun who recounted that PO1 Magpantay pursued and arrested
Guadayo x x x.
xxxx
Unfortunately, the record is bereft of proof on the chain of custody of the shabu taken from appellant
Guadayo. PO1 De Sagun did not state that the sachet of shabu was handed to him by PO1 Magpantay
after it was confiscated from appellant Guadayo. The chain of custody rule requires that the testimony
be presented about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is
offered in evidence. Notably, in this case, the prosecution failed to put on witness stand PO1 Magpantay
who allegedly ran after appellant Guadayo and seized the shabu.
Corollary thereto, there was a break in the chain of custody because no mention was made as to what
happened to the substance from the time it was seized from the appellant [Guadayo], how it got to the
laboratory and how it was kept before being offered in evidence.
More importantly, no shabu allegedly seized from appellant, Guadayo was identified before the trial
court.
As aptly held by the Supreme Court in Malillin v. People:
The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence
is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond doubt.
Likewise, the Supreme Court made an enlightening disquisition on this matter in People v. Doria, viz.:
Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized movements and custody of the seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the
presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the illegal
sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Without such dangerous
drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally
translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the
particular offense charged.
With crucial portions of the chain of custody not clearly accounted for and the alleged shabuconfiscated
from appellant Guadayo not clearly established, reasonable doubt is thus created as to her guilt.
Appellant, Guadayo is therefore entitled to an acquittal for violation of Section 11 of Article II of R.A. No.
9165.16
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the instant appeal. The assailed
Decision of RTC of Lemery, Batangas, (Branch 5) dated 23 August 2011 is MODIFIED as follows;
1. Appellant Hilario is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 11-2008 for violation of
Section 11 of RA No. 9165 as being considered absorbed in the commission of Section 5 of
RA No. 9165 under Criminal Case No. 10- 2008; and
2. Appellant Guadayo is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 13-2008 for violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 on reasonable doubt and is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful case.
Other aspects of the Decision are hereby AFFIRMED.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.17
Hilario's Notice of Appeal was given due course by the appellate court in a Resolution18 dated August
13, 2013.
In a Resolution19 dated February 19, 2014, this Court required the parties to file their respective
Supplemental Briefs if they so desire. Both parties manifested that they are no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief.20
In her Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Hilario argued that the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165. Hilario contended that PO1 de Sagun only made a blanket declaration that as poseur-buyer, he
was able to buy shabu from Hilario and his testimony lacked clear and complete details of the supposed
buy-bust operation. Hilario likewise averred that the identity of the shabu supposedly bought and
confiscated from Hilario was not established with certainty by the prosecution, pointing out that PO1 de
Sagun's confusion as to the markings affixed on the seized item was apparent. Thus, Hilario asserted
that serious doubts arose as to whether the sachet of suspected shabu submitted for laboratory
examination were the same as that purportedly bought and confiscated from her.
There is merit in this appeal.
At the outset, the Court establishes that an appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision
reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is
it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. When the Court of Appeals imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Rule 124, Section 13(c)
of the Rules of Court to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case
for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an
appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law. 21
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment finding Hilario guilty of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and imposing upon her the sentence of reclusion perpetua. Hilario filed a Notice of
Appeal with the appellate court in accordance with Rule 122, Section 3(e), in relation to Rule 124,
Section 13(c), of the Rules of Court, which provide:
Rule 122
APPEAL
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –
xxxx
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Rule 124
PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
xxxx
SEC. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. - x x x
xxxx
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment. imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, Hilario's appeal opens the entire case for review by the Court on any question, whether or
not the questions were raised by Hilario as accused-appellant and whether they are questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law.
Undeniably, Hilario challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support her conviction for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The RTC and the Court of Appeals gave total faith and credence to the testimony of
PO1 de Sagun, the sole prosecution witness.
The rule that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the
findings of fact and conclusions of the lower court; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed
decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.22 All of these exceptional circumstances are availing in
the present case.
In People v. Ismael, 23 the Court pronounced:
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is
important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is
properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
xxxx
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the
accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity
and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule
performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed." (Citations omitted.)
PO1 de Sagun's testimony - consisting of generalizations which lacked material details, riddled with
inconsistencies, and uncorroborated - failed to establish the elements of the offense charged with proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
PO1 de Sagun described the alleged buy-bust operation only m general terms, thus:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why did your group arrest accused Marilou Hilario on
January 22, 2008 at about 11 o'clock in the evening?
A Through the buy-bust operation we conducted I was able to buy shabu from her, sir.
Q Alright in other words you pretended yourself to buy shabu. Were you able to buy shabu from the said
accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much shabu did you buy [from] Marilou Hilario?
A Five hundred (₱500.00) pesos only, sir. operation on January 22, 2008; and they did not know Hilario or Guadayo prior to the buy-bust
Q After buying shabu from the accused in the amount of five hundred pesos (₱500.00), what happened operation and the arrest of the two. How then were the police officers able to identify Hilario or
next? Guadayo, from all the other residents of Brgy. Maguihan, as the ones selling drugs in Brgy. Maguihan
A We immediately arrested the person, sir. and who would be the subject of their buy-bust operation?
Q Were you in uniform on that time when you conducted the buybust operation?
A No sir, we were in civilian. The lack of specific details on the planning and conduct of the buybust operation on January 22, 2008 in
Q So after buying shabu you arrested the accused? Brgy. Maguihan casts serious doubts that it actually took place and/or that the police officers carried out
A Yes, sir. the same in the regular performance of their official duties. Relevant herein is the following discourse of
Q Were you alone or together with other police officers in arresting the accused? the Court on buy-bust operations in People v. Ong26:
A I was with PO1 Cabungcal, sir.
Q Who actually among you arrested accused Marilou Hilario?
A I, sir.24 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as
It's a generic narrative of any buy-bust operation, offering no distinctive detail except for Hilario's name an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust
as alleged seller. PO1 de Sagun failed to describe how he came to know that Hilario was operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or
selling shabu; where Hilario was and what she was doing that time; how he approached her and asked prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its
to buy shabu from her; how they came to agree on the purchase price for the shabu; where Hilario got agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed
the sachet of shabu she handed to him; and what his pre-arranged signal was to show the other police contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.
officers that the sale had been consummated and Hilario could already be arrested - details which
police officers who carried out legit buy-bust operations should be able to provide readily and To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in
completely. effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For,
When pressed for details during his cross-examination, PO1 de Sagun was unable to give enlightening the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in
answers - the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail
over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. It is the
duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through
Q Prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation, can you tell us what are the preparations you made? lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and
A We prepared a pre-operation report, ma'am. injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
Q What is the basis of your pre-operation report?
A Due to the sale of the illegal drugs, ma'am.
Q You mean to tell us because of the alleged information that there was a rampant selling of illegal In People v. Doria, we stressed the "objective" test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such
drugs? operations, the prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction, which "must start
A Yes, ma'am. from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
Q By the way Mr. witness did you conduct surveillance against Marilou Hilario and Lalaine Guadayo payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
prior to January 22, 2008? subject of the sale. We emphasized that the manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to
A No, ma'am. purchase the drug, the payment of the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the
Q By the way, do you know this Marilou Hilario on January 22, 2008 or before that day? subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
A No, ma'am. commit an offense."
Q How about accused Lalaine Guadayo?
A No, ma'am. In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
Q So, that was the first time that you saw on January 22, 2008 these Marilou Hilario and Lalaine confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how
Guadayo? it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO 1 Gonzales
A Yes, ma'am. who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPOl Gonzales' testimony is hearsay and
xxxx possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the
hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on
Q Do you have a copy of your pre-operation report? this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this
A I have no copy of the pre-operation report, ma'am.25 case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the
material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the appellants
So according to PO1 de Sagun, he and his fellow police officers conducted a buy-bust operation in must fail. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Brgy. Maguihan based on information from unnamed source/s that selling of drugs was rampant in the
area; they prepared a pre-operation report which was not produced in court; they went to Brgy. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to present during the trial the corpus delicti. There were material
Maguihan without a specific target/subject; they did not conduct any surveillance prior to the buy-bust inconsistencies between PO1 de Sagun's testimony vis-a-vis the object and documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution itself which rendered highly questionable whether the dangerous drug A Only one, sir.
presented before the RTC during trial was actually the same as that seized from Hilario during the buy- Q I will ask you, you pretended to buy shabu from the accused as in fact you were able to buy shabu?
bust operation. A Yes, sir.
Q The shabu you bought you marked in evidence as "NBS"?
During his direct examination, PO1 de Sagun recalled the chain of custody of the items seized from A Yes, sir.
Hilario during the buy-bust operation, thus: xxxx

Q After buying shabu from the accused in the amount of five hundred pesos (₱500.00), what happened FISCAL PEREZ
next? Q Can you please explain why there are two (2) sachets of shabu here?
A We immediately arrested the person, sir. A I bought only one·(l) sachet, sir.
xxxx COURT
Q Who actually among you arrested accused Marilou Hilario? Q What about the other one?
A I, sit. A PO1 Magpantay ran after one Lalaine, your Honor.
Q After arresting the accused, what did you do next, if any? Q The other sachet of shabu was allegedly taken from one Lalaine?
A We placed the markings "NBS-1" to the marked money and in the alleged shabu, "NBS-2", sir. A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You mean to tell before the Court that immediately after the arrest of the accused you placed FISCAL PEREZ
markings on the money used in buying shabu and the shabu itself? Q That's why a case was filed against that Lalaine?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q In the place where the accused was arrested? Q So, you were present, who is the police officer who confiscated the sachet of shabu from Lalaine?
A Yes, sir. A P02 Magpantay, sir.
Q Who actually placed the marking in the shabu? Q Were you not present when P02 Magpantay took the shabu from
A I, sir. Lalaine?
Q What marking did you place in the money you used in buying shabu? A Yes, sir.
A "NBS-1 ", sir. COURT
Q What was the denomination of the money you used in buying shabu? Q Were you present?
A A five hundred (₱500.00) peso bill, sir. A No, Your Honor.
Q What about in the shabu you obtained ,from the accused in buying the same, what marking did you Q You were not certain whether Magpantay is present?
place? A Yes, sir.
A "NBS-2", sir. FISCAL PEREZ
xxxx Q So, in other words you were not present when Magpantay took
the shabu from Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
Q You stated earlier, you marked the sachet of shabu you bought from the accused. If the same sachet COURT
of shabu will be shown to you, will you be able to identify or recognize the same? Q Were you present?
A Yes, sir. A No, Your Honor.
Q Why will you be able to identify the shabu you bought from the accused during the buy-bust Q You were not certain whether Magpantay is present?
operation? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, because of the marking, sir. FISCAL PEREZ
xxxx Q So, in other words you were not present when Magpantay took the shabu from Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do with the shabu you bought from the accused in this case? xxxx
A We brought them to the Crime Laboratory, for examination, sir.
Q Do you know what was the result of the laboratory examination of the specimen pertaining to this Q I am showing you sachets of suspected shabu, will you please tell the Honorable Court which among
case? the two (2) sachets of shabu you bought from Marilou Hilario?
A It gives positive result, sir.27 (Emphases supplied.) A The one with marking "NBS-1", sir.
However, when the public prosecutor opened the brown sealed envelope purportedly containing the Q Why did you say that "NBS-I is the sachet of shabu you bought from Marilou?
dangerous drugs seized from Hilario, there were two sachets of shabu inside, marked as "NBS-1" and A Because of the marking, sir.
"NBS-2." Upon further questioning, PO1 de Sagun testified: Q What marking is that?
FISCAL PEREZ A NBS-1, sir.
Q How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the accused aside from the one you bought from COURT
the accused? Q What is that NBS stands for?
A Nemesio Brotonel de Sagun, Your Honor.28 (Emphases supplied.)
PO 1 de Sagun himself admitted the discrepancies during his cross-examination:
Q And you likewise stated that you were able to buy shabu from accused Marilou Hilario?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q You likewise stated that marked money was marked as NBS-1?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And that suspected shabu which you allegedly bought from accused Marilou Hilario was marked as
NBS-2?
A Yes, ma' am.
Q But when the Public Prosecutor presented to you the alleged shabu which you allegedly bought from
the accused which you identified because of the marking NBS- 1, right?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q So, there was a discrepancy with your marking because you stated before, the marked money was
marked as NBS-1 and the shabu which you allegedly bought from accused Marilou Hilario was already
marked as NBS- I, right?
A Yes, ma'am.29
PO1 de Sagun was insistent that he seized only one sachet of shabu from Hilario; and that he marked
the ₱500.00-bill used in the buy-bust operation as "NBS-1" and the sachet of shabu from Hilario as
"NBS-2." Yet, confronted with two sachets of shabu, marked as "NBS-1" and "NBS- 2," he identified the
sachet marked as "NBS-1" as the one he bought from Hilario.
PO1 de Sagun could not explain how there were two sachets of shabu even though he testified that the
items seized from the buy-bust operation were in his custody the entire time from the arrest of Hilario,
until their inventory at the police station, and finally, until the delivery of the suspected shabu to the
crime laboratory for examination. The prosecution claimed that the other sachet of shabu was the one
seized by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, from the very beginning, the prosecution charged Hilario before the RTC through two separate
Informations: (a) Crim. Case No. 10-2008 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which involved a sachet
of shabu weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as "specimen A (NBS-1);" and (b) Crim. Case No. l I- 2008 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, which involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 gram, referred
to as "specimen B (NBS-2)." However, the prosecution changed its theory before the Court of Appeals,
stating in its Brief for the Appellee that only one sachet of shabu was confiscated from Hilario and
agreeing in the acquittal of Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 for the reason that she "cannot be
convicted for possession of the prohibited drugs she sold because possession of dangerous drugs is
generally inherent in the crime of sale of illegal drugs. Conviction for both crimes is not
feasible."30 Meanwhile, the Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs against Guadayo involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.04 gram.
Second, the documentary evidence of the prosecution, particularly, (a) the Inventories31 of the items
seized, dated January 22, 2008, prepared by PO1 de Sagun and witnessed by Mrs. Loma Orlina and
Simplico "Sims" Garcia, representatives of the DOJ and the media, respectively; (b) the Laboratory
Examination Requests32 dated January 23, 2008 for the specimens seized, prepared by Police
Superintendent Gaudencio Del Valle Pucyutan; and (c) Chemistry Report Nos. BD-O12-08 and BD-OI3-
0833 dated January 23, 2008, issued by P/Cinsp. Delantar, all consistently state that there were two
sachets of shabu from Hilario marked as "NBS-I" (weighing 0.04 gram) and "NBS-2" (weighing 0.03
gram) and one sachet of shabu from Guadayo marked as "AAM-1."
Third, PO2 Magpantay did not testify before the RTC. PO1 de Sagun conceded that he was not present
when PO2 Magpantay supposedly apprehended Guadayo and seized one sachet of shabu from her
possession, so PO1 de Sagun's testimony on said matters are hearsay.
And finally, the two sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were marked with "NBS," the initials of
PO1 de Sagun.1âwphi1 It makes no sense that the sachet of shabu taken by PO2 Magpantay from
Guadayo be marked with PO1 de Sagun's initials. As the documentary evidence of the prosecution itself
showed, the sachet of shabu supposedly seized from Guadayo was appropriately marked "AAM-1,"
presumably, PO2 Magpantay's initials.
Hence, it could not be said that one of the two sachets of shabu presented against Hilario during the
trial before the RTC was purportedly seized from Guadayo.
Clearly, the identity and integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de Sagun from Hilario
were not preserved, despite PO1 de Sagun's assertion that he had been in possession of the said
sachet from its seizure from Hilario until its turnover to the crime laboratory. The prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral
certainty. When there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined
and established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a
prohibited drug. The prosecution's failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from Hilario was
the same one presented in court is fatal to its case.34
It is fundamental in the Constitution35 and basic in the Rules of Court36 that the accused in a criminal
case enjoys the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Likewise, it is well-established in
jurisprudence that the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal. On the other hand, if the
existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is established by the prosecution, the accused gets a guilty
verdict.37 In order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense.38
The evidence for the prosecution were insufficient in material details and fraught with discrepancies and
contradictions. PO1 de Sagun himself, who claimed to have seized, marked, and kept custody of the
sachet of shabu seized from Hilario, could not positively identify which between the two sachets
of shabu he was presented with at the trial, marked as "NBS-I" and "NBS-2," was the one he actually
seized from Hilario. Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court cannot merely rely on the
presumption that PO1 de Sagun regularly performed his official duties.
As the Court declared in Mallillin v. People,39 the presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which, when challenged by the evidence, cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from Hilario in this case strongly militates
against a finding of guilt.
Also worth reproducing hereunder is the declaration of the Court in People v. Pagaduan40that:
We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that
destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies
concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless
of how much we want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the
Constitution, most particularly the presumption of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional
presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime charged,
which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less than an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05244 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario is ACQUITTED of the charge of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She is ORDERED immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women for immediate
implementation and to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special
investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or
simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The
complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of
Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police
Republic of the Philippines officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the
SUPREME COURT latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located
Manila along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them
₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the
FIRST DIVISION complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the
meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven received calls supposedly from
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014 "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
vs. complainants.1âwphi1 A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The
officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent
powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner
DECISION was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by
forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It
SERENO, CJ: later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test
result labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the
Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R.
No. 00670. The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while
eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he
wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His
request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
his urine sample, to no avail.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February
2006, which reads: THE RULING OF THE RTC

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been
duly appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having beenarrested
by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive
for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug
after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The records
do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the
Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. 5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test despite its
dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission. First, he alleges
that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by
counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing
jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would violate
a person’s right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of
hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest
and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, 6 saying that "petitioner’s
arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest
the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately
established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was
grounded on a valid and existing law.
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or not
the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was
charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive
for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six
(6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article
VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00):
Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in
his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in
which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. 8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were
established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also
reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine
because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against
himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept
of a custodial investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA,
erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested
for any crime.The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165.
Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the
law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
"importation,"9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings" 13 ; being
"employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; 14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal
chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or
"possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties,
social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or
culture of plantsclassified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; 22 and "maintenance and keeping
of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled precursors and essential
chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not
listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note thataccused appellant here
was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of
charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is
more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the charges that are filed
by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases
where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of
residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more
in keeping withthe intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time
offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec.
15.The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue
isimprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of
drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec.
11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and
provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest
was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should
have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no
residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person
who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact,
under the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima
facieevidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated
Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test
required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the accused a
chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should
only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in
the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of thisprovision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice
Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the
bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this
case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises
the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest."27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does
not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not required. (People
vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs.
Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378
Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920])
and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken
from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was
contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth;
(U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity
with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the
concept of a custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People, 29 the
petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search
warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples,
which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal
possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was inadmissible
in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined
came from the body of the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the
record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but
they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we
agree with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes
charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of
petitioner in the instant case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he
volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for
the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted
having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidencethat was
used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down
offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our
society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it
is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or
unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police
force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra
y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing them 2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ₱10,000,000.00 each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan
(Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, one of them
an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicate crime group as they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of
illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor
vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to read
"Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug which is commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred
three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever. 3
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 4 on 1 August 2007 convicted Morilla and his co-
accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal transport 5 of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five
hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the
prosecution’s failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The
dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie Mitra y
Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ₱10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered
immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as representative sample which is
still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles driven by Mayor Mitra
and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as
the police officers have already acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be
used for transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information
turned out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more than five
hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride.7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any knowledge of the
contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his Starex
van. He explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter
bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of
knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was just transporting
wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance,
Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an
accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were caught in flagrante
delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent any convincing
circumstance to corroborate their explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained. 8
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the testimonies of the four
accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by
Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The
Starex van which was ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police
officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted
window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents,
Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection.
When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were scattered on the floor,
prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that
he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass. 9 His request was rejected by
the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of
Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They
then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van was also
loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open
the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the
same was rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks
of methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court for failure on
the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that
Dequilla’s and Yang’s mere presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that
they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla. 12
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the finding of
conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport several sacks
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their respective vehicles. The singularity of their
intent to illegally transport methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to
drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead
vehicle, the Starex van.13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the illegal contents of the
sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was implausible due to the obvious
disparity of texture and volume.14
Court’s Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be convicted for conspiracy to
commit the offense charged sans allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the
prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the Information.15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 16 to
substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but
instead, the statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality
of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x." He argued that
conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the Information. 17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this point, is
deemed to have been waived due to Morilla’s failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash before
entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict the
allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right
within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms
to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of
the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that
they are parts of some complete whole.22In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a
conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous
drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to
Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it
was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a
routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to
open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told
the police officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed the
instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous
drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or
convey from one place to another."23 It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the
ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very
act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an
offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need
not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.24
In a similar case of People v. Libnao, 25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal transportation of
marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they
were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, 26 the penalty for illegal transportation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years
and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1683,27 the penalty was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty
thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659, 28 where the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos.

From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of ₱10,000,00.00 to be paid by each of the
accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659
and the principle of retroactive application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment
for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other
hand, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties.29

The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People,30 thus:

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in
accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime
on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No.
1683. The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No.
7659 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed
from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00" to "reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the
amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659
rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it
being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.1âwphi1

We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:

"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law,
being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x."

And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that
criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty
imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner, the same being more favorable to him. 31

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to
the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of
₱10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192235 July 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO LAYLO y CEPRES, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 28 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03631. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated 16 September 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in Criminal Case No. 06-017, convicting
appellant Rolando Laylo y Cepres (Laylo) of violation of Section 26(b), Article II (Attempted Sale of
Dangerous Drugs)3 of Republic Act No. 91654 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
The Facts
On 21 December 2005, two separate Informations against appellant Laylo and Melitona Ritwal (Ritwal)
were filed with the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 06-017 and
06-018, respectively. The information against Laylo states:
Criminal Case No. 06-017
That on or about the 17th day of December, 2005, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly
attempt to sell, deliver, and give away shabu to PO1 Angelito G. Reyes, 0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which were found positive to the
test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, thus commencing
the commission of the crime of illegal sale but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce such crime by reason of some cause or accident other than the accused’s own spontaneous
desistance, that is, said PO1 Angelito G. Reyes introduced himself as policeman, arrested the accused
and confiscated the two (2) above-mentioned sachets from the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. However, during
the trial, Ritwal jumped bail and was tried in absentia. Thus, Ritwal was deemed to have waived the
presentation of her evidence and the case was submitted for decision without any evidence on her part.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: Police Officer 1 (PO1) Angelito G. Reyes (PO1 Reyes) and
PO1 Gem A. Pastor (PO1 Pastor), the poseur-buyers in the attempted sale of illegal drugs.
The prosecution summed up its version of the facts: In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes
and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations at
Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. While the police officers were in front of a sari-sari store
at around 5:40 p.m., appellant Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked, "Gusto
mong umiskor ng shabu?" PO1 Reyes replied, "Bakit mayroon ka ba?" Laylo then brought out two
plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, "Dos (₱200.00) ang isa." Upon hearing this,
the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on
the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and
found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying.
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal
and forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing. Forensic
Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens
submitted and found the recovered items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.
The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets
containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the
third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu.
The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions of the facts. The witnesses presented
were: appellant Laylo; Laylo’s three neighbors namely Rodrigo Panaon, Jr., Marlon de Leon, and
Teresita Marquez.
Laylo testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the street, two men
grabbed them. The two men, who they later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to
their house. Once inside, the police officers placed two plastic sachets in each of their pockets.
Afterwards, they were brought to the police station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs
were planted on them, they were arrested and charged.
To corroborate Laylo’s testimony, the defense presented Laylo’s three neighbors. Marlon de Leon (de
Leon), also a close friend of the couple, testified that he was taking care of the Laylo and Ritwal’s child
when he heard a commotion. He saw men, whom de Leon identified as assets, holding the couple and
claimed that he saw one of them put something, which he described as "plastic," in the left side of
Laylo’s jacket.
Rodrigo Panaon, Jr. (Panaon) narrated that on 17 December 2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., he was The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
on his way home when he saw Laylo arguing with three men in an alley. He overheard Laylo uttering,
"Bakit ba? Bakit ba?" Later, Panaon saw a commotion taking place at Laylo’s backyard. The three men In a Decision dated 28 January 2010, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion
arrested Laylo while the latter shouted, "Mga kapitbahay, tulungan ninyo kami, kami’y dinadampot." of the decision states:
Then Panaon saw someone place something inside the jacket of Laylo as he heard Laylo say, "Wala
kayong makukuha dito."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged
decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
Teresita Marquez (Marquez) testified that while she was fetching water from the well on 17 December
2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., she heard Laylo’s son shouting, "Amang, Amang." Marquez then
saw the child run to his father, who was with several male companions. Then someone pulled Laylo’s SO ORDERED.8
collar and frisked him. Marquez overheard someone uttering, "Wala po, wala po." Marquez went home
after the incident. At around 9:00 in the evening, Ritwal’s daughter visited her and borrowed money for Hence, this appeal.
Laylo and Ritwal’s release. Marquez then accompanied Ritwal’s daughter to the municipal hall, where a
man demanded ₱40,000.00 for the couple’s release. The Ruling of the Court

In its Decision dated 16 September 2008, the RTC found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable The appeal lacks merit.
doubt of violations of RA 9165. The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who
were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. The RTC stated that Reyes and
Pastor were straightforward and candid in their testimonies and unshaken by cross-examination. Their The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and
testimonies were unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their material points. The RTC added seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 9
that the denial of appellant Laylo is weak and self-serving and his allegation of planting of evidence or
frame-up can be easily concocted. Thus, Laylo’s defense cannot be given credence over the positive In the present case, PO1 Reyes narrated in court the circumstances of the illegal sale:
and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
PROS. ARAGONES:
We thus find accused Rolando Laylo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 26(b) of Q: What time did you proceed to that place of surveillance?
R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of A: 5:40 p.m., Ma’am.
₱500,000.00. We also find accused Melitona Ritwal GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Q: And what happened when you and PO1 Gem Pastor went there?
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and illegally possessing a total of 0.02 grams of Methylamphetamine A: When we were making standby at a nearby store there was a man talking with a woman, the man
Hydrochloride or shabu and accordingly sentence her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and asked me if we want to have a shot of shabu.
one day as minimum to 13 years as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Q: What was your reply?
A: "Bakit, meron ka ba?"
Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for Q: How did that other person react to that question, what did he tell you, if any?
proper disposition. Furnish PDEA with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007. A: "Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?"
Q: What happened after that?
A: I replied, "Bakit meron ka ba?" then he showed me two small plastic bags containing shabu, Ma’am.
SO ORDERED.6 Q: How big is that bag, Mr. Witness?
A: Small, Ma’am.
Laylo filed an appeal with the CA. Laylo imputed the following errors on the RTC: Q: Can you tell us the size?
A: (Demonstrating) Almost one inch the size of a cigarette, Ma’am.
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF COURT: It was in a plastic not in foil?
THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION WITNESS’ PATENTLY A: Yes, your Honor.
FABRICATED ACCOUNTS. PROS. ARAGONES:
Q: After showing you two plastic bags, what happened?
A: I introduced myself as a police officer then I caught this man and confiscated the two small plastic
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF bag containing shabu.
THE OFFENSE CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE Q: How about the lady?
DOUBT. A: My partner caught the woman because she was intending to run away and he got from her right hand
Smart SIM card case containing one small plastic. 10
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PO1 Pastor corroborated the testimony of PO1 Reyes:
DESPITE THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS’ FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF PROS. ARAGONES:
THE ALLEGED SEIZED SHABU.7 Q: Mr. Witness, while you were conducting surveillance on December 17, 2005, what happened?
A: While we were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal, while we police officers identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under arrest. From the testimonies
were at the store, two (2) persons approached us, one male and one female, Ma’am. of the witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there was an attempt to sell shabu. In
Q: Who were those persons? Did you come to know the name of those persons? addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of
A: At that time I don’t know the names but when they were brought to the police station I came to know the crime charged were sufficiently established by evidence.
their names, Ma’am.
Q: What are the names of these two persons? Appellant claims that he was a victim of a frame up. However, he failed to substantiate his claim. The
A: Rolando Laylo and Melitona Ritwal, Ma’am. witnesses presented by the defense were not able to positively affirm that illegal drugs were planted on
Q: At that time they approached you during the time you were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, appellant by the police officers when they testified that "they saw someone place something inside
what happened? appellant’s jacket." In Quinicot v. People,13 we held that allegations of frame-up and extortion by police
A: The male person approached PO1 Reyes and asked if "iiskor", Ma’am. officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous drugs cases. They are viewed by the
Q: What was the reply of PO1 Reyes? Court with disfavor, for such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated.
A: He answered "Bakit meron ka ba?"
Q: When that answer was given by Reyes, what did that male person do?
A: He produced two (2) small plastic sachets containing allegedly shabu and he said "dos ang isa." Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish and reckless to offer to sell shabu to
COURT: What do you mean by "dos ang isa"? strangers. In People v. de Guzman,14 we have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known, with
A: Php 200.00, Your Honor. ever increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell their wares for the right price to anybody,
PROS. ARAGONES: be they strangers or not. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or
Q: Where were you when that male person produced two (2) small plastic sachets? the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and
A: I was beside PO1 Reyes, Ma’am. delivery of the prohibited drugs.
Q: After he showed the plastic sachets containing drugs, what happened next?
A: We introduced ourselves as policemen, Ma’am. Further, appellant did not attribute any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. The presumption of
Q: After you introduced yourselves, what happened next? regularity in the performance of the police officers’ official duties should prevail over the self-serving
A: PO1 Reyes arrested the male person while I arrested the female person, Ma’am. denial of appellant.15
Q: Why did you arrest the woman?
A: At that time, she was about to run I confiscated from her a SIM card case, Ma’am. In sum, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and CA.1avvphi1 Appellant was correctly
COURT: What was the contents of the SIM card case? found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165.
A: One (1) piece of alleged shabu, Your Honor.11

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 January 2010 of the Court
From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03631.
the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets
which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the
prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of ₱200.00 for each sachet had SO ORDERED.
been made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police
officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner
Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with
attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts
shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under
this Act:

xxx

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

xxx

Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended
crime by showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor.12 The sale was aborted when the
TITLE VII:
Crimes Committed by
Public Officers
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 194157 July 30, 2014
ROMEO R. ARAULLO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, HON. GERARDO C.
NOGRALES, HON. ROMEO L. GO, HON. PERLITA B. VELASCO, HON. ARDEN S. ANNI, ATTY.
FILOMEMO B. BALBIN, ATTY. ERNESTO P. TABAO and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE
LEON, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Romeo R. Araullo (Araullo) to assail an
undated Resolution2 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing his criminal complaint docketed
as OMB-C-C-09-0410-H.
The records indicate that Araullo had previously obtained a favorable judgment in a labor complaint for
illegal dismissal which he filed against Club Filipino.3 He first worked for Club Filipino as an electrician,
and was Maintenance Supervisor at the time of his dismissal from employment on December 23,
2000.4 His labor complaint was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter Fedriel Panganiban (LA
Panganiban), whose ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Upon
appeal, however, both the Court of Appeals and this Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed
from employment. Club Filipino was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages
and other monetary benefits.5
Following the finality of the decision in his favor, Araullo filed with LA Panganiban a motion for issuance
of a writ of execution. LA Panganiban, however, inhibited from further hearing the action, resulting in a
re-raffle and assignment of the case to LA Arden S. Anni (LA Anni). 6 Araullo’s motion for execution was
approved by LA Anni, who issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff’s collection of the amount of
2,338,152.25, as determined by the Computation and Examination Unit. 7 The issuance of the writ was
questioned by Club Filipino on the ground that it had filed a Motion to Recompute 8 the judgment award,
which remained unresolved by the LA. Club Filipino then filed its Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution.9
Before the motion to quash could be heard, LA Anni issued an Order10 dated August 12, 2008 quashing
the writ and lifting the notice of garnishment that was previously servedby Sheriff Noli S. Nicdao upon
Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands. LA Anni also later inhibited from further hearing the case,
concerned that his impartiality might be questioned because Club Filipino’s President, Atty. Roberto F.
De Leon (Atty. De Leon), and counsel, Atty. Ernesto P. Tabao (Atty. Tabao), were his fraternity brothers
in San Beda College of Law.11
Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ, Araullo filed a petition12 to set aside LA Anni’s order, which was
denied in a Resolution13 dated October 29, 2008 issued by the NLRC First Division, composed of NLRC
Chairman Gerardo C. Nograles(Chairman Nograles), Commissioner Romeo L. Go (Commissioner Go)
and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco (Commissioner Velasco). The NLRC ordered that the case
records be forwarded to the arbitration branch of origin, which should decide on the issues leading to
the final computation of the award and the issuance of a writ of execution. 14
When Araullo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC,15 he filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman the criminal complaint docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0410-H against respondents LA Anni,
Chairman Nograles, Commissioner Go, Commissioner Velasco, Atty. Tabao, Atty. De Leon and Atty.
Filomemo B. Balbin (Atty. Balbin).16 He charged them of violating Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Office of the Ombudsman summarized his arguments as follows:
[Araullo] alleged that [LA Anni] is guilty of issuing an unjust interlocutory order for granting the motion to
quash filed by Club Filipino despite the fact that his counsel was not furnished with a copy of the said
motion. [LA Anni] ordered the quashal of the writ of execution without conducting any hearing which was
tantamount to a denial of [Araullo’s] right to due process. The order of [LA Anni] was issued hastily and
purposely to delay the execution of the judgment in the labor case which was decided in [Araullo’s]
favor.
The act of [LA Anni] in ordering the quashal of the writ of execution and lifting the notice of garnishment
and thereafter inhibiting himself from taking further cognizance ofthe case were done in order to give
undue advantage and benefit toClub Filipino whose President and counsel were fraternal brothers of
[LA Anni].
The belated appearance of [Atty. Balbin] also as counsel of Club Filipino at the stage of execution of the
labor judgment was considered highly irregular by [Araullo] who submitsthat Atty. Balbin was hired only
to influence the decision of the public respondents as he was the former Executive Assistant IV of
retired NLRC Chairman Roy Señeres.
[Araullo] averred that [LA] Anniand the lawyers of Club Filipino conspired together to delay the
implementation of the decision of the court in the labor case. Thus, he also sued [Atty. De Leon], [Atty.
Tabao] and [Atty. Balbin] for graft and corruption and held them responsible for the issuance of an
unjust interlocutory order.
On the other hand, the act of the respondent NLRC Commissioners in sustaining the unjust interlocutory
order of [LA] Anni made them responsible for issuing their own unjust interlocutory order. The manifest
partiality of [LA Anni] towards his fraternity brothers was tolerated and supported by the respondent
Commissioners when they affirmed the order that quashed the writ of execution and lifted the notice of
garnishment. As a result[,] [Araullo] was back to where he started and would have to undergo through
all the efforts again ifonly to receive the award due him in the labor case. The delay caused [Araullo] so
much pain and stress that he sued the respondent Commissionersfor causing undue injury to him.
Moreover, the affirmation given by the respondent Commissioners to [LA] Anni only meant that the said
Commissioners gave undue advantage and favor also to Club Filipino. 17
Araullo’s charges were dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman via the now assailed
resolution18 issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Romualdo V. Francisco and
approved by then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez. It reasoned that the deferral in the
execution of the judgment in favor ofAraullo could not be attributed to the respondents in the criminal
complaint.19 The presumption that the respondents regularly performed their official duty was not
overcome by sufficient evidence. The LA’s and NLRC’s rulings were rendered pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC. This finding then barred a prosecution for violation of Article 206 of the RPC.
For the claim of violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Office of the Ombudsman also found no probable cause
given Araullo’s failure toestablish that the respondents to his complaint gave undue advantage to Club
Filipino, or that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, orgross and inexcusable
negligence.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullofiled this petition for certiorarito assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s
dismissal of his criminal complaint.
The Court dismisses the petition.
The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has emphasized in Casing v.
Ombudsman20 the nature and extent of the powers, authority and findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as we held:
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public
officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function
that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Office of the Ombudsman which, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrityof the public service." While the Ombudsman’s findings as to whether probable
cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion, the Ombudsman’s act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Court’s own constitutional
power and duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 21 (Citations
omitted)
Given the subject of the present petition, the Court’s inquiry shall then be limited to the question of
whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint filed by Araullo. By jurisprudence, "[g]rave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsicalexercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be in
a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."22
Upon review, the Court has determined that the Office of the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse
of discretion. Explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the grounds that supported its finding of
lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by Araullo.
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. 23 "[It] can only find
support in facts and circumstances that would leada reasonable mind to believe that the person being
charged warrants a prosecution."24 To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then
should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition, there
should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least support
a ruling that would call for their further prosecution.
Specifically for the charge of violation of Article 20625 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of unjust
interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first,the orders issued by the respondents to his
complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held that
LA Anni’s order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC’s resolution affirming it, were not
unjust. Contrary to Araullo’s claim, the rulings of the labor officials were in accordance with law and the
rules of the NLRC, specifically since Rule XI, Section 4 of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure
provided that:
Sec. 4. Computation during execution. – Where further computation of the award in the decision,
resolution or order is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no writ of execution
shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the
parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter.
Given this provision, the quashal of the writ was then only necessary to rectify LA Anni’s prior issuance
of a writ of execution notwithstanding a pending motion for re-computation that was filed by Club
Filipino. Araullo failed to establish that the labor officials were impelled by any motive other than the
correction of this error. At any rate, this issue on the propriety of the quashal of the writ had been
resolved by the Court in an earlier review. In Romeo R. Araullo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 26 which
was an appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Araullo’s administrative complaint for
grave misconduct against the same labor officials herein charged and also on the same basis ofthe
quashal of LA Anni’s writ of execution, the Court declared:
There is no doubt that [LA]Anni’s July 29, 2008 Writ of Execution was procedurally irregular,as it pre-
empted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is
necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until
after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the parties have been duly
notified and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the
computation madeby the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and
unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that
it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the
parties would be unjustly enriched. For example, it appears that petitioner owed Club Filipino a
substantial amount of money which the latter sought to deduct from the judgment award by way of
compensation; ifthis is true, then the necessary adjustment in the award may be made to allow Club
Filipino to recover what petitioner owes it, to the extent allowable by law.
Since the Writ of Execution was issuedin contravention of the law, it is irregular and defective, and there
was no need to further hear Club Filipino’s motion to quash the writ; [LA] Anni’s issuance of the August
12, 2008 Order quashing the writ ahead of the scheduledAugust 20, 2008 hearing is therefore not
improper. "A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. x x x."
xxxx
On the part of the respondent Commissioners, the Court detects no irregularity in their actions either.
While petitioner accuses them of gross misconduct for improperly affirming, through their October 29,
2008 Resolution, [LA] Anni’s order quashing the Writ of Execution, the Court believes otherwise; they
acted pursuant to the NLRC Rules, and averted further mistake and damage by affirming the quashing
of an otherwise improvident writ.
The Court fails to discern any indication of malice, bad faith, misconduct, or even negligence in the
respondents’ actions. Nor are there signs of partiality or attempts to favora party to the case. All their
actions were aboveboard. x x x.27 (Citation omitted)
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable
cause for violation of Article 206 against the respondents labor officials. Without a finding of probable
cause against these labor officials, the dismissal of the charge against Atty. Balbin, Atty. Tabao and
Atty. De Leon, being private individuals who did not appear to conspire with their co-respondents for the
commission of a criminal offense, was also warranted.
Araullo failed to prove that the respondents were impelled to act by any of such motives. The records
instead indicate that the labor officials only wanted to satisfy the demands of law and their procedural
rules.
Finally, the mere fact that Araullo’scounsel was not furnished with a copy of Club Filipino’s motion to
quashthe writ also failed to support Araullo’s criminal complaint. As the Court had declared in Araullo, "it
appears that the apparent failure of petitioner's counsel to be served with a copy of the assailed
decision did not prejudice [Araullo's] rights."32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Similarly, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the complaint for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. A violation under this provision entails the following:

(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he
must have acted with manifestpartiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 28

The second and third elements are wanting in this case.1âwphi1 With the Court’s finding on the
correctness of the LA’s and NLRC’s rulings, there could have been no undue injury suffered by Araullo
notwithstanding the mentioning that notwithstanding the labor officials’ rulings, Araullo was not even left
without any remedy to enforce the final judgment in his favor. The NLRC’s endorsement of his case to
the arbitration branch of origin was merely for the resolution of pending incidents in the case. It was
necessary to hear these matters first in order to ensure that all the parties to the case were afforded due
process.Time and again, the Court has emphasized that "[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may
be relaxed."29

There was also no showing that the labor officials’ actions were performed with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. The Court explained in People v. Atienza 30 that in order to
determine whether any of these circumstances attends a case, the following parameters should be
considered:

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgmentbut also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. x x x [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. 31 (Citation omitted)
 Republic of the Philippines (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO
SUPREME COURT AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese
Manila Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and out of said demand, the
complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and
FIRST DIVISION delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to the above-named
accused at a designated place at the Coffee Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila,
causing damage to the said complainants in the aforesaid amount of P25,000.00, and to the prejudice
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006 of government service."5

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner, After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision disposed as
vs. follows:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito S.
x--------------------------------x Perlas and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006 and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S.
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, Hernandez and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
vs. Costs against the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
"On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
DECISION charged. The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold Departure Order
against him embodied in this Court’s Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled."6

PANGANIBAN, CJ:
The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused. The second
Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas’ Motion for New Trial.
This Court defers to the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard any cogent
reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft court’s findings. In any event,
after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse the Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7

The Case The Facts

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review1 assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,2 and the
January 33 and 14, 20034 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194. Francisco
SB. Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III and Jose
P. Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads thus:
"That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ
and VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking advantage of their
official positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating with
Senior Police Officer 3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila,
together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the LUCENARIO, MARGATE,
MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private
individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million
The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao
Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro
Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 dated December 13, 1993, issued by BID
Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao
Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he
was suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.
"To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez who
issued an undertaking (Exh. ‘B’) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi
promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a guarantee for
his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the
passport.
"On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito ‘Dick’ Perlas 9 and informed him
about the taking of her husband’s passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would refer their problem
to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III
Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They
discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December
20, 1993.
"As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M.
Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh. ‘6’ – Acejas). Atty.
Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what the
ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagi’s passport.
"Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. ‘5’ – Hernandez) which was submitted to Ponciano M.
Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao
Aoyagi, who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial investigation.
"In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco
Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who
would handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. ‘D’) dated December 22, 1993 was entered
into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the Lucenario Law Firm.
"In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the
Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas
P40,000.00, P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket fee
(Exh. ‘O’). The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning flight was postponed.
"On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her
brother, Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr., about her husband’s passport.
"On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and told the
latter of Takao Aoyagi’s problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told Pelingon
to call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs. Aoyagi flew back to Manila.
"On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic Conanan and
Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.
"Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun
Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.
"On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao Aoyagi’s
passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica
Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and Atty. Somera
who arranged the entrapment operation.
"On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee Shop
of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested Dick Perlas,
Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked
money representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and Victoriano were
brought to the NBI Headquarters."10
Version of the Prosecution
Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno "Jun" Basaca Pelingon, Jr.,
and Carlos Romero Saunar.11
The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1 million as
consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a drug trafficker and
Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged "problem" and to facilitate the
processing of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the amount demanded, Conanan
stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). 12
During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and government
enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of P300,000, but Pelingon said that
the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid another meeting. 13
After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,14 Pelingon called up Dick Perlas to
schedule the exchange.
Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adds the
following facts:
"1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat Restaurant.
[Acejas] informed Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who
confiscated the passport of Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which
allegedly were in connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and
Conanan arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas] never mentioned to the BID agents the
P1 million lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his
[Acejas’] bag.
"1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the amount of P1
million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent visa
in the Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagi’s lawyer, did nothing.
"1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko.
Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials and even the press
were after Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of
P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the
amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the
negotiations.
xxx xxx xxx
"1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel.
Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to
Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed to
 Hernandez the envelope15 containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and
motioned that [Acejas] be the one to receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed it
beside him and Perlas.
x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagi’s pass- port, he reminded the group of their earlier
agreement of ‘kaliwaan’, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1
million."16
Version of the Defense
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and Ponciano
M. Ortiz testified for the defense.17
To the Sandiganbayan’s narration, Hernandez adds:
"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), went to
the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and serve a Mission
Order issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on December 13, 1993, for the
arrest of Takao Aoyagi.
"7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husband’s passport, [Hernandez] found out that the
latter’s [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private respondents to go with him
to the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the BID office for
investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi entrusted to
[Hernandez] her husband’s passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in return, acknowledge[d] in the
same instrument.
"8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared and that he
can pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was invited by Perlas to
make the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel Coffee Shop. Upon arrival
thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas, Aoyagi’s counsel, and within less than ten
minutes, he left the coffee shop."18
In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:
"1. 18th December 1993 – The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco & Acejas was
engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"3. 22nd December 1993 –
"a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas] about the
facts regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the passport belonging to a
Japanese client. x x x.
"b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to ‘meet his brother-in-law Mr.
Expedito Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr. Takao Aoyagi.’
Thus, [Acejas] ‘met Mr. Perlas for the first time in the afternoon’ of this date.
"c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the Diamond
Hotel, where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the law firm decided
that the clients ‘can file an action for Replevin plus Damages for the recovery of the
Japanese passport.’
"d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client and the
law firm, thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way of ‘Case Retainer’s/Acceptance Fees’,
which was supposed to be payable ‘upon (the) signing (t)hereof’, and the sum of
Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee. However, the client proposed to pay half
only of the acceptance fee (Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for
the filing or docket fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the
‘balance of Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery of
the Japanese passport’.
"e) The clients informed [Acejas] that ‘they are supposed to leave for Davao the
following day on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in Davao City; but
they promised that they will be back on the 26th, which is a Sunday, so that on the
27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the BID officers will have to be filed in
Court’.
xxx xxx xxx
"6. 27th December 1993 – ‘(T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the Japanese
did not come back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot be filed on the 27th
instead (it has) to wait for client’s instruction.’
"7. 4th January 1994 – ‘In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call from Mr.
Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was requesting for an
appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5, 1994’.
"8. 5th January 1994 – [Acejas] ‘met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr.’ including a
certain Nimoto Akira.
x x x.
"b) [Acejas] ‘told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but, of
course, the Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint and sign if
they want to pursue the filing of the complaint against the BID agents’.
"c) For the first time, ‘Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the case’. x x
x He ‘instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the BID agents.’
 "d) Thereafter, ‘Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID agent who
confiscated the Japanese passport.’ ‘Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon were able to
contact the BID agent’.
"e) For the ‘first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez’, when the latter arrived and also
accused Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation ensued
between [Acejas] and [Hernandez] concerning the legal basis for the confiscation of
the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of the Japanese passport x x x. Mr.
Hernandez ‘said that if there are no further derogatory report concerning the
Japanese client, then in a matter of week (from January 5 to 12), he will return the
passport’.
"f) [Acejas] ‘gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese passport will not
be returned in one (1) week’s time, then (the law firm) will pursue the filing of the
replevin case plus the damage suit against him including the other BID agents’.
"g) ‘x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing thereof saying
that his Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in his own words
‘magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money anyway].’
"9. 8th January 1994 –
"a) Again, ‘Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the Japanese client
is now in Manila.’ Petitioner attended the meeting they arranged in ‘(Makati) and meet
Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez and Pelingon Jr. x x x.
"b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with anybody
because anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.
"c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] ‘met him for the second
time. x x x [Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return the passport on
or before January 12, 1994, then the law firm will have no choice but to file the case
against him x x x. Again, for the third time Mr. Pelingon warned against the filing of
the case because he said that he would directly negotiate with the BID agents.’
"d) The Makati meeting ended up ‘with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez will
have to undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on or before January 12,
1994.’
"10. 12th January 1994 –
"a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was already
in Manila and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at lunchtime of
January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where he was billeted.
xxx xxx xxx
"c) x x x x x x x x x
"At this meeting, ‘the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and he was
wondering why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when according to him he
has already paid for the attorney fees. And so, [Acejas] explained to him that the case
has to be filed and they still have to sign the complaint, the Special Power of Attorney
and the affidavit relative to the filing of replevin case. But the Japanese would not fully
understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised against the filing of the case saying that
since there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the BID office, then the BID
agents should return the Japanese passport.’
xxx xxx xxx
"e) Thereafter, ‘Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr. Hernandez.’
Since, they were able to contact the latter, ‘we waited until around 2:00 p.m.’. ‘When
Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the Japanese client is cleared at the BID office and
so, he can return the Japanese passport and he gave it to [Acejas]. x x x ‘When
[Acejas] received the Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the
documents and finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the
Japanese client.’
"‘Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese across the
table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the table. x x x [Acejas] found
it strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things like that under the table.
But nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who
was seated at (his) right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from [Acejas] and finally
handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi.’ x x x. ‘After that, there was a little chat between Mr. Hernandez and the
client, and Mr. Hernandez did not stay for so long and left.’
"Still, thereafter, ‘(w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas] were
talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing to pay the
Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.’
"‘Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to receive it while
Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it.
"Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope.
xxx xxx xxx
"Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was ‘signaling something’ as
if there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When [Acejas]
approached Mr. Victoriano, he ‘said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front of the Diamond Hotel
gate, somebody took the car’. [Acejas] ‘went out and checked and realized that it was valet parking so it
was the parking attendant who took the car and transferred the car to the parking area’. [Acejas]
requested ‘Mr. Victoriano to get (the) envelope and the coat’, at the table.
"g) ‘When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car. When the
car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr. Dick
Perlas coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents." They then ‘were taken to the
NBI’, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez."19
On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,20 as well as conspiracy in the commission
of the crime,21 had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;22 Perlas negotiated and
dealt with the complainants;23 and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it to Perlas. 24
"V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery."30
"1. The Conspiracy Theory
2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to client’s cause; lawful performance of
duties

Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked up the envelope containing the 3. ‘Instigation’ not ‘entrapment’
payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other accused. 26
4. Credibility of witness and testimony
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the
balance of the law firm’s legal fees.27 If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to him, he
should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been pretending to protect 5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the accused
his client’s rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.28
6. Elements of ‘bad faith’
The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of
Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be 7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)
present during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994.29 His presence during one of those meetings,
on January 5, 1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator. 8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence" 31

The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas’ Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a new trial. In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they raised are
therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
The Issues
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:
The Petitions have no merit.
"I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the conspiracy
to extort money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and convincing evidence. Main Issue:

"II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present as to
warrant [Hernandez’] complicity in the crime charged.
"III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when it relied
solely on the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr. in
order to declare the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt of the
accused.
Finding of Guilt
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)
agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present;
2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3)
abstains from the performance of official duties. 32

"IV. Whether or not [respondent] court’s acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and its Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the existence of a elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or
conspiracy. through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to
the exercise of official duties.33
Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he was "Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the money it
merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate Takao pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x .
Aoyagi.34 The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at
the BID office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.35 "AJ ESCAREAL:

The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had "Noted.
taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi.36 On various dates,37 he met with Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi,
and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on
the payoff,38 during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas. 39 "PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Bethel Grace Aoyagi’s testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as follows: "Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?

"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR: "A: No, sir.

"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened? "Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?

"A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir. "A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"Q: After that, what happened?
"INTERPRETER:
"A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: The passport?
"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do?
"A: Yes, sir.
"A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
xxxxxxxxx
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport?
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so when Mr.
Perlas handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my husband and he "A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
passed it to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same.
"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?
"ATTY. ACEJAS:
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: After that, what happened?
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.]
Mr. Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the
envelope, sir."40
Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his
representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside the
BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a
standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations. 41 It can readily be
inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time despite the
absence of any legal purpose.
Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanan’s acquittal.42 While the testimony of
Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy, 43 there was an abundance of
evidence showing Hernandez’s involvement.
"A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore] mentioned,
sir."45
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his client’s behalf, he still failed
to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he had received
the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel Grace Aoyagi:
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecution’s "Interpreter:
version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport.44 According to him, he
kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court case. "Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.

Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by Spouses "Prosecutor Montemayor:
Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just been a charade
and was in fact belied by Pelingon’s testimony regarding the January 5, 1994 meeting: "Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

"ATTY. VALMONTE: "A: Yes, sir.

"Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas? "Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

"A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir. "A: Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx "Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?

"Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing you "A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
documents that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?

"x x x x x x x x x
"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: After that, what happened?

"Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each other, Atty.
Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1 million damage suit
should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport? "A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.

"Q: And then, what happened?

"WITNESS:
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.]
Mr. Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the
envelope, sir.
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
"Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope?
xxxxxxxxx
"A: Victoriano, sir."46
Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his contention
that the envelope represented the balance of his firm’s legal fees. That it was given to Hernandez
immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the money was a
consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if he believed it to be his.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement on this point:
"x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how come
he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not
contain the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it. Moreover,
the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to Hernandez who
refused to accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for the balance of the
acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez.
xxxxxxxxx
"Acejas’ defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left immediately after
the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have presented accused
Victoriano to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him and caused him
to leave their table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots
with his co-accused."47
Lawyer’s Duty
Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with the
complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest48 and had the right to be present
when the passport was to be returned.49
True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His presence at
Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact, however, does not
support his innocence
Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the payoff, but did
nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he was to get a share. Thus, he
received the money purporting to be the payoff,
even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a conspirator.
The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics 50 when confronted by public officers who extort money.
Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities. 51 If the extortion is directed at the client,
they must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover, they must report it to the authorities,
without having to violate the attorney-client privilege.52 Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal
act.53
Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.
Instigation
Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them into
accepting the payoff.54 Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons into the
commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.55 As opposed to entrapment, criminal intent
originates in the mind of the instigator. 56
There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an extortion
attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had arranged for the payoff.
During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice Escareal
clarifying question as follows:
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband?
"A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement that upon
handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately (‘magkaliwaan’)."57
Alleged Discrepancies
According to Acejas, Pelingon’s testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-Affidavit,
inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were contradictory. 58 He cites
these particular portions of Pelingon’s Affidavit:
"5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting innocent men, I
have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the accused in the
Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action.
"6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no reward,
promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this affidavit." 59
Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his life.60 He return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return
did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true testimony was in the first of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.
Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.61
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as principals.74 The
By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of Desistance. An evidence shows that the
affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence given on the witness
stand.62 parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did
not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The Court accomplishing a criminal design.75 The act of one is the act of all.
therefore adopts the Sandiganbayan’s finding that these were minor details that were not indicative of
the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 63 People v. Eligino64 is in point: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
"x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from
their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimony completely SO ORDERED.
discarded as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing
statements neither dilute the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Thus,
inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy the credibility of
witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance credibility as these
discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed."65

Suppression of Evidence

Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money was
supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness. 66

The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People.67 The freedom to
devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution.68 Necessarily, its decision on which
evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by the trial
court.69 If petitioners believed that Takao Aoyagi’s testimony was important to their case, they should
have presented him as their witness.70

Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence was
not resolved by the Sandiganbayan.71 In that Comment/Objection, he had noted the lateness in the filing
of the Formal Offer of Evidence.

It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence
upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas’ Comment/Objection was deemed immaterial. It
could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that the Sandiganbayan needed to
act upon.72

Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this
Court.73 We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced in this case.

In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question that
the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi
spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. Petitioner
Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas
received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175074 August 31, 2011
JESUS TORRES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution 1 dated
September 6, 2006 and Resolution dated October 17, 20062 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 29694.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In an Information3 dated November 15, 1994, petitioner Jesus U. Torres was charged with the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of April 1994, or sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Virac, Catanduanes, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Principal of Viga Rural Development High School, Viga,
Catanduanes, and as such by reason of his office and duties is responsible and accountable for public
funds entrusted to and received by him, to wit: PNB Checks (sic) Nos. C-983182-Q for ₱42,033.32; C-
983183-Q for ₱95,680.89; C-983184-Q for ₱58,940.33, all dated April 26, 1994 in the total amount of
ONE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR PESOS and FIFTY-FOUR
CENSTAVOS (₱196,654.54), Philippine Currency, representing salaries, salary differentials, additional
compensation allowance and Personal Emergency Relief Allowance from January to March 1994 of the
employees of the said school, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to
his office, encashed said checks with the Philippine National Bank, Virac, Catanduanes Branch and
once in possession of the money, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with grave
abuse of confidence, misapply, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit
the aforementioned amount of money, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
Contrary to law.
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the
merits ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
[Petitioner] Jesus Torres y Uchi was the principal of Viga Rural Development High School (VRDHS). On
April 26, 1994, he directed Edmundo Lazado, the school’s collection and disbursing officer, to prepare
the checks representing the teachers’ and employees’ salaries, salary differentials, additional
compensation allowance (ACA) and personal emergency relief allowance (PERA) for the months of
January to March, 1994. Lazado prepared three (3) checks in the total amount of ₱196,654.54, all dated
April 26, 1994, viz: PNB Check Nos. C-983182-Q for ₱42,033.32; C-983183-Q for ₱95,680.89; C-
983184-Q for ₱58,940.33 (Exhs. "A", "B" and "C"). The [petitioner] and Amador Borre, Head Teacher III,
signed the three (3) checks (TSN, Aug. 30, 2001, pp. 4-8).
Upon the instruction of the [petitioner], Lazado endorsed the checks and handed them to the accused. It
was the custom in the school for Lazado to endorse the checks representing the teachers’ salaries and
for the accused to encash them at PNB, Virac Branch and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution to
the teachers (Id., pp. 12-17).
The following day, April 27, 1994, the accused encashed the three (3) checks at PNB, Virac Branch but
he never returned to the school to deliver the money to Lazado (Id., pp. 8-9).4
Evidence for the Defense
The [petitioner] admitted that he encashed the subject checks at PNB, Virac Branch in the morning of
April 27, 1994 but instead of going back to the school, he proceeded to the airport and availed of the
flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his chest pain. Two (2) days after, around 4:30 o’clock in
the morning of April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew were on the road waiting for a ride, three (3)
armed men held them up and took his bag containing his personal effects and the proceeds of the
subject checks. He reported the incident to the police authorities, but he failed to recover the money
(TSN, Nov. 12, 2002, pp. 11-25).5
On August 31, 2005, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense
charged, the RTC rendered a Decision6 convicting petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jesus Torres y Uchi GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, and to 18 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; and to pay
the fine of ₱196,654.54 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.7
On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal, 8 where it was indicated that he was seeking
recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC before the Court of Appeals.
On February 10, 2006, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion9 acknowledging that he filed the
appeal before the wrong tribunal. Petitioner eventually prayed, among other things, that the case be
referred to the Sandiganbayan for appropriate action.
In its Comment10 filed on June 29, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General prayed that the appeal be
dismissed outright, since transmittal to the proper court, in cases of erroneous modes of appeal, are
proscribed.
On September 6, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules and Section 4 of SC
Circular No. 2-90, the instant appeal hereby is DISMISSED OUTRIGHT for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 but was denied in the Resolution13 dated October 17,
2006.
Hence, the petition raising the sole error:
Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal outright instead of
certifying the case to the proper court.14
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals instead
of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court exercise its sound discretion and prerogative
to relax compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the case on the merits, considering that
from the beginning, he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that the case was wrongfully
filed with the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition is without merit.
Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), 15 which defined the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provides:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions
or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.16
Hence, upon his conviction, petitioner’s remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan.
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of petitioner’s appeal before
the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any
jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to appeal.17
It must be emphasized, however, that the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the
validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should be made within the
15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate
court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise,
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply, 18 the relevant portion of which states:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – x x x
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court,
but shall be dismissed outright.19
In the case at bar, petitioner sought correction of the error in filing the appeal way beyond the expiration
of the period to appeal the decision. The RTC promulgated its Decision on August 31, 2005. Petitioner
filed his Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2005. Petitioner tried to correct the error only on February
10, 2006 when he filed his Manifestation and Motion. Clearly, this is beyond the 15-day period to appeal
from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it
dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Besides, even if we look into the merits of his arguments, the case is doomed to fail. Contrary to
petitioner’s argument, We find that he is an accountable officer within the contemplation of Article
21720 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, is untenable.
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who
has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. 21 The nature of
the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money
for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or
not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school principal of a
public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with
public funds and misappropriates the same.1avvphi1
Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the Information without
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the accusations against him. He maintains that the
Information clearly charged him with intentional malversation and not malversation through negligence,
which was the actual nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the trial court. This too lacks
merit.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or
property, or passively through negligence.22 To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the
existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.23
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or
negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the
Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.24 Explicitly stated –
x x x [E]ven on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence, but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case, his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. x x x 25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 6,
2006 and October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29694 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184908 July 3, 2013
MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Major Joel G. Cantos appeals the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-
07-A/R-0008, which affirmed with modification the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 47, convicting him of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In an Information3 dated February 19, 2003, Major Cantos was charged as follows:
That on or about December 21, 2002 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Commanding Officer of the 22"d Finance Service Center, based in the
Presidential Security Group, Malacañang Park, Manila and as such is accountable for public funds
received and/or entrusted to him by reason of his office, acting in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and
convert to his personal use and benefit the amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱3,270,000.00), Philippine Currency, from such public funds received by him by
reason of his Office to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion by the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order4 granting the amendment of the date of
the commission of the offense from December 21, 2002 to December 21, 2000, the error being merely
clerical. When arraigned, Major Cantos entered a plea of not guilty. 5
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witness Major Eligio T. Balao, Jr.6 He testified that on
December 21, 2000, he reported for duty as Disbursing Officer at the 22nd Finance Service Unit (FSU),
Presidential Security Group (PSG), Malacañang Park, Manila. At that time, he did not notice any
unusual incident in the office. He picked up some Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) forms which he filed
with the BIR Office at the Port Area, Manila. He returned to the office at around 10:00 a.m. At around
12:00 noon, his commanding officer, Major Cantos, called him to his office and informed him that the
money he (Major Cantos) was handling, the Special Duty Allowance for the month of December, and
other Maintenance Operating Expenses in the amount of more or less ₱3 Million was missing from his
custody. Shocked, he asked Major Cantos where he kept the money, to which the latter replied that he
placed it in the steel cabinet inside his room. He then inquired why Major Cantos did not use the safety
vault, but Major Cantos did not reply.7
Major Balao further testified that Major Cantos asked him to get a screwdriver so he went out of the
office and got one from his vehicle. He gave the screwdriver to Major Cantos, who used it to unscrew
the safety vault. Then, he left the office and handed the screwdriver to Sgt. Tumabcao.
After a few minutes, Major Cantos instructed him to go to the house of Major Conrado Mendoza in
Taguig to get the safety vault’s combination number. However, Major Mendoza was not around. When
he returned to the office at around 4:00 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) personnel took
his fingerprints. He learned that all the personnel of the 22nd FSU were subjected to fingerprinting.
Thereafter, Col. Espinelli tried to force him to admit that he took the money, but he maintained that he
was not the one who took it.8
In his defense, Major Cantos testified that on July 2000, he was assigned as the Commanding Officer of
the 22nd FSU of the PSG, Malacañang Park, Manila. His duty was to supervise the disbursement of
funds for the PSG personnel and to perform other finance duties as requested by the PSG Commander,
Gen. Rodolfo Diaz. On December 19, 2000, he received a check from Director Aguas in the amount of
₱1,975,000 representing the Special Allowance of PSG personnel. Accompanied by two personnel, he
went to the Land Bank branch just across Pasig River and encashed the check. He placed the money in
a duffel bag and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his office together with the ₱1,295,000 that was earlier
also entrusted to him by Gen. Diaz. Major Cantos added that as far as he knows, he is the only one with
the keys to his office. Although there was a safety vault in his office, he opted to place the money inside
the steel cabinet because he was allegedly previously informed by his predecessor, Major Conrado
Mendoza, that the safety vault was defective. He was also aware that all personnel of the 22nd FSU
had unrestricted access to his office during office hours. 9
Major Cantos also narrated that on December 20, 2000, he arrived at the office at around 9:00 a.m. and
checked the steel filing cabinet. He saw that the money was still there. He left the office at around 4:00
p.m. to celebrate with his wife because it was their wedding anniversary. On the following day,
December 21, 2000, he reported for work around 8:30 a.m. and proceeded with his task of signing
vouchers and documents. Between 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., he inspected the steel cabinet and
discovered that the duffel bag which contained the money was missing. He immediately called then
Capt. Balao to his office and asked if the latter saw someone enter the room. Capt. Balao replied that he
noticed a person going inside the room, but advised him not to worry because he is bonded as
Disbursing Officer.10
In a state of panic, Major Cantos asked for Capt. Balao’s help in finding the money. Capt. Balao asked
him how the money was lost and why was it not in the vault, to which he replied that he could not put it
there because the vault was defective. Capt. Balao then suggested that they should make it appear that
the money was lost in the safety vault. In pursuit of this plan, Capt. Balao went out of the office and
returned with a pair of pliers and a screwdriver. Upon his return, Capt. Balao went directly to the vault to
unscrew it. At this point, Major Cantos told him not to continue anymore as he will just inform Gen. Diaz
about the missing funds. Major Cantos was able to contact Gen. Diaz through his mobile phone and
was advised to just wait for Col. Espinelli. When Col. Espinelli arrived at the office, Col. Espinelli
conducted an investigation of the incident.11
Lt. Col. Al I. Perreras, Executive Officer of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), likewise
conducted an investigation of the incident. His testimony was however dispensed with as the counsels
stipulated that he prepared the Investigation Report, and that if presented, the same would be admitted
by defense counsel.12 It likewise appears from the evidence that Police Inspector Jesus S. Bacani of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) administered a polygraph examination on Major Cantos and the result
showed that he was telling the truth.13
On April 27, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Major Cantos of the crime charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court finds the accused Major Joel G. Cantos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, under paragraph 4 of
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
present, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Eighteen (18) Years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum; to reimburse the AFP Finance Service Center,
Presidential Security Group, Armed Forces of the Philippines the amount of Three Million Two Hundred
Seventy Thousand Pesos (₱3,270,000.00); to pay a fine of Three Million Two Hundred Seventy
Thousand Pesos (₱3,270,000.00); to suffer perpetual special disqualification from holding any public
office; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.14
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the RTC explained that although there was no direct proof that
Major Cantos appropriated the money for his own benefit, Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. The RTC concluded that
Major Cantos failed to rebut this presumption.
Aggrieved, Major Cantos appealed to the Sandiganbayan questioning his conviction by the trial court.
On July 31, 2008, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision promulgated on May 3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 03-
212248 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila finding the
accused-appellant Major Joel G. Cantos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that instead of being convicted of malversation through negligence, the Court hereby
convicts the accused of malversation through misappropriation. The penalty imposed by the lower court
is also likewise AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.15
The Sandiganbayan sustained the ruling of the RTC. It held that in the crime of malversation, all that is
necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did
not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct
evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and petitioner
cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner liable for
malversation through misappropriation because he failed to dispute the presumption against him. The
Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner’s claim that the money was taken by robbery or theft has not been
supported by sufficient evidence, and is at most, self-serving.
Contending that the Sandiganbayan Decision erred in affirming his convicting, Major Cantos filed a
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution16 dated October 6, 2008, however, the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner assails the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR
MALVERSATION DESPITE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE FUNDS WERE
CONVERTED TO THE PERSONAL USE OF PETITIONER.
II.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION ON THE
BASIS OF THE MERE PRESUMPTION CREATED BY ARTICLE 217, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN VIEW OF THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PRESENT
CASE.17
Essentially, the basic issue for our resolution is: Did the Sandiganbayan err in finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds?
Petitioner argues that mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of misappropriation which would
warrant his conviction. He stresses that the prosecution has the burden of establishing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he
appropriated, took, or misappropriated, or that he consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take the public funds.
On the other hand, the People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), argues that
petitioner, as an accountable officer, may be convicted of malversation of public funds even if there is
no direct evidence of misappropriation. The OSP asserts that the only evidence required is that there is
a shortage in the officer’s account which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
The petition must fail.
The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in its decision convicting petitioner of malversation
of public funds, which is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. that the offender is a public officer;
2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;
and
forth by petitioner is unsatisfactory and does not overcome the presumption that he has put the missing
funds to personal use.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the
offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. 20 All that is
necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he
did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is
hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. 21 To
our mind, the evidence in this case is thoroughly inconsistent with petitioner's claim of innocence. Thus,
we sustain the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. SB-07-A/R-0008 convicting Major Joel G. Cantos of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.18

We note that all the above-mentioned elements are here present. Petitioner was a public officer
occupying the position of Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the AFP Finance Center, PSG. By
reason of his position, he was tasked to supervise the disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances and
other Maintenance Operating Funds of the PSG personnel, which are indubitably public funds for which
he was accountable. Petitioner in fact admitted in his testimony that he had complete control and
custody of these funds. As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to rebut the legal
presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his personal use.

In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which states that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. The presumption is, of
course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any
likelihood that he put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end
and the prima facie case is effectively negated.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt.1âwphi1 He failed
to explain the missing funds in his account and to restitute the amount upon demand. His claim that the
money was taken by robbery or theft is self-serving and has not been supported by evidence. In fact,
petitioner even tried to unscrew the safety vault to make it appear that the money was forcibly taken.
Moreover, petitioner’s explanation that there is a possibility that the money was taken by another is
belied by the fact that there was no sign that the steel cabinet was forcibly opened. We also take note of
the fact that it was only petitioner who had the keys to the steel cabinet.19 Thus, the explanation set
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering
from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of
calamities.
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte,
operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent
calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for
construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70%
done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction
stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the
help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s Supplemental
Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP
still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food
to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his
approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal
slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro
instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department regarding the matter. On
being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the
withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter
to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the
present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that
the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She
also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units
governed the distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the
poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund.
Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in
urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a
comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined
him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public
property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. On
May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010
Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed technical malversation.
He particularly raises the following questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different
from their originally intended purpose;
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could
be used to augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
The Court’s Rulings
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public
funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such
funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated
by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third
element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were
not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution
00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive
budget7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and
Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the
two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the
annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for
SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding
programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely
underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members
whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule provides assurance that the SFP would
cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government’s limited
resources.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing
free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not
legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP
malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore,
the same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People 12 which
states that funds classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be
used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro’s argument.
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran
throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished
its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed
the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the
remaining food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry
mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods
were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his
testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the
transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it
happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding
what the municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal
intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.1âwphi1
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose.
The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a
criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy,
order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal
intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the
crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not
grave, warranting a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
SO ORDERED.

In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply
funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:

SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for the
specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations from one item to another. However, the local chief executive or the presiding
officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in the
approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in other items within the same expense
class of their respective appropriations.

The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives
the Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the
augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.

Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the
subject goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to
present the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse
if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No.166680 July 7, 2014
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an
accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 2181 of the Revised Penal Code.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
September 10, 2004 Decision2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26528 and its January 11,
2005 Resolution3 denying reconsideration thereof.
The Information4 dated January 25, 2001 under which petitioner Aloysius Dait Lumauig (petitioner) was
tried and convicted has this accusatory portion:
That in or about August 1994 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Alfonso Lista, Ifugao and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused then Municipal Mayorof
Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, and as such accountable public officer, and responsible for the amount of
₱101,736.00 which the accused received by way of cashadvance for payment of the insurance
coverage of the twelve (12) motorcycle[s] purchased by the Municipality, and, hence with the
corresponding duty under the law to account for the same, did then and there, willfully and feloniously
fail to liquidate and account for the same to the damage and prejudice of the Government. 5
The facts are matters of recordor otherwise undisputed.
Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan examined the
year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During the courseof her
examination of the records and related documents of the municipality, she came across a disbursement
voucher6 for ₱101,736.00 prepared for petitioner, a former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance
for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated
to the municipality. The amount was covered by Land Bank Check No. 11894200 7 dated August 29,
1994 wherein the payee is petitioner. Her further investigation of the accounting records revealed that
no payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August 1994.
Thus, she issued a certification8 to this effect on November 29, 2001. She likewise claimed that she
prepared two letters to inform the petitioner of his unliquidated cash advance but the same were not
sent to him because she could not get his exact address despite efforts exerted. She averred that on
June 4, 2001, petitioner paid the subject cash advance before the treasurer of the municipality, for
which reason, incumbent Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance.9
Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of ₱101,736.00 during his incumbency as
municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao.10 This amount was intended for the payment of freight and
insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to bedonated to the municipality by the City of Manila.
However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He claimed that
it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already
turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand
from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay
when he came to know that he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not toprolong the
issue, he paidthe amount of ₱101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.
From the same facts stemmed an Information for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No.
301911 docketed as CriminalCase No. 26527 against petitioner for having allegedly utilized the cash
advance for a purpose other than for which it was obtained.
On September 10, 2004, after a joint trial, the Sandiganbayanrendered a consolidated
Decision12 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises consideredthe Court rules as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 26527, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is hereby ACQUITTED.
No civil liability shall be imposed there being no basis for its award. The cash bondposted for
his provisional liberty is ordered returned to him, subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedure; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 26528, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is hereby CONVICTED of
the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to a straight penalty of six months and one (1)
day and a fine of Php1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.13
On January 11, 2005, the Sandiganbayanpromulgated its Resolution14 denying petitioner’s
UrgentMotion for Reconsideration.15
Hence, this Petition.
After a thorough review of the records of the case and a judicious consideration of the arguments of the
petitioner, the Court does not find sufficient basis to reverse the judgment of conviction. From the
prevailing facts, we entertain no doubt on the guilt of petitioner.
The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-
graft case is not a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the
present case.
Petitioner stakes the present Petition on the assertion that since the cases for which he was indicted
involve the same subject cash advance in the amount of ₱101,736.00, his exoneration in the anti-graft
case should likewise exculpate him from further liability in the present case.
We are not persuaded.
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. "However, [we have] consistently
held thatthe same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges." 16 Further, because
there is a variance between the elements of the two offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely assume
that his innocence in one case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of
evidence.
To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e)of RA 3019, the following elements must be
present:
(1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) That said public officer commitsthe prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury toany party, whether the government or a private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted withmanifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.17
On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom;
(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial
auditor; and,
(4) That he fails to do so for a period oftwo months after such account should be rendered.18
The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily imply that the requisite
evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would certainly differ in each case. Hence,
petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him inthe present case given the
differences between the elements ofthe two offenses.
Prior demand to liquidate is not a
requisite for conviction under Article
218 of the Revised Penal Code.
The central aspect of petitioner’s next argument is that he was not reminded of his unliquidated cash
advances. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218 does not require the COA
orthe provincial auditor to first make a demand before the public officer should render an account. It is
sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an account. The question has been
settled in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan19 where we ruled that prior demand to liquidate is not necessary
to hold an accountable officer liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code:
x x x [W]e are asked to resolve whether demand is necessary for a conviction of a violation of Article
218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Citing United States v. Saberon, petitioner contends that Article 218 punishes the refusal of a public
employee to render an account of funds in his charge when duly required by a competent officer. He
argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime unless the prosecution has proven that there was a
demand for him to render an account. Petitioner asserts that COA Circular No. 90-331 provides that the
public officer shall be criminally liable for failure to settle his accounts after demand had been made.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the case had become moot and academic since he already submitted
his liquidation report.
For the People, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) counters that demand is not an element of
the offense and that it is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring the public officer to render
an account. The OSP insists that Executive Order No. 292, Presidential Decree No. 1445, the COA
Laws and Regulations, and even the Constitution mandate that public officers render an account of
funds in their charge. It maintains that the instant case differs from Saberonwhich involved a violation of
Act No. 1740 where prior demand was required. In this case involving a violation of Article 218, prior
demand is not required. Moreover, the OSP points out that petitioner even admitted his failure to
liquidate the funds within the prescribed period, hence, he should be convicted of the crime.
We shall now resolve the issue at hand.
Article 218 consists ofthe following elements:
1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom;
2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to
a provincial auditor; and
4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.
Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable
officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided,
the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
 mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.
Petitioner’s reliance on Saberonis misplaced. As correctly pointed out by the OSP, Saberoninvolved a
violation of Act No. 1740 whereas the present case involves a violation of Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 218 merely provides that the public officer berequired by law and regulation to
render account. Statutory construction tells us that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless
the statute or code provides otherwise. 20
Petitioner is liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 5 of COA Circular No. 90-331, the circular in force at the time petitioner availed of the subject
cash advance, pertinently provides:
5. LIQUIDATION OFCASH ADVANCES
5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
xxxx
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of the
year; subject to replenishment during the year.
Since petitioner received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to
liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he should
have liquidated the cash advance within two months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20,
1995. In the case at bar, petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan,petitioner was liable for violation of Article 218 because it took
him over six years before settling his accounts.
The penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified.
Petitioner argues that assuming that he is liable for violation of Article 218, he should be meted a lesser
penalty considering that (1) he subsequently liquidated the subject cash advance when he later
discovered and was confronted with his delinquency, and (2) the COA did not immediately inform him of
his unliquidated cash advance.
On this point, we partially agree with petitioner.
In sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six months and one day of prisión correccionaland a fine
of ₱1,000.00, the Sandiganbayan correctly considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, as borne by the records,21 in favor of petitioner.However, it failed toconsider the mitigating
circumstance of return or full restitution of the funds that were previously unliquidated.
In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of the funds
misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogousto voluntary
surrender.22 Although this case does not involve malversation ofpublic funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an account under Article 218 (i.e., the succeeding
Article found in the same Chapter), the same reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution
ofthe funds that were previously unliquidated in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance in
favor of petitioner.
The prescribed penalty for violation of Article 218 is prisión correccionalin its minimum period or six
months and one day to two years and four months, or by a fine ranging from 200to 6,000 pesos, orboth.
Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances and there are no aggravating circumstances,
under Article 64 (5)23 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty which, in this case, is arresto mayorin its maximum period or four months and one
day to six months.1âwphi1
The Indeterminate Sentence Law, under Section 2,24 is not applicable to, among others, cases where
the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. In determining "whether an
indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually
imposed by the trial court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and not the imposable
penalty."25 In the case at bar, since the maximum of the imposable penalty is six months, then the
possible maximum term that can be actually imposed is surely less than one year. Hence, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is notapplicable to the present case. As a result, and in view of the
attendant circumstances in this case, we deem it proper to impose a straight penalty of four months and
one day of arresto mayorand delete the imposition of fine.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Sandiganbayanin Criminal
Case No. 26528 dated September 10, 2004 convicting petitioner of the felony of Failure of Accountable
Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMEDwith the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Petitioner is sentenced to a straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, and 2. The
imposition of finein the amount of ₱1,000.00 is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Henry T. Go
seeking to nullify the Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, which denied his
motion to quash. Likewise sought to be nullified is the Sandiganbayan Resolution of March 24, 2006
denying petitioner Go’s motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On May 5, 2003, this Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc. (PIATCO),1 declaring as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental Contracts entered into between the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.
By the aforementioned contracts (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts), the Government
awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).2
The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified
bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the
PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for being contrary to public policy. The penultimate
paragraph of the Court’s Decision states thus:
CONCLUSION
In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo
Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further, considering that
the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, which amendments
had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from
the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary
to public policy. The provisions under Section 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997
Concession Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a
direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the
ARCA, are likewise null and void.3
Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), charging
several persons in connection with the NAIA IPT III project. The AEDC was the original proponent
thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO when it failed to match the latter’s bid price.
After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan the Information dated January 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, as then DOTC
Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g) 4 of
RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go. The
Information reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, accuses VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with Violation of Sec. 3 (g), R.A. No.
3019 committed as follows:
On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to
his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after
the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III)
was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I,
Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On February 11, 2005, petitioner Go posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty.
On February 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order against Rivera and petitioner
Go.
On March 28, 2005, petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."
On May 26, 2005, Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or Re-Determination) of Probable
Cause and Motion to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner Go a period of ten (10) days within
which to file a comment thereon.
On June 20, 2005, petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Adopting the view advanced
by Rivera, petitioner Go harped on the alleged "missing documents," including Pesayco’s amended
affidavit-complaint and those others that were mentioned in the resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman finding probable cause against Rivera and petitioner Go, but which were not allegedly in
the records. Petitioner Go maintained that apart from the bare allegations contained in Pesayco’s
affidavit-complaint, there was no supporting evidence for the finding of the existence of probable cause
against him and Rivera. Petitioner Go further alleged that he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government. At least one of the important elements of the crime under
Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.
On June 21, 2005, petitioner Go filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute the Comment with
Motion to Quash, which the prosecution, through the Office of the Ombudsman, opposed.
On December 6, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying Rivera’s Motion for
Judicial Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Go’s
Motion to Quash.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecution’s submission, it could still entertain petitioner
Go’s Motion to Quash even after his arraignment considering that it was based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Go’s
Motion to Quash holding that, contrary to his claim, the allegations in the Information actually make out
the offense charged. More particularly, the allegations that accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in
conspiracy with petitioner Go, entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, are constitutive of the elements of the
offense charged as defined under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Go’s contentions that he is not a public officer, he did not
conspire with Rivera in the execution of the ARCA and, in any case, the said agreement cannot be said
to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, could not be properly considered for
the purpose of quashing the Information on the ground relied upon by him. According to the
Sandiganbayan, these matters raised by petitioner Go have to be proved during trial.
The decretal portion of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the "Motion for Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable
Cause and Motion to Dismiss" and the "Motion to Quash," filed by accused Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and
Henry T. Go, respectively, are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner Go filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in the
Resolution dated March 24, 2006.
Petitioner Go now seeks recourse to the Court and, in support of his petitioner, alleges that:
A.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not ruling that Section 3(g) does not embrace a private person within its proviso.
B.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not ruling that there is no probable cause to hold petitioner for trial. 7
Petitioner Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even enlarged
by implication or intendment to bring within its limited scope private persons. The said provision of law
allegedly punishes only public officers as it penalizes the act of "entering, on behalf of the government,
into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby." As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a
contract "on behalf of the government," there being no showing of any agency relations or special
authority for him to act for and on behalf of the government.
Citing several cases,8 petitioner Go enumerates the following elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
He also cites Marcos v. Sandiganbayan9 where the Court acquitted then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos of
the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as it found that she did not sign the subject Lease
Agreement, entered into between the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) and Philippine General
Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), as a public officer, but in her capacity as Chairman of the PGHFI, a
private entity. As such, the Court held that the first element of the offense charged, i.e., that the accused
is a public officer, was wanting.
Petitioner Go claims that, in the same manner, the first element of the offense charged against him is
absent because he is not a public officer who is authorized by law to bind the government through the
act of "entering into a contract." He also points out that, similar to his case, in Marcos, the Information
also alleged that the former First Lady conspired with a public officer, then Minister Jose P. Dans of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications, in entering into a contract. Nonetheless, the Court
therein dismissed the allegation of conspiracy.
Petitioner Go maintains that by any of its definition,10 he cannot be considered a "public officer." Further,
only a public officer can enter into a
contract in representation of the government. He stresses that the first element of the offense, i.e., that
the accused is a public officer, is an essential ingredient of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019. He
likens it to the crime of parricide where the essential element is the relationship of the offender to the
victim and, citing a criminal law book author, a stranger who cooperates in the execution of the offense
is not allegedly guilty of this crime. The stranger is allegedly either liable for homicide or murder but
never by "conspiracy to commit parricide."11
By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the crime penalized
under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is that the offender must be a public officer. Since he is not a public
officer, one of the essential elements of the offense is lacking; hence, there is no other recourse but to
quash the Information.
Section 9 of RA 3019 was also cited which reads:
SEC. 9. Penalties for violation. –
(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in
Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and
one month or fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in
favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and other lawful income.
xxx
Petitioner Go posits that had it been the intention of the lawmakers to penalize private persons who
supposedly "conspired" with public officers in violation of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RA 3019, it could
have easily used the conjunctive "and," not "or," between the terms "public officer" and "private person"
in Section 9 thereof.
Petitioner Go takes exception to the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement that even as a private individual
he is not excluded from the coverage of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not being accused
singly but as someone who conspired with a public officer in violating the said law. According to
petitioner Go, this proposition applies only to Section 3(e)12 of RA 3019, the elements of which include
that "the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them." 13 He stresses
that, unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019, Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only public officers as the operative
phrase in the latter provision is "on behalf of the government."
Petitioner Go vigorously asserts that there is no basis for the finding of probable cause against him for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. In particular, he insists that the allegation of conspiracy between
Rivera and himself is not supported by any evidence. He makes an issue out of those documents that
were mentioned in the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause against him but
were not in the records of the Sandiganbayan. His mere signing of the ARCA does not allegedly
establish culpability for violation of RA 3019. Further, he faults the Sandiganbayan for invoking the
doctrine of non-interference by the courts in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of
probable cause. It is petitioner Go’s view that the Sandiganbayan should have ordered the quashal of
the Information for palpable want of probable cause coupled with the absence of material documents.
The petition is bereft of merit.
For clarity, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is quoted below anew:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.14
Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public officer does not
necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Go’s simplistic syllogism,
i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes
against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that
a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, 15 the Court had
ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private
persons:
x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum
prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in
consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the
repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act
or which may lead thereto.16
Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and private
persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to both
public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than
six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
xxx
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer"
does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being
charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder.
The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan17 is instructive. In the said case, Gregorio Singian, Jr., a
private person who was then Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI), together with some
officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), was charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA
3019 in connection with the loan accommodations that the said bank extended to ISI which were
characterized as behest loans.
A total of eighteen Informations were filed against Singian and his co-accused by the Office of the
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan corresponding to the nine loan accommodations granted to ISI.
Each loan was subject of two Informations alleging violations of both Section 3(e) and (g), respectively.
In other words, nine Informations charged Singian and his co-accused with violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 and the other nine charged them with violation of paragraph (g) of the same provision.
Singian filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for re-determination of existence of probable cause but
the same was dismissed. He then filed with the Court a petition for certiorari but it was likewise
dismissed as the Court held that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had not committed grave
abuse of discretion when they respectively found probable cause against Singian for violations of both
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA 3019.
Singian thus illustrates that private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Another case,
Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,18 may likewise be applied to this case by analogy.
In the said case, Diosdado Garcia, proprietor of D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, together with Jaime
Domingo, then municipal mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, was charged with Section 3(h) of RA 3019 as it
appeared that he was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business transaction with the
municipality. Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law reads:
SEC.3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by
the Constitution or by any law from having an interest.
The elements of this offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; (3) he either: (a) intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or (b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.19
Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of Garcia, a private
individual, as well as that of Domingo, who was then a municipal mayor, for violation of Section 3(h) of
RA 3019. In so holding, the Court established that Domingo and Garcia acted in conspiracy with one
another in the commission of the offense. Domingo thus also serves to debunk petitioner Go’s theory
that where an offense has as one of its elements that the accused is a public officer, it necessarily
excludes private persons from the scope of such offense.
The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is applicable to the
present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and
(h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.
Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan20 is not quite appropriate. To recall, upon her
motion for reconsideration, the Court therein acquitted former First Lady Imelda Marcos of the charge of
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 in its Resolution dated October 6, 1998. Her acquittal was based on
the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer. As
such, the first element, i.e., that the accused is a public officer was wanting.
Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Court’s ruling in Marcos in its proper factual backdrop. The
acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Court’s Decision dated January
29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v. People,21 which the former First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding merit in
her motion, gave rise to the Court’s Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the
former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and Communications, for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, alleged that they were both public officers and, conspiring with
each other, entered into the subject lease agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a
private entity, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Lady’s conviction for violation of Section 3(g)
of RA 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated earlier, upon the
former First Lady’s motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its Resolution in
Marcos.
It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the former First Lady’s
conviction was based on the fact that it was later held that she signed the subject lease agreement as a
private person, not a public officer. However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with the
fact that the public officer with whom she had supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier
been acquitted. In other words, the element that the accused is a public officer, was totally wanting in
the former First Lady’s case because Dans, the public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in
committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could
not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.
In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his case
because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by
virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary. The case against both of them is still pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Go’s case are, therefore, not exactly on all fours as ELEMENTS ALLEGATIONS
those of the former First Lady’s case as to warrant the application of the Marcos ruling in his case.
1a\^/phi1.net
Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the Information is infirm as
1. The offender is [T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of
far as petitioner Go is concerned because it failed to mention with specificity his participation in the
a public officer Department of Transportation and Communications
planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. It opines that "aside from the sweeping allegation of
(DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and
conspiracy, the Information failed to mention any act as to how petitioner had taken part in the planning
taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused
and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. Mere allegation of conspiracy in the Information does not
HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of Philippine
necessarily mean that the criminal acts recited therein also pertain to petitioner." While it concedes that
International Air Terminals, Co., xxx"
the Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over private individuals, it submits that it may do so only
"upon Information alleging with specificity the precise violations of the private individual." By way of 2. He entered into "[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., xxx in
conclusion, the dissenting opinion cites Sistoza v. Desierto22 where the Court stated that a signature a contract or conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO xxx did then and
appearing on a document is not enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among officials and transaction in there, willfully & unlawfully and feloniously entered into an
employees charged with defrauding the government. behalf of the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA),
government after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
These asseverations, however, are unpersuasive. It is well established that the presence or absence of International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
after a full-blown trial on the merits.23 In the same manner, the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy Consortium/PIATCO x x x
among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.24 3. The contract or "xxx which ARCA substantially amended the draft
transaction is Concession Agreement covering the construction of the
grossly and NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by
Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera in
manifestly Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the
violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner Go had taken part in the
disadvantageous government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the
planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy need not be set forth in the Information as these are
to the government event of the latter’s default specifically Article IV, Section
evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be shown and proved during the trial on the merits. Indeed, it
4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA
bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission
which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation
of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the
of the BOT Law and manifestly grossly disadvantageous to
accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
the government of the Republic of the Philippines."27
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-
principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of the law the Finally, in the assailed Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated thus:
act of one is the act of all."25

In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of Section 8,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are complied with:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of Rule
117 on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the fundamental
test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an Information is whether or not the facts
alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the Information are not to be considered. 26
As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted
hypothetically, establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à-vis petitioner Go:
The rule is that the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is a function
that belongs to the public prosecutor, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case. Such official is vested
with authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court and the concomitant
function of determining as well the persons to be prosecuted. Also, it must not be lost sight of that the
correctness of the exercise of such function is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon, consistent with the policy of non-interference by the courts in the determination
by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.
Accordingly, upon the foregoing premises, we believe and so hold that any and all questions relating to
the finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman should be addressed to the said office
itself, then to the Court of Appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
On the matter of the judicial determination of probable cause, we stand by our finding that the same
exists in this case, the said finding we arrived at upon a personal determination thereof which we did for
the purpose of and before the issuance of the warrant of arrest.1awphi1.nét While it may indeed be true
that the documents mentioned by accused-movant as being absent in the records are missing, we
nevertheless had for our perusal other documents assiduously listed down by accused Rivera in his
motion, including the information, which we found to constitute sufficient basis for our determination of
the existence of probable cause. It must be emphasized that such determination is separate and distinct
from that made by the Office of the Ombudsman and which we did independently therefrom. 28

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function of the government
prosecutor, which in this case is the Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s
exercise of discretion in determining probable cause, unless there are compelling reasons.29 Mindful of
this salutary rule, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made its own determination on the basis of the
records that were before it. It concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the records for the finding
of the existence of probable cause against petitioner Go.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.30 Clearly, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed on the Sandiganbayan when it held that there exists probable cause against
petitioner Go.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated
December 6, 2005 and March 24, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 are
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of
the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government,
through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals,
Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the
Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo
Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in
relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III)
was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended
the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957,
as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as
well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default
under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which
terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government
of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground
that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not
a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that
Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public
official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is
hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
 II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE
THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL
LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3
of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is
a case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private
person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer,
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court,
as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or
more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in
contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. 17 The death of
one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. 18 Thus, this
Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent)
conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other
co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent
to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the
principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically
provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the
common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt
acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S.
vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime
unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy
to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other
evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the
conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the
crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of
one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-
doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is
axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire
to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained
in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each
(conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with
the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission
of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is
generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of
the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary
Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves
evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated
before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in
a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in
violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's
motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August
31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution
became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in
G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private
respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over
his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest
or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise
the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail,
demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the
SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion
to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring
the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his
person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered
into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court
which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by
certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In
the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy
with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have
been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that
the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer
be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged
offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to
the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means,
promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 147026-27 September 11, 2009
CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,
vs.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Carolina R. Javier in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff
versus Carolina R. Javier, Accused," seeking to nullify respondent Sandiganbayan's: (1) Order2 dated
November 14, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 25867, which denied her Motion to Quash Information; (2)
Resolution3 dated January 17, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 25898, which denied her Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Quash Information; and (3) Order4 dated February 12, 2001, declaring
that a motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 25898 would be superfluous as the issues are
fairly simple and straightforward.
The factual antecedents follow.
On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,5 or otherwise known as the "Book Publishing Industry
Development Act", was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in promoting the
continuing development of the book publishing industry, through the active participation of the private
sector, to ensure an adequate supply of affordable, quality-produced books for the domestic and export
market.
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book Development Board
(NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the administration and supervision of
the Office of the President. The Governing Board shall be composed of eleven (11) members who shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines, five (5) of whom shall come from the government,
while the remaining six (6) shall be chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book
publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private education sector.
On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector
representative for a term of one (1) year. 6 During that time, she was also the President of the Book
Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the following year.
On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for the same period of one
(1) year.7 Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish
linkages with international book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the
Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on
October 8-12, 1997.8 Based on her itinerary of travel,9 she was paid ₱139,199.0010 as her travelling
expenses.
Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.
On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately
return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.11 Petitioner, however, failed to
do so. On July 6, 1998, she was issued a Summary of Disallowances12 from which the balance for
settlement amounted to ₱220,349.00. Despite said notice, no action was forthcoming from the
petitioner.
On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the
Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and properties. She averred
that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the NBDB her
cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival, or in this case from the date of cancellation of
the trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio
further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 13 for failure to file her Statement
of Assets and Liabilities.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019,14 as amended, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. 15 It, however,
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the charge for violation of R.A. No. 6713.
In an Information dated February 18, 2000, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
That on or about October 8, 1997, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Quezon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, a public officer,
being then a member of the governing Board of the National Book Development Board (NBDB), while in
the performance of her official and administrative functions, and acting with evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, without any justifiable
cause, and despite due demand by the Resident Auditor and the Executive Director of NBDB, fail and
refuse to return and/or liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel abroad which did not
materialize, in the total amount of ₱139,199.00 as of September 23, 1999, as required under EO No.
248 and Sec. 5 of COA Circular No. 97-002 thereby causing damage and undue injury to the
Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867 and raffled to the First Division.
Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for not liquidating the cash advance
granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to Spain. During the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, petitioner was required to submit her counter-affidavit but she failed to do so. The
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the crime charged and recommended the
filing of the corresponding information against her. 17
Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25898, and raffled to the Third Division, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999, or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the
National Book Development Board and as such, is accountable for the public funds she received as
cash advance in connection with her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188
in the amount of ₱139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit
the aforementioned amount of ₱139,199.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.18
During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, petitioner
delivered to the First Division the money subject of the criminal cases, which amount was deposited in a
special trust account during the pendency of the criminal cases.
Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 on May 16, 2000 in
order to determine jurisdictional issues. On June 3, 2000, petitioner filed with the same Division a
Motion for Consolidation19 of Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867, pending before
the First Division. On July 6, 2000, the People filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Information20 in Criminal Case No. 25898, which was granted. Accordingly, the Amended Information
dated June 28, 2000 reads as follows:
That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999, or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the
National Book Development Board equated to Board Member II with a salary grade 28 and as such, is
accountable for the public funds she received as case advance in connection with her trip to Spain from
October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount of ₱139,199.00, which trip did not
materialize, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of ₱139,199.00,
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.21
In its Resolution dated October 5, 2000, the Third Division ordered the consolidation of Criminal Case
No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867. 22
On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information,23 averring that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not allege that she is a public
official who is classified as Grade "27" or higher. Neither did the information charge her as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee and that she belongs to the
Governing Board only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be
charged under R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public
officials. Moreover, she claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any
administrative or political power to speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing industry by
advancing their interest as participant in the government's book development policy.
In an Order24 dated November 14, 2000, the First Division25 denied the motion to quash with the
following disquisition:
The fact that the accused does not receive any compensation in terms of salaries and allowances, if
that indeed be the case, is not the sole qualification for being in the government service or a public
official. The National Book Development Board is a statutory government agency and the persons who
participated therein even if they are from the private sector, are public officers to the extent that they are
performing their duty therein as such.
Insofar as the accusation is concerned herein, it would appear that monies were advanced to the
accused in her capacity as Director of the National Book Development Board for purposes of official
travel. While indeed under ordinary circumstances a member of the board remains a private individual,
still when that individual is performing her functions as a member of the board or when that person
receives benefits or when the person is supposed to travel abroad and is given government money to
effect that travel, to that extent the private sector representative is a public official performing public
functions; if only for that reason, and not even considering situation of her being in possession of public
funds even as a private individual for which she would also covered by provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, she is properly charged before this Court.
On November 15, 2000, the First Division accepted the consolidation of the criminal cases against
petitioner and scheduled her arraignment on November 17, 2000, for Criminal Case No. 25898. On said
date, petitioner manifested that she is not prepared to accept the propriety of the accusation since it
refers to the same subject matter as that covered in Criminal Case No. 25867 for which the
Sandiganbayan gave her time to file a motion to quash. On November 22, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash the Information26 in Criminal Case No. 25898, by invoking her right against double jeopardy.
However, her motion was denied in open court. She then filed a motion for reconsideration.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution27 denying petitioner’s motion with the
following disquisition:
The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of P.D. 1606 as amended so
provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
xxxx
The offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad was given to her because of her
Directorship in the National Book Development Board.
Furthermore, there are also allegations to hold the accused liable under Article 222 of the Revised
Penal Code which reads:
Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. – The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal
funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached ,
seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.
Likewise, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 25898 on the ground of litis
pendencia is denied since in this instance, these two Informations speak of offenses under different
statutes, i.e., R.A. No. 3019 and the Revised Penal Code, neither of which precludes prosecution of the
other.
Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her
with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She
advanced the following arguments in support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer,
and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against
double jeopardy.
A motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
are apparent in the face of the Information.28
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not
a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as
a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action.29
The above general rule, however admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss
or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. 30
To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector
representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives
provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing
industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a
book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her,
and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book publishing
industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to
ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization
structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was
created to supervise the implementation. The Governing Board was vested with powers and functions,
to wit:
a) assume responsibility for carrying out and implementing the policies, purposes and
objectives provided for in this Act;
b) formulate plans and programs as well as operational policies and guidelines for undertaking
activities relative to promoting book development, production and distribution as well as an
incentive scheme for individual authors and writers;
c) formulate policies, guidelines and mechanisms to ensure that editors, compilers and
especially authors are paid justly and promptly royalties due them for reproduction of their
works in any form and number and for whatever purpose;
d) conduct or contract research on the book publishing industry including monitoring, compiling
and providing data and information of book production;
e) provide a forum for interaction among private publishers, and, for the purpose, establish and
maintain liaison will all the segments of the book publishing industry;
f) ask the appropriate government authority to ensure effective implementation of the National
Book Development Plan;
g) promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act in consultation with other
agencies concerned, except for Section 9 hereof on incentives for book development, which
shall be the concern of appropriate agencies involved;
h) approve, with the concurrence of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the
annual and supplemental budgets submitted to it by the Executive director;
i) own, lease, mortgage, encumber or otherwise real and personal property for the attainment
of its purposes and objectives;
j) enter into any obligation or contract essential to the proper administration of its affairs, the
conduct of its operations or the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives;
k) receive donations, grants, legacies, devices and similar acquisitions which shall form a trust
fund of the Board to accomplish its development plans on book publishing;
l) import books or raw materials used in book publishing which are exempt from all taxes,
customs duties and other charges in behalf of persons and enterprises engaged in book
publishing and its related activities duly registered with the board;
 m) promulgate rules and regulations governing the matter in which the general affairs of the
Board are to be exercised and amend, repeal, and modify such rules and regulations
whenever necessary;
n) recommend to the President of the Philippines nominees for the positions of the Executive
Officer and Deputy Executive Officer of the Board;
o) adopt rules and procedures and fix the time and place for holding meetings: Provided, That
at least one (1) regular meeting shall be held monthly;
p) conduct studies, seminars, workshops, lectures, conferences, exhibits, and other related
activities on book development such as indigenous authorship, intellectual property rights, use
of alternative materials for printing, distribution and others; and
q) exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be required by the law. 31
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature of
public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.32
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law
invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the
government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as
it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the
public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position
outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it
that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively
and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the
private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government
objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law,
which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent
or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even
nominal, from the government.33
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a
public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though
her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a public function. The fact
that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that
members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for
every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the
Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered
a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform
in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.34
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No.
8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the
government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during
her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in
Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. The next question for the Court to resolve is whether,
as a public officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Presently,35 the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
xxxx
Notably, the Director of Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau, of the
Department of Budget and management provided the following information regarding the compensation
and position classification and/or rank equivalence of the member of the Governing Board of the NBDB,
thus:

Per FY 1999 Personal Services Itemization, the Governing Board of NDBD is composed of one (1)
Chairman (ex-officio), one (1) Vice-Chairman (ex-officio), and nine (9) Members, four (4) of whom are
ex-officio and the remaining five (5) members represent the private sector. The said five members of the
Board do not receive any salary and as such their position are not classified and are not assigned any
salary grade.

For purposes however of determining the rank equivalence of said positions, notwithstanding that they
do not have any salary grade assignment, the same may be equated to Board Member II, SG-28.36

Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs to the
employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase "all other national and local officials classified as
‘Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, We can not likewise give in to the contentions advanced by
petitioner. She argued that her right against double jeopardy was violated when the Sandiganbayan
denied her motion to quash the two informations filed against her.1avvphi1

We believe otherwise. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898
refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary
that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information
sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. 37 In the instant case, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the
criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter
information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending
before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases
against her.

It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment
or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed
or terminated without his express consent. 38 The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case
at bar.

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the present petition does not fall under the exceptions wherein the
remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's motion to quash the information. And
even assuming that petitioner may avail of such remedy, We still hold that the Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and Order of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175457 : July 06, 2011]
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 175482]
VS. ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil,
Jr.[1] and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.[2] assailing the Decision[3] promulgated on September 16,
2005 and Resolution[4] dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter[5] of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No.
10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report[6] dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) [7] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the
Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against petitioners.[8]
Nonetheless, in an Information[9] dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A.
Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum [10] dated August 4,
2000, recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the
Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156[11] of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. The Amended Information[12] reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or] subsequent thereto, [in] the
Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial
Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern
Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other,
with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco
Adalim, accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by
Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A.
AMBIL, JR.'s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil's residence for a period
of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order, thus accused in the
performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor
Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.[13]
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that
Adalim's transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed
by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim's sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-
White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after the
admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence
with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial[14] but the same was denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White
and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001. According
to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim's lawyers that he directed the transfer of Adalim's detention to
his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody
of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the company of inmates who were put away by his
sister and guards identified with his political opponents. [15]
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the sister of
Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were attending a wedding in
Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative
custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee
the mayor's safety.[16]
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed
his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed against him in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White's account that he spotted
inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial
jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched fist. Sensing
danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.'s residence for almost
three months before he posted bail after the charge against him was downgraded to homicide. [17]
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He recalls
that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor
Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim's arrest and arguing with the
jail guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty.
White who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latter's capacity as a provincial
jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governor's order to relinquish
custody of Adalim.[18]
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and
undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There
were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was
unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for use during
conjugal visits.[19]
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed
Decision[20] finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in
moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in
the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees
do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be
released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. [21]
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners' defense that Adalim's transfer was made to ensure his
safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on Adalim's life
but relied simply on the advice of Adalim's lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability
of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have
been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s failure to turn
over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4)
months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance
of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month
to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO
PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR
PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY,
EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID
SECTION 3(e).
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER SECTIONS
1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND
SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A
DETENTION PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [22]
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan:
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN
CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER SHOULD BE ACCORDED
FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO'S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER
OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO THE
PREJUDICE x x x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE. [23]
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial governor has
authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5)[24] of the RPC.
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.'s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: (1) Whether he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled
to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose
under Article 11(6)[25] of the RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case
because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a
public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be
held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking
custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under the Administrative Code of
1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner
Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior when
he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence that
restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP
explains that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have accorded undue
preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim
is deemed a private party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the
unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention prisoner
accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by
their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates
petitioners' lack of authority to take custody of a detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it
concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. [26]
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official
functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606,[27] as amended by R.A. No. 8249.[28] The pertinent portions of Section 4,
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.--The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade `27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade `27' or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is
true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification[29] from the Provincial Government
Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary
Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade `27' or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the
proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them - the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In Sison v. People,[30] we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence
has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." x x x [31]
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the
detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s
contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the
"Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief executives over
the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police.--The extent
of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit,
and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known
as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," and the rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975[32] on the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over all city
and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the National Government for
not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.[33] An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do
it himself.[34]
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it
that the subordinate officers perform their duties."[35] If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill
their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. [36] The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he have
discretion to modify or replace them.[37]
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise
control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of
acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within
the bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down
on how the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731,
Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.--The governor of the province shall be charged
with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the same in
accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the government of provincial
prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed to the care of a jailer to
be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer shall be regarded as within the
unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in which classified positions are filled, and if so
filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except
that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the appointing governor and until a successor in
the office of the jailer is appointed and qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor
shall, under the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the province, supply
proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the
contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again, nowhere did said
provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial jailer," or even slightly suggest that he is
empowered to take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that the
provincial governor's duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the
procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those
acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by
the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it[38] by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of
his administrative powers, the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section 1737 [39] under
which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province in case the provincial jail be
insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been
superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section
3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention by legal
process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is
vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. This was amply clarified
by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication[40] dated October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner Ambil,
Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier received by this
Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor Francisco "Aising" Adalim of
Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal
Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of Section 3, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be delivered to the nearest police
station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the accused municipal
mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of supervision vested unto the provincial
governor over provincial jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to take in custody any person in
detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds of law and to
immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said petitioner's
usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful defiance to official advice in order
to accommodate a former political party mate, [41] betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith
that attended his actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. As mentioned
above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the
act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison
and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the
applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not
applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses,
permits or other concessions" and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the
purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if
he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling inMejorada v. Sandiganbayan [42]where we held that a
prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the
accusedpublic officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Following
is an excerpt of what we said inMejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic)
declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it
specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the
last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public
officers" may not come within the term.It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions.[43] (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,[44] we affirmed that a prosecution for violation of said
provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.[45]
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a
"public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal
from the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact that
Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners' case beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person" to
describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term
"party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance [46] as distinguished from "person"
which, in general usage, refers to a human being.[47] Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who
is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private
person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him
at petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as
a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.[48] The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
"Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.[49]
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the
provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment,
was free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to
Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor's life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any risk on
Adalim's safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet,
even if we treat Akyatan's gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same
would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant Adalim's detention outside the
provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have been
used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing repair.
Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s
house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his
person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. In
order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in
the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise months.
of such right or office.[50] Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s case.
With costs against the petitioners.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer
and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did SO ORDERED.
not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office.

In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order
issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal liability.
For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been
issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.[51] Only the first requisite is present in this case.

While the order for Adalim's transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor,
neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his
capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim
at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil,
Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1) [52] of the RPC.

An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the attainment
of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.[53]

Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.'s willful cooperation in executing
petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner
Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring
a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even
petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power
to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the
violation charged, makes them equally responsible as conspirators.

As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public
officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for not less than
six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from
public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act
No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in accord with
law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160211 August 28, 2006
VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable Justices RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, GREGORY S. ONG, and MA. CRISTINA G.
CORTEZ-ESTRADA as Members of the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division, and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
A meticulous review of the records and the evidence establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Clearly, the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
Hence, the conviction of petitioner is inevitable.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 2, 2003
Decision 2 and September 29, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23627. The
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused VENANCIO
NAVA Y RODRIGUEZ of the crime of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly
Section 3(g) thereof, or entering on behalf of government in any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same whether or not the pubic officer profited or will profit thereby. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, and one (1) day as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum and to suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office. Accused Nava is further ordered to pay the government the amount of P380,013.60 which
it suffered by way of damages because of the unlawful act or omission committed by the herein accused
Venancio Nava.
"From the narration of facts, there hardly appears any circumstance that would suggest the existence of
conspiracy among the other accused in the commission of the crime.
"Thus in the absence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime complained of and as the herein
other accused only acted upon the orders of accused Venancio Nava, in the absence of any criminal
intent on their part to violate the law, the acts of the remaining accused are not considered corrupt
practices committed in the performance of their duties as public officers and consequently, accused
AJATIL JAIRAL Y PONGCA, ROSALINDA MERKA Y GUANZON & JOSEPH VENTURA Y ABAD are
hereby considered innocent of the crime charged and are hereby acquitted." 3
The assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2003, denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The Sandiganbayan narrated the facts of this case as follows:
"The complaint involving the herein accused was initiated by the COA, Region XI, Davao City, which
resulted from an audit conducted by a team which was created by the COA Regional Office per COA
Regional Assignment Order No. 91-74 dated January 8, 1991. The objective of the team [was] to
conduct an audit of the 9.36 million allotment which was released in 1990 by the DECS, Region XI to its
Division Offices.
"In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have been released to the DECS
Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the newly nationalized high schools located within the
region. Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was called among his seven (7)
schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of
Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the allotment to the
one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities,
accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division superintendents to use the
allotment for the purchase of science education facilities for the calendar year 1990.
"In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall be done through a public
bidding pursuant to Circular No. 85-55, series of 1985. But in the instant case, evidence shows that
accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division superintendents to ignore the circular as
allegedly time was of the essence in making the purchases and if not done before the calendar year
1990, the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund.
"In the hurried purchase of SLTD’s, the provision on the conduct of a public bidding was not followed.
Instead the purchase was done through negotiation. Evidence shows that the items were purchased
from Joven’s Trading, a business establishment with principal address at Tayug, Pangasinan;
D’[I]mplacable Enterprise with principal business address at 115 West Capitol Drive, Pasig, Metro
Manila and from Evelyn Miranda of 1242 Oroqueta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As disclosed by the audit
report, the prices of the [SLTDs] as purchased from the above-named sellers exceeded the prevailing
market price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the mathematical computation done by the COA
audit team. The report concluded that the government lost P380,013.60. That the injury to the
government as quantified was the result of the non-observance by the accused of the COA rules on
public bidding and DECS Order No. 100 suspending the purchases of [SLTDs]." 4
The Commission on Audit (COA) Report recommended the filing of criminal and administrative charges
against the persons liable, including petitioner, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Petitioner was subsequently charged in an Information 5 filed on April 8, 1997, worded as follows:
"That on or about the period between November to December 1990, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Digos, Davao Del Sur and/or Davao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused Venancio R. Nava (DECS-Region XI Director) and Ajatil Jairal
(Division Superintendent, DECS, Davao del Sur), both high[-]ranking officials and Rosalinda Merka, and
Teodora Indin (Administrative Officer and Assistant Division Superintendent, respectively of DECS-
Division of Davao Del Sur), all low ranking officials, while in the discharge of their respective official
functions, committing the offense in relation to their office and with grave abuse [of] authority, conniving
and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, on
behalf of the government, into transactions with D’Implacable Enterprise and Joven’s Trading,
respectively, represented by accused Antonio S. Tan and Evelyn Miranda and Joseph Ventura for the
purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD) intended for use by the public high schools
in the area amounting to [P603,265.00], Philippine currency, without the requisite public bidding and in
violation of DECS Order No. 100, Series of 1990, which transaction involved an overprice in the amount
of P380,013.60 and thus, is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government." 6
Special Prosecution Officer II Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommended the dismissal of the foregoing
Information on the ground, among others, that there was no probable cause. She argued that only
estimates were made to show the discrepancy of prices instead of a comparative listing on an item to
item basis. 7 The recommendation was disapproved, however, by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due trial, only petitioner was convicted, while all the other accused were acquitted. 8
Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or
entering on behalf of the government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit thereby.
The Sandiganbayan (SBN) said that, in the purchase of the Science Laboratory Tools and Devices
(SLTDs), petitioner had not conducted a public bidding in accordance with COA Circular No. 85-55A. As
a result, the prices of the SLTDs, as purchased, exceeded the prevailing market price from 56 percent
to 1,175 percent, based on the mathematical computations of the COA team. 9 In his defense, petitioner
had argued that the said COA Circular was merely directory, not mandatory. Further, the purchases in
question had been done in the interest of public service. 10
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the foregoing defenses raised by petitioner. On the
contrary, it found the evidence adduced by petitioner’s co-accused, Superintendent Ajatil Jairal, to be
"enlightening," manifesting an intricate web of deceit spun by petitioner and involving all the other
superintendents in the process. 11
The graft court did not accept the claim of petitioner that he signed the checks only after the other
signatories had already signed them. The evidence showed that blank Philippine National Bank (PNB)
checks had been received by Nila E. Chavez, a clerk in the regional office, for petitioner’s signature.
The
Sandiganbayan opined that the evidence amply supported Jairal’s testimony that the questioned
transactions had emanated from the regional office, as in fact, all the documents pertinent to the
transaction had already been prepared and signed by petitioner when the meeting with the
superintendents was called sometime in August 1990. 12
In that meeting, the superintendents were given prepared documents like the Purchase Orders and
vouchers, together with the justification. 13 This circumstance prompted Jairal to conduct his own
canvass. The Sandiganbayan held that this act was suggestive of the good faith of Jairal, thereby
negating any claim of conspiracy with the other co-accused and, in particular, petitioner.
In its assailed Resolution, the SBN denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. It held that the series
of acts culminating in the questioned transactions constituted violations of Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 100; and COA Circular No. 85-55A. Those acts, ruled the SBN,
sufficiently established that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly or grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Hence, this Petition. 14
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or excess
of jurisdiction in upholding the findings of the Special Audit Team that irregularly conducted the audit
beyond the authorized period and which team falsified the Special Audit Report.
"II. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in upholding the findings in the special audit report where the Special Audit Team
egregiously failed to comply with the minimum standards set by the Supreme Court and adopted by the
Commission on Audit in violation of petitioner’s right to due process, and which report suppressed
evidence favorable to the petitioner.
"III. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in upholding the findings in the Special Audit Report considering that none of the
allegedly overpriced items were canvassed or purchased by the Special Audit Team such that there is
no competent evidence from which to determine that there was an overprice and that the transaction
was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
"IV. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in finding that there was an overprice where none of the prices of the questioned
items exceeded the amount set by the Department of Budget and Management.
"V. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in selectively considering the findings in the decision in Administrative Case No.
XI-91-088 and failing to consider the findings thereon that petitioner was justified in undertaking a
negotiated purchase and that there was no overpricing.
"VI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in selectively considering the findings of XI-91-088 and failing to consider the
findings thereon that petitioner was justified in undertaking a negotiated purchase, there was no
overpricing, and that the purchases did not violate DECS Order No. 100.
"VII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in failing to absolve the petitioner where conspiracy was not proven and the
suppliers who benefited from the alleged overpricing were acquitted.
"VIII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting in evidence and giving probative value to Exhibit ‘8’ the existence and
contents of which are fictitious.
"IX. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in giving credence to the self-serving and perjurious testimony of co-accused Ajatil
Jairal that the questioned transactions emanated from the regional office [in spite] of the documentary
evidence and the testimony of the accused supplier which prove that the transaction emanated from the
division office of Digos headed by co-accused Ajatil Jairal.
"X. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in finding that the petitioner entered into a transaction that was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government where the evidence clearly established that the questioned
transactions were entered into by the division office of Digos through co-accused Ajatil Jairal.
"XI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in convicting the petitioner in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt." 15
All these issues basically refer to the question of whether the Sandiganbayan committed reversible
errors (not grave abuse of discretion) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Propriety of Certiorari
At the outset, it must be stressed that to contest the Sandiganbayan’s Decision and Resolution on June
2, 2003 and September 29, 2003, respectively, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, not the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, 16 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, 17 provides that "[d]ecisions and final orders
of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court likewise provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the x x x Sandiganbayan x x x whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."
Basic is the principle that when Rule 45 is available, recourse under Rule 65 cannot be allowed either
as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal. 18 The special civil action for certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, when the latter remedy is available. 19
This Court has consistently ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 20 A remedy is
considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency or as in this case, the
Sandiganbayan. 21 Since the assailed Decision and Resolution were dispositions on the merits, and the
Sandiganbayan had no remaining issue to resolve, an appeal would have been the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy for petitioner.
To be sure, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. 22 For this procedural lapse, the Petition should have been dismissed outright.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as it was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 45, the Court
treated it as a petition for review (not certiorari) under Rule 45 in order to accord substantial justice to
the parties. Thus, it was given due course and the Court required the parties to file their Memoranda.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him, because the pieces of evidence to
support the charges were not convincing. Specifically, he submits the following detailed argumentation:
"1. the Special Audit Report was fraudulent, incomplete, irregular, inaccurate, illicit and suppressed
evidence in favor of the Petitioner;
"2. there was no competent evidence to determine the overprice as none of the samples secured by the
audit team from the Division of Davao del Sur were canvassed or purchased by the audit team;
"3. the allegedly overpriced items did not exceed the amount set by the Department of Budget and
Management;
"4. the decision in an administrative investigation were selectively lifted out of context;
"5. the administrative findings that Petitioner was justified in undertaking a negotiated purchase, that
there was no overpricing, and that the purchases did not violate DECS Order No. 100 were disregarded;
"6. Exhibit ‘8’, the contents of which are fictitious, was admitted in evidence and given probative value;
"7. The suppliers who benefited from the transactions were acquitted, along with the other accused who
directly participated in the questioned transactions; and
"8. The self-serving and perjury-ridden statements of co-accused Jairal were given credence despite
documentary and testimonial evidence to the contrary." 23
Petitioner further avers that the findings of fact in the Decision dated October 21, 1996 in DECS
Administrative Case No. XI-91-088 24 denied any overpricing and justified the negotiated purchases in
lieu of a public bidding. 25 Since there was no overpricing and since he was justified in undertaking the
negotiated purchase, petitioner submits that he cannot be convicted of violating Section 3(g) of Republic
Act No. 3019.
Validity of Audit
The principal evidence presented during trial was the COA Special Audit Report (COA Report). The Price + 10%
COA is the agency specifically given the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all Allow.
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of fund and property Flask Brush made of
owned by or pertaining to the government. 26 It has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its Nylon P112.20 P8.80 P103.40 1,175% 400 P41,360.00
audit and examination and to establish the required techniques and methods. 27
Test Tube Glass
Pyrex (18x50 mm) 22.36 14.30 8.06 56% 350 2,821.00
Thus, COA’s findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, when they are not tainted with Graduated Cylinder
grave abuse of discretion. 28 Only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion may the courts set Pyrex (100ml) 713.00 159.50 553.50 347% 324 179,334.00
aside decisions of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their
special technical knowledge and training. 29 In this case, the SBN correctly accorded credence to the Glass Spirit Burner
COA Report. As will be shown later, the Report can withstand legal scrutiny. (alcohol lamp) 163.50 38.50 125.00 325% 144 18,000.00
Spring Balance
(12.5kg)Germany 551.00 93.50 457.50 489% 102 46,665.00
Initially, petitioner faults the audit team for conducting the investigation beyond the twenty-one day
period stated in the COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991. But this Iron Wire Gauge 16.20 9.90 6.30 64% 47 296.10
delay by itself did not destroy the credibility of the Report. Neither was it sufficient to constitute fraud or Bunsen Burner 701.00 90.75 610.25 672% 150 91,537.50
indicate bad faith on the part of the audit team. Indeed, in the conduct of an audit, the length of time the
actual examination occurs is dependent upon the documents involved. If the documents are Total P380,013.60
voluminous, then it necessarily follows that more time would be needed. 30 What is important is that the
findings of the audit should be sufficiently supported by evidence.
What is glaring is the discrepancy in prices. The tabulated figures are supported by Exhibits "E-1," "E-
2," "E-3," and "E-4," the Official Receipts evidencing the equipment purchased by the audit team for
Petitioner also imputes fraud to the audit team for making "it appear that the items released by the purposes of comparison with those procured by petitioner. 34 The authenticity of these Exhibits is not
Division Office of Davao Del Sur on 21 February 1991 were compared with and became the basis for disputed by petitioner. As the SBN stated in its Decision, the fact of overpricing -- as reflected in the
the purchase of exactly the same items on 20 February 1991." 31 aforementioned exhibits -- was testified to or identified by Laura S. Soriano, team leader of the audit
team. 35 It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, since it was
The discrepancy regarding the date when the samples were taken and the date of the purchase of the able to observe the demeanor of witnesses firsthand and up close. 36 In the absence of contrary
same items for comparison was not very material. The discrepancy per se did not constitute fraud in the evidence, these findings are conclusive on this Court.
absence of ill motive. We agree with respondents in their claim of clerical inadvertence. We accept their
explanation that the wrong date was written by the supplier concerned when the items were bought for It was therefore incumbent on petitioner to prove that the audit team or any of its members thereof was
comparison. Anyway, the logical sequence of events was clearly indicated in the COA Report: so motivated by ill feelings against him that it came up with a fraudulent report. Since he was not able to
show any evidence to this end, his contention as to the irregularity of the audit due to the discrepancy of
"1.5.1. Obtained samples of each laboratory tools and devices purchased by the Division of Davao del the dates involved must necessarily fail.
Sur, Memorandum Receipts covering all the samples were issued by the agency to the audit team and
are marked as Exhibits 1.2 and 3 of this Report." An audit is conducted to determine whether the amounts allotted for certain expenditures were spent
wisely, in keeping with official guidelines and regulations. It is not a witch hunt to terrorize accountable
"1.5.2. Bought and presented these samples to reputable business establishments in Davao City like public officials. The presumption is always that official duty has been regularly performed 37 -- both on
Mercury Drug Store, Berovan Marketing Incorporated and [A]llied Medical Equipment and Supply the part of those involved with the expense allotment being audited and on the part of the audit team --
Corporation (AMESCO) where these items are also available, for price verification. unless there is evidence to the contrary.

"1.5.3. Available items which were exactly the same as the samples presented were purchased from Due Process
AMESCO and Berovan Marketing Incorporated, the business establishments which quoted the lowest
prices. Official receipts were issued by the AMESCO and Berovan Marketing Incorporated which are Petitioner likewise invokes Arriola v. Commission on Audit 38 to support his claim that his right to due
hereto marked as Exhibits 4,5,6 and 7 respectively." 32 process was violated. In that case, this Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not
sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was based on undocumented claims. Moreover, in Arriola, the
The COA team then tabulated the results as follows: 33
documents that were used as basis of the COA Decision were not shown to petitioners, despite their
repeated demands to see them. They were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price
Total quotations from accredited suppliers.
Purchased Recanvassed % of Over- Quantity Amount of
Item Unit Cost Difference pricing Purchased Overpricing
As the present petitioner pointed out in his Memorandum, the foregoing jurisprudence became the basis
for the COA to issue Memorandum Order No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997, which states:
"3.2 To firm up the findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial findings of overpricing based on
market price indicators mentioned in pa. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheet and/or
price quotations indicating:
a) the identities of the suppliers or sellers;
b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the requirements of the procuring agency;
c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in the finding of overpricing;
d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned
transaction"
Petitioner’s reliance on Arriola is misplaced. First, that Decision, more so, the COA Memorandum Order
that was issued pursuant to the former, was promulgated after the period when the audit in the present
case was conducted. Neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum Order can be given any retroactive
effect.
Second and more important, the circumstances in Arriola are different from those in the present case. In
the earlier case, the COA merely referred to a cost comparison made by the engineer of COA-Technical
Services Office (TSO), based on unit costs furnished by the Price Monitoring Division of the COA-TSO.
The COA even refused to show the canvass sheets to the petitioners, explaining that the source
document was confidential.
In the present case, the audit team examined several documents before they arrived at their conclusion
that the subject transactions were grossly disadvantageous to the government. These documents were
included in the Formal Offer of Evidence submitted to the Sandiganbayan. 39 Petitioner was likewise
presented an opportunity to controvert the findings of the audit team during the exit conference held at
the end of the audit, but he failed to do so. 40
Further, the fact that only three canvass sheets/price quotations were presented by the audit team does
not bolster petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was violated. To be sure, there is no rule
stating that all price canvass sheets must be presented. It is enough that those that are made the basis
of comparison be submitted for scrutiny to the parties being audited. Indubitably, these documents were
properly submitted and testified to by the principal prosecution witness, Laura Soriano. Moreover,
petitioner had ample opportunity to controvert them.
Public Bidding
Petitioner oscillates between denying that he was responsible for the procurement of the questioned
SLTDs, on the one hand; and, on the other, stating that the negotiated purchase was justifiable under
the circumstances.
On his disavowal of responsibility for the questioned procurement, he claims that the transactions
emanated from the Division Office of Digos headed by Jairal. 41 However, in the administrative
case 42 filed against petitioner before the DECS, it was established that he "gave the go signal" 43 that
prompted the division superintendents to procure the SLTDs through negotiated purchase. This fact is
not disputed by petitioner, who quotes the same DECS Decision in stating that his "acts were justifiable
under the circumstances then obtaining at that time and for reasons of efficient and prompt distribution
of the SLTDs to the high schools." 44
In justifying the negotiated purchase without public bidding, petitioner claims that "any delay in the
enrichment of the minds of the public high school students of Davao del Sur is detrimental and
antithetical to public service." 45 Although this reasoning is quite laudable, there was nothing presented
to substantiate it.
Executive Order No. 301 states the general rule that no contract for public services or for furnishing
supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities may be renewed or entered into without public bidding. The rule however, is not
without exceptions. Specifically, negotiated contracts may be entered into under any of the following
circumstances:
"a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of, or
danger to, life and/or property;
"b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be
delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
"c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have
subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government;
"d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant
or non-conforming to specifications;
"e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated purchase
is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head concerned;
"f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government." 46
National Center for Mental Health v. Commission on Audit 47 upheld the validity of the negotiated
contracts for the renovation and the improvement of the National Center for Mental Health. In that case,
petitioners were able to show that the long overdue need to renovate the Center "made it compelling to
fast track what had been felt to be essential in providing due and proper treatment and care for the
center’s patients." 48
This justification was likewise accepted in Baylon v. Ombudsman 49 in which we recognized that the
purchases were made in response to an emergency brought about by the shortage in the blood supply
available to the public. The shortage was a matter recognized and addressed by then Secretary of
Health Juan M. Flavier, who attested that "he directed the NKTI [National Kidney and Transplant
Institute] to do something about the situation and immediately fast-track the implementation of the
Voluntary Blood Donation Program of the government in order to prevent further deaths owing to the
lack of blood." 50
Unfortunately for petitioner, there was no showing of any immediate and compelling justification for
dispensing with the requirement of public bidding. We cannot accept his unsubstantiated reasoning that
a public bidding would unnecessarily delay the purchase of the SLTDs. Not only would he have to prove
that indeed there would be a delay but, more important, he would have to show how a public bidding
would be detrimental and antithetical to public service.
As the COA Report aptly states, the law on public bidding is not an empty formality. It aims to secure
the lowest possible price and obtain the best bargain for the government. It is based on the principle
that under ordinary circumstances, fair competition in the market tends to lower prices and eliminate
favoritism. 51
In this case, the DECS Division Office of Davao del Sur failed to conduct public bidding on the subject
transactions. The procurement of laboratory tools and devices was consummated with only the following
documents to compensate for the absence of a public bidding:
"1.13.a Price lists furnished by the Supply Coordination Office
1.13.b. Price lists furnished by the Procurement Services of the Department of Budget and Management
1.13.c. Price lists of Esteem Enterprises" 52
The COA Report states that the Division Office merely relied on the above documents as basis for
concluding that the prices offered by D’Implacable Enterprises and Joven’s Trading were reasonable.
But as found by the COA, reliance on the foregoing supporting documents was completely without merit
on the following grounds:
"a. The Supply Coordination Office was already dissolved or abolished at the time when the
transactions were consummated, thus, it is illogical for the management to consider the price lists
furnished by the Supply Coordination Office.
"b. The indorsement letter made by the Procurement Services of the Department of Budget and
Management containing the price lists specifically mentions Griffin and George brands, made in
England. However, the management did not procure these brands of [SLTDs].
"c. The price lists furnished by the Esteem Enterprises does not deserve the scantest consideration,
since there is no law or regulation specifically mentioning that the price lists of the Esteem Enterprises
will be used as basis for buying [SLTDs]." 53
Granting arguendo that petitioner did not have a hand in the procurement and that the transactions
emanated from the Division Office of Davao del Sur, we still find him liable as the final approving
authority. In fact, Exhibit "B-2" -- Purchase Order No. 90-024, amounting to P231,012 and dated
December 17, 1990 -- was recommended by Jairal and approved by petitioner. 54 This exhibit was part
of the evidence adduced in the Sandiganbayan to prove that the purchase of the SLTDs was
consummated and duly paid by the DECS without any proof of public bidding.
Although this Court has previously ruled 55 that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into
negotiations, it is not unreasonable to expect petitioner to exercise the necessary diligence in making
sure at the very least, that the proper formalities in the questioned transaction were observed -- that a
public bidding was conducted. This step does not entail delving into intricate details of product quality,
complete delivery or fair and accurate pricing.
Unlike other minute requirements in government procurement, compliance or non-compliance with the
rules on public bidding is readily apparent; and the approving authority can easily call the attention of
the subordinates concerned. To rule otherwise would be to render meaningless the accountability of
high-ranking public officials and to reduce their approving authority to nothing more than a mere rubber
stamp. The process of approval is not a ministerial duty of approving authorities to sign every document
that comes across their desks, and then point
to their subordinates as the parties responsible if something goes awry.
Suspension of Purchases
Obviously working against petitioner is DECS Order No. 100 dated September 3, 1990 which states
thus:
"In view of the Government’s call for economy measures coupled with the deficiency in allotments
intended for the payment of salary standardization, retirement benefits, bonus and other priority items,
the procurement of reference and supplementary materials, tools and devices equipment, furniture,
including land acquisition and land improvement shall be suspended for CY 1990. However, the
following items shall be exempted from the said suspension:
a) textbooks published by the Instructional Materials Corporation and its commercial edition;
b) elementary school desks and tablet arm chairs[.]"
As the COA Report succinctly states, the Administrative Order is explicit in its provisions
that tools and devices were among the items whose procurement was suspended by the DECS for the
year 1990.
Petitioner claims that in the administrative case against him, there was no mention of a violation of
DECS Order No. 100. 56 He alleges that the purchases of SLTDs by the division superintendents were
entered into and perfected on July 1, 1990; that is, more than two (2) months before the issuance of
DECS Order No. 100. He also alleged that the Sub-Allotment Advice (SAA) to the DECS Regional
Office No. XI in the amount of P9.36M -- out of which P603,265.00 was used for the procurement of the
questioned SLTDs -- had been released by the DECS Central Office in August 1990, a month before
the issuance of DECS Order No. 100.
The Court notes that these arguments are mere assertions bereft of any proof. There was no evidence
presented to prove that the SAA was issued prior to the effectivity of DECS Order No. 100. On the other
hand, the COA Report states that the DECS Division of Davao del Sur received the following Letters of
Advice of Allotments (LAA): 57
"LAA NO. AMOUNT DATE OF LAA
DO CO471-774-90 P141,956.00 October 24, 1990
DO-CO471-797-90 P161,309.00 November 16, 1990
DO-CO471-1007-90 P300,000.00 December 14, 1990"
The foregoing LAAs were attached as annexes 58 to the COA Report and were presented during trial in
the Sandiganbayan. 59
Also, Schools Division Superintendent Jairal had sent a letter to petitioner, requesting favorable
consideration of a forthcoming release of funding for the different barangay and municipal high schools.
The letter was dated October 16, 1990, 60 and was made well within the effectivity of the DECS Order.
In that letter, Jairal mentioned the receipt by his office of DECS Order No. 100, albeit wrongly
interpreting it as suspending only the purchases of reference books, supplementary readers, and so on,
but allegedly silent on the purchase of laboratory supplies and materials. 61
Finally, the SLTDs were purchased within the covered period of DECS Order No. 100, as evidenced by
the following relevant
documents adduced by the COA audit team, among others:
1) Disbursement Voucher dated November 27, 1990 for the payment of various laboratory supplies and
materials by DECS, Davao del Sur in the amount of P303,29.40 62
2) Official Receipt No. 455 dated January 7, 1991 amounting to P68,424.00 issued by Joven’s
Trading 63
3) Report of Inspection dated November 26, 1990 signed by Jacinta Villareal and Felicisimo Canoy 64
4) Sales Invoice No. 044 dated November 26, 1990 issued by Joven’s Trading in favor of DECS
amounting to P303,259.40 65
5) Certificate of Acceptance dated November 27, 1990 signed by Felicismo Canoy 66
6) Purchase Order No. 90-021 in favor of Joven’s Trading dated November 26, 1990 recommended for
approval by Ajatil Jairal 67
7) Official Receipt No. 92356 dated January 7, 1991 issued by D’Implacable Enterprises amounting
to P231,012.00 68
8) Purchase Order No. 90-024 dated December 17, 1990 recommended for approval by Ajatil Jairal and
approved Director Venancio Nava amounting to P231,012.00." 69
The confluence of the foregoing circumstances indubitably establishes that petitioner indeed wantonly
disregarded regulations. Additionally, DECS Order No. 100 negates his claim that the negotiated
transaction -- done instead of a public bidding -- was justified. If that Order suspended the acquisition of
tools and devices, then there was all the more reason for making purchases by public bidding. Since the
buying of tools and devices was specifically suspended, petitioner cannot argue that the purchases
were done in the interest of public service.
Proof of Guilt
To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that 1)
the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. 70
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence presented
warranted a verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf
of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the
SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established
such undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an administrative
order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g); namely,
that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, as seems to be stated in the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. 71 Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage.
Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the
lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires
that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the
government. 72
If the accused is to be sent to jail, it must be because there is solid evidence to pin that person down,
not because of the omission of a procedural matter alone. Indeed, all the elements of a violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove the culpability of the accused. In
this case, there is a clear showing that all the elements of the offense are present. Thus, there can be
no other conclusion other than conviction.
We note, however, that petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum. Under Section 9 of Republic Act 3019,
petitioner should be punished with imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor
more than fifteen years. Thus, we adjust the minimum penalty imposed on petitioner in accordance with
the law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the minimum sentence imposed shall be six (6) years and one (1) month, not six
(6) years and one (1) day. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04 September 2, 2009
OFELIA C. CAUNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 182020-24
JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
assail the Decision1 dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution2 dated March 10, 2008 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954, finding petitioners Joey
P. Marquez (Marquez) and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan) guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Marquez and Caunan, along with four (4) other local government officials of Parañaque City 3 and
private individual Antonio Razo (Razo), were charged under five (5) Informations, to wit:
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27944 states:
That on January 11, 1996 or thereabout, in Parañaque City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being
the City Mayor of Parañaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with the members of
the aforesaid Committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU
TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget Officer (SG 26),
OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff,
Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties
and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and with the accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZARO
Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions,
through personal canvass, with said ZARO Trading, for the purchase of 5,998 pieces of "walis ting-ting"
at ₱25 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-12-8629 in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱149,950.00), without
complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on
Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual
cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only ₱11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its
Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of ₱14.00 per piece or a total
overpriced amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO PESOS
(₱83,972.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27946 states:
That on June 30, 1997 or thereabout, in Parañaque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the
City Mayor of Parañaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the
aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU
TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26),
OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff,
Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties
and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O]
Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions,
through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 23,334 pieces of "walis ting-ting" at
₱15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-447 in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND TEN PESOS (₱350,010.00), without complying with the Commission on
Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and
which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting"
was only ₱11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May
13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of ₱4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of NINETY
THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX PESOS (₱93,336.00), thus causing damage and
prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27952 states:
That [in] September 1997, or thereabout, in Parañaque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being
the City Mayor of Parañaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the
aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU
TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26),
OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff,
Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties
and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O]
Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions,
through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 8,000 pieces of "walis ting-ting" at
₱15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-561 in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱120,000.00), without complying with the Commission on
Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and
which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting"
was only ₱11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May
13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of ₱4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (₱32,000.00), thus causing damage and prejudice to the government in the
aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27953 states:
That during the period from February 11, 1997 to February 20, 1997, or thereabout, in Parañaque City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P.
MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Parañaque City and Chairman,
Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE
LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA
M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services office (SG
26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking advance of their official positions, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO,
the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross
inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase
of 10,100 pieces of "walis ting-ting" on several occasions at ₱25.00 per piece without complying with the
Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on procurement and Public
Bidding and which purchases are hereunder enumerated as follows:
Date of Transaction Voucher No. Amount Quantity
February 20, 1997 101-97-04-1755 ₱ 3,000.00 120 pcs.
February 12, 1997 101-97-04-1756 ₱100,000.00 4,000 pcs.
February 11, 1997 101-97-04-1759 ₱149,500.00 5,980 pcs.
in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱252,000.00), and which
transactions were clearly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only P11.00
as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a
difference, therefore, of ₱14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (₱141,400.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the
government in the aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27954 states:
That during the period from October 15, 1996 to October 18, 1996 or thereabout, in Parañaque City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P.
MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Parañaque City and Chairman,
Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE
LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA
M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG
26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the
offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO,
the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross
inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase
of 8,000 pieces of "walis ting-ting" on several occasions at ₱25.00 per piece without complying with the
Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on procurement and Public
Bidding and which purchases are hereunder enumerated as follows:
Date of Transaction Voucher Number Amount Quantity
October 15, 1996 101-96-11-7604 ₱ 100,000.00 4,000 pcs.
October 18, 1996 101-96-11-7605 ₱ 100,000.00 4,000 pcs.
in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱200,000.00), and which transactions
were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only ₱11.00 as
found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a
difference, therefore, of ₱14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱112,000.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the
aforesaid sum.4
The five (5) Informations were filed based on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special
Audit Team that there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions of Parañaque City. In March
1999, a Special Audit Team composed of Fatima Bermudez (Bermudez), Carolina Supsup, Gerry
Estrada, and Yolando Atienza, by virtue of Local Government Audit Office Assignment Order No. 99-
002, audited selected transactions of Parañaque City for the calendar years 1996 to 1998, including the
walis tingting purchases.
In connection with the walis tingting purchases audit, the audit team gathered the following evidence:
1. Documents furnished by the Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City upon request of the
audit team;
2. Sample walis tingting with handle likewise submitted by the Office of the City Mayor of
Parañaque City;
3. Samples of walis tingting without handle actually utilized by the street sweepers upon ocular
inspection of the audit team;
4. Survey forms accomplished by the street sweepers containing questions on the walis
tingting;
5. Evaluation by the Technical Services Department 5 of the reasonableness of the walis
tingting procurement compared to current prices thereof;
 6. A separate canvass by the audit team on the prices of the walis tingting, including purchases
thereof at various merchandising stores;6 and
7. Documents on the conduct and process of procurement of walis tingting by the neighboring
city of Las Piñas.
Parenthetically, to ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998, the audit
team made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of Parañaque City.
All, however, were reluctant to provide the team with signed quotations of purchase prices for walis
tingting. In addition, the audit team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the named suppliers of
Parañaque City. Curiously, when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, these
were occupied by other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team located, and purchased
from, a lone supplier that sold walis tingting.
As previously adverted to, the audit team made a report which contained the following findings:
1. The purchase of walis tingting was undertaken without public bidding;
2. The purchase of walis tingting was divided into several purchase orders and requests to
evade the requirement of public bidding and instead avail of personal canvass as a mode of
procurement;
3. The purchase of walis tingting through personal canvass was attended with irregularities;
and
4. There was glaring overpricing in the purchase transactions.
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Disallowance Nos. 01-001-101 (96) to 01-006-101 (96), 01-
001-101 (97) to 01-011-101 (97), and 01-001-101 (98) to 01-004-101 (98) covering the overpriced
amount of ₱1,302,878.00 for the purchases of 142,612 walis tingting, with or without handle, by
Parañaque City in the years 1996-1998.7
Objecting to the disallowances, petitioners Marquez and Caunan, along with the other concerned local
government officials of Parañaque City, filed a request for reconsideration with the audit team which the
latter subsequently denied in a letter to petitioner Marquez.
Aggrieved, petitioners and the other accused appealed to the COA which eventually denied the appeal.
Surprisingly, on motion for reconsideration, the COA excluded petitioner Marquez from liability for the
disallowances based on our rulings in Arias v. Sandiganbayan8 and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan.9
On the other litigation front, the criminal aspect subject of this appeal, the Ombudsman found probable
cause to indict petitioners and the other local government officials of Parañaque City for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Consequently, the five (5) Informations against petitioners, et al. were
filed before the Sandiganbayan.
After trial and a flurry of pleadings, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan
and Marquez, along with Silvestre de Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 3019. As for accused Flocerfida Babida, Ailyn Romea and private individual Razo, the
Sandiganbayan acquitted them for lack of sufficient evidence to hold them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:
1. The prosecution evidence, specifically the testimony of Bermudez and the Special Audit
Team’s report, did not constitute hearsay evidence, considering that all the prosecution
witnesses testified on matters within their personal knowledge;
2. The defense failed to question, and timely object to, the admissibility of documentary
evidence, such as the Las Piñas City documents and the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) price listing downloaded from the Internet, which were certified true
copies and not the originals of the respective documents;
3. The Bids and Awards Committee was not properly constituted; the accused did not abide by
the prohibition against splitting of orders; and Parañaque City had not been afforded the best
possible advantage for the most objective price in the purchase of walis tingting for failure to
observe the required public bidding;
4. The contracts for procurement of walis tingting in Parañaque City for the years 1996-1998
were awarded to pre-selected suppliers; and
5. On the whole, the transactions undertaken were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.
Expectedly, the remaining accused, Caunan, Marquez and Tanael, moved for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan decision. Caunan and Tanael, represented by the same counsel, collectively filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (with Written Notice of Death of Accused Silvestre S. de Leon). Marquez
filed several motions,10 including a separate Motion for Reconsideration.
All the motions filed by Marquez, as well as Caunan’s motion, were denied by the Sandiganbayan.
However, with respect to Tanael, the Sandiganbayan found reason to reconsider her conviction.
Hence, these separate appeals by petitioners Marquez and Caunan.
Petitioner Caunan posits the following issues:
1. [WHETHER] THE PROSECUTION’S PROOF OF OVERPRICING [IS] HEARSAY.
2. [WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN [ERRED] IN ADMITTING WITNESS FATIMA
V. BERMUDEZ’ TESTIMONY DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS SOURCES ARE THEMSELVES
ADMITTEDLY AND PATENTLY HEARSAY.
3. [WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY [ERRED] IN APPLYING AN
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE[.] UNDER THIS EXCEPTION, "PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
CONSISTING OF ENTRIES IN PUBLIC RECORDS, ETC.," x x x ARE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.
4. CONSEQUENTLY, [WHETHER] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING [CAUNAN].11
For his part, petitioner Marquez raises the following:
1. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] MUST BE ACQUITTED FROM THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES BASED
ON THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN THE ARIAS AND MAGSUCI CASES EARLIER DECIDED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE AND OTHER EXISTING REGULATIONS[;]
2. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] MUST BE ACQUITTED FROM THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES SINCE
HE WAS ALREADY EXCLUDED FROM LIABILITY BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT[;]
3. WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF CO-ACCUSED 1) SUPPLIER ANTONIO RAZO WHO WAS THE
OTHER PARTY TO, AND RECEIVED THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF, THE QUESTIONED CONTRACTS
OR TRANSACTIONS, 2) CITY ACCOUNTANT MARILOU TANAEL WHO PRE-AUDITED THE CLAIMS
AND SIGNED THE VOUCHERS, 3) CITY BUDGET OFFICER FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, AND 4)
HEAD OF STAFF AILYN ROMEA CASTS A BIG CLOUD OF DOUBT ON THE FINDING OF
[MARQUEZ’S] GUILT BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN – FOURTH DIVISION[;]
4. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] CAN BE CONVICTED ON PLAIN HEARSAY, IF NOT DUBIOUS
EVIDENCE OF OVERPRICING OR ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT DO NOT
AMOUNT TO PROOF OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES[;]
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED OVERPRICING WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR CLAIMING THAT THE
CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BY [MARQUEZ] IN BEHALF OF PARAÑAQUE
CITY WERE MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT WAS
ASCERTAINED OR DETERMINED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OR PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED UNDER COA MEMORANDUM NO. 97-012
DATED MARCH 31, 1997[;]
6. WHETHER THE QUANTUM OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS OVERCOME THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WHICH [MARQUEZ] ENJOYS IN THE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES[;]
7. WHETHER THE RIGHT OF [MARQUEZ] TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE
CHAIRMAN (JUSTICE GREGORY ONG) OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN – FOURTH DIVISION
REFUSED TO INHIBIT DESPITE SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST[;]
8. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE REOPENING OF THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES[;]
9. WHETHER THE RIGHT OF [MARQUEZ] TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED WHEN INSTEAD OF ONLY ONE OFFENSE,
SEVERAL INFORMATION HAD BEEN FILED IN THE TRIAL COURT ON THE THEORY OF
OVERPRICING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF BROOMSTICKS (WALIS TINGTING) BY WAY OF
SPLITTING CONTRACTS OR PURCHASE ORDERS[; and]
10. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL SINCE HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL
TRIAL WAS VIOLATED IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES WHEN THE CHAIRMAN (JUSTICE
GREGORY ONG) REFUSED TO INHIBIT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SERIOUS CONFLICT OF
INTEREST RAISED BY THE FORMER BEFORE THE JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL. 12
In a Resolution dated February 23, 2009, we directed the consolidation of these cases. Thus, we impale
petitioners’ issues for our resolution:
1. First and foremost, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty of violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. Whether the testimony of Bermudez and the report of the Special Audit Team constitute
hearsay and are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
3. Whether petitioner Marquez should be excluded from liability based on our rulings in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan.14
Both petitioners insist that the fact of overpricing, upon which the charge against them of graft and
corruption is based, had not been established by the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases,
i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.15 Petitioners maintain that the evidence of overpricing, consisting
of the report of the Special Audit Team and the testimony thereon of Bermudez, constitutes hearsay
and, as such, is inadmissible against them. In addition, petitioner Marquez points out that the finding of
overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as required by COA Memorandum No. 97-
012 dated March 31, 1997.16 In all, petitioners asseverate that, as the overpricing was not sufficiently
established, necessarily, the last criminal element of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 — a contract or
transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government — was not proven.lavvphil
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the
accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.17
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question we
should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or
disadvantageous to the government.
We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of
Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced
procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently
shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven.
Thus, we grant the petitions.
In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.18 The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a
constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence.19 The court, in ascertaining the guilt of
an accused, must, after having marshaled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to
the accused’s guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.20 Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA’s finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on
the special audit team’s report. The audit team’s conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was
pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting
without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting
accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team
purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative
to the walis tingting purchases of Las Piñas City. These documents were then compared with the
documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Parañaque City’s walis tingting
transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution
did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Parañaque City. In fact, even
the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the
walis tingting actually utilized by the Parañaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by
the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to
substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in
1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to
the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the
disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 3019.
On the issue of hearsay, the Sandiganbayan hastily shot down petitioners’ arguments thereon, in this
wise:
We find no application of the hearsay rule here. In fact, all the witnesses in this case testified on matters
within their personal knowledge. The prosecution’s principal witness, Ms. Bermudez, was a State
Auditor and the Assistant Division Chief of the Local Government Audit Office who was tasked to head a
special audit team to audit selected transactions of Parañaque City. The report which she identified and
testified on [was] made by [the] Special Audit Team she herself headed. The disbursement vouchers,
purchase orders, purchase requests and other documents constituting the supporting papers of the
team’s report were public documents requested from the City Auditor of Parañaque and from the
accused Mayor Marquez. Such documents were submitted to the Special Audit Team for the specific
purpose of reviewing them. The documents were not executed by Ms. Bermudez or by any member of
the Special Audit Team for the obvious reason that, as auditors, they are only reviewing acts of others.
The Special Audit Team’s official task was to review the documents of the walis tingting transactions. In
the process of [the] review, they found many irregularities in the documentations —violations of the
Local Government Code and pertinent COA rules and regulations. They found that the transactions
were grossly overpriced. The findings of the team were consolidated in a report. The same report was
the basis of Ms. Bermudez’s testimony. x x x. 21
The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is specious and off tangent. The audit team reached a conclusion
of gross overpricing based on documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present market price
of walis tingting of a different specification, purchased from a non-supplier of Parañaque City, and the
price of walis tingting purchases in Las Piñas City. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to
demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, in order to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.
As pointed out by petitioner Caunan, not all of the contents of the audit team’s report constituted
hearsay. Indeed, as declared by the Sandiganbayan, Bermudez could very well testify thereon since the
conclusions reached therein were made by her and her team. However, these conclusions were based
on incompetent evidence. Most obvious would be the market price of walis tingting in Las Piñas City
which was used as proof of overpricing in Parañaque City. The prosecution should have presented
evidence of the actual price of the particular walis tingting purchased by petitioners and the other
accused at the time of the audited transaction or, at the least, an approximation thereof. Failing in these,
there is no basis to declare that there was a glaring overprice resulting in gross and manifest
disadvantage to the government.
We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioners failed to conduct the requisite public bidding for the
questioned procurements. However, the lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a
manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. As we had occasion to declare in Nava v.
Sandiganbayan,22 the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to
secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. However, this does
not satisfy the third element of the offense charged, because the law requires that the disadvantage
must be manifest and gross. After all, penal laws are strictly construed against the government.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to rule on the applicability of our rulings in Arias
and Magsuci to petitioner Marquez. Nonetheless, we wish to reiterate herein the doctrines laid down in
those cases. We call specific attention to the sweeping conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that a
conspiracy existed among petitioners and the other accused, most of whom were acquitted, particularly
private individual Razo, the proprietor of Zaro Trading.
Our ruling in Magsuci, citing our holding in Arias, should be instructive, viz.:
The Sandiganbayan predicated its conviction of [Magsuci] on its finding of conspiracy among Magsuci,
Ancla and now deceased Enriquez.
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the
crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy
need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence
therefore must reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design.
xxxx
Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the very functions he had
to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been no intimation at all that he had
foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might
have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports
submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there
must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionality on the part of cohorts.

In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, aware of the dire consequences that a different rule could bring,
has aptly concluded:

"We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems—
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence—is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives
of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.

"x x x x

"x x x. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. x x x. There has to be
some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even
small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed.
There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely
pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or department is even more appalling." 23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution dated March
10, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Joey P. Marquez in G.R. Nos. 182020-24 and Ofelia C.
Caunan in G.R. Nos. 181999 and 182001-04 are ACQUITTED of the charges against them. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133535 September 9, 1999
LILIA B. ORGANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, 1 that denied
petitioner's motion to quash the information in the case below, for lack of merit.
We grant the petition.
The facts are as follows:
On August 15, 1997, Special Prosecution Officer Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Information against petitioner, together with others, for the crime of "plunder" or violation of R.A. No.
7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. 2
The Information reads as follows:
That on or about 05 November 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Dominga S. Manalili, Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose dP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, being
then public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as employees of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Region 7, Quezon City, and Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo
S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr., conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass and acquire funds
belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank account with
the Landbank of the Philippines, West Triangle Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, for and
in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to
the government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments, then withdraw
therefrom the total sum of Pesos: One Hundred Ninety Three Million Five Hundred
Sixty Five Thousand Seventy Nine & 64/100 (P193,565,079.64) Philippine Currency,
between November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper authority, through checks
made payable to themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above named
private persons, thereby succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or
malversing said public finds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own
personal gains, advantages and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforestated amount. 3
On August 20, 1997, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash information for lack of
jurisdiction, contending that the Sandiganbayan no longer had jurisdiction over the case under R.A.
8249, approved on February 5, 1997.
On September 29, 1997, without first resolving petitioner's motion to quash information, the
Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused in the case.
On November 28, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash
the information for lack of merit.
On December 9, 1997, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration, reiterating
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249, approved on
February 5, 1997.
On April 28, 1998, after one hundred forty (140) days from its filing, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration ruling that she should first surrender to the
court before she may file any further pleading with the court.
Hence, this petition.
On June 23, 1998, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition, not to file
a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. 4
On September 14, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People of the
Philippines, filed its comment. 5
On January 4, 1999, the Solicitor General filed his comment. 6
We give due course to the petition.
At issue is whether the Sandiganbayan at the time of the filing of the information on August 15, 1997
had jurisdiction over the case, in view of the enactment on February 5, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8249,
vesting in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses and felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by public officers and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of Section 4 in
relation to their office where the accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Petitioner contends that since none of the accused holds a position with Salary Grade "27" and higher,
jurisdiction over the case falls with the Regional Trial Court. 7 On the other hand, respondent
Sandiganbayan's position is that Republic Act No. 7080 which defines and penalizes the crime of
"plunder" vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction thereof, and since it is a special law, it constitutes an
exception to the general law, Republic Act No. 8249. 8
Republic Act No. 7080, Section 3 provides: In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied positions with Salary
Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be within the 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. for.

This law was enacted on September 23, 1991, and was effective on October 7, 1991. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition, for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, dated November 20, 1997, and April 28, 1998, in Criminal Case No. 24100.
On February 5, 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was approved, further defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith refer the case to the court of proper jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of the law provides: No costs.

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original SO ORDERED.

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in sub-section a of this
section in relation to their office.

xxx xxx xxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. 9

This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is a
special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan of "small fry" cases. In an unusual manner, the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty
imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of
accused government officials and employees.

However, the crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until otherwise provided by
law." 10 Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special law that provided for the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.

Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher,
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to
their office.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional.
This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his
bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President
and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent
Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution1 finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under
Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then
mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the
case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused
was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the
ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one
offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On
its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause
exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved
in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No.
7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he
be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix
Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the
Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct
Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending
Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash
and Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set
for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1)
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION
TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused
Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada,
his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for
plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the
same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his
alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing
together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent
court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea
prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner,
and denying him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators,
with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
 4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information
which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of
proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies
him the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder
Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended
Information which charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
"ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie
‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF
HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY
IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50]
AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on
the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot
constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it
is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with
the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the
accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of
R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in
the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with
former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling
amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected
money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the
petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the
petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to
indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they
appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are
to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on
several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section
1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different
predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges
petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of
the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have
received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required
under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the
Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in
pertinent part reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have
also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned
from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two
occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul
totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An
alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 &
Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2
million was delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is,
therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by
the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545
million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in
exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x."15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any
probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable
cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then
underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to
guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." 16 Thus, he posits
the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we
impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should
it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten
specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in
five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and
the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to
apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is
charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-
paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be
different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable
penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second
paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate
acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the
penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for
alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected – contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial
of substantive due process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate
act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because
he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from
the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information. 19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-
vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with
the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes
in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in
particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate
acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances,
money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and
expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing
the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which
act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-
paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President.
Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation,
and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became
part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts
fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the
former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the
predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose
Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to
amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former
President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the
predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in
four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted
to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the
aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President
Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with
the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire
illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and
required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several
criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but
eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same
accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to
address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and
abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft
and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to
come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the
previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different
accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to
purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly
involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person
or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and
(2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which
there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy.
The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the
spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground
that the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed
that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American
law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in
common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a
general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when
the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion
and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the
gravamen of the offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by
concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or
unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.25 Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal
objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent
necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. 26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes
of conspiracy27 – conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to
impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized
under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor
only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory,
Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting
or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any
duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his
duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of
his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to
injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties,
each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or
both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United
States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to
"commit any offense against the United States" refers to an act made a crime by federal laws. 29 It refers
to an act punished by statute.30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal
laws, whether criminal or regulatory. 31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white
slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs
violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws
and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation. 32 Section 371 penalizes
the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is
generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense, 33 hence, the court rulings that
acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related
conspiracy.34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of
property or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by
deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the United
States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of
effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of
particulars.37 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the
offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in
furtherance of the agreement.38 To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they
agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a
conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement,
and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great
a certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense. 40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American
courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they
lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated,
conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be
alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the
sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime
must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense
given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was
committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be
made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name
given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. 41 The information
must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. 44 Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information.45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.46 The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of
said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy
to commit treason" is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to
levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and
decide to commit it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the
Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the
offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or
(b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or
persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a
crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all
the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
their participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be
equally responsible for the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of all.51 In People v.
Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in
the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the
facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or
supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold
such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the
other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act
of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know
from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts
of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all
the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that
can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the
words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged
with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated
crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information
must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a
community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the
accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or
"confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the
form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the
unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such
as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of
basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be
confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be
shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a
mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word
"conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; 53 or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. 54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation;
of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of
sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary
in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms
how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with
his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of
the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant
petition before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for
Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical
condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention.1âwphi1 The motion
was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings
on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as
sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate
Resolution of Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations."
Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. 56
conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity
to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong
evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its
Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence
was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s
guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine
if the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for
resolution and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21,
2001.

On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual
basis."57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that
petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the
accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."58

The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:

"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution."59

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which reads:

"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."

The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
TITLE VIII:
Crimes Against Persons
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 129895. April 30, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG y CUSTODIO, Appellant.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the 10 January 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
42, in Criminal Case No. 17838, finding appellant PO3 Armando Dalag guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of parricide for killing his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag. The trial court imposed upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay their children P50,000 as civil indemnity.
The amended Information against the appellant reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PO3 Armando C. Dalag of the crime of PARRICIDE
(Under Art. 246 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, said accused Armando C. Dalag, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and with
evident premeditation, that is having conceived and deliberated to kill his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag, with
whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did, then and there, attack, assault, dragged (sic) and inflict
serious multiple injuries upon his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag, in the different parts of her body, to wit:
Cranio-Cerebral Trauma with probale (sic) severe diffuse Axonal injury r/o Intracranial hematoma; r/o
Multifocal Cerebral Contusions; Multiple Abrasions-Contusions; face, neck anterior chest extremities and
such other injuries contained in the post exhumation autopsy/examination report employing means,
manner and form in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specially to insure its commission
without danger to the person of the accused, as a result of which attack and injuries caused the death of
said Leah N. Dalag.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On his arraignment, Armando, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 3 Trial
ensued.
The Antecedents
Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to the Bacolod City police station,
was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag4. They had three children: Francis, Princess Joy and Ezra
John. The family resided in Barangay Handumanan, Bacolod City.
The marriage of Armando and Leah was far from idyllic. Their coverture was marred by violent quarrels,
with Leah always at the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises
and lumps on different parts of her body. The situation came to a point when on one occasion, Leahs
father, Marcos Nolido, had to advise Armando to stop beating his wife. Armando replied that he planned
to sell the house and leave Leah. Marcos was taken aback. He went to the kitchen and after a few minutes,
heard Armando ordering his wife to get out of the house. He saw Armando poke his firearm at Leah.
Marcos tried to pacify Armando to no avail. Marcos lost his temper and shouted at Armando: What kind
of a policeman are you? You are committing police brutality against your wife. Instead of being chastened,
Armando poked his gun on his father-in-law instead.
On August 15, 1996, at around 8:00 p.m., Francis, then eleven years old, and his sister Princess Joy,
then nine years old, were watching television in their house. Armando, who was drinking hard liquor, and
Leah were in the yard sitting under the datiles tree. Momentarily, the children heard their parents
quarreling. Leah was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The kids sensed that some object was
being banged on the wall. Thereafter, they heard their mother cry. Francis and Princess Joy rushed
outside the house to see what was happening. They were horrified when from a distance of three meters,
they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of her body. She fell to the ground. Even as
Leah was already lying posthaste on the ground, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the
different parts of the body. Francis and Princess Joy pleaded to their father to stop maltreating their
mother. Armando angrily told them not to interfere and that he will later beat them up as well. He grabbed
Leahs hair and banged her head on the wall. Leahs forehead directly hit the wall. In the process, Armando
stepped on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband, she told him Toy, Toy, I will find
some medicine for your wound. Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor, Felisa Horilla or Tia Feli.
Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the house of Felisa. Francis went back to the house. Princess
Joy looked for her parents but could not find them. She decided to go back to their house to sleep. In the
meantime, Armando herded Leah back to the house. Princess Joy was awakened when she heard her
mother crying. When Princess Joy went outside of the house, she saw her mother being pushed by her
father. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and
ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She did. She poured water on the face of her mother but the
latter did not move. Armando then tried to revive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no
avail.
Princess Joy went back to the house to rouse Francis. When Francis came out to the yard, he saw his
mother lying on the ground still unconscious. Armando was sitting near Leah, while nonchalantly smoking
cigarette. Francis got a piece of carton from their store and placed it underneath his mothers body. Francis
then suggested to his father that they bring Leah inside the house. Armando nonchalantly remarked, You
really love your mother.
Armando and Francis carried Leah to the house. Francis noticed that there were lumps on his mothers
face as well as bruises on both her arms, between her breasts and on her thighs. There was likewise
blood on Leahs right ear. After laying down her head on the bed, Armando told Francis to get some hot
water. Armando then washed his wifes face with lukewarm water. When Francis finally went to sleep, his
mother was still unconscious.
When they woke up the following day, or on August 16, 1996, Francis and Princess Joy noticed that their
mother remained unconscious. Despite their mothers condition, they decided to go to school. During
lunchtime, Francis went home and saw that Leahs condition had not improved. When the children came
home in the afternoon after their classes, Armando told them that their mother was brought to the hospital.
Armando instructed Francis to inform his colleagues at the police headquarters that he would be unable
to report for duty because his wife accidentally slipped and had to be brought to the hospital.
When Francis visited his mother in the hospital, he saw her lying on the bed, her face badly swollen. He
saw the lumps and bruises on the different parts of her body. Leah never regained her consciousness.
She died on August 22, 1996.
When SPO3 Herman S. Garcia, the station commander, was apprised of the death of Leah, he ordered
Armando not to leave the police station. However, on August 23, 1996, Armando left the police station
without the knowledge and permission of Garcia and could not be located.5 However, on August 28, 1996,
Armando surrendered to SPO3 Garcia and to PO3s Joel Stephen B. Casador and Filemon
Roderos.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Jesse Rey T. Cruel, the medico-legal officer of the Commission on Human Rights, conducted a post
exhumation autopsy on the cadaver of Leah. The autopsy report revealed as follows:
FINDINGS
ABRASIONS:
1. 2.0 cms. x 3.0 cms., xiphi-sternal area, chest;
2. 6.0 cms. x 8.0 cms., multiple, in various sizes and shapes, knee region, left;
3. 5.0 cms. x 7.0 cms., multiple, in various sizes and shapes, elbow region, left;
4. 6.0 cms. x. 10.0 cms. multiple, in various sizes and shapes, elbow region, right;
5. 4.0 cms. x 11.0 cms., multiple, in various sizes and shapes, dorsal aspect, hand, right;
6. 1.5 cms. x 3.0 cms., shoulder, left.
CONTUSED ABRASIONS, brownish:
1. 4.0 cms. x 7.5 cms., lateral aspect, malleolar area, left;
2. 6.0 cms. x 6.5 cms., lateral aspect, malleolar area, right;
3. 1.0 cm. X 2.5 cms., temporal area, head, left side.
CONTUSIONS, purplish-brown:
1. 1.0 cm x 3.0 cms., antero-lateral aspect, arm, middle third, right;
2. 2.0 cms. x 4.0 cm., anterior aspect, middle third, thigh, right;
3. 5.0 cms. x 6.5 cms., anterior aspect, middle third, thigh right;
4. 2.5 cms. x 4.0 cms., antero-lateral aspect, proximal third, leg, right;
5. 1.5 cms. in diameter, infra-mammary region, chest, right side;
6. 1.5 cms. in diameter, medial aspect, chest, right side;
7. 3.5 cms. x 6.5 cms., axillary region, right.
Scalp hematoma, parietal region, head, right side, with shallow depression of the right, temporal bone
along the pterion.
Blood, clotted, approximately 100 milliliters in volume, anterior fossa, right.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Pleural and peritoned cavity, non-bloody.
Stomach, empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to blunt injury of the head. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Cruel testified that Leah suffered severe beatings and traumatic physical violence resulting in
intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death.
The Defense of Armando
Armando vigorously denied killing his wife. He testified that he was a member of the PNP. However,
before joining the police, he was unemployed. Thus, during the early part of his marriage to Leah, Marcos,
his father-in-law, disapproved of him. He admitted that his relationship with his father-in-law did not
improve because every time he and his wife had a spat, Marcos would interfere. Moreover, Marcos
resented him because he (Armando) was a Catholic while Marcos and his family, including Leah, and
their children belonged to the Mormon faith.
Armando narrated that on August 15, 1996, at around 6:00 p.m., he was watching TV Patrol on television
with Leah and their children. When the program was over, he went out to their yard and sat under
the datiles tree. Leah followed him. They then decided to drink liquor. He stood up to get a cigarette when
he stepped on a four-inch nail. The nail punctured his foot, causing it to bleed. Marcos ordered Leah to
get medicine. However, she could not find any. She then proceeded to the house of Tia Feli to ask for
medicine. When Leah failed to return after an hour, he followed her to Tia Felis house and found her
conversing with friends. She told Armando that she was not able to find any medicine for him. He then
asked her why she was still there, and ordered her to go home with him because it was already late.
When they were near their gate, Leah pushed Armando and ran towards their house. As she was running,
Leah stumbled upon a pile of cut bamboos, causing her to fall to the ground. She then hit her head in-
between the two stones found in their yard. Leahs left temple and nape (back portion of her neck) hit the
stones. She then rolled over. Armando immediately rushed to Leahs aid and when she saw that she had
lost consciousness, applied mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on her. Leah regained consciousness.
Armando called Francis and Princess Joy and told them that their mother had an accident.
Armando and Francis carried Leah and brought her inside the house. Upon his fathers instructions,
Francis wiped his mothers face with towel soaked in lukewarm water. Armando asked her if she wanted
to be brought to the hospital, but Leah refused. The following morning, Armando noticed that Leah had
two lumps at the back of her neck and on her left temple. Realizing that his wifes condition was getting
worse, he had his mother fetched and together, they brought Leah to the hospital.
During Leahs confinement in the hospital, Armando stayed away to avoid confrontation with his father-in-
law. After his wifes death, the children lived with Leahs parents. Armando averred that the testimonies of
his children were untrue. In fact, he insisted, when they visited him at the headquarters they told him that
they did not want him to go to jail.
Armandos mother, Agueda Dalag, testified that on August 16, 1996, Ada, her daughter, fetched her from
the house upon the instruction of Armando. She and Ada went to the house of Armando and saw Leah
on bed unconscious. When she asked Armando what happened to Leah, Armando replied that his wife
slipped and fell, hitting her head on two stones. Armando, Agueda and Ada brought Leah to the hospital.
Agueda testified that her son loved his wife and that she was not aware of any occasion where he
maltreated or manhandled Leah.
PO3 Joel Stephen B. Casador testified that as far as he knew, Armando and Leah had a good marital
relationship. Nenita Garcia, a neighbor of Armando and Leah, testified that early in the evening of August
15, 1996, she saw husband and wife drinking under the datiles tree in their yard. At around 8:00 in the
evening, Leah passed by her house on the way to Tia Felis house. Thereafter, Armando followed Leah
to Tia Felis house. Nenita observed that Armando was limping. He and Leah went back to their house
together. Nenita said that she did not see the couple quarrel, nor was there anything unusual in the
behavior of the couple that night.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding Armando guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of parricide for killing his wife and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
appreciated the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and one analogous to passion and
obfuscation in favor of Armando. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused, ARMANDO CUSTODIO
DALAG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and one analogous to passion and obfuscation and there being no Q Do you know what were they doing there?
aggravating circumstance in attendance in [the] commission of the crime, hereby sentences the accused A My father was drinking.
to serve the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all its accessory penalties and to indemnify the Q How about your mother?
children of the deceased, Leah Nolido-Dalag, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P 50,000.00) PESOS. No A My mother was admonishing my father to stop drinking.
costs. Q Why do you know that?
A Because I went out of our house.
SO ORDERED.8cräläwvirtualibräry Q Why did you go out from you[r] house?
WITNESS:
A Because I heard my mother crying.
In his appeal brief, Armando, now the appellant, contends that: FISCAL CHUA:
Q Aside from hearing your mother crying, did you hear anything else?
I A Yes, maam.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED INFLICTED INJURIES TO THE Q What was that?
DECEASED THAT CAUSED HER DEATH. A I heard something banged against our wall.
II Q So, when you went out from your house, did you see your father and mother there?
THAT THE LOWER [COURT] ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF FRANCIS AND A Yes, maam.
PRINCESS JOY DALAG WHICH WERE FABRICATED AND COACHED. Q And what did you see?
III A My father and mother were quarreling.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CRE[C]ENCE (SIC) TO THE UNFOUNDED Q Was your mother fighting with your father or you[r] father fighting with your mother?
ALLEGATIONS OF MARCOS NOLIDO, JR. WHO HAS AN AXED (SIC) TO GRIND AGAINST THE A I saw my father fighting with my mother.
ACCUSED.9cräläwvirtualibräry Q What was your father doing to your mother?
A He was castigating or maltreating my mother.
The issues raised by appellant involve the credibility of witnesses and their testimony and the probative Q Can you specifically tell the court how was your father maltreated (sic) or castigo your mother?
weight thereof. He, in effect, assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the probative weight WITNESS:
accorded by the trial court to their respective testimonies. A He punched and at the same time kicked my mother.
FISCAL CHUA:
Q How about your mother? What was she doing?
The Verdict of this Court A She was crying.
Q Was she fighting back?
It is axiomatic in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate A No, she was not fighting back.
court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached Q Now, when your mother was kicked and punched by your father, what happened to her?
conclusions that are clearly unsupported by evidence, or unless it has overlooked some facts or A While my father was physically abusing my mother, my mother was crying while she was sitting on the
circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would affect the result of the case. 10 The ground.
rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting Q When your father kicked your mother, where was she hit?
falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses A She was hit on her stomach.
while testifying.11cräläwvirtualibräry Q How about the boxing?
WITNESS:
A The punches of my father landed all over the body of my mother.
In this case, the trial court declared that the children, Francis and Princess Joy, the principal prosecution
FISCAL CHUA:
witnesses, testified in a logical, candid, and straight-forward manner, describing in detail what they saw
Q How many times did your father punch and kick your mother that night?
and heard in a manner characteristic of witnesses who are telling the truth.12 The Court finds no reason
A Many times.
to deviate from these findings as the records fully support the same. The children recalled the sordid
FISCAL CHUA:
events that happened in the evening of August 15, 1996 involving their parents without any trace of bias,
Q During this physical abuse inflicted by your father to your mother, what happened to your mother that
impelled by no other motive than to bring justice to their mothers senseless death. Francis for one
evening while you were still there?
graphically testified in this manner:
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
Objection, your honor. It was already answered by the child. He said his mother was crying, your honor,
FISCAL CHUA: while she was physically abused by the accused.
Q How about your mother and father at that time? Do you know where they were? COURT:
WITNESS: Overruled, may answer.
A Yes, maam. WITNESS:
Q Where? A She was sitting on the ground.
A They were outside of our house near the datiles tree. FISCAL CHUA:
Q While she was sitting on the ground, did your father continue maltreating her? Q Later that evening, what happened?
A Yes, maam. A I went back to sleep.
FISCAL CHUA: Q Now, this incident on August 15, 1996, was this the first time that you saw your father beat your mother?
Q And when you went out, what did you see again? A No, maam. That was not the first time. Actually, there were several occasions where my father beat my
WITNESS: mother.
A When I went out again while my parents were still quarreling, me and my younger sister told my father, FISCAL CHUA:
Tatay, thats enough. And my Tatay told her, Do not interfere or else, I will beat you by and by. Q Later, you said your mother was brought to the hospital. Were you able to visit your mother at the
Q And when you heard this, what did you do? hospital the following day?
A When our father told us not to interfere, and ordered us to go back inside our house, we complied with WITNESS:
his order while he was still continuing beating our mother. So, I went out again. A Yes, maam.
Q When you went out again, did you see anything? Q Did you see your mother?
A They were no longer there. A Yes, maam.
Q Later, did you see them? I withdraw that question. Q Can you tell us how your mother looked at the hospital?
So, when you saw that they were not there, what did you do? A When I visited my mother at the hospital, I noticed that her face was swo[l]len and [s]he had several
WITNESS: lumps on her face and I also noticed that she still had so many bruises in both arms and body.
A I went out of the road in front of our house to look for my parents but they were not there. Q At the hospital, was your mother able to regain consciousness or talked to you?
Q So, what did you do? A No, maam. My mother never regained consciousness.
A I went back inside. Q Ultimately, do you know what happened to your mother at the hospital?
Q When you went back inside, what did you do? A Yes, maam.
A After I went back inside of our house, I was so terrified and I sat down for awhile and went to sleep. FISCAL CHUA:
Q Later, did you wake up? Q What happened to her?
A Yes, maam. WITNESS:
Q And when you woke up, what did you do? A She died.
A When I woke up, I saw my mother already unconscious. Q Do you know when your mother died?
Q Where was your mother then while she was unconscious? A My mother died on August 22, 1996.13cräläwvirtualibräry
A She was lying on the ground near the datiles tree. Princess Joy substantially corroborated her brothers testimony on its material points. She narrated how
Q And did you see the physical condition of your mother when you brought her inside the house? the appellant assaulted Leah:
WITNESS: PROSECUTOR PELAYO:
A Yes, maam. And what did you see that evening? What happened between your father and your mother?
FISCAL CHUA: WITNESS:
Q Will you please tell the court how did you see or observed the physical condition of your mother that They had a quarrel.
night? PROSECUTOR PELAYO:
A After we brought our mother inside our house I observed that on her face, there were several lumps And what was your father doing then while he was quarreling with your mother?
and at the same time, she also had bruises on both of her arms, and also somewhere in the middle of her WITNESS:
breast. My father physically abused my mother.
Q How about the legs? Did you see your mothers legs or thighs? PROSECUTOR PELAYO:
A Yes, maam. Can you tell the Court how did your father physically abused or beat or castigo your mother that evening
Q What did you see? of October 15, 1996?
A My mothers legs had also bruises. WITNESS:
Q Did you see any blood on your mothers body or face? My father first choked my mothers neck, he banged her head against something and lastly, he kicked her
A I saw my mother was bleeding on her right ear. under her left armpit.
FISCAL CHUA: ATTY. GRIJALDO:
Q After that, what did you do after your mother was brought in to your house? My we suggest that the phrase banged her head on something be changed to banged her head on a wall.
WITNESS: COURT:
A My father ordered me to get some hot water. On something. Let that interpretation stay and we will clarify from the witness as we go along.
Q Where you the one who got the hot water? PROSECUTOR CHUA:
A Yes, maam. You said your father banged your mother on something. Can you tell us how did your father banged her
Q And what happened then when you brought that hot water? head on something?
A After I brought some hot water, my father used it to wipe of (sic) wash my mother. WITNESS:
Q After that, what happened? What did you do? My father held my mother on the head and banged my mothers head against the wall.
A While my father was washing my mother with lukewarm water, I noticed that my mother never regained PROSECUTOR CHUA:
consciousness and she had several cuts and bruises on her body. And what part of your mothers head that hit the wall?
WITNESS: WITNESS:
My mothers forehead hit the wall. She ran.
PROSECUTOR CHUA: PROSECUTOR CHUA:
When your mothers head hit the wall, what happened to her? So, when your mother left, running away, what did you do?
WITNESS: WITNESS:
About the same time, my mothers head was against the wall, my father stepped on a nail. I went out to look for my mother and my father but in doing so I no longer found them on our yard.
PROSECUTOR CHUA: PROSECUTOR CHUA:
You said your father kicked your mother. What was the position of your mother when your father kicked When your mother ran away, what did your father do?
her? ATTY. GRIJALDO:
WITNESS: Objection, Your Honor, her mother did not run away to get medicine.
My mother was lying prone on the ground. COURT:
PROSECUTOR CHUA: Sustained.
How did your father kicked your mother this time? Please describe. PROSECUTOR CHUA:
WITNESS: When your mother ran, what did your father do?
He just kept on kicking my mother while she was lying prone on the ground. WITNESS:
PROSECUTOR CHUA: When my mother get (sic) out and ran, my father chased my mother.
Did you see where your mother was hit? PROSECUTOR CHUA:
WITNESS: You said you went out of the house and looked for your father and your mother and you found out that
She was hit on the left side portion of her stomach. they were not there anymore. Since you found out that your father and mother were not there anymore in
PROSECUTOR CHUA: your yard, what did you do?
Did you see how your father was able to hit your mother here at her side, under her left side. WITNESS:
WITNESS: I went back to our house.
My father kicked my mother and he hit the left portion of her body under her left side which caused my PROSECUTOR CHUA:
mother to roll on the ground. What did you do inside your house?
PROSECUTOR CHUA: WITNESS:
About your mother, what was she doing, was she fighting back? I slept for a while.
WITNESS: PROSECUTOR CHUA:
No, maam. Later, were you able to wake up that same evening?
PROSECUTOR CHUA: WITNESS:
What was she doing? Yes, sir.
WITNESS: PROSECUTOR CHUA:
She was just merely crying. What made you wake up again?
PROSECUTOR CHUA: WITNESS:
You said later your father stepped on a nail. So, what happened when he stepped on a nail. I overheard my mother crying.
WITNESS: PROSECUTOR CHUA:
After my father stepped on a nail my mother told him Toy, Toy, I will find some medicine for your wound Meaning, you heard your mother crying I withdraw. So, when you heard your mother crying, what did you
and my mother went out and went to the house of Tia Feli. do because you have already woke up?
PROSECUTOR CHUA: WITNESS:
After your mother ran away from your father, what happened after that? I went out.
ATTY. GRIJALDO: PROSECUTOR CHUA:
We object, Your Honor, the witness did not say that her mother ran away. When you went out from your house after waking up and hearing the cry of your mother, did you see your
COURT: father and mother outside your house?
Reform. WITNESS:
PROSECUTOR CHUA: Yes, maam.
After your mother ran away, as you said PROSECUTOR CHUA:
ATTY. GRIJALDO: What did you see?
Same objection, Your Honor. WITNESS:
COURT: I saw my father pushed my mother.
Same ruling. PROSECUTOR CHUA:
PROSECUTOR CHUA: When your father pushed your mother, what happened to your mother?
When your mother told your father that she was going to get medicine to apply on the wound of your WITNESS:
father, did she ran (sic) or did she walk (sic) from your father? My mother, after being pushed by my father, fell to the ground and lost her consciousness.
PROSECUTOR CHUA: Q So, will you please describe the injuries that you have observed when you examined this particular
When your mother lost consciousness, what did your father do? patient and such injuries that are now reflected in this diagram which have been made under your direction
WITNESS: which you have testified earlier?
When my mother lost consciousness, my father laid her on some stone on the ground. A She had peri-orbital hematomas.
PROSECUTOR CHUA: Q Can you explain that in the laymans language?
What else did your father do aside from lying your mother on the stone? A Okey. She had a blackeye. She had also evidence of contusion, hematoma also on the right mastoid
WITNESS: area.
After my mother was laid down on some stone (sic), my father on a sitting position, ordered me to get Q Where is that, Doctor?
some water and when I came back I poured the water on my mother. A Behind the ear. Those two (2) signs indicate usually basal fracture and hemorrhage on the base of the
PROSECUTOR CHUA: brain.
After you poured water on your mother, did your mother came to consciousness? FISCAL CHUA:
WITNESS: Q What else have you noticed on the face of the patient, Doctor?
No, maam. WITNESS:
PROSECUTOR CHUA: A The one which really struck me and I was suspicious then, were the apparent fingermarks.
What else did your father do? COURT:
WITNESS: Q Where?
My father tried to resuscitate her by supplying air into her mouth. WITNESS:
PROSECUTOR CHUA: Q In the neck.
Did your mother recover? FISCAL CHUA:
WITNESS: Q And what does that indicate these clawmarks on the neck which arose your suspicion?
No, maam.14cräläwvirtualibräry A They were located on the anterior part of the neck.
Q And what does this indicate? How does this mark came into the neck of the patient?
The testimonies of Francis and Princess Joy, who are of tender age, innocent and guileless, pointing to A Well, to be honest, it was my own opinion then because there was a discrepancy from the injuries I
their father as the person responsible for the death of their mother deserve full faith and credence have seen and the alleged accident which was told by the informer that time.
considering that they would not impute a heinous crime against him for which he could be meted reclusion FISCAL CHUA:
perpetua or even the death penalty if such were not the truth. A witness testimony against a blood relative Q And Doctor, in your opinion, what could have caused this injury on the neck?
is given great weight, if it is not found to have been motivated by ill will. 15cräläwvirtualibräry WITNESS:
A I was suspecting that she was strangled.
Q Now, Doctor, there is also a mark on this diagram here. Can you tell us what is this on the chest?
Moreover, the version of Francis and Princess Joy as to what actually transpired on that night of August A That is another contusion abrasion which I noted.
15, 1996 is more credible than that proffered by the appellant. The childrens testimonies are buttressed Q Where?
by the findings of Dr. Canto, the neurological surgeon who attended to Leah when she was confined in A On the anterior part of the chest at the level of the syphoid process. This is the most interior part of the
the hospital, and Dr. Cruel of the Commission on Human Rights, who conducted the post-mortem sternum.
examination on Leahs body. Indeed, the appellants claim that the death of resulted from accident, i.e., Q In laymans language Doctor, what part of the body is that?
she slipped and hit her head on two stones, flies in the face of incriminating medical findings. As opined A Well, it is just midline just below the level of her breast.
by Dr. Canto, he found it difficult to believe that the injuries sustained by Leah resulted from a bad fall. Q Now, Doctor, there are also here some marks on the ear of the patient as drawn here. Can you tell or
The testimony of the doctor is as follows: explain this to us?
WITNESS:
Q Doctor, you saw the patient Leah N. Dalag, of course? A This was explained earlier. These are hematomas, contusions. Hematomas at the mastoid area. It is
WITNESS: usually a sign of basal skull fracture.
A Yes, maam. FISCAL CHUA:
Q You examined her personally? Q Now, Doctor, was this contusion and hematoma found on both ears of the patient Leah Dalag?
A Yes, maam. A I cannot recall but based on this drawing, it is bilateral on both sides of the ears.
Q You examined the extent of her injuries when she was brought in to the hospital and you saw her for Q Doctor, have you noticed upon examination of the patient whether or not blood was coming out from
the first time? any part of her body?
WITNESS: A I cannot recall.
A Yes, and in fact, I have to add. In this particular case, I was interested specifically because I was Q What else have you noticed, Doctor, aside from hematomas and contusions?
suspecting some foul play because the history, it was told by the Resident Physician that she fell but I A I cannot recall everything but I note some abrasions on the extermities (sic) in the elbows.
saw a lot of discrepancies injuries. Q How about on the temple? On the head? Aside from those that you have described on the two (2) ears,
FISCAL CHUA: how about the portion on the head?
WITNESS:
A None.
FISCAL CHUA: I reform, your honor.
Q Now, Doctor, is it possible that a human brain can sustain internal injuries without outward manifestation Q Assuming the facts as already established by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the
which may be visible to the naked eyes? injuries that you have described just right now, can you state in your own opinion with reasonable certainty
A Yes, maam. that the injuries suffered by the deceased was the direct result of the violence and the batterings she
Q Can you give specific instance, Doctor? Can you explain further? received on August 15, 1996 or before she was brought to the hospital?
A The brain floats inside the skull. Imagine the brain contained in a glass jar with fluid. The brain floats A Yes, maam.
there and any movement of the jar will cause also an acceleration-deceleration movement. If you translate Q Now, further assuming the facts established by other witnesses in this case, can you state with
it into a force applied to the skull, for example a vehicular accident the brain can bust to and fro or even reasonable certainty whether in your opinion, the injuries sustained by the deceased Leah N. Dalag could
rotated around the skull and cause the internal injuries. have caused her death on August 22, 1996?
COURT: A Yes, maam.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Q Just like the effect of boxing?
WITNESS: The foregoing testimony of Dr. Canto as to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by Leah not
A Yes, Your Honor. only confirms the testimonies of the children but likewise exposes as utterly preposterous the appellants
COURT: claim that she suffered from a bad fall. Notably, Dr. Cantos findings were corroborated by the findings of
Q Whether professional or amateur boxing? Dr. Cruel, who conducted the post-mortem examination on Leahs corpse. As the trial court aptly observed:
A Yes, your honor.
FISCAL CHUA:
Q How about Doctor, when you choke a person? Shake him or her can it sustain brain damage? The denials of the accused that he authored the injuries sustained by his wife and his claim that she was
ATTY. GRIJALDO: injured because she hit her head on two big stones when she accidentally fell, appear illogical and a poor
We object to the question, your honor. That already assumes that this witness, your honor, is being concoction of facts, so hard to believe in the light of undisputed findings and conclusions by medical
presented as an expert witness, your honor. The purpose of presenting this witness is to testify on his experts declaring otherwise, and the recollection of facts by the eye-witnesses.17cräläwvirtualibräry
findings on the injuries sustained by the deceased, your honor. He was not presented as an expert
witness, your honor. The trial court thus correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her death were
FISCAL CHUA: the consequence of the appellants deliberate and intentional acts. The appellant is criminally liable for the
He was. death of Leah pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
COURT:
Paero, I have been keeping track of the qualification of the physician. He is not an ordinary physician. But The Crime Committed by the Appellant
he has specialized in Neurology. That is why he is considered as a specialist.
ATTY. GRIJALDO:
But he was offered to testify on his findings on the deceased, your honor. The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus:
COURT:
That is why the findings here are contusions. He is explaining now why he arrived at this conclusion. He ART. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
is going into the details. That is how I understand. Overruled : May answer. The court would like also to illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall
know about that. be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (Restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659.)
WITNESS:
A Choking with a finger or even whatever means, an assailant can inflict causing several injuries; not only
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
the shaking of the head. At the same time, he also decrease oxygenation of the brain. Because there are
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate
several factors involved here. First, the patient cant breath, therefore, she will have asphyxia. Choking
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
can also compress the carotid arteries which supply the main supply of blood to the brain. This also
accused.18 The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.19 The key element in
causes hypoxemia which decrease oxygenation of the blood. So, aside from the injuries being sustained
parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
by the brain by the force acted upon by the shaking, it causes swelling of the brain because of the other
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. 20 In
factors that I mentioned hypoxemia and asphyxia.
this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of parricide.
FISCAL CHUA:
Q Now, Doctor, assuming the facts as already established by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
as well as what you have testified, can you state with reasonable certainty whether in your opinion, the The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the
injuries suffered by the deceased was the direct result of the violence and batterings from the hands of appellant. He surrendered to SPO3 Herman S. Garcia, PO3 Joel Stephen Casador and Felimon Roderos
the accused Armando Dalag on August 15, 1996? on August 28, 1996 at 12:45 p.m.21cräläwvirtualibräry
ATTY. GRJALDO:
Objection, your honor. The trial court erred in applying in favor of the appellant Article 13, paragraph 6 in relation to Article 13,
COURT: paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code which read:
Sustained. Do not point to the accused. Reform
FISCAL CHUA:
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.

The trial court declared that the appellant was agitated and angered when Leah failed to return
immediately from Tia Felis house where she was supposed to get medicine for his wounded foot. The
attitude of Leah was, as found by the trial court, obviously unjust and improper to a husband who was
suffering and bleeding.22 This conclusion of the trial court is without factual basis. This Court agrees with
the finding of the trial court that Leah did not bother getting medicine for the injury on the foot of the
appellant when he stepped on a nail as he martyred Leah. However, this Court believes that Leah told
the appellant that she was going to the house of Felisa to get medicine for his injured foot merely as a
ploy to enable her to escape from him and avoid further physical abuse. Leah cannot be faulted for
preferring to escape from the clutches of the appellant rather than get medicine for the injured foot of the
latter. She was being assaulted by the appellant relentlessly and without mercy. Unless she escaped from
the clutches of the appellant, she would be killed by him. Leah could not be expected to first get medicine,
return to the house and treat the injured foot of the appellant only to be assaulted again by her husband.
For the trial court to blame Leah for preferring to escape and survive rather than treat the injured foot of
the appellant, and reward the appellant by mitigating his criminal liability is a travesty.

There being one mitigating circumstance in favor of the appellant and no aggravating circumstance
against him, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on him in consonance with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of
the victim is in order.23 The children of Leah Nolido are entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated January 10, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
42, in Criminal Case No. 17838 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide defined in and penalized by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime. The
appellant is ordered to pay to the children of the victim Leah Nolido the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity and the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 182551 July 27, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the Decision1 dated August 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00282, which modified the Decision2 dated November 3, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4232. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
the accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) separate counts of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double murder in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old
and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had
provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds upon Ranil Tagpis:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which wounds caused the death of
Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera, immediately thereafter.3
When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Trial,
thereafter, ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health Officer of
Carigara, Leyte; (2) Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim Felipe Lagera and sister
of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.;5 (3) Adoracion Lagera, the wife of Felipe Lagera; and (4) Alma Tagpis, the
daughter of Felipe Lagera and mother of Ranil Tagpis, Jr.
Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the victim Felipe
Lagera on November 6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds, the first of which
was located at his right arm and was about 23x2x4 centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have
been caused by a sharp instrument such as a bolo. The second wound was located at Felipe’s "nose
maxillary area,"6 measuring 13 centimeters, with an inverted C shape. The second wound was not fatal
and could have been caused by a sharp-edged instrument like a bolo. The third wound was located at
Felipe’s left arm and was measured as 9x1x1.5 centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have
likewise been caused by a sharp-edged instrument. Dr. Profetana concluded that the causes of death of
Felipe were hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds. She also conducted a
post-mortem examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. on the aforementioned date. The results
revealed that Ranil sustained a hacking wound at the "fronto-temporal area"7 with a skull fracture. In the
case of Ranil, the cause of death was "hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary
to [the] hacking wound to the head."8 The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a
bolo.9
Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in question. She pointed to the accused-
appellant as the "Bata Endong"10 (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and brother. She stated
that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while Felipe was hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder.
After Felipe was hacked by the accused-appellant, the former was still able to walk outside of his house,
to the direction of the coconut tree and thereafter fell to the ground. Carmela said that she saw that a long
bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that Felipe also owned a bolo but he was not
able to use the same when he was attacked. She was then inside the house with Felipe and her two
younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about four meters away when the hacking
incident occurred indoors.11
On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the incident, she was playing with a toy camera
inside the house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was also there near
the bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right arm. When asked whether the accused-appellant came
inside the house in a sudden manner, Carmela answered in the affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was
indeed carried by Felipe when the accused-appellant entered the house. She said that no fight or
altercation occurred between Felipe and the accused-appellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately
ran outside of the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the house. 12
Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was at the house of a certain
Justiniano Rance. After arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who told her to go home because
Felipe had been hacked. She ran towards the direction of her house. When she got there, she saw the
lifeless body of Felipe sprawled on the ground. She then went inside the house and found her daughter,
Alma Tagpis, cuddling the body of Ranil whose head was wounded. She told Alma to look for a motor
vehicle to bring the child to the hospital. She also found out that the other two children, Carmela and
Jericho, hid when they saw Felipe being hacked. When she asked them who went to their house, Carmela
told her that it was the accused-appellant who entered their house and hacked the victims. 13
Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was in Brgy. Sogod, having their
palay (unhusked rice grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went home and proceeded to the house of her
father, Felipe, where she left her children. She then met a person looking for her mother who was about
to tell the latter that Felipe was hacked. When she rushed to Felipe’s house, she saw him lying in the
grassy place, wounded and motionless. She asked Felipe who hacked him, but he was not able to answer
anymore. She went inside the house and saw blood on the floor and the feet of her son Ranil. Thinking
that the killer was still inside, she went to the back of the house and pulled a slot of board on the wall so
she could get inside. Upon seeing the body of Ranil, she took him and ran towards the road. She was
able to bring Ranil to the hospital, but the doctor already pronounced him dead. Her other two children,
Carmela and Jericho, soon arrived at the hospital with the police. When she asked them who killed Felipe,
Carmela answered that it was the accused-appellant.14
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following documentary evidence, to wit: (1) Exhibit A –
the Post-mortem Examination Report on Felipe;15 (2) Exhibit B – the sketch of the human anatomy
indicating the wounds sustained by Felipe;16 (3) Exhibit C – the Certificate of Death of Felipe;17 (4) Exhibit
D – the Post-mortem Examination Report on Ranil;18 (5) Exhibit E – the sketch of the human anatomy
indicating the wounds sustained by Ranil;19 and (6) Exhibit F – the Certificate of Death of Ranil. 20
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond Rance, the
stepson of the accused-appellant; (2) Renerio Arminal,21 the barangay chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay,
Carigara, Leyte; (3) Arnulfo Alberca, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at
Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.
Raymond Rance testified that his mother’s name is Marites Rance. The accused-appellant is not his
biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated that on the night of
July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their house. Felipe placed himself on top of Raymond’s
mother, who was lying down. Raymond and his younger sister, Enda, were then sleeping beside their
mother and they were awakened. His mother kept pushing Felipe away and she eventually succeeded in
driving him out. In the evening of July 20, 2002, at about 11:00 p.m., Raymond recounted that he saw
Felipe’s son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy was able to go upstairs and kept trying to
place himself on top of Raymond’s mother. The latter got mad and pushed Timboy away. She even
pushed him down the stairs. The accused-appellant was working in Manila when the aforesaid incidents
happened. Raymond said that his mother thereafter left for Manila. Subsequently, he saw the accused-
appellant at the house of a certain Bernie, several days after the accused-appellant arrived in Leyte. He
told the accused-appellant about the incidents involving Felipe and Timboy. On November 6, 2002,
Raymond and the accused were already living in the same house. On the said date, the accused-appellant
left their house after they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was going to call the latter’s mother.
Raymond testified that the accused-appellant is a good man and was supportive of his family. He also
stated that the accused-appellant seldom drank liquor and even if he did get drunk, he did not cause any
trouble.22
Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant surrendered to him. The latter
came to him alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant) fought with Felipe Lagera. Arminal then
ordered the human rights action officer, Ricky Irlandez, and the chief tanod, Pedro Oledan, to bring the
accused-appellant to the police station. Afterwards, the police officers came to his place and he
accompanied them to the house of Felipe.23
Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness stand to prove that the voluntary surrender of the
accused-appellant was entered into the records of the police blotter. He was asked to read in open court
the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002, which recorded the fact of voluntary surrender
of the accused-appellant. His testimony was no longer presented, however, since the prosecution already
admitted the contents of the blotter.24
The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila on August 15, 2002. He
went to the house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children. There, he learned that his wife went
to Manila and his brother was taking care of his two children and his stepson, Raymond. On November
2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his friend, Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latter’s
mother went to Manila and he was told that, while he was still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went
to their house and tried to place themselves on top of his wife. He then said that he harbored ill feelings
towards the said men but he was able to control the same for the sake of his children. On November 6,
2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the house of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a call to his wife
who was in Manila. He was carrying a bolo at that time since he was using the same to cut cassava stems
in his farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was sexually molested by Felipe and
Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so he first sought
shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After staying
there and drinking for half an hour, the accused-appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he
remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera.25
The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached the house of Felipe, the latter was feeding
chickens. When Felipe asked him what was his business in going there, he confronted Felipe about the
alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-appellant had a bad purpose
for being there and that the latter wanted to start a fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and
responded that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he (Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and
his wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at him, but he was able to parry
it with his hand. The accused-appellant then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side of the
abdomen, as the latter was already turning and about to run to the house. He also went inside the house
since Felipe might get hold of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a
second hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow
was delivered suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on
Ranil. When he saw that he hit the child, he got angry and delivered a third hacking blow on Felipe, which
landed on the right side of the latter’s neck. Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He followed Felipe and hacked
him again, which blow hit the victim’s upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on the yard of his
house and was about to run towards the road. He then left and surrendered to the barangay chairperson. 26
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when he proceeded to
Felipe’s house, but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after the first hacking blow, the
accused-appellant stated that he had no intention to back out because he was thinking that the victim
might get a gun and use the same against him. The accused-appellant also asserted that when he was
about to deliver the second hacking blow, Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who was sitting on a sack and
used him to shield the blow. There was a long bolo nearby but Felipe was not able to take hold of the
same because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted that he had a plan to kill Felipe but
claimed that when he arrived at the latter’s house on the day of the attack, he had no intention to kill him.27
The defense also presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 – the Police Blotter Entry
No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002;28 and (2) Exhibit 2 – the Civil Marriage Contract of Rosendo Rebucan
and Marites Rance.29
On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
double murder. The trial court elucidated thus:
[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the accused] was sexually abused by the
father and son Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to avenge his wife’s sexual molestation. Days had
passed, but this decision to kill Felipe did not wither, instead it became stronger, that on the 6th of
November 2002, he armed himself with a sharp long bolo known as "sundang" and went to Brgy.
Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte where the victim live[d]. Fueled by hatred and the spirit of London gin after
consuming one bottle with his compadre "Enok", he decided to execute his evil deeds by going to the
house of Felipe Lagera, in the guise of buying kerosene and once inside the house hacked and wounded
the victim, Felipe Lagera who was then holding in his arm his grandson, one and half years 1 ½ old, Ramil
Tagpis, Jr.
The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was
a premeditated decision and executed with treachery.
xxxx
There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the victim, Felipe was
holding in his arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his house, when the accused entered,
and without any warning or provocation coming from the victim, the accused immediately delivered
several hacking blows on the victim giving no regard to the innocent child in the arms of Lagera. With this
precarious situation, the victim who was unarmed has no opportunity to put up his defense against the
unlawful aggression of the accused, moreso, to retaliate. Moreover, what defense could an innocent 1
1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up against the armed and superior strength of the accused, but to
leave his fate to God.
The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victims, unarmed, were caught
totally unprepared to defend themselves qualifies the crime committed as murder. x x x.
After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan immediately went to the house of Brgy. Chairman,
Renerio Arcenal at sitio Palali, Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to surrender, because he killed Felipe
Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky
Irlandez and his Chief Tanod, Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of Carigara, Leyte.
This fact of voluntary surrender was corroborated by Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who presented to
Court the police blotter, under entry No. 5885, dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP, Carigara, Leyte.
Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the authorities showed his intent to submit himself
unconditionally to them, to save the authorities from trouble and expenses that they would incur for his
capture. For this reason, he has complied with the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance[.] x x x.
From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating circumstances of admission and voluntary surrender
credited to the accused are not sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances of: a) evident
premeditation; b) treachery (alevosia); c) dwelling – the crime was committed at the house of the victim;
d) intoxication – the accused fueled himself with the spirit of London gin prior to the commission of the
crime; e) abuse of superior strength; and f) minority, in so far as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is
concerned, pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. x x x.
xxxx
In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially established the quantum of evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.30
The RTC, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6, Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and further amended by R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), the Court found accused
ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER
charged under the information and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil
indemnity to the heirs of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
(₱75,000.00) Pesos for each victim and moral damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
(₱75,000.00) Pesos to each; and
Pay the Cost.31 (Emphases ours.)
The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review and the same was docketed as G.R.
No. 161706.32 The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs. 33 In our Resolution34 dated
July 19, 2005, we ordered the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.35 Before the appellate court, the case was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on August 21, 2007, modifying the judgment of
the RTC. The appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the
felonious acts of the accused-appellant resulted in two separate crimes of murder as the evidence of the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals
subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. With respect to the ensuant mitigating
circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited the circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the
accused-appellant, but rejected the appreciation of intoxication, immediate vindication of a grave offense
and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that the same was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. As
modified, accused-appellant is hereby adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
murder for the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr., and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder he has committed.
The award of civil indemnity is reduced to ₱50,000.00 for each victim; the award of moral damages is
likewise reduced to ₱50,000.00 for each victim. Further, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00
is awarded to the heirs of each victim. 36
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal37 of the above decision. In a Resolution38 dated February
6, 2008, the Court of Appeals ordered that the records of the case be forwarded to this Court.
On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice. 39 Thereafter, both parties manifested
that they were adopting the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals and will no longer file their
respective supplemental briefs.40
The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246.46 There is treachery
CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
III arising from the defense which the offended party might make.47 The essence of treachery is a deliberate
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE INTOXICATION AS A and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no
IV opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.48
CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND MINORITY. 41
In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the
The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but denies that the crime was committed with presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out the violent killings of
treachery and evident premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as to the presence of treachery given Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we reiterate the established doctrine articulated in People v. De
that there was no eyewitness who categorically stated that the accused-appellant attacked the victims Guzman49 that:
suddenly, thereby depriving them of the means to defend themselves. He brushed aside the testimony of
Carmela Tagpis, insisting that she was not in a position to say that there was no altercation between him In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
and Felipe, which could have put the latter on guard. The prosecution allegedly failed to prove that the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able
accused-appellant intentionally waited for the time when Felipe would be defenseless before initiating the to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence
attack. The fact that he voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chairperson and the police and admitted of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
the killings supposedly showed that it was not intentional and he did not consciously adopt the method of reviewing court. x x x.50
attack upon the two victims. The accused-appellant similarly rejects the finding of the RTC that there was
evident premeditation on his part since the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately planned the
killing of Felipe. Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.51
The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the incident, he was still unable to control his anger
as he just recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by Felipe and the latter’s son, Timboy.
He also avers that he was a bit intoxicated when the crime took place so that he was not in total control Carmela testified as follows:
of himself. He claims that he is not a habitual drinker and that he merely consumed the alcohol prior to
the incident in order to appease his friend. He likewise argues that the aggravating circumstance of PROS. TORREVILLAS:
dwelling should not have been appreciated inasmuch as the same was not alleged in the information. Q: Do you have a brother named Ranil Tagpis, Jr?
Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated since he A: Yes sir.
did not deliberately harm or attack Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and the death of the latter was accidental. The Q: Where is he now?
accused-appellant prays that he should only be found guilty of the crime of homicide with the mitigating A: He is dead.
circumstances of voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a grave offense and intoxication. Q: Do you know the circumstance of his death?
A: Yes sir.
The appeal lacks merit. Q: Why did he die?
A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.
Q: Do you know also your grandfather Felipe Lagera, Jr?
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution must establish A: Yes sir.
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof Q: Where is he now?
as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that A: He is dead also.
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 42 Ultimately, what the law simply Q: Why did he die?
requires is that any proof against the accused must survive the test of reason for it is only when the A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.
conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the crime is the person on trial should there be a judgment Q: Is the person your Bata Endong here in the court room who hacked your brother and your
of conviction.43 A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence, not on the grandfather?
weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 44 A: Yes sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Witness pointing to a person when asked of his name identified himself as Rosendo Rebucan.
Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder. xxxx
Q: What instrument did the accused use in killing your [brother and] your grandfather?
According to Article 24845 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another A: Long bolo, sundang.
shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among Q: Were you able to see that long bolo?
 A: Yes sir. shown. For the weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the
xxxx accused.54
Q: Was your grandfather armed that time?
A: He has his own bolo but he placed it on the holder of the long bolo. Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture on the matter, i.e., that the attack was
Q: Was that long bolo used by your grandfather? preceded by a fight between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be persuaded by the accused-
A: No sir. appellant’s version of the events in question. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the testimony of children of
xxxx sound mind is "more correct and truthful than that of older persons" and that "children of sound mind are
Q: How far were you to the incident, when this hacking incident happened? likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their
A: (witness indicating a distance of about 4 meters). testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons."55 In the instant case, Carmela was
xxxx cross-examined by the defense counsel but she remained steadfast and consistent in her statements.
COURT: Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to distrust the testimony of Carmela.
Cross.
ATTY. DICO:
Q: You stated awhile ago that your brother Jericho, Bitoy [Ranil] and you and your papo Felipe Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only contradicts that of Carmela, but some
were at the house of your papo Felipe? portions thereof do not also conform to the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court. The
A: Yes sir. testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch of the human anatomy of Felipe, which was marked as Exhibit
Q: You mean to say that there were no other persons present in that house other than you four B for the prosecution, stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds that were found on his right arm,
(4)? at his "nose maxillary area"56 and on his left arm. On the other hand, the accused-appellant testified that
A: Yes sir. he delivered four hacking blows on Felipe, the three of which landed on the left side of the victim’s
xxxx abdomen, the right side of his neck and on his upper left arm. When confronted on the said apparently
Q: So, you were playing that toy camera inside the room of your papo Felipe? conflicting statements, the accused-appellant did not offer any explanation.57
A: No sir, I was playing then at the side of the chicken cage.
Q: Is that chicken cage was inside or outside the house of your papo Felipe’s house? Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the
A: Inside the house of my grandfather. Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of Felipe and Ranil to murder.
xxxx
Q: Was your brother Ranil carried by your grandfather Felipe? The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ appreciation of the
A: Yes sir. aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there
He was carried by his right arm. must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when
Q: So, you mean to say that your uncle Endo went inside, it was so sudden? the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
A: Yes sir. determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and execution, to allow himself to
Q: Because it was sudden, you were not able to do anything, what did you do? reflect upon the consequences of his act.58 It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or
A: I then cried at that time. surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to
xxxx commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not
Q: But you are sure that when your uncle Endo entered as you said that your brother Ramil was merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation."59 In the case at bar, the evidence of the
carried by your papo Felipe? prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident premeditation since the testimonies they
A: Yes sir. presented pertained to the period of the actual commission of the crime and the events that occurred
Q: Did your uncle Endo and your papo Felipe fight or was there an altercation? thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that tended to establish the exact moment
A: No sir.52 when the accused-appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry
out the plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his plan.
As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly and categorically pointed to the accused-
appellant as the person who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated that the attack was not Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength,
preceded by any fight or altercation between the accused-appellant and Felipe. Without any provocation, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
the accused-appellant suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness of the treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. 60 On the other hand, dwelling, minority and intoxication
unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any opportunity to repel the attack cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the instant case considering that the same were
and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child unfortunately suffered the same fatal not alleged and/or specified in the information that was filed on January 23, 2003. Under the Revised
end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial court likewise correctly appreciated the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, a generic aggravating circumstance
existence of treachery. The said circumstance may be properly considered, even when the victim of the will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the information. This requirement is laid down in
attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to wit:
the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of
it.53 Furthermore, the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals vis-à-vis the nature of crimes
committed, we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2)
separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." There are, thus,
two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other. 61
The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls under any of the two
classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly and indubitably establish the
fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from the accused-appellant. The
eyewitness testimony of Carmela did not contain any detail as to this material fact. To a greater degree,
it was neither proven that the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary means for committing
and/or facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa. As the factual milieu of the case at bar excludes the
application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should be made liable for two
separate and distinct acts of murder. In the past, when two crimes have been improperly designated as
a complex crime, this Court has affirmed the conviction of the accused for the component crimes
separately instead of the complex crime.62
In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant, we uphold the trial court’s
ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. For voluntary
surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and
(3) the surrender is voluntary.63 To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a
manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they
acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily
be incurred in searching for and capturing them. 64 The accused-appellant has duly established in this
case that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally to the barangay
chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before he was actually arrested. The prosecution
also admitted this circumstance of voluntary surrender during trial.
We reject, however, the accused-appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate
the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave offense.
The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the intoxication of the offender
shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony
in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but
when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court finds that the accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication
since his own testimony failed to substantiate his claim of drunkenness during the incident in question.
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant himself positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy
but not drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. 65 He cannot, therefore, be allowed to make a
contrary assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the crimes he committed on the basis thereof.
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot
likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires
that the act be "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony
(delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees." The established rule is that there can be no immediate
vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. 66 In the
case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue
of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of
the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002,
the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a
period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have regained
his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the
accused-appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of any other aggravating circumstance in both the murders of Felipe and
Ranil. On the other hand, as the presence of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was
properly established in both instances, Article 63, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code 67 mandates
that the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each of the two
counts of murder.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 68
The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each set of heirs. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reduced
the aforesaid amounts to ₱50,000.00 and further awarded the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages to the heirs of the victim.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.69 Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the court for the mental anguish
suffered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the latter’s death. The purpose for making such an award
is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings.70 The award of
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In People v. Dalisay,71 the Court clarified that "[b]eing corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore,
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much
the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article
2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award."72

Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages is, however, increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with
the prevailing jurisprudence. As held in People v. Combate, 73 when the circumstances surrounding the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts that should be awarded are
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award of ₱25,000.00 temperate
damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. The award of ₱25,000.00 for temperate damages in
homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the
trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven.74

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated August 21, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. The accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin
is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The accused-appellant is
further ordered to indemnify the respective heirs of the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each victim, plus legal interest on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the finality of this decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197807 April 16, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the May 14, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03289, which affirmed the January 18, 2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 in
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 for Murder and Criminal Case No. 02-200107 for Frustrated
Murder.
The Facts
Two Informations3 charged accused Cecilia Lagman as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-200106
That on or about February 24, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago, by then
and there stabbing him with a knife with an approximate length of 6 ½ inches (blade and handle) hitting
his neck and trunk, thereby inflicting upon said Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago stab wounds which are
necessarily fatal and mortal, which were the direct cause of his death immediately thereafter.
Criminal Case No. 02-200107
That on or about February 24, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of Violeta Sicor y Sapitula, by then and there stabbing her hitting her buttocks, thereby inflicting
upon the said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula mortal wounds which were necessarily fatal, thus, performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula which prevented her death.
During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Donna Maniego (Maniego), Violeta Sicor
(Sicor), Police Officer 3 Ricardo M. Alateit (PO3 Alateit), and PO3 Ronaldo Samson (PO3 Samson).
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her banana cue store on Lakandula
Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her mother, Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle.
Without warning, the accused approached her and punched her face several times. The accused turned
on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Maniego got out
of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the barangay chairman was not
around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago (Santiago), at the house of
Santiago’s mother.4 On her way there, she saw the accused stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance
of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was
stabbed was about nine (9) meters.5 Maniego then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying
a knife and heading towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed
Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she
saw the accused, who was being treated after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the
policeman who was escorting the accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.6
After receiving the information from Maniego, the accused was arrested and brought to police
headquarters.7
On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for almost ten years and had a
close relationship with her. She stated that the accused got angry with her when she eloped with
Santiago.8
Sicor, Maniego’s mother, corroborated Maniego’s testimony. She saw the accused punch Maniego
several times while they were inside the sidecar on February 24, 2002. The accused then grabbed her
and stabbed her in her buttocks with a small knife. She said that after she was stabbed, two sidecar boys
came to her aid and brought her to the hospital. She added that she was released from the hospital two
hours after receiving treatment.9
PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his motorcycle on his way home. While
he was on the corner of Juan Luna and Moriones Streets, it was reported to him that a stabbing incident
had taken place. He headed towards an area where a crowd was causing a commotion. He then saw a
woman who looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her head was bloodied. He handcuffed the injured
woman after he was informed that she had stabbed someone. At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell
from the woman’s waist. He confiscated the item and brought the woman to the police station and to Gat
Andres Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the woman as the accused.10
Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2 Edison Bertoldo was the
police investigator in the case against the accused and that he prepared the following:
(1) Sworn Statement of Maniego, Exhibit "A";
(2) Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit, Exhibit "C";
(3) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Exhibit "E";
(4) Crime Report dated February 25, 2002, Exhibits "F," "F-1" and "F-2"; and
(5) Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002, Exhibit "F-3."11
The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date of the incident, he was
assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory Division. He presented before the court the
sharp object used in stabbing the victim (Exhibit "M") and the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit
"M-1").12
For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr. Mario Lato.
Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the date of the stabbing incident,
she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that she had been spreading the rumor that the
accused was insane. Maniego answered in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped Maniego and
left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead pipe. Since she
needed medical treatment after the attack, she was brought to Gat Andres Bonifacio Medical Hospital by
her mother and a barangay kagawad.13
At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing was found on her body
when she was frisked. She said that the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were
other people in the area where it was found. She added that she had an argument only with Maniego, not
with Sicor or Santiago.14
Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused, who had a laceration on the
head which was possibly caused by a hard object such as a pipe. He said that the accused sustained a
two-centimeter laceration in her mid-pectoral area.15
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-200106 and Less
Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No. 02-200107. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Cecilia Lagman y Pring guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-
200106. She is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jondel Lari
Santiago, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In Crim. Case No. 02-200107, this court finds same
accused guilty of Less Serious Physical Injuries. She is sentenced to suffer six (6) months of arresto
mayor and to pay Violeta Sicor the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness Maniego. She also averred that the same witness’
credibility was improperly appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was different from the one who
rendered the decision.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the totality of the prosecution’s
evidence showed that accused-appellant’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It added that
accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify
against her. The dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 18, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-200106 and 02200107 is AFFIRMED.17
Hence, We have this appeal.
The Issues
I
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
II
Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s witness despite
patent inconsistencies
III
Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery
The defense reiterates previous arguments calling for an acquittal of accused-appellant.1âwphi1 It casts
doubt on Maniego’s testimony, claiming that it has irreconcilable inconsistencies which affected her
credibility.
The defense also calls attention to the fact that Maniego testified before Judge Romulo A. Lopez, while
the Decision was penned by Judge Myra Garcia-Fernandez.18 It is further contended that Maniego did not
actually witness Santiago being stabbed, because she admitted in court that she found out that Santiago
had been stabbed when she was already at the hospital attending to her injured mother.
Moreover, it is pointed out by the defense that the victim was 5’8" in height and of average built while
accused-appellant is only 4’11". It is, thus, incredible that she could have inflicted fatal wounds on the
victim.
Lastly, the defense argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the killing of Santiago was
accompanied by treachery. Assuming that accused-appellant did stab the victim, the defense claims that
it was not proved that she deliberately and consciously adopted her mode of attack. The encounter was
even preceded by a confrontation between accused-appellant and Maniego, and it was Sicor and
Santiago who followed accused-appellant after the confrontation. The stabbing incident should have been
considered as having occurred in the spur of the moment.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the CA Decision.
Elements of Murder Established
The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.19
The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was accused-appellant
who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiago’s killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego. Paragraph 16, Art. 14
of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of
the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Maniego’s testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as follows:
Q What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?
A I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay hall to ask help x x x.
Q And what happened after that?
xxxx
A ‘Papauwi na po ako sa bahay ng biyenan ko sakto po ng pagpunta ko ho doon nasalubong po
ni Cecilia Lagman si Jondel Mari wala hong sabi sabi inundayan po niya ng saksak si Jondel
Mari.’ (When I went home to the house of my mother-in-law because the barangay chairman
was not in the barangay hall Jondel Mari meet [sic] Cecilia Lagman and without any word Cecilia
Lagman stabbed Jondel Mari.)
Q And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly stabbed Jondel Mari Santiago?
A At Asuncion, Lakandula [in Tondo Manila] x x x.
Q When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far were you?
A (Witness demonstrating 5 to 6 meters away).
xxxx
Q What was Jondel Santiago doing when he was stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?
A He was lighting a cigarette x x x.
Q And what was the reaction of Jondel Santiago when he was stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?
A ‘Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh.’ [He was shocked because he
did not know he was going to be stabbed.]
Q What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was stabbed?
A One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x
Q x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will you be able to identify her?
A Yes x x x.
xxxx
x x x [Witness pointing to a woman, Cecilia Lagman]
Q x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four times is in court will you be
able to identify him or her?
A ‘Siya rin po." [She is the same person.]20
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.21 The essence of treachery
is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 22 These elements were present
when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with approval the appellate court’s finding on the
presence of treachery:
In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without warning, stabbed him four
times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from
appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing the victim
leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery.23 x x x
Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between accused-appellant and the victim, We affirm the
finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant’s method of inflicting harm ensured
that she would fatally wound Santiago without risk to herself. The perceived advantage of the victim in
terms of height was of no use to him as accused-appellant employed treachery in attacking him. He was
not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant suddenly started stabbing him repeatedly
with an improvised knife.
Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
We see no reason to overturn the findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It has been long
settled that when the issues raised concern the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s findings of fact, its
calibration of testimonies, and its assessment of the testimonies’ probative weight, including its
conclusions based on said findings, are generally given conclusive effect. It is acknowledged that the trial
court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth.24 Furthermore, accused-appellant failed to show why Maniego
and her mother would falsely accuse her of committing a terrible crime. Maniego was the common-law
spouse of the victim and she would naturally want to seek justice for his death as well as the injury
sustained by her mother.
An examination of the records shows that there is no truth to the allegation of accused-appellant that
Maniego did not witness the stabbing of Santiago. She clearly testified that accused-appellant first
stabbed Santiago on the chest, then on the side of his neck, then twice on his back. 25
On the other allegation of accused-appellant, We have earlier held that the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of
conviction.26 That the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render
the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. 27
Alibi as a Defense
The defense of alibi is likewise unconvincing. Accused-appellant was positively identified by
eyewitnesses. She herself admitted that she confronted one of the eyewitnesses, Maniego, moments
before she was seen attacking Maniego, Santiago and Sicor. It is well-settled that alibi cannot be
sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not, on its face, demonstrate
the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission. 28 In accused-appellant’s case, there is no corroborative evidence of
her alibi or proof of physical impossibility of her being at the scene of the incident to shore up her defense.
Elements of Less Serious Physical Injuries Not Established
We modify the conviction of accused-appellant with regard to Criminal Case No. 02-200107. Originally
charged with frustrated murder, accused-appellant was convicted of less serious physical injuries in
Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on
a vital part of the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving medical treatment.
The RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated murder as it was not shown that there
was intent to kill.29 However, while the RTC correctly ruled that the accused-appellant is not guilty of
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200107, the records do not support a conviction for less serious We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since only slight physical injuries
physical injuries. were committed and no proof of medical expenses was presented during trial.

Art. 265 of the RPC provides, "Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described
[as serious physical injuries] but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or
more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor." Nothing in the records, however, supports the
finding that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten (10) days or more or that she required medical
attention for the same period. After the wound on her buttocks was treated, Sicor was released two hours
after she was admitted to the hospital.30 She later returned to the hospital for the removal of the suture on
her wound, according to the RTC, "after a certain period of time." 31 The Medico-Legal Report on Sicor
(Exhibit "H") does not indicate how many days of medical treatment her injury would need.32 Sicor,
however, testified that she lost two (2) days of work on account of the injury she sustained. 33 The
testimony of her attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis Cendeno, on the other hand, was dispensed
with following a stipulation by the parties on his testimony.34 The prosecution was, therefore, unable to
establish that the injury sustained by Sicor falls under less serious physical injuries absent the requirement
that her injury required medical attention for 10 days or incapacitated her for the same period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289 finding accused-
appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago the sum
of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages,
and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until
fully paid. With respect to Criminal Case No. 02-200107, accused-appellant is convicted of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty (20) days of arresto menor. The award of temperate
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries. Under par. 1, Art. 266 of
the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor "when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period." There being no modifying circumstances to be appreciated, and in
accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64, 35 accused-appellant should be meted a penalty of imprisonment of
arresto menor in its medium period, which has a duration of eleven (11) to twenty (20) days under Art. 76
of the RPC.

Pecuniary Liability

The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 and PhP
25,000 as temperate damages in Criminal Case No. 02-200106.

People v. Combate36 reiterated the rule on civil indemnity and damages:

When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. In People v. Tubongbanua,
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the award of damages. This rule
would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such as Mendoza v. People, People v.
Buban, People v. Guevarra, and People v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case.
Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages,
i.e., actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.

In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,37 the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Santiago is
in order. Moral damages of PhP 50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum, are also proper.38
 Republic of the Philippines The Prosecution's evidence revealed that at around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac was
SUPREME COURT having drinks with Ricardo Surban, Dionisio Barcomo alias Boy, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan on Pangako
Manila Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the course of their drinking, an argument ensued between
THIRD DIVISION .Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group: Hintayin nyo ako
d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo, and then left.5 After around three minutes Macaspac retun1ed wielding a
kitchen knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan, saying: Ano? Jebulan simply replied: Tama na. At that
February 22, 2017 point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. Surban
and the others witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to the hospital
G.R. No. 198954 but was pronounced dead on arrival.6

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession of
RODRIGO MACASPAC y ISIP, Accused-Appellant the lmife, and that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he seized control of the knife, viz.:7

DECISION Atty. Sanchez

BERSAMIN, J.:
When the victim was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument between
him and the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former, treachery cannot be
appreciated as an attendant circumstance. When the resolve to commit the crime was immediately
followed its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the crime is homicide, not
murder.
The Case
Rodrigo Macaspac y Isip (Macaspac) hereby seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on April 7,
2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03262, affirmed with modification the
decision rendered in Criminal Case No. C-31494 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 129, in
Caloocan City declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the killing of Robert
Jebulan y Pelaez (Jebulan).2
Antecedents
The information charging Macaspac with murder filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan
City reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of July 1988, at Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to
kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with a kitchen knife on the vital part of his body one ROBERT JEBULAN Y
PELAEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which injuries directly caused the
victim's death.
Contrary to law.3
The case was archived for more than 15 years because Macaspac had gone into hiding and remained at
large until his arrest on July 28, 2004. Upon his arraignment on August 31, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to
the foregoing information.4
Q - And it was alleged here in the information that on July 7, 1988 at around 8 o'clock in the evening, in
the City of Caloocan you stabbed the victim Robert Julian (Jebulan). What can you say about this?
A - We scuffled for possession for a sharp instrument and when l was able to grab that sharp
instrument, I was able to stab Roberto Jebulan, sir.8
However, Macaspac later on claimed that Jebulan had been stabbed by accident when he fell on the
knife. Macaspac denied being the person with whom Jebulan had the argument, which he insisted had
been between Barcomo and one Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their argument, but his effort
angered Jebu1an, who drew out the knife and tried to stab him. He fortunately evaded the stab thrust of
Jebulan, whom he struck with a wooden chair to defend himself. The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the
knife, puncturing his chest.9
On February 19, 2008, the RTC found Macaspac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, 10 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the killing of Robert Jebulan is qualified by treachery. In the absence
of mitigating and aggravating· circumstances, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer the imprisonment of reclusion
perpertua.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 11
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conv1ct1on but modified the civil liability by imposing civil indemnity of
₱50,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00, and temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the appealed 19 February 2008 Decision of Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that appellant, aside from the moral damages
awarded by the trial court in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), is further ORDERED to
pay the heirs of the victim, Robert Jebulan, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Twei1ty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages and Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.12
Macaspac is now before the Court arguing that the CA erred in affirming his conviction for murder on the
ground that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt. 13
Ruling of the Court
It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken
by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These factors are the most significant in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its personal observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
expected to determine whose testimonies to accept and which witnesses to believe. Accordingly, the
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted as to materially affect the
disposition of the case.14
The Court sees no misreading by the RTC and the CA of the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence
of the parties. On the contrary, the CA correctly observed that inconsistencies had rendered Macaspac 's
testimony doubtful as to shatter his credibility. 15 In so saying, we do not shift the burden of proof to
Macaspac but are only stressing that his initial invocation of self-defense, being in the nature of a forthright
admission of committing the killing itself, placed on him the entire burden of proving such defense by clear
and convincing evidence.
Alas, Macaspac did not discharge his burden. It is noteworthy that the CA rejected his claim of self-
defense by highlighting the fact that Jebulan had not engaged in any unlawful aggression against him.
Instead, the CA observed that Jebulan was already running away from the scene when Macaspac
stabbed him. The CA expressed the following apt impressions of the incident based on Macaspac's own
declarations in court, viz.:
ACP Azarcon
x x xx
Q - How could you (appellant) hit him (Jebulan) at his back when you were facing him?
A - When I picked up the chair, when I was about to hit him with the chair, Obet turned his back to ran
(sic) from me, sir.
Q - To ran (sic) away from you?
A - Yes, sir, because he saw me, I was already holding the chair, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
Self-defense, requires three (3) elements, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
From the above-quoted testimony of appellant, it is clear that even before he stabbed Jebulan, the latter
was already running away from him. Hence, granting that Jebulan was initially the aggressor, appellant's
testimoriy shows that said unlawful aggression already ceased when appellant stabbed him. Clearly,
appellant's act of stabbing said victim would no longer be justified as an act of self-defense.16
Macaspac's initial claim that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession of the knife, and that he had
stabbed Jebulan only after grabbing the knife from the latter became incompatible with his subsequent
statement of only striking Jebulan with the wooden chair, causing the latter to fall on the knife. The
incompatibility, let alone the implausibility of the recantation, manifested the lack of credibility of Macaspac
as a witness.
Both the RTC17 and the CA18 concluded that Macaspac had suddenly attacked the completely unarmed
and defenseless Jebulan; and that Macaspac did not thereby give Jebulan the opportunity to retaliate, or
to defend himself, or to take flight, or to avoid the deadly assault.
Did the lower cou1is properly appreciate the attendance of alevosia, or treachery?
This is where we differ from the lower courts. We cannot uphold their conclusion on the attendance of
treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 19 Two conditions must
concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the criminal act which ·give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted by the assailant.20 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly
proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder. 21
Based on the records, Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others when they had an
argument that soon became heated, causing the former to leave the group and punctuating his leaving
with the warning that he would be back "to sweep them," the vernacular for killing the others Hintayin n’yo
ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo). His utterance was a threat of an impending attack. Shortly thereafter,
Macaspac returned to the group wielding the knife, immediately confronted and directly taunted
Jebulan (Ano?), and quickly stabbed the latter on the chest, and then fled. The attack, even if it was
sudden, did not constitute treachery. He did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated
argument between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back "to sweep them" had
sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault.
Nonetheless, the information also alleged the attendance of evident premeditation. We now determine if
the records sufficiently established this circumstance.1âwphi1
The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to
commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution expenses was presented during the trial.28 Moreover, Macaspac is liable for interest on all the items of
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.22 damages at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until fully paid. 29

Macaspac 's having suddenly left the group and his utterance of Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko
kayo marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His returning to the group with the knife
manifested his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. The first and second elements of
evident premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of this circumstance that the
execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.23 Was the lapse of time
between the determination and execution - a matter of three minutes, based on the records - sufficient to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act? By quickly returning to the group with the knife, he
let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was
as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the third requisite was
absent.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES accused-appellant
RODRIGO MACASPAC y ISIP guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of EIGHT YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to 14 YEARS,
EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum; to pay to the heirs of the
late Robert Jebulan: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest on all damages hereby awarded at the rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

Accordingly, we cannot appreciate the attendance of evident premeditation in the killing, for, as explained SO ORDERED.
in People v. Gonzales:24

x x x The qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be satisfactorily established only if it could

be proved that the defendant had ample and sufficient time to allow his conscience to overcome
the determination of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation and reflection, following his
plan to commit the crime. (United States v. Abaigar, 2 Phil., 417; United States v. Gil, 13 Phil., 530.) In
other words, the qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be taken into account only when
there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence in the accomplishment
of the criminal act. (United States v. Cunanan, 37 Phil. 777.) But when the determination to commit
the crime was immediately followed by execution, the circumstance of premeditation cannot be
legally considered. (United States v. Blanco, 18 Phil. 206.) x x x (Bold underscoring is supplied for
emphasis)

Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident
premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan. The penalty for homicide,
based on Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,25 the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that" prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. In the absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period, or 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to A1iicle
64 of the Revised Penal Code.26 It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
is reckoned from. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is taken from the
degree next lower to reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. Accordingly, Macaspac shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal.

Anent the civil liabilities, we deem a modification to be necessary to align with prevailing
jurisprudence.27 Hence, Macaspac shall pay to the heirs of Jebulan the following amounts, namely: (a)
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages. The temperate damages are awarded because no documentary evidence of burial or funeral
 Republic of the Philippines At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum"
SUPREME COURT and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the
Manila point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire
abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac
arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed
FIRST DIVISION into a coma after the operation.6

G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015 Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually,
died the next day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis
x-----------------------x secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death was
G.R. No. 213886 "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries."7
JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They averred
that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the
leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him.
DECISION They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not for Quibac' s intervention.
Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the latter, and the two
engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home. 8
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated December 6,
2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, The RTC Ruling In a Judgment9 dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
which, inter alia, found petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac Rafael (Quibac) beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
The Facts of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay Aro's heirs the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. 10
In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and
Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows: Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in stating that
the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his death. 11
That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show the
confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and extent and effect of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his death xx x,"
feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one ELNER ARO y LARUAN, thereby inflicting Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray
upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death thereafter. and not for Homicide.12

That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11,
2004, he was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he
heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his
cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's
stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As
Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter,
Aro was taken to the hospital.5
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of
Homicide under A1iicle 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one ( 1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six percent ( 6%) per annum on the damages
awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 15
In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this
relation, it observed that the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his credibility
since there was no proof that his testimony was driven by any ill motive. 16 However, contrary to the RTC's
findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a
Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was
no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide,
with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown
that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.17
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18 In a Resolution19 dated July 21,
2014, the CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration; 20 hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.21
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s
conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder.
Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and
assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used
violence upon the person of the victim.
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons;
(b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. 22 Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes
place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous
affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.23
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which
reads:
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of Homicide are the
following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide. 24
In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro
died.1âwphi1 On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons,
Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking
turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel
or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident. 25 Since Wacoy and Quibac were
even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in
a tumultuous affray.26 Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was
the proximate cause27 of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore,
specifically for the crime of Homicide.
On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to inflict
slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore in its
maximum period,28 pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC. The said provision reads:
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that
intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to
commit, the following rules shall be observed.
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the
offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one
which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if
the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty
provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the maximum period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from
that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to
cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act
(praeter intentionem),29

as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed.30 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide
because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.31

Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to
the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article
13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the
presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental process and is an
internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts. 32 In
this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of
evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been
done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life
of Aro.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, taking into consideration the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of ₱50,000.00 each are
increased to ₱75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 33 All other awards, as
well as the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the monetary awards
from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid, are retained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated
July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of Elner Aro the amounts
of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-
appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new
Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to
continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the
crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with
an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds
which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused
gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts
of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused
the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately the
facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning
of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his
daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went
back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine
trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded
to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at
the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-
9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act
of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC
soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an
M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find
his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout"
of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado
who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong
were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley
Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as
a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn,
Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on
in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His
wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments
(p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month
was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for
medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25,
tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the
amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does
not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
 prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to
death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant
spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's
wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been
deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca
is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical
reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death
inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in
full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect
to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters
are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to
the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is
no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of
illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article
247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the
shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by
external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-quoted
article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit —
amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally
married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus,
in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and
his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for
the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be
— is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. (People
vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted,
the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance,
for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly
lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which
practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense,
and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in
 the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating
and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime
charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a
complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or
exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged-
but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider
that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General
Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we
think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could not have
possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence
or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half
months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We
presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate
estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-
appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being
the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to
four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in
confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define IT IS SO ORDERED.
and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the
killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned. ... 7

xxx xxx xxx

Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his
protection. 8

It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable
act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.

The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the
victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The
accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing
an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts
to a felony. 9

But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when
he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.
We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting
the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to
be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an
waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 212161 March 29, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee
vs
JUANITO ENTRAMPAS, Accused-Appellant
LEONEN, J.:
This is a tragic story resulting from an act of depravity: an 11-year old girl gave birth to a child after she
was repeatedly raped by the common-law husband of her biological mother.
This is an appeal from a conviction for two (2) counts of statutory rape.
We emphatically affirm the conviction.
The setting of this case is in a rural sitio of Barangay Bawod, San Isidro, Leyte.1 It is far from the urban
centers where courts sit, but it is a place where the writs shaped by the rule of law can still provide succor.
Accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas (Entrampas) and BBB were common-law spouses.2 They co-
habited for eight (8) years, from 1995 to 2003. AAA, BBB's daughter from a previous relationship, lived
with them.3 She looked up to Entrampas as her adoptive father.
Entrampas, then 50 years old,4 was a farmer who tilled a rice field half a kilometer away from their
home.5 BBB collected· shrimps and shells for a living,6 and would usually be at sea or by the beach from
4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.7 AAA was still in elementary school.8
Sometime in February 2003, at about 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived from school to cook for her family. She was
interrupted by Entrampas and was asked to go to the room upstairs.9 The 11-year old girl obeyed.10
"Once in the room, [Entrampas] forced AAA to lie down on the floor[.]" 11 She was warned by accused-
appellant that if she shouted he would kill her. She was also warned that if she told her mother about what
he was about to do, he would kill them.12
Entrampas took off the child's panty, undressed himself, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt
pain as he penetrated her. Her vagina bled. She cried and pleaded him to stop. 13
As he consummated the act, she noticed a knife on the wall within his reach. She became more fearful.
After satisfying himself, he again warned the child that he would kill her arid her mother if she informed
anyone about the incident.14
She was left in the room sobbing.15
That evening, after arriving from the sea shore, BBB asked AAA why she was crying. Fearful of
Entrampas' threats, AAA did not tell her mother.16
The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003.17 Entrampas told AAA to lie down, penetrated
her vagina, and then left her.18 AAA stayed in the room upstairs, crying, until her mother came home at
10:00 p.m.19
Over the following months, Entrampas repeatedly raped AAA, who, out of fear, remained silent.20
In July 2003, BBB observed some changes in her daughter's body.21 AAA's breasts had swollen, she had
lost her appetite, and she was always sleeping.22 By September 2003, AAA's belly had become noticeably
bigger.23 She was brought to the dispensary where her urine test was submitted for analysis. 24 AAA's
pregnancy test yielded positive.25
Fearing for her life, AAA refused to reveal the identity of the father of her child. 26 Neighbors suspected
that Entrampas got her pregnant. BBB asked Entrampas, who, according to BBB, admitted that he was
the father of AAA's child.27
On September 8, 2003, Entrampas and BBB went to BBB's brother, CCC, "to confess the crime he had
committed against AAA."28 Entrampas allegedly felt remorseful and told CCC to kill him to avenge AAA.
CCC immediately reported the matter to the police.29
On November 3, 2003, AAA gave birth to a baby boy at the North Western Leyte District Hospital of
Calubian, Leyte.30
Before the Regional Trial Court, Entrampas was charged with two (2) counts of qualified rape under the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997).31 Two (2) separate
informations were filed against him:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CN-04-457
That sometime in the afternoon of February, 2003, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, through threat and intimidation, succeed in having carnal
knowledge of [AAA], who was eleven (11) years old and the daughter of his common-law wife, without
her consent and against her will.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CN-04-458
That sometime in the evening of February, 2003, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, through threat and intimidation, succeed in
having carnal knowledge of [AAA], who was eleven (11) years old and the daughter of his common-law
wife, without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the qualifying circumstances that the victim was under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is the common-law spouse of the mother of the victim.32
Prosecution presented AAA's certificate of live birth, the laboratory report of AAA's pregnancy test, Dr.
Robert C. Nicolas's certification dated October 26, 2004, and four (4) witnesses' testimonies. 33
According to BBB, Entrampas was her live-in partner for eight (8) years.34 BBB was at sea when the rape
happened in February 2003.35 Entrampas admitted to BBB that he impregnated AAA, and that they came
to see CCC, to whom Entrampas also admitted the rape. 36
The second prosecution witness, AAA, narrated how Entrampas raped her in February 2003, again one
(1) week after, and in the succeeding months until she had a baby bump.37 He gave her ₱l0.00 for the
first time he raped her.38 She had her menstruation at 11 years old, while she was in Grade 5, and
Entrampas knew this.39 AAA had no boyfriend as she had no suitors.40
The third prosecution witness, Dr. Danilo Bagaporo (Dr. Bagaporo ), verified that he was the Municipal
Health Officer of San Isidro, Leyte. 41 On September 10, 2003, he administered AAA's pregnancy test,
which yielded a positive result.42
The fourth prosecution witness, CCC, held that, on September 8, 2003, he was chopping wood in Sitio
Cabgan, Brgy. Biasong, San Isidro, Leyte when Entrampas and BBB visited him.43 Entrampas confessed
the rape to CCC. At about 11:00 a.m. on the same day, CCC reported this to the barangay captain of
Bawod, San Isidro. CCC was first referred to the house of the punong tanod, who was then not around.
At noon, he proceeded to the police headquarters. The police investigated the incident and then
incarcerated Entrampas.44
The defense's sole witness was Entrampas himself. 45 Entrampas claimed that he could not have raped
AAA as he was often in the rice field. 46 He usually went to the rice field at 5 :00 a.m. and headed home
at about 5 :00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m.47
He denied having raped AAA and having visited CCC with BBB. 48 He equally refuted confessing to CCC
that he raped AAA and asking for his forgiveness.49 He also contested the alleged inconsistent statements
of AAA regarding the time the first and second rape happened, and whether she was awake or asleep
before the sexual molestation.50
On December 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of statutory rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision 51 reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused, Juanito Entrampas, in Criminal
Cases [sic] Nos. CN-04-457 and CN-04-458, [guilty] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory
rape as charged in the Informations and as defined and penalized in Article 299-A of the Revised Penal
Code, and in accordance with Criminal Case No. CN-04-457, this Court is left with no alternative but to
impose upon the accused, Juanita Entrampas, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay Ten Thousand (₱l0,000.00)
Pesos, as moral damages, and to pay the cost, and in Criminal Case No. CN-04-458, the accused, Juanito
Entrampas, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law and to indemnify the victim, [AAA], the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay Ten Thousand (₱l0,000.00) Pesos, as
moral damages and to pay the cost.
The herein accused, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to a full credit of his preventive imprisonment
in the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
In the Decision53 dated November 6, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court. It held that the inconsistencies alleged by Entrampas did not "touch upon the commission of the
crime nor affect [the minor victim]'s credibility."54 The dispositive portion of this Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of
Calubian, Leyte, in Criminal Case Nos. CN- 04-457 and CN-04-458 are hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS that the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in both charges are
increased to Php75,000.00 each. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay Php30,000.00 as
exemplary damages as well as the rate of 6% per annum interest on all the damages awarded to be
computed from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.55 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 2, 2013, Entrampas appealed via a Notice of Appeal56 before the Court of Appeals, which
resolved to give it due course on March 25, 2014. 57 For resolution is whether accused-appellant Juanito
Entrampas 1s guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape.
We affirm the finding of Entrampas' guilt.
The alleged inconsistencies "are collateral and minor matters which do not at all touch upon the
commission of the crime nor affect [the minor victim]'s credibility."58 AAA's inability to recall the precise
date and time of the rape is immaterial as these are not elements of the crime. 59 Moreover, "rape victims
are not expected to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates, number of times[,] and
manner they were violated."60
Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, truth, or weight of the
victim's testimonies.61 "[M]inor inconsistencies may be expected of [a girl] of such tender years ... who is
unaccustomed to a public trial[,]"62 particularly one where she would recount such a harrowing experience
as an assault to her dignity. The inconsistencies and contradictions in AAA's declarations are quite
expected. The victim is a child less than 12 years old and, therefore, more likely to commit errors than
teenagers or adults.63
Neither do these alleged discrepancies, not being elements of the crime, diminish the credibility of AAA's
declarations. Jurisprudence has consistently given full weight and credence to a child's
testimonies.64 "Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. "65 "Leeway should be given to
witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse."66
AAA, then only 11 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner. Her declarations are
generally coherent and intrinsically believable. In People v. Dimanawa:67
[R]everence and respect for the elders is deeply rooted in Filipino children and is even recognized by law.
Thus, it is against human nature for a . . . girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself, as well as her
family, to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment
of her own father.68 (Citation omitted)
Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the incident to the authorities or to
her mother do not undermine her credibility. The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual
molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated. 69 A minor "cannot be expected to act
like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard
the threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted." 70
Force and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim's perception and judgment when the
assailant committed the crime.71 In rape perpetrated by close kin, such as the common-law spouse of the
child's mother, actual force or intimidation need not be employed.72
"While [accused-appellant] was not the biological father of AAA ... [she] considered him as her father
since she was a child."73 Moral influence or ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA. It enhanced
the fear that cowed the victim into silence. Accused-appellant's physical superiority and moral influence
depleted AAA's resolve to stand up against her foster father. The threats to her and her mother's lives, as
well as the knife within accused-appellant's reach, further prevented her from resisting her assailant. As
accused-appellant sexually assaulted AAA, she cried and pleaded him to stop. Her failure to shout or
tenaciously repel accused-appellant does not mean that she voluntarily submitted to his dastardly act.
Accused-appellant questioned the Regional Trial Court's appreciation of the age of the victim at the time
of the commission of rape. He claimed that the birth certificate cast doubt on whether the victim was
indeed below 12 years old in February 2003, when the offense was first committed. According to him,
AAA's birth certificate should be questioned as it was registered late.74 This allegation is speculative.
Absent proof to the contrary, accused-appellant's objection must be set aside. A public document such
as a birth certificate generally enjoys the presumption of regularity. 75 Accused-appellant failed to present
any evidence to overturn this legal presumption. In Baldos v. Court of Appeals:76
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up the civil
register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of validity. It is
not for [the owner of the birth certificate] to prove the facts stated in his [or her] certificate of live birth, but
for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity.77 (Citations omitted)
Thus, it is not for AAA to prove that the Certificate of Live Birth reflects the truth of the facts stated in it;
rather, it is for accused-appellant to rebut the presumption that AAA's birth certificate sufficiently
establishes her birth on November 11, 1991. Accused-appellant miserably failed to do this.
A careful examination of the records shows that there is nothing that would warrant a reversal of the
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. "[W]hen a woman, especially a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed."78
Settled is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial
court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight
and substance."79
On the two (2) charges of qualified rape, AAA clearly and consistently communicated how accused-
appellant threatened and forced her into having sexual congress with him. Sometime in February 2003,
accused-appellant made AAA lie down on the floor and warned her that he would kill her and her mother
if she called for attention.80 He removed AAA's panty, undressed himself, and stripped her of her
innocence.81 AAA cried and pleaded him to stop.82 She grew more fearful as she saw a knife within the
assailant's reach.83 Accused-appellant again threatened her and her mother's lives. 84 Terrified of
accused-appellant's threats, AAA did not tell her mother what happened. 85
The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003. 86 Accused-appellant told her to lie down,
penetrated her vagina, and then went outside.87 AAA stayed in the room upstairs, crying, until BBB came
home later that evening.88 "For the succeeding months, [Entrampas] continued to rape AAA who [kept
silent] out of fear."89
Accused-appellant's acts amounted to statutory rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(l )(d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
Accused-appellant also committed the crime with the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that he was the
common-law spouse of AAA's mother. Under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
….
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a ... guardian ... or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
As to the circumstances qualifying rape, the prosecution established that the victim was less than 12
years old when the incident happened in February 2003, and that the offender was her guardian.90 AAA's
Certificate of Live Birth proved her minority. AAA was accused-appellant's foster daughter. AAA and her
mother, who was accused-appellant's former live-in partner, resided with accused-appellant in his house.
In September 2003, Dr. Bagaporo administered AANs pregnancy test and found her to be with
child.91 AAA gave birth on November 3, 2003,92 within nine (9) months from the date of the first rape in
February 2003.
₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; moral damages from ₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; and exemplary damages
from ₱30,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00,97 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
All awards for damages are with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.98
SO ORDERED.

Meanwhile, CCC averred that accused-appellant admitted the crime to him, after which CCC reported the
incident to the barangay captain and then to the police. 93

As against these details and testimonies, all that accused-appellant offered in defense were denials and
alibis, which jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable. 94

The Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly found that the testimonies of AAA,
BBB, CCC, and Dr. Bagaporo corroborated each other and supported the physical evidence. There was
no showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had ill motives to testify against accused-appellant.
Their testimonies are, therefore, accorded full faith and credence.

Raping a daughter destroys the purity of a father-daughter relationship. It shatters her dignity. It destroys
her ability to trust her elders charged with her care. The selfish momentary pleasure of the father will
torment her for life. In this case, it will also aggravate with the existence of the child of his daughter. This
Court is at a loss for words to describe this evil. All it can do is to increase the amounts awarded to AAA
in the hope that she will remember that the law is on her side.

In view of the depravity of the acts committed by accused-appellant against his 11-year old foster
daughter, this Court increases the amounts awarded to AAA, in accordance with jurisprudence:

For qualified rape through carnal knowledge, this Court modifies the award of civil indemnity from
₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; moral damages from ₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; and exemplary damages
from ₱30,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00.95

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Regional Trial Court Decision dated December 6,
2008 and Court of Appeals Decision dated November 6, 2013 are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

Judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Juanito Entrampas, in Criminal Case Nos. CN-04-457
and CN-04-458, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape as charged in the
informations and as defined and penalized in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. CN-04-457, Juanito Entrampas is SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law. We modify the award of civil indemnity from ₱75,000.00
to ₱l00,000.00; moral damages from ₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; and exemplary damages from
₱30,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00,96 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Likewise, in Criminal Case No. CN-04-458, Juanito Entrampas is SENTENCED to reclusion

perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. We modify the award of civil indemnity from
 Republic of the Philippines When "AAA" stood up to leave, appellant pulled her back, compelled her to sit on his lap anew, and then
SUPREME COURT proceeded to unhook her bra. What took place after this, "AAA" herself graphically recounted thus:
Manila
FIRST DIVISION PROS. PERALTA:

March 15, 2017 xxxx

G.R. No. 213390 Q We go back to that incident when he removed the hook of your bra, what happened after that?
A He made me lie down, Madam.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, Plaintijf-Appellee Q What happened next?
vs A [T]hen he forced me, he raped me, Madam.
JESSIE GABRIELy GAJARDO, Accused-Appellant Q When you said he raped you, what do you mean by that?
A He made me lie down, he made me spread my legs and he undressed me, Madam.
Q What were you wearing at that time?
RESOLUTION A I was wearing t-shirt and pajama, madam.
Q And x x x after spreading your legs, what did he do next?
DEL CASTILLO, J.: A He x x x inserted his penis [into] my vagina, Madam.
Q What happened when he inserted his penis [into] your vagina?
This is an appeal from the March 25, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. A I [cried] and I told him that I don't like [what he was doing] but he insisted, Madam.
05147 which affirmed with modification the July 19, 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Q When you refused, what did he do, if any?
Dagupan City, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 2010-0118-D finding appellant Jessie Gabriel y Gajardo A I just cried, Madam.
guilty of the crime of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Q How about the accused?
A He continued what he was doing, Madam.
Q What was he doing?
The facts of the case are as follows: A He was raping me, Madam.
Q For how long did it happen?
Appellant was indicted for rape in an Information which alleged: A Minutes, Madam.
Q When you said minutes, you mean one (1) minute?
A Around thirty (30) minutes, madam.
That on or about the 17th day of February 2010, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
Q What was his position at that time?
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused JESSIE GABRIBL y GAJARDO, with force
and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have carnal knowledge upon one A He was on top of me, madam.
["AAA"],3 a 17-year old minor, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. Q While he was on top of [you], what did [he] do?
A He raped me, Madam.
Q When you said he raped you, what do you mean by that?
Contrary to Article 266-A par. 1-a, in relation to the 2nd par. of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code A He inserted his penis [into] my vagina, Madam.
as amended by RA 8353.4 Q What did you feel at that time when he inserted his penis [into] your vagina?
A None, [M]adam.
Arraigned thereon, appellant entered a negative plea. Q What, if any, did you feel or notice while his penis was inside your vagina?
A None, [M]adam.
Q You said that you were crying while he was raping you, why were you crying?
"AAA" at the time material to this case is a 17-year old first-year nursing student at the Colegio de
A I was afraid and I don't like it, Madam.
Dagupan and temporarily resides at the boarding house of appellant in Dagupan City. "AAA" testified that
Q When he started to insert his penis [into] your vagina, did you feel anything?
at about 6:00 p.m. of February 17, 2010, she, with her cousin and co-boarder ''BBB," was inside their
A Yes, [M]adam.
room at the second floor of the said boarding house when appellant suddenly entered their room and
Q What did you feel?
accused them of having stolen items of merchandise from his store located near the said boarding house.
A It was painful [M]adam.
"AAA" and "BBB" vehemently denied this accusation, but appellant did not believe them. Instead,
COURT:
appellant directed them to see him in his room at the first floor of the boarding house to talk about the
Q Why did you not push him while he was on top of you?
matter. When "AAA" went inside appellant's room, the latter renewed his insistence that "AAA" own up to
A He was forceful, [M]adam.
having stolen the merchandise in question, otherwise he would bring her to the Police Station and have
Q What do you mean when you said her was forceful?
a theft case against her blottered. He t.1-ien told her to sit on his lap and began caressing her back. "AAA"
A He [was strong], [M]adam.5
demanded that he stop what he was doing because she did not like it, but he paid no heed to her demand.
Appellant's lecherous assault upon "AAA;' ceased only when his child knocked on the door and called for
him. When he heard his child's knocking, he released "AAA" from his clutches, told her to get dressed
and leave the room. "AAA" then went to the bathroom to wash and then returned to her room at the
second floor where she continued to cry. "BBB" asked her why she was crying but she could not tell her
of her forcible violation. Later that evening, "AAA's" aunt, "CCC," and her husband "DDD," together with
"BBB's'' mother "EEE" (who was earlier texted by "BBB" to come to the boarding house) arrived. They
confronted appellant about his accusation that "AAA'' and "BBB" had stolen certain items from his store.
It was then that "'AAA" told "CCC" and "DDD" that she had been raped by appellant. A call was then
made to the city police department which deployed SPO1 Esteban Martinez and PO1 Ramon
Valencerina, Jr. who, upon reaching the boarding house, were informed that "AAA" had been raped by
appellant. These police officers arrested appellant and brought him to the police station. After this, "AA.A''
submitted herself to physical examination at the Region 1 Medical Center in that city.
The other prosecution witnesses, namely "BBB," "EEE'' and "CCC," not having actually witnessed "AAA's"
violation, claimed that they came to know of "AAA's" rape from "AAA" herself. However, they were present
just outside the boarding house when "CCC", "AAA's" aunt exploded into hyste1ical outburst on hearing
from "AAA" that she had been raped by appellant. The Medico-Legal Report issued by Dr. Marlene
Quiramol moreover showed tell-tale evidence that "AAA" had indeed been sexually abused, as there were
erythema and fossa navicularis at the external genitalia, as well as multiple fresh lacerations at the 3, 6,
9 and 12 o'clock positions in "AAA's" hymen.
Appellant denied that he raped "AAA". He claimed that on the morning of February 17, 2010J he noticed
that some items of merchandise in his store were missing and he suspected that "AAA" and '~BBB" were
the culprits; hence, he went to their room to confront them. These two however denied his accusation, so
he confronted them with the pictures of the missing items which he earlier took in the locker inside the
room rented by "AAA" and "BBB."
Appellant nevertheless admitted that on said occasion, he talked with "AAA" inside his room at the first
floor of the boarding house for some 15 minutes, but stressed that after their conversation, "AAA" went
outside while he proceeded to his store.
The only other witness presented by appellant, one Sandro Montanez, a boarder in the former's boarding
house, simply testified that on the day in question (February 17, 2010), he saw "AAA" doing her laundry
and that he did not notice anything unusual in her appearance at all.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Synthesizing the conflicting contentions of the prosecution and the defense, the RTC held:
The instant rape case is one of multifarious cases where there are no identified witnesses, and where the
evidence effectively boils down to the complainant's word against the accused's. However, a
pronouncement of guilt arising from the sole testimony of the victim is not unheard ot: so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility. This is especially true in the crime of rape the evidentiary character
of which demands so much on the part of the victim - it entails her to submit to an examination of her
private parts, and to subject the sordid details of her story to a public trial and against a given presumption
of the accused's innocence.
To establish the crime of Rape under the article cited above, two elements must be shown to exist. And
these are; 'that the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party; and that the coitus was done
through the use of force or intimidation.'
AAA cried profusely while recounting her awful experience at the hands of her abuser. As has been
repeatedly held, 'no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of so se1ious a crime as rape, undergo medical
examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was
other than a fervent desire to seek justice.' AAA had revealed the incident to her relatives. If it is not rape,
what is it?
Accused's attempt to characterize the testimony of 'AAA' as incredible lacks merit. Accused['s] defense
of denial must crumble in light of AAA's positive and specific testimony. It is an established jurisprudential
rule that denial, like alibi, being negative self-serving defense, cannot prevail over the affirmative
allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive identification of the accused as her assailant.
'Denial must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.'
Moreover, AAA's testimony is corroborated by the findings of the examining physician, Dr. Marlene
Quiramol x x x viz[.]; (+) Erythema at the peri hymenal and fossa navicularis; (+) Multiple fresh lacerations
at 3, 6, 9 & 12 o'clock positions. Medical examination showed evidence of sexual abuse.
'When a rape victim's account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings
of the exarmining physician, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.' As the Highest Court
succinctly stated in People vs. Borja,' a victim who says she has been raped almost always says all there
is to be said.'
The defense made it appear x x x that there were other people at the time of the incident. Granting
arguendo that there were other people in the house when the rape was committed, rapists are not deterred
from committing t11eir odious act by the presence of people nearby or the members of the family. Lust,
being a very powerful human urge is, to borrow from People v. Virgilio Bernabe, 'no respecter of time and
place.' For the crime of rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal or the weather
to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed. Rape can be
committed in even the unlikeliest places and circumstances and by the most unlikely persons. The beast
in a man bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere - even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other
occupants, in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places
which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. Besides, there is no rule
that rape can be committed only in seclusion.
In stark contrast to AAA's firm declaration, the defense of denial invoked by the accused rests on shaky
grounds. The accused insists that 'the accusation is a lie' and claims that he did not rape the victim It
should be noted however that accused himself admitted having a one-on-one confrontation with AAA in
his room about the alleged missing items as he required her to see him in his room and it lasted for around
15 minutes. Why would he require her to go to his room when he had already confronted them inside their
room if not for his bestial desire and intention? Besides, he already went to the extent of taking pictures
of the alleged missing items inside the locker of the victim and her cousin in their absence so as to compel
them to admit the crime. Why did he not complain right away to the police if indeed his accusation against
the victim is true?
Judicial experience has taught this Court that denial like alibi are the common defenses in rape cases.
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability
to merit credibility. It is a negative self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence. The barefaced denial of the charge by the accused even if one of his
boarder had testified cannot prevail over the positive and forthright identification of him as the perpetrator
of the dastardly act.
In rape, force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime. AAA's failure to shout or to tenaciously resist accused should not be
taken against her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her submission to
accused's criminal act. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some
people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to
yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. Moreover resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that
she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or
intimidation present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. Though a man puts no
hand on a woman, yet if by the use of mental and moral coercion and intimidation, the accused so
overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result she dare not resist the dastardly act inflicted on her
person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him. In this case, the threat of reporting her to the police
and have the incident blottered regarding his accusation of theft against her speaks loudly of accused's
use of force and intimidation.
Moreover, AAA said she was not able to do anything to resist the accused [when] he was raping her. She
told him to stop what he was doing [because] she didn't like it but he [persisted]. The most that she did
was to cry.1âwphi1 Owing to the minority of AAA and her physique as compared to her molester, the
Court believes that she was cowed by the accused's act of forcing himself upon her especially so when
he threatened to report them to the authorities. 'Physical resistance need not be established in rape when
threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear -
physical resistance is not the sole test to ascertain whether or not a woman involuntarily yielded to the
lust of her attacker.'
AAA's account evinced sincerity and truthfulness and she never wavered in her story, consistently pointing
to accused as her rapist. Besides, no woman would willingly submit herself to the rigors, humiliation and
stigma attendant in a rape case if she was not motivated by an earnest desire to punish the culprit. While
there may be inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, they refer only to trivial matters which did not affect at
all her account of the incident.
'Errorless recollection of a traumatic and agonizing incident cannot be expected of a witness when she is
recounting details of an experience as humiliating and as painful as rape.' 6
Against this backdrop, the RTC disposed thus –
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JESSIE
GABRIEL GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article
266-A (a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti Rape Law of
1997 and is hereby imposed with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ordered to pay AAA the sum
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00), by way of civil indemnity, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱50,000.00), as moral damages and THIRTY TH0USAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA maintaining that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of
the crime of raped.
But the CA thumbed down the appeal, anchoring its verdict on the RTC's aforequoted ratiocination, and
more particularly on "AAA's" testimony-in-chief relative to the actual assault on her person in the manner
quoted. Indeed, the CA's findings that "AAA" was raped by appellant were a virtual reiteration of the
RTC's own summation as regards the rape.
The CA characterized "AAA's'' testimony in this wise:
The testimony of AAA is simple, candid, straightforward, and consistent on material points, detailing the
act of rape against her by appellant. It is corroborated by the physical evidence of fresh hymenal
lacerations. The medico-legal report revealed tt1at AAA's perihymenal areal and fossa navicularis had
erythema and her hymen had multiple fresh lacerations at 3, 6, 9 & 12 o'clock positions. In short, the
medical exan1ination showed evidence of sexual abuse. x x x 8
After this, the CA addressed appellant's assault upon "AAA's" credibility, to wit:
Appellant, however, casts doubts on the credibility of AAA He contends that AAA was motivated by
revenge because he had accused her of stealing and insisted that she admit the act. He also assails the
credibility of AAA's account of the rape by pointing out that: AAA offered no resistw1ce; she first claimed
that she did not feel appellant's penis inside her vagina but later abandoned her claim; x x x she did not
tell her boardmate Montanez, "BBB", and her aunt "CCC" [about the alleged rape] but confided to them,
except Montanez, that appellant was forcing her to admit to the theft; AAA did not immediately reveal the
rape to the police but first talked to her uncle after which the latter confronted appellant.9
The CA however found appellant's contentions unconvincing:
It is highly improbable that a young, decent woman taking up nursing would concoct a rape story against
a man who is accusing her of a petty crime which she denies. A woman who claims rape exposes herself
to the spectacle of a public trial where she would recount the sordid details of her ordeal. Thus, it has
been repeatedly ruled 1hat no young and decent woman in her right mind would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to
a public trial if she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against
her.
Even assuming that AAA did not tenaciously resist the sexual assault[,] that does not negate rape. In
rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime. It is settled that not all victims react the same way. Some victims
may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to
the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance
at all. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did
all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or
intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. In this case, what is
important is that AAA did not consent to the intercourse. She cried as appellant ravished her and told her
uncle about the rape at the first opportunity.
xxxx
That AAA did not immediately report the rape to the police when they came to the house but to her uncle
enhances rather than weakens her testimony.1âwphi1 It is consistent with human experience for a woman
to prefer to reveal the assault on her honor to her kin first rather than to strangers, including the police.10
Expounding on the usual reason for the seeming inability of the prosecution to assemble a number of
witnesses to establish a rape case, like the present case, the CA posited:
Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually
the victim alone who can testify on the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the
credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important point to consider. If the victim's
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of her lone
testimony.11
In the end, the CA sustained the factual underpinnings of the RTC's verdict, harking back to the well-
settled dictum that the trial court is the best assayer and evaluator of witnesses and their testimonies,
thus:
The trial court gave credence to AAA and her testimony. Since the trial court had the opportunity to
examine her demeanor and conduct on the stand, We do not find any reason to depart from its findings.
Time and time again, it has been ruled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique firsthand opportunity to
observe them under examination. x x x
There is no showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance in convicting appellant. Its decision must be upheld. Besides,
appellant's defense is in the nature of a denial which hardly creates reasonable doubt of his guilt in light
of his testimony that he was at the place and time of the rape. Appellant's denial cannot prevail over AAA'
s direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is inherently a weak defense which
cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical statement that has the earmarks of truth
on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 12
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch
43, dated July 19, 2011, in Criminal Case No. 2010-0118-D is AFFIRMED with modification in that
accused-appellant Jessie Gabriel is further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
6% per annum :from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.13
Our Ruling
We find no reason to disturb the CA's above-mentioned findings and conclusion, especially so because
in the case at bench the CA and the RTC have uniformly given short shrift to appellant's bare denial.
In the 1901 case of United States v. Ramos,14 this Court had already declared that "[w]hen a woman
testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all that is necessary to constitute the commission
of this crime has been committed. It is merely a question then, whether or not this court accepts her
statement." Jurisprudence has clung with unrelenting grasp to this precept.
The trial court's assessment and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis their testimonies ought
to be upheld as a matter of course because of its direct, immediate and first hand opportunity to observe
the deportment of witnesses as they delivered their testimonies in open court. Thus, the trial court's
findings bearing on the credibility of witnesses on these matters are invariably binding and conclusive
upon the appellate court unless of course, there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misapprehended or misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight or substance, or had failed to
accord or assign such fact or circumstance its due import or significance. Here, it bears stressing that the
CA itself declared in its Decision that:
There is no showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance in convicting appellant. Its decision must be upheld. Besides,
appellant's defense is in the nature of a denial which hardly creates reasonable doubt of his guilt in light
of his testimony that he was at the place and time of the rape. Appellant's denial cannot prevail over
"AAA's" direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is inherently a weak defense
which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical statement that has the earmarks of
truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 15
To these postulations by the CA, we give our unreserved assent. Nonetheless, we have to modify the
awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. Conformably to this Court's holding
in People v. Jugueta,16 the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages should
be upgraded to ₱75,000.00 each. The CA, however correctly imposed interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed March 25, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05147 finding appellant Jessie Gabriel y Gajardo guilty of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with FURTHER
MODIFICATIONS that the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are
increased to ₱75,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN LENNON", Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a 10-year-old child would need for lunch money, a known
acquaintance of their family would destroy a child's dignity by having illicit carnal knowledge of her. This
case involves an act that is so dastardly that it is punished by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
as statutory rape which carries a sentence of reclusion perpetua.
We are asked to review the Court of Appeals decision1 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02955. This decision
affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for statutory rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 30, 2005, an information2 was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 59. The information reads:
That on or about November 29, 2005, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the offended party, (AAA), who is under twelve (12) years old.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at Camp
7 Elementary School in Baguio City. She testified that on November 29, 2005, she went home from school
at around 12 noon to have lunch.3 On the way home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his
room and laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down
his pants and then inserted his penis into her vagina. 4
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white
liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (₱5.00) before she went back to school. 5
AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap, asked her where she came
from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer. When asked again why she was tardy, AAA
admitted she came from "Uncle Rod." She also admitted that she went there to ask for money. Chapap
then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, AAA's previous teacher. Together, they brought AAA to the
principal's office. AAA was brought to the comfort room where Ambaken inspected her panties. The
principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAA's private organ was swelling. Her
underwear was also wet.6
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General Hospital where her underwear was
again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way to the hospital, Dalisdis passed by the
barangay hall and the police station to report the incident.7
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant had done the same thing to her about 10 times
on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (₱10.00) or five (₱5.00) pesos. 8
The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr. Ogues was the superior
of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based on the medical certificate issued by the
examining physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma that could have been caused by sexual
abuse. She also stated that there was another medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Carag, surgical
resident of the Department of Surgery of Baguio General Hospital, showing findings of some hematoma
in AAA's legs.9
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house at 12 noon on November 29, 2005 and claimed
he was already at work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long time since his family rented the house
of AAA's grandfather from 2001 to 2004.10 When the police came and asked him if he knew AAA, he
answered in the affirmative. He was then brought to Baguio General Hospital where he was told that AAA
identified him as the one who raped her.11
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's sister, and they even lived together as common-
law spouses.12 He also admitted that a similar complaint was filed against him by AAA's mother when
AAA was eight years old, but they settled the case at the barangay level. 13
On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a judgment 14 finding Rodrigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was additionally required to
indemnify the offended party ₱50,000.00 moral damages and ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages with costs
of suit.
Rodrigo appealed15 to the Court of Appeals claiming that AAA's testimony fell short of the requirement of
the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that she did not cry for help when her family's
house was just nearby, which was cause for reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate.
On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision16 affirming the conviction.
On March 11, 2013, Rodrigo filed a notice of appeal17 with the appellate court, which was given due
course in a resolution18 dated March 15, 2013.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In the resolution19 of September 9, 2013, this court required the parties to submit their respective Q: Now, when you met the accused, what did he do?
supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both parties, however, manifested that they were dispensing with A: He brought me in the room, Ma'am.
the filing of a supplemental brief as their arguments were already substantially and exhaustively discussed Q: The room is located inside his house?
in their respective briefs filed before the appellate court. A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And, was that the first time you entered the room?
The only issue to be resolved by this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond A: (The witness nods.)
reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape punishable under Article 266-A Q: After entering the room, what did Uncle Rod tell you?
of the Revised Penal Code. A: He laid me down, Ma'am.
COURT:
Q: Where?
Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states: A: On the bed, Ma'am.
PROS. BERNABE:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. ― Rape is committed: Q: Who were the persons inside the room aside from you and Uncle Rod?
A: (Witness shook her head - meaning no persons around.)
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: Q: After lying down on the bed, what did he do next?
A: He raised up my skirt.
Q: After raising up your skirt, what else did he do?
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; A: He removed my panty, Ma'am.
Q: Was he able to remove it from your legs your panty? [sic]
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; A: No, Ma'am.
Q: Until where was he able to remove?
A: (Witness is pointing down to the ankle.)
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
Q: After pulling down your panty until your ankle, what happened?
A: He pulled down his short pants, Ma'am.
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none Q: After pulling down his short pants, what did Uncle Rod do?
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. A: He brought out his penis.
Q: After bringing out his penis, what did he do next?
xxxx A: He inserted his penis to my vagina, Ma'am.
Q: Will you please show us where is your vagina?
A: (The witness stood and pointed to her private part.)
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused
Q: You also mentioned AAA that Uncle Rod inserted his penis to your vagina, could you point to the "ari"
has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the
of Uncle Rod?
victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of
A: (The witness pointed to a portion where the private part of the elder brother was standing.)
authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.
Q: Was it painful when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
People v. Teodoro20 explained the elements of statutory rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph Q: Did you cry when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina?
(1) (d): A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Did he stay long on top of you? At around how many minutes?
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of A: Very long, Ma'am.
committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve Q: Did he withdraw his penis from your vagina?
(12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; A: Yes, Ma'am.
the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law Q: And after he withdrew his penis inside your vagina, what happened?
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the A: There is some white liquid that came out of his penis, Ma'am.22
child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. (Emphasis
supplied) As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that
was done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of the incident. Her birth deserves full weight and credence. People v. Veloso23 stated that:
certificate was presented before the trial court.21 What is critical in this case, therefore, is whether there
is a showing that Rodrigo had carnal knowledge of AAA. In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full
weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands
In the testimony of AAA, she narrated that on November 29, 2005, she met Rodrigo in his house, thus: sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not
true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will-
as in this case-motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that when a woman,
more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.24
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led to the discovery
of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together with the testimonies of the physicians, is
consistent with the finding that she was sexually abused.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 He noted that
her house was just near his house where the incident happened.
This argument is so feeble that it could only have been put up out of desperation.
Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle Rod." He admitted that AAA's family had known him
for a long time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any elder in the family of AAA had. Instead of
providing the moral guidance that his status allowed him, he took advantage of AAA's youthful innocence
to satiate his illicit carnal desires. To cover this up and seemingly justify his actions, he gave his child-
victim the measly sum of five pesos. Rodrigo knew that what he did was wrong; AAA would have probably
doubted whether such act was normal among adults.
Due to the utter heinousness of the crime involved in this case, we, therefore, exercise our judicial
prerogative and increase the damages to ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
There are not enough words to condemn the depravity that one adult can do to a child-victim. The many
years that Rodrigo Gutierez will, by law, serve in prison will, of course, not make up for the wrong and the
injury that he has so selfishly and callously caused and with utter disregard for what truly makes us human:
that we care, nurture, and protect our children because we hope that they can make their world better
than ours. All this was lost on Rodrigo Gutierez. The five pesos that he gave on every occasion that he
defiled his child-victim simply underscores the ignominy of his act.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the accused-appellant Rodrigo Gutierez y
Robles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume that even the child-victim's desire
for help would be muffled by her fear of her "Uncle Rod." To a young 10-year-old, the ordinary world can
be daunting. To be so young and silently aware that one is the victim of such callous depravation by
Rodrigo, who she could have expected to take care of her, can create the kind of lasting fear that
diminishes the development of her own person and her own convictions.

In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since "[t]he law
presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own."25

Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years of age, on
November 29, 2005.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
in cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266-A where there are no aggravating or qualifying
circumstances present. The lower courts correctly imposed this penalty.

Their award of damages, however, must be modified in light of recent jurisprudence.

It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding that rape was committed, along
with the award of moral and exemplary damages. 26 In People v. Degay,27 the accused-appellant was
found guilty of raping his nine-year-old neighbor. This court did not hesitate to increase the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. In People v. Gambao, 28 we have also
increased the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00 each.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR,1 Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"[T]he trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to he highest respect absent a
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case."2
On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832
which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
In three separate Informations,5 appellant was charged with rape committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there commit an act
of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting] the same into the
genital orifice of "AAA,"6 a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the labia majora of the
vagina of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there commit an act
of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting] the same into the
anal orifice of "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the perianal region of the said
anal orifice of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] "AAA",
a minor who is six (6) years of age; that on the same occasion that the Accused raped said minor, the
accused did, then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette, against her will and
consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty. 7 Pre-trial conference was terminated
upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits ensued.
Factual Antecedents
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
The victim in these cases[,] "AAA[,]" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was x x x playing x x
x with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which x x x was just below their
house. "AAA" clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her
father located in their house x x x and where accused was employed. While "AAA" was at the house of
accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said
accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who also took his
clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have
illicit carnal knowledge [of] the then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN Aug. 7, 2001,
pp. 10-12.)
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughter’s birth certificate (Exhibit "B") which stated that
she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the other hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the
Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA" identified his Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit "M") and testified
that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was
possible that the said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victim’s skin.
Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the
same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination which was also on April 8, 1999.
(TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 11-17)
"CCC" [aunt of "AAA"] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of "AAA" in bringing the victim to
the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a doctor also examined "AAA" and
confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of rape. "CCC" testified that they then proceeded to the
Women’s [D]esk to file the instant complaint against the accused. (TSN August 5, 2003 pp. 4-8)
On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his brother-in-
law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the house of accused when the
latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same
day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as the latter worked in the night shift
schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victim’s father. (TSN February 3, 2006 pp.
6-8)
When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony of his brother-in-
law that it was impossible for him to have raped "AAA" on the date and time stated in the information as
his night shift work schedule just would not permit such an incident to occur. Accused added that he knew
of no reason why the family of the private complainant would pin the crime against him. (TSN Nov. 17,
2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAA’s" body, the defense presented a
supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary, she was then 7 years
old when she and two other playmates together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit" the son of accused were burning
worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good Friday in the year 1999. This Joel "Liit"
supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of "AAA’s" body. Mary’s exact
words were to the effect that "napatakan ang puwit ni "AAA"."8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is found GUILTY of all offenses
stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations and is hereby sentenced to the following:
a) In Criminal Information # 99-16235 and Criminal Information # 99-16236, accused is to suffer
the Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and is ordered to pay the victim "AAA" civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00, moral damages
of ₱30,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱15,000.00 for each of the two Criminal Informations.
b) In Criminal Information # 99-16237, accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱50,000.00
and exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal Informations.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal10 which was given due course by the trial court in its
Order11 dated February 2, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY FOR THE
CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266-A PAR. 1 AND ART. 267-B, PAR. 7 IN RELATION TO R.A. NO. 7610)
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.1awp++i1 In particular, appellant insisted that the trial court erred in finding "AAA’s"
testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used
in burning her private parts.13 Appellant argued that "AAA" never showed signs of shock, distress, or
anxiety despite her alleged traumatic experience.14 Appellant also alleged that "CCC’s" testimony should
be disregarded as she was not even present when the rape incidents happened.15 He opined that "CCC"
influenced her niece, "AAA," to file the suit against him which bespoke of ill-motive on her part. Appellant
concluded that these "inconsistencies and contradictions" are enough to set aside the verdict of conviction
imposed upon by the RTC.16
However, the CA gave short shrift to appellant’s arguments. The CA rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read thus:
"1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten17 (8) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty Thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Thirty Thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifteen Thousand pesos
(₱15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for each count of rape by sexual assault; and
(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA Seventy-Five
Thousand pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral
damages, and Thirty Thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and all the costs of
suit."
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal19 which the CA gave due course in its Resolution20 of January 6, 2011. In a
Resolution21 dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion,22 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court that
it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already exhaustively discussed and refuted all
the arguments of the appellant in its brief filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a Manifestation In
Lieu of Supplemental Brief23 praying that the case be deemed submitted for decision based on the
pleadings submitted.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual assault
and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
 a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphases
supplied)
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman
below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on
account of her tender years."24 In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of
statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made her lie down.
Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of "AAA," inserted his penis into her vagina,
and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, "AAA" was only six years of age.
Her birth certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. "AAA’s" testimony was corroborated by
Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts of rape by
sexual assault.1âwphi1 Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAA’s" genital
orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick
into "AAA’s" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
We agree with the CA that "AAA’s" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that
was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is so inconsequential
and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the
essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
person’s genital or anal orifice."25 In any event, "inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair
her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape."26 We also held in People v. Piosang27 that –
"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined
to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellant’s argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her
traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that people
react differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard behavioral response
when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act
nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAA’s" reaction does not in any way prove the innocence of appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAA’s" reactions, it did not diminish the fact that she was
raped by appellant or that a crime was committed. 28
We also agree with the CA that "CCC’s" efforts to hale appellant to the court should not be equated with
ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find "CCC’s" efforts to seek justice for her niece who was raped
more in accord with the norms of society. At any rate, even if we disregard "CCC’s" testimony, appellant’s
conviction would still stand. We agree with the observation of the OSG that "CCC’s" "testimony actually
had no great impact on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed mainly of the fact that she was
the one who accompanied the mother of "AAA" in bringing "AAA" to the Pasig General Hospital and
thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the Women’s desk."29
On the other hand, appellant’s alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed against
"AAA’s" positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he admitted
that he lived just four houses away from the house of "AAA". His denial is also unsubstantiated hence the
same is self-serving and deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC properly disregarded the
testimony of Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellant’s brother-in-law, who claimed that appellant was at his
house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted, his house is near the house of "AAA"
hence there was no physical impossibility for him to be present at the crime scene. Also, the RTC
observed that Oletin’s testimony did not "prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it to state that the private
prosecutor correctly noted that the said witness was always smiling and laughing when answering
questions propounded to him as if making a mockery of the proceedings which his own brother-in-law
was facing."30
Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 99-16237) is death
when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape was
committed on April 8, 1999, "AAA" was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,31 the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant
but without eligibility for parole.32 The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old is punishable
by reclusion temporal.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no other aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision mayor34 as minimum, to
reclusion temporal,35 as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape). However, the award
of moral damages must be increased to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 36 As regards
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault), the CA likewise
properly awarded the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, for
each count. However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of rape by sexual assault must
be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.37 In addition, all damages awarded shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape) is
increased to ₱75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased to ₱30,000.00 for each count. In
addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. AURELIO JASTIVA, Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the final appeal1 of Aurelio Jastiva from his conviction for the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 12772, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva,” by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 9, in Dipolog City on September 1, 2009, 2 which the Court of Appeals affirmed with slight
modification through its Decision3 promulgated on August 31, 2011 in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 00754–
MIN.
Gathered from the records of the case, the facts are as follows:
On September 29, 2004, appellant Jastiva was charged in the RTC with rape penalized under Article
266–A in relation to Article 266–B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under the following
information:
That in the evening, on or about the 3rd day of August, (sic) 2004, in x x x, Zamboanga del Norte, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse
with one [AAA4 ], a 67–year–old married, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 266–A of the Revised Penal Code).5
With the assistance of counsel, appellant Jastiva pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged when he was
arraigned on November 26, 2004.6
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely (i) AAA,7 the private offended party, 69 years
old, married, a farmer, and a resident of Sitio WWW, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga
del Norte; (ii) BBB,8 the husband of AAA, 74 years old, a farmer, and a resident of Sitio WWW, Poblacion
YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (iii) Dr. Domiciano Talaboc,9 Municipal Health Officer,
ZZZ Rural Health office, Zamboanga del Norte; (iv) Celedonio Paul T. Payla, Jr.,10 Barangay Kagawad,
Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; and (v) Police Officer (PO) 3 Alfredo
Esmade,11 Desk Officer, PNP Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and several pieces of documentary
evidence,12 specifically: (i) the Medical Certificate13 of AAA dated August 5, 2004 issued by the Office of
the Municipal Health Officer; (ii) the Barangay Blotter;14 (iii) a Certification15 of the Excerpt from the Record
Book of Dapitan City Police Station; and (iv) the Affidavit16 of BBB.
As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution tried to establish from the preceding enumerated
testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence that –
On August 3, 2004, then [6717 ]–year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn (“kamalig”) in a farmland
located at [Sitio XXX], Zamboanga del Norte, when her husband[,] BBB[,] left her alone. BBB spent that
night in their permanent residence at [Sitio WWW] because their daughter has (sic) no companion.
At about 11:00 x x x in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later identified as
accused–appellant Aurelio Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and told her not to
scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA grabbed accused–appellant’s hand and
felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, accused–appellant removed AAA’s underwear. However,
he cannot proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet erected (sic), accused–appellant
therefore toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. Accused–appellant then made his way up and tried
to suck AAA’s tongue. The latter evaded her assaulter’s sexual advances by closing her lips tightly and
in the process wounded the same through her teeth. Once done, accused–appellant held his penis and
inserted it to (sic) AAA’s vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire and before AAA could stand up, accused–
appellant tapped AAA’s shoulder and said “Salamat” (Thank [y]ou).
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused–appellant out. When the latter passed through (sic)
AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the moon, that it was
their (sic) neighbor accused–appellant who abused her. Engulfed with fear, AAA immediately closed the
door because she thought that accused–appellant might go (sic) back and kill her. AAA later learned that
accused–appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen to enter the small barn. AAA was no longer
able to sleep after the incident.
At about 5:00 x x x in the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her neighbor Corazon Mokot
and her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her that they will bring the matter to the attention of the
authorities.
On August 5, 2004, they [AAA and BBB] went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay [YYY] to report the
incident. Barangay Kagawad Celedonio Paul Payla, Jr., the officer–on–duty wrote a barangay blotter
about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically examined by Dr. Domiciano Talaboc, the
Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of [ZZZ]. The Medical Certificate dated August 5, 2004
revealed that AAA’s labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of irritation and are reddish
in color, in addition to a partial separation of tissues noted between the labium. AAA’s vaginal opening
also showed signs of irritation and are (sic) reddish in color. The same also stated that AAA sustained
multiple scratches at both her upper and lower lips.
On August 6, 2004, assisted by Police Inspector and Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police,
[ZZZ] Police Station of Zamboanga del Norte, AAA filed a Complaint for Rape against accused–appellant.
A warrant for the arrest of accused–appellant was subsequently issued and on August 29, 2004,
accused–appellant was apprehended by the police authorities.18 (Citations omitted.)
To counter the evidence summarized above, the defense offered the testimonies of the following
witnesses: (i) Gloria Ordas (Ordas),19 48 years old, housekeeper, and a resident of Villahermosa,
Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (ii) Vilma Jastiva (Vilma),20 the common–law wife of appellant
Jastiva, 56 years old, laundry woman, and a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ,
Zamboanga del Norte; (iii) Merlyn Jastiva (Merlyn),21 the daughter of appellant Jastiva, 25 years old, and
also a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; and (iv) appellant
Jastiva,22 54 years old, and a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del
Norte. And the defense formally offered a single documentary evidence – the Medical Certificate of AAA.
According to the defense, appellant Jastiva, 49 years old at the time of the incident, could not have
committed the crime because on the date and time thereof, he was at home sleeping. Likewise, as
digested by the Court of Appeals, the testimonies of appellant Jastiva, Vilma and Merlyn, common–law
wife and daughter of appellant Jastiva, respectively, as well as Ordas, a friend of Merlyn, were offered to
show that –
On August 3, 2004, accused–appellant Aurelio Jastiva was in their house at the Municipality of [ZZZ],
Zamboanga del Norte. He was then with his wife Vilma and his youngest child. The Jastivas had a visitor
that time, a certain Gloria Ordas, the friend of accused–appellant’s daughter, Merlyn.
At around 11:00 x x x in the evening, the time the alleged incident happened, accused–appellant was fast
asleep with his wife. This fact was corroborated by Vilma.
Merlyn also corroborated his father’s story that he was sleeping at the time of the incident because their
house has only one door and nobody can go out without waking the other members of the family. Merlyn
narrated that his father could not have left the house unnoticed because their feet were blocking the door.
Merlyn does not remember waking on the day of the incident. Thus, accused–appellant could not have
gone outside their house. This fact was also confirmed by Gloria who visited and eventually spent the
night with the Jastivas on August 3, 2004. Gloria recounted that she was sleepless that night and she
clearly saw that accused–appellant was sleeping at around 11:00 x xx on that evening. 23 (Citations
omitted.)
After trial and upon evaluation of the evidence on record, the RTC found appellant Jastiva guilty of the
crime charged. The dispositive of the Decision dated and promulgated on September 1, 2009 states:
WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Aurelio
Jastiva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape penalized under Article 266–A in relation
to Article 266–B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to serve
the determinate penalty of reclusion perpetua. In view of his conviction and without need of further proof,
he is also ordered to pay complainant [AAA] the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
Being a detention prisoner, Aurelio Jastiva is entitled to the full benefit of his preventive
detention.24 (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, appellant Jastiva questioned his conviction to the Court of Appeals grounded on the following:
(i) the RTC “gravely erred by giving weight to the testimony of [AAA] that she recognized the accused–
appellant when he went out of the house of [AAA];” and (ii) the RTC “gravely erred in convicting [the]
accused–appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.”25cralawred
In his Brief,26 appellant Jastiva particularly argued the following points, (i) that “[t]he identity of the
appellant was not established,” x x x “considering that the private complainant herself admitted that the
room where the alleged incident happened was dark;” (ii) that “the witness could not possibly identify the
real culprit” because she testified that “she only saw his back, albeit the alleged moonlight;” (iii) that
“private complainant even opened the door for her rapist to let the latter go out of her house x x x private
complainant had all the opportunity to shout for help but she did not do so;” (iv) that the private
complainant’s two conflicting statements – in her sworn affidavit that appellant Jastiva removed her panty
and inserted his penis in her vagina vis–à–vis her testimony in open court that appellant Jastiva removed
her panty but first sucked her vagina to make his penis erect, and then inserted his penis into her vagina
– seriously cast doubts on her credibility; (v) that “[t]he testimony of the private complainant failed to show
any force or intimidation exerted upon her person” as appellant Jastiva was still able to engage in sexual
foreplay with leisure prior to the actual sexual intercourse; (vi) that “[t]he absence of rape is further
bolstered by the medial (sic) findings x x x the medical certificate states, among other things, that no sign
of irritation at the external genitalia; external genitalia appeared multiparous with corrugated skin folds x
x x;” and (vii) that his defense of alibi and denial should be given great weight in view of the weakness of
the evidence of the prosecution.27
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for appellee People of the Philippines, rebutted the foregoing
points with the two basic counter–arguments: (i) that “[b]ased on the x x x testimonies [of AAA], there is
no doubt that the victim positively identified appellant as the individual who raped her on the night of
August 3, 2004 x x x positive identification, when categorical and consistent and without ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial;” 28 and (ii) that “[t]he act of
holding a knife is by itself strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim
with a knife is sufficient to bring her into submission x x x. Inasmuch as intimidation is addressed to the
victim’s mind, response thereto and the effect thereof cannot be measured by any hard and fast rule such
that it must be viewed in the context of the victim’s perception and judgment not only at the time of the
commission of the crime but also at the time immediately thereafter. Physical resistance is immaterial in
a rape case when the victim is sufficiently intimidated by her assailant and submits against her will
because of fear for her life or personal safety x x x.”29
On August 31, 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC
albeit with a slight modification, i.e., that appellant Jastiva be further required to pay interest on all
damages awarded to AAA. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all respects except that accused–appellant
Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered to pay AAA interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of this Decision. 30 (Citation omitted.)
In affirming the conviction of appellant Jastiva, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime
of rape as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 266–A of the Revised Penal Code were established by
the prosecution, that is, “[a]ccused–appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through intimidation as shown
by her sordid experience x x x”31 coupled with the positive identification of appellant Jastiva by AAA as
her tormentor. On the issue that the RTC erred in giving weight to AAA’s testimony that she saw her
assailant’s face; hence, she could positively identify appellant Jastiva, the Court of Appeals stated that –
Accused–appellant however[,] maintains that the trial court erred in heavily relying on AAA’s positive
identification because her testimony on this matter is dubious considering that AAA herself admitted that
the small barn, where the alleged incident happened, was dark, hence[,] she could not have identified
him. Accused–appellant added that AAA could not have seen him due to the illumination of the moon
when he went out of the small barn because AAA testified that she only saw his back through the window
when he was going towards his house.
Accused–appellant’s argument is misleading.
True, the place where the incident happened was dark[,] which prevented AAA from recognizing accused–
appellant as the author of her honor’s ravishment. But it was not only through the window when AAA saw
accused–appellant but also when he passed through her upon going out the door of the small barn. This
put AAA in a position to clearly see accused–appellant. AAA’s testimony on this point is revealing:
Q: And you also said that you were the one who opened the door to let him go out, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir. I was afraid if he will stay longer, he will kill me.
Q: So you were already standing up?
A: Yes, considering I was the one who unlocked the door.
 xxx
Accused–appellant next posits that AAA’s testimony below failed to show any force or intimidation exerted
Prosecutor Olvis: (to the witness) upon her. Accused–appellant stated that what further erodes the credibility of AAA is her testimony that
accused–appellant appeared to have indulged in “sexual foreplay” first, i.e.[,] he sucked AAA’s vagina
Mrs. Witness, you stated that you were the one who unlocked the door to let Aurelio Jastiva got (sic) out and then went up to kiss her, which does not happen in rape cases. Usually, according to accused–
form (sic) your house. So when he passed the door, you saw him, clearly, isn’t it? appellant, a rapist is pressed with (sic) time so as not to be caught in flagrante delicto; thus, a rapist would
not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim being in consonance with reason and common
A: Yes, ma’am. experience.

Q: You stated that the room was dark. How were you able to see him? We still disagree.
A: When the door was opened, he was illuminated by a moonlight.
For one, the “sexual foreplay” referred to by accused–appellant was not improbable considering that as
Q: So, it was Aurelio Jastiva who left your house when you opened the door? testified to by AAA, accused–appellant was not yet erected (sic) at that time. For another, there is a
A: Yes, ma’am. sufficient reason to believe why accused–appellant did this because he may have been aware that BBB,
AAA’s husband, was not around on that night. Certainly and more likely, accused–appellant would not
Q: He was the one who raped you? have acted upon his lewd design had he known that BBB was there in the small barn with AAA. In addition
A: Yes, ma’am. to this was accused–appellant’s testimony that aside from the fact that he knows AAA very much, he also
knows that sometimes AAA’s family would stay in their small barn in Barangay XXX and sometimes in
xxx their permanent residence in Barangay ZZZ.33 (Citations omitted.)

Atty. Velasco: (to the witness) As to the damages awarded by the RTC to AAA, though the Court of Appeals affirmed the same, however,
in the dispositive portion of the decision, it further imposed upon appellant Jastiva the need to pay interest
Now when you saw the person who came out from your house, did you see exactly his face? on all the damages due at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of its decision – the Court of
A: Yes, sir. In fact, when he walked away, I even looked at him over the window. Appeals anchored its directive upon this Court’s decisions in People v. Galvez34 and People v. Abella.35

Q: Why (sic) was he walking towards you or walking away from you? On September 9, 2011, appellant Jastiva filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. In a
A: He was walking to the direction of his house. Resolution dated October 4, 2011, the appellate court resolved to grant the same and ordered its Judicial
Records Division to elevate the records of the case to this Court.
Q: So in other words, his back was directed towards you while the front of his body was directed to
where he was going? Hence, this appeal under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, as amended, wherein appellant Jastiva essentially
A: After he passed the door, I saw him. When he already walked away, what I only saw was his prays for his acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
back.
Appellant Jastiva reiterates his assignment of errors in the Court of Appeals, viz:
Q: But in your room, the surroundings was still dark?
A: Yes, sir. Inside the house was dark but when he came out, there was a moonlight, so I saw I.
him clearly.32
And on the various points above–quoted anent the supposed failure of the trial court to prove appellant THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED BY GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
Jastiva’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had this to say: OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT THAT SHE RECOGNIZED THE ACCUSED–APPELLANT WHEN
Accused–appellant next asserts that the case of People v. Castro is on all fours with the instant case. He HE WENT OUT OF THE HOUSE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
claims that if indeed AAA saw him as [her] attacker, she should have mentioned distinguishing features
or physical appearance on his body to recognize him. II.

We do not agree.
In Castro, x x x [t]herein accused–appellant Castro was practically a stranger to private complainant Edith,
thus the need x x x for the latter to mention distinguishing features in the face or physical appearance of
the former to show that she indeed recognized him as the person who raped her.
Unlike in this case, AAA testified that she knows accused–appellant very well, they being neighbors. In
fact, she is a friend of accused–appellant’s wife as sometimes, the latter would sleep with her at night.
Accused–appellant even admitted that she knows AAA and that the latter could not have mistaken her for
someone else. Thus, AAA does not need to mention any distinguishing features of accused–appellant.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED–APPELLANT DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 36
To restate, according to appellant Jastiva, the evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime charged; and “[t]he manner
by which AAA was allegedly raped is incredible,”37 and is tantamount to reasonable doubt as to his legal
culpability thereto, viz:
From her testimony, it would appear that accused–appellant indulge (sic) into (sic) foreplay in raping AAA.
This is highly unbelievable. Normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in flagrante,
would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually happened in this case.38
And in his Supplemental Brief39 filed before this Court, appellant Jastiva continues to insist that his guilt
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues further that AAA’s claim that he indulged in
sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to the normal
conduct of a rapist, to wit:
The manner by which AAA was allegedly raped is incredible. From her testimony, it would appear that
accused–appellant indulge (sic) into (sic) foreplay in raping AAA. This is highly unbelievable. Normally, a
rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual
intercourse with his victim, as what actually happened in this case.
xxx
With utmost due respect to the Court of Appeals, we beg to disagree with its findings that the “sexual
foreplay” was not improbable considering that accused–appellant may have been aware that AAA’s
husband was not around on the night of the alleged rape. With all due respect, there was no evidence
showing that the accused–appellant was indeed aware of the fact that AAA’s husband was not around at
that night so that [the] accused–appellant can do the sexual foreplay without fear of having (sic) caught.
Apparently, the Court of Appeals made a conclusion which was not present in evidence x x x it merely
made a conclusion that the accused–appellant “may have been aware that AAA’s husband was not
around during the night of rape” thereby the accused–appellant could have resorted to sexual foreplay.
Why would the accused–appellant resort to sexual foreplay knowing that the husband of AAA might arrive
anytime of the night?
The postulation therefore that the accused–appellant could resort to sexual foreplay is possible because
he is aware that BBB was not around at the night of the alleged rape cannot be taken against the accused–
appellant’s resulting in his conviction especially so if there is no evidence that indeed accused–appellant
was aware of the absence of BBB. The said theory is merely a suspicion not supported by evidence. It is
hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of conviction in a criminal
case. Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent
evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.
We humbly submit that the foregoing evidence leads to one conclusion, that is, the guilt of the accused–
appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt there being doubt as to who the real culprit
was.40 (Citations omitted.)
On March 29, 2012, appellee People manifested that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief as it had
already refuted thoroughly in its Appellee’s Brief all the assignments of error raised by appellant Jastiva
filed before the Court of Appeals.
The principal issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and the documentary evidence presented.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 266–A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:
ART. 266–A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation[.]
From the above–quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1, subparagraph a) are
as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3)
that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation.41
The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had carnal knowledge of
AAA against the latter’s will through force and intimidation. Despite his vigorous protestations, this Court
agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by appellant Jastiva against AAA was proved by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAA’s credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances surrounding her
rape;
b) AAA’s positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;
c) The physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped; and
d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against appellant Jastiva.
Consequently, this appeal is denied, and the conviction of appellant Jastiva is affirmed.
Firstly, the appeal of appellant Jastiva centers on the credibility of AAA, the main prosecution witness.
But credibility of a witness is the sole province of the RTC being the trial court in this case. Basic is the
rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses are generally conclusive
on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Such conclusiveness derives from the trial court’s having the
first–hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of the victim when he/she testified at the
trial.42 Undeniably, the calibration of the testimony of a witness, and the assessment of the probative
weight thereof, are virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witness at the stand. Unless there are substantial matters that might have been
overlooked or discarded, generally, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of a witness will not
be disturbed on appeal.43 The foregoing is especially true when such findings are affirmed by the appellate
court. In this case, with appellant Jastiva not showing that the RTC and the Court of Appeals overlooked
any fact or material of consequence that could have altered the outcome had they taken it into
consideration, this Court will not disturb on appeal the RTC’s findings of fact, but must fully accept the
same.
At this point, it is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation of
rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in mind the
intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care and
caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was committed. In a long line of cases, this
Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may
issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s testimony. This is because no decent and sensible woman will
publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape
victim.44
In this case, appellant Jastiva insistently makes an issue out of AAA’s failure to shout for help or struggle
against him, which for him does nothing but erode her credibility. This Court, however, does not agree. It
does not follow that because AAA failed to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she
could not have been raped. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not
only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other.45 And
physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and town where the crime of rape was committed, stating his medico–legal findings of his examination of AAA
the latter submits herself against her will to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal made on August 5, 2004 showing:
safety.46 Record disclose that in this case, AAA was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the
Findings:1)Patient is ambulatory, conscious, coherent and oriented as to time, day and place.
dark by appellant Jastiva who was armed with a knife. Justifiably, a woman of such advanced age could
only recoil in fear and succumb into submission. In any case, with such shocking and horrifying
2)Multiple scratches noted at both upper and lower lips, towards the inner folds.
experience, it would not be reasonable to impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction. Time and
again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving a
xxx
startling occurrence.47 The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable,
and people react differently – some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into
5)On internal examination, both labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of
insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion.48
irritation, reddish in color, and partial separation of tissues between labia majora and labia
minora on both sides was noted with more separation on the right side. 55
More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused.49 Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too
is consistent with AAA’s assertion that appellant Jastiva succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
intimidated to offer any resistance at all,50 just like what happened in this case. Thus, the law does not
impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution
And, fourthly, worth noting is the fact that appellant Jastiva did not allege, much less show, that AAA was
is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim 51 – which it
prompted by improper or malicious motives to impute upon him such a serious charge. This being so, the
did in the case at bar.
categorical and positive identification of appellant Jastiva prevails over the latter’s plain alibi and bare
denial.
The preceding paragraphs altogether, the testimony of AAA was shown to be credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature; and the fact that AAA is already of advanced age lends more credence
Moreover, such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to its being easily and conveniently
to her protestations of rape and inspires the thought that this case was filed for the genuine reason of
resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and not prevailing over the positive assertions
seeking justice.
of an eyewitness. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the
following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that
Secondly, the circumstances after the commission of the rape testified to by AAA sufficed to establish the
it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical
ability of the latter to identify appellant Jastiva as the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant Jastiva’s
impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of
assertions that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the “kamalig” where the crime took place,
the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and
utterly diminished AAA’s ability to identify him or anyone for that matter, is downright specious. AAA never
could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
claimed to have seen her attacker inside the “kamalig.” What AAA testified to was the fact that she saw
committed.56
appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the open door of the “kamalig” and his face was finally
illuminated by the moonlight. As explained by the RTC –
Here, appellant Jastiva utterly failed to satisfy the above–quoted requirements. From the testimonies of
In not a few cases, though, the High Court held that an accused need not always be identified under a
the witnesses, it was shown that the distance between AAA’s farmhouse and appellant Jastiva’s house
perfect or near perfect visibility. This was demonstrated in People v. Villaruel with the Supreme Court
was only 150 meters, more or less.57 Certainly, 150 meters is not too far as to preclude the presence of
saying that –
appellant Jastiva at the farmhouse of AAA. That he presented witnesses to attest to his presence at his
own home around the time the rape was said to have been committed did not help him one bit. If truth be
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be
told, the testimonies of his wife and daughter were more deleterious to his defense because they
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.
contradicted each other’s account on material points relative to the circumstances of that fateful night.
Appellant Jastiva’s common–law wife, Vilma, testified that:
The ruling in People v. Pueblas, citing the earlier ruling in People v. Vacal, is even more to the point,
Q: Mrs. Witness, how are you related with (sic) Aurelio Jastiva?
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A: My husband, sir.
[I]f identification of persons is possible even by the light of stars, with more reason that one could identify
persons by moonlight.52 (Citations and emphases omitted.)
Q: Where were you on August 3, 2004 at around 11:00 x x x in the evening?
A: In our house.
From the above, the RTC correctly held that “the Court is not disposed to doubt the evidenced ability of
xxx
the complainant to identify her rapist especially because her familiarity of the latter could easily be
strengthened by the fact that the accused is her neighbor living some 100 meters away from the crime
Q: How about Aurelio Jastiva, where was he on August 3, 2004 at around 11:00 x x x in the evening?
scene.”53
A: He was still in our house because during the time we had a visitor in our house.

Q: Who was your visitor in your house at that time?

Thirdly, contrary to appellant Jastiva’s claim that the “absence of rape is x x x bolstered by the medical
A: Gloria Ordas.
findings,”54 the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Domiciano P. Talaboc, Municipal Health Officer of the
Q: Why can you say that Aurelio Jastiva was in your house at that time? xxx
A: I was a witness because I was there also in our house.
Q: And your father is just sleeping far from the door? From the women?
Q: Now, Aurelio Jastiva is charged of alleged Rape which allegedly happened on August 3, 2004 at A: Yes, ma’am. Because he slept with my brother siblings.60 (Emphasis supplied.)
around 11:00 x x x in the evening, what can you say about that? The aforequoted testimonies highlighted the fact that appellant Jastiva could have slipped in and out of
A: I have no knowledge about that old woman who was raped because she was lying. their house undetected by Vilma and Merlyn. Such scenario is all the more likely as appellant Jastiva
himself admitted upon questioning by the RTC that he actually slept in another room; hence, his wife and
Q: Why can you say that? daughter had no way of being sure if he was inside their house or not, to wit:
A: Because I have no knowledge about that incident considering that we are on a far Q: How about the “kamalig”. How far is the kamalig to your house?
place.58 (Emphasis supplied.) A: 150 meters more or less.
On the other hand, the testimony of appellant Jastiva’s daughter, Merlyn, is quite informative:
Q: Merlyn Jastiva, how are you related with the accused Aurelio Jastiva? Q: Who are the occupants of your house [on] August 3, 2004?
A: He is my father, sir. A: We, your Honor.

Q: Where were you in the evening of August 3, 2004? Q: Who are those “we”?
A: At home, sir. A: My children together with my wife.

xxx Q: How many children do you have?

A: Seven (7) children and my wife.
Q: Where was Aurelio Jastiva in the evening of August 3, 2004?
A: He was sleeping at home. Q: Meaning, all of you were at your house at [Poblacion YYY], [ZZZ], Zamboanga del Norte on August
3, 2004?
Q: Before 11:00 x x x in the evening, where was Aurelio Jastiva? A: Yes ma’am.
A: He did not leave the house. He just stayed home.
Q: And the dimension of the house is 8x12 with only one room?
Q: At about 11:00 x x x in the evening of that day, August 3, 2004 where was Aurelio Jastiva? A: Yes ma’am, Only one (1) room.
A: At home sleeping.
Q: Meaning, there is no division in your house?
Q: Why can you say that during that time Aurelio Jastiva was in your house? A: There is a division ma’am which divides the house into two.
A: Because I was sleeping with my parents. I know that my father slept beside my mother.
Q: In that division are there doors or what?
Q: Will you be able to notice if your father went out of your house in that evening of August 3, 2004? A: Yes, your Honor, going to the sala.
A: Yes, because we have only one door in our house.
Q: So, the sala and the other room is used for sleeping?
Q: Did he go out of the house in that evening of August 3, 2004 at about 11:00 x x x in the evening? A: Yes, ma’am.
A: No sir, he already fall (sic) asleep.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
But when she was cross–examined, Merlyn revealed that her father did not actually sleep beside her Q: All the nine (9) of you were asleep in that one (1) room?
mother; thus, contradicting her earlier declaration that her father slept beside her mother, and she (Merlyn) A: No your Honor. Only my wife together with our youngest sleep in that room.
slept with them, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: You said earlier that your brothers used to go out even at night. Now, during that time was any of Q: How about the other six (6) children of yours? Where do they sleep?
your brothers was (sic) out during that night? A: In the sala, your Honor.61 (Emphasis supplied.)
A: No ma’am. We already fall (sic) asleep.
Appellant Jastiva further tries to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that AAA’s claim that he
Q: Where was Rolly [her brother] sleeping at that time? indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to the
A: We, women are sleeping near the door and the other siblings in the other corner of the house. normal conduct of a rapist, i.e., that “[n]ormally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in
flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually happened in
Q: You said the women are sleeping near the door? this case.”62 He reasons that he could not have engaged in sexual foreplay because he could not have
A: Yes, ma’am. known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse on the night in question.

Q: And the men sleep safely far from the door? Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and audacious
A: Yes ma’am. circumstances.63 The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the crampness of
the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient
and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. 64
Also, appellant Jastiva’s objections are without basis, and at best, merely lip service. During his cross–
examination, he admitted that he knew AAA; in fact, he acknowledged that she could easily identify him,
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: And the residence of [AAA] is also at [Poblacion YYY], [ZZZ], Zamboanga del Norte?
A: It is not their real residence it is only a barn.
Q: That place is just near from your house. Is that right?
A: Yes, ma’am. We are only apart by a rice field which is about more or less 150 meters.
xxx
is obligatory upon conviction of rape. As to moral damages, it is automatically awarded to rape victims
without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that they suffered moral injuries entitling them to such
award. Similarly, the Court of Appeals fittingly imposed interest on all damages awarded to AAA, the
private offended party, at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this
Court’s decision in conformity with present jurisprudence. 67
This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the award of exemplary
damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded even in the absence of an
aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender.68 Thus, this Court deems it necessary to modify the civil liability of appellant
Jastiva to include exemplary damages for the vindication of the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered
by AAA, a woman of advanced age, and to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to those who abuse
the elderly, and to protect the latter from sexual assaults.

Q: You know very well [AAA]? WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No.
A: Yes, ma’am. 00754–MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
Q: And she could not be mistaken of your identity. Right? and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
A: Yes ma’am, being a neighbor.65 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered to pay legal interest
And when the RTC propounded clarificatory questions, appellant Jastiva disclosed that he knew pretty on all damages awarded in this case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
well the routine of the spouses AAA and BBB, viz: this decision until fully paid.
Q: You mentioned about “kamalig” or barn. Is that where [AAA] and her family live?
A: Yes, ma’am. If they are working in the field. SO ORDERED.

Q: How about when they do not work in the field, where does [AAA] live?
A: In [WWW]. Their real residence.

Q: And [she] live there in [WWW] together with her family?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Who are the members of her family if you know?

A: She has only two (2) children.

xxx

Q: How far is the residence of [AAA] from [WWW] to your residence at [YYY], [ZZZ], Z.N.?
A: About a kilometer ma’am.66
All told, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jastiva committed the crime of
rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA using force and intimidation. Under Article 266–B of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper penalty to be imposed is:

Art. 266–B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines;” thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, properly imposed upon appellant Jastiva the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Relative to the award of damages, the RTC correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages, and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in
Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto,
and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen
Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, 3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and
once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside
said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having
carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed
her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.5
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. Afterwards,
they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission
from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for
an election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told
her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim,
Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding.
After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from
Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola,
and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor
where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to
celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being
passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At
first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared
their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was
then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five
(5) glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap.
Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she
told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda
also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They
helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make
her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned
on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy
bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from
the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was asleep
again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House.
She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and
wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing
her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist
when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For
the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt heavy and
exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body
was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing
up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her
and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They
brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital
for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004,
and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior
fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in the
evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemeno’s house.
Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned
by the latter’s family. When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for
Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to
Alson’s Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to
celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana,
Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking
were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a
certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell
her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto’s lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo
on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?"
Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA also
kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging
House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then
requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the
second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother
might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay here."
Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alson’s Palace
again,and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck.
Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to take
her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a
motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I
want to sleep here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down
on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then
removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her
brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants.
AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to
AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAA’s legs
and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alson’s Palace to
get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When
AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started
kissing AAA’s breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio
on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and
slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m.,
he went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the
lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola
had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy,
and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion
perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum
of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the
commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages and another sum of ₱30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and
Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be
credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up
to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then
up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was
ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently
posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus
resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute
the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and, consequently,
acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual
congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse.
She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old
hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge
with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she
discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that
her child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65,
questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending that
the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7, 2008 to
assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE
PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES. 11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the following
errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly
conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice.
As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the
rules should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their
operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities. 14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to
the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v. Santiago: 18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal.
However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant
has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name
of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State
through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against
him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is
solely vested in the OSG.20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the
aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal
prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the
subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private
offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of
the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General’s intervention was not necessary, the
recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that
of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its Comment, 22 thereby
fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA can file
the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be
dismissed for petitioner’s failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for
reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the
court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of
the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-
defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from
an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.24
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is
also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only
of the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is
a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse
of discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial
conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the
respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense
justice.25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally
disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and
sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes
beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense
and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts 28 of the
case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that
it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate
court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that
transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the
Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling
of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented,
regardless of the party who offered the same. 32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn
a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule
becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the
incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous.
Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the
defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own
flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact that she
never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against the private
respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. 34 Here, the accused A: Yes, sir.
intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of
but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished light.
her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.
shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy A: Yes, sir.
by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate court never provided any Q: Where?
reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient xxxx
to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that Q: So, you fell asleep again?
basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered A: Yes, sir.
to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself. 36 The trial court correctly ruled xxxx
that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
narrated her harrowing experience.37 Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA’s testimony simple Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to A: I was starting to cry, sir.
the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
rehearsed testimony.38 Thus: A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct): Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
xxxx A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain your ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.
consciousness? xxxx
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
Brandy. COURT: Continue.
xxxx ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle there inside that room?
of Emperador Brandy? A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted. Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember? A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir. Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle? A: Dressed up, sir.
A: Yes, sir. Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
Q: What happened after that? A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
A: I fell asleep again, sir. Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
Q: When did you regain your consciousness? A: I could not remember, sir.
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs. xxxx
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you? Q: After that, what happened?
A: Yes, sir. A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Who? Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
 A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana,
sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel (sic)
something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that their
account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible. 40 Besides, the defense of consensual
copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The
accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about
it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise. 41 More importantly, it
must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between
him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that
he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense
that needs convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was
indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every
element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in
criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. 43 Burden of evidence is that logical
necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his
favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue
in litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing
proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual
relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence. 45
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to
discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging
house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed
her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went to kiss
AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the
other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While
Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then
he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull
the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto,
he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him.
Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with
Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had
intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA
vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time. 47 Despite said shameless
admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on
AAA’s part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with
them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and
therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when
testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a
rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the attending circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive
and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment
and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better
position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of
witnesses who have personally appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the
details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the
matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and
recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference. 52 Since the CA
and the private respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the
findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and
binding.53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal laceration on
AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present when the
alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication.
According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the
penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent
considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual
encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for
organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the
time of the incident, having just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case, 54 the
Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men —
or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or
as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-
year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court
evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any
reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged. 55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true. 56 And even if
she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was
actually committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of
rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial where,
as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through
intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the
carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent. 57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential
elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out.
Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part
of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAA’s mother’s act
of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human
mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently."59 Different
people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the
frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late
the night before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled
by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith
and credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell
her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape?
She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private respondents, 62 nor was she shown
to have been in a relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved. 63 She never became
pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to
drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply because she was,
in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had
already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor
that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its
findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and
jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his participation
in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation was not in
furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape. 68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred
in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is
proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in
furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after
the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense.70
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the
crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the mauling and
whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not,
Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary.1âwphi1 In this case, the
rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their
exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the testimony of
the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that
Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela
Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of
them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous participation
and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the
commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in
the commission of the crime.73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all uncertain.
As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished
with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and
Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions.
He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any
one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While
it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of
the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however, actually
charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous
complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and
enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or
more charges which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for
quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect
is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did
not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they
are deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts
imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime,
as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of. 81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June
accused to be informed of the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
"took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations Court hereby renders judgment:
made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled
several times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single perpetua in each case;
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4)
or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed imprisonment from six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in
the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4)
as long as prescription has not yet set in. counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in each case.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts of
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them, 84 for each count. With regard to for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate
Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case be forwarded
penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.
a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range SO ORDERED.
of prision mayor(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the
Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each
count of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section
51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years,
so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows:89

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be taken
into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone
beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 shall likewise be
imposed by way of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial acts.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234
which affirmed appellant’s conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal
Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information, 2 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000,
alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit
with the said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA.3 The second
Information,4 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and hitting with a lead pipe one
[AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while
in such defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will
and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter tried jointly
because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old at the time
of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her
neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six o’clock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near
the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice
pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete
wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and
to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the
lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter
covered her body with thick grass.5 Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times
more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position,
appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then
went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant
also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. 6
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her
uncle’s farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.7 When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle,
BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for
more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.8
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant accosted them
because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he would
harm them.9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six o’clock in the morning, he was at his rice field at Sampaloc,
San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about
200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind her. However, when she
was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He
immediately approached her and saw that her face was swollen, with her hair covering her face, and her
clothes all wet. He asked AAA what happened to her, and AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni" referring to
appellant who is his son-in-law.10 With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home. 11 AAA was later
brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited AAA at the
hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere
at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista where they
found Jennifer’s cadaver covered with grass and already bloated. 12
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan, conducted the
autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
…the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] … eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips
and abdomen are swollen; … desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in
the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from the nose, mouth,
genital region and at the site of wounds, … three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the
submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the chest of the victim[.]
… cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head and trunk.13
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifer’s
mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent ₱25,000
for Jennifer’s funeral and burial.14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at home
cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay,
Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven o’clock, he was arrested by the
police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he
"went wild" that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their
house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.15
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they would ask
for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut
but they left the following morning at around seven o’clock. An hour later, he left his house to have his
scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was the time when he "went wild" after
seeing his wife with another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away
from the scene of the crime.16
The defense also presented appellant’s nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to appellant’s
house on June 5, 2000, at around three o’clock in the afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He
recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncle’s house about seven times because AAA and his
uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived before midnight on June 5, 2000 and
slept with AAA. The following morning, at around six o’clock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and
appellant meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe
repaired while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan. 17
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision18 on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran,
the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused Conrado Laog
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the private
complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement in People v.
Mateo,20 the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s judgment. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-
2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual
damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are
hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction for both crimes of rape
and murder. In a Resolution22 dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties to submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised
the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAA’s credibility, the prosecution’s main
witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of the crimes charged. According
to him, AAA’s narration that he waylaid them while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply
for work negates evident premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was their usual
route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Fiscal:
abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado Laog?
of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been shown in order A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
to determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome the victim physically or whether the Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
upon AAA’s testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
appellant, she was still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfather’s farm. A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
The appeal lacks merit. A: He was beside me, sir.
Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because Fiscal:
of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts" 24 and "absent A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, Q: Then, what happened next?
the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have Q: And what happened to Jennifer?
affected the outcome of the case."25 This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court A: She fell down, sir.
concurred with the trial court.26 Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of AAA, Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
the lone eyewitness to Jennifer’s killing and was herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial court’s evaluation Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
of the prosecution eyewitness’ credibility. In particular, we defer to the trial court’s firsthand observations A: He came back to me, sir.
on AAA’s deportment while testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit: Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the trepidations of a woman Q: And what happened to you?
outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with trembling A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were constantly fixed on the floor as Q: Then, what happened to you?
if avoiding an eye contact with the man she was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct, A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my blouse and
the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue my bra.
any further with her testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her Q: After that, what did he do next?
direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue with her aborted questioning, this time, A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
composed and collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her credibility Q: Then, what happened?
vanished.27 A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness stand for Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct examination. However, during the next A: Yes, sir.
hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward manner, describing Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe A: For quite sometime, sir.
and ice pick before raping her. We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony: Q: After that, what happened?
A: After that, he stood up, sir.
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that you’re not able to reach your Q: And where did he go?
place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not reach your place of work? A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir. Q: And after that, what did you do?
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog? A: I fell unconscious, sir.
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir. Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
xxxx Interpreter:
Q: Where were you when you were hit? Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmate’s uniform and when asked his name, answered:
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor. Conrado Laog.
x x x x28
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at the
time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense,
however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively identified
him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that positive identification
of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.29 AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant
as the one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It should be
noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with
AAA’s familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her identification of
appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering appellant, did not run away
as she never thought her own uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction
of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the
manner in which the crime is being committed. 30 There is no evidence to show any improper motive on
the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime.
Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 31
In People v. Nieto,32 we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can
scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in
the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly,
alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly,
in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else
during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to
be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June 6, 2000. In
fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house was more or less only 100 meters
from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added reason that he
has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi deserve no consideration.
We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical
testimony of a rape victim.33
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she testified on being
very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when
she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends that
the prosecution should have presented the physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that
she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAA’s account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra were merely
lifted up ("nililis") while her undergarments were just pulled down, which therefore explains why she still
had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfather’s farm. Nonetheless, this matter raised by
appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies
referring only to minor details and collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect
the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses’ declarations, as long as these are
coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. 34 For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony
of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant
for the crime charged.35 It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished,
let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.36
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the trial, we find
this not fatal to the prosecution’s case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony
and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate,
is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is
important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and
credible,38 as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and
killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder
and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one
not raised by the parties.39 The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by
appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.40
In People v. Larrañaga,41 this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty
for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the
special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with
rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape
with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed;["] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on
the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses,
appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. x x x42 (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty
in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People
v. Barros,43 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the
rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single
act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an
offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single
penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses." 44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite
acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of
Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision.
There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she
is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the
original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA’s
body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer’s body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by
passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause
her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were consummated,
and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape.
An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts
of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery. In People v. De Leon,45 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony
of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of
the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be
robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. 46 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
rape.47 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would
not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the
case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales48
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic
aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in
defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by
appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery
is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime
with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime
of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances
proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide
to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be
imposed.49 (Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to
the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. 50 It
is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked. 51
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then
stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain
Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless
and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in
treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of
superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense,
although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
[a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellant’s sudden attack caught the victim off-guard rendering
her defenseless.52
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to be
considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose
on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.53
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly weapon have
greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While the trial court and CA were
correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the
award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to
exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal knowledge of
a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify
the award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAA’s relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the information but admitted
by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x54 (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAA’s relationship to appellant will not bar the
consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where the
circumstances of the case show the "highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender." Citing
our earlier ruling in the case of People v. Catubig,55 this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay56:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary
damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information.
This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised
Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the
determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance
has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are the
following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages
based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged,
so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which
remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules
should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized:
one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another
awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven
following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People
v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada,
People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in
the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the
Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case
was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages—
taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime,
courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening
on this point, thus—
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally,
but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation
suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant—associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud—that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance
when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of
the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers
with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in
People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity
and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of
the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
jurisprudence, the amount of ₱30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer as exemplary damages was
correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal
the amounts of ₱50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral
damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 59 Anent
the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased to ₱75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence. 60 As
to expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount
of ₱25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of ₱50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well as the
award of ₱50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of
rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. 61
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant
Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal ₱75,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as actual damages and ₱30,000 as exemplary
damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to
justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate
opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind
the award of exemplary damages—to set a public example or correction for the public good."57 (Emphasis
supplied.)1avvphi1

In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his niece-in-law
who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award
of exemplary damages. Appellant’s sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several times on the
head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and
pulling down her undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position, covering her
body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and outrageous.
Such vicious assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained
more stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award
of exemplary damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall
behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.58 In line with current
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184926 April 11, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a crime and the identity
of the culprit.
Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with homicide by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 128, in Caloocan City based on circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the conviction with modification on February 22, 2007.1
The victim was Marita,2 a girl who was born on October 29, 1994 based on her certificate of live
birth.3 When her very young life was snuffed out by strangulation on July 2, 1999, she was only four years
and eight months old.4 She had been playing at the rear of their residence in Bagong Silang, Caloocan
City in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from home. 5 By
noontime, because Marita had not turned up, Julia called her husband Manito at his workplace in Pasig
City, and told him about Marita being missing.6 Manito rushed home and arrived there at about 2 pm,7 and
immediately he and Julia went in search of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house in
the vicinity. They did not find her.8 At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to the police that Marita was
missing.9 In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant (manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and
the latter hinted that Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the
clairvoyant’s direction, they found Marita’s lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack 10 inside the
comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house. 11 Her face was
black and blue, and bloody.12 She had been tortured and strangled till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum, who indicated
that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita. 13 The police thus arrested Villaflores
at around 5 pm of July 3, 1999 just as he was alighting from a vehicle.14
On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the information charging Villaflores
with rape with homicide committed as follows:15
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of one Marita, a minor of five (5) years old, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said Marita, against the latter’s
will and without her consent, and thereafter with deliberate intent to kill beat the minor and choked her
with nylon cord which caused the latter’s death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.16
The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision, viz:
After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the prosecution presenting witnesses namely,
Aldrin Bautista, Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio
Nacis, PO3 Rodelio Ortiz, PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy Tepase.
From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, the lifeless body of a 5-year old
child, Marita (hereinafter Marita) born on October 21, 1994, (see Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit
K) was discovered by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl at an unoccupied house
about 5 houses away from their residence in Phase 9, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at
about noon time his wife called him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was missing,
prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the child. He went around possible places, inquiring from
neighbors but no one could provide any lead until the following morning when his wife in desperation,
consulted a "manghuhula" at a nearby barangay. According to the "manghuhula" his daughter was just at
the 5th house from his house. And that was how he tracked down his daughter in exact location. She was
covered with a blue sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked to the skin. He found a yellow sack
under her head and a white rope around her neck about 2 and a half feet long and the diameter, about
the size of his middle finger. There were onlookers around when the NBI and policemen from Sub-station
6 arrived at the scene. The SOCO Team took pictures of Marita. Jessie was investigated and his
statements were marked Exhibits C, D and D-1. He incurred funeral expenses in the total amount of
P52,000.00 marked as Exhibit L and sub-markings. (See other expenses marked as Exhibit M and sub-
markings).
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and narrated that at about 10:00
o’clock in the morning of July 2, 1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his
Batman tag and a neighbor of the [victim’s family], leading Marita by the hand ("umakay sa bata"). At
about noon time they were at Batman’s house where they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie
are drug users. Aldrin sports a "sputnik" tattoo mark on his body while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G.
("through crusher gangster"). While in Batman’s place, although he did not see Marita, Jovie presumed
that Batman was hiding the child at the back of the house. Jovie related that about 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day, he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman ("Narinig ko
pong umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol"). At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Jovie saw again
Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. He thought that the child must have been in the
sack because it appeared heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child was found was SPO2 PROTACIO
MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-station 6 Bagong Silang, Caloocan City who was dispatched by Police
Chief Inspector Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the SOCO Team and on different
vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, Phase 9 arriving there at about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of
July 3, 1999. They saw the body of the child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he himself
recovered pieces of evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack inside the comfort
room. The child appeared black and blue, (kawawa yong bata wasak ang mukha"). He saw blood stains
on her lips and when he removed the sack covering her body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina.
The yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had already a greenish and fleshy
color. The sack was no longer in the same condition when recovered, saying, when asked by the Court:
"medyo buo pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira." There was another sack, colored blue, which was used to
cover the face of the child while the yellow sack was at the back of the victim. He forgot about the blue
sack when SOCO Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the body to the funeral parlor.
He had already interviewed some person when the SOCO Team arrived composed of Inspector Abraham
Pelotin, their team leader, and 2 other members. He was the one who took the statement of the wife of
Edmundo Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of evidence to Police Officer SPO2 Arsenio
Nacis who placed a tag to mark the items. When the SOCO Team arrived, a separate investigation was
conducted by Inspector Pelotin.
PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City Police Station, as a police investigator, took
the sworn statement of Aldrin Bautista upon instruction of his chief, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin to
read his statement after which he signed the document then gave it to investigator, SPO2 Protacio
Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused the confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo
Villaflores. Aldrin went closer to the detention cell from where he identified and pointed to Villaflores as
the one who abducted the child. Villaflores appeared angry.
SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS’ participation was to supervise the preparation of the documents to be submitted
for inquest to the fiscal. He asked the investigator to prepare the affidavit of the victim’s father and the
statement of the two witnesses and also asked the investigator to prepare the referral slip and other
documents needed in the investigation. He ordered the evidence custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure
all the physical evidence recovered from the scene of the crime composed of 2 sacks. In the afternoon of
July 3, the suspect, Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3 Harold Blanco, SPO1 Antonio Alfredo,
NUP Antonio Chan and the members of Bantay Bayan in Bagong Silang.
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, Caloocan City, as follow-up operative, was
in the office at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, together with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and
Police Officer Martin Interia, when Police Inspector Corpuz, as leader formed a team for them to go to the
scene of the crime. They immediately proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector Corpuz entered the premises
while he stayed with his companions and guarded the place. SPO3 Magtajas was already investigating
the case. They were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco and the
other police officers returned to the crime scene and asked the people around, who kept mum and were
elusively afraid to talk. When he went with SPO1 Antonio Chan accompanied by councilman Leda to the
house of Batman, it was already padlocked. They went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo Antonio nearby to
avoid detection and asked a child to look out for Villaflores. Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived
and a commotion ensued as people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the said
jeep. The officers took him in custody and brought him to Sub-station 6 and SPO3 Nacis instructed them
to fetch his wife. He was with police officer Antonio Chan and they waited for the arrival of the wife of
Villaflores from the market. When she arrived, it was already night time. They informed her that her
husband was at Sub-station 6 being a suspect in the killing of a child. There was no reaction on her part.
She was with her 3 minor children in the house. She went with them to the precinct. When Sgt. Nacis
asked Mrs. Villaflores if she knew anything about what happened on the night of July 2, initially, she
denied but in the course of the questioning she broke down and cried and said that she saw her husband
place some sacks under their house. He remembered the wife saying, "noong gabing nakita niya si
Villaflores, may sako sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya yong sako at
nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si Villaflores, ano yon? Sabi niya, wala yon,
wala yon." The wife was crying and she said that her husband was also on drugs and even used it in front
of their children. She said that she was willing to give a statement against her husband. Their house is a
"kubo" the floor is made of wood and there is space of about 2 feet between the floor and the ground. She
saw the sack filled with something but when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She related
that before she went outside, she again took a look at the sack and she saw a protruding elbow inside
the sack. She went inside the house and went out again to check the sack and saw the child. It was Sgt.
Nacis who typed the statement of Erlinda Villaflores which she signed. He identified the sworn statement
marked as Exhibit X and sub-markings.
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory, SOCO, Caloocan City Police Station
also went to the crime scene on July 3, 1999 at about 2:50 in the afternoon with Team Leader Abraham
Pelotin, at the vacant lot of Block 57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan City. He cordoned the area and saw the
dead child at the back of the uninhabited house. She was covered with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied
around her neck. There was another yellow sack at the back of her head. He identified the nylon cord
(Exhibit N) and the yellow sack. He does not know where the blue sack is, but he knew that it was in the
possession of the officer on case. The blue sack appears in the picture marked as Exhibits S, T, and R,
and was marked Exhibits T-3-A, S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter they marked the initial report as Exhibit U and
sub-markings. They also prepared a rough sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked
as
Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked as Exhibit W.
DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory with office at Caloocan City
Police Station conducted the autopsy on the body of Marita upon request of Chief Inspector Corpus. The
certificate of identification and consent for autopsy executed by the father of the victim was marked as
Exhibit G. He opined that the victim was already dead for 24 hours when he conducted the examination
on July 3, 1999 at about 8 o’clock in the evening. The postmortem examination disclosed the following:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in secondary stage of flaccidity with postmortem
lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.
HEAD, NECK AND TRUNK
1) Hematoma, right periorbital region, measuring 4 x 3.5 cm; 3.5 cm from the anterior midline.
2) Area of multiple abrasions, right zygomatic region, measuring 4 x 2.2 cm, from the anterior
midline.
3) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 1.7 x 0.8 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, upper lip, measuring 4 x 1 cm, bisected by the anterior midline.
5) Contusion, frontal region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 6.5 cm left of the anterior midline.
6) Punctured wound, left pre-auricular region, measuring 9.2 x 0.1 cm, 11.5 cm from the anterior
midline.
7) Ligature mark, neck, measuring 24 x 0.5 cm, bisected by the anterior midline.
8) Abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 0.7 x 0.4 cm, 6 cm from the Posterior midline.
9) Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 1.2 x 0.8 cm, 6.5 cm from the posterior midline.
There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The vestibule is abraded and markedly
congested, while the posterior fourchette is likewise lacerated and marked congested.
The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly congested with scattered
petecchial hemorrhages.
Stomach is ½ full of partially digested food particles mostly rice.
Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation."
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule was abraded and markedly congested
while the posterior fourchette was likewise lacerated and markedly congested, too. It could have been
caused by an insertion of blunt object like a human penis. The cause of death was asphyxia by
strangulation, in layman’s term, "sinakal sa pamamagitan ng tali." The external injuries could have been
caused by contact with a blunt object like a piece of wood. The abrasion could have also been caused by
a hard and rough surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-250-99 of the victim, Marita _____
marked as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He issued the death certificate marked as Exhibit E. The
anatomical sketch representing the body of the victim was marked as Exhibit I and sub-markings. The
sketch of the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on the head could have been caused
by hard and blunt object while other injuries were caused by coming in contact with a hard or rough
surface. There were also punctured wounds which could have been caused by a barbecue stick or
anything pointed. The ligature mark was congested and depressed.
On cross-examination, among others, he explained the stages of flaccidity which is the softening of the
body of a dead person. The first 3 hours after death is the primary stage of flaccidity and after the third
hour, the body will be in rigor mortis and after the 24 hours, it is the secondary stage. The victim could
have been dead at least 9 o’clock in the morning on July 2. As regards the multiple lacerations of the
hymen, it is possible that two or more persons could have caused it.
The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as follows:
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the charge of raping and killing the child saying
he did not see the child at anytime on July 2, 1999. At around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of July 2, 1999,
he was at the market place at Phase 10 to get some plywood for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt called him at
8:30 in the morning and stayed there for about 5 hours and arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon.
His Aunt was residing at Phase 10 which is about a kilometer from his place. His residence is some 5
houses away from the place of the child. He knows the child because sometimes he was asked by the
wife of Manito to fix their electrical connection. He corrected himself by saying he does not know Marita
but only her father, Manito. He denied carrying a sack and throwing it at the vacant lot. He was arrested
on July 3, 1999 and does not know of any reason why he was charged. He has witnesses like Maring,
Sherwin, Pareng Bong and Frankie to prove that he had no participation in the killing.
On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being called "Batman" in their place and that Aldrin
and Jovie are his friends. They go to his house at Package 5, Phase 9, Lot 32 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan
City. They are his close friends being his neighbors and they usually went to his house where they used
shabu ("gumagamit ng bato"). At 42, he is older than Aldrin and Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes
called him to his house to fix electrical wiring. He also knew his wife, but does not know their children. On
the night of July 2, Aldrin and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested on July 3 in a street near the
precinct while walking with his wife. They came from Bayan. His wife works in a sidewalk restaurant. Two
of his children were in Phase 3, the other two were in his house and two more were left with his siblings.
When he was arrested, he was carrying some food items which they brought in Bayan. They did not tell
him why he was being arrested. He saw his wife once at Police Station 1 before he was brought to the
city jail. Aldrin and Jovie harbored ill feelings against him because the last time they went to his house he
did not allow them to use shabu. He admitted using shabu everytime his friends went to his house. He is
not legally married to his wife. She visited him for the last time on July 19, 1999. He denied that the door
of his house had a sack covering neither was it locked by a piece of string. He has not talked with the
father or mother of the child nor did he ask his wife for help. He just waited for his mother and she told
him, they will fight it out in court, "ilalaban sa husgado."
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his house. His bathroom is in front of
his house.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of Edmundo Villaflores told the court that
the charges against Villaflores were not true, the truth being, that on the night of July 2, 1999 he saw
Aldrin and Jovie at the back of his house holding a sack containing something which he did not know.
They were talking to Batman and offering a dog contained in the sack and then they left the sack near the
comfort room outside the door of the house of Batman. They came back and took the yellow sack. He
followed them up to the other pathwalk and then he went home. The following day he learned that
Villaflores was being charged with the killing of Marita. At first, he just kept quiet because he thought
Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a drug user, but later when he had a drinking spree with
his father and uncle, he told them what he knew because he could not trust any policeman in their place.
He told them what really happened and they advised him to report the matter to the barangay. So he went
to the purok and made a statement in an affidavit form. He executed the "Salaysay" in the presence of
their Purok secretary and barangay tanod. It was the Purok secretary who gave him the form. He saw
Aldrin and Jovie about midnight of July 2, 1999. There was also another person with them, one Jose
Pitallana, who is the eldest in the group and considered their "Amo-amo". In his affidavit, he said: "Ako ay
lumabas ng bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita ko si Jose na tinalian ng nylon and bata. Tapos po ay
may narinig po akong kung sino man ang titistego sa akin ay papatayin ko, basta kayo ang saksi sa
ginawa in Batman." He said he was sure that the sack contained the child because he saw the head of
the child, it seemed like she was staring at him and asking his help. He executed the statement after the
arrest of the accused. He did not go to the police station to narrate his story. He made his statement not
in the barangay hall but only at their purok.
On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2, 1999 he left the house at about 11:00 o’clock
in the morning to go to school in PMI at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He did not see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie
about noon time of July 2. He arrived home at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening because he passed by
the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his mother who was a vendor there. They closed the store at
about 6:30, then they bought some food stuffs to bring home. He was not sure of the date when Batman
was arrested. He admitted that Batman is his uncle being the brother of his mother. His uncle is a known
drug addict in the area. He usually saw him using shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana, his wife, Aldrin
and Jovie. After he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he did not do anything because he was
busy reviewing for his exam. He did not also visit him in jail. After he made his statement, he showed it to
their Purok Leader, Melencio Yambao and Purok Secretary, Reynaldo Mapa. They read his statement
and recorded it in the logbook. It was not notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin and Jovie.
Jose Pitallana is no longer residing in their place. He did not even know that Aldrin and Jovie testified
against his uncle. He never went to the police to tell the truth about the incident.
As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide, holding that the
circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable
doubt.17 The RTC decreed:
Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping and
killing "Marita" and hereby sentences him to the Supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of ₱75,000.00, moral damages in the sum of ₱30,000.00 and exemplary damages
in the sum of ₱20,000.00, and to pay the cost if this suit, to be paid to the heirs if the victim.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused to the National Penitentiary
upon receipt hereof after the promulgation of the decision.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction, 18 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 128 finding the accused Edmundo
Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide is affirmed with modification
in the sense that (a) the death penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to reclusion perpetua and
the judgment on the civil liability is modified by ordering the appellant to pay the amount of ₱100,000.00
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 moral damages and ₱52,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable
doubt every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide
was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.
Ruling
We sustain Villaflores’ conviction.
I xxx
Nature of rape with homicide as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special
complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty
provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime
under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed
by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized,
that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a
composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or
compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that
accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate
information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstance mentioned above be present.
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape with
homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a single penalty,
the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining whether the
crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously
conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally designed to
commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the
rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase
on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what homicide may be
covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended
to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No.
8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that
occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated
rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as
the killing is linked to the rape, became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the meaning of the phrase appearing in line 24,
"or on the occasion"?
When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed by reason of the rape, I would
understand that. But what is the meaning of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"? How far in time must
the commission of the homicide be considered a homicide "on the occasion" of the rape? Will it be, if the
rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are drunk and they killed somebody along the way, would
there be a link between that homicide and the rape? Will it be "on the occasion" of the rape?
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself, and the homicide is committed with a
very short time lapse.
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President: If the rapist enters a house, kills a
maid, and rapes somebody inside the house, I would probably consider that as a rape "on the occasion
of". Or if the rapists finished committing the crime of rape, and upon leaving, saw somebody, let us say,
a potential witness inside the house and kills him, that is probably clear. But suppose the man happens
to kill somebody, will there be a link between these? What is the intent of the phrase "on the occasion of
rape"? x x x
xxx
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course, is rape, and homicide is a result of
the circumstances surrounding the rape.
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from Cagayan where, let us say, the offender
is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the police and he commits homicide, I think would be examples
where the phrase "on the occasion thereof" would apply. But the principal intent, Mr. President, is rape.19
II
The State discharged its burden of
proving the rape with homicide
beyond reasonable doubt
As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of proving all the elements of
rape and homicide beyond reasonable doubt in order to warrant the conviction of Villaflores for the rape
with homicide charged in the information.20 The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following
facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal
knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female
under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is
deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Marita’s Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit K)
disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight
months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by
Villaflores would constitute statutory rape.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to
testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime
is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed.
Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial
evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. 21 Direct evidence
proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder;
in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an
inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. 22 To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be
resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free. 23
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances
from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when
the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 24 Nor has the quantity of circumstances sufficient
to convict an accused been fixed as to be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every
instance. Thus, the Court said in People v. Modesto: 25
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well set out in the
following passage from People vs. Ludday:26 "No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt."
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several circumstances, which
when "appreciated together and not piece by piece," according to the CA,27 were seen as "strands which
create a pattern when interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion
that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide.
We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following. Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and
Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2,
1999,28 leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses away
from the victim’s house.29 Secondly, Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the
discovery of her lifeless body on the following day.30 Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores’ house at about
3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from
inside.31 Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying
a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the child’s
lifeless body was later found.32 Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same
yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her
body;33 Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered her body. 34 Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed
between the abandoned house where Marita’s body was found and Villaflores’ house, because his house
had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other
houses.35 This indicated Villaflores’ familiarity and access to the abandoned house. Seventhly, several
pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the victim’s neck
and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the door of his
house,36 and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet.37 Eighthly, the medico-legal findings
showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent
with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions
and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh
blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for
spermatozoa.38 And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time
of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage
of flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2,
1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a moral certainty
of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide. As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple
deep fresh hymenal lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-legal officer who had
conducted the autopsy of her cadaver on July 3, 1999, attributed to the insertion of a blunt object like a
human penis. The fact that the vaginal and periurethral smears taken from Marita tested positive for
spermatozoa confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As to the homicide, her death
was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time of death as determined by the medico-
legal findings was consistent with the recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the
abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the yellow sack that was later on found to cover
Marita’s head. Anent the identification of Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista
attesting to Villaflores as the person they had seen holding Marita by the hand going towards the
abandoned house before the victim went missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying of a
child from within Villaflores’ house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white rope
found at the crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.
We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating testimony of Borcillo. They justifiably did
so.1âwphi1 For one, after he stated during direct examination that Villaflores was only his neighbor, 39 it
soon came to be revealed during his cross-examination that he was really a son of Villaflores’ own
sister.40 Borcillo might have concealed their close blood relationship to bolster the credibility of his
testimony favoring his uncle, but we cannot tolerate his blatant attempt to mislead the courts about a fact
relevant to the correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Borcillo deserved no credence as a witness.
Also, Borcillo’s implicating Solidum and Bautista in the crime, and exculpating his uncle were justly met
with skepticism. Had Borcillo’s incrimination of Solidum and Bautista been factually true, Villaflores could
have easily validated his alibi of having run an errand for an aunt about a kilometer away from the place
of the crime on that morning of July 2, 1999. Yet, the alibi could not stand, both because the alleged aunt
did not even come forward to substantiate the alibi, and because the Defense did not demonstrate the
physical impossibility for Villaflores to be at the place where the crime was committed at the time it was
committed.
The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC to reclusion perpetua in consideration of the
intervening enactment on June 24,
2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.41 Nonetheless, we have also to specify in the judgment that Villaflores
shall not be eligible for parole, considering that Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly holds
persons "whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" not eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended.
The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper. However, we add exemplary damages to take
into account the fact that Marita was below seven years of age at the time of the commission of the rape
with homicide. Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code has expressly declared such tender age of the victim
as an aggravating circumstance in rape, to wit:
Article 266-B. Penalties. – xxx.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
xxx
Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil
liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 42 The Civil Code
permits such award "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."43 Granting exemplary damages is not dependent on
whether the aggravating circumstance is actually appreciated or not to increase the penalty. As such, the
Court recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to exemplary damages as a way of correction for
the public good. For the purpose,
₱30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages, 44 for a lesser amount would not serve
genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on February 22,
2007 finding and pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with homicide, subject
to the following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (a) that he shall suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended; (b) that he shall pay to the heirs
of the victim the sum of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the damages awarded by the
Court of Appeals; and (c) that all the awards for damages shall bear interest of 6% per annum reckoned
from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211027 June 29, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSE BRONIOLA @ "ASOT", Accused-Appellant,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated September 24, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cagayan de Oro City
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00805-MIN affirming with modification the Judgment 2 dated September 30, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kidapawan City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 207-2000. The
RTC found appellant Jose Broniola alias "Asot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide
under Republic Act (R.A) No. 83533, Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim, AAA,4 the sum of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Antecedent Facts
AAA, a Grade VI pupil, left her house for school in the morning of February 28, 2000. She did not return
home that day. Her lifeless body was found on February 29, 2000 in a grassy lot near an uninhabited farm
hut at Sitio Kabanatian, Barangay Tumanding, Arakan, Cotabato.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar D. Bayog filed the following Information 5 charging appellant with
the crime of rape with homicide:
That on or about February 28, 2000, in the Municipality of Arakan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the
said accused, armend with a bolo (Lagaraw), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
by means of force and intimidation, have a carnal knowledge with [AAA], minor, 13 years old, against her
will, that after the occasion, accused with intent to kill, attack, assault, hack and use physical violence to
the above-named victim, thus inflicting upon her hack wounds on the different parts of her body, which is
the direct and proximate cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. After pre-trial,
trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 28, 2000, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Alfredo Abag6 (Abag), a resident of Sitio
Kabanatian,7 Bgy. Tumanding, was on his way home bringing some "Taiwan" fish to sell when he met the
appellant at a shortcut road passable only to people and animals. He noticed that appellant had scratches
on his face and his hand was holding a lagaraw8 (bolo) with blood on it. Appellant asked for the price of
the fish but he did not buy and just left. From what he had observed, appellant was restless and uneasy.9
Meanwhile, AAA’s father, BBB, reported to the barangay authorities that his daughter was missing. In the
morning of February 29, 2000, he, together with Abag and two barangay officials, began to search for
AAA. They found her already dead, lying on a grassy area near a farm hut owned by Jhonefer Q.
Darantianao10. AAA’s body bore several hack wounds, blood oozed from her mouth, her one hand and
one finger were cut off. He knows appellant because they are neighbors. Their families had a rift because
appellant’s father was killed by his son-in-law, Lito Miguel.11
Dr. Sofronio T. Edu, Jr., Municipal Health Officer or Arakan, conducted a post-mortem examination of the
cadaver of AAA. He submitted a Post-Mortem Report12 with the following findings:
Multiple hacked wounds:
Left face mandibular area, partial transaction
Left neck area lateral and anterior area, partial transaction extending into the vertebra
Left hand completely transected at the midpalmar area
Right thumb completely transected
Right hand partially transected at the palmer area, medial
Right wrist, partially transected anterior
Perineal and internal examination:
Blood stained white underwear
Lacerated hymen at 3, 9 and 11 o’clock position
Whitish discharge sent to Arakan, Valley District Hospital Antipas, Cotabato for sperm
analysis
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-Respiratory Arrest secondary to hemorrhage secondary to multiple hacked
wounds
According to Dr. Edu, the probable cause of death was loss of blood due to the hack wounds. He also
opined that the genital injury could have been caused by a penetrating penis or any blunt object. 13
Version of the Defense
In the morning of February 28, 2000, appellant was plowing his farm located adjacent to their house. After
having lunch, he worked in the fishpond just beside their house until 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Thereafter, he stayed inside their house together with his mother, wife and children. Pelita 14 Antac, who
is a niece of her mother, and Jessie Panesales who is the husband of his younger sister, were also there
in the house. He denied having left house at that time and meeting Abag at Sitio Banataian. 15
Appellant claimed he does not know Abag. AAA or BBB. He admitted that his family has a land in Sitio
Kabanatian but after the death of his father, he does not go there anymore. When BBB testified in this
case, it was only then he learned that BBB is the father-in-law of Lito Miguel who reportedly killed his
(appellant) father. He denied having grudges with the family of BBB and he does not have any knowledge
regarding the amicable settlement between their families in connection with the killingof his father. At
present, Lito Miguel is now his co-inmante at the provincial jail and they are now friends. Lito Miguel told
him that Lito killed his father because they had a quarrel. When Lito Miguel asked him about this case of
rape with homicide, he told Lito Miguel that he did not do it.16
Pelita Antac stayed in appellant’s house from February 23, 2000 until the second week of March, because
it was planting season. She corroborated the testimony of appellant, who is her cousin, that he never left
the house on February 28, 2000 and just worked in his farm in Bgy. Tumanding.17
Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found the testimony of Abag to be straightforward, categorical and convincing, which
established that appellant went to Sitio Kabanatian where Abag met him coming from the shortcut road
in the afternoon of February 28, 2000 carrying a blood-stained lagaraw. Said court gave no credence to
appellant’s defense of denial and alibi as it failed to show the impossibility of his presence at the scene of
the crime and to rebut the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence proving that he committed the rape and
killing of AAA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA found no merit in appellant’s argument that the circumstantial evidence failed to prove he was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. It noted that the timing of witness Abag’s encounter
with appellant who was then holding a lagaraw stained with blood, restless and with scratches on his face,
coincides with the time when the victim was missing, and the place was near the sport the dead victim
was found the next day. As to appellant’s alibi, the CA also was not convinced and held that the rule that
alibi and denial are weak defenses applies even where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence.
The fallo of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 17 of Kidapawan City in Criminal Case No. 207-2000 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is imposed without the possibility of
parole. In addition to the ₱100,000.00 civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages shall also be
awarded in the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (₱75,000.00) PESOS and THIRTY THOUSAND
(₱30,000.00) PESOS, respectively. An interest at the rate of six percent (6%) period shall be applied to
the award of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages from the finality of the judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
Appellant was charged and convicted of rape with homicide. The felony of rape with homicide is a special
complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for
being the product of a single criminal impulse.19 In rape with homicide, the following elements must
concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.20
In this case, nobody witnessed the actual rape and killing of AAA. Appellant, however may still be proven
as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. 21 As we held in
People v. Pascual22:
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must
be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to
prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It
becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the
victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial
evidence is usually unavoidable.23
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.24 Section 4, Rule 133, of
the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the requirements of circumstantial evidence that
is sufficient for conviction, viz:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The RTC and CA found the following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution as sufficient
for the conviction of appellant: First, witness Abag met the appellant on a shortcut road near the place
where AAA’s dead body was found, at about the same time (5:30 p.m.) AAA went missing as she failed
to return home that day, February 28, 2000; Second, appellant had scratches on his face and he was
holding a lagaraw a type of bolo used in the rural areas, which was stained with blood, and he was restless
and uneasy; Third, in the morning of the following day, February 29, 2000, AAA’s lifeless body was found
with several hack wounds inflicted on her face, neck and extremities, one hand and one finger were totally
severed; Forth. The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Edu confirmed that AAA died from loss
of blood due to multiple hack wounds, her underwear was blood-stained, she had hymenal lacerations
and a whitish discharge was found in her vagina; Fifth, appellant had the motive to commit the crime
against AAA considering that it was BBB’s son-in-law, Lito Miguel, who killed appellant’s father; and Sixth,
appellant was evasive when being questioned on his knowledge of the identity of his father’s killer and
the latter’s relationship to the family of AAA, and the amicable settlement executed by his mother in behalf
of appellant’s family.
We concur with the CA and RTC.
Considering all the circumstances mentioned and in light of previous rulings, we are satisfied that the
evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one fair and reasonable
conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the
possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.25 This was adequately established in the case at bar.
As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

On the other hand, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines" provides:

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Furthermore, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides, "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."

The CA thus correctly modified the RTC judgment by declaring that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
without the possibility of parole, in accordance with the law.

Conformably with People v. Gambao,26 we sustain the award of ₱100,000 as civil indemnity and increase
the awards of moral and exemplary damages to ₱100,000 each. In addition, we award ₱25,000 to the
victim’s heirs as temperate damages in lieu of unproven actual damages. 27 The CA correctly added that
damages assessed in this case shall be subject to interest at six percent (6%) per annum.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated September 24, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CR-HC No 00805-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are increased to ₱100,000 eah and
that temperate damages of ₱25,000 is awarded to the heirs of AAA.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189822 September 2, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
BRION, JOJIE SUANSING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape since she is incapable of giving
consent to a sexual act. Under these circumstances, all that needs to be proved for a successful
prosecution are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latter’s mental
retardation.1
Factual Antecedents
For review is the July 17, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00439-MIN
that affirmed with modification the April 14, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33,
Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 49,196-2002, finding appellant Jojie Suansing (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against "AAA,"4 as described in the Amended Information,5 the
relevant portions of which read as follows:
That sometime in the first week of April 2001, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one "AAA", attended by the qualifying circumstance
that the victim has a mental disability. The accused knew of such mental disability at the time of the
commission of the crime. The sexual assault done by the accused was against the will of "AAA".
Contrary to law.6
Appellant pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as its witnesses "AAA;" her aunt and guardian, "EEE;" her friend, "FFF;" doctor
of gynecology, Mary Grace Solano, M.D. (Dr. Solano); doctor of psychiatry, Sally Jane Kwong-Garcia,
M.D. (Dr. Kwong-Garcia); and psychologist Evangeline Castro (Castro). The RTC allowed "AAA" to testify
after evaluating her ability to comprehend and answer questions. The RTC also permitted the prosecution
and the defense to propound leading questions to her.7 Based on their testimonies,8 the following facts
emerged:
"AAA" was born on July 6, 1975. She used to live in Tangub City with her grandparents because her
mother suffered from and later died of tuberculosis. When "AAA" was 15 years old, she became a mother
to a baby boy who was born on September 29, 1990. Nobody admitted responsibility for her pregnancy.
To receive better guidance and supervision, "AAA" was transferred to the residence of "EEE" who raised
her as a daughter.
Sometime before April 8, 2001, "GGG" requested "FFF" to get from appellant’s boarding house an electric
fan and a transformer. "FFF" together with her brother and "AAA" went to the boarding house of appellant.
After giving the requested items, appellant ordered "FFF" and her brother to leave "AAA" behind.
"FFF" brought the items to "GGG" who, upon learning that "AAA" was still with appellant, requested "FFF"
to return to appellant’s boarding house to fetch "AAA." Upon arriving at the boarding house, "FFF" noticed
that the door was closed. She called out to "AAA" to go home to avoid being scolded by "EEE." "AAA"
opened the door and came out fixing her short pants. "FFF" then asked "AAA" if anything happened.
"AAA" replied that after "FFF" and her brother left the boarding house, appellant pulled her inside the
room, removed her shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her
vagina without her consent. "AAA" requested "FFF" not to tell anyone that she was raped by appellant.
On August 3, 2001, "EEE" learned about the rape and confronted "AAA." "EEE" then reported the incident
to police authorities.
The genital examination of "AAA" on August 6, 2001 revealed old hymenal lacerations. Her psychiatric
evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12-
year old child. Although with impaired adaptive skills, the RTC found "AAA" qualified to testify. The
psychological examination of "AAA" established her mental retardation to be in a mild form and her
intelligence quotient (IQ) of 53 though below the average IQ score of 71 was "within the defective level of
a Normal Intelligence Scale."
Version of the Defense
In his testimony,9 appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that he used to live with "AAA" and her
relatives and was considered a member of their family. He treated "AAA" as his niece and knew about
her mental retardation. He later rented a room near the residence of "AAA." He admitted that sometime
in the first week of April 2001, his sister "GGG," who was living nearby, asked "AAA," "FFF," the latter’s
brother and another girl to go to his boarding house to get an electric fan, a bread toaster, and a wall
décor. "AAA," "FFF" and the other girl went inside his room while "FFF’s" brother waited outside. After
getting the items, "FFF" and the other girl left while "AAA" stayed behind. After a few minutes, "FFF" and
the other girl returned to fetch "AAA." He belied the statement of "FFF" that "AAA" was fixing her short
pants when she came out of his room.
Appellant claimed that the relatives of "AAA" filed the instant case against him because his sister, "GGG",
no longer gives them financial support.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its April 14, 2004 Decision, the RTC found convincing evidence that "AAA" is a mental retardate; that
in spite of her mental inadequacy, her testimony was credible as shown from her "intelligent and coherent
answers to questions propounded to her by the prosecution, the defense and the Court;" 10 that appellant
was aware that "AAA" is a mental retardate; that appellant raped "AAA;" that "AAA" or "FFF" was not ill-
motivated to falsely accuse appellant of such crime; and, that proof of force or intimidation was
unnecessary as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.
However, the RTC also ruled that since "AAA’s" mental retardation was not specifically alleged in the
Amended Information, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance that would warrant the
imposition of the death penalty. The RTC stated that the "mental disability" of "AAA" at the time of the
rape relates to a broad description of several mental ailments and that the Amended Information failed to
specify what constitutes "mental disability." Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple rape, the accused JOJIE SUANSING is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the offended party in
the sum of Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
He shall be committed forthwith to the national penitentiary.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal12 with this Court. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,13 the case was remanded to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. 14
In his brief, appellant imputed upon the court a quo the lone error that it –
X X X GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.15
Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; that the medical findings do not substantiate the allegation that "AAA" was raped; that the elements
of force, violence and intimidation were not proved; that he was falsely accused of the crime charged; that
"AAA’s" aunt, "EEE", was angry at him even before they reported the alleged rape to police officers; that
even if nobody raped her, "AAA" would say the opposite just to please "EEE."
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asserted in its brief 16 that the RTC’s
Decision should be affirmed in all respects since the arguments of appellant failed to persuade; that a
medical examination is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of rape and an accused may be
convicted even on the sole basis of the victim’s credible testimony; that force and intimidation do not have
to be proved since "AAA" suffers from mental retardation; and that appellant’s denial cannot prevail over
the positive identification of "AAA." It thus invoked the well-established rule that the findings of the RTC
on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and are given
the highest consideration on appeal.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to the assessment of the testimony
of "AAA." It also affirmed the RTC’s ruling not to consider the mental retardation of "AAA" as a qualifying
circumstance that would result in the imposition of the death penalty since it was not specifically alleged
in the Amended Information. However, the CA modified the awards for civil indemnity and moral damages
to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Davao City, dated April 22, 2004 in
Criminal Case No. 49,196-2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant JOJIE
SUANSING is ordered to pay the private complainant the sums of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php50,000.00 as moral damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal18 praying for his exoneration.
On February 3, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs 19 but both the OSG and
appellant opted to adopt their respective briefs submitted before the CA as their appeal briefs.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
8353, states that:
Art. 226-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented." 20 From these requisites, it can
thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person
suffering from mental retardation. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A
mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault
on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak
to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape[,] without
requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act." 21 Only the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latter’s mental retardation need to be
proved.22
In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the sexual
congress between appellant and "AAA" and the latter’s mental retardation. "AAA" positively identified
appellant as her rapist.23 She also described the manner by which appellant perpetrated the crime, viz:
ATTY. GASPAR:
Q: No.
What happened when you stayed behind? COURT:
A: Alright.
He removed my shorts and panty. Q:
Q: And you consented [to] the sexual intercourse?
So what happened after removing your shorts and panty? A:
A: No.
[We] had a (sic) sexual intercourse. Q:
COURT: Why did you allow yourself to have sexual intercourse with Jojie Suansing?
Q: A:
What did he do to you? Because he pulled me towards the room.24
A:
(No answer) Both the RTC and the CA also found that "AAA’s" mental retardation was satisfactorily established by the
ATTY. GASPAR: prosecution. Dr. Kwong-Garcia, a psychiatrist at the Davao Medical Center, testified that the results of
We manifest Your Honor that the witness is crying. the IQ test conducted on "AAA" revealed that she is a mental retardate with a mental age of between 9-
ATTY. CAGATIN: 12 years. These findings are contained in a Medical Certificate dated December 11, 2002. 25 These
We would like to manifest for the record, your Honor that in spite of several questions of what [Suansing findings were corroborated by the Psychological Assessment Report26 of Castro, a psychologist at the
did] to her[,] no answer was given. Davao Medical Center, whose examination showed that the intellectual capacity of "AAA" is between 9-
COURT: 12 years old. These pieces of evidence prove beyond doubt that "AAA" is a mental retardate. Notably,
Alright. the defense did not even impugn "AAA’s" mental retardation. On the contrary, records show that even
Q: appellant himself conceded that "AAA" is a mental retardate. We therefore agree with the RTC’s ruling,
Could you answer the question? as affirmed by the CA, that "AAA’" is mentally retarded.
A:
[We] had sexual intercourse.
ATTY. GASPAR: A mentally retarded victim cannot fabricate her charges.
Q:
Where did that happen? The RTC and the CA did not err in giving credence to the testimony of "AAA." Records show that "AAA"
A: cried when she recalled on the witness stand her ordeal at the hands of the appellant. "[T]he crying of a
At the boarding house. victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity borne out of
Q: human nature and experience."27
What part of the boarding house?
A: There is also nothing from "AAA’s" testimony that would arouse suspicion. Considering the mental
I could not recall. retardation of "AAA," we find it highly improbable that she would fabricate the rape charge against
Q: appellant. It is likewise unlikely that she was instructed into accusing appellant given her limited
What was your position, were you lying when he had sexual intercourse with you? intellect.1âwphi1 Due to her mental condition, only a very traumatic experience would leave a lasting
A: impression on her so that she would be able to recall it when asked. 28 Thus, in People v. Balatazo,29 we
He asked me to lie down. held that:
COURT:
Q:
Did the penis enter your vagina? Given the low IQ of the victim, it is impossible to believe that she could have fabricated her charges
A: against appellant. She definitely lacked the gift of articulation and inventiveness. Even with intense
(The witness is gesturing in the affirmative.) coaching, assuming this happened as appellant insists that the victim’s mother merely coached her on
ATTY. CAGATIN: what to say in court, on the witness stand where she was alone, it would eventually show with her
The gesture of the witness could not be made a point of reference. Nothing has been shown by the testimony falling into irretrievable pieces. But, this did not happen. During her testimony, she proceeded,
witness that it has been for the affirmative. though with much difficulty, to describe the sexual assault in such a detailed manner. Certainly, the
COURT: victim’s testimony deserves utmost credit. 30
Alright, you answer.
A: Mental retardation does not lessen her credibility.
He entered his penis.
Q:
The mental deficiency of "AAA" does not diminish the reliability of her testimony. It has been our consistent
And you enjoyed it?
ruling that the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect in the absence of
A:
any attendant grave abuse of discretion since it had the advantage of actually examining the real and
testimonial evidence, including the conduct of the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the
matter. This rule finds greater application when the RTC’s findings are sustained by the CA, as in this
case. Here, we do not find any reason to depart from the RTC’s assessment of the testimony of "AAA." 31
Further, "AAA" was able to make known her perception, communicate her ordeal, in spite of some
difficulty, and identify appellant as her rapist. Even a mental retardate qualifies as a competent witness if
she can perceive, and can make known her perception to others.32
Absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse.
Concededly, the physical examination conducted on "AAA" revealed old hymenal lacerations. However,
"[t]he absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse. In fact, rupture of the hymen is
not essential as the mere introduction of the male organ in the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia
consummates the crime."33 In other words, "[w]hat is required for a consummated crime of rape x x x is
the mere touching of the labia by the penis."34 In this case, "AAA" went beyond this minimum requirement
as she testified that appellant’s penis entered her vagina. 35
All told, we are not persuaded by appellant’s denial, which is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the
positive identification by "AAA" of him as the perpetrator of the crime. "[A]ppellant’s mere denial cannot
overcome the victim’s positive declaration that she had been raped and the appellant was her rapist." 36
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the rape qualifies and makes it
punishable by death.
Paragraph 10, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime
of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be
alleged in the Information since "a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the
indictment."37
In this case, the Amended Information specifically provides:
That sometime in the first week of April 2001, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one "AAA", attended by the qualifying circumstance
that the victim has a mental disability. The accused knew of such mental disability at the time of the
commission of the crime. The sexual assault done by the accused was against the will of "AAA".
Contrary to law.38
Clearly, appellant’s knowledge of the mental disability of "AAA" at the time of the commission of the crime
of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. "Knowledge of the offender of the mental
disability of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime of rape qualifies the crime and makes it
punishable by death x x x."39 "When rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the victim’s
mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death."40 "Mental retardation is a chronic condition present
from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by
standardized tests."41 Intellectual or mental disability "is a term synonymous with and is now preferred
over the older term, mental retardation."42
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was aware of the mental retardation of "AAA." Appellant testified that he knew "AAA" and that
he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he
regarded "AAA" as his niece. His boarding house was also a few minutes away from the residence of
"AAA." He also admitted that "AAA" was known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low
intellect of "AAA" was easily noticeable to the RTC from the answers she gave to the questions
propounded to her in the course of her testimony. We also stress that from the filing of this case until its
appeal, appellant did not assail "AAA’s" mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual
inadequacy.
Thus, appellant’s knowledge of "AAA’s" mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime
qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape.
Proper Penalty
Paragraph 10 of Article 266-B of the RPC expressly provides that the penalty of death shall be imposed
"when the offender knew of the mental disability x x x of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime." The supreme penalty of death should have been imposed on the appellant due to the special
qualifying circumstance of knowledge at the time of the rape that "AAA" was mentally disabled.
However, the enactment of RA 934643 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in accordance with Section 2 of RA 9346. In addition, as provided
under Section 3 thereof, appellant shall not be eligible for parole.
Damages
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be ₱75,000.00 if the rape is
perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of
the death penalty.44
Moral damages must also be awarded in rape cases without need of proof other than the fact of rape
since it is assumed that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the
CA’s award of ₱50,000.00 must be increased to ₱75,000.00 to conform to existing case law.45 Exemplary
damages are likewise called for, by way of public example and to protect the young from sexual
abuse.46 We therefore order appellant to pay "AAA" exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00.47 In addition, we order appellant to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages
awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.48
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00439-MIN dated July 17,
2009 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Jojie Suansing is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole. The amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to "AAA" are
increased to ₱75,000.00 each. Appellant Jojie Suansing is also ordered to pay "AAA" exemplary damages
in the amount of ₱25,000.00. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO, Accused-
Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11,
2010 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime in an Information dated September 9,
2003:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 07th day of September 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs[,] and by means of
force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of
AAA],3 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is
known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and consent and to her
damage and prejudice.4
Accused-appellant Cataytay entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on October 3, 2003. Trial
thereafter ensued.
BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in their
compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six houses
away from BBB’s house.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in their house to look for BBB’s youngest
daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told her
that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused-appellant were
already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost that she was the mother of the victim. When
BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, “Mommy, ni-rape po ako.” BBB asked her who raped her. AAA
responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA
narrated how she was raped by accused-appellant, which ended when a certain “Mimi” knocked at the
door. When accused-appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does
not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their
neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) dated May 25, 1999, which was conducted in connection with another rape
case. The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child.7 BBB also identified
AAA’s birth certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the
incident.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999 against a certain
Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape committed by the
accused-appellant.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested that by
merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate.10 AAA, who was crying while
being asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her,
despite her protestations. After the deed, she was given money by accused-appellant. She knew the
accused-appellant before the incident as a shoe repairman.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a Social Case Study upon AAA in
relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the accused. 12 NCMH Psychologist Susan
Sabado was presented as a prosecution witness, but her testimony was dispensed with when the defense
agreed to a stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests conducted on AAA affirmed that the
latter had a mental capacity of a seven-year-old child.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA on
September 8, 2003 was likewise presented as a prosecution witness. The defense agreed to a stipulation
that the findings of the examination were consistent with recent sexual
intercourse.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September 7, 2003, at around 7:00 p.m., he was in
his house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter. He then went out and proceeded
to a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his house.15 He stayed at the videoke bar for less
than 15 minutes, as barangay officers suddenly arrived and arrested him. Upon asking why he was being
arrested, the officers told him that he was the suspect in the rape of AAA. He was brought to
the Barangay Hall, where he denied the accusations against him. He estimated that the house of BBB
was more or less 50 meters away from his house,16 and that it would take more or less a one minute walk
from the videoke bar to the house of AAA.17 Accused-appellant admitted that by merely looking at AAA,
he could tell that she has a mental disability.18
Accused-appellant’s brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay (Jose), testified that at 6:30 p.m. of September 7,
2003, accused-appellant was inside their house feeding his daughter. At around 7:00 p.m., accused-
appellant told Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which was around 30 meters away from their
house. Accused-appellant stayed in the videoke bar for 5 to 10 minutes, then went back to their house
and watched television. Accused-appellant was arrested that night within the vicinity of their house by
the barangay tanods. He estimated that AAA’s house is 20 to 30 meters away from the videoke bar, and
that it would take less than five minutes to reach the house of AAA from
the videoke bar.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, testified that she lives two meters
away from AAA’s house and 60 meters away from that of accused-appellant. She was inside her house
at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during which time she heard AAA shouting that she was
raped. She asked AAA who raped her. AAA replied “Pilay,” apparently referring to their neighbor who
was called Jun Pilay. Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAA’s house towards a dark
area.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, and
disposing of the case as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape against one [AAA] defined and penalized
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 266-B paragraph 10 of hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or
the same Code. heard.25cralawredchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby sentenced to suffer Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard from AAA’s
the penalty of imprisonment of from TWENTY YEARS (20) and ONE (1) DAY to FORTY (40) YEARS narration, we nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. Despite lacking
of reclusion perpetua. certain details concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly raped, the trial court, taking into
consideration the mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child witness,26 found her testimony
to be credible and convincing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA],
Q- Uulitin ko sa iyo ‘yung unang tinanong ko sa’yo ha, bakit ka nandito sa office ni Judge, para
the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as and by way of moral damages and
ano?
SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
A- Para magsumbong.
Q- Sinong isusumbong mo?
A- Leonardo Cataytay.
Finally, the period of detention of accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO at the Mandaluyong City
INTERPRETER:
Jail is hereby fully credited to his account.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Witness at this moment is now crying.
Q- Nandito ba si Leonardo Cataytay, [AAA], nandito ba siya ngayon sa office ni Judge? Tingin ka
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32275. On sa office ni Judge kung nandito ngayon si Leonardo, sabi mo isusumbong mo siya kay Judge,
August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which diba?
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary COURT:
Ituro mo nga kung nandiyan siya, sige.
INTERPRETER:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision appealed from Witness pointed to the male person seated in the first row of the gallery, wearing white t-shirt,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that an additional award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is who when asked to identify himself, answered to the name of LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y
granted to the victim and the award of exemplary damages of P75,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The SILVANO.
penalty of imprisonment to be served is simply reclusion perpetua.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary PROS. LAZARO:
Q- [AAA], itinuro mo si Leonardo, sabi mo kanina isusumbong mo siya, bakit mo siya isusumbong,
anong ginawa niya sa’yo?
Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay adopted his Appellant’s Brief with the Court of A- Ni-rape po ako.
Appeals, which contained the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Q- Ilang beses ka niya ni-rape?
A- Isa lang po.
I Q- Papaano ka niya ni-rape?
A- Pinasok niya ‘yung ari niya sa akin.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE Q- Anong sinabi mo sa kanya ‘nung ni-rape ka niya, anong sinabi mo kay Leonardo?
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT A- Ayaw ko na po.
II Q- Anong sinabi naman ni Leonardo habang nire-rape ka niya?
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE A- Wag daw po ako maingay.
THE FACT THAT HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED. 23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Q- Kasi pag maingay ka, ano daw ang gagawin sa’yo?
A- Uulitin daw niya po.
In his appellant’s brief, accused-appellant claims that BBB’s testimony concerning the details of the Q- Anong sinabi ni Leonardo sa’yo pagkatapos ka niyang ni-rape, [AAA]? May sinabi sa’yo
commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has no probative value. Accused- pagkatapos ka niya ni-rape? Meron o wala?
appellant also points out that the Psychological Evaluation Report dated May 25, 1999 and Psychological A- Wala po.
Report dated June 29, 2009 illustrate that AAA can be easily influenced. Q- May binigay sya sa’yo?
A- Opo.
Q- Anong binigay niya? Punasan mo ang luha mo.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the commission A- Pera po.
of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay and cannot be Q- Alam mo kung magkano?
considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his own personal A- Hindi po.27
knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived from her own perception.24 A witness may not
testify on what she merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the assault in her
testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she was asked at
the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases,
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is
necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar,
immaturity are generally badges of truth.28 Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of
the physical examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional corroboration
to the testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was stipulated upon by the
prosecution and the defense.
We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed
the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere
denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 29 For the defense of alibi to prosper,
it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of
the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. 30 In the case at bar,
accused-appellant and his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the former was taking care
of his daughter in his house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003. He then went out and proceeded
to a videoke bar, which was merely 20 meters away from his house. Accused-appellant and his brother
admitted that their house was merely 50 meters away, or around a one-minute walk, from the house of
AAA, where the alleged incident occurred. Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate
vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellant’s
defense of alibi must fail.
Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented the testimony of Alicia, a neighbor of AAA and
accused-appellant, to prove that another person raped AAA. However, the record is clear that AAA
positively identified accused-appellant as the culprit both at the barangay outpost minutes after the
incident, and in open court. It is furthermore axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of
the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a
better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to
decide who among them is telling the truth. 31 The trial court, which was able to carefully observe the
testimony of Alicia, was not adequately convinced by her allegations.
To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of committing the following act: “by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA],
19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is known
to accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and consent and to her damage
and prejudice.”32 The Information, as worded, can conceivably comprehend rape under either paragraph
1(b) or 1(d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;chanrobleslaw
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;chanrobleslaw
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;chanrobleslaw
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Caoile,33 we differentiated the terms “deprived of reason” and “demented,” as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional
apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus,
AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who
is “deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental capacity of a
seven-year old child.34 The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the
psychologist that the “mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the time of the commission of
the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child.”35 Accused-appellant is
therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The
appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation was alleged in the Information and
admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the
penalty of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No.
934636 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be
imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty years and one day
to forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty to be
simply reclusion perpetua. Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law cannot be applied.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As regards accused-appellant’s civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in the amount of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals modified
the trial court’s decision by granting the additional award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and reducing
the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however, to People v. Lumaho,38 where
the penalty for the crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346,
we increase the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, we
impose 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32275 dated August 11, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION increasing the amounts of
indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral
damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are furthermore subject to interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200940 July 22, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARTIN NERIO, JR., Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Brought before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 30, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00853-MIN. The CA affirmed in toto the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21, dated July 22, 2010
in Criminal Case No. XXI-1016(03), finding accused-appellant Martin Nerio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.
In an Information dated September 22, 2003, the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur charged Nerio
with the crime of Rape, allegedly committed against AAA3 as follows:
That on or about the 26th of February 2003 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon thereof and/or
subsequent thereto, at Barangay Blocon, Municipality of Magsaysay, Province of Davao del Sur and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused after bringing the offended party
thirteen (13) year old and mentally retarded AAA from Chapter 5, Barangay Aplaya, Digos City to his
residence at Barangay Blocon, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, by force or intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with aforesaid offended party against her will
and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Nerio, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.5
During trial, the prosecution presented the following version of the facts:
AAA, a child with special needs, was born on April 15, 1990 and was adopted by Kathlene 6 and Rick. In
the afternoon of February 26, 2003, Kathlene was working in the school canteen of the Aplaya Elementary
School when she noticed that AAA, who was also enrolled at the same school, was missing. Thinking that
AAA just went to her cousin's house near the school, Kathlene did not worry until after school hours when
AAA was still nowhere to be found. She then went to look for her child, and when she was unsuccessful,
she went to the police to have the incident placed in the blotter.
Rick likewise looked for AAA, and he was told that his daughter was seen boarding a minibus with a group
of people who just had picnic at the beach. Together with their neighbor, Rosaliah,7 Rick and Kathlene
proceeded to Matanao, Davao del Sur, after learning that the minibus was Matanao-bound. With the
assistance of the police, they were able to find the owner of the minibus who told them that he indeed
saw AAA inside his bus. The charterer of the minibus, Arthur Lucero, informed them that AAA went to the
house of the Nerios in Blocon, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. It was already 1 :00 a.m. of February 27, 2003
when they arrived at said house. When Lucero knocked, it was the mother of the accused-appellant,
Violeta, who opened the door. When Kathlene asked about her daughter, Violeta told her that AAA was
sleeping upstairs. But when Kathlene started climbing the stairs, Violeta immediately corrected herself
and said that AAA was, in fact, sleeping on the ground floor. Still, Kathlene proceeded and upon seeing
a room with the door left ajar, she went inside. To her dismay, she saw her daughter scantily clad sleeping
beside a half-naked Nerio, with her head resting on the latter's shoulder.
When Rosaliah asked Violeta why she allowed her son to sleep with AAA, she received no answer. So
they took AAA and proceeded to the Matanao Police Station to report the incident before finally returning
home to Digos.
On February 28, 2003, Dr. Arthur Navidad examined AAA. He found a hymenal laceration at eleven (11)
o'clock position, which appeared fresh and could not have occurred more than three (3) days from the
date he examined AAA. Dr. Navidad also testified that AAA acted like a small child so they even had to
bribe her in order to examine her genital area.
The prosecution likewise presented a Psychological Assessment Report8 on AAA by the psychologist at
the Psychiatry Department of Davao Medical Center, which reads:
MENTAL ABILITY:
Subject gained a raw score of 11 and its equivalent percentile rating is 55%. Results suggest Mild [to]
Moderate Mental Retardation. Subject attains intellectual levels similar to those of average four - seven
year-old children. She can hardly understand simple instructions.
xxxx
In defense of her son, Violeta testified that AAA, who was a complete stranger to them, joined them during
their picnic on February 26, 2003 at the Aplaya Beach in Digos. When they were about to go home, AAA
also boarded the minibus. When asked to leave, AAA simply held on to her seat. Since they could not
seem to do anything that would make AAA leave, they decided to take her home with them and just bring
her to the barangay officials the following day. At home, Nerio would ask his mother to take AAA
downstairs because she kept following him to his room. Later, when it was time to sleep, Violeta asked
Nerio and AAA to come down and they all slept on the ground floor, with Violeta in between the two (2).
Nerio, for his part, testified that all along, he and his family knew that AAA is a special child. He was also
surprised that the police came to their house late at night but he did not mind because he thought they
only came to take AAA home. Thus, he was shocked when he learned that he was being accused of
raping AAA. He asserted that he could not have abused AAA because he slept downstairs while AAA
slept upstairs with his mother and sisters.
On July 22, 2010, the RTC of Bansalan, Davao del Sur found Nerio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. The decretal portion of the Decision declares:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Martin Nerio, Jr. guilty of rape beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby meted the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to pay private
complainant ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Nerio thus sought relief from the CA. On September 30, 2011, the appellate court rendered a Decision
affirming the trial court's ruling in its entirety. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The court a quo's Decision dated July 22, 2010 in Criminal
Case No. XXI-1016 (03) is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.10
Nerio now comes before the Court seeking the reversal of the CA Decision. He raises the lone issue of
whether there can be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape where the victim,
who is mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial to substantiate the accusation in the
criminal information.11
The Court finds the petition to be devoid of merit.
Mental retardation has been defined as a chronic condition that exists at birth or early childhood and
characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. Intellectual or mental
disability is a term synonymous with and is now preferred over the older term, mental retardation. 12
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape can be committed in the following manner:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is
committed – 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
x x x13
It is settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape as she is in the same
class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. The term "deprived of reason" has been
construed to encompass those who are suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or
retardation.14 Carnal knowledge of a woman above twelve (12) years of age but with the mental age of a
child below twelve (12) years, even if she agrees to the same, is rape because a mental retardate cannot
give a valid and intelligent consent to such act.15 If sexual intercourse with a child below twelve (12) years
of age is rape, then it must follow that sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl whose mental
capacity is that of a four or seven year-old child will likewise constitute rape.16 The essence of the offense
is whether the alleged victim has the ability to render an intelligent consent, and therefore, could not have
been deprived of the required reason at the time of the sexual congress. Contrary to the assertion of the
defense, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is indeed a special child. In fact, Nerio himself
said in his direct testimony that he and his family had known from the start that AAA is a special child.17 At
the time of the incident, AAA was already in her sixth year as a Grade 1 pupil. According to Kathlene, she
first noticed that her adopted child is mentally challenged when the latter was merely six (6) years old. Dr.
Navidad observed that when he was about to conduct the physical examination, AAA, a thirteen year-old,
acted more like a small child. She started crying and refused to be examined. The prosecution also
submitted the Psychological Assessment Report showing that AAA has Mild to Moderate Mental
Retardation. Lastly, the lower court observed that while in court and seated next to Kathlene, AAA would
bury her head on the lap of her mother and would make unnecessary and imperceptible sounds. This
would prompt Kathlene to bring her out of the court from time to time. 18
Nerio doubts the trial court's conclusion that AAA is mentally retarded based merely on its observation of
her demeanor in court. He strongly presses that AAA was never presented in court as a witness. AAA
even refused to give her name when asked to be identified. The lower court, therefore, could not have
possibly been sure that the child seated beside Kathlene was indeed AAA.
This argument is ludicrously misplaced.
It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the victim is a small
child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as to the details of
the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable.
Circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, indirectly proves a
fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.19 It is not a
weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence.20 Resort to it is imperative when the lack of direct
testimony would result in setting an outlaw free. The Court reiterates that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court may draw its finding of guilt. 21 In fact,
circumstantial evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may even be the sole basis of
a criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis.22 Established facts that
form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning
towards a conviction. Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support conviction: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime. Thus, to
justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.23
Here, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was declared unfit to fully discharge the
functions of a credible witness.1âwphi1 The psychologist who examined her found that her answers
reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of capacity to deal with matters rationally. She
could hardly even understand simple instructions.24 The testimonies of the prosecuti0n witnesses, who
were not shown to have any malicious motive to fabricate a story, positively identified Nerio as the person
seen alone with AAA in bed in the evening of February 26, 2003. AAA, who was only in a sando and
panties, had her head on the shoulder of Nerio, who was naked and only had a blanket covering the lower
portion of his body. Although Nerio denied this because he allegedly slept downstairs, while AAA slept
with his mother and sisters upstairs, his testimony is inconsistent with that of his mother, who testified that
AAA and Nerio actually slept in one (1) room, but she lay between the two. Further, Dr. Navidad found a
fresh hymenal laceration on AAA's genitals. He explained that it could not have been inflicted more than
three (3) days from the date he examined AAA. There was likewise no showing that AAA met with another
man during that three-day-period. Hence, the courts below did not err when they held that these pertinent
circumstances proven during the trial form an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion that
Nerio had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent.25 More importantly, when it comes to credibility,
the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, as in this case. Since it
had the full opportunity to observe directly the deportment and the manner of testifying of the witnesses
before it, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence. Unlike the trial courts, the appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during
trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. The defense failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the trial court's findings of fact; these findings must,
therefore, be given due deference and great weight.26

As regards the penalty, the courts below were correct in imposing reclusion perpetua under Article 266-
B of the RPC. However, with respect to the civil liability, Nerio must likewise pay AAA exemplary damages
in the amount of ₱30,000.00 by way of example in order to deter others from committing the same bestial
act especially against mentally challenged persons. This will be in addition to the ₱50,000.00 for civil
indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages granted by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision dated September 30,
2011 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision dated July 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. XXI-1016(03),

finding accused-appellant Martin Nerio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of his civil liability. He is ORDERED to PAY an
additional amount of ₱30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines In a Resolution10 dated February 15, 2012, we required both parties to file their Supplemental
SUPREME COURT Briefs. However, they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals as their
Manila Supplemental Briefs.11

SECOND DIVISION Appellant argues that the testimony of “AAA” deserves no credence because she was incapable of
intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental disability.
G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014
We are not persuaded.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. JERRY OBOGNE, Accused–Appellant. Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:

RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused by
means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of “AAA”,1 a 12–year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said
“AAA”.2
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 3 On March 13, 2008, the
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, rendered a
Judgment,4viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple rape committed against “AAA” and, hereby, sentences him to suffer a penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify “AAA” the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that
the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.6 In its Decision7 of March 28, 2011, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with modifications, viz:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxxx
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons cannot be
witnesses:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully
In this case, “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental condition. As
correctly observed by the trial court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrar
When “AAA” was presented on November 14, 2006, defense counsel manifested his objection and called
the Court’s attention to Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, which lists down persons who cannot
be witnesses; i.e. those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others x x x.
During the continuation of AAA’s testimony x x x she was able to recall what [appellant] did to her x x x.
“AAA” recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him because he
would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought “AAA” to his house and while inside, ‘he removed her
panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and
then he gave it to her and then she went home.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment, dated March 13, 2008, of the Regional Trial
Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 34,8 in Criminal Case No. 3303, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that accused–appellant is further ordered to pay “AAA” the additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity apart from the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages and of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this appeal.
xxxx
This Court finds “AAA” a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to defense
counsel’s objection that “AAA” was not capable of intelligently making known her perception to others,
“AAA” managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused, though in a soft
voice and halting manner x x x.
“AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and truthfulness.
While it is true that, on cross–examination, “AAA” faltered in the sequence of events x x x this is
understandable because even one with normal mental condition would not be able to recall, with a
hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But “AAA” was certain that ‘it was a long
time x x x after the incident’ when it was reported to the police. Likewise, she was very certain that the
accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x.12
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically merit the imposition of
the death penalty. Under Article 266–B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of
the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape
is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such this
circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution.

In the same vein, the appellate court found “AAA” qualified to take the witness stand, viz:
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that “AAA” was shown to be able to perceive, to make known
her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents. Her narration of the incident of rape given
in the following manner is worthy of note:
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances
to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of a specific or particular
allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental disability or retardation, as well as lack
of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article 266–B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied
xxx

xxxx
Private complainant “AAA” provided a clear, convincing and competent testimonial evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused–appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As found by the trial court,
the testimony of “AAA” was replete with consistent details, negating the probability of fabrication.
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article 266–A of the [Revised]
Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.17
However, it must be mentioned that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 318 of Republic
Act No. 9346.19

We stress that, contrary to accused–appellant’s assertions, mental retardation per se does not affect a
witness’ credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. 13
Appellant’s assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have considered his alibi must
likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that appellant was at another place at the
time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene. In this case, appellant attempted to show that he was at barangay Ananong at the time of the
rape incident. However, as found by the trial court, the distance between barangay Ananong
and barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be traversed in one hour or even less.14
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and properly
imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266–B, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental disability could not be considered as a
qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of such mental
condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As held in People v. Limio:15
The awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity are likewise
proper. However, the award of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.20 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed from date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR H.C. No. 03270
finding appellant Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay “AAA” civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral
damages of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; the
amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for the imposition
of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is specifically alleged and
adequately proved by the prosecution.

For the Anti–Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266–B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the
qualifying circumstance of ‘(10) when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.’ Said knowledge x x
x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266–B (10),
RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.16

xxxx
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL JOSON Y ROGANDO, Defendant-
Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated 31 August 2012 that affirmed the
judgment2 of conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dasmarinas (RTC), Cavite, Branch 90 sitting in
Imus, Cavite, convicting appellant Michael Joson y Rogando of the crime or rape of his 14-year old sister.
Appellant was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads
That on or about the 14th day of May 2009, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the biological brother and
thus a relative within the second degree of consanguinity of [AAA], 3 a minor fourteen (14) years of age
and born on March 24, 1995, motivated by lust and with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation
and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], against her will and consent, thereby debasing,
degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and integrity as a child, to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant.4cralawlawlibrary
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecution’s evidence is based on the
sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at
around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellant’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by
appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After
undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina.
AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00
or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her
not to tell on his wife. The letter reads:
Ne!
Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay. Sana po wala
ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang pamilya ko at mga
buhay natin. Paki tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin. 5cralawlawlibrary
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellant’s wife the rape incident. 6 And
on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police and she executed a
sworn statement detailing the rape.7cralawred
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted on AAA by
Irene D. Baluyut of Philippine General Hospital which essentially states that there is no evident injury on
AAA at the time of the examination.
Also submitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she was
still a minor at the time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.
Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that he was
staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in Dasmariñas on 26 May
2009. Appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented him
because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied writing the apology letter and presented his
specimen handwriting in court.8cralawred
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape as defined in Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and the said accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim by way of moral damages in the amount
of Php50,000.00, civil indemnity ex-delicto in the amount of Php50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of Php25,000.00.9cralawlawlibrary
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA. It noted that appellant even wrote to the victim that
he was sorry for what he has done. The trial court considered the letter as admission against appellant’s
interest.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.10 On 31 August 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision affirming the judgment of conviction.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal11 with the appellate court. In a Resolution12 dated 19 June 2013, the
Court ordered the elevation of the records and directed the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs should they so desire. However, appellant and the Office of the Solicitor- General both manifested
that they were adopting their respective appeal briefs previously filed with the Court of
Appeals.13cralawred
In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape as
defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements of force, threat or
intimidation. Appellant argues that AAA did not allege that she was threatened by appellant with the use
of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did appellant say anything to threaten or intimidate her. With
respect to moral ascendancy, appellant contends that the Court in a recent case did not consider a brother
as one of those close kin who has moral ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for force and
intimidation. Appellant further points out that there was no showing of any resistance on the part of AAA
to his alleged sexual advances.
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find no reason to reverse appellant’s conviction.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must Q: What were you doing?
prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through A: Umiiyak lang po ako.
force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she Q: What about the accused, what did he do to you?
was under 12 years of age or was demented.14cralawred A: Pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko.
Q: He went on top of you? Thereafter what did the accused do next?
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother, to A: Pilit niya pong ipinapasok ang ari niya sa ari ko.
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Q: Was he able to insert his penis?
A: Opo.
Q: For how long?
Q: Do you know one Michael Joson?
A: Matagal po.
A: Opo.
Q: How did you feel when his organ was inside your organ?
Q: Why do you know him?
A: Masakit po.
A: He is my brother.
Q: And what (sic) you trying to do while his organ was inside?
Q: Is he inside the courtroom?
A: Umiiyak lang po ako.
A: Opo.
Q: After that, what happened next?
Q: Please point to him. (Witness points to a man wearing a yellow tshirt, who when asked what
A: Pinaghahalikan niya pa rin po ako, tapos tumayo po siya sandali tapos humiga po uli siya.
his name is, answered “Michael Joson.”)
Natulog po.
Q: On May 14, 2009, around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, where were you?
Q: What about you, you went to sleep also?
A: Nasa bahay po.
A: Hindi po, umiiyak lang po ako.
Q: What were you doing in your house?
Q: The following day, in the morning, were you not able to sleep after that incident?
A: Tulog po.
A: Hindi po.
Q: What time did you wake up?
Q: What did you do?
A: Sa tingin ko po mga 1:00 o’clock.
A: Doon lang po, umiiyak lang po.
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court the reason why you woke up early?
Q: What about the accused?
A: Hinuhubaran po niya ako.
A: Doon lang din po siya.
Q: Who are you referring to?
Q: Beside you?
A: Ng kapatid ko.
A: Opo.
Q: He was undressing you? So what did you do while he was undressing you, while you were
Q: And what happened next, at 6:00 o’clock in the morning or 7:00 o’clock?
lying or sleeping? That’s why you were awakened?
A: May iniwan po siyang sulat.
A: Opo.
Q: Where did he go, if you know?
Q: So what happened next when you felt that he was undressing you?
A: Sa trabaho po.
A: Pumalag po ako, kasi hinihigpitan po niya ako sa braso ko.
Q: What was the letter all about?
Q: So what else did you do?
A: Humihingi po siya ng sorry.15
A: Sabi po niya kasi, wag daw po ako maingay.
Q: Who was your companion in the house, aside from your brother?
Who else was there in the house? Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
A: Wala po. Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as
Q: Where were they? the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her
A: ‘Yung asawa niya po, umuwi sa kanila. vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we
Q: What about your parents, where were they? quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:
A: ‘Yung tatay ko po, nagtatrabaho.
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required in rape cases is
Q: Your mother?
relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to
A: Patay na po.
consummate his purpose is enough. The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into
Q: What happened next when you were told not to shout?
account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which
A: Hinubaran niya po ‘yung ibaba ko, tapos pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko tapos pinaghahalikan
may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of
niya ko.
tender age.
Q: Was he able to undress you?
A: Opo.
Q: Totally? In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the
A: Opo. rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the
Q: Thereafter, what did you do? tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-appellant who was in the prime of his life,
A: Pinaghahalikan niya po ako. the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her
suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired
result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
xxxx
In conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence, we deem it proper to modify the amount of damages
awarded in this case. In People v. Gambao,21 we increase the amounts of indemnity and damage where
the penalty for the crime committed is death but which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No.
9346, as follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant’s insistence that the absence of any resistance on the 1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without her consent. The failure of the
victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical 2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim needs no proof; and
submits herself to her attackers of because of fear.
Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed to 3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape All damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
and its absence does not denigrate AAA’s claim that the accused-appellant consummated his bestial judgment until fully paid.22cralawred
act.16cralawlawlibrary
Anent appellant’s argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister, the victim, that WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding appellant Michael
could substitute for force and intimidation, our ruling in People v. Villaruel,17 as cited by the Court of Joson y Rogando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
Appeals, has rejected such proposition. perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity awarded is increased to P100,000.00;
moral damages to P100,000.00; and the exemplary damages to P100,000.00. The award of damages
The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother sexually molested her in the
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
morning of February 21, 1996. The accused-appellant was her older brother who had definitely moral
ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the
eldest among the children since both of their parents were dead, the accused-appellant stood as guardian SO ORDERED
of the siblings. Thus, when the complainant was roused from her sleep to accompany the accused-
appellant to buy bread, the complainant obediently followed him. To the accused-appellant, this was
highly improbable that the complainant would entertain his plea to go out with him at such an unholy hour
or even allegedly knowing fully well that the latter had taken shabu and liquor. There is nothing incredible
with the complainant’s story. Notwithstanding the time or the physical condition of her brother, Myra
certainly did not expect that he had other ill motives against her. It certainly is not normal for a brother to
take out his lust on his sister. Myra also testified that she did not resist his advances for fear of her life as
her brother had two (2) fan knives poking at her as she was being raped. More importantly, the moral
ascendancy and influence the accused-appellant has over the complainant sufficiently substitute for the
force and intimidation required in rape.18cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals found AAA’s testimony credible. The trial court,
having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best assess the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Thus, the trial court’s findings are accorded great respect
unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might
affect the result of the case.19cralawred
With respect to appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, it is an oft- repeated rule that positive identification
where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence
is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 20cralawred
We likewise agree that appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189293 July 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICENTE CANDELLADA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the appeal of the Decision dated April 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G,R.
CR.-H. C. No. 00361-MIN,1 which affirmed the Consolidated Decision2 dated December 23, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte in Criminal Case Nos. 118-07-2005 and
159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005, acquitting accused-appellant Vicente Candellada of the charge of
attempted rape but finding him guilty of eight counts of rape.
Accused-appellant was charged with attempted rape before the RTC under the following Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 118-07-2005:
That on or about December 28, 2004, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at x x x, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is father
of AAA3, a 14-year-old minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design, and
who was under the influence of liquor, wanted to have sexual intercourse with said AAA, but the latter
strongly refused, so that accused got mad and boxed, and battered AAA, by the use of a piece of wood,
but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Rape as a
consequence by reason of the fact that AAA, shouted for help and the people of x x x, Lanao del Norte,
were able to apprehend the aforesaid accused.4
Accused-appellant was likewise charged with eight counts of consummated rape committed on May 30,
2004,5 June 2, 2004,6 June 12, 2004,7 July 10, 2004,8 August 13, 2004,9 November 5, 2004,10 December
15, 2004,11 and December 25, 200412 under eight Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-
2005 to 166-07-2005. The Informations were similarly worded except for the different dates of commission
of the crime and read as follows:
That on or about date at x x x, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal knowledge upon AAA, the accused’s own daughter, a minor
14 years of age, against her will and consent, which sexual abuse by the accused debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human being.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law in relation to
R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not guilty
to the charges against him.13
During pre-trial, the defense admitted that accused-appellant is the father of private complainant AAA and
that AAA was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crimes charged and/or filing of the
cases.14
Thereafter, the nine criminal cases were tried jointly.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Jovenal Magtagad (Magtagad),15 the Municipal Health
Officer who physically examined AAA on December 29, 2004; AAA, 16 the victim herself; Elsie Gemina
(Gemina),17 the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where accused-appellant and AAA lived; and
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Rosa Bastigue (Bastigue),18 Women’s Desk Police Non-Commissioned
Officer (PNCO), Magsaysay Police Station. It also presented the following documentary evidence:
Gemina’s Affidavit19 dated January 3, 2005; AAA’s Sworn Statement20 dated January 3, 2005; Joint
Affidavit21 dated January 3, 2005 of SPO4 Bastigue, Police Investigator SPO3 Orlando Caroro, and
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Officer Virgilio Yaral (Yaral); and Dr. Magtagad’s
Medical Certificate22 dated December 29, 2004.
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA was born in Davao on January 10, 1990. She was 15 years old when she testified before the RTC
on August 24, 2005.23
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused-appellant and his deceased first wife. AAA lived with
accused-appellant and the latter’s second wife, while AAA’s two sisters lived with accused-appellant’s
mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-appellant impregnated AAA. When AAA was
already five months pregnant, accused-appellant brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Accused-
appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.24
Accused-appellant approached Gemina, who he came to know during a previous visit to Lanao del Norte
in 1993. Accused-appellant asked permission if he could stay at Gemina’s old house with his wife,
introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. Gemina immediately noticed that AAA was pregnant. She also
commented that AAA was so young she could already be accused-appellant’s daughter, but accused-
appellant only laughed. Gemina and her husband allowed accused-appellant and AAA to stay at their old
house on the condition that accused-appellant would pay for the electricity.25
While they were staying at Gemina’s old house, accused-appellant had intercourse with AAA many times,
but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004;
July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004; November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When
asked to explain what "intercourse" meant, AAA stated that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA further testified that she consistently resisted accused-appellant’s bestial acts but he
threatened to stab her with a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Gemina’s
help on September 24, 2004, but the baby died four days later, on September 28, 2004. 26
On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made amorous advances on AAA. AAA refused so
accused-appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA and hit her head with a piece of wood, which
rendered her unconscious.27 Gemina, who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay Captain.
The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested the accused-appellant.28
According to Gemina, since accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte, the two lived as
husband and wife. However, sometime in December 2004, a drunk accused-appellant already admitted
to Gemina’s husband that AAA was his (accused-appellant’s) daughter. Gemina further testified that the
mauling incident that took place on December 28, 2004 was already the fourth time she saw accused-
appellant maltreating AAA.29
After conducting a physical examination of AAA on December 29, 2004, Dr. Magtagad observed
hematoma, contusions, and abrasions on different parts of AAA’s body, which were caused by a blunt
object, possibly a piece of wood.30 Dr. Magtagad estimated that AAA’s injuries would heal in five to seven
days. AAA did not mention being raped by accused-appellant to Dr. Magtagad.
SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral were assigned to AAA’s case. They were initially
investigating only the mauling of AAA, but during the course of their investigation, AAA claimed that she
had been raped by accused-appellant at least eight times.31 In their Joint Affidavit though, SPO4 Bastigue,
SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral reported only the mauling of AAA and did not mention her being
raped by accused-appellant. SPO4 Bastigue reasoned on the witness stand that maybe the investigator
merely forgot to include the rapes in the Joint Affidavit.
The sole evidence for the defense is accused-appellant’s testimony, summarized as follows:
Accused-appellant acknowledged that AAA is his daughter with his deceased first wife. 32 Accused-
appellant stated that AAA was born on January 10 but since he was unschooled, he could not remember
the exact year of AAA’s birth.
Accused-appellant recalled that AAA went to school in Davao. Accused-appellant and AAA had
misunderstandings because he would admonish AAA for roaming around late in the evening. In 2004,
AAA got pregnant and had to stop her studies. Accused-appellant did not inquire from AAA’s sisters,
friends, classmates, or teachers who impregnated AAA. Accused-appellant, upon the insistence of his
second wife, brought AAA to Lanao del Norte to conceal AAA’s pregnancy. Accused-appellant and AAA
stayed at Gemina’s old house while in Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant denied introducing AAA to
Gemina as his wife. He introduced AAA to Gemina as his daughter and said that AAA was impregnated
by a classmate. By accused-appellant’s account, AAA gave birth on October 10, 2004 but the baby died.
Accused-appellant and AAA were planning to go back to Davao in January 2005 after accused-appellant
had saved enough money from making charcoal and cutting grass. 33
Accused-appellant outright called AAA a liar. He denied raping AAA eight times between May 30, 2004
to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an attempt to rape AAA on
December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time. Accused-appellant claimed that he was already
arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday, after he struck AAA.34
The RTC rendered its Consolidated Decision on December 23, 2005.
The RTC found that there was not enough evidence to prove accusedappellant’s culpability for the charge
of attempted rape on December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,35 the RTC pointed
out that the overt acts committed by accused-appellant resulted only in AAA’s physical injuries that took
five to seven days to heal and slight physical injuries were not necessarily included in the charge of
attempted rape. As for the charge of eight counts of consummated rape, the RTC pronounced that "AAA’s
down-to-earth testimony was convincing and straightforward that she was abused by her father in x x x
Lanao del Norte."36 In the end, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, and by the weight or quantum of evidence, the
Court renders judgment as follows:
1. For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt in
Crim. Case No. 118-07-2005, for attempted rape in relation with Republic Act No. 9262, acquits
him thereof;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 163-07-2005,
164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005, pursuant to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
in relation with Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as Anti-Child Abuse Law, finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged and committed against
his minor daughter, AAA, and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of
the 8 counts thereof;
3. Accused is ordered to pay moral damages to complainant of ₱75,000.00 and exemplary
damages of ₱25,000.00 in each of the 8 cases of rape;
4. The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology warden of Tubod, Lanao de Norte is ordered
to deliver the living body of accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila
within 15 days from the promulgation of the decision.37
The records of the eight rape cases were then forwarded to the Court of Appeals for appellate review.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contended that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of eight counts of rape. AAA’s short and simple answers during her testimony "were short of a mere
allegation." Despite remembering the dates of the alleged crimes, AAA could not vividly describe how she
was molested. AAA merely repeated that on all eight occasions, accused-appellant had intercourse with
her by inserting his penis into her vagina. AAA’s uniform manner of describing the alleged rapes created
a strong suspicion that her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived. Accused-appellant also
labeled AAA’s testimony incredible because according to AAA, accused-appellant immediately inserted
his penis into her vagina without even taking off their undergarments. Thus, accused-appellant argued
that the presumption of innocence accorded to accused-appellant must prevail, for it could not be
overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or probability. The standard has always been proof beyond
reasonable doubt.38
Plaintiff-appellee, for its part, maintained that the RTC judgment of conviction against accused-appellant
was consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However, it prayed that the sentence imposed upon
accused-appellant be modified in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines.39
In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction against
accused-appellant but modified the sentence and award of damages:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is modified, and after taking into
account the qualified aggravating circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship with
accused-appellant Vicente Candellada, he (Vicente Candellada) is DIRECTED and ORDERED to serve
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the eligibility for parole for each rape committed under Criminal
Cases Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 163-07-2005, 164-07-2005, 165-07-
2005, and 166-07-2005. Accused-appellant Vicente Candellada is further DIRECTED and ORDERED to For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1)
pay AAA the following for each rape committed: sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition
of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time
₱75,000.00 as Civil Indemnity; of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. 40

₱75,000.00 as Moral Damages; The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by accused-appellant during the
pre-trial conference.
₱25,000.00 as Exemplary Damages.
The existence of the first three elements was established by AAA’s testimony. Relevant are the
pronouncements of the Court in People v. Manjares 41 that:
Hence, the instant appeal.
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim
Accused-appellant insists that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when
a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
There is no merit in the appeal. been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on
the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of
Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for
amended: the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For
this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor
victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. (Citations omitted.)
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
The Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that AAA’s testimony
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: deserves full faith and credence. In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility
of the victim’s testimony. The settled rule is that the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses
a) Through force, threat or intimidation; in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times, even finality. Having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court
stood in a much better position to decide the question of credibility. Findings of the trial court on such
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.42 No such facts or
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; circumstances exist in the present case.

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not necessarily mean that her
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also, AAA’s failure to mention that accused-appellant
removed their undergarments prior to the rape does not destroy the credibility of AAA’s entire testimony.
xxxx Rape victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the manner in which they
were sexually violated. Thus, errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a
witness, especially when she is recounting details from an experience so humiliating and painful as
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.
rape.43 In addition, bearing in mind that AAA had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant for a period
of time (beginning in Davao, which resulted in AAA’s pregnancy), it is not surprising for AAA to recall each
xxxx incident in much the same way. What is important is that AAA had categorically testified that on eight
specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, successfully had sexual intercourse with
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following her by inserting his penis into her vagina.
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats to AAA,
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close kin, such as the
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
spouse of the parent of the victim. force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.44
Although Gemina did not personally witness the rapes of AAA by accused-appellant, she did confirm that
accused-appellant had introduced AAA as his wife; and when Gemina stayed a week with accused-
appellant and AAA at the old house, Gemina observed that the two apparently lived as husband and wife.
Accused-appellant’s imprudence in representing himself as AAA’s husband to the public lends credence
to AAA’s assertions that accused-appellant took perverted liberties with her in private.

Accused-appellant’s denial and alibi deserve scant consideration.1âwphi1 No jurisprudence in criminal

law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. It has been consistently held that denial and alibi
are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not prevail over complainant's direct, positive
and categorical assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on
one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 45

Accused-appellant proffered a general denial of all eight rapes. Accused-appellant’s alibi that he was
arrested and imprisoned on December 23, 2004 is not supported by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence. In fact, it was entirely uncorroborated. Moreover, he was charged of seven other counts of rape
that happened on earlier dates. In contrast, prosecution witnesses AAA, Gemina, and SPO4 Bastigue
consistently testified that accused-appellant was arrested only on December 28, 2004.

With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole,
instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, when the
law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 further provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. 46

As for the damages, the Court affirms the award to AAA of ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00
moral damages for each count of rape. However, in line with jurisprudence, 47 the Court increases the
amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape;
and imposes an interest of 6% per annum on the aggregate amount of damages awarded from finality of
this judgment until full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00361-MIN is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA shall be increased to
₱30,000.00 for each count of rape, and all damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines kill “AAA” and her family if she reported the incident to anyone. At that time, “AAA’s” maternal grandmother
SUPREME COURT was in the house but was unaware that “AAA” was being ravished.
Manila
xxxx
SECOND DIVISION
Unable to endure the torment, “AAA” confided her ordeal to her mother. But “AAA’s” mother did not believe
her. “AAA” ran away from home and went to her maternal uncle’s house. There, she disclosed her
G.R. No. 191362, October 09, 2013 harrowing experience to her mother’s siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellant’s wrong
doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched her.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCIANO CIAL Y LORENA, Accused-
Appellant. For fear that she might be raped again, “AAA” ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Her aunt
helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
DECISION
On March 19, 2003, “AAA” was brought to Doña Marta Memorial District Hospital in Atimonan, Quezon
where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial issued a Medico-Legal Report
DEL CASTILLO, J.: which essentially states that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Assailed before this Court is the November 24, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. 1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area, with normal
CR-H.C. No. 03162 which affirmed with modifications the November 26, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional external genitalia;
Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 finding appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena guilty beyond 2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 o’clock and 5 o’clock positions, introitus admits one
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape. examining finger with ease; and
3) spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of
On February 5, 2004, appellant was charged with the crime of rape. The Information 3 reads as spermatozoa.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about the month of December, 2002, at Barangay Balubad, Municipality of Atimonan, Province According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means that the victim
of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests during puberty. Dr.
lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer
have carnal knowledge of “AAA”,4 a minor, 13 years old, against her will. a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin
as she would have suffered pain. On the absence of spermatozoa on the victim’s genitals, Dr. Imperial
That the commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority, the victim explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost four months from the time
being less than 18 years old, and relationship, the accused being the common-law husband of of the rape would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa.
complainant’s mother.
On April 7, 2003, “AAA” and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women at Gumaca,
Contrary to law.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary Quezon. “AAA” was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside therein at the time of her
During his arraignment on June 29, 2004, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 After pre-trial, trial on the merits testimony.7
ensued. Version of the Defense

Version of the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution as summarized in the Appellee’s Brief6 is as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
“AAA” is one of the six (6) children born to “BBB” and “CCC.” After “CCC” died, “BBB” cohabited with
appellant Marciano Cial (also known as “Onot”). Appellant and “BBB” have two (2) children.
In 2002, “AAA”, then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her family and
appellant in x x x Quezon Province. “AAA” calls appellant “Papa.”
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called “AAA” and told her to go to the bedroom inside their house.
Once inside, appellant took off “AAA’s” shorts and panty and spread her legs. Appellant pulled his pants
down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girl’s vagina. “AAA” felt intense pain but she did not
try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to
As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated “AAA” as his own daughter.
He also claimed that “AAA’s” aunt fabricated the charge because appellant called her a thief.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of “AAA” especially considering that the same is corroborated
by the medical findings. On the other hand, the RTC found appellant’s defense not only “laughable” and
“sickening” but also completely untrue.8cralawlibrary
The court a quo also found the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship to be present. Thus,
on November 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of qualified rape.
Considering, however, the proscription on the imposition of the death penalty, the trial court instead
sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, accused Marciano Cial is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the complainant “AAA” is awarded moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant appealed to the CA but the appellate court found the appeal to be without merit and dismissed
the same. The appellate court thus affirmed the RTC finding appellant guilty of qualified rape but with
modifications as to the damages, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FOR THESE REASONS, the decision dated November 26, 2007 of the RTC is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with R.A. No. 9346,
without eligibility for parole; and
2. He is ordered to indemnify AAA (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages;
and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA found that the elements of rape have been duly established. “AAA’s” testimony proved that
appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent. The examining doctor
corroborated “AAA’s” narration by testifying that the hymenal lacerations could have been possibly caused
by an erect penis. The CA disregarded appellant’s contention that he could not have raped “AAA” in the
presence of “AAA’s” grandmother as “lust is no respecter of time and place.”11 Moreover, the appellate
court found that the prosecution satisfactorily established “AAA’s” minority as well as the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of “AAA’s” mother.
Hence, this appeal raising the following arguments, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY
POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF RAPE.12
Appellant argues that if he indeed raped “AAA” in the manner that she narrated, it would be improbable
for “AAA’s” maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same. Appellant also claims that it was illogical
for “AAA’s” uncle to allow “AAA” to return home after learning about the alleged rape incident. Appellant
also insists that the examining physician was unsure as to what actually caused “AAA’s” hymenal
lacerations.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In this appeal, appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the credibility it lent to the
testimony of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court accords great respect to the factual findings
of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA. We find no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution
witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate
courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the
result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the
sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, her ‘furtive glance, blush of unconscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness,
sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath’ – all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination
of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are
telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted.) 13
Besides, it would not be amiss to point out that “AAA” was only 13 years of age when she testified in
court.14
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame
to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story. x x x15
We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that if he indeed raped “AAA” inside their house, then
“AAA’s” maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled jurisprudence that rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate. As held by the CA, “lust is no respecter of time and
place.”16 Thus, the presence of “AAA’s” grandmother would not negate the commission of the rape;
neither would it prove appellant’s innocence.
There is also no merit to appellant’s contention that it was irrational for “AAA’s” uncle to allow her to return
home even after learning about the rape incident. The considerations or reasons which impelled “AAA’s”
uncle to allow her to return home are immaterial to the rape charge. Such have no bearing on appellant’s
guilt.
Likewise undeserving of our consideration is appellant’s imputation that the examining physician was
unsure as to what caused “AAA’s” hymenal lacerations. It must be stressed that the examining physician
was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim and on the results of such
examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo
Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that “AAA” suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the
location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to establish
the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no personal knowledge of how these
hymenal lacerations were inflicted on “AAA.” He could only surmise that the lacerations could have been
caused “by activities like cycling, horseback riding x x x or the insertion of [a] hard object [into] the vagina
of the victim x x x [such as] the penis.”17 In any case, a medical examination is not even indispensable in
prosecuting a rape charge. In fact, an accused’s conviction for rape may be anchored solely on the
testimony of the victim. At best, the medical examination would only serve as corroborative evidence.
We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of qualified
rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship attended the
commission of the crime. We rule otherwise.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence,18 the prosecution mentioned “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth. Also
attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit “B” is “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth showing that
“AAA” was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of
Live Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of the case. During the March 28, 2006 hearing,
the prosecution manifested before the RTC that it will be presenting “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth at
the next setting. In its Order19 dated June 27, 2006, the trial court reset the hearing of the case to allow
the prosecution to present evidence with respect to “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth. However, up until the
prosecution rested its case, nobody was presented to testify on “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth. Records
show that the prosecution presented only “AAA” and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never
testified on “AAA’s” age. On the other hand, “AAA” even testified on the witness stand that she does not
know her age, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. Do you remember how old were you during that time?
A. I do not know, ma’am.
Q. Do you know your birthday?
A. I do not know, ma’am.20
Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of “AAA”.
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of “AAA’s” mother23 as
well as the step-father of “AAA”.24 Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its reference to appellant
as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any discussion as to how it reached its conclusion that
appellant is the common-law husband of “AAA’s” mother or that “AAA” is his step-daughter.
The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellant’s claim that he is married to “AAA’s” mother,
it went on to declare, without any explanation or justification, that appellant is the common-law husband
of “AAA’s” mother, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxx
Also, given that Marciano and AAA’s mother were not legally married, the qualifying circumstance that
the accused is the common-law husband of the victim’s mother may be properly appreciated. 25
The terms “common-law husband” and “step-father” have different legal connotations. For appellant to be
a step-father to “AAA,” he must be legally married to “AAA’s” mother.26cralawlibrary
Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the
crime itself. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of the crime of
simple rape, the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.27cralawlibrary

The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecution As regards damages, “AAA” is entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in
likewise miserably failed to establish “AAA’s” relationship with the appellant. Although the Information the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. In addition, interest at
alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of “AAA’s” mother, “AAA’” referred to appellant as the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from date of finality of this judgment until
her step-father. fully paid.

Q. And who is Onot? WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 24, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
A. He is my step father, ma’am. CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 is MODIFIED. Appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena is hereby found guilty of
Q. What do you mean step father, what is his relation to your mother? rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay “AAA” the
A. He is the husband of my mother, ma’am. amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
xxxx damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
Q. When did this Onot become the husband of your mother? this judgment until fully paid.
A. I could no longer remember, ma’am.
Q. Were you still small or big when he [became] the husband of your mother? SO ORDERED.
A. I was still small when he [became] the husband of my mother, ma’am.
Q. And how do you call this Onot?
A. Papa, ma’am.
Q. Is this Onot whom you called Papa inside this room now?
A. Yes, ma’am. (Witness pointed [to] the bald man who when asked his name responded that he is
Mar[c]iano Cial).
Q. Do you know that person?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. Because he is the husband of my mother, ma’am.21
Meanwhile, appellant claimed that he is married to “AAA’s” mother:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. You [identified] yourself Mr. Witness as married. You are married to the mother of “AAA”?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q. So, you mean to say that you are the step father of “AAA”?
A. Yes, sir.22
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS
“MACHETE,” Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–
H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03–0763 to 03–0765, finding herein appellant
Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias “Machete” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape,
thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay
AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took
advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or
intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent.
(Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against
him.5 Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection
Unit, University of the Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP–PGH), who examined the victim.
The testimonies of the above–named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at around
11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and
chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay
tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for
violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to
escape, thus, she alone was apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the
tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did
not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained
unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside
the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while,
the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the
former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San
Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once
she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle.
AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then
took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at
AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on
the ground and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the
appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again,
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted
again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered
AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about
what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in
Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should
she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply
advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and
her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical examination by Dr.
Tan,11 which resulted in the following findings:
Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock area with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9
HYMEN
o’clock area with eccymosi at 8–10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic
xxx
Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 o’clock area. No evident injury at
ANAL EXAMINATION
the time of examination.
xxx
IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis
supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn statement
accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her assailant because the former
was wearing a jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,” as well as a Barangay Identification Card, at
the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the parties made the following stipulations: (1) that
the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and he
stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to 12:00
midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3)
that when he woke up at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations,
Corpuz’s testimony was dispensed with. 14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different
version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall. His
task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls
from fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same day, he received a call from
his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that
transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he denied
that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he
was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of
their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the
appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was
shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime. 16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical, straightforward and
positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of
three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266–A, in relation to
Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of Rape (under Art. 266–a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266–B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353) and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the
[appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following assignment
of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24
August 2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages
awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed that the appellant
succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one
after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his
lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of
rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal briefs 23 filed with
the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation attended
the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual
advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact
that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the
opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human experience,
thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical examination is quite disturbing as it
appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to this effect
in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period
of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three
separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single
criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; hence,
his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages awarded in
favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two
persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the complainant.
Following the above principles, this Court is duty–bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive evaluation
of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to reverse the
rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266–A, in
relation to paragraph 2, Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These provisions
specifically state:
ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
xxxx
ART. 266–B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1)
when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such
character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that
the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into
submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is
threatened with death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as observed by the
trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony
revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered
to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying
his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.
This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle
on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were
employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the
same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind
of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he
could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil
desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit
her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected
to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is
not an essential element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life
and personal safety. The victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her
submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be
expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may
shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility. 30
In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the appellant
puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice
was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to
appellant’s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s testimony. As this
Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the
commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though
AAA made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was,
indeed, raped by the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant.
She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where
nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully
inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration the
appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into
her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant again inserted his
penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical findings showing fresh
hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of “blunt force or
penetrating trauma” – a disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses are totally
inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or intimidation thereby
implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported by
clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who,
in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her
chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight.
While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim, 33 as in this case.
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall doing his
job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, the
corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight,
almost the same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster the
possibility of the appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill–motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely
against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since no woman would concoct a tale that
would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself
to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her
quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her. 34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that
he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was
motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered
the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s
vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the
makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued
making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one
count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from
which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual
assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was
committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of
rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in
satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts
of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266–B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
that “[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.” As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in
order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court
in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral damages, on the other hand, is automatically
granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 38 Hence, this
Court upholds the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of rape,
that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of the use
of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent
jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No.
03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay
AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote
with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It
appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
[AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein
the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when
the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA],
he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC Y
MARQUEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the verdict must be one of acquittal of
the accused. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation for rape.
Factual Antecedents
Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez (appellant) appeals the September 26, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05452 which affirmed with modification the February 15, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453. The
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against "AAA" 3 under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The designation of the crime in the
Information against appellant is rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC.
However, the accusatory portion of the Information charges appellant with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1(b), Article 266-A, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about September 29, 2008 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and
by means of force and intimidation, commit sexual abuse upon the person of "AAA" by then and there
making her drink liquor which made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise
unconsciousness, bringing her to a room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her
will.
Contrary to law.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Elvis James Meneses (Meneses) was involved in the
commission of the crime but could not be prosecuted due to his minority. He was only 14 years old at the
time of the incident.
Version of the Prosecution
"AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was having a drinking session with
appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At
around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his
penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to
cut hotdog and now lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left
after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he
could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped
only when she tried to reposition her body. "AAA" then left appellant's house and immediately returned to
the house she shared with her live-in partner.
The following day, "AAA" reported the incident to the police. She also underwent a medical examination
and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a drinking session
with his cousin, Gerry Tionloc. After a while, Meneses and "AAA" arrived and joined in their drinking
session. Meneses and "AAA" then went inside his bedroom and continued drinking while he went out of
the house to buy food. When he returned and entered his bedroom, he saw Meneses and "AAA" having
sex. They asked him to leave, so he went to the kitchen. Meneses then came out of the bedroom followed
by "AAA" who was holding a bottle of "rugby," which she brought home with her. Appellant contended
that nothing more happened that night. Meneses corroborated his version of the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision5 dated February 15,2012, the RTC clarified that appellant is charged with rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based on the allegations in the
Information and not with rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of the same provision of law, as the
designation in the Information suggests. The RTC stressed that this is consistent with the legal precept
that it is the allegations or recital in the Information that determine the nature of the crime committed.
Thus, the RTC ruled that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual intercourse
against "AAA." It held that the prosecution successfully established the crime through the testimony of
"AAA," which was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrar
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez GUlLTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the private
complainant Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
Appellant appealed the RTC's Decision arguing that discrepancies in the sworn statement of "AAA" and
her testimony diminished her credibility. Appellant contended that "AAA" alleged in her sworn statement
that: (1) appellant held her hands while Meneses was on top of her; and (2) she slept after Meneses raped
her and awakened only when he was on top of her. However, "AAA" did not mention these allegations
during her direct examination. Appellant maintained that "AAA" failed to refute his assertions that her aunt
and uncle fabricated the charges against him for having previous affairs with two of her cousin.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision7 dated September 26, 2013, the CA ruled that discrepancies between the affidavit and
testimony of "AAA" did not impair her credibility since the former is taken ex parte and is often incomplete
or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. The inconsistencies
even preclude the possibility that the testimony given was rehearsed. Moreover, the CA held that a rape
victim like "AAA" is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and
painful that she might even try to obliterate it from her memory. The CA gave scant consideration to the
appellant's claim of ill motive of the aunt and uncle of"AAA," as well as his denial of raping her which
cannot overcome her positive, candid and categorical testimony that he was the rapist. The CA therefore
affirmed the Decision of the RTC with modification that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed
on all damages awarded from the date of finality of the CA's Decision until fully paid. The dispositive
portion of the CA's Decision reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 15 February 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region. Manila, Branch 37, in Crim. Case No. 08-
264453 finding accused-appellant Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
another Php50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of private complainant AAA is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.
Assignment of Error
Appellant adopts the same assignment of error he raised before the CA, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not able to establish the
required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
The Facts Recited In The Information Determine the Crime Charged.
It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the Information (rape by sexual
assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and the recital in the Information (rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of the same provision of law). However, this discrepancy does not
violate appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As ruled
correctly by the RTC, the allegations in the Information charged appellant with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital in the Information
determine the nature of the crime committed. "[T]he character of the crime is not determined by the caption
or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information." 10
The Use Of Force, Threat or Intimidation Causes Fear on the Part of the Rape Victim.
Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of appellant by
presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1,
Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to
have been committed by force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that
the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove
that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to
do so is fatal to its cause."11
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in
mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she
is threatened with death if she reports the incident. 12 "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear
caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol."13
It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had sexual
intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no
evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA."
She testified that appellant and Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of
appellant. At around 7:00p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of appellant and
chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up to about 11 p.m. when she took a
nap, there is no showing that appellant or Meneses forced, threatened or intimidated her.
As to how appellant and Meneses had sexual intercourse with her, "AAA" merely testified as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q- Madam Witness, you said that it was Elvis James who raped you first.
And then after he left this Juan Richard Tionloc [accused] approached you and asked if you can
do it?
A- Yes, Ma'am; he asked me but I did not answer because I was still shivering.
Q- And then what else happened after that?
A- That is it; he was the one who did it. 14
No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant employed force, threat or
intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that appellant physically overpowered, or used or
threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her
life since a knife lying on the table nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere
product of her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely to
threaten or intimidate her. We cannot even ascertain whether said knife can be used as a weapon or an
effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented nor described in court. These
findings are clear from the following testimony of "AAA:"
Q While Elvis James was inserting his penis to [sic] your vagina, what are [sic] you doing?
-
 A I was crying, Ma'am.
-
Q You did not shout for help?
- who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent and allowing
A I did not because I was afraid, Ma'am.
- The Age Gap Between the Victim and Appellant Negates Force, Threat or Intimidation.
Q Why were you afraid, madam witness?
- negates force, threat or intimidation; he was only 14 while "AAA" was already 24, not to mention that they
A Because there was a knife inside the room which we used in cutting the hotdog and then [I] did
- not shout anymore because I was afraid that they might stab me, Ma'am.15
Even assuming in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in "AAA's" mind, it should
be noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA" for a sexual favor. In other words, the
source of the feigned force, threat or intimidation was no longer present when appellant casually asked
his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it" one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in
the negative.
Resistance Should be Made Before the Rape is Consummated.
Later on, appellant went on top of "AAA" without saying anything or uttering threatening words. For her
part, "AAA" neither intimated any form of resistance nor expressed any word of rejection to appellant's
advances. It was only when she felt something painful minutes during their sexual intercourse that
"AAA" tried to move. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A- During the intercourse that was about few minutes and when I felt the pain that was the time
when I tried to move.
Q When you tried to move, what else happened?
-
A- When I tried to move he released himself.
Q And then what happened?
- Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
A- He went out of the room.16
Three things are thus clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, appellant never employed the slightest
force, threat or intimidation against her; second, "AAA" never gave the slightest hint of rejection when
appellant asked her to have sex with him; and, third, appellant did not act with force since he readily
desisted when "AAA" felt the slightest pain and tried to move during their sexual congress.
"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make
any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress
when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal
or rejection of appellant's sexual advances.
In People v. Amogis,17 this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt
to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor and chastity.
And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil design
became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman
him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape.
"AAA's" state of"shivering" could not have been produced by force, threat or intimidation. She insinuates
that she fell into that condition after Meneses had sexual intercourse with her. However, their age gap
were friends. In addition, per "AAA's" own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter
threatening words or perform any act of intimidation against her.
Drunkeness Should Have Deprived the Victim of Her Will Power to Give her Consent.
The fact that "AAA" was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant. There is authority
to the effect that "where consent is induced by the administration of drugs or liquor, which incites her
passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the accused is not guilty of rape." 18
Here, and as narrated by "AAA" on the witness stand, appellant and Meneses were her friends. Thus, as
usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and chatted with them while drinking liquor
for about four hours. And while "AAA" got dizzy and was "shivering," the prosecution failed to show that
she was completely deprived of her will power.
"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be. "AAA" is used to
consuming liquor.19 And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering" at that time rendered her immobile
such that she could not move her head to signal her rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to
whisper to him her refusal, then she would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home
immediately after the alleged rape.
It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests
on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles
appellant to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 05452 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez is ACQUITTED due to insufficiency of evidence. His
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give
her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly
and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support
her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm
of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then
and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal
Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged
the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. 11 On August 18, 1999, the
accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, 12 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a
plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the
name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated
that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999, 16 attested that the true dates of
commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated
in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the
criminal informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK],
against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK],
against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments
and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000,
which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They
got married after a year of courtship. 20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-
appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill
and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the
accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely
assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods. 22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication.
Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents. 23 He would drive the trucks
sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses. 24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with
that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and
one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and
sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days
of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store
and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day. 29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was,
in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree
of enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her
panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He
wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x."
She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept
together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998,
the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly
routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken.
Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the
rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared
their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal
bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon
with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior
prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You
transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed,
lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from
where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. 37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that
she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to
her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. 39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to
bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on
them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was
carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me
because I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses'
bedroom,43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on
me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed
upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama
is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and
said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her
mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and
then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't
interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top
of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?"
before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]" 49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring
her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a
blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the
accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to
"[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He
then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and
embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out. 51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK
relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well."
The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October
17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since,
according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children
proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's
small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to
sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women
that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting:
"So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted
her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?]
Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear
apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you." 58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front
of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his
daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they
subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed. 59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short
pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and
also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex." 60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced
himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and
went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because
you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found
the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside
and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the
bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK
replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel
well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's
father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married
on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their
joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own
businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that
hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those
dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere
in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had
to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October
14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can
take care of the truck and buy some com. 64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims.
According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's
loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the
accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished
loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around
4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck
left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together
with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to
the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four
of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998.
The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because
he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up
truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their
bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of
₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount
dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from
her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant
and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her
after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had
sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an
employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer
ask for his permission whenever she went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love
letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio,
Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a
government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the
paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her. 72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that
time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he
asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player,
spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation
between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During
the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had
somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and
was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-
fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-
appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant
by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999. 75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by
giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime
such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's
accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the
accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting
declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on
October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of
the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the
sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations.
Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with
respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the
elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using
force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the
commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with
mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or
manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained
that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape;
what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces
the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of
having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she
only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate
complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission
of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about
four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties
that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and
Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed
that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel,
filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape
incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary
act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance
or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in
KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a
man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and
married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish
the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in
his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity. 85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his
wife, he was merely using his property. 86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under
three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until
she marries to become the property of her husband. 87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had
to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous. 88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied
her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order
within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the
woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal
property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied
consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she
cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and
England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be
rape if committed against a woman not his wife. 93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as
"the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator." 94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would
always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar
rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis. 96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained
to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for
being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in
cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its
effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation. 100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York
declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing
between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The
various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic
notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even
the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been
cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed
consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent.
Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes
severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational
and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a
husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not
be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by
his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic
relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman
was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in
this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded
as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia,
outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a
husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep,
or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears,
however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied
consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, 104 a husband may
not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband
should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's
bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination
against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's
empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among
others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate
means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other
appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate,
prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of
gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the
generally accepted principles of international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353
eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. 109 The law reclassified rape as a
crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the
present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof
recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished
or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with
his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th
Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on
tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus
of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,'
viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital
rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does
this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice
in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in
this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even
jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why
even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for
approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for
sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for
marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that
prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief
of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it
here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that
is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265
our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor,
direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is
that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because
under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry
that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because
all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape
whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So
there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the
husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it
marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x. 110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained
in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not
another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not
mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And
if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am
the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means.
That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital
rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot
beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you
cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have
carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of
authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang
sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit
already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape
x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule
of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8,
the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I
think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should
be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the]
legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have
to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up,
I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime
but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is
husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement
now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is
that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x
x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even
if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is
present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does
not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not
rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been
married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the
concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything
to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to
show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse
against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding
the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No.
9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a
man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a
sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking
the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together
in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence
are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married
women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight
percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In
his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to
the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim,
KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary
rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be
adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and
wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have
already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women
and respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well
as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns
of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated
the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over
his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at
least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the
CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of
discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse
of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and
other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and
the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow
human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity
by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot
renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual 123 and not
the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty
and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope
of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge
for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate
justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent
or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. 125 But he
cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that
constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class
of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's
own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish
between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims
over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal
redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to
those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own
body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with
her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and
responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of
coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting
marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. 130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates,
cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth.
Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would
inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims
of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on
rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of
proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal
principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no
reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict
mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused
in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are,
nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must
ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the
testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses
and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown
that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the
trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb
its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to
the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate
between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain Q So, what did you do after that?
and debunk the allegations of the defense. A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.
insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, xx xx
his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging Q So after that what else did he do?
subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I
and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted. 133 failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held
the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's your two hands?
bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the Q How did you say that to your husband?
children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out xxxx
of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her A I shouted when I uttered that words.
short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen xxxx
and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted xxxx
her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135 (Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?
the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136 A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, do that if he have sex with you?
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and A Yes, Sir.
voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
party is under 12 years of age or is demented. A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with
him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force A Yes, Sir.
and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
pertinent testimony of KKK, viz: A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident: Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?
(Direct Examination) A No, Sir.
ATTY. LARGO: Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what A He raised my duster [sic] up.
happened? Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him. A No, only on the breast level.138
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you? On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand. (Direct Examination)
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand? ATTY. LARGO
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
means that he wanted to have sex." A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in
having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing
her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired
non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations
prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral
authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her
to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she
insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband
all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16,
1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The
accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal
bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no
indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since
the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom
the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear
to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-
appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual
intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey
that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not
impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind
thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to
recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent
him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him
to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to
bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the
defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission. 142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of
a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's
underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence
that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the
gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her
consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances
of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the
complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal
expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration.
This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an
indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous
and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did
not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in
relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether
they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration
of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK
shouting and crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998
shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs
to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother
who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and
rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay
on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape
and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a
beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged
inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the
accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even
in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where
they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through
the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on
the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical ₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine
resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of
the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although
on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was
all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will. spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused
appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank.153
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his
explained, is not fatal to the wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is
credibility of a witness. June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to
the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by
rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an
by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of
satisfactorily explained.150 whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent
with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those
malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when
Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions
charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151 that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her
testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere
vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital
exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to
legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the Alibi
common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in
marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-
to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal
occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble. informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon
will thus be irrelevant.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny
that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape
incidents. Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because
it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
The victim -S testimony on the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
complaint-affidavit as evidence. the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when
credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. 155
weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan,
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152 Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily
exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was
Ill motive imputed to the victim physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission
of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. 156 Thus,
loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the
it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the
rape incidents were committed. atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of
the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill
motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's
clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming
force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by
the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based
thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of
raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-
appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason
of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted
to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00
as awarded by the RTC.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband
does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human
right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her
consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual
intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the
Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an
annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that
achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities
may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in
the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints
and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent
provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar
Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered
to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an
award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen
anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-
honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge
 Republic of the Philippines where a make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming from the vehicles
SUPREME COURT around.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong
Cooperative near the basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court were
January 17, 2018 several trees. She was not able to reach the comfort room because [ Amarela] was already waiting for
her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked and was
no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day care center. He punched
G.R. No. 225642-43
her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to resist him but
he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of her and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted for help and then
vs. three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant
The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her. So
DECISION she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around, she
proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first to the
MARTIRES, J.: Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed behind So
Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead.
This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
Nos. 01226-MIN and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment2 of the Regional Trial xxxx
Court, Branch 11 of Davao City (RTC). The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G.
Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different charges of rape. [AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie
down. When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him but
THE FACTS he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of [AAA]. [Racho]
then inserted his penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After consummating the act, [Racho] left her. So [AAA] went
home alone.
The two (2) Informations in this case read:

When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and cried. The
Criminal Case No. 64,964-09
following morning, she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her decision until eventually,
[AAA] told her mother about what happened to her. She told her [eldest] brother first who got very angry.
That on or about February 10, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
They reported the matter to the police and eventually [ Amarela] and [Racho] were arrested.6
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after boxing her legs. 3

For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened
Criminal Case No. 64,965-09
with AAA:

That on or about February 11, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after grappling her. 4
These two (2) cases were jointly tried before the RTC, and Amarela and Racho's appeals, although
separate, were consolidated in the CA on 13 November 2015.5
The RTC summarized the factual milieu of this case:
Prosecution presented [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of [XXX], Calinan, Davao City. On
February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with her
aunt at Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The contest was being held at a basketball court
Defense presented [Amarela] who confirmed the fact that on February 10, 2009, he attended the fiesta
celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. He said he met private complainant,
[AAA], at the cooperative building at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [AAA] asked him if he knew a
person by the name of Eric Dumandan who was allegedly her boyfriend. After a while, Eric Dumandan
passed by and so he told him that [AAA] was looking for him. Then he left.
Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt dizzy and fell
down from the bench. So Sanchez brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in Tawan-tawan.
He did not know what happened next because he slept and woke up at six o'clock in the morning. 7
On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her:
Defense also presented [Racho], a resident of Sitio Maligatong, Barangay Tawan-tawan, Baguio District,
Calinan, Davao City. He testified that he was at the house of his mother on February 10, 2009. At around
10:00 o'clock in the evening, [AAA] arrived with Godo Dumandan. [AAA] was asking for help while crying
because she was allegedly raped by three persons in the pineapple plantation.
His mother advised her to just take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house. But [AAA]
wanted to go home. Since he was the only one who was not drunk, Racho was instructed by [his] mother
to accompany [AAA] in going to her aunt's house.
When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's house because she knows
the latter would just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura. Since
Ventura was far, Racho did not go with her and instead went back home.
When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that because his
hand is impaired while showing a long scar on his left arm. This was a result allegedly of a hacking incident
on September 21, 2008. He offered a Medical Certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Lugi Andrew Sabal of the
Davao Medical Center which indicates that Racho was confined in the said hospital from September 21,
2008 up to October 1, 2008 after an operation on his left forearm. He said that his left arm was placed in
a plaster cast but that he removed the cast after three (3) months. He said that even after he removed
the cast, his arm was still painful and he could not move it around.
Racho said he was surprised when policemen came to his house on February 11, 2009 and invited him
to the police station because there was a complaint for rape against him.
Anita Racho testified that she was at home in the evening of February 10, 2009 together with her husband
and sons Bobby and [Racho]. Godo Dumandan arrived together with [AAA] who was allegedly raped by
three (3) men. [AAA] appeared madly and wet so she advised her to take a bath and not to go home
anymore since it was late. [AAA] insisted on going home, so she asked her son [Racho] to accompany
her. [Racho] at first refused pointing to his elder brother Bobby to accompany her. He eventually brought
[AAA] home. He came back at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and then he went to sleep.
The following day, she was surprised when [Racho] was arrested allegedly for raping [AAA]. [Racho]
denied raping [AAA].8
Ruling of the Trial Court
In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to
be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as
these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and Racho were
convicted as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 64964-09 finding [Amarela]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 64965-09, judgment is hereby rendered finding [Racho] GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages. 9
The Assailed CA Decision
Before the CA, Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only material
testimony on record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances casting doubt
on AAA' s claim that she was raped because her testimony does not conform to common knowledge and
to ordinary human experience.
In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the trial
court's factual findings. It held:
[AAA] has testified in a straightforward manner during her direct examination and remained steadfast in
her cross-examination that Amarela sexually abused her on February 10, 2009, and [Racho] abused her
five hours later. The first rape incident took place in the daycare center. She was pulled by Amarela while
she was on her way to the comfort room located at the back of the x x x cooperative building. Private
complainant, full of mud and wet, with dress tom, took refuge at the house of her boyfriend and sought
for help. Her boyfriend's father took her to the house of the in-laws of her cousin. [AAA], who was still wet
and muddy, begged the mother-in-law of her cousin that she be taken to the house of her aunt. While the
in-laws of her cousin helped her by having escorted her to her aunt's house, it turned out however, that
[Racho] her escort had another plan in mind. [Racho] sexually abused [AAA], who had no more strength
to fight him.
The records render no reason to reverse the factual findings of the court a quo. Both of the appellants'
denials miserably fail in contrast to [AAA's] positive identification of the accused-appellants as the person
who sexually abused her. There is no doubt in our mind that both appellants had carnal knowledge of
[AAA]. Her credibility is cemented by her lack of motive to testify against the two appellants, Amarela and
[Ra.cho]. There is no evidence to suggest that she could have been actuated by such motive. The People
has ably demonstrated the existence of the elements of Rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which states:
xxxx
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility of
witnesses, the assessment made by the trial court should be respected and given preponderant weight.
[AAA's] ordeal is so traumatic that she would rather forget the whole incident. But once a rape victim has
decided to seek justice, that means she is willing to recall the dastardly detail of the animalistic act
committed on her person.
[Racho] would have us believe that the charge against him was merely fabricated because, according to
him, being raped by two different assailants, on two different occasions and only hours apart, is contrary
to the normal course of things.
We are not convinced.
The Supreme Court has once said that rape in itself is prompted by the abnormal need of a man to
overpower and control a woman by way of sexual abuse. There is no typical mode, norm, or circumstance
in committing rape or sexual abuse for the evil in man has no conscience. In fact, in a catena of cases,
the Supreme Court had ruled that rape is no respecter of time or place. Thus, we cannot agree with
[Racho]'s argument that just because [AAA] had been raped five hours earlier, the possibility that she
might get raped again is nil.
Undeterred, appellants posit that [AAA's] testimony is not substantially corroborated by medical findings
as the medical certificate does not show any physical injuries resulting from the alleged use of force by
the appellants.
We do not agree.
The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not militate
against the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth, honesty, and
candor. It must be stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on the victim depends
on the degree of force employed by the accused to consummate the purpose which he had in mind to
have carnal knowledge with the offended woman. Thus, the force employed in rape need not be so great
nor of such a character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force used by the accused is sufficient
to enable him to consummate his purpose.
Appellant Amarela also argues that [AAA] could not have identified her assailant because it was very dark
at the place where [AAA] was allegedly pulled by her assailant and the place where she was allegedly
raped.
[AAA], in her re-direct examination, testified that she knew it was Amarela who raped her because she
saw Amarela's fact while Amarela brought her from the cooperative building to the daycare center.
Time and time again, the High Court has repeatedly ruled that positive identification prevails over denial,
a negative defense that is inherently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt [AAA's] unwavering
assertions positively establishing the identities of the two accused-appellants. We find the guilt of each of
the accused-appellants to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto. 10
OUR RULING
More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases
are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we
have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has
been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 11 However,
this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage,
but creates a travesty of justice.
The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People v.
Tana, 12 the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person
named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:
It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused
unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We
cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it
did actually take place.13
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would have
been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we
simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We,
should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today;
she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person,
willing to fight for her rights.
In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 14 Thus, in order for us to
affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by
the victim.
In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to the
credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely on the
observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly, examination. 15 It has since
become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect
by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which
testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.16 Although we put a premium on the factual
findings of the trial court, especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court,17 this rule is not
absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended, and misinterpreted.
We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to wit:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.18
After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt lingers
as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances, particularly,
would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her
affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified
Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony
lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical
findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.
First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the beauty
contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:
Q: Now, you said that you watched the beauty contest at around 7:00 in the evening on Feb. 10, 2009.
After that, Ms. Witness, while watching, what did you do?
A: I was on my way to the CR.
Q: And where is the CR located?
A: Near the coop.
Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?
A: Cooperative.
Q: Can you recall the exact name?
A: Maligatong Cooperative.
Q: And, where is this Maligatong Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where the
beauty contest was held?
A: It's near.
xxxx
Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, what separates these two
buildings?
A: Durian trees and cacao.
Q: You said that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative to relieve
yourself. And, were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative?
A: Nomore.
Q: Why not?
A: [Amarela] was waiting for me.
Q: Exactly, can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for you?
A: At the back of the cooperative.
Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened?
A: He pulled me.
Q: Going to what place?
A: Going towards the day care center.19
Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away from the beauty contest
stage to the day care center:
6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB] together with her siblings and grand children went
back to Maligatong Cooperative Building to watch a beauty contest. My companions stayed at the
multicab at the parking area of said building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went closer to the stage. While
at there, the person of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly appeared and introduced himself to me. I resisted to
get his hand on my hands because he is holding it tightly and forcibly brought me to the back portion of
the building. I asked for help but nobody heard me maybe because of the high volume of the sound
system.
7. While at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told
him, "Ran (Eric's palayaw) naa si gemma diri!" and Eric responded, "ahh! tinga-a."
8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok beside the daycare center of Sitio
Maligatong, Brgy. Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from the [cooperative]
building. I shouted for help but still nobody heard me.20
It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually
incomplete and inadequate.21 We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and do
not impair the credibility of the rape victim.22 In this case, however, the version in AAA's affidavit-complaint
is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away
from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she
was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction because it goes into whether it
was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.
If we were to take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of the
stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her will. Thus,
AAA's version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away from the crowd
watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA was being taken away
against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed by Amarela, why
does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court testimony? To our mind, AAA's
testimony could have been concocted to just make her story believable rather than sticking to her original
story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her away from the stage. We cannot say that this
inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth
- that she was abducted against her will before she was raped.
Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts AAA's
credibility in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on the lone
testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with
human experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the testimony of a victim
who is not a minor and is mentally capable.
Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole incident
allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not illuminated and that
she did not see Amarela's face:
Direct Examination
Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while ago as the daycare
center?
A: Coconut trees, durian trees, and cacao.
Q: ·what else?
A: Several trees.
Q: How about grass?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place?
A: It was dark.
Q: Why is it that it was dark?
A: Because there was no lighting.23
Cross-Examination
Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at that time, correct?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And when you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong Cooperative
building, it was also dark on your way?
A: Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very dark? xxxx
A: Yes, ma'am. Q: Now, after that, what happened, Ms. Witness?
Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela], was not clear to you because it was very dark, correct? A: He pushed me under.
A: Yes, ma' am.24 Q: What happened after that?
Re-Direct Examination A: He [punched] me in my abdomen.
Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing you could not see his face, would you Q: What else did he do to you?
confirm that? A: I felt weak.
A: Yes, sir. Q: After that what happened?
Q: What about his body? A: He undressed me.
A: No, sir. Q: While he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness?
Q: Why, Ms. Witness? A: I was just lying down.
A: It was dark. xxxx
xxxx Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances?
Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify that A: He boxed my upper left thigh.
[Amarela] was the one who raped you? Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh?
A: I know him when he brought me from the Coop. A: I felt numbness.
Q: From the Coop. to the day care center that was the time that you identified him? xxxx
A: Yes, sir.25 Q: Now, you said that he undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself. What,
then, [did he] do to you?
From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting conditions A: He placed himself on top of me.
in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela while she was Q: What did he do after that?
being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as to how she was able to A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ.27
do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was dark and covered by trees.
Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw reservations from AAA's testimony. From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and place
himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for two human
Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The beings to move freely under a stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist sexual advances.
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift stage without any sign
Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA could have easily called for
for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of help or simply run away.
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.26
Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-legal
Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then raped officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no pertinent
seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. She said: physical findings/or physical injuries:28

Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he bring you? FINDINGS
A: Under.
GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS
Q: Under what?
A: Under the makeshift stage. Height 5 feet & 4 inches Weight 44 Kg
Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center?
A: Yes. General Survey Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory distress
Q: Was it finished makeshift stage or not? Conscious, coherent, respond well to
A: Not yet finished. Mental Status questions when asked and maintained eye to
Q: You said that he brought you under that makeshift stage? eye contact
A: Yes.
Q: Please tell us how did you fit in that makeshift stage? Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Injuries Normal Findings
A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high. ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
Q: Since you said he pulled you towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness?
A: I was scared. External Genitalia Normal findings
Q: And what did you do?
A: I did not know what to do then. Urethra and Periurethral Area Normal findings
 (+) Hyperemic/Erythematous perihymenal From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual
Perihymenal Area and Fossa Narvicularis from non-consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of
area.
lacerations and whether they are located in different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was
(+) Complete laceration at 9 o’clock and 3 consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the vaginal orifice, then it
Hymen o’clock positions with minimal bloody secretion would be a good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand, if the lacerations are found in
on the lacerated area. a specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest consensual intercourse.
Perineum Normal findings
In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the hymen.
Discharge None Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability that AAA
Internal and Speculum exam Not done voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-when she said she was
punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had consensual intercourse.
Anal Examination Good Sphincteric tone
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the
female.37 It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged
Pending laboratory results (Spermatocyte and shown to be without her consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape,
Forensic Evidence and Laboratory Results
determination gram staining). provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent.39 The
IMPRESSONS female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however
reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being
Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.29 rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion. 40

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a medico-legal
report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature. 30 In
convicting rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that a medico-legal report
is by no means controlling.31 Thus, since it is merely corroborative in character, a medico-legal report
could even be dispensed with.32
Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in mind
that the burden of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits. Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It is fundamental
that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.41

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only infer
possibilities and not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual incident, cannot
testify on what exactly happened as his testimony would not be based on personal knowledge or derived
from his own perception. Consequently, a medico-legal's testimony cannot establish a certain fact as it
can only suggest what most likely happened.
In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged rape
victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical examination on
AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or penetrating trauma.
In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva, 33 the most common sites for lacerations were determined,
"in rape victims with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as followed at dorsal
recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration at 6 o'clock position in 42.02% of cases; (2) two lacerations
at 5 and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36%
of cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in 25% of cases."
These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury resulting from
sexual abuse.34
As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases.1âwphi1 This means
that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on the testimony
of the private complainant in rape cases, we require that her testimony be entirely credible, trustworthy,
and realistic. For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially when it concerns one of the
elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test of credibility. Since we
doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider her testimony against
Racho under the same light.
In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house, but instead
forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho supposedly boxed AAA's
abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina.
Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself.42
We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan's house
to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told Neneng Racho what
happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted that she be brought to her
aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond human experience. If AAA had already told other people what
happened, there was no reason for her not to report the incident to the proper authorities.

Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho's
However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse, the
version that they parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho did
authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost the
not even want to bring AAA to her aunt's house nearby. 43 If he had the intention to have sex with AAA,
same.35 Their findings suggest that the injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual
Racho would not have declined her mother's instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by herself
intercourse.36
because he did not want to bring AAA to her house since this was in another town from her aunt's
house.44 His reason for leaving AAA to go home alone is supported by the fact that he was able to
immediately come home right after he left with AAA. Unlike AAA's testimony, the version offered by Racho
is corroborated by the testimony of his mother.

Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we have
dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not,
uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but he said
he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho's mother corroborated this part of the
story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily raised these
defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise covered up this
story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed Racho raped AAA that
night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he thought he did not have to raise, given that
he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself to go home. To our mind, these are badges of truth
which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.

In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by
proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.45 Absolute guarantee of guilt
is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral
certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the
offender.46 Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion,
to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. 47

The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether AAA's
ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its part to
convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the government
to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the best of their
ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what happened based
on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution's duty to properly evaluate the evidence
if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering
doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of
evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a
matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11 of Davao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February 2016
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered unless they
are being held for other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I fully agree with the ponencia in affirming the finding of guilt of the accused-petitioner Richard Ricalde
(Ricalde) for rape through sexual assault. However, I also wish to express my disagreement over the
ponencia's holding regarding the penalty to be imposed on him, as well as its ruling on which law governs
the conviction of the petitioner.
To recall, the accused was charged with an Information which reads:
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus of XXX who was
then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW1
An examination of the evidence presented by both prosecution and accused would show that, indeed, the
trial court correctly convicted the petitioner of the offense charged. The ponencia's application of Article
III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), 2 however, I believe, is misplaced. In the first
place, such a charge is not embodied in the Information filed against the accused, and his conviction for
such an offense would result in a violation of his right to due process and his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him. The Information plainly alleges rape through sexual
assault, which is a violation of Article 226-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Rightfully then, the petitioner
can be convicted of rape, the following elements of which having been stated in the Information and
proven during trial:
(1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means: (a) By inserting
his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or
xxxx
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation;
(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.3· ·
A violation of R.A. No. 7610, on the other hand, is not specifically stated in the Information. The Court
had, in previous cases, stated the following elements of child abuse under Sec. S(b) ofR.A. No. 7610:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.4
While the Information stated that the petitioner "[inserted] his penis in the anus of XXX" and that the victim
"was then 10 years of age," which satisfies the first and third elements of child abuse under Sec. S(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, nowhere is it stated that the said act was performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse-the second element of the offense.
Therefore, even assuming that such element was proven during trial, the accused can nevertheless claim
constitutional protection, and his conviction will not stand in light of the constitutionally protected rights of
the accused to due process, 5 as well as his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. 6 This Court had long held that each and every element of the offense must be alleged in the
Information. As the Court reasoned in Noe S. Andaya v. People:
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are
substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the
information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or
is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance
between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case
if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights. 7
I am fully aware that, in the past, the Court had upheld the convictions of those charged with similarly-
worded Informations under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. In 2005, in the case of Olivarez v. Court of
Appeals,8 this Court said that "a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges
in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult."
I believe, however, that the said interpretation is incorrect, and the Court must re-examine the same. What
I find most enlightening regarding the controversy is the dissenting opinion offered by our colleague,
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in Olivarez, where he makes sense of the phrase "other sexual abuse"
mentioned in Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. He discussed:
The majority opinion correctly enumerates the essential elements of the crimes of acts of lasciviousness
under Section 5 of RA 7610. The majority opinion states:
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
resolved is whether or not the petitioner is guilty of rape. Thus, the petitioner was never given the
opportunity to defend himself against a charge of violation of R.A. No. 7 610, because, in the first place,
it was never put in issue. The Court cannot now suddenly determine that the proper offense is R.A. No.
7610 and not the Revised Penal Code, without giving the petitioner the chance to be heard and defend
himself, especially considering that R.A. No. 7610 is not only a separate and distinct offense from rape
under the Revised Penal Code, but also that the former imposes a stiffer penalty than the latter.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote that the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 8,
2013 be affirmed in toto, finding the petitioner guilty of rape punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The majority opinion correctly distinguishes the first element from the second element.1âwphi1 The first
element refers to acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child. The second element
refers to the special circumstance that the "child (is) exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse." This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs acts of lasciviousness on
the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child are separate from the
child's exploitation in prostitution or subjection to "other sexual abuse. "

Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither
exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse. " In contrast, under Section 5 of RA 7610,
the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to "other sexual abuse. "

Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a child
already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse. " Clearly, the acts of
lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance -that the
child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse. "

The phrase "other sexual abuse" refers to any sexual abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness
complained of and other than exploitation in prostitution. Such "other sexual abuse" could fall under acts
encompassing "[O]bscene publications and indecent shows" mentioned in Section 3(d)(3) of RA 7610. 9

I fully subscribe to this reasoning and logic employed by Justice Carpio in Olivarez. While now, as then,
his opinion remains to be in the minority, as the Court continues to uphold the convictions under R.A. No.
7610 whenever the victim is underage or below 18 years of age, I believe it is high time for the Court to
re-examine this doctrine, and, perhaps, give way to a more level-headed interpretation of the law, as
offered by Justice Carpio in Olivarez.

Given this doubtful interpretation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the Court must uphold the interpretation
which is more beneficial to the accused. Thus, instead of imposing the higher penalty imposable under
R.A. No. 7610, he must instead be made to suffer the penalty imposable under Art. 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code.

A final note I wish to make is the fact that the ponencia did not discuss whether the issue of the applicability
of R.A. No. 7610 was ever put in issue in the lower court before or during trial. It seems to me that it is
only now, and only the Court, on its own initiative, deemed that R.A. No. 7610 is applicable to the case at
bar. It appears to me that in the lower court, as well as in the Court of Appeals, the only main issue
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193854 September 24, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 4, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated October 8, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194, Parañaque City, finding appellant Dina Dulay guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. No. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation.
The records bear the following factual antecedents:
Private complainant AAA3 was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister introduced
the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced AAA to accompany her at
a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look
for appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Niño at Don Galo. However,
appellant's boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to
ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend
proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the
Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was
waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger
girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked
for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but
appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had
happened or else they would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter
informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio.
Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station.
The Parañaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the assistance of the
Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the latter assigned the case to Dr.
Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a social worker
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview
and physical examination on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report4 stating that there was
no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her
testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital examination
and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion of the body of AAA. 5
Thus, an Information was filed, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one alias
"Speed," whose true name and identity and present whereabouts is still unknown, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered
for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent, which act is
prejudicial to the normal growth and development of the said child.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.7 Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Merle Tan.
On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of appellant which can be summarized as
follows:
Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by her cousin
Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of appellant was AAA's
neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005, appellant averred that she was at
La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for about
thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the said house,
appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She also saw AAA who was engaged in a
conversation with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and
the latter said that it was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response
of AAA, appellant left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.
On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as co-
principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the offended party the amount of ₱ 50,000.00
by way of damages.
The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.8
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to the CA. The latter, on
August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a modification on the award
of damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the
offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱ 50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱ 50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱ 25,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
In her Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:
I by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal by indispensable cooperation
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF RAPE AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above assignment of errors by
stating the following arguments:
I.
CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT THAN THE POSITIVE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT. 11
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision on
the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. 12
The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the crime of Rape under
Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.
She was eventually convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape as a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as provided under Article
266-B of the RPC.
In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation, the CA,
ratiocinated:
To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not
necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of
each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without which the commission of the crime
would not have been accomplished. x x x
xxxx
The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited example. It
will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which is
different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. Accused-appellant cooperated in
the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by acts without which the crime would not
have been consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof, convinced the victim
to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the
victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then after receiving
some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that
"Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and intimidation, as he did. 13
However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court, as sustained
in the crime of rape.
Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by
inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.15 Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts
committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by
the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have
accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been
raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still
end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape.
It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and
offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed." Thus:
PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina Dulay?
WITNESS AAA: She invited me to go with her boyfriend, Sir.
xxxx
Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the fish port or bulungan, AAA?
A: Pumunta kami sa kubuhan, Sir.
Q: Where is this kubuhan located in relation to the fish port?
A: At the back portion, Sir.
Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your companion in going to that kubuhan?
A: Dina Dulay and her boyfriend, Sir.
Q: Do you know the name of the boyfriend of Dina Dulay?
A: No, Sir.
xxxx
Q: All right. After reaching the kubuhan, what happened next?
A: Pina-rape po ako, Sir.
Q: What made you say AAA that accused here Dina Dulay had you raped at the kubuhan?
A: Kasi po binayaran siya nung lalaki, Sir.
Q: Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that person who was you said raped you?
A: No, Sir. I just saw them.
Q: And what did you see that was paid to Dina?
A: Pera, Sir.
Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you hear any conversation between this Dina
Dulay and that man who gave money to her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court AAA, what was that conversation you heard between this Dina Dulay
and the person who gave money to her?
A: He said to look for a younger girl, Sir. 16
xxxx
PROS. R. GARCIA:
Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina Dulay, what happened to you and the
man?
A: He raped me, Sir.
Q: Where were you raped?
A: At the Kubuhan, Sir. Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were raped by that person?
A: He tied me up, Sir.
Q: How were you tied up as you said?
A: He tied up both my hands, Sir.
Q: Then after tying your hands what happened next?
A: He raped me and he pointed a knife at me, Sir.
Q: When you said you were raped, are you referring to the insertion of his penis into your sex organ?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man was inserted into your organ?
A: It was painful, Sir.
Q: And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped by this person?
A: I cannot talk. He put clothes in my mouth, Sir.
Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May isang oras ba kayo doon?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, tell us how AAA many times did this person insert his penis into your organ?
A: Only one (1) AAA, Sir.17
It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed raped by
considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.18 However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality
of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general
conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence. 19 In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality
that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not
hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime that
justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused,
although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These realities compel this Court to approach with great caution
and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends.20
In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements
or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.21
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent
to engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.22
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates
sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused
primarily for profit.23
As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant facilitated or induced
child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. 24 Thus, the act of
apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for
sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of
the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 25 A child exploited in prostitution
may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However,
we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of their age or mental disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent 26 to any lascivious act
or sexual intercourse.
It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape under Article
266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, and then
went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its body. The Information partly reads:
x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year
old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA
against her will and without her consent x x x 27

Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as a procurer
of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that the character of the crime
is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. 28 The sufficiency of an information is not negated
by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but
by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises
the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 29 1âwphi1

To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant merely interposes the
defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the weakest form of defense and it can never
overcome an affirmative testimony, particularly when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 30

Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610, the penalty prescribed
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Therefore, in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. 31 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a
special law, appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 32 Since the penalty
provided in R.A. 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the
first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.33 Thus, appellant is entitled to a maximum
term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be
taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months).34

As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A. 7610 to afford children
special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that every person
who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same.35 Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section 5 (a), Article
III of R.A. 7610. This is also in compliance with Article 100 of the RPC which states that every person
criminally liable is civilly liable. Hence, the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto as awarded in
cases of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 761036 shall also be the same in cases of violation of
Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. However, the
Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610, amended, for which she is sentenced to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother,
SUPREME COURT both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the
Manila procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor,
threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
FIRST DIVISION hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; 4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and
challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013 on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the
incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner, Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson
vs. suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10
(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be
intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a
human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal
Code.
The Case
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of
child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he
only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told
him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He
denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but
only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned
Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted
that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the
petitioner as a loving and protective father. 8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit:9

Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking
said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting
his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo
kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here),
which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the said child as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610,
and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances
in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the lack of credibility of
the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining brothers to react to the incident,
which was unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George
Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as
the maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he was
guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s
affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal
taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly
brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals: 12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice
would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the province of
a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court
of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his
petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course to the
petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a
reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors
of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the
crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies
reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt for the crime
charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and
assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be
defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing
of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the petitioner received
a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well
beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing the
petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on their
merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence imposed on him not being
commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the
other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed,
the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give
premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly
enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every litigant.
Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond realization here unless the Rules of Court be given
liberal construction and application as the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to
substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal
ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our consideration.
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without due
process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case. Hence,
we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal
procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors
in the appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article
VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:
 (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases
resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages is
consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a)
finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of
₱5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck SO ORDERED.
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his
acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal
safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With
the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor
of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. 18

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, 19 the petitioner
was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code,21 because the
petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.22 Passion or
obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. 23 It is relevant
to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent.
With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor
daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in
the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016
VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated August 12, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated January 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 4 promulgated on May 31, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 210,
finding Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron (Jabalde) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act (R.A) No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation, Discrimination Act."
The Antecedent Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
Jabalde pleaded "not guilty" in a criminal information dated October 14, 2002, for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, before the RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, 5 which reads:
That on December 13, 2000 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, in Barangay Cawitan,
Santa Catalina, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, [Jabalde], with
cruelty and with intent to abuse, maltreat and injure one LIN J. BITOON, 8 years of age, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously slap and strike said Lin J. Bitoon, hitting said Lin J.
Bitoon on the latter's nape; and immediately thereafter[,] [c]hoke the said offended party, causing
the latter to sustain the following injuries: Abrasions: Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the base of
the right mandibular area; One (1), linear 1 inch at the right lateral neck; Two (2), linear 1 cm in
length at the anterior neck; and Four (4), minute circular at the left lateral neck, which acts of sa[i]d
accused caused the said offended part[y] not only physical but also emotional harm prejudicial to
his development.
CONTRARY to the aforesaid.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were: Lin J. Bito-on (Lin), the minor victim; Dr. Rosita Muñoz
(Dr. Muñoz), the physician who examined Lin; Ray Ann Samson (Ray Ann), the classmate of Lin who
witnessed the incident; and Aileen Bito-on (Aileen), the mother of Lin.7chanrobleslaw
Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School. At around 9:00
a.m. of December 13, 2000, he was playing "langit lupa" during recess with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova and
another classmate. During the course of their game, he touched the shoulder of Nova, Jabalde's daughter,
causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then helped Nova to stand while one of his
classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building, which was
near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck and choked
him. Lin was able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck. He immediately ran
towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. He told his mother Aileen about the incident.
Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for treatment and a medical certificate was then
issued to him.8chanrobleslaw
Dr. Muñoz testified that she was the physician who issued the medical certificate to Lin on December 13,
2000 for the physical examination conducted upon the latter. Dr. Muñoz stated that Lin sustained
abrasions: two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the base of the right mandibular area; one (1) linear
abrasion 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck; two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the back of
the neck; and four (4) minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck. According to her, the abrasions
could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted and that these linear abrasions were signs
of fingernail marks. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color signifying that they were still fresh.
She did not notice other injuries on the body of Lin except those on his neck.9chanrobleslaw
Ray Ann, the classmate and playmate of Lin, testified that she knows Jabalde because she was a teacher
at Cawitan Elementary School. At about 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she was playing "langit lupa"
with Lin, Nova, Ryan and Rhea. Nova, who was standing on top of an unstable stone fell on the ground
and thereafter hit her head on the stone. Then, somebody called Jabalde, Nova's mother. When Jabalde
came to see her daughter, she struck Lin on his neck then squeezed it. Lin cried and was able to free
himself and ran towards their house. Jabalde then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself
because if not I should have killed you."10 Ray Ann saw Lin again after their class dismissal at 11:00 a.m.
when she went to their house. Lin did not return to school again because he was afraid of Jabalde. During
cross examination, Ray Ann testified that Lin did not run into the dilapidated building after the incident
and that she was near them when Jabalde struck Lin. 11chanrobleslaw
Aileen testified that Lin is her son who was born on September 4, 1993, and at the time of the incident,
he was still 7 years old. That at about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, Lin came home crying and
trembling. Lin told her that he was strangled by Jabalde, who happens to be Aileen's aunt and Lin's
grandmother. Lin was running back and forth crying but Aileen noticed his neck with scratches. Thereafter,
she went to see his teacher-in-charge whom she asked for details of the incident. While in the school
campus, she did not see Jabalde. She also testified that they went to Dr. Muñoz for the examination of
her son's injuries. Afterwards, they went home. Her son no longer returned to the school because of fear
but they let him pass on that school year. During cross-examination, she testified that Jabalde's house is
just adjacent to their house in Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. Aileen also filed two cases against her for stealing
and physical injuries in the year 2002 in Sta. Catalina. After she filed two cases, she then filed the instant
complaint in the Provincial Prosecution's Office in Dumaguete City. She said it took her until 2002 to file
the present charges against Jabalde because she was still pregnant during the time of the incident and
that her husband was still assigned in Surigao. She admitted that when she was still a child, she already
feared Jabalde. She also initiated the filing of the present case because she heard that if she will not file
a case against Jabalde, the latter instead will file a case against them.12chanrobleslaw
The defense, on the other hand, presented Jabalde herself She testified that she is a school teacher at
Cawitan Elementary School for 18 years. Lin is her grandson and that his mother Aileen is her niece. She
remembered that it was about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she was teaching Mathematics when
some children went to her classroom and shouted "Mam Jabalde, Ma'm Jabalde, Nova's head was
punctured (nabuslot)".13 Thinking that her daughter was dead, her vision got blurred and she fainted.
When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about 5 to 10 minutes.
The children then came again and shouted that her daughter's head got punctured. She ran towards her
daughter's classroom while at the same time, looking for a gathering of people in the hope of finding her
daughter. But, before reaching the place of the incident, she saw her grandson Lin crying. She asked him
the whereabouts of Nova but he just kept on jumping and so she held him still. Lin said, "Lola[,] forgive
me, forgive me"14 and immediately ran. Jabalde proceeded to her daughter's room and saw the latter
seated on the desk. Thereafter, she brought Nova to her own classroom and applied first aid. Then she
resumed teaching. She believed that there was a motive in filing the instant complaint which has
something to do with a family grudge because of inheritance.15chanrobleslaw
Another defense witness Rhealuz Pedrona, playmate of Nova and Lin, testified that Nova got injured while
they were playing "langit lupa" during their recess on December 13, 2000. She went to Jabalde to inform
her that Nova's head was punctured. Jabalde immediately ran to the place of incident. She, however, did
not see Jabalde slap or choke Lin.16chanrobleslaw
In its Judgment17 promulgated on May 31, 2006, the RTC found Jabalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of [Jabalde] beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of paragraph (a), Section 10, Article VI of R.A. 7610, as amended, [Jabalde] is Convicted. Appreciating
in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obluscation, and applying the provisions of the
indeterminate sentence law, [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum
The bond posted for her temporary liberty is hereby ordered release.
SO ORDERED.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Naturally dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Jabalde appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On August 12, 2010, the CA dismissed Jabalde's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
modification.19 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2006 Decision, of the [RTC], Branch 63, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.20
Jabalde filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on January 4, 2011.21
The Issues
1. Whether or not acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or
R.A. No. 7610.
2. Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in appreciating the
acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is punishable under
the RPC particularly Article 266(1)22 which defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be punished
under the RPC and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.23chanrobleslaw
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out in its Comment 24 filed on May 24, 2011 that since
the issue was just raised for the first time on appeal by Jabalde, this is already barred by estoppel citing
the cases of People v. Francisco25cralawred and People v. Lazaro, Jr.26chanrobleslaw
The cases cited by the OSG do not apply in this case. In Francisco, the appellant assailed the order of
the trial court for failing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea of guilt for the records show neither proof
nor a transcript of the proceedings that the appellant indeed voluntarily made a guilty plea and that he
fully understood its import. The appellant also maintained that he was not given the opportunity to present
evidence and that the case was submitted for decision immediately after the prosecution filed its offer of
evidence. In Lazaro, the appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In both cases, this Court held that issues raised for the first time on appeal are
barred by estoppel.
However, the reliance on the foregoing cases is misplaced due to different factual antecedents. Here,
Jabalde postulates that the acts complained of do not fall within the definition of R.A. No. 7610 and
therefore, she should not be convicted on the basis of the said law, to wit:
[Jabalde] postulates that other acts of child abuse falling under Section 10 (a), Art. II, R.A. 7610 is limited
to acts not punishable under the [RPC]. As the law is being defined in this section: "Any person who shall
commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the [RPC], as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its maximum period[."]
Needless to say, acts which are covered under the [RPC] will be dealt with under the provisions of the
[RPC] and definitely, out of the context of R.A. 7610, particularly Section 10 (a). In the case of [Jabalde],
the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is punishable under the [RPC] particularly Article
266 (1) which defines slight physical injuries. The act of [Jabalde] in slapping, striking and choking [Lin],
causing abrasions on the different parts of his neck is absolutely covered within the realm of Article 266
(1). When the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period, shall be punished with
arresto menor.27 (Citations omitted)
Here, Jabalde questions the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case and
is correct in claiming that the instant petition raises pure question of law28 and not question of fact29 as
being argued by the OSG. In Cucueco v. CA,30 the Court discussed the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. There is a "question
of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On
the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
complicated. In a case involving a "question of law," the resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.
x x x The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
"The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or the alleged falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them."32chanrobleslaw
In the case on hand, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood of the alleged facts nor the
sufficiency of the evidence, but the appreciation of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the
case. Jabalde is simply correct in raising the question of law in the instant petition.
Now, on the substantive issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the case at bar, the Court agrees
with the contention of Jabalde in her Reply to OSG's Comment33 that the acts complained of do not fall
within the definition of the said law, to wit:
The [OSG] in his comment is correct in saying that the issues that could be raised in a petition for review
are purely questions of law. Guided by this principle, [Jabalde] comes to this Court to raise a question of
law. [Jabalde] has been arguing when she availed of his right to appeal that the acts of the [OSG] does
not fall within the definition of R.A. 7610 and should not be convicted on the basis of the said law. This is
not a new matter that [Jabalde] raised.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10(a), Article VI,
of R.A. No. 7610, which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis ours)
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as follows:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,35 the Court expounded the definition of "child abuse" being
referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case, therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by
the lower courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Court held that only when
the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC, to wit:
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his
acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to
debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson
to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed
by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at
the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was
so essential in the crime of child abuse.36 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his nape, and immediately
thereafter, choking the said offended party causing the latter to sustain injuries.37 However, the records
of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Lin as a human being.
Black's Law Dictionary defined debasement as "the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of
something."38 Degradation, on the other hand, is "a lessening of a person's or thing's character or
quality."39 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defined demean as "to lower in status, condition,
reputation, or character."40chanrobleslaw
The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being informed that
her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got
blurred and she fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board
for about five to ten minutes.41 Moreover, the testimony of the examining physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied the
accusation that Jabalde, with cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin, to wit:C
[T]he abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted. She also testified that the
linear abrasions were signs of fingernail marks. She did not notice other injuries on the body of the victim
except those on his neck. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color, signifying that they were still
fresh.42 (Emphasis ours)
It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself testified that
the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse, maltreat
and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows.
As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the most
excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just
a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as
manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on
inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the prescribed
degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
 shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I should have killed you,"50 deserve more
What crime, then, did Jabalde commit? credit than Jabalde's own statement that she merely held Lin still because the latter kept on jumping.51 The
laying of the hands and the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin established the fact that Jabalde,
Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC, to wit: indeed, intended to cause or inflict physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
xxxx
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical
injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical
assistance.
xxxx
As found out by Dr. Muñoz, Lin only sustained abrasions namely: two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length
at the base of the right mandibular area; one linear abrasion of 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck;
two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the back of the neck; and four minute circular abrasions at the
left lateral neck.43 When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended parly for labor or of the
required medical attendance; or when there is no proof as to the period of the offended party's incapacity
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.44chanrobleslaw
Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde lacked the intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being as required under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, her acts of laying hands against Lin showed the essential element of intent
which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.
The case of Villareal v. People45 is instructing. In that case, the Court discussed that the RPC belongs to
the classical school of thought. The criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the
actor. The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent -
is the predominant consideration. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of "dolo" or "malice".46chanrobleslaw
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one (1) day to thirty (30) days
of imprisonment.52 In imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6). of the RPC,53 because Jabalde lost his reason
and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.54 There is passional obfuscation when
the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. 55 For passion and obfuscation
to be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce
passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a
reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the
accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit
of lawlessness or revenge.56 With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her daughter,
Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten [10] days) when only mitigating
circumstance is present in the case.57 Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, 58 Jabalde shall suffer a penalty of one
(1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 12, 2010 and Resolution dated January 4, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424 are SET ASIDE; and a new judgment is ENTERED (a) finding
petitioner Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 2, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of
freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying
an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent
in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act.47
In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the [RPC], the employment of
physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
Thus, in case of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements
of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a
man guilty unless his intentions are.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde slapped him on his neck
and choked him,49 and that of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck, squeezed it and then
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of
Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically maltreated for having
accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom.
Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal must
determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10
(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be
intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a
human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal
Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in its
comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom
when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep
on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to
apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p.
6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and
pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness.
Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told
his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales
reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who
advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay
Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined
by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997,
p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and
the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as follows: The Provincial
Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses
FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a public
school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the
DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales,
a seven year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him to the
ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on
different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article
VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated on
May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered
on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the
accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as the maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the petitioner
constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and notunder the
Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner’s constitutional right to
due process and her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not
violated when the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly recited in the information. 10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are mainly factual
and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by
the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming
evidence of the trial; and that the information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and
substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in her present
recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof law. The immediate
implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by
the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze
or weigh the evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in which the Court
may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate
courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate
courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k)
all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further
exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed bythe
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 12 Yet, none of the exceptions
applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by
MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity.
She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably
do towards the development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in
loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction
of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the
violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family
Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher
or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr.
Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo
who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours
from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr.
Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the
extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim
could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level
of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt
pain when she put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact
with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not
have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the
left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked. 14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor
by wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael
Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and
when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the
desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant
further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor." 15 On her part, the trial judge said
that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused
him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him
to another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only
maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had
also experienced the petitioner’s cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City
(Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel
Legayada.18 Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the
trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form
and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and
that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of law was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the petitioner in the context
of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus
complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should
no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and
substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information
through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence had been
adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The explanation
tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however, because even without proof of the
actual expenses, or testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and
allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted
on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his
parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain error that
demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People, 21 it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine
the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover
civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation ofthe accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest
the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a
matter of law and justice.1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly
entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name
unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for
only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of
administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be
invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been
reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and in
that respect the Court believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled
to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least
one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the
petitioner was aggravated her being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum
period pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a deterrent to other public
school teachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against the
infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of
the actual expenses for the victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the granting of a measure of compensation
in the formof temperate damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered
when some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being
no question aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat least
₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment. Lastly,
interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality
of this decision until full payment.

The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic
Act No. 7610, viz:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Atiicle 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public
schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty
provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee."
Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as
admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose
three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years,
eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four
months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence
should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision
correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum period,
whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years,
four months and one day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales
₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate
damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the children of XXX and
SUPREME COURT YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who derived
Baguio income from selling vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with YYY in
EN BANC Palapas, Ligao City.

April 18, 2017 On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the ducks of AAA's grandfather. He lived
with AAA's grandparents whose house was just a few meters away from YYY's house.
G.R. No. 214497
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house to buy kerosene since
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA,, Petitioner, there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's
vs. grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her siblings were afraid. He agreed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,, Respondent. and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when
she felt Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand inside
her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand.
DECISION
Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in his house. Quimvel
VELASCO, JR., J.: replied that he was just accompanying the children. After he left, YYY and his children went back to sleep.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 29,
2014 Decision1 and September 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
35509.3 The challenged rulings sustained the petitioner's conviction4 of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b ), Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610.5
The Information reads:6
AMENDED INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA
also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:
On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while XXX was lying down with her
children, she asked them what they were doing while she was away. BBB told her that Quimvel touched
her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she recounted that Quimvel laid down beside
her and touched her vagina.
Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay Tanod and thereafter to the police
station to report the incident. Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical examination.
As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him. He maintained that he brought the ducks
of AAA' s grandmother to the river at 7 o'clock in the morning, fetched it and brought it back at AAA's
grandmother's place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007. After that, he rested. He said that he
never went to AAA's house that evening. When YYY confronted and accused him of touching AAA, he
was totally surprised. Even if he denied committing the crime, he was still detained at the Barangay Hall.
He was then brought to the police station for interrogation. Eventually, he was allowed to go home. He
did not return to the house of AAA's grandmother to avoid any untoward incidents.
Ruling of the Trial Court

That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design,
through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, insert his hand
inside the panty of [AAA],7 a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against her will and consent, to Lending credence to AAA' s straightforward and categorical testimony, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
her damage and prejudice. Branch 11 in Ligao City, Albay, on January 23, 2013, rendered its Judgment9 finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads: 10
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
The Facts
1. Finding the accused, EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/ EDUARDO QUIMUEL Y
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the Decision of the CA, are as follows: 8 BRAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section
5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 and thereby sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal in its medium
period as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and NINETEEN (19) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period as maximum; and
2. ORDERING the accused, EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/ EDUARDO QUIMUEL Y
BRAGA, to pay the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and to pay a fine in the amount
of ₱30,000.00.
In the service of his sentence, accused EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/ EDUARDO
QUIMVEL Y BRAGA shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention pursuant to Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
Thereafter, petitioner lodged an appeal with the CA but to no avail. For on May 29, 2014, the CA rendered
its assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Judgment of the trial court. The dispositive portion
of the Decision provides: 11
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region,
Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD QUIMVEL y BRAGA is ORDERED
to pay the victim, AAA moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of ₱15,000.00 each
as well as ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity. All damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
Aggrieved, Quimvel elevated his case to this Court and raised the following issues for resolution:
I.
The CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court as the prosecution was not able to prove that he
is guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
II.
Assuming without admitting that he is guilty hereof, he may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the CA's Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness as penalized under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610.
The Information charged the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610
Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, he should
only be held liable for the crime as penalized under the RPC and not under RA 7610. According to him,
to be held liable under the latter law, it is necessary that the victim is involved in or subjected to prostitution
or other sexual abuse, and that the failure to allege such element constituted a violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him. 12
His argument fails to persuade.
i. The acts constituting the offense must
be alleged in the Information
It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must be alleged in
the Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and parcel of the rights accorded to an accused
enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Sections 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, in turn, pertinently provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.-A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. (emphasis added)
Jurisprudence has already set the standard on how the requirement is to be satisfied. Case law dictates
that the allegations in the Information must be in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know ' the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. The
facts and circumstances necessary to be included therein are determined by reference to the definition
and elements of the specific crimes. 14
The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be set out in the Information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are
substantial matters and the right of an accused to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in
the information cannot be waived. 15 As further explained in Andaya v. People: 16
No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted
of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein.
To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged
would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights. (emphasis added)
Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the Information as
constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an investigating
prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the
law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital
of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of law. 17 It then behooves this
Court to place the text of the Information under scrutiny.
ii. The elements of the offense penalized
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 were
sufficiently alleged in the Information
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the Information is deficient for failure to allege all the elements
necessary in committing Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 9160.
His theory is that the Information only charges him of the crime as punished under Art. 336 of the RPC,
which pertinently reads:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.-Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned on the preceding article, shall be
punished by prision correccional.
Conviction thereunder requires that the prosecution establish the following elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances: 18
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconsc10us;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
On the other hand, the prosecution endeavored to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
child abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, which provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x (emphasis added)
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the
requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC earlier enumerated must be
met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, which are as follows: 19
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
3. That child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 20 (emphasis supplied)
Hypothetically admitting the elements of Art. 336 of the RPC, as well as the first and third elements under
RA 7610 -that a lascivious act was committed against AAA who at that time was below twelve (12) years
old - petitioner nevertheless contends that the second additional element, requiring that the victim is a
child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, " is absent in this case.
The fault in petitioner's logic lies in his misapprehension of how the element that the victim is "exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" should be alleged in the Information.
Guilty of reiteration, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA
also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, insert
his hand inside the panty of [AAA], 21 a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 22 (emphasis added)
To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA
7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. 23
Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein
the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.24 Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution
but also other forms of sexual abuse against children. This is even made clearer by the deliberations of
the Senate, as cited in the landmark ruling of People v. Larin:25
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, 'who for money or profit.' I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to
cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in this
section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER
CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR
GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no
longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who is
being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the
other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual
purposes, only for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been used
for profit or...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the
President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the
amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE
OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF
ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, 'Child Prostitution,' shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Clear from the records of the deliberation is that the original wording of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 has been
expanded so as to cover abuses that are not characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case
at bar, the abuse suffered by AAA squarely falls under this expanded scope as there was no allegation of
consideration or profit in exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the Information, petitioner committed
lascivious conduct through the use of ''force" and "intimidation."
iii. "Force and intimidation" is
subsumed under "coercion and
influence "
The term "coercionandinfluence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover ''force and intimidation"
as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as
"compulsion; force; duress " 26 while "[undue] influence" is defined as ''persuasion carried to the point of
overpowering the will. " 27 On the other hand, ''force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength
directed to an end " 28 while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as
"unlawfulcoercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. " 29 As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost
synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7 610 and by the
Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering doubt as to their interchangeability, the
Court enunciated in Caballo v. People30 that:
x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when
there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of
the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is
defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives
a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper
use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." (emphasis
added)
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
With the foregoing, the Court need not burden itself with nitpicking and splitting hairs by making a
distinction between these similar, if not identical, words employed, and make a mountain out of a mole
hill.
It is not necessary that the description of the crime, as worded in the penal provision allegedly violated,
be reproduced verbatim in the accusatory portion of the Information before the accused can be convicted
thereunder. Sec. 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is relevant on this point:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The Court has held in a catena of cases 31 that the rule is satisfied when the crime "is described in
intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense
charged." Furthermore, "[t]he use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts
constituting the offense charged is sufficient " Hence, the exact phrase "exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other abuse" need not be mentioned in the Information. Even the words "coercion or
influence" need not specifically appear.
Thus, the Court, in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,32 has similarly sustained the conviction of therein
petitioner Isidro Olivarez (Olivarez) for violating Sec. 5, RA 7610. The Information indicting Olivarez of the
offense read:
The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecution (sic) of Laguna upon a sworn complaint filed by the
private complainant, [AAA], hereby accuses ISIDRO OLIY AREZ of the crime of VIOLATION OF RA 7610,
committed as follows:
That on or about July 20, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, said accused actuated by lewd design did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of force and intimidation commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of one
[AAA], by touching her breasts and kissing her lips, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (emphasis added)
Conspicuously enough, the Information in Olivarez is couched in a similar fashion as the Information in
the extant case. The absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" or
even the specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was never a bar for the Court to uphold the finding
of guilt against an accused for violation of RA 7610. Just as the Court held that it was enough for the
Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the offense was committed by means of "force and
intimidation," the Court must also rule that the Information in the case at bench does not suffer from the
alleged infirmity.
So too did the Court find no impediment in People v. Abadies,33 Malta v. People,[[34]] People v.
Ching, 35 People v. Bonaagua,36 and Caballo v. People37 to convict the accused therein for violation of
Sec. 5, RA 7610 notwithstanding the non-mention in the Information of "coercion," "influence," or
"exploited in prostitution or subject to other abuse."
The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as appearing in
the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the
Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly. 38 Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble states that the
crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
In Malto v. People,39 therein accused Michael John Z. Malto (Malto) was charged for violation of RA 7610
in the following wise:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5[b], ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael
John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and
exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption
College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law. (emphasis and words in brackets added)
Interestingly, the acts constitutive of the offense, as alleged in the Information, could make out a case for
violation of either Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 or Rape under the RPC. 40 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the
finding that Malto is criminally liable for violation of RA 7610, and not for Rape.
The Court is not unmindful of its pronouncements in People v. Abello(Abello)41 and Cabila v. People
(Cabila)42 that the second element must specifically be alleged in the Information and thereafter proved.-
However, these rulings cannot support petitioner's prayer that he be convicted under Art. 336 of the RPC
instead of under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
To begin with, the factual milieu of Abello significantly differs with that in the case at bar. Our refusal to
convict therein accused Heracleo Abello was premised on the the fact that his victim cannot be considered
as a "child" within the purview of RA 7610. 43 The victim in Abello, was 21 years of age when the offense
was committed. Although she had polio, the prosecution failed to substantiate through evidence that the
victim's physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself
against sexual abuse. 44 Hence, Abello was only convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of
the RPC.
Cabila, on the other hand, is a stray division case that has seemingly been overturned by the Court's
recent en banc ruling in Dimakuta v. People (Dimakuta). 45 The latter case attempted to punctuate the
discussion on the issue at hand, but fell short as the conviction therein for violation of Art. 336 of the RPC
had already attained finality. Instead, what the Court en bane was confronted with in Dimakuta, the bone
of contention that remained, was whether or not an accused is disqualified to apply for probation even if
such appeal resulted in the reduction of the non-probationable penalty imposed to a probationable one.
The Court, therefore, deems it more appropriate here to categorically abandon our ruling in Cabila.
Neither can petitioner buttress his claim by citing the dissent in the 2005 case of Olivarez v. CA46 wherein
it was expounded thus:
The first element refers to the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child. The second
element refers to the special circumstance that the child (is) exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse. This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs acts of lasciviousness additional element of a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of, and
on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child are separate and if the Court were to require that a third person act in concert with the accused.
different from the child's exploitation in prostitution or subjection to "other sexual abuse."
The RTC and CA did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither
exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of RA 7610, Well-settled is the rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed
the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
subjected to "other sexual abuse." conclusive upon this Court.49 This is so because the observance of the deportment and demeanor of
witnesses are within the exclusive domain of the trial courts. Thus, considering their unique vantage point,
Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a child trial courts are in the best position to assess and evaluate the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and
already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of their testimonies. 50
lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the child
is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." (emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, the R TC held that the prosecution duly established petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt through AAA' s straightforward testimony. The trial court observed that when AAA testified, she
Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does was able to steadily recount Quimvel's immodest acts, as follows:
not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act
complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a Q Okay. On the same date, where was your mother, if you know?
violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against A During that time, my mother was in Batangas, she being a household helper.
the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront. Q Alright. How about your father, where was he on July 18, 2007, at more or less 8: 00 o'clock in the
evening?
iv. There need not be a third person subjecting the exploited child to other abuse A He was on duty at Palapas, Ligao City.
Q Okay. What was your father's job?
The intervention by a third person is not necessary to convict an accused under Sec. 5 of RA 7610. As A He was on duty, since he was a Barangay Tanod.
regards paragraph (a), a child may engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct regardless of Q Okay. Now, on that date and time, where were you, if you recall?
whether or not a "bugaw " is present. Although the presence of an offeror or a pimp is the typical set up A I was in our house. Q Who were with you inside your house?
in prostitution rings, this does not foreclose the possibility of a child voluntarily submitting himself or herself A I was with my two (2) siblings.
to another's lewd design for consideration, monetary or otherwise, without third person intervention. Q Okay. Now, what happened while you and your siblings were there inside your house on that date and
Needless to say, the child, would still be under the protection of the law, and the offender, in such a time?
situation, could still be held criminally liable for violation of Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610. A Eduardo went to our house with a viand vegetable for us.
Q Okay. Who is this Eduardo that you are referring to?
A He is the helper of my grandfather.
The Senate deliberations made clear, though, that other forms of sexual abuse, not just prostitution, are Q Okay. If you know, why was he bringing you then a viand?
within the extended coverage of RA 7610. The offense is even penalized under the same prov1s1on as A He was sent by our Lolo to bring the viand for us.
prostitution-Sec. 5 of the law. Both offenses must then be dealt with under the same parameters, in spite Q Alright. When he brought the viand to you, what did you say, if any? A I told him to accompany us in
of the differences in their elements. Thus, concomitant with the earlier postulation, just as the participation our house because we are afraid.
of a third person is not necessary to commit the crime of prostitution, so too is the circumstance Q Okay. What did he say, if any, when you told him that?
unessential in charging one for other sexual abuse. A He told me, it's alright.
Q Okay. So, what did you do after he told you that?
It is immaterial whether or not the accused himself employed the coercion or influence to subdue the will A After that, I went to sleep.
of the child for the latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted under paragraph (b). Q How about your brother or sister, what did they do also?
Sec. 5 of RA 7610 even provides that the offense can be committed by "any adult, syndicate or group, A They too went to sleep.
" without qualification. 47 The clear language of the special law, therefore, does not preclude the Q And then what happened, if you recall?
prosecution of lascivious conduct performed by the same person who subdued the child through coercion A Since his leg was placed over my body. I was awaken[ed] because from that, he was also inserting his
or influence. This is, in fact, the more common scenario of abuse that reaches this Court and it would be hand inside my panty.
an embarrassment for us to rule that such instances are outside the ambit Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. Q Alright. Now, could you tell us which leg was it that he placed on top of your body?
A His right leg(,) ma' am.
It is as my esteemed colleagues Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe Q Okay. Now, you've mentioned that he inserted his hand inside your panty, do you recall what you were
reminded the Court. Ratio legis est anima. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. In this case, the wearing at that time?
law would have miserably failed in fulfilling its lofty purpose 48 of providing special protection to A I was wearing shorts and panty.
children from all forms of abuse if the Court were to interpret its penal provisions so as to require the Q Alright. How about on the upper portion of your body, what were you wearing then?
A I was wearing a blouse, like what I am wearing now. (Witness pointing to her blouse)
Q Alright. And you mentioned that he inserted his hand on your panty, which hand did he use?
A His right hand.
Q Alright. And after inserting his hand inside your panty, what did he do with it?
A After inserting his hand inside my panty, he rubbed my vagina. (Witness is demonstrating by rubbing
her left hand with her right hand.)
Q Now, could you tell us for how long did Eduardo rubbed or caressed your vagina? (sic)
A Maybe it took for about five (5) minutes.
Q Do you know how long is a minute?
A I do not know(,) ma'am.
Q Now, if you are going to count one (1) to ten (10), each count would be equivalent to one (1) second
and if you have counted for ten (10), on what number would you reach to approximate the time wherein
Eduardo caressed your vagina?
A It could be thirty (30) minutes.
COURT
Maybe she did not understand it.
PROS. CRUZ
Q Alright. Now, he (sic) took a long time for the accused to caress your vagina, is that what you are trying
to tell this Honorable Court?
A Yes(,) ma'am.
Q And what did you do when he was caressing your vagina for that long?
A I removed his hand from inside my panty. 51
The foregoing testimonial account demonstrates that all the elements of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, as earlier enumerated, are present.1âwphi1
Let us not forget the circumstances of this case, not only was the offense committed against a child under
twelve (12) years of age, it was committed when the victim was unconscious, fast asleep in the dead of
the night. AAA, then a minor of seven (7) years, was awoken by the weight of petitioner's leg on top of
her and of his hand sliding inside her undergarment. His hand proceeded to caress her womanhood,
which harrowing experience of a traumatic torment only came to a halt when she managed to prevent his
hand from further touching her private parts.
As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed subjected to other sexual
abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. 52 Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent
to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. 53 The law does not
require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient. 54
The petitioner's proposition-that there is not even an iota of proof of force or intimidation as AAA was
asleep when the offense was committed and, hence, he cannot be prosecuted under RA 7610-is bereft
of merit. When the victim of the crime is a child under twelve (12) years old, mere moral ascendancy will
suffice.
Here, AAA was a child at the tender age of seven (7) when the offense was committed. She was residing
with her father in Palagas, Ligao City, Albay while her mother works as a household helper in Batangas.
Her father, however, is out of the house most of the time, working two jobs as a vendor and barangay
tanod. Petitioner, on the other hand, was known to the victim and her siblings as the caretaker of their
grandmother's ducks. Thus, when petitioner brought some vegetable viand to the victim's house at the
day the crime was committed; he was requested by the children to stay with them because they were
afraid. AAA entrusted to petitioner her safety and that of her siblings, only to be betrayed. In this situation,
the Court finds that because of the relative seniority of petitioner and the trust reposed in him, petitioner
abused the full reliance of AAA and misused his ascendancy over the victim. These circumstances can
be equated with "intimidation" or "influence" exerted by an adult, covered by Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. Ergo,
the element of being subjected to sexual abuse is met.
That AAA is a child of tender years does not detract from the weight and credibility of her testimony. On
the contrary, even more credence is given to witnesses who were able to candidly relay their testimony
before the trial courts under such circumstance. The child's willingness to undergo , the trouble and
humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. 55
In stark contrast, Quimvel' s defense-that he did not go to AAA' s house on the alleged time of the incident
as he was busy watching over the ducks of AAA's grandmother at the latter's house 56 -deserves scant
consideration. Jurisprudence is replete of cases holding that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which
cannot prevail against positive identification. 57 A categorical and consistent positive identification which
is not accompanied by ill motive on the part of the eyewitness prevails over mere denial. Such denial, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law. It cannot be given a greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. 58
For his alibi to prosper, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that he was somewhere else when the
offense was committed, and that he was so far away it would have been impossible for him to be physically
present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission. 59 But in his
version of the events, petitioner failed to prove the element of physical impossibility since the house of
AAA' s grandmother, where he claimed to be at that time, is only 150 meters, more or less, from AAA's
house. His alibi, therefore, cannot be considered exculpatory.
Article 336 of the RPC was never repealed by RA 8353
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) posits that Art. 336 of the RPC has allegedly
been rendered incomplete and ineffective by RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape law. The good
justice brings our attention to Sec. 460 of the special law, which clause expressly repealed Art. 335 of the
RPC. And since the second element of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC is sourced from
Art. 335 of the same code,61 it is then Justice Leonen's theory that Acts of Lasciviousness ceased to be
a crime under the RPC following Art. 335's express repeal.
We respectfully disagree.
Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of Congress, it
would have expressly done so.1âwphi1 Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified,
or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential
decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of [RA 8353]."
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions that are inconsistent with
RA 8353. It may be that mere amendment or modification would suffice to reconcile the inconsistencies
resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case, Art. 335 of the RPC, 62 which previously penalized
rape through carnal knowledge, has been replaced by Art. 266-A. 63 Thus, the reference by Art. 336 of
the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned on the erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is
perpetrated should now refer to the circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape
Law.
We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor repeals by implication for laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. The failure
to particularly mention the law allegedly repealed indicates that the , intent was not to repeal the said law,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.64 Here,
RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision other than Art. 335 as having been amended,
modified, or repealed. And as demonstrated, the Anti Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art. 336 of the
RPC, on the other, are not irreconcilable. The only construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding
article" is that Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the repealed Art. 335. It is,
therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted under the RPC.
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by the Anti-Rape Law and
argue in the same breath the applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. The latter provision reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - x x x
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x (emphasis added)
If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged incompleteness, then so too would
Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of reference
to the RPC provision.
The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per Justice Leonen's theory, would
not sufficiently be supplanted by RA 7610 and RA 9262, 65 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Law (Anti-VAWC Law). Under RA 7610, only minors can be considered victims
of the enumerated forms of abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VA WC law limits the victims of sexual
abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women with whom the offender has had a dating
or sexual relationship, or against her child. 66 Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection against
sexual offenders who do not discriminate in selecting their victims. One does not have to be a child before
he or she can be victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a woman with an existing
or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can be a victim of another's lewd design. And if
the Court will subscribe to Justice Leonen's position, it will render a large portion of our demographics
(i.e. adult females who had no prior relationship to the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to sexual
abuses.
The RTC and the CA imposed the proper prison term
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Sec. 5 of RA 7610 provides that the penalty for lascivious
conduct, when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period, which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. 67
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103,68 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides
that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of
the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. 69 Be that as it may, the
Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v. Simon 70 that the situation is different where
although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native
to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.
Thus, in People v. Santos (Santos),71 which similarly involved charges for Acts of Lasciviousness under
Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the Court applied the ISL and adjusted the prison term meted to the accused-
appellant therein.
In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court held that the maximum term of the
sentence to be imposed shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
which ranges from fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to sixteen (16) years, five
(5) months and nine (9) days. On the other hand the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next
lower to reclusion temporal medium,that is reclusion temporal minimum, which ranges from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the prison term meted to petitioner (i.e. fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as minimum to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and nineteen (19) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period) must be modified
to be in consonance with the Court's ruling in Santos. Accordingly, the minimum prison term shall be
reduced to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, while the maximum term shall be adjusted to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
35509 finding petitioner Eduardo Quimvel y Braga also known as Eduardo/Edward Quimuel y Braga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region,
Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD QUIMUEL y BRAGA
is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as minimum to fifteen (15) years. six (6) months. and twenty-one(21) days
of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA,
moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of P15,000.00 each as well as P20,000.00
as civil indemnity. All damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 206627 January 18, 2017
VAN CLIFFORD TORRES y SALERA, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
1
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Van Clifford Torres y Salera (Torres) challenges
the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution3 dated February 22, 2013 in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR No. 00481. The assailed judgments affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June
5, 2006, which convicted Torres for violation of
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. 4
In an Information dated June 9, 2004 filed before Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Bohol, Torres was charged with other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610: 5
That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003, in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
harm and humiliate, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse, slap and whip AAA, a
14 year old minor (born on June 5, 1989) with a T-shirt hitting his neck and shoulder and causing him to
fall down on the stairs of the barangay hall which acts are humiliating and prejudicial to the development
of the victim and are covered by Article 59 of Pres. Decree 603, as amended; to the damage and prejudice
of the said victim in the amount to be proved during trial. 6
Upon arraignment, Torres pleaded not guilty. 7 Trial on the merits ensued.8
The prosecution presented the victim AAA, AAA's aunt and uncle, Dr. Vicente Manalo Jr., and Barangay
Captain Hermilando Miano as witnesses to testify on the alleged incident. 9 The prosecution established
the following facts during trial:
CCC, AAA's uncle, previously filed a complaint for malicious mischief against Torres, who allegedly
caused damage to CCC's multicab. 10 AAA witnessed the alleged incident and was brought by CCC to
testify during the barangay conciliation. 11
On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the conciliation
proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from fishing. 12 CCC's wife,
who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the conciliation proceedings to
answer for his liability. 13 Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's multicab. 14 In the middle of the
brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of
stealing CCC's fish nets. 15
Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not
stop. 16 However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's
multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. 17 Torres
continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. 18 CCC came to his nephew's defense
and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain
Hermilando Miano. 19 Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times.20
Based on the physical examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustained a contusion.21
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version of the incident:
Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer for the
damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated discussion
between the two men. 22 Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making unfounded
accusations or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres' bluff, which further provoked Torres.
Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked
him.23
Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against
CCC. 24 He also claimed that he tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife.25 However, the parties
failed to reach an agreement due to the unreasonable demands of the spouses. 26
On June 5, 2006, the Regional Trial Court convicted Torres, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds VAN CLIFFORD TORRES y Salera, the accused[,]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Section 10, paragraph A of
Republic Act No. 7610 and applying in his favor the beneficial provisions of The Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby imposed the indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS, the maximum
period of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. Van Clifford Torres y Salera is also imposed a
penalty of FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PS,000) pursuant to Section 31, Letter f, RA 7610. The
Court credits Van Clifford Torres y Salera his preventive imprisonment in the service of his penalty
pursuant to Art. 29 [of] the Revised Penal Code as Amended.
SO ORDERED.27
Torres appealed before the Court of Appeals. 28 He argued that the prosecution failed to establish all the
elements of child abuse and that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.29 He also questioned
the lower court's jurisdiction over the case. 30
In its Decision31 dated August 11, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision,
albeit with modification as to the penalty:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated 5 June 2006 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1 in Tagbilaran City in Crim.
Case No. 12338 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to five (5)
years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis in the original)
Torres moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution33 dated
February 22, 2013.1âwphi1
Aggrieved, Torres filed before this Court this Petition for Review on Certiorari.34
On October 7, 2013, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a Comment, 35 to which petitioner filed a Reply36 on February 7, 2014.
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court's resolution: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining his conviction on a judgment premised on a misapprehension of facts; and (2) whether the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.37
Petitioner invites this Court to review the factual findings on the ground that the judgment was rendered
based on a misapprehension of facts. He argues that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals disregarded certain material facts, which, if properly considered, would have justified a different
conclusion.38 In particular, petitioner challenges the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. 39 He
highlights the inconsistencies in their testimonies and their failure to clearly establish the presence of
CCC's wife during the incident.40
Petitioner also calls attention to the partiality of the prosecution's witnesses, majority of whom are relatives
of the victim.41 He believes that the prosecution's witnesses could not have given a true narrative of the
incident because of their obvious bias.42 Hence, their testimonies were undeserving of any weight and
credit.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the questions raised by petitioner were questions of fact, which
are generally proscribed in a petition for review under Rule 45.43
We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck with a wet t-shirt
constitutes child abuse.
It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.44 The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
generally binding and conclusive on this Court.45 This Court is not a trier of facts. 46 It is not duty-bound
to analyze, review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the absence of any showing of any
arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.47 A departure from the general rule may only be
warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the
trial court or when these are unsupported by the evidence on record.48
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial courts.49 It
is a question of fact not reviewable by this Court.50 The trial court's findings on the matter are entitled to
great weight and given great respect and "may only be disregarded ... if there are facts and circumstances
which were overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially alter the results of the case[.]" 51
This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court neither
disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially alter the case. The
presence or absence of one person during the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the finding
that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt.52
Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should not be
considered as child abuse because the law requires intent to abuse. 53 Petitioner maintains that he
whipped AAA merely to discipline and restrain the child "from further intensifying the situation."54 He also
maintains that his act was justified because AAA harassed and vexed him. 55 Thus, petitioner claims that
there could not have been any intent to abuse on his part.
Petitioner contends that the injuries sustained by AAA will not affect the latter's physical growth or
development and mental capacity. 56 He argues that he could not be convicted of child abuse without
proof that the victim's development had been prejudiced. 57 He begs the indulgence of this Court and
claims that his conviction would only serve as a "precedent to all children to act recklessly, errantly[,] and
disobediently"58 and would then create a society ruled by juvenile delinquency and errant behavior. 59 If
at all, petitioner claims that he could only be convicted of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code for the contusion sustained by AAA. 60
Respondent maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of child abuse. 61 Respondent argues that
the act complained of need not be prejudicial to the development of the child for it to constitute a violation
of Republic Act No. 7610.62 Respondent, citing Sanchez v. People,63 argues that Section 10(a)64 of
Republic Act No. 7610 defines and punishes four distinct acts.65
We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred.
Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has
been defined in Araneta v. People:66
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive
program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping
with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend
the right of the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."67 (Emphasis omitted, citation omitted)
Under Section 3(b) of the Republic Act No. 7610, child abuse is defined, thus:
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
….
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in
a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. Petitioner,
as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old
child.

As can be gleaned from this provision, a person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or demeans WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 11, 2011 and
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not, can be held liable Resolution dated February 22, 2013 in CA_G.R. CEB-CR No. 00481 affirming the conviction of petitioner
for violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Vam Clifford Torres y Salera for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 are AFFIRMED.

Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child SO ORDERED.
abuse,68 petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
can be inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of.

To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times.69 Common sense
and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck, with a wet t-
shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times. There is also
reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force. Otherwise, AAA would not have fallen down the
stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have sustained a contusion.

Indeed, if the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and f stop him from interfering, he could
have resorted to other less violent means. Instead of reprimanding AAA or walking away, petitioner chose
to hit the latter.

We find petitioner liable for other acts of child abuse under Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No.
7610, which provides that "a person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development . shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period."70

In Araneta:

[Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610] punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59
of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial
to the child's development. . . . [An] accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not
prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the
child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before
the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there
are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation;
and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized
act cannot be interpreted ... as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the
entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.71 (Emphasis supplied)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage
in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. 10 To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262
for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support
legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also
filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal
case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to
support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under
R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their
minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a
foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and
obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his
alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law
which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact
that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar
Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to
wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42,
whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is
taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode
of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign
national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be
held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the
liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal
laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present
case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for
future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency
and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not
fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner
that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also added that by
reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support. 33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code
in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their
personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf.
Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on
petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to
support his child is specifically stated, 46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said
law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in
Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law
should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of
the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that
is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support
his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former
wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or
her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies
to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international
law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent
was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal
basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished
on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts
being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction
over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks
SUPREME COURT pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but
Manila showed no remorse over his acts.6

THIRD DIVISION As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two (2) criminal Informations
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f)7 of RA No. 9262.
The two Informations against him read:
G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015

Criminal Case No. 1701:

RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he
has two common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by
DECISION repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterances directed against
the victim and a feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.
PERALTA, J.:
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the of the victim being pregnant at the time.
Decision1 dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution2 dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, which affirmed with modification the conviction of petitioner for violation of Criminal Case No. 1702:
Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 .
That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he
The facts of the case follow. has two common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by
boxing the victim on the head, kicking her at the back and removing her pant(sic) and panty (sic).
On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session and
went to the boarding house of AAA.3 At that time, Dinamling and the woman AAA were in an ongoing five- CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance
year relationship and they had two common children (then aged four and two years old). Dinamling and of the victim being pregnant at the time.
his friend arrived as AAA was putting the two children to bed. Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA
and the children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and a carton box for ducklings. His reason
for the eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as a "whore house" wherein she "brought (her) Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly. 8
partners." AAA initially did not want to leave as she could not carry the children and their things, but she
left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house, causing it to break. She then went For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae Codamon Diaz testified. For the accused, only
to the house of BBB and requested the latter to fetch her children. When BBB and another friend went for petitioner testified for and in his own defense. His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on
the children, Dinamling already had left with the older child and only the baby was left. The baby was duty at the town's police station at the time that the offenses were committed.9
brought by the friends back to AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between
Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went to the
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4, 2009 finding Dinamling guilty of both charges. For
police, she was merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that
Criminal Case No. 1701, the court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one
time, a policeman himself.4
(1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor.10 For Criminal Case No. 1702, the court ordered him to
suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., another incident occurred. AAA was at the maximum period.
house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When she
came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed and the one in
kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she
Criminal Case No. 1702 was affirmed with the modification on the penalty, by applying the Indeterminate
was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and
Sentence Law, such that Dinamling was sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years, four (4) months
kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA and
shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle. 5 AAA stayed at her friend's
home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to Hence, the present petition.
The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding his defenses of denial
and alibi as well as in discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness'
testimony. Allegedly, the witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was unsure if the abortion was a result of the
mauling that AAA suffered or could have been caused by an infection or other factors. 11
This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, but will modify some of the penalties imposed by
the appellate court.
The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the
appellate court. As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review brought before this Court.12 Time and again, the Court has consistently
declared that questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition for review. 13 Factual findings of the trial
court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding on this Court.14
But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact may not be entertained by this Court
in a petition for review, to wit:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record,15
None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are cited by the petitioner as a ground to grant his
petition. But even assuming arguendo, and in the interest of substantial justice, that any of the exceptions
above were indeed invoked, as the petition alleges that the appellate court failed to give weight to
petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi as well as to his stance that the testimony of Dr. Diaz exculpates
him from the crime, this Court, upon a close examination of the case records, still found no error in the
appellate court's finding of guilt in petitioner.
On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In
particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges was clear,
categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence. Herein below are excerpts of her
testimony:
Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in the evening of March 14, 2007, could you please
tell the court what transpired?
A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around seven or eight o'clock in the evening, I was
letting my kids sleep (w)hen (Dinamling) came with a friend. They had a drinking spree and x x x he
started to evict us from that boarding house because according to him, I (was) using that boarding house
as a whore house (by) bringing in partners, et cetera to that boarding house. That (was) why he was
letting us out of it. And he even told me that if I (had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the basura (garbage)
bag outside and I (could) use the carton where he placed the ducklings to pack our things and leave the
place. That night, I (did) not know how to carry them out and I was waiting for him to stop talking and
leave but he never left us up to the time he threw the feeding bottle of my baby outside that caused it to
break and that was also the time I decided to go to the house of BBB because it is the place where my
landlady (was) staying.
xxxx
Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.
A. He threw it outside, Sir.
Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the accused that evening?
A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that time it was directed (at an) innocent individual and
that is very painful.
Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or fearful at the time the accused was acting that way?
A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would again inflict those pain (on) us.
Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what happened next?
A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home with one of the kids but to my dismay, even the
milk of my baby was not there any more; that night because it was around 11:00 o'clock, we had to use
the feeding bottle of BBB's son together with the milk because when they went to fetch the kids, the milk
was gone.
Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it happened (sic) previously?
A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I was) prompted to go back home and to my
relatives for protection but he (came, followed) us where we (went).
Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007, what did he do, if any?
A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts hitting my head, pulls my hair kicks me and
there was a time I went to the police station but they said that (it) is some kind of family problem that we
could talk xxx over and so it was left that way. I thought leaving him would be the best thing to do but he
kept on following us.16
xxxx
Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March 20, 2007. Will you please tell the court what
happened that late afternoon or early evening?
A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend because of what happened on March 14, 2007 when we
left the boarding house.
xxxx
Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that place?
A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came and shouted words that (on) final count, (I) should
be out of that place.
Q. And what else happened?
A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.
Q. What transpired next?
A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him outside and I inquired (as to) why he (kept on)
following us when we (already) left the boarding house and then he started shouting at me, shouting my
family name, x x x x that I (was) good for nothing and that I (could) sue him (in) court and he (would) pay
me. So I said "I thought when we already left, you were at peace with yourself already." When I was going
down, going to the barangay captain's house, he followed me. When I tried to go back, he kicked me. He
pulled my pants down and pulled even my panty and he said x x x he (did) that to me because I was
worthless.
Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down your pants and your panty?
A. Front of CCC.
Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?
A. Road.
Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses nearby, that road, that spot where he pulled down
your pants and panty?
A. There is a small store and people were looking at us. There are houses above and then one of them
told me he saw but he is afraid to come out.
Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?
A. Dark but then there was a street light near the residence.
Q. Was it still early evening?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what time?
A. Around 9 o'clock.
Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along that road, what else happened?
A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left shouting at me, my family name. It is very hurting
because my family (had) nothing to do with this.
xxxx
Q. And what happened the following day?
A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock early morning of March 21, there was pain at my
back. That night when he kicked me, there was pain at my back. I said I (would) just go tomorrow for
medication but I did not reach the day because I was bleeding. When I went to the bathroom, there (was)
blood so I said I think I am going to abort. There (was) blood already so I decided to go to bath before I
(went) to the hospital but when I went to take a bath, I already had profuse bleeding so they (had) to carry
me with the use of a blanket to the hospital.17
AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third child with Dinamling.
She also testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the sound of his motorcycle as
that signalled that she or her children would be abused. She previously filed with the police a complaint
for physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later, she learned from Dinamling that he had been discharged
as a policeman.18
The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said testimony of AAA which the Court of Appeals
has affirmed. Under such circumstances, this Court has little option but to accord said findings with great
respect, if not finality. The findings off act of the trial court, as regards the credibility of a witness, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the evidence on record are accorded finality. 19
In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was "like a corpse"
because of Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her daughter, including
the times that she saw her with "bluish spots" and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the boxing and
kicking that she had received from Dinamling.20 She knew that Dinamling was a married man when he
had his relationship with AAA21 and she knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live with AAA and the
children because he always went home to his own wife.22
The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No.
9262 and as alleged in the two Informations filed against petitioner. The provision of the law states:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime
are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;23
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has
a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;24
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children
or similar such acts or omissions.25
As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been
proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-
year ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two common
children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal abuse. In the evening
of March 14, 2007, an incident occurred in which she and her children were actually evicted by Dinamling
from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend and the children, accused AAA of
using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that AAA brought sexual partners in that place.
Dinamling further humiliated AAA by telling her to pack her clothes in a trash bag and in a carton box
used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby bottle outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave
even without her children. Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and left the baby behind.
AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but the latter found only the baby. According to AAA
and her mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one, as similar incidents had happened previously.
As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition
to the first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender, the
prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public ridicule or
humiliation when it showed Dinamling acting in the following manner: a) by calling and counting down on
AAA for the latter to come out of the house where she was staying;
b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;
 c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"
d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;
e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear (panty) and calling
her worthless;
f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name as he left.
All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting the public ridicule
and humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain. AAA's suffering is so much that
even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear in her.
All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the crime as
prescribed in the law.
It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The
testimony of the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the act, as long as it is credible,
suffices to establish the guilt of the accused because evidence is weighed and not counted. 26 If, in criminal
cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the positive, categorical and credible testimony of a lone witness is deemed
enough to support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving a case of violation of Section 5(i) of RA
No. 9262, this Court shall treat in the same manner the testimony of a single but credible witness for the
prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and was delivered
spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner, corroborative testimony is not needed to
support a conviction.29
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on
victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual
and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.
The law defines psychological violence as follows:
Section 3(a)
xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing
the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of
the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it
is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. 30 All of
this was complied with in the case at bar. In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner
Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed
that he was on duty at XXX Police Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those dates.32 However, on cross
examination, he admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station to AAA's
boarding house.33
Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as inherently
weak34 and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim.35 In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the
affirmative testimony of the offended party.36 The only exception to this rule is where there is no effective
identification, or where the identification of the accused has been fatally tainted by irregularity and
attendant inconsistencies.37
In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward, unequivocal and
positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling as the perpetrator is not an
issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew each other very well as, in fact, they were at that time
carrying on a five-year relationship which had borne two common children.
Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only was
heat some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission. 38 Using such
standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his alleged location at the time of commission,
that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on duty, in the same municipality as the crimes' place of
commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this police station is just "two to three minutes" away
from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused admits that he was in the same municipality as the place
where the offense occurred, it cannot be said that it was physically impossible for him to have committed
the crime, and his defense of alibi cannot prosper.39
Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a negative assertion
that is weaker than the affirmative testimony of the victim.40 It almost has no probative value and may be
further discarded in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witness to impute so
grave a wrong against the accused.41 As for alibi, it is not given weight if the accused failed to demonstrate
that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 42
But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance of
which allegedly frees him from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child.
By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, brought a copy of a
medical certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:
a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March 21 to March 24, 2007;
b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling, and;
c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion of the left elbow.43
The witness testified that she herself typed the medical certificate and had it signed by Dr. Baguilat. 44 Dr.
Baguilat, however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of the court from his current place of
work.45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-gynecologist of the Ifugao
Provincial Hospital, who testified that the medical certificate indicated that AAA was pregnant, but that
her incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her "mauling."46 Dr. Diaz added that the
anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the contusion and hematoma were caused by a fall,
trauma, blow or impact to the patient's body.47 When cross-examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other possible
causes of abortion include infection of the reproductive organ or urinary tract infection and intake of strong
medicines, while another cause of anemia is malnutrition.48
Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to
whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.
The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from
the mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is charged.
Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him. Therefore, the testimony of Dr.
Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's
conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime that petitioner
was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the
perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA
9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is
alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence
must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental or emotional
suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence translates to
psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being. In the
case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and
underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since
it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or
emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done
on her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to
prove such facts.
The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have
led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the case at
bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof
or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or physical injuries, in
isolation, are not elements of this particular crime.
As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-physical suffering,
that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the offended party,
and not of direct bodily harm or property damage which are covered by the other subsections of the law's
provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or property harm to the victim,
falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have caused mental or emotional anguish.
Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if they lead to such psychological harm.
Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of mental or emotional harm, are punishable
under the other provisions of the law.
As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or
even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner Dinamling's
acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of AAA's miscarriage or incomplete
abortion is not essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it is alleged to have caused mental
or emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not abortion but the mere fact of
pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an aggravating circumstance, not an element,
of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof
shall be punished according to the following rules:
xxxx
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child,
the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00); (b)
undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the
court.49
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which
increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for the
penalty to be properly imposed.50
It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the crime's
elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact of miscarriage
one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating circumstance for the crime
and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony
as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course of such testimony to show that she
was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling."
Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete abortion
or miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present contradictory evidence
during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof of pregnancy. The pregnancy was never
put in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in question in this petition. Therefore, it may
be safely concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been established and it may be taken account
of and considered as a circumstance that aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.
Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly modify the penalties imposed by the trial
court and appellate court.51
As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the
crime.1âwphi1 Although it was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the presence of AAA's
children, such fact was not alleged in the information and therefore will not be taken into
consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not considered aggravating because it neither facilitated the
commission of the offense nor was it shown to have been purposely sought by the offender. 53 The fact of
AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has been alleged and established. This single
circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises his penalty to the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and also Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a maximum penalty that is derived from prision
mayor in its maximum period, which is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 54 the minimum penalty should come from the penalty
one degree lower than prision mayor which is prision correccional, whose range is from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years.55 Therefore, this Court modifies the trial court's Order dated September
17, 2009,56 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and imposes on petitioner Dinamling an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. The trial court's order for
petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological
counseling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is upheld.

As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance.
Again, the single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises
his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and Article
64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals are to be
modified. The maximum penalty should be derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which,
again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. And again, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be imposed shall be imprisonment of six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of
the penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00)
and the order for him to undergo psychological counseling, as upheld by the appellate court, are hereby
affirmed.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are
punishable by the same range of penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to the greater
ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal Case No. 1702, the minimum and maximum lengths
of the sentence imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal Case No. 1701.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of petitioner to show any reversible
error in the assailed CA decision. The assailed Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated
November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, are hereby AFFIRMED and
MODIFIED only as to the penalties imposed, to wit:

1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is ORDERED to serve an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is, likewise,
ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo
psychological counseling;

2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to serve an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six ( 6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ORDERED to PAY a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of investigation, it
SUPREME COURT forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and
Manila possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of
2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding
probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez),
FIRST DIVISION
Leotharius C. Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) –
collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015 Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G.
FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B.
OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 174786]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G.
MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding
of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral
(RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant Senior Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos),
Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo
Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco
(Velasco), and ENS. Dominador Operio (Operio) – collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman
Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered
re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for
grave misconduct and abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the
Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of
hazing.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SERENO, C.J.:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members for hazing, this
case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school authorities under Republic
Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been characterized
by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and responsibility.1 This responsibility
has been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school authorities to
take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as
accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of
patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty
to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against
the principal accused, Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the
Information.13 They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential elements of the offense.
They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite
for admission to the PMMA, especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the
academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a
fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the Information of any
assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the “physical, mental, and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness
of prospective regular members.” Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they
were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity.

It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already been
(PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti- dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated
Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed2 the Information against them on in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in
the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information alleged
the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals
Information. must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition
of the Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an
The Case Background allegation that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and
whether the academy was considered an “organization” within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA.3 In order to
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination
and Orientation Period,”4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. 5 Balidoy died on 3 May Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them.
2001.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed
with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal
responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice,
there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In
this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with
whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the
case against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices
could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the allegations
therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that the alleged hazing
was not part of the “physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members”
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to
Section 1 of the law.16 It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical
determination that the PMMA was considered an “organization” within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing
Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against
Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash,17 adopting the
grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006.18 However, on 3 August 2006,
the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him.
According to the court, since Velasco was similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against
him must likewise be quashed in light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution,
the Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively,
Velasco et al.), explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same
offense.19 It is unclear from the records20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were
arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court on 13
March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition challenging
SB Resolution II.
The Issues
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough evaluation
of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in
spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
Our Ruling
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed
outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals
had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is
not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case
against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact
been established.22 In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: “The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other.
As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.” Accordingly,
so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to
determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged
principal.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of
Judgment25 dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case
was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not
cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when
it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the
dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of
Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be “sufficient.” One of the key
components of a “sufficient information” is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense
charged, subject of the complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and
concise enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged against
them.27 This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly
committed.28 The information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied
upon.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court based on
the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that
ground, the basic test30 is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential
elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth
or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the
appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury.
The term “organization” shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military
Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the
Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual faculty members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary
be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied) midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. during the school’s Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to
take any action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a person
injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to
is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. 36
or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical
organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons
injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a
defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would
psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.
prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term37 – in this case, hazing – is
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere
may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above
conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must
elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to
include, inter alia, both “the designation of the offense given by the statute” and “the acts or omissions
or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
complained of as constituting the offense.” The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument38 in his Petition
before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization.
as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status
Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups,
– does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate
teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies,
facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.31 Attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications, 32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the
institution33 established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine
filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case
officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for
chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution
failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly
fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor
recommended and approved “testing and training procedure and practices” for prospective regular
insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has
members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element
he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the
of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not
Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the
by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing
case.
by clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the
prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
quashal of that Information.
information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would not
bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The
Information charging respondents reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised by
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM]
petitioner.
Virginio R. Aris, [LTSG.] Dominador D. BAYABOS, [LTJG.] Manny G. Ferrer, [LTJG.] Ronald G. Magsino,
[LTJG.] Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, [LTJG.] Gerry P. Doctor, [ENS.] Dominador B. Operio, Jr., and [ENS.]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition
Dennis S. Velasco, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as
for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the campus of the
SO ORDERED.
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Zambales,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM Virginio R. Aris, President
of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. Dominador D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets;
(LTJG.) Manny G. Ferrer, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino, Security Officer; LTJG.
Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG. Gerry P. Doctor, Batl. Mast.; ENS. Dominador B.
Operio, Jr., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. Dennis S. Velasco, Mess Officer, all public officers,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in relation to office
and while in the performance of their duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or
TITLE IX:
Crimes against Personal
Liberty and Security
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 226836, December 05, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BONG CHAN AND ELMO CHAN, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Actual taking indicates an intention to deprive the victim of his liberty.1
This is an appeal filed by appellants Bong Chan (Bong) and Elmo Chan (Elmo) from the March 31, 2016
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CR-HC No. 06418, affirming the July 31, 2013
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Criminal Case
No. 4755-A, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Factual Antecedents
Appellants were charged under the following Information:
That on or about September 27, 2004 in the evening[,] in Barangay Tawin-tawin, Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping each other and after threatening to kill the victim, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously club Reynard P. Camba with pieces of bamboo until he was
rendered unconscious and thereafter, the same accused placed his body in a sack and carried him
away depriving him of his liberty against his will and continued to detain and hide him illegally up to the
present.
Contrary to [Article] 267 of the Revised Penal Code.4
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 5
Version of the Prosecution
During the bail hearing, the prosecution presented as witness, the victim's second cousin, Tito Camba
(Tito) who was present the night the victim had an altercation with the family of the appellants. 6
During the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Ernesto Estepa (Ernesto), the victim's
uncle; (2) Rachelle Camba (Rachelle) and Erica Jean Camba (Erica), daughters of the victim; and (3)
Rey Camba (Rey), the brother of the victim.7
According to the version of the prosecution, the victim was the nephew of Ernesto's wife; that at around
9:00p.m. of September 27, 2004, the victim went to Ernesto's house to visit his (victim's) son, who was
living with Ernesto and his wife; that the victim stayed at Ernesto's house for about two hours; that the
victim told Ernesto that, earlier that evening, the victim had a quarrel with Melrose Libadia (Melrose) and
her husband, Ronnie, because Melrose refused to sell the victim liquor from her store and that
Melrose's father, appellant Elmo, threatened to kill the victim; that upon hearing this, Ernesto told the
victim that it would be better for the latter to stay the night; that the victim refused because his wife
might look for him; that around 11:00 p.m., the victim left Ernesto's house; that Ernesto followed the
victim only until the latter was nearing the house of Helen Pamo; that the victim was about 10-20 meters
ahead of Ernesto; that when the victim reached Melrose's house, Ernesto saw appellants come out of
the yard; that upon seeing appellants, Ernesto hid; that Ernesto saw appellants hit the victim with
bamboo sticks on the neck and kept hitting him even after he became unconscious and fell to the
ground face down; that appellants went inside the yard; that they came back carrying a sack; that the
appellants placed the victim, who was then unconscious, inside the sack and carried him inside their
yard; that Ernesto did not see what happened thereafter; that he went home and had a restless night;
that the following day, he drove his jeepney plying the route of Alaminos-Lingayen; that when he arrived
at his house at around 5:30 p.m., he met Rey, the brother of the victim; and that Ernesto told Rey that
appellants killed the victim and that Rey should not tell anyone about it because they might kill him
also.8
Rachelle, Erica, and Rey testified for the sole purpose of proving damages.9
Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, offered the testimony of appellant Bong and his sister, Melrose.10
Melrose testified that around 9:00p.m. of September 27, 2004, she was inside their house when the
victim and Tito wanted to buy liquor; that she told the victim that she had no more stock of wine; that,
contrary to the claim of the prosecution, there was no heated argument; that she left them and returned
inside their house to take care of her husband who was sick at that time; and that on the said night, her
brother and her father were at the auditorium of Barangay Tawin-tawin, which is a kilometer away from
their house, to watch over their sacks of palay.11
Appellant Bong, on the other hand, denied the accusations against them and claimed that, on the said
evening, at around 10:00 p.m., he and his father were at the cemented pavement near the auditorium to
watch over their palay that was scheduled for drying the following day; and that they stayed there until
the morning of September 28, 2004.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 31, 2013the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
RPC. The RTC gave no credence to the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial considering the positive
testimony of Ernesto, who had no ill motive to testify falsely against the appellants. 13 Thus -
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds both accused Bong Chan and
Elmo Chan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and as charged in the afore-quoted
Information and, accordingly, hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua or twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years with the accessory
penalties provided for by law; to pay the heirs of the late Reynald Camba the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnification and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages, both without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be credited with the full time during which they
underwent preventive imprisonment provided that they voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners otherwise they shall be credited to only four fifths
(4/5) thereof. (Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended).
SO ORDERED.14
Appellants appealed the case to the CA putting in issue the credibility of Ernesto. They contended that
Ernesto's testimony that he was driving his jeepney in the morning of September 28, 2004 to earn
money contradicted with the testimony of Rachelle that Ernesto was with them in the morning of
September 28, 2004 looking for the victim. 15 They further argued that the prosecution failed to prove
actual confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim. 16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 31, 2016, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime.17 The CA pointed out that the element of
restraint was clearly established by the testimony of Ernesto.18 As to the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Ernesto and Rachelle, the CA ruled that these pertained to events which transpired after
the commission of the crime.19 As such, these inconsistencies on minor details did not in any way affect
the veracity of Ernesto's testimony.20
Hence, appellants filed the instant appeal, raising the same arguments they had in the CA.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime.
Under Article 267 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
are, as follows: "(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or public officer."21
All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. First,
appellants are both private individuals. Second, the fact that they kidnapped the victim was clearly
established by the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Ernesto. Third, appellants' act of
kidnapping was illegal. Lastly, the victim has been detained for more than three days. In fact, until now,
the victim has not returned, nor his body been found.
Appellants, however, insist that the element of restraint was not clearly established as the prosecution
allegedly failed to establish actual confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim.
The Court does not agree.
Actual confinement, detention, and restraint of the victim is the primary element of the crime of
kidnapping.22 Thus, in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution must show "actual confinement or
restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor." 23
In this case, Ernesto testified that he saw appellants: (1) hit the victim on the neck and other body parts
using bamboo sticks causing the victim to fall down on the ground unconscious; (2) retrieve a sack from
their yard; (3) place the victim inside the sack; and (4) carry him to their yard. Clearly, the acts of
appellants of hitting the victim until he was unconscious, of putting him inside the sack, and of carrying
him to their yard showed their intention to immobilize the victim and deprive him of his liberty. Thus,
contrary to the claim of appellants, the element of restraint was clearly established. As aptly pointed out
by the CA, "[a]ctual restraint of the victim was evident from the moment appellants clubbed the victim on
the neck and other parts of his body and thereafter placed him inside a sack. Not only was [the victim's]
freedom of movement restricted, he was immobilized because the blows rendered him unconscious.
Putting him inside the sack completely rendered the victim powerless to resist." 24
Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility and veracity of the testimony of the
prosecution's witness.
Appellants' attempt to discredit the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness must likewise fail.
Discrepancies or inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses pertaining to minor details, not
touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair the credibility of the witnesses; on the contrary,
they even tend to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses since they discount the possibility of
witnesses being rehearsed.25 In this case, discrepancies or inconsistencies in the testimony of Ernesto,
vis-a-vis the testimony of Rachelle pertaining to minor details that have no bearing on the elements of
the crime, do not affect the veracity and credibility of Ernesto's positive testimony, who had no ill motive
to testify against appellants. As the Court has consistently ruled, "the positive identification of the
appellants, when categorical and consistent and without any [ill motive] on the part of the [eyewitness]
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial."26
All told, the Court affirms the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. However, in order to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence,27 the Court finds it necessary to increase the awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00 each, and award exemplary damages in the amount of
P75,000.00 to set an example for the public good. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn legal
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 31, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06418, which affirmed the July 31, 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 4755-A, finding
appellants GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages be
increased to P75,000.00 each and that exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 be awarded.
In addition, the damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Worried that Jerome had not returned from school, his parents Edna Rosario and Jerry Rosario started
SUPREME COURT to look for Jerome. When they chanced upon Daryll, a classmate of Jerome, and asked him on his
Manila whereabouts, Daryll informed them that an unknown man had taken Jerome during dismissal time.
Edna and Jerry then reported the incident to the barangay, where it was blottered.
THIRD DIVISION
The next day, August 8, 2008, Edna received a call on her daughter's cellphone from a person who
introduced himself as Jerome's classmate. The man, whom Edna recognized to be appellant, stated
September 26, 2018
that Jerome was with him and will be let go, provided that he will be given ₱150,000.00 and Edna will be
unaccompanied when they meet. He directed her to meet him at a terminal in Dau, Pampanga.
G.R. No. 232361
The following day, August 9, 2008, Edna and Jerry went to the Muntinlupa City Police Station to report
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee the matter. An operation was planned to retrieve Jerome, where it was agreed that upon meeting
vs. appellant at the designated meet-up point, Edna would touch appellant's arm, signaling to the police his
FRANCISCO DAMAYO Y JAIME, Accused-Appellant identity.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the January 30, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 07683, which affirmed with modifications the July 29, 2015 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 207, Muntinlupa City (RTC), finding accused-appellant Francisco Damayo y Jaime
(Damayo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Damayo was indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in an Information which reads:
At 2:00 P.M. of the same date, Edna, Jerry, and the police officers, namely, Senior Police Officer 4
(SP04) Elias Nero, Police Officer 3 (P03) Rudolph Delmendo, P03 Roberto Lanting and Police Officer 2
(P02) Julkabra Sulaiman, proceeded to the Dau terminal in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Upon seeing
appellant, Edna touched his arm which prompted the police to arrest him. After handcuffing him,
informing him of his arrest and reading him his constitutional rights, the police asked appellant where
Jerome was being kept. Appellant told them that Jerome was at his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San
Fernando, Pampanga. They proceeded to the area and were able to safely recover Jerome. 3
Version of the Defense
The defense relates Damayo' s version of the facts in this manner:
xxxx

That, on or about the 7th day of August, 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the 11. On the other hand, accused FRANCISCO J. DAMAYO vehemently denied the charge against him
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, did then and there and interposed that on 7 August 2010, he was instructed by Edna to fetch Jerome from school and to
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one JEROME ROSARIO Y SAMPAGA, an eleven ( 11 )-year- meet her at the Pasay bus terminal thereafter. This is because they were planning to transfer Jerome to
old minor, for the purpose of extorting ransom. another school in Pampanga where they were living as common-law spouses.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 12. Prior to the incident, the accused, being one of the Rosaries' close friends, stayed in their house in
Sucat for a couple of weeks. At which time, he witnessed how Gerry Rosario abused his wife (Edna)
and children. He (accused) tried to distance himself from the Rosarios but Edna kept on asking for his
When arraigned, Damayo pleaded not guilty to the charge. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued. help and advice. As time went by and due to the fact that the accused has always been there for Edna,
they grew closer and had an illicit relationship. Ashamed of his weakness, the accused left and stayed
Version of the Prosecution with his daughter in Tagaytay. Edna, however, kept on following him.

As summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the People's factual version is as follows:
On August 7, 2008, at 12:00 noon, Jerome Rosario, then eleven (11) years old, was outside his school
at Sucat Elementary School, Brgy. Sucat, Muntinlupa City when appellant, known to him as Kuya Frank,
approached and told him that he was there to fetch him as they were going somewhere. Since Jerome
was familiar with appellant, he went with him and both boarded a jeep bound for Pasay. Upon arriving at
Pasay, they boarded a bus. Jerome did not know where they were going.
13. As a last effort to rid himself of his affair with Edna, the accused went to Clark, Pampanga to work
there. He, likewise, changed his contact information. Edna, however, was able to trace him and unable
to avoid her, the accused succumbed to her desires. They (Edna and the accused) started living
together in Pampanga. Edna would then fetch her son, Jerome, every Friday and bring him back to
Sucat every Sunday.
14. As the set up proved to be inconvenient for both Edna and Jerome, the couple (Edna and the
accused) decided to just transfer Jerome to a school in Pampanga. Thus, on 7 August 2008, after his
stay in Tagaytay, the accused met Edna at their house in Sucat, where she asked him to fetch Jerome
from school and she will join them at Pasay bus terminal.
15. To his surprise and disappointment, however, Edna did not show up, thus, at Jerome's prodding, the
accused decided to leave with Jerome and let Edna follow them to Pampanga.
16. The following day, or on 8 August 2008, Edna called the accused, asking him to bring Jerome back
to Sucat, as her husband learned of their plan (to live together with Jerome in Pampanga), and got mad.
Unfortunately, however, the accused had no means to travel back to Sucat that day. He (accused) told
Edna to fetch Jerome herself or to wait for him to be able to come up with the money for their fare back
to Sucat.
17. On 9 August 2008, while the accused was driving his jeepney, he received a call from Edna, asking
him to meet her at Dau terminal. Upon arriving thereat, he was suddenly handcuffed by two (2) men in
civilian clothes, accusing him of kidnapping Jerome. He instantly denied it and even told them where to
find the boy. With no intention of detaining or abducting Jerome, the accused reasoned that he was only
following Edna's instructions.4
The RTC Ruling
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 29, 2015, finding Damayo guilty beyond reasonable
of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Francisco Damayo y Jaime guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under the first (the private complainant is a minor) and second
(for the purpose of extorting ransom) paragraphs of Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole. He is further ordered to pay private
complainant Jerome Rosario y Sampaga civil indemnity in the amount of P25,000.00, and moral
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 both with 6% interest per annum from the finality of this decision
until fully paid.
The Jail Warden, Muntinlupa City Jail is directed to immediately transfer accused Francisco Damayo y
Jaime to the New Bilibid Prison for the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED. 5
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence which established that on August 7, 2006,
Damayo took Jerome Rosario y Sampaga (Jerome), who was then eleven years of age, from his school
and brought the latter to his house in Pampanga where he deprived the said victim of his personal
liberty for three (3) days and that Damayo demanded ransom of P150,000.00 from Edna, Jerome's
mother, for the release of her son from captivity. According to the RTC, Jerome convincingly testified on
the events that transpired during the kidnapping incident from August 7 to 9, 2006 and positively
identified Damayo as his abductor. The RTC rejected the defense of denial interposed by Damayo
because it was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Not in conformity, Damayo appealed his conviction before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On January 30, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming Damayo's conviction with
modification as to the award of damages, the fallo of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 July 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
207, in Criminal Case No. 08-556 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) that the amounts of moral damages and civil indemnity are increased to P100,000.00, each;
(2) that exemplary damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 is further awarded.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA ruled that the prosecution witnesses unerringly established the commission of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and Damayo's culpability thereof. The CA, likewise, brushed aside Dama yo' s
defense of denial for being self-serving and unsupported by any plausible proof.
Aggrieved, Damayo filed the present appeal and posited the lone assignment of error he previously
raised before the CA, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
KIDNAPPING SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES' INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES. 7
In its Resolution8 dated August 23, 201 7, the Court directed both parties to submit their supplemental
briefs, if they so desire. On October 23, 2017, the OSG filed its Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental
Brief)9 praying that it be excused from filing a Supplemental Brief as its Appellee's Brief had sufficiently
ventilated the issues raised. On November 21, 2017, Damayo filed a Manifestation (In lieu of a
Supplemental Brief) 10 averring that he would adopt all his arguments in his Appellant's Brief filed before
the CA where he had already adequately discussed all matters pertinent to his defense.
Insisting on his acquittal, Damayo asserts that the case for the prosecution was enfeebled by the
inconsistent and contradictory testimonies of its witnesses, Jerome and Edna Rosario (Edna). He
submits that said testimonies are barren of probative weight and, thus, his conviction based thereon
was erroneous. He puts premium on the following alleged material and substantial discrepancies to
impugn the credibility of Jerome and Edna:
1) Jerome averred in his Affidavit, dated August 9, 2008, that appellant took him by force, while during
his direct testimony, Jerome recounted that he voluntarily went with Damayo because he was familiar
with him;
2) While at the witness stand, Edna claimed that she and her husband purposely went to Jerome's
classmate, Daryll, to know the whereabouts of their son, but during her later testimony, Edna alleged
that she and her husband only chanced upon the said classmate; and
3) During her direct examination, Edna recalled that it was her daughter who received the call from
Damayo, while during her cross-examination, Edna stated that she was the one who received the call
from Damayo who demanded ransom of ₱150,000.00.
Damayo denies that he abducted Jerome and maintains that his denial gained commensurate strength
since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable. He contends that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused based on the principle that it is better to liberate a
guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proven by the required quantum
of evidence. Damayo stresses that his constitutional right to presumption of innocence remains because
there is reasonable doubt that calls for his acquittal.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit. Damayo's conviction of the crime charged must stand.
In the case at bench, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave more weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to that of Damayo. After a judicious review of the
evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the R TC
and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Despite Damayo's vigorous protestation, the Court is convinced beyond cavil that the
prosecution has proven with moral certainty that Damayo kidnapped Jerome for the purpose of extorting
money from his parents.
Jerome unmistakably and compellingly narrated, in detail, the events of the kidnapping incident, from
the moment he was taken by Damayo from his school and brought to the latter's residence in
Pampanga where he remained in captivity for three (3) days until his rescue by the police officers and
his parents. The RTC described Jerome's testimony as "simple, straightforward and credible which was
not toppled down in the cross-examination." 11 A perusal of Jerome's testimony confirms the trial court's
observation. Jerome was consistent in his account. Even during the rigorous cross-examination
conducted by Damayo's counsel, he remained steadfast in his story of the commission of the crime and
categorically pinpointed Damayo as his abductor. There is no showing that Jerome simply made up the
details of his testimony or that he was coached. His testimony is unequivocal, forthright, cohesive and,
hence, bears the hallmarks of honesty and truth. In turn, the RTC did not commit any error when it gave
probative weight and credence to Jerome's testimony.
In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private
individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; ( c) the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and ( d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it
is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is
a minor, female, or a public officer. 12
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. 13 It is settled that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not
involve any physical restraint upon the latter's person and it is not necessary that the offender kept the
victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. 14 The crime of serious illegal detention is committed by
detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 15 Its essence is the actual deprivation
of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation. 16
The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been sufficiently proven in the
case at bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he took Jerome from his
school at Sucat Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on August 7, 2008 at 12:00 noon,
brought said victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga, and kept him there
until he was safely recovered by his parents and the police officers on August 9, 2008. That Damayo
had no justification whatsoever to detain Jerome is undeniable.
Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was locked up, he was
nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the place where Damayo brought him as
the latter remained outside and kept watch of him. This only goes to show that Jerome was constantly
guarded by Damayo during the period of his captivity. Also, let it be underscored that leaving a child in a
place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place
of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty inasmuch as under this situation, the child's
freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. 17
Here, bringing minor Jerome to a house located somewhere in Pampanga, a place which is totally
unfamiliar to him and very far from his residence at Sucat, Muntinlupa City, would constitute denial of
the said victim's liberty. Even if Jerome had the freedom of locomotion inside the house of Damayo, he
did not have the freedom to leave the same at will or escape therefrom because he did not know where
to go and could not possibly go back home to his mother Edna as he didn't know how to do so. Jerome
was merely waiting and hoping that he would be brought home or that his parents would fetch him.
Verily, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that Damayo intended to deprive
Jerome of his liberty, and his parents, with the custody of their minor son.
In his attempt at exculpation, Damayo posits that the charge against him should not have been given
credence since the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jerome and Edna are allegedly laced with
inconsistencies and discrepancies which cast serious doubt on the veracity of their respective claims.
Specifically, Damayo points out that while Jerome stated that he had been taken by force in his affidavit,
he subsequently testified during his direct examination that he voluntarily went with the appellant
because he personally knew the latter as "Kuya Frank" since Damayo stayed in their house for a time.
Damayo submits that such inconsistency is sufficient to discredit Jerome.
Damayo's arguments do not persuade.
Jerome's testimony prevails over the statement he gave in the affidavit which he previously executed. It
is sett]ed that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in
court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to
testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes
inaccurate. 18 Affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by administering
officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have said. 19 They are products
sometimes of partial suggestions and at other times of want of suggestions and inquiries. 20 Almost
always, the affiants would simply sign the documents after being read to them. Jurisprudence is
unequivocal in saying that the testimony of a witness prevails over an affidavit.21
At any rate, the inconsistency adverted to by Damayo is negligible and merely refers to a minor detail
that does not bear relevance on the material and significant fact that Damayo kidnapped Jerome. It
does not pertain to the why's and wherefore's of the crime, as to adversely affect the reliability of the
People's evidence as a whole. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime,
is not a ground to reverse a conviction. 22
Thus, whether Jerome was taken by force or not is of no moment. What is controlling is the act of the
accused in detaining the victim against his will after the offender is able to take the victim in his
custody.23 Besides, it is settled that the carrying away of the victim can either be made forcibly or
fraudulently, 24 as in this case. The Court gathers from Jerome's testimony that he was deceived by
Damayo to go with him. Jerome clearly testified that Damayo told him that they would just go
somewhere for a while and that he would be brought back shortly thereafter. The unsuspecting minor
readily acceded to Damayo's request because he trusted his "Kuya Frank," but the latter took him
instead to Pampanga. Viewed in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the discrepancy in
question did not damage nor shatter altogether the credibility and the essential integrity of Jerome's
testimony, but instead, the honest inconsistency serves to strengthen rather than destroy the victim's
credibility.
Anent the inconsistencies in the testimony of witness Edna cited by Damayo, suffice it to say that they
are mere trifles which could not discredit her testimony nor diminish her credibility. It must be stressed
that even the most candid witnesses oftentimes make mistakes and would fall into confused statements.
Trivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon which the witness' credibility rests. On the
contrary, they are taken as badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood for they manifest
spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony 25 as well as negate all doubts that the
same were merely perjured. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free
testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. 26 Edna is not expected to
remember every single detail of the incident with perfect or total recall.
What militates against Damayo's claim of innocence is the time-honored rule that the issue of credibility
of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position
of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying and absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial
court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's
findings. 27 The Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial
court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.28
We do not find any compelling reason to deviate from the trial court's evaluation of prosecution
witnesses as credible witnesses and the credibility of their respective testimonies. Neither the RTC nor
the CA overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied or disregarded any significant facts and circumstances
which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. To the contrary, the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies presented a cohesive, detailed, and convincing account of Jerome's August 7 to
9, 2008 kidnapping incident: from Jerome's actual abduction, to the ransom negotiation, to the
supposed ransom payout, and to accused-appellant's apprehension by the police officers and Jerome's
rescue.
Still, Damayo denies that he kidnapped Jerome. In a crude effort to muddle the case for the
prosecution, Damayo asserts that he and Edna were lovers and that he took Jerome from his school
and brought him to Pampanga upon Edna's request. Damayo explains that he and Edna had
considered transferring Jerome to a school in Pampanga. He claims that it had been the practice for
Edna and Jerome to spend their weekends with him at their rented home in Pampanga.
Damayo's contention is nothing more than a futile maneuver and a vain attempt to provide a viable
excuse for taking Jerome from his school and bringing him to his house in Pampanga where he
detained said victim for three days. What destroys the veracity of Damayo's claims is the categorical
and credible declaration of Jerome that he and his mother have never stayed in Pampanga with
Damayo at any given time, and that he has never been in Pampanga before the kidnapping incident.
Case law has it that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, and that the testimony
of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons. 29
Moreover, as aptly observed by the R TC, if the trip to Pampanga was indeed planned as claimed by
Damayo, then Jerome would have brought with him certain personal belongings which he will use
during his . stay at appellant's house. Or, if Edna and Jerome really spend their weekends at
Pampanga, there would have been clothes available for use at Damayo's place. Evidence on record,
however, showed that for the entire duration of his detention, Jerome only wore his school uniform and
only had with him his school bag.
Edna, on the other hand, vehemently denied that she and Damayo were lovers and that she gave him
an instruction to bring Jerome to Pampanga.1âwphi1 We agree with the courts a quo that Edna has not
given her consent for Damayo to take and keep her son. This is evident from the fact that Edna,
together with her husband, wasted no time and went through the trouble of going to Jerome's school to
look for their son when the latter failed to go home at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon on August 7,
2008 and in having' the incident of the taking of Jerome by a male person to be blottered before
the Barangay Office of the Sucat, Muntinlupa City. This is, likewise, clear from the plea of Edna, via
cellular phone, for Damayo to bring home her son.
Apart from Damayo' s bare assertion, no other evidence was adduced by the defense to substantiate
his claim that he and Edna were lovers. Records show that the testimony of defense witness Edwin
Alcantara, appellant's sonin-law, confirming the alleged love affair between Damayo and Edna, was
ordered by the RTC to be expunged from the records due to the failure of this witness to appear and
testify for cross-examination. Granting arguendo that Edna and Damayo were indeed sweethearts, the
same does not negate the commission of kidnapping. Such a romantic relationship, even if true, does
not give Damayo the authority to remove Jerome from his school and detain him for three days at San
Fernando, Pampanga away from his parents. In any event, the Court notes that Edna's reactions
consisting of immediately reporting the kidnapping of his son to the Muntinlupa City· Police and
identifying the culprit to be herein appellant, cooperating with the police for the apprehension of
Damayo, and testifying against him before the RTC, are certainly not consistent with the conduct of a
woman deeply in lqve with appellant. Besides, if it was really true that Edna and Dama yo are lovers,
then she should have conveniently joined appellant and Jerome in Pampanga instead.
More importantly, Damayo's defense of denial was not corroborated nor bolstered by any competent
and independent evidence testimony or other evidence and, hence, cannot be sustained in the face of
Jerome's unwavering testimony and of his positive and firm identification of Damayo as the perpetrator.
Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the
declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. 30
It bears stressing that Damayo utterly failed to allege, much less, prove any ill or ulterior motive on the
part of Jerome and Edna to fabricate a story and to falsely charge Damayo with such a very serious
crime. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious or improper motive why a prosecution witness
should bear false witness against the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony
is worthy of full faith and credit. 31
Lastly, the Court determines that the qualifying circumstance of extortion of ransom being the purpose
of Damayo in kidnapping Jerome was duly alleged in the Information and has been sufficiently
established by the prosecution. Edna clearly testified that on August 8, 2008 at around 8 o'clock in the
morning, she received a call from Damayo who demanded that he be given ₱150,000.00 in exchange
for the safe release of Jerome and that the ransom payout shall be held at the Dau Terminal,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Damayo never rebutted this particular testimony of Edna. The fact that he did
not receive the ransom payment is of no consequence. Actual payment of ransom is not necessary for
the crime to be committed. It is enough that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom. 32

Since Damayo' s guilt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom had been established beyond reasonable
doubt, he should be meted the penalty of death under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. However, considering that the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines", the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon Damayo. In addition, the
qualification "without eligibility for parole" should be affixed to qualify reclusion perpetua pursuant to
A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.33 Thus, the RTC has properly imposed upon Damayo the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Coming now to the civil liabilities, the Court finds that the CA is correct in awarding ₱100,000.00 each
for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages being consistent with current
jurisprudence.34 Further, six percent (6%) interest per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
to be reckoned from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.35

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 30, 2017 in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 07683 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant
Francisco Damayo y Jaime is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole. He
is ORDERED to PAY the private complainant Jerome Rosario y Sampaga the amounts of ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son,
Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with
him some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child be
punished to the full extent of the law.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to
a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked
for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat,
Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when
she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside
the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they
reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of
Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no
word about Christopher’s whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating
her misery.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller
claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent
photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when
Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the
mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the
ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s
Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was
formed and Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece.
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they
arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.1awphi1
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women
came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa
and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a
certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in
Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told
Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to
Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them
that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused.
Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher
was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement
that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes
with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer
recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was,
the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her
niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney
which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the
ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the
PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other
hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her
third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following
Information:
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for his release amounting to
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario in said
amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time
and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw
Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She
took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already
7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so
they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur.
Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for Christopher’s picture for confirmation. It was at this
point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7,
2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa
was the boy’s mother did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of
the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent. There were no charges
against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao
del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who
was in Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s
Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived
later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak
saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was returning him to his mother.
Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned
when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and
there was no warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on November
30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and
accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the
Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency
of this case.
SO ORDERED.3
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision4 dated March 31, 2006, the
appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for ₱30,000 as a demand
for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-
03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the
records.6
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim7 or a public officer
who has a duty under the law to detain a person;8
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
 or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a
public official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped
and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes
inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present. 9
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it.10 It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited to
mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such
restraints necessary for the common welfare. 12
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after
almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or
restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants’ custody and
return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far
away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of
the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del
Norte. She demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s
actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt
that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual
findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently
supported by evidence.
Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of
a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home
not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the
proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s social
workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how
could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to
each other?
Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was
only there that she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release of the kidnap
victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed
otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of
Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself.13 The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and
Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if
not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.14
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which
necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount
as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of
Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement
of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement
for "board-and-lodging.")
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. 15 No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the
felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for
the victim’s freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his
mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom.
One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has
banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant
to People v. Garalde,20 the award of ₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000 considering
the minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by
way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to ₱100,000 exemplary damages. 22
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak
and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱200,000 moral
damages and ₱100,000 exemplary damages to their young victim Christopher Basario.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO HERMANO ALIAS "BOBBY REYES,"
ROLANDO DEQUILLO, ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH FERRAER, appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.), Rolando Dequillo y Tampos
(Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo "Eddie" Hermano alias "Bobby Reyes" alias "Eddie
Reyes" (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were charged with
kidnapping for ransom with homicide1 and carnapping2 in two separate informations. Only Muit, Pancho
Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial. However, Ferraer was discharged from
the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was utilized as a state witness. 3 All appellants
pleaded not guilty during their arraignments.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the
latter’s house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho, Jr.,
Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car with plate number PSV-818. Julaton
introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their relative. Pancho, Sr. told
Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their "visitor." Ferraer was hesitant at first
as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry because they are
not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get
would be shared equally among them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five
other men came and they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias
Puri. They had dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for
safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in a big paper bag, and a green
backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package contained guns. Ferraer brought the package inside
his room; he inspected the contents before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton
contained a shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also showed him
their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists. 4
At one o’clock in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano with a
companion, seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their companion as
Romeo. They informed Ferraer that the following day, they would proceed with their plan. Romeo would
be the informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. The next day, at nine
o’clock in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraer’s house alone and asked Ferraer if he was
already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told him to wait for the
group’s return. However, the group returned without the intended victim because the latter did not show
up at the construction site.5 On 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo informing them
that the victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit
commuted to the construction site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on board
the Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At around two o’clock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997, Roger Seraspe (Seraspe),
the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero with plate number UDL-746 carrying Engr. Ruth
Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the
site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from the Pajero and, along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured
the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO
Construction, while waiting for his boss.6
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of the Pajero. Seraspe was
surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together suddenly lay prostrate on the ground.
Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed
men surrounded the Pajero. Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the armed men,
Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground. 7 The
assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them
the keys to the Pajero. When the victim was already on board the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of them
say, "Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay."8
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate. Two more
persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.9
At 2:30 that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt. Mission)
received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was ongoing and the
kidnappers on board a Pajero with plate number UDL-746 were heading towards Lipa City. Supt.
Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In the
meantime, two teams were organized to intercept the Pajero. They proceeded to the barricade.10
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted. When
policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two policemen approached
the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. At
this point, all the policemen present at the scene fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four
minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and the front passenger who managed to
escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who turned out to be Muit, the
driver of the Pajero, at Barangay San Carlos, Batangas, about 200 meters from the place of the
shootout.11
On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their
agreed meeting place but did not find Hermano’s group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in
front of the construction site. He thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the group, so
he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraer’s house, he told Ferraer what happened to their operation.
Worried that something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for
the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. watching
the TV program "Alas Singko y Medya." He joined them and saw on the news the Pajero riddled with
bullets. Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraer’s house at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left
behind the Mitsubishi car they used. That night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage
showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with
bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong, Jr.; Seraspe;
Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy; Supt. Mission,
Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare12 (Atty. Mallare), the lawyer who assisted
appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their
accounts were corroborated by the prosecution’s documentary evidence such as the extra judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare. Muit
executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December 1997, in which he
was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December 1997 in which
he was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and
his brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented appellants
Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997 he was working as a
mason at Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. His work starts at 8:00 in the morning and ends at 5:00
in the afternoon. He stated that on 8 December 1997, he was arrested by the CIDG at his house in
Purok Sto. Domingo, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. At the CIDG Detention Center, he was
questioned about the guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly tortured when he
denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement without being allowed
to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement. He denied any
participation in the crimes charged against him.13
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He was first
brought to the Calbayog City Police Station, and then transferred to Camp Crame. He alleged that the
police tortured him and forced him to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He
denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged against him. 14
On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of the
shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his uncle Bonifacio
when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the crime. He denied knowing the
people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He claimed that the names were
supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.15
In a decision16 dated 22 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 83 of Tanauan City, Batangas found Muit,
Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.17 Only the cases involving the charges of carnapping and
kidnapping for ransom which resulted in the death of the victim were automatically appealed to this
Court.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of
the prosecution’s witnesses. It found the prosecution’s witnesses more credible than appellants, whose
self-serving statements were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability. The
RTC did not give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured
through torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants’ medical
certificates which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements. And
the RTC noted that even without appellants’ extra judicial confessions, there was still sufficient evidence
on record to hold them guilty.
In a resolution dated 17 January 2006, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review.18
The Court of Appeals in a decision19 dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the RTC. 20 The
appellate court held that the RTC was correct in convicting appellants for kidnapping and carnapping.
The prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one another in the
planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed extra judicial
confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping. As for Muit,
other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified during the kidnapping by
eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. Appellants filed their notices of appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Before this Court, appellants opted not to file supplemental briefs, and instead adopted the assignment
of errors in their respective original briefs.21 Taken together, appellants claim that: (i) the RTC erred in
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against them; (ii) the RTC erred in its
finding that they acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged against them; and (iii) the
RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the
sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.22
The appeals are bereft of merit.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention23 are the following: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the
offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The essence of the crime of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the
accused to effect the same.24 The totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this case established the
commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, defines
"carnapping" as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.25 The crime was committed in this case when the victim’s Pajero was forcibly taken away from
him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct testimony
of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced him to
let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraer’s
house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the construction
site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the victim was
already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the construction site,
as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointed their guns at
the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to
the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They
immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by
the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and
engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two
persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the
house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and
Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of them
were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who
all took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the investigation, Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and family members, executed extra judical
confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the victim,
they should still be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.26 Where conspiracy is
established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes
secondary since the act of one is the act of all.27 The degree of actual participation in the commission of
the crime is immaterial.
The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly
planned the kidnapping in Ferraer’s house and patiently waited for the day when the victim would be at
the construction site. Then on 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo so they
proceeded to the construction site and carried out their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to
consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual
abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the
group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the group’s informant.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them.
There is nothing on record to support appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants’ extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the investigating
officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information
given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their
statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily
and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional
rights.28 Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two
extra judicial confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his
brother, Dominador. Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra
judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muit’s case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and
Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate
on the ground.29
Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations
done on them.30 These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time
during trial; appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while they were
imprisoned about the alleged tortures.31 Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to complain of
the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he was brought there. 32 Claims of
torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and
independent corroborating evidence.33
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecution’s
case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person
making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial statements
had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion
with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects
identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated
therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime and may
likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as
"interlocking confessions."34 Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the
aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraer’s testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in
his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Neither actual
demand for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that
the deprivation of liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.35 The death of the victim as a result of the
kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for the rule is that when more than one
qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances.36
The imposition of death penalty is also proper in the carnapping of the victim’s Pajero because it was
committed by a band, which serves as a generic aggravating circumstance, without any mitigating
circumstance.37 There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together
in the commission of the offense.38 As planned, Muit and three other armed men kidnapped the victim
and drove away with the latter’s Pajero while two more persons waiting near the Pag-asa road boarded
the Pajero.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalties imposed are commuted to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and without
eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103.39
As to damages, the RTC erred in awarding compensation for loss of earning capacity. Pursuant to
jurisprudence, the Court precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof as it
partakes of the nature of actual damages.40 The bare testimony of the father of the deceased that, at
the time of his death, the victim was earning
₱5,000.00 per month as an engineer is not sufficient proof. 41 But pursuant to the Court’s ruling
in People v. Abrazaldo42 wherein we deemed it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 in cases where evidence confirms the heirs’ entitlement to actual damages but the amount
of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting and duly presented
receipts, the Court awards ₱25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the victim in the present
case.

The civil indemnity should be increased to ₱75,000.00. 43 The award of civil indemnity may be granted
without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. 44 In line with jurisprudence, the moral
damages should also be increased to P 500,000.00.45

Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide46 and ₱25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping should be awarded. The law allows
exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is
attended by one or more aggravating circumstances. 47

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02044 which commuted the
death penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607 to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the compensation for loss of earning capacity
be deleted while the civil indemnity be increased to ₱75,000.00 and the moral damages to ₱500,000.00,
and that appellants shall also pay the heirs of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages of ₱25,000.00
and exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and
₱25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.
 epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y
RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando),
Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y
Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother
Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he
received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. 2 Records
show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied
Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number
UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At
around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers
who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of
ransom money in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only
had ₱50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to
release Edwin in exchange for the amount of ₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the
money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the
ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was
driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick
received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the
Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an
orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men
alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men
returned to their car and drove away. 6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3
Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame
Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an
employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to
kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain
Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo
gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the
early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin
at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN
NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion
thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of denial and
alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their
respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to
Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself,
averred that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he
noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle,
boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made
to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been
summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death 13 with
Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a
gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in
Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
clearly established that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car
and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants‟
respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of
Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death.
However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual participation was geared
toward a joint purpose and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim
Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, 19 a fact which is supported by the subject
certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-
appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps
or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating
public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise sustained the finding that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony
of the brother of the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common design, and they
were united in its execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and that
Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent
counsel in its execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive
and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the
result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses
deserves high respect by the appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these
testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took the
victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting
ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the court a
quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on this score.1âwphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the
conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be
presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted
action, and community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that
accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts
emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution, 29 the CA, affirming
the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and
the CA, as the crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear,
merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a)
specifically charged in the Information,30 and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably,
while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be
considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws
open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though
unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the
same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified
the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with
murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex crime‟ of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between
those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those
where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the
accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the
following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum ·from
the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of
death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death
penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are
not eligible for parole.34

On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well as
damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon, 35 the Court explained that even if the
death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the
award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the crime. 36 In the present case, considering that both the qualifying
circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during captivity were duly alleged in the
information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must therefore be
awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.37

Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217
of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that
moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the
kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the detention and
eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, 38 moral
damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.

Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid
qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179570 February 4, 2010
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50,
finding accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim2 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
abduction with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281 and finding accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. 12309.
In view of our decision in People v. Cabalquinto,3 the real name and identity of the rape victim, as well
as the members of her immediate family, are withheld. In this regard, the rape victim is herein referred
to as AAA; her mother, BBB; and her father, CCC.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron) were charged with the
crime of abduction with rape in an Information4 dated March 17, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another and by means of force, threat, violence and
intimidation, while armed with a bladed weapon known as "Badong", did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one AAA, a girl of 16 years of age, against her will and
consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the said accused by means of force,
threat, violence and intimidation, and while armed with a knife, accused Sahiron Lajim, with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said AAA,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped Sahiron Lajim by acting as look-out
during the commission of the said crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) were charged with the
crime of serious illegal detention in an Amended Information5 dated August 28, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December 15, 1994, at Barangay
Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and detain AAA, an unmarried woman under 15 years of age in the house of Egap
Madsali thereby depriving said AAA of her liberty all against her will and as a result of that illegal
detention, said AAA was not able to go home to her mother for a period of more than five (5) months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and with the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office,
Criminal Case No. 12309 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 12281, pending before the RTC of
Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50.
Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on September 21, 1995 in
Criminal Case No. 12309. He pleaded not guilty to both charges. Egap was arrested and, thereafter,
arraigned on March 8, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12309. Maron was arrested
and, later, arraigned on March 11, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12281. A joint trial
ensued. However, in July 1996, Egap escaped while under the custody of prison guards.
The evidence presented by the prosecution are as follows:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama
were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron
arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron
overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and told her, "Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I
will kill you." Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to
shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew
his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, "If you will not go, I will shoot
you." Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place,
Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA
refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth,
and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While
Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she
would submit to his desire, her life would be spared. Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts
and inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she
noticed blood on her private parts. She was sexually abused three times on the ground, where she was
made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron,
Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the
following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron
instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAA’s mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if
she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did
not report the incident to the police authorities.6 Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but
she refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were
married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the
presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with
the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA
did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and
her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention,
Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was
usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and threatened
by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's abduction to
the proper authorities. AAA was detained at the house of Egap from July 2, 1994 until December 15,
1994. On December 16, 1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron claimed that he
and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their elopement. During the period of their engagement,
Sajiron lived with AAA in her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and out of her own free
will. The sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The defense further claimed
that AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he did not pay the dowry (dower) in the
amount of ₱10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not pay the dowry because he had
already rendered services to AAA's family for about three years prior to his marriage with AAA. After the
marriage, Sajiron and AAA were brought by the latter's father to his house in Balabac, Palawan. They
stayed there for about four months. Then they went to Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at
the house of Egap for about two weeks. Sajiron was thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only
learned that a case for abduction with rape was filed against him by AAA when he was being
interrogated by the Bataraza Police.
On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, to suffer imprisonment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12281, the accused Sa[j]iron Lajim and Maron Lajim are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or forty (years) and each of the accused
are ordered to indemnify the complainant AAA the same amount of ₱50,000.00 as and for civil
indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. 12309, the accused Egap Madsali and Sa[j]iron Lajim are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and both accused are ordered to
separately indemnify the complainant AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as and for civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However,
pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,8 the case was transferred to the CA. The CA
rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2007 affirming the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos.
12281 and 12309.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE IMPLICATION OF THE 5-
MONTH INACTION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED
ADBUCTION AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HER DAUGHTER; AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY
OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S OWN FATHER.
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the five-month inaction of BBB through his
failure to report the alleged abduction and illegal detention of her daughter is totally inconsistent with
AAA's claim that she was abducted and illegally detained.
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility of the
complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay
was unreasonable and unexplained.9 BBB explained that she did not immediately report the abduction,
rape and detention of her daughter to the authorities, because Egap threatened to kill AAA,10 who was
then in his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared to report the
matter to the authorities. True enough, when Egap learned that she did what he forbade her to do, he
made good his threat and shot her at the back.11 Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five
months should not be taken against her.
Anent the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the unrebutted testimonies of CCC and
Imam Musli Muhammad cast a reasonable doubt on the charge against them. CCC testified that Sajiron
courted his daughter and proposed marriage after their three-year courtship. He claimed that he gave
his consent to the marriage of his daughter to Sajiron. Prior to the marriage, CCC said that he was even
able to talk to his daughter and his wife, and both were amenable to the marriage. AAA never
mentioned to him anything about having been kidnapped or raped. Neither did his wife tell him of their
daughter's alleged harrowing experience. He and his wife were present during the marriage celebration.
Again, the testimony of CCC fails to persuade Us. AAA testified that she had never seen her father
since she was a child, as her father had abandoned them. 12 BBB testified that she and her husband had
been separated for a long time, and she did not know his whereabouts. She further said that CCC left
their place in March 1983 to go to Malaysia, and that was the last time she saw him. 13 CCC's allegation
that his wife was present during the marriage celebration was also controverted by the testimonies of
AAA, her mother, and Imam Musli Muhammad. Thus, save for CCC's self-serving allegations, he could
not muster any sufficient evidence to beef up those allegations. It is also very surprising that CCC, after
his long absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the defense. CCC would like to impress upon this
Court that he has maintained constant communication with his family; however, no single witness was
presented to corroborate this claim.
Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay14 dated December 28, 1995, alleged that in
1991, his wife wrote and informed him that Sajiron asked for their daughter's hand in marriage. CCC
replied that he was giving his permission for their daughter to marry. In the same salaysay, he also said
that Egap wrote him a letter on July 4, 1994 and instructed him to proceed to Malitub, Bataraza to
discuss the intended marriage of AAA and Sajiron. However, records are bereft of proof of the existence
of these letters. Clearly, these allegations, being unsupported by evidence, are self-serving and cannot
be given any probative value.
Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness, attested that the parents of
AAA and Sajiron were not present during the marriage,15 thus controverting CCC's allegation that he
was present and gave consent to the marriage. Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when presented as
an accused witness, recanted his earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the wedding, the same
cannot be given credit. Recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is
exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself
repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor
by the courts.16 Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of
justice, simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or
another.17
As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on
affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against
petitioner.18
The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him was his failure
to pay the ₱10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true. No young Filipina of decent repute
would publicly admit she has been raped unless that is the truth. Even in these modern times, this
principle holds true.19 When the offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial, if
their accusation were not true.20
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a horrid story and impute to the
accused a crime so grave and subject herself and her family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a
public trial just to avenge the alleged non-payment of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine
desire to expose the truth, vindicate her honor and seek justice she so greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the "sweetheart theory," the defense of the accused, by alleging that
AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and marriage. If there were
indeed romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal reaction would
have been to cover up for the man she supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting
the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation,21 right after she was rescued by the authorities.
Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal
knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed
relationship by substantial evidence.22 The "sweetheart theory" hardly deserves any attention when an
accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that,
indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts. 23 In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any
evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere
fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. It
bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and
Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house. 24
More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most
important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's
conviction.25 This is so because, owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence
that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party. 26
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The trial court held that AAA's
testimony was clear, categorical and consistent. She remained steadfast in her assertions and
unfaltering in her testimony given in court on the unfortunate incident.27 The trial court found that AAA
positively identified Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated how she was taken and thrice
raped by Sajiron in the forest. AAA recounted her sordid experience as follows:
AAA on Direct-Examination by Private Prosecutor Narrazid.
Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at 3:30 p.m. do you remember where you were?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Where were you?
A: We fetched water on July 1, 1994.
Q: Where?
A: In a cave, ma’am.
Q: Was there anything unusual that happened during that time?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: What was that incident?
A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run towards me and held me by my hair. He was carrying a
Barong and he was forcing me to go with him but I refused ma’am.
Q: And what did you do if any when he forced you to go with him?
A: He threatened me to kill me if I will not go with him. What I did was to hold the hair of Inon
Dama who came to my rescue, ma’am.
Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if any?
A: He hacked Inon Dama but was not hit and it was the container that was hit, ma’am. And
Sahiron Lajim left and I was forced to go with him telling me, "go with me if you do not want to
die."
Q: When this Inon Dama left what happened next and you were left alone with Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared who was also carrying a gun.
Q: What happened next?
A: The father of Sahiron Lajim told me to go with them but I refused. What they did was to tie
my hands behind my back and my mouth was covered by them by a piece of cloth, ma’am.
Q: And after that what happened next?
A: Then they brought me to the forest ma’am.
Q: And when you were in the forest what happened next?
A: Sahiron Lajim raped me while his father was watching ma’am.
Q: And how did Sahiron Lajim raped you?
A: When we reached the forest my hands were untied and my dress were removed and only
my bra was left ma’am.
Q: Who removed your dress?
A: Sahiron Lajim ma’am.
Q: And you stated that it was only your bra that was left in your body how about your panty?
A: It was already removed.
Q: While Sahiron Lajim was undressing you what did you do, if any?
 A: I pleaded to him not to pursue his intention and Sahiron Lajim threatened me that if I will However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's judgment finding
allow him to do such thing to me he will not kill me, ma’am. Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape in Criminal Case No. 12281. An appeal in a criminal
Q: And did he hold the private parts of your body? case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties 30 Article
A: Yes ma’am. (witness pointing to her bust, and the lower part of her body) 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that
Q: What other part did Sahiron Lajim touch in your body? the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction
A: My private part, my vagina, ma’am. is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
Q: What else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his organ to my vagina. Then after raping me he required me to wear my A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would readily show
blouse. He repeated the act again for two times up to the following day, ma’am. that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible abduction, because the taking, as
Q: How long was the private part of Sahiron Lajim inside your private part? alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd
A: A little bit long. Nearing one (1) hour. design was the act of rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the
Q: That was the first time his organ entered your private part? crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
A: Yes ma’am. rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: Did you notice anything in your private part?
A: I have seen blood. I was even pushing him away.
Q: How did you feel at that time when his organ was inside your private part? Although the information does not specifically allege the term "kidnap or detain," the information
A: It was painful, ma’am. specifically used the terms "take" and "carry away." To "kidnap" is to carry away by unlawful force or
Q: And you stated that his organ entered your private part again for the second time, how fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away.31 Whereas, to "take" is to get into one's
long? hand or into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem. 32 Thus, the word take, plus the
A I did not notice anymore how long was it, ma’am. accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the accused
Q: And you stated Madam Witness that you were repeatedly raped that night, is that correct? that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Up to what time? Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
A: The first time that he raped me was about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, the second was information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
midnight. And the third was 3:00 o’clock in the morning. conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital
Q: Were you able to sleep that night? of facts as alleged in the body of the information. 33 Simply put, the crime charged is determined by the
A: No ma’am. information's accusatory portion and not by its denomination.
Q: At the time when you were raped for the first time where was the father of Sahiron Lajim?
A: He was guarding ma’am. The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and
Q: How far was his father? Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of
A: He was near a tree which was 10 meters away from us. force, threat, violence and intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA.
Q: Now, the place where you were brought by Sahiron Lajim is a forest?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Was there a hut in that forest? The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
A: None ma’am, we were at a place where there were big trees, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say you were raped on the ground? Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
A: Yes ma’am. detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
Q: Without any blanket? kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
A: He got some leaves of trees, ma’am. present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating
Q: What did he do with that leaves of trees? public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
A: He secured some leaves and placed it on the ground, which served as mat, ma’am. or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
Q: Now, the second and the third time that Sahiron Lajim raped you where was his father? officer.35
A: He was also there, ma’am.28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a
xxxx minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists
not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of
As a rule, this Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness, his liberty.36 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. 37 Its
because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
of a witness while testifying, thus, putting it in a better position to determine whether a witness was lying accused to effect such deprivation.38 In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an
or telling the truth.29 enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her
mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away
from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had
no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible abduction and the
subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. 39 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of
the degree of participation of each of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act
of all.40 In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to prevent AAA from
resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her back and putting a piece of cloth in her mouth.
Maron watched and stood guard to make sure that no one would interrupt or prevent the bestial act
perpetrated by his son against AAA. Maron did not endeavor to prevent his son from raping AAA thrice.
The next morning, Sajiron and Maron brought AAA to the house of Egap to detain her there.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larrañaga,41 the Court explained that this provision gives rise to
a special complex crime:
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between
those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those
where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659."
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is
called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are
(1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4)
kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No.
7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a
special complex crime. (Italics in the original)
Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious
illegal detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a female
and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the forest, she was brought to and
detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on
July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape.42 She did
not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted to flee. 43
AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife.44 Even the two sons of Egap, upon the latter's instruction,
constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from leaving.45 In fine, the accused had successfully
instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping would cause her not only her own life, but also the lives of her
loved ones.
To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA. However, the marriage between
her and Sajiron is considered irregular under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree
No. 1083). Art. 15 (b) of said the law provides that no marriage contract shall be perfected unless the
essential requisite of mutual consent of the parties be freely given. And under Art. 32 of the same law, if
the consent of either party is vitiated by violence, intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the
marriage is considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its celebration.
AAA did not give her consent to the wedding.46 The marriage was solemnized only upon the instruction
of Egap.47 She was also forced to sign the marriage contract without the presence of her parents or any
of her relatives.48 She did not want to marry Sajiron because she did not love him. 49 The Imam who
solemnized their marriage did not even ask for the consent of the parties.50 He was merely compelled to
solemnize the marriage because he was afraid of Egap, and the latter threatened him. 51 Clearly, the
marriage ceremony was a farce, and was only orchestrated by the accused in an attempt to exculpate
themselves from criminal responsibility.
Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating or modifying circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and rape is death. However, R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was approved on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty. Thus, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua, 52 without eligibility for
parole.53
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the pendency of his case and his
subsequent unexplained absence during the promulgation of the decision convicting him of the crime
charged has divested him of the right to avail himself of any remedy that may be available to him,
including his right to appeal. In a recent case, this Court held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to
a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from it.54 Hence, insofar as accused Egap is concerned, the judgment against him became final
and executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment.
As to the award of damages. (b) In Criminal Case No. 12309, accused Sajiron Lajim is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape.55 of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages.
In People v. Quiachon,56 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in
R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual SO ORDERED.
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,57 while
R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided
for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the civil
indemnity for AAA is ₱75,000.00.

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, 58 without the
necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. 59 Moral damages is granted in
recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. 60 Such award is
separate and distinct from the civil indemnity. 61 Therefore, the Court awards the amount of ₱75,000.00
as moral damages.1avvphi1

In Criminal Case No. 12309, for serious illegal detention, the trial court's award of ₱50,000 civil
indemnity to AAA was proper, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.62

We also find that AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, which
provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. 63 This is predicated on
AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for more than five months.
Thus, the Court awards the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.64

Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995. There was no
showing that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations with other men. Further,
Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, testified that since AAA gave
birth on April 8, 1995, the baby must have been conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or
about the time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it can be logically deduced that Sajiron is the
father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code,65 he is civilly liable for the support of his
offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to
the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in
accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code. 66

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00475 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and to pay jointly and severally, the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Sajiron Lajim is further ordered to
support the offspring born as a consequence of the rape. The amount of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in arrears to be
reckoned from the date the appealed decision was promulgated by the trial court; and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00271,1 dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count
of rape through sexual assault.
Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not have kidnapped and
raped the victim, AAA,2 whom he claims to be his live-in partner. The records, however, reveal with
moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly, We modify the CA Decision and find him guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
THE FACTS
AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.
It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA
was dancing with her elder sister, BBB. 3
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back through
the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knife’s point thrust at her
right side. She will come to know the man’s name at the police station, after her escape, to be Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr.4 He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while
two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd,
walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy
fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing
the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun
from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the
Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis.5
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he
ordered her to remove her pants.6 When she defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun,
forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and
rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs,
pushed and pulled his penis inside.7 "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper at her,8 as she succumbed to
pain and exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting until
her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her to
open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair
with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle
and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree,
gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her
underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion
warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away. 9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth.
Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again
inserted his penis into her vagina.10
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the
same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to
another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a
cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig,
where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times. 11
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla
and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a river, got
drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the
fields and stayed out of people’s sight for two nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its path,
leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It was 11 January
2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police
gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the
man’s face – she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her. 12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in
different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse.13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from
her vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea.14
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each other at the Albay
Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had a short chat. They were
neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for good. 15
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her, 16 and, after five days,
as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in cheap motels. On 24
October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house in Kilikao, they met again at the park, at their
usual meeting place, in front of the park’s comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also
served as the CR’s guard.17 They decided to elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned
house in Rawis, at the back of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to
them for ₱1,500.00.18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. 19 From 12 December
2000 until 11 January 2001,20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio Marcellana’s house, at the
resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAA’s menstrual
periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. 21 In late December, however, Mirandilla, who
just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating
stomach pain.22 AAA had abortion – an inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside
AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left him in January 2001 after quarrelling for
days.23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA missed her
menstruation in December 200024 and that he would not have known she had an abortion had she not
confessed it to him.25
THE RTC RULING
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5, with
kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277), and
rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and
one count of rape through sexual assault with this finding:
This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company of three
others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of xxx, on or on about midnight of December
2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate
cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while holding a
gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times, employing force and intimidation. The twenty seven sexual
intercourses were eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the towns of xxx and xxx. At least
once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while employing
intimidation, threats, and force.26
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It found him guilty of
the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts
of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault. 27 It rejected Mirandilla’s defense that he and AAA
were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. 28 It noted that Mirandilla failed
to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain his defense.29
Hence, this appeal.
Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution’s lone witness, AAA, was not a credible witness
and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy they expressed in consensual sex.
OUR RULING
We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened almost
nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind
romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to
separation mainly because of AAA’s intentional abortion of their first child to be – a betrayal in its
gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific ordeal and her flight to
freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
First Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witness
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only come from a
credible witness but must be credible in itself – tested by human experience, observation, common
knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years.30
Daggers v. Van Dyck,31 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.32
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA’s manner and demeanour on the
witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA appeared to be a simple and truthful woman,
whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and serious
contradictions."33 The court continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to influence her in fabricating
criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence of ill motive enhances the standing of AAA
as a witness. x x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., to positively
identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.’s response was to smile. AAA was a
picture of a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x. 34
Second, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible in itself. AAA’s ordeal was entered into the
police blotter immediately after her escape,35 negating opportunity for concoction.36 While in Mirandilla’s
company, none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited,
saw, or talked to her. None of them knew her whereabouts.37 AAA’s testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal
lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination. The defense
lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA’s credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility, when affirmed by the CA, is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight or influence.38 This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under gruelling examination. 39 Thus, in
Estioca v. People,40 we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following
principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower courts, unless there is a
showing that it overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may
affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanour when they testified
on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a
credible witness.41
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence.42 Usually, these are letters, notes, photos,
mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling
element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust. 44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof;45 after the prosecution has successfully established a prima facie
case,46 the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused,47 who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual.48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to
support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial
to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when created against him."50(Emphasis
supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the prosecution’s prima facie
case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and
Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified that on 30 October
2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park. 51 They approached her and chatted with her. On
cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting with her
first, before AAA finally came.52 She also claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October
2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination with the version that she met them previously,
three times at least, in the previous month. 53 On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on
3 October 2000 at the park.54
The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in Kilikao only
after his imprisonment.55 This contradicted Mirandilla’s claim that he visited his mother several times in
Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001.56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood, agonizing in pain, with
the abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he came to
know AAA’s abortion only through the latter’s admission.57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies contradicted each other and flip-
flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they concocted stories in a desperate
attempt to exonerate the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be reconciled,58 it being
true that such is possible since a witness is not expected to give error-free testimony considering the
lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.59 But, this principle, learned from lessons of human
experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters – innocent lapses that do not affect witness’
credibility.60 They do not apply to self-contradictions on material facts.61 Where these contradictions
cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies,62 and apply the maxim, falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious
and deliberate intention to falsify a material point. In other words, its requirements, which must concur,
are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as to one or more material points; and (2) that there
should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsity. 63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by
the parties.64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902 landmark case of U.S. v. Abijan, 65 which is now
embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and
increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial Court
for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. 66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one count of
rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that Mirandilla kidnapped
AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three days during which time he had carnal
knowledge of her, against her will.67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found that
Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a
gun and/or a knife.68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or
intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:
la detención, la prición, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier
medio ó por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su
actividad."69
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659,70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives
rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v. Larrañaga, 71 this arises where the
law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses.72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape.73 This is because these
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts
with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no
matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed
– the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the
victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People
v. Garcia,74 we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several
times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the
forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes
distinct and separate count of rape.75
It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible
abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,76 the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua,77 without eligibility for parole.78
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape cannot be
considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil damages ex
delicto is mandatory.79 As we elucidated in People v. Prades,80 the award authorized by the criminal law
as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside from other proven actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. 81 Thus, we held that the civil liability ex
delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and indemnification, 82 all
correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code.83
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor,84 the Court enunciated that if, in the crime of rape, the
death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in the increased amount
of NOT85 less than ₱75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the Court: "this is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes..."86 xxx (Emphasis
supplied)
After the enactment R.A. 9346,87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions arose as to the
continued applicability of the Victor88 ruling. Thus, in People v. Quiachon,89 the Court pronounced that
even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto
of ₱75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death,
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of death attended the commission of
the offense.90 As explained in People v. Salome,91 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still
death, and the offense is still heinous.92 (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, 93 without the
necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. This move of dispensing evidence
to prove moral damage in rape cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades, 94 where we held that:

The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages
may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court
deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for
essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect
included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on
her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in
the case need not go through superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis
supplied)95

AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, pursuant to the present jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape
under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay the
offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
TITLE X:
Crimes against Property
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 212191, September 05, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD DILLATAN, SR. Y PAT AND
DONATO GARCIA Y DUAZO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by herein accused appellants Richard Dillatan, Sr. y
Pat (Dillatan) and Donato Garcia y Duazo (Garcia) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision[1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 30, 2013, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05294, which
denied their appeal and affirmed, with modification, the October 24, 2011 Decision [2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, finding herein accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide, imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay
civil indemnity as well as moral and actual damages.
The facts, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:
Herein private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob), were owners of a
market stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa, Aurora, Isabela. Around 6 o'clock in the evening of
February 7, 2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall and proceeded
home by riding together on their motorcycle. Homer was the driver, Violeta sat at the middle, while
Henry sat behind her. They were approaching the entrance to their barangay around 6:30 p.m. when
they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as herein accused-appellants, near a motorcycle.
When they passed, accused-appellants rode the motorcycle and tailed them. Accused-appellants
eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to stop and immediately
declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag which contained
P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter, Dillatan uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired at the victims hitting,
first, the left hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest
causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the other hand, was able to get off
the motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby hitting his right knee. Accused-
appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people then came to the aid of the private
complainants and brought them to the hospital where Homer later expired by reason of his gunshot
wound. Violeta and Henry were treated for their wounds. Accused-appellants were apprehended by
police authorities later at night where they were subsequently identified by Violeta at the police station
as the ones who grabbed her belt bag and shot them. A criminal complaint was subsequently filed
against accused-appellants.
On February 8, 2010, an Information was filed against herein accused-appellants, the accusatory
portion of which reads, thus:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 2010 in the Municipality of Aurora, Province of Isabela,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused RICHARD DILLATAN, SR. y
PAT and DONATO GARCIA y DUAZO, conspiring, confederating together, and helping one another,
with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation against persons, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away a belt bag containing cash money in the
amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00) and belonging to [complainants] against their
will and consent to the damage and prejudice of the said owners, in the aforesaid amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00).
That during the occasion and by reason of the said robbery, the said accused in pursuance of their
conspiracy, and to enable them to take, [steal] and bring away the said amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot the [person] of Homer Acob on his chest
which directly caused his death and the bullet penetrating Homer Acob's body and hitting Violeta Acob
inflicting gunshot wound on [her] left hand and Henry Acob hitting him on his right knee, which injuries
would ordinarily cause the death of said Violeta Acob and Henry Acob, thus, performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did
not produce it, by reason of causes independent of their will, that is by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to the said Violeta Acob and Henry Acob, which prevented their death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Accused-appellants were arraigned on September 29, 2010 where both pleaded not guilty. 4
In their defense, accused-appellants denied the allegations of the prosecution and also raised the
defense of alibi. For his part, Garcia claimed that on February 7, 2010, he was at a tricycle terminal in
Aurora, Isabela where he worked as a dispatcher until 7 o'clock in the evening. His allegation was
corroborated by the testimony of another tricycle driver who claimed to have seen him during the night
in question. On the part of Dillatan, he testified that he was in his bakery in Quezon, Isabela until 7
o'clock in the evening of February 7, 2010. His testimony was corroborated by his own witness.
Pre-trial was conducted on October 20, 2010.5 Thereafter, trial ensued.
On October 24, 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused appellants guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt, a JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
convicting accused RICHARD DILLATAN y PAT and DONATO GARCIA y DUAZO of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
thus, imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Accused are also ordered to jointly and severally pay the following:
a. The amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity, and another Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) as moral damages to the Heirs of Homer A cob;
b. The amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000) as actual damages to spouses Henry and Violeta
Acob;
c. The amount of Forty-eight thousand six hundred seventy [t]hree and 75/[1]00 pesos (P48,673.75) to
Henry Acob as reimbursement of his medical expenses;
d. The amount of Five thousand five hundred seventy-one pesos (P5,571) to Violeta Acob as
reimbursement of her medical expenses.

SO ORDERED.6
The RTC held that: all the elements of the crime of robbery are present in the instant case; robbery was
the main purpose of accused appellants; the killing of Homer and the infliction of injuries upon Violeta
and Henry are only committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery; hence, these crimes are
merged into a special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The RTC further held that the prosecution was able to
sufficiently establish that the accused-appellants are the perpetrators of the crime when they were
positively identified by Violeta.
Accused-appellants appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
On August 30, 2013, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC with
modification by ordering accused-appellants to further pay temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the
elements of robbery with homicide by proving that Dillatan declared a holdup and grabbed Violeta's belt
bag, while Garcia fired at the private complainants in order to facilitate the taking of the bag and their
escape from the crime scene. The CA sustained the RTC in giving credence to the testimony of Violeta
who positively identified the accused-appellants in court, as well as in the police station, on the same
night that the crime took place. The CA also gave credence to Henry's testimony identifying accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. The CA held that accused-appellants' defenses of denial
and alibi could not prevail over the positive testimony of Violeta and Henry who pointed to them as the
ones who robbed and fired at them.
On September 11, 2013, accused-appellants, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal[7 manifesting
their intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.
In its Resolution8 dated October 29, 2013, the CA gave due course to accused-appellants Notice of
Appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Court.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In a Resolution9 dated July 7, 2014, this Court, among others, notified the parties that they may file
their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire.
In its Manifestation and Motion10 dated August 27, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) manifested that it will not be filing a Supplemental Brief because it had already adequately
addressed in its Brief filed before the CA all the issues and arguments raised by accused-appellants in
their Brief.
In the same manner, accused-appellants filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief 11 dated
September 2, 2014, indicating that they no longer intend to file a Supplemental Brief on the ground that
the issues have been thoroughly discussed and applicable defenses and arguments were already
raised in their Brief which was filed with the CA.
In their Brief, accused-appellants mainly contend that the RTC erred in convicting them of the crime
charged, and the CA, in affirming their conviction, despite the incredibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, and the failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the assailants.
The appeal lacks merit. The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse accused-appellants' conviction.
Essentially, accused-appellants question the credibility of the prosecution's key witnesses, Henry and
Violeta Acob, who identified them as the malefactors.
First, accused-appellants argue that, since the alleged crime happened so fast and in a very short
period of approximately two minutes, Violeta and Henry could not have clearly seen and remembered
the faces of the perpetrators. Second, accused-appellants attempt to cast doubt on their identification by
claiming that there was inadequate lighting at the locus criminis. They contend that the poor illumination
at the crime scene made positive identification impossible; thus, the trial court should not have accepted
the identification of accused-appellants as the malefactors.
The Court is not persuaded.
The basic issues raised by accused-appellants are mainly factual and it is a well settled rule that in
criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. 12 It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that
the Court will evaluate the factual findings of the court below. 13 More importantly, it is an established
principle ·in appellate review that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect and that
these findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA. 14 Guided by the
foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC's factual findings, as affirmed
by the CA.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the
robbery.15 To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed.16 A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.17 The intent to rob must precede the taking
of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.18
Under the given facts, the Court finds no error in the findings of both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) accused-appellants forced Homer, Henry and Violeta
to stop their motorcycle; (2) Dillatan declared the holdup and grabbed the belt bag in Violeta's
possession; and (3) thereafter, Garcia fired at the victims in order to preserve their possession of the
stolen item and to facilitate their escape.
The Court, likewise, finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of both the RTC and the CA in giving
credence to the testimonies of Henry and Violeta, especially, their positive and categorical identification
of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Thus, pertinent portions of Violeta's testimony in open court are as follows:
xxxx
Q. In going home coming from your store, Madam Witness, can you recall what time did you leave the
Public Market of Aurora, Isabela?
A. 6:00 o'clock in the evening, sir.
Q. Were you able to reach your home at Barangay Diamantina, Aurora, Isabela, Madam Witness?
A. No, sir.
 Q. Can you please tell us why you were not able to reach your home at Barangay Diamantina, Q. And Donato Garcia was using the same firearm then, Madam Witness?
Aurora, Isabela, Madam Witness? A. Yes, sir.19
A. When we were about to enter our barangay a motorcycle came near us, sir.
Q. Do you know who are these persons riding on a motorcycle, Madam Witness?
Henry also testified, during cross-examination, as follows:
A. No, sir.
Q. Mr. Witness, you said in your direct-testimony that on your way home from the Aurora Public
Q. When these two (2) persons riding on a motorcycle went near you, what happened then, Madam
Market on February 7, 2010, you were held up by two (2) men, is this correct?
Witness, if there was any?
A. When the motorcycle came near us I heard the words stop this is a hold-up, give your bag to us,
THE WITNESS:
sir.
A. Yes, ma'am
Q. Did you know who was this person declaring hold-up, Madam Witness?
Q. And that the incident happened at the Barangay Road of Barangay Diamantina, Aurora, Isabela, is
A. That man, sir. (The witness pointed to a man sitting on the first bench of the Court and who when
that correct?
asked his name gave his name as Richard Dillatan, Sr.)
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When accused Richard Dillatan, Sr. declared hold-up, what did you do, Madam Witness, if there
Q. And that the incident happened at around 6:30 in the evening, is this correct?
was any?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
A. When I was about to give my bag he said again "shoot them", sir.
Q. And that you were on board a motorcycle, together with your wife and son, when the incident
Q. To whom did you give your bag, Madam Witness?
happened?
A. It was grabbed from me by that person I previously identified a while ago as Richard Dillatan, Sr.,
A. Yes, Ma'am.
sir.
Q. The men who held you up were also on board a motorcycle, is this correct?
Q. Was he able to get your bag, Madam Witness?
A Yes, Ma'am.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that the motorcycle was one (1) meter away from the motorcycle you were riding at when they
Q. You also mentioned a while ago that somebody uttered, "sige barilin mona sila", do you know who
declared a hold up, is this correct?
was that person who uttered that (sic) words?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
A. The same person who took my bag, sir.
Q. And that the man driving the other motorcycle immediately shot your son, which caused the
Q. What happened, Madam Witness, when accused Richard Dillatan, Sr. instructed his co-accused to
motorcycle that you were riding at to fall down, is this correct? .
shoot you?
A. Yes, Ma'am
A. I was hit on my left hand and the bullet which penetrated my hand hit my son on his chest, sir.
Q. And that the man who held you up also shot you once, which hit you on your knee, is this correct,
Q. By the way, Madam Witness, do you know this person who shot you?
Mr. Witness?
A. I know him, sir.
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. Can you please tell us his name, Madam Witness, if you know?
Q. And that the companion of the man, who shot you, immediately grabbed the belt bag from your
A. That man, sir (The witness pointed to a man sitting on the first bench of the Court and who when
wife, is this correct?
asked his name answered Donato Garcia )
A. Yes, Ma'am, after we were shot.
xxxx
Q. Mr. Witness, how long did it take for the men who held you up to declare hold up to time they
Q: You mentioned a while ago that a motorcycle went near you, Madam Witness, is that correct?
grabbed the belt bag and sped away?
A: Yes, sir.
A. I cannot recall, Ma'am.
Q: How far were these two (2) persons from you when they went near you, Madam Witness?
Q. Could it be one (1) minute, Mr. Witness?
A: Like this, sir. (The witness demonstrated the distance and when measured it is 25 centimeters
A. Maybe two (2) minutes, Ma'am.
away ).
Q. So, Mr. Witness, you are saying that the incident happened in more or less two (2) minutes?
Q: When these two (2) male persons you identified as Donato Garcia and Richard Dillatan, Sr. went
A. Yes, Ma'am.
near you, were you able to recognize their [faces], Madam Witness?
Q. And that the assailants were one (1) meter away from you when it happened?
A: I recognized them because we were near with (sic) them, sir.
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q: You mentioned a while ago that the incident transpired at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening, how
Q. So, Mr. Witness, can you tell us how were the assailants identified?
come that you were able to identify the faces of the two accused, Madam Witness?
A. They were near from (sic) us when they shot us, Ma'am.
A: Because it was still bright that time, sir.
Q. You were able to clearly see their faces despite the fact that the incident happened at 6:30 in the
xxxx
evening?
Q. Madam Witness, when you were shot upon by accused Donato Garcia, what happened next?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
A. They shot also my husband and he was hit on his knee, sir.
Q. Mr. Witness, did you personally identify the accused?
Q. Who shot your husband, Madam Witness?
A. I recognized their faces, Ma'am.20
A. Donato Garcia, sir.
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found Violeta's and Henry's separate testimonies as
Q. How many times did he shoot your husband, Madam Witness?
credible. It is doctrinal that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of
A. Only once, sir.
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had overlooked,
Q. By the way, where was your husband when accused Donato Garcia shot him, Madam Witness?
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could reverse
A. He was running when he was shot, sir.
a judgment of conviction.21 In fact, in many instances, such findings are even accorded finality.22 This is
so because the assignment of value to a witness' testimony is essentially the domain of the trial court,
not to mention that it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to observe the demeanor of a
witness on the stand, which opportunity provides him the unique facility in determining whether or not to
accord credence to the testimony or whether the witness is telling the truth or not. 23 The foregoing
doctrine finds application in the instant case.
Even after carefully going through the records of the case, the Court still finds no sufficient ground to
disturb the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
The records show that Henry and Violeta positively, categorically and unhesitatingly identified Dillatan
as the one who declared the holdup and successfully grabbed Violeta's belt bag, while Garcia was the
one who fired at the victims, thereby killing Homer and wounding Henry and Violeta.
The Court is not persuaded by accused-appellants' insistence on their argument that given the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, the prosecution failed to establish their identity
as the malefactors.
First, this Court has ruled that common human experience tells us that when extraordinary
circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. [24 This
Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. 25 Most
often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot
be easily erased from a witness' memory. 26 Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual
acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of
reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.27
Thus, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the
faces of the assailants, this Court sees no reason how both parents, who witnessed the violence
inflicted, not only upon themselves, but especially upon their son, who eventually died by reason
thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Henry and Violeta were seated together atop
their motorcycle when Dillatan grabbed her bag and Garcia fired at them. In fact, Violeta was embracing
her son, Homer, when a single bullet struck them. Both accused-appellants, at that time, were both less
than a meter away from the victims. Hence, despite the swiftness of the assault upon them, Henry and
Violeta could not have mistaken the identity of accused-appellants as the persons responsible for the
attack.
Moreover, Violeta's testimony disproves the poor illumination claim of accused-appellants when she
testified that "it was still bright" at the time of the commission of the crime. 28 It is settled that when the
conditions of visibility are favorable, as in this case, the eyewitness identification of accused-appellants
as the malefactors and the specific acts constituting the crime should be accepted. 29 Add the fact that
Violeta and Henry had an unhindered view of the faces of accused-appellants during the whole time that
the crime was being committed. Thus, accused-appellants' attack on the positive identification by
Violeta and Henry must, therefore, fail.
The lower courts, also, correctly ruled that accused-appellants acted in conspiracy with one another.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.30 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint
purpose, concert of action and community of interest.31 For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that
there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of
the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.32 In the present case, the coordinated acts and movements of accused-appellants before,
during and after the commission of the crime point to no other conclusion than that they have acted in
conspiracy with each other. Moreover, it is settled that when homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take
part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. 33
Lastly, accused-appellants' lackluster defenses of denial and alibi fail to cast doubt on the positive
identification made by Henry and Violeta and the continuous chain of circumstances established by the
prosecution. This Court has consistently held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 34 They are facile to
fabricate and difficult to disprove, and are thus generally rejected.35 Besides, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or
within its immediate vicinity.36 The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no
exception.37 Where there is the least possibility of accused-appellants' presence at the crime scene, as
in this case, the alibi will not hold water.38 The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of
the lower courts that apart from their self-serving testimony that they were someplace else at the time of
the commission of the crime, accused-appellants were unable to sufficiently show that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
As to the penalty, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under Article 294 (1) of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 63 of
the same Code, as amended, states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two (2)
indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed. Considering that there was no modifying circumstance which attended
the commission of the crime, the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
At this stage, the Court notes that, on the occasion of the robbery, aside from Homer being killed, the
Spouses Acob also sustained injuries by reason of the gunshots fired by Garcia. It bears to reiterate at
this point that the component crimes in a special complex crime have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to ·commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the
process of committing the said crime, another crime is committed.39 "Homicide," in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and forms part of the essential
element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. 40 Stated differently,
all the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.41 Thus, as in the present case where, aside from the killing
of Homer, the Spouses Acob, on the occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless
of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries sustained by the
Spouses Acob are subsumed under the generic term "homicide" and, thus, become part and parcel of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Nonetheless, it is also settled that in robbery with homicide, the victims who sustained injuries, but were
not killed, shall also be indemnified.42 Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by these
victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages.43
It is settled that if a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not
fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded
equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage. 44
In the instant case, while it was alleged in the Information that Henry, who was shot on his right knee,
and Violeta, who's left hand was hit by the same bullet that killed Homer, could have died from their
injuries were it not for the timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, the prosecution failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove such allegation. Thus, their injuries are not considered fatal and, as
such, the Spouses Acob are each entitled only to be indemnified amounts which are equivalent to those
awarded in an attempted stage.

Also, this Court has held in the controlling case of People v. Jugueta45 that in special complex crimes
like robbery with homicide where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the awards for civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are now uniformly pegged at P75,000.00. The
award of temperate damages is also increased to P50,000.00.

Thus, with respect to accused-appellants' civil liabilities, this Court deems it proper to modify the
monetary awards granted by the lower courts in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.

Hence, for the death of Homer, his heirs are entitled to the awards of P75,000 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of temperate
damages to the heirs of Homer, for burial expenses, shall be increased from P25,000.00 to P50,000.00.
With respect to the Spouses Acob, in addition to the awards of actual damages to them for their
hospitalization expenses and the return of the P70,00.00 cash taken from them, each of them are
entitled to the awards of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.46

The Court also imposes interest, at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum, on all the monetary
awards from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision, dated August 30, 2013, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05294, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accordingly,
accused-appellants, RICHARD DILLATAN, SR. Y PAT AND DONATO GARCIA Y DUAZO, are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In addition, to the monetary awards granted by the lower courts, accused-appellants are
further ORDERED to PAY the Heirs of Homer the following:

In addition, to the monetary awards granted by the lower courts, accused-appellants are
further ORDERED to PAY the Heirs of Homer the following:
(1) civil indemnity and moral damages in the increased amounts of P75,000.00, each;
(2) exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00;
(3) temperature damages in the increased amount of P50,000.00
Accused-appellants are, likewise, ORDERED to PAY each of the victims, Henry and Violeta Acob, the
following:
(1) civil indemnity int he amount of P25,000.00;
(2) moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and
(3) exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Accused-appellants shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary
awards, from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

All other awards are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ARNEL BALUTE y VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Arnel Balute y Villanueva (Balute)
assailing the Decision2 dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05649 which affirmed the Decision3 dated June 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
18 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 03-211951, finding Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
The Facts
On November 22, 2002, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1)4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended, the accusatory portion of which reads: 5
Crim. Case No. 03-211951
"That on or about March 22, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together with one whose true name, real identityand present whereabouts are still
unknown and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun at one SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS, forcibly
grabbing and snatching his Nokia 3210 cellular phone, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the same valued at ₱6,000.00 against his will, to the damage and
prejudice of the said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS in the aforesaid amount of ₱6,000.00 Philippine
Currency; thereafter shooting said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS with an unknown caliber firearm,
hitting him at the back, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal gunshot wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
According to the prosecution, at around 8 o’clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B.
Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and daughter
Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a
lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) malepersons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Leo
Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, withBalute poking a gun at the side
of SPO1 Manaois and saying "putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaois’s
mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois
reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the
assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite
undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention.6
In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him.1âwphi1 He
maintained, inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol)
wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day as he was busy working the entire time.
Nicol corroborated Balute’s story, and imputed liability on Blaster and a certain Intoy. 7
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision8 dated June 11, 2012, the RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and accordingly, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, in lieu of the death penalty,
as well as ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO1 Manaois the amounts of ₱50,000.00 ascivil indemnity,
₱6,000.00 as compensatory damages for the value of the stolen mobile phone, and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from the filing of the
Information.9
It found that the prosecution was ableto establish the existence of all the elements of Robbery with
Homicide, as it proved that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois’s side, took his mobile phone, and
shot him, resulting in the latter’s death. In this relation, the RTC gave credence to Cristita and Blesilda’s
positive identification of Balute as the assailant, as compared to the latter’s mere denial and alibi. 10
Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision11 dated February 3, 2014, the CA affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification in that: (a)
the aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the prosecution failed to allege
the same in the Information;12 (b) the civil indemnity was increased to ₱75,000.00 in view of existing
jurisprudence; (c) the ₱6,000.00 compensatory damages, representing the value of the mobile phone,
was deleted in the absence of competent proofof its value, and in lieu thereof, actual damages in the
aggregate amount of ₱140,413.53 representing SPO1 Manaois’s hospital and funeral expenseswas
awarded to his heirs; and (d) all the monetary awards for damages are with interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) p.a. from the date of finality of the CA Decision until fully paid.13
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The lone issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for
Robbery with Homicide.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.

It must be stressed that in criminalcases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court
below.14 Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC’s factual
findings, as affirmed by the CA.

In People v. Ibañez,15 the Court exhaustively explained that "[a] special complex crime of robbery with
homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason,or on the occasion, of the robbery.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime
of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the
robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to
the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery."16 Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of
robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. 17

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to establish
the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and thereafter, shot
him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and
Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter’s
denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving,
as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the
matter."18 This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim – such as Cristita
and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively – since "[t]he natural
interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would
actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits."19

In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the RPC, as amended. However, the Court deems it
appropriate to adjust the award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 in order to conform
with prevailing jurisprudence.20 Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00 in favor of the heirs of SPO1 Manaois due to the highly reprehensible and/or outrageous
conduct of Balute in committing the aforesaid crime.21 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
The Decision dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 finding
accused-appellant Arnel Balute y Villanueva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and is ordered to pay the heirs of SPOl Raymundo B. Manaois
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱140,413.53 as actual damages, and ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
March 25, 2015
G.R. No. 209227
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLIE OROSCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05171 which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 10 finding the accused-appellant Charlie Orosco guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Appellant, along with Abner Astor, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe," were charged with Robbery with
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, with intent of gain and by means of violence, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully,
feloniously and forcibly enter the store owned by one Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis,
Legazpi City, and once inside said store, take, steal and carry away cash money, to the damage and
prejudice of said Lourdes Yap, and by reason of or on occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of their superior strength
and with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab the aforesaid Lourdes Yap, thereby inflicting upon her
injury which directly caused her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on the eyewitness account of Albert M. Arca
(Arca), the postmortem findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo Belgira who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, and the victim’s grandson, Ryan Francis Yap.
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one o’clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes
Yap (Yap) at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet hardened
(frozen) so he went home. At around two o’clock, he was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same
store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male
customers. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient change and insisting they gave a
P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store. From outside the
store and thru its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap
and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her hands.
He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco (appellant), while he
described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less hair and dark complexion. The latter
stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant
then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the religious icon or "santo" at the altar infront of the
store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with two other men outside
who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went home afraid because
he was seen by one of the lookouts.4
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later, at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of
appellant and the dark thin man who stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and
video clip shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting
beside the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against appellant and Astor.
But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.
Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal Report5 stating:
TRUNK:
1)Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, 9 cm
deep. The wound tract is directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, cutting the sixth anterior
thoracic rib and piercing the heart.
CONCLUSION:
The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the trunk.
He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object, such as a knife,
was inflicted while the victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense wounds. 6
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house in
Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He stayed in the house
until his wife finished the laundry at past 3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co- accused Astor.
While he admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other
house at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to testify against
him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting for work after May 16, 2006 as he
was selling fish. He was arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine
for his sick child.7
Appellant’s wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the incident he
was at their house while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On cross-examination,
she was asked the distance between their place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less
than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.8
On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged, thus: Q.Please look around you and point at him.
A.He is here.
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of Q.If he is in Court, please point at him.
the crime of robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, Q.Why can’t you point at him? COURT INTERPRETER
to pay the heirs of Lourdes Yap P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death, P75,000.00 as moral At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling. ACP NUQUI
damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Oh, you see. ATTY. BAÑARES
The witness can not answer. ACP NUQUI
By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid. Perhaps….
Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending their xxxx
eventual arrest. ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q.Please point at him.
SO ORDERED.9 ATTY. BAÑARES
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at anyone. ACP NUQUI
Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA upheld his conviction as it found no No. He said that the…. ATTY. BAÑARES
compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court. Then, let him voluntarily do it. ACP NUQUI
Okay.
ATTY. BAÑARES
In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the trial court erred in Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to another question because we keep on waiting
giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the already.
trial, and that even granting that criminal charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery ACP NUQUI
and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide considering the fact that it was not him who Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he keeps on glancing at the person.
stabbed Yap. COURT
Observations are all noted.
The appeal lacks merit. xxxx
ACP NUQUI
At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record that when it comes to the person of Charlie
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a single,
Orosco, Your Honor, he stopped and did not say ---- he did not nod or do anything of what he has been
trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of a sole
doing when the other persons were identified.
witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt
COURT
beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant
Okay. Noted.11
the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.10
Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by appellant’s companion and appellant
taking the thick wad of P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts. When asked for the fourth
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, time to pinpoint appellant, Arca was still hesitant:Q.Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?
convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he A.Yes, sir, he is around.
initially desisted from physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands from behind and Q.This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you said "he is in Court," will you please look at
took her money at the store after she was stabbed by appellant’s cohort (John Doe). him.
xxxx
In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap but refused ACP NUQUI (continuing)
to pinpoint him in open court, thus: Q.Is he now in Court?
A.Yes, sir.
Q.Please point at him. ATTY BAÑARES
ACP NUQUI x x x x
The same observation, Your Honor. COURT
Q.This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, were you able to identify him?
Oh, the same observation? ACP NUQUI
A.Yes, sir.
Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable because he is afraid.
Q.Do you know the name of this person?
xxxx
A.Yes, sir. He is Charlie.
COURT (to the witness)
Q.Do you know the family name?
Q.Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according to you he is inside the Court?
A.Orosco, sir.
WITNESS (answering)
Q.If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, if he is in Court,
A.I can’t afford to point at him.
would you please point to him?
ACP NUQUI (to the witness)
WITNESS (answering)
Q.Why?
A.Yes, sir.
A. I am afraid.
COURT
He can not because he is afraid.12 (Emphasis supplied)
At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to pinpoint
appellant as among those persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus:
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to Lourdes Yap. Who are these persons you are
referring to?
ATTY. CHAN
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A- Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of the persons talking, how long have you
known Charlie Orosco?
A- He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and because of that I know him.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- You mentioned that you have long known Charlie Orosco. Will you look around and point to
him if he is in Court?
INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow T-shirt with handcuff and when
asked answered by the name of Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
No further questions Your Honor.13
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively identified
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz:
Here, Albert Arca, the prosecution’s main witness, positively identified accused Orosco as one of [the]
two men who robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful day. As observed by the trial court during
the bail hearings, when asked to identify one of the men who robbed and killed the victim, Arca was
trembling and constantly looking towards the direction of accused Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca
was well-aware of the possible consequences his testimony could trigger. To the Court’s mind, Arca’s
act of constantly looking towards Orosco’s direction whenever he was asked to point out one of the
culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As
such, Arca’s act is sufficient identification already.
Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer some additional questions, he was able to gather
enough courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the hands of Lourdes Yap while his
companion stabbed her. Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify and point out accused earlier
because he feared what Orosco might do to him. Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife stated that they
do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap. Thus, it appears that there is no reason whatsoever for
Arca to lie and attribute the crime to Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence, Arca’s positive
identification of Orosco prevails over the latter’s alibi. 14
We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court on its evaluation of
Arca’s testimony. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without
any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which could affect the result of the case. 15
Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the trial
court’s firsthand observation of said witness’ deportment revealed, Arca’s fear of appellant sufficiently
explains his initial refusal to point to him in open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally
able to point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap during his
additional direct examination when he had apparently mustered enough courage to do so.
Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides in part:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used
in its generic sense) is committed.16 Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the
occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime. 17 In robbery with homicide, the
original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human
life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.18
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and
John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal
tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change was
just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept her earnings. To verify whether the cash
payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the store but once inside they got
hold of her and stabbed her. Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was
only robbery since Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed
the victim.
We disagree.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with his
co-accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal altercation until
she allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe wrapping
his arm around her neck while appellant held her hands at the back. With the victim pressed between
the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she fell down,
appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar inside the store and fled together with John Doe
and the two lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between
appellant and his co- accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery.
He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act
contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John Doe stabbed her
frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co- accused, appellant is equally liable for the
killing of Yap.

As we held in People v. Baron19

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed
beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that
there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that the
appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the
appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the
act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant
and his co-accused are one and the same. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide. Appellant
was positively identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among those who perpetrated the robbery
and killing of Yap at the latter’s store on May 16, 2006 in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This positive
identification prevails over accused’s defense of alibi. As pointed out by the trial court, it was not
physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime considering the presence of many
public conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to Rawis to only a "couple
of minutes."20

On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death and
P75,000.00 as moral damages, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.21 We also find the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 proper due to the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, though these were not alleged in the
information. While an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit
established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the
offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of
specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. 22

The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 10 in Criminal Case No. 10916 is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded as civil
indemnity (P75,000.00), moral damages (P75,000.00) and exemplary damages (P30,000.00) shall earn
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173479 July 12, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUAN CABBAB, JR., Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the decision1 dated February 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 which affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 687, finding appellant
Juan Cabbab, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Attempted
Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo2 which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was
earlier3 referred to the CA, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01978, for appropriate
action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, was
charged with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in an
Information4 alleging, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay Kimmalasag, Municipality of San Isidro,
Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with the intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, while armed with a firearm (not-
recover), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot from ambush WINNER AGBULOS and EDDIE
QUINDASAN, consequently inflicting thereby multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of their
bodies, killing Winner Agbulos on the spot and causing the death of Eddie Quindasan shortly thereafter,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shot William Belmes, said accused
having commenced the execution of Murder by overt acts but were unable to perform all the acts of
execution, which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, due to alertness
of victim William Belmes to roll and poor marksmanship of the accused thus prevented his death, then
and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously, with the intent of gain, take, steal and carry away the
money of Winner Agbulos in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), Philippine currency..
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of: (1) uninhabited place.
On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused Segundino Calpito separately entered their
pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which
the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police investigator at
Camp Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO William Belmes, a member of the Integrated National Police at the
Villaviciosa Police Station; Vidal Agbulos, father of the victim Winner Agbulos; Dra. Leona Garcia-
Beroña, medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of Winner Agbulos; and Dr.
Godofreco Gasa, a physician at the Abra Provincial Hospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself; accused Segundino Calpito; and George de
Lara, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The People’s version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in its Appellee’s Brief,5 to wit:
In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie
Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San
Isidro, Abra to attend a "fiesta" celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out that the fiesta
celebration was already over, thus, they decided to go home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already
lunchtime, the group took their lunch at Sitio Turod, located in the same area of Barangay Kimmalasag.
After taking their lunch and on their way home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr.
and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the game of "russian poker."
Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played "pepito" with the group of accused-appellant. Winner
Agbulos played the dealer/banker in the game while accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito acted as
players therein. Around 3:00 o’clock p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan that they should be going home after three (3) more deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner
Agbulos’s group wrapped-up the game and were set for home together with his group. Winner Agbulos
won the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused
Segundino Calpito and a companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of
accused-appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking
behind the group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by
accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw
the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The
three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime where
they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and
Segundino Calpito who ambused them and took the money, estimated at ₱12,000.00, of Winner
Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital
but died the following day.
Postmortem examination of Winner Agbulos showed that the cause of his death was "cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds." On the other hand, Eddie
Quindasan’s cause of death was "cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to
multiple gunshot wounds."
For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand claiming that in the morning of April 22, 1988,
he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all
surnamed Borreta. He stayed there almost the entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived
home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He declared that his co-accused Calpito was
not with him that day. He likewise averred that he did not know prosecution witnesses PO William
Belmes and Vidal Agbulos nor did he know of any motive for them to testify against him.
Appellant’s co-accused Calpito denied having committed the crimes charged. He testified that at around
8:30 a.m. of April 22, 1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the
following day.
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the paraffin
cast taken from appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on appellant’s
hands. The results of the said examination showed that appellant was negative of nitrates. He opined
that certain factors may affect the result of the test such as perspiration, wind velocity, humidity or the
type of gun used. He also theorized that a paraffin test would yield a negative result if fertilizers or
cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast is taken.
The Trial Court’s Decision
In a decision6 dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted Segundino Calpito but found appellant
Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder.
Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double
murder with robbery or better put, robbery with double homicide and attempted murder as defined in Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery with double homicide
defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Same Code with aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances and sentences him with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each of the killing of Winner Agbulos and for robbing the said victim after killing
him and for the killing of Eddie Quindasan. The court likewise finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the attempted murder defined and penalized in Art. 48 in relation to Art. 6
of the Revised Penal Code. These offenses attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place with no mitigating circumstances and sentence him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum.
He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 for each of them plus P20,000.00 also
for each of them as actual expenses and finally, the amount of P100,000.00 also for each of them as
moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic review. As stated at the onset
hereof, the Court, in its Resolution7 of January 17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling in People v.
Mateo,8 referred the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968.
In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial court’s decision and found appellant
guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed appellant’s conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the
separate crime of attempted murder.
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its Resolution 9 of
September 20, 2006, the Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective supplemental
briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of appellee People, informed the Court
that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief and was merely adopting its appellee’s brief before the CA
as its supplemental brief.
Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his supplemental brief on the lone assigned
error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE VERSION IS
MORE CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant pleads for
acquittal. He avers that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to positively identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime as they did not actually see him shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on the
results of the paraffin test showing that he was negative of gunpowder nitrates.
The appeal must fail.
Appellant’s contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify him as the perpetrator of
the crime is belied by the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the victims when the incident
happened. We quote from the transcripts of the stenographic notes:
William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30, 1988, exactly eight (8) days after the
incident when the incident wherein you were investigated upon still very very fresh in your mind (sic).
Now, in your statement which you gave to the investigator, Pat. Tubadeza, you stated that you saw the
persons shot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan and after the two (2) had fell down then you also
likewise saw them shot at you at the time you were rolling to the ground. Do you affirm and confirm this
statement of yours which you subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte Valera?
ATTY. YANURIA:
Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the shooting of Eddie Quindasan and Winner
Agbulos was not seen. He only saw the persons who were firing at him namely: Juan Cabbab and
Segundino Calpito.
COURT:
In his testimony before the court he testified before the court that he saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino
Calpito shot at Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos. Reform the question.
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shoot at you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2) accused when they were firing at you?
A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at you?
A. If I’m not mistaken it was 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. 10
xxx xxx xxx
William Belmes on cross-examination
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino Calpito and Juan Cabbab but you did not see
them shoot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?
A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan (the witness using
the word "banat") and when they already fell down, they continued firing attempt and in my case I rolled
and they also fired at me.11
The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to look at and see appellant at the time
he perpetrated the crime. To our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to
appellant’s identity, what with the fact that just a few hours before the incident, it was even appellant
himself who invited Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure, Belmes had a face-to-face encounter
with appellant before the assault and thus would be able to unmistakably recognize him especially
because at the time of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away from appellant and conditions
of visibility were very good at the time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the afternoon.
Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the
appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime was
committed.12
Belmes’ testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who was also with the group when the
robbery and shooting took place. Again, we quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:
Vidal Agbulos on direct examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you again that your son was already killed and
Eddie Quindasan was injured?
A. Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
Q. What happened next when he told you that?
A. When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet from my son.
COURT:
Q. At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on the ground?
A. Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down.13
Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the person who robbed his son, Winner, of
his winnings. Just like Belmes, Agbulos could also not have been mistaken as to appellant’s identity
considering that it was appellant who personally approached Agbulos’ group and invited them to play
poker just a few hours prior to the commission of the crime. Further, Agbulos testified that he was
familiar with appellant as he would often see him in a cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at first hand the demeanor of
witnesses Belmes and Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the truth or not, gave full faith and
credence to their testimonies. Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would
otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the highest respect to the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of these witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands yielded no
trace of gunpowder residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test would not
exculpate him. The negative findings of said test do not conclusively show that a person did not
discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed. This Court has observed that it is quite
possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant
fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly washes his hands
thereafter.14 As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the trial court, if a person
applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken, gunpowder residue would not be found in that
person’s hands. He also testified that certain factors could contribute to the negative result of a paraffin
test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used. In fine, a finding that the paraffin test on
the person of the appellant yielded negative results is not conclusive evidence to show that he indeed
had not fired a gun.
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses
Belmes and Agbulos that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. In fact, appellant himself
declared that he did not know of any reason why Belmes and Agbulos would implicate him in the crime.
Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath
deserve full faith and credence.15
Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to
visit his friends in the morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to
prosper, however, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.16 Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water. 17
Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra where appellant allegedly visited his
friends was only 30 minutes drive from Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the crime was
committed. In short, appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission.
The weakness of appellant’s alibi is heavily underscored by the fact that appellant was positively
identified by witnesses Belmes and Agbulos who were with the victims at the time of the incident. For
sure, appellant’s positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of alibi
unworthy of credit.18
The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties.— Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. 19
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.20
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, having lost to Winner
Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting to ₱20,000.00. In
pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his
companion, Eddie Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty composed
of two indivisible penalties, like that for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC provides that
"when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied." In this case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime, as appellant’s attack on the victims who were then unsuspectingly walking on
their way home was sudden and done without any provocation, thus giving them no real chance to
defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659,21 the trial court and the CA correctly imposed upon appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.1avvphi1
The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime
of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder
committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery
with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the
number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery. 22
We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan are each
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00, 23 to moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00,24 and to exemplary damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00.25
With respect to actual damages, Winner’s father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he spent a total of
₱50,000.00 as burial expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor. In People v. Abrazaldo, 26 we
laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be
determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in
the amount of ₱25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Winner because although the exact amount was not proved
with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the
victim. We, however, cannot grant the same to the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on
the matter. Finally, appellant is obliged to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of
₱20,000.00 he had taken from Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of
₱20,000.00 representing the amount stolen from him. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Winner Agbulos the following: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, (c) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
3. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Eddie Quindasan ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the separate crime of attempted
murder against the person of PO William Belmes.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines party, Clarissa B. Angeles, against her will.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Contrary to law.[2]

Appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged when arraigned.
FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 170191, August 16, 2006 ] The Case for the Prosecution

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RODOLFO SUYU @ RUDY, WILLY SUYU,
FRANCIS CAINGLET AND ROMMEL MACARUBBO @ ROMMEL BARIUAN, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01238 affirming, with
modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Criminal Case No.
7177 convicting petitioners Rodolfo Suyu, Willy Suyu, Francis Cainglet and Rommel Macarubbo of
robbery with rape.
The Antecedents
An Information was filed with the RTC of Tuguegarao City charging appellants with robbery with rape.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Rodolfo Suyu alias Rudy, Rommel
Macarubbo y Licawan alias Rommel Bariuan, Francis Cainglet y Gargolla and Willy Suyu, armed with
guns and sharp-pointed bladed instrument with intent to gain by the use of threat, violence and
intimidation of persons, conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away against the will of the owner, the following items:
I - TAKEN FROM CLARISSA B. ANGELES
a) A pair of gold earrings valued at - P1,500.00
b) A gold ring valued at - 1,000.00
c) Cash money in the amount of - ____10.00
TOTAL - P2,510.00
II - TAKEN FROM WILLIAM C. FERRER
a) A wallet containing cash money in the amount of - P 150.00
all belonging to Clarissa B. Angeles and William C. Ferrer with a total value of P2,510.00 and P1 50.00,
respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner, Clarissa B. Angeles and William C.
Ferrer in the aforesaid amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TEN (P2,510.00) PESOS and
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (P150.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, respectively; that on the same
occasion of the robbery, the above-named accused, likewise, armed with their aforesaid arms, with lewd
design and by the use of force, violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously conspiring together and helping one another, have sexual intercourse with the aforesaid
At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a third-year student of St. Paul
University, was with her boyfriend, William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-up truck
parked in a vacant lot near the Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) [now DepEd] in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, about fifteen meters from
the highway. Momentarily, a tricycle passed by the truck on its way to the COA Building. [3] Clarissa was
seated on the passenger's side, while William was behind the wheel. The two were alarmed when they
saw shadows of persons near the truck. Clarissa suggested to William that they leave. The latter
opened the window on his side halfway to check if there were persons outside. Suddenly, a man, who
turned out to be Rommel Macarubbo, appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them and said:
"This is a holdup. If you will start the engine of the car, I will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who
turned out to be Willy Suyu, lifted the lock on William's side and entered the pick-up. Clarissa told
William to give everything so that they would not be harmed. Willy Suyu then took Ferrer's wallet which
contained around P150.00. A third man, who turned out to be Francis Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry
valued at around P2,500.00 and cash amounting to PI0.00. Thereafter, Willy Suyu clubbed William and
dragged him out of the truck. Fortunately, William was able to escape and immediately went to the
police station to report the incident.
Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of the pick-up truck at Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then opened the
door. The two and Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place, not far away. Macarubbo and Willy Suyu
held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her. She pleaded for mercy as she was
brought to a house near a muddy place. At that point, a man, who turned out to be Rodolfo Suyu, the
half-brother of Willy Suyu, came out of the house. Willy Suyu, Cainglet and Macarubbo pushed Clarissa
towards Rodolfo Suyu. The latter pushed Clarissa and said: "You stay there because I will be the first
one." Rodolfo Suyu then started embracing and kissing Clarissa and fondling her breast. When Rodolfo
Suyu removed her pants, the ring she kept hidden inside her pants fell to the ground. She felt a knife,
flashlight and pliers at the perpetrator's back. Pretending that she was submitting to him, she suddenly
reached for the knife. They briefly struggled and Clarissa kicked his groin. Cursing, Rodolfo Suyu
loosened his grip on her. And she tried to run, but she stumbled and she was grabbed by the hair. He
then punched her stomach twice. She pleaded to the three others for help, but the three did nothing.
Rodolfo Suyu passed Clarissa to Cainglet. Clarissa again pleaded, "Please do not hurt me, do not kill
me and do not rape me. I am willing to join your group." She further begged, "Just give me the knife and
I will be the one to kill myself." Cainglet kissed her but she pushed him away. He continued to kiss her
and then pushed his tongue inside her mouth. She bit hard at his tongue, causing it to bleed down her
shirt. She was cursed anew.
Then the three others came shouting, "They are coming." A beam of light illumined them. Cainglet and
Rodolfo Suyu then brought her to the top of the hill near the Capitol. She attempted to shout but she
feared for her life as a knife was thrust against her. She was forced to lie down on her back. Willy Suyu
and Macarubbo served as lookouts, as Cainglet punched her on the thighs. Cainglet pinned her hands
on the ground as Rodolfo Suyu removed her pants and undergarments. Rodolfo Suyu then spread her
legs apart, removed his pants and undergarments, and went on top of her. Rodolfo Suyu then tried to
insert his fully erected penis inside her vagina but the girl kicked him. He rolled down but was able to
recover immediately. He resumed molesting her. Clarissa uttered, "It is better that you will just kill me
and not rape me." Rodolfo Suyu insisted "Ipitem (sic) met lang e. Anyway, this is just for a few minutes."
When he pushed his tongue inside her mouth, Clarissa bit it so hard that her teeth went through it. As
the blood dripped on her shirt, he uttered, "I will let the blood drip on your shirt, mahirap na." Rodolfo
Suyu inserted two fingers inside her. He then commented to Cainglet, who was still pinning her down,
"Pare, this is still a virgin." Thereafter, with the aid of his two fingers, he inserted his penis inside her
vagina.
Afterwards, Rodolfo Suyu told Cainglet, "You will be next." Cainglet then climbed on top of Clarissa
while Rodolfo Suyu held her by the hands. She again pleaded for help from Willy Suyu and Macarubbo.
But all her pleas fell on deaf ears. She kicked Cainglet, who then let go one of her hands. When one of
her hands was briefly freed, she placed the crucifix pendant of her necklace on her mouth and uttered,
"Lord, I offer you my soul." Rodolfo Suyu remarked, "We do not have God (sic), we do not believe in
God." Cainglet continued to move on top of her. The two lookouts, Willy Suyu and Macarubbo, on the
other hand, shouted, "They are coming." Rodolfo Suyu then helped her to sit down. Cainglet then spoke
to her saying, "Put your pants. We will not give you your panty because we will have your panty be
'makulam' and tomorrow, we will display your panty on the gate of St. Paul with a dedication 'to Marie
Sanchez'," the name she gave them. Cainglet was able to insert half an inch of his penis into her
vagina.[4]
Cainglet suggested that she be released for ransom. The two lookouts again yelled, "They are coming."
Then a beam of light illumined them and engines from vehicles became audible. Thereafter, two
vehicles arrived from about 10 to 15 meters away from the pick-up truck. After pleading for mercy and
promising not to report them to the police authorities, she was allowed by the culprits to leave.
Clarissa fled to a house illumined with a fluorescent light and climbed over its gate. She went around the
house and knocked on the door. An old man answered the door. Blood-stained and covered in mud,
she then pleaded to be let in. At first, the old man got a piece of wood to club her, but because one of
his children recognized her, she was allowed inside. Thereafter, the barangay tanod was summoned.
After 15 minutes, two police jeeps arrived and took her to the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital
(CVRH). The nurses there, however, merely examined her bruises.
At the Don Domingo Police Station, Clarissa saw William. The authorities asked her if she had been
sexually abused, she declared that there was merely an attempt to rape her. At that time, she was
ashamed to admit in front of her boyfriend that she had been abused.[5]
On January 17, 1996, Clarissa submitted herself to a physical and gynecological examination at the
CVRH. The examining physician, Dr. Elsie A. Pintucan, found hematoma and contusions, which she
diagnosed to have been sustained five days before. Furthermore, she made the following findings:
xxxx
Genitalia: external examination = abundant pubic hair, nulliparous outlet,
no bleeding note.
= hymen (+) complete, old healed laceration at 4 and 7 o'clock.
speculum = vaginal wall no erosions/laceration.
cervix = pinkish, (+) whitish discharge.
Internal examination = admits 1 finger with ease,
cervix = closed, small midline, firm, non-tender on wriggling,
uterus = small,
adnexae = negative for tenderness.[6]
On January 19, 1996, Clarissa signed and filed a criminal complaint for robbery and rape against
Rodolfo Suyu, Willy Suyu, Francis Cainglet and Rommel Bariuan (also known as Rommel Macarubbo)
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City. Appended to her complaint was her sworn
statement executed on the same date. She later gave supplemental statements on January 25, 1996. [7]
Accused Macarubbo, who was born on August 24, 1978, then, still a minor, moved to be released on
recognizance. Upon the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and Services, he was
released on recognizance.[8]
Meanwhile, Macarubbo, accompanied by an old woman, arrived at Clarissa's boarding house. The
woman offered that her son, Macarubbo, would testify for her case. Clarissa was amenable to the idea
because the authorities had earlier advised her to agree to Macarubbo being a state witness. The old
woman pleaded that Clarissa pity Macarubbo, who then worked as a part-time newspaper vendor to
help his parents.[9] Moreover, Macarubbo did not rape her.
On April 2, 1996, Macarubbo, assisted by his counsel Atty. Gabriel O. Valle and his mother, Angelina,
signed a sworn statement, in the form of questions and answers before Municipal Judge Elpidio Atal. He
confessed to his participation and implicated Rodolfo and Willy Suyu, and Cainglet, in the robbery and
the rape of Clarissa.[10]
The Case for the Accused
Rodolfo Suyu denied the charge against him. He also interposed the defense of alibi. He declared that,
on January 13, 1996, he was in their house at Alimannao, Tuguegarao City, taking care of his three
young children, the youngest of whom was five months old. [11] His wife was in Manila with her sister-in-
law who had just given birth. He never left their house in the evening. [12]
At 3:00 p.m. on January 16, 1996, he left his house and gathered cogon at the Bassig Resort, which
was about a kilometer away. He was shot on the left thigh, but he did not know who shot him; neither
did he bother to ascertain the identity of the perpetrator. [13] He managed to escape and arrived home at
7:00 p.m.[14] His wound was treated by his neighbor and eldest child. [15] While away, his 9-year-old
eldest child took care of his five-month-old baby. He did not report the shooting incident to the police.
On January 18, 1996, policemen led by SPO4 Teodulfo Cudal arrested him and brought him to the
hospital where his wound was treated. He was later brought to the Sto. Domingo Police Substation
where he was detained. He was told to join a police line-up. SPO4 Cudal told Clarissa to point to him as
one of the culprits.[16]
Cainglet declared that he was employed as a security guard inspector by the Night Hawk Security
Investigation Agency with principal office in Quezon City. At about 7:15 p.m. on January 13, 1996, he
was in the company of Nestor, an employee of the security agency, conducting a roving inspection at
the Corinthian*Gardens. At 8:00 p.m. on January 21, 1996, he boarded a Victory Liner passenger bus
and arrived in Tuguegarao City at 7:30 a.m. the next day, January 22, 1996. He intended to seek
financial help from his mother since his wife needed money for her placement fee. A neighbor told him
that his mother had left for Mindanao. He opened the door of the house with a duplicate key. After
lunch, 12 armed men, led by SPO4 Cudal, barged inside and searched the house without any warrant.
The armed men took his wedding ring and that of his wife, his wallet with cash of P2,150.10, and his
Seiko watch. The personal properties taken from him were worth P10,000.00. [17]
He was tortured, hogtied with a nylon cord, and boarded in an owner-type jeep with only his underwear
on. He was brought to the police headquarters for investigation for robbery with rape. [18] When the
policemen failed to secure a confession from him, SPO4 Cudal took out a knife from his table. He was
ordered to bring out his tongue and when he did, another policeman held out his tongue while SPO4
Cudal pointed the knife to his tongue. When he turned his face to the left, his tongue was injured. [19] He
was brought to the CVRH where he saw Rodolfo Suyu. When SPO4 Cudal told Rodolfo Suyu that
Cainglet was one of his companions, Rodolfo Suyu told SPO4 Cudal that he did not know him. [20]
At 7:30 a.m. the next day, he was ordered to join a line-up, including two persons he knew only while in
detention, namely, Rodolfo Suyu and Rommel Macarubbo. [21] Clarissa arrived and was ordered by
SPO4 Cudal to point to him as one of those who raped her. She failed to point at him at first, but when
ordered anew by SPO4 Cudal, she finally pointed to him.[22] She also pointed to Rodolfo Suyu and
Rommel Macarubbo. From the time Cainglet was arrested and while detained, he had no counsel.
Macarubbo testified that he was born on August 24, 1978. [23] He denied knowing any of his co-accused
before his arrest on January 17, 1996. He declared that he was a native of Cagayan, Tuguegarao City,
and went to San Pablo, Isabela on January 12, 1996 to visit his aunt Emma Pagulayan. He arrived in
San Pablo at 7:00 a.m.[24] On January 17, 1996, he visited his friend Joel Iringan in San Pablo for a
drinking spree. One of the guests created trouble and shot him on his right leg. [25] He was brought to
Tumauini District Hospital but was transferred to the CVRH in Tuguegarao City. The next day, the
policemen, led by Capt. Salvador,[26] maltreated him. He was forced to confess to the crime in
Carig.[27] After his wounds were treated at the hospital, he was brought to the police station where he
was detained. He never left San Pablo from January 12, 1996 until his arrest on January 17, 1996.[28]
Willy Suyu testified that on the day of the alleged robbery and rape, he was in their house at Dodan,
Penablanca, Cagayan, about 45 minutes by tricycle from Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. [29] At 6:00
a.m., he and his wife went on foot to a place called Hot Spring to gather firewood. They arrived at the
place at around 11:00 a.m., had their lunch at the house of his wife's niece, Lanie Tuliao, gathered
firewood, then proceeded back home to Dodan. By 6:00 p.m., they were already at their house. They
had their dinner at 8:00 p.m. Before going to bed, their neighbor, James Taccad, invited him for a bottle
of beer. He went back home at around 8:20 p.m., and went to bed with his wife at 9:00 p.m. He worked
as a tricycle driver, but he did not go out the following day, as the piston ring of the tricycle he was
driving was broken.[30]
James Taccad, Willy's neighbor, and Eduardo Dalin, Willy's brother-in-law, were presented to
corroborate Willy's testimony.[31]
Willy Suyu further testified that on February 12, 1996, he was arrested and detained. [32] At the police
station in Tuguegarao City where he was brought, he was maltreated by policemen. After 3 or 4 days in
detention, Clarissa, whom he met for the first time, went to the station and asked for the person named
Willy Suyu. The other detainees pointed to him and Clarissa said, "So you are the person named Willy
Suyu." She asked him to show his tongue. He did so and Clarissa said, within the hearing distance of
the other detainees, that he was not the one.[33]
Willy, moreover, admitted that Rodolfo Suyu was his half-brother. He, however, denied having known
Macarubbo and Cainglet prior to his detention as he met them only in jail. He also saw Clarissa, for the
first time, at the police station when she asked for him.[34] Rodolfo Suyu used to stay at their father's
house in Capitol Hills (near the place where the robbery and rape happened), but stayed at Barangay
Gosi, Tuguegarao, most of the time where he helped in the farming.[35]
Accused Rodolfo Suyu and Macarubbo presented SPO4 Cudal as their witness. The police officer
testified that, as gleaned from the police blotter, at 9:30 p.m. on January 13, 1996, Clarissa failed to
identify the culprits and to declare that she was raped. However, she insisted that in the event that she
saw the culprits again, she can identify them.[36] Cainglet was a mere caretaker of the house where he
was arrested.[37] It was the owner of the house who informed the police officers that he was hiding in the
house.[38] He noticed a bite mark on the tongue of Cainglet when he viewed it. [39]
On cross-examination, SPO4 Cudal declared that Macarubbo, assisted by his counsel, executed an
extrajudicial statement on April 2, 1996, in the presence of his mother.[40]
SPO1 Alexander Tamang, the investigator assigned at the Domingo Police Substation on the evening of
January 13, 1996, was presented by Willy's counsel and testified, among others, that the blotter, as
written, did not state the name of the malefactors, their features or characteristics, or the unlawful taking
of personal property; and that the blotter did not state a sexual abuse but only that Clarissa bit the
tongue of one of the suspects and kicked the sex organ of the other accused. [41] He, however, added
that he did not write the word rape because what he understood from Clarissa's statement was the
biting of the tongue and the kicking of the sex organ. [42]
The prosecution presented SPO4 Cudal as rebuttal witness and testified that accused Macarubbo gave
an extrajudicial confession on April 2, 1998 while detained at the jail, and that he signed his extrajudicial
confession before Judge Atal.[43] The prosecution wanted to present Atty. Gabriel Valle as rebuttal
witness because the judge was already dead; but, after an off-the-record conference between the court,
the counsel of the accused and the prosecution, the plan of the prosecution did not materialize. [44] The
court admitted the extrajudicial confession of Macarubbo[45] only as part of the testimony of SPO4 Cudal
because, according to the court, the prosecution failed to present Judge Atal. [46]
On February 10, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with rape. The RTC gave credence and probative weight to Clarissa's testimony and
rejected the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused. The court ruled that the latter's testimonies
were full of inconsistencies and were not in accord with human experience. The RTC further ruled that
the four accused conspired in the robbery with rape. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Finding RODOLFO SUYU, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARRUBO,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and hereby sentence each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
(2) Ordering the accused to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of PI,510.00 representing the value of
the jewelry (earring) and cash belonging to Clarissa Angeles; and
(3) Ordering the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, Clarissa Angeles the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[47]
The accused appealed the decision to the Court. After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the
Court ordered the transfer of the case to the CA pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo. [48]
The CA rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the decision of the trial court. The fallo of the
decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the decision dated 10 February 2003 of the court a
quo is perforce AFFIRMED but with the modification that insofar as the accused-appellant ROMMEL
MACARUBBO is concerned, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum. the robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape victim right after
her ordeal to remain mum about what really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in
SO ORDERED.[49] revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered
doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.[62] Besides, Clarissa sufficiently explained
Hence, the present petition, where the appellants raise the following arguments: her initial reluctance on cross-examination, thus:

I Atty. Morales:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF And what did you tell these policemen at the Don Domingo police
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT CLARISSA ANGELES. Q:
station?
II A: Naturally (sic) I told them what transpired to me, Sir.
Will you please tell now before this court what exactly were those
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND Q:
things that you reported to the police station?
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. At that time, Sir, I was then trembling because of fear so that I told
III them that there was only an attempted rape to me (sic) because I
A:
was then ashamed to the policemen and infront (sic) of my
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE THE ALLEGED boyfriend.
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROMMEL MACARUBBO.[50] As a matter of fact when you arrived at the CVRH you also
Q: informed the nurses that what was committed was only an
Appellants assert that Clarissa was not able to identify any of them at the city jail and succeeded in attempted rape, is that correct?
identifying them only after she was coached by SPO4 Cudal. They contend that Clarissa was declared I did not talk to the nurse but it was only the policemen who told
by Dr. Pintucan to be ambulatory and coherent with no signs of cardio-respiratory distress, proof that A:
the nurse.
she was not forcibly and sexually assaulted. It was also discovered that there was no evidence of You heard these policemen informed the nurses that what was
forcible assault despite the insertion of one finger on her cervix. Appellants argue that the trial court Q:
committed is an attempted rape, is that correct?
erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant Macarubbo. A: Yes, Sir.
Your boyfriend was present when you went to the Don Domingo
Appellants, moreover, aver that the testimony of Clarissa is postmarked with inconsistencies. She Q:
police station?
executed no less than five sworn statements before the MTC. These statements were substantially A: Yes, Sir.
inconsistent. In her January 13, 1996 statement made immediately after the alleged commission of the And your boyfriend also accompanied you when you went to the
crime, she declared to the police investigator that appellants attempted to rape her, but she actually Q:
CVRH?
succeeded in thwarting all attempts.[51] In her second sworn statement dated January 18, 1996, she A: No, Sir.
maintained the said story. The police blotter did not even carry an allegation of rape. However, in her When you heard these policemen mentioned to the nurses that
January 19, 1996 statement:, Clarissa declared that she had been raped. [52] Appellants, thus, argue that what was committed was attempted rape (sic) you did not try to
the alleged victim has the propensity to lie and withhold valuable information in her affidavits. [53] Q:
call the attention of the policemen (sic) and correct them that what
actually happened (sic) you were allegedly raped?
We are not persuaded. To begin with, the rule is that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial A: Because I was ashamed, Sir.[63]
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance, which xxx
would have affected the result of the case, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses Atty. Salud:
are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. [54] The stringency with which You stated that at first you did not divulge that you were sexually
appellate tribunals have observed this rule is predicated on the undisputed vantage of the trial court in Q:
molested, did you?
the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence. [55] At first, Sir, what I have stated is that they held my breast, the
A: different parts of my body and they also fingered me, Sir. But I did
The trial court found Clarissa's testimony to be consistent, [56] believable,[57] and credible,[58] hence, is not state that their penis were inserted to my vagina.
worthy of full faith and credit.[59] The CA reviewed Clarissa's testimony and found the same to be clear, So all that you have divulged at first was that your breast was held
sincere and could have only come from the mouth of a victim. During the grueling cross-examination Q:
and so with the different parts of your body?
conducted by three separate counsels of appellants, she remained steadfast in her testimony that she A: Yes, Sir.
was raped. The credibility of complainant's testimony is a primordial consideration in rape cases for the Q: To whom did you divulge that?
accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, natural, A: To Sir Cabildo, Sir.
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. [60] When the testimony of Q: That was the first time you divulged it to any person?
a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigorous cross-examination and unflawed by At first, Sir, I divulges (sic) that to the PNP Substation at Don
any serious inconsistency or contradiction, the same must be given full faith and credit.[61] A: Domingo, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, then to my parents, to my
classmates and lastly to Sir Cabildo, Sir.
While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was raped after Q: Whom (sic) for the first time did you disclose that you were raped?
 A: To Sir Cabildo, Sir.
Q: When?
A: January 19 in the afternoon, Sir.
Are you very certain that you first divulges (sic) it (sic) that you
Q:
were raped to Cabildo on January 19, 1996 in the afternoon?
A: Yes, Sir.
You are certain in the sense that there can be no probability that
you have committed mistake (sic) in remembering that you
Q:
divulged for the first time to Mr. Cabildo that you were rape (sic) in
the afternoon of January 19, 1996?
A: No, Sir.
Is it not a fact that you executed a second sworn statement before
Q: a police officer named SP02 Marcelo R. Cabildo on January 18,
1996?
A: Yes, Sir.
And still you are sure that on January 18, 1996 on the occasion of
the taking of your sworn statement by SP02 Marcelo R. Cabildo
Q:
inside the investigation room of the Tuguegarao Police Station,
you did not disclose to him that you were raped?
I was investigated on the 18th day of January and I have not yet
divulge (sic) to SP02 Cabildo that I was fingered and I was raped
A: because I was then ashamed at that time. Because this
policeman Cabildo is from Baggao, he might have (sic) divulged
what had happened to me in our town of Baggao, Sir. [64]
Understandably, Clarissa was reluctant to reveal, while at the police station, the fact that she was raped,
considering that her boyfriend was present when she. made her first statement before the police
investigator. Further, one of the investigating officers was her townmate. Indeed, the fear of social
humiliation prevented Clarissa from revealing, at the time, the details of her defilement. She was in a
state of trauma, impelled by her natural instinct to put out of her mind such a painful and disturbing
experience. Oftentimes, victims would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private than reveal their
shame to the world.[65] In her desire for justice, she, nonetheless, later revealed the true events that
happened on that fateful night of January 13, 1996, thus:
Pros. Sagucio:
Now, you said that when you were first investigated by the police or at
the CVRH that you are (sic) not raped which is half true (sic) and now
Q:
when you were again investigated you said you were raped, what made
you changed (sic) your mind?
I finally thought of filing a case of rape because of the fact that I am
helping other people whom (sic) might be the next victim and (sic) aside
A: from the fact that I did not owe anything to them, I did not owe any
obligation to anybody else and finally I want justice that (sic) will prevail
of (sic) what they have done to me.[66]
Certainly, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor
tainted unless such were true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor and obtain justice
for the wicked acts committed upon her. [67]
Appellants, likewise, contend that Clarissa was coached by SPO4 Cudal during the police line-up, while
Rommel had to be pointed by the other detainees. She even asked them to show their tongues so that
she could ascertain whether they were the ones who molested her. [68]
The arguments of appellants do not persuade. The victim recounted that there were lights emanating
from the nearby DECS (now DepEd) and COA buildings, and several residences. [69] The place was
bright enough for her to see the faces of her assailants, only that she did not know their
names.[70] Familiarity with the physical features of a person is an acceptable way for proper
identification.[71] Indeed, We agree with the following ruling of the trial court, thus:
Defense' contention that they were not sufficiently identified cannot be taken seriously. Accused did not
resort to any disguise. There could be no doubt as to their identities. Besides, it appears that the
accused stayed with Clarissa for a couple of hours so that there was ample time and opportunity for her
to see and observe their features.[72]
Appellants, in their brief, further fault the trial court in not declaring as inadmissible the alleged
extrajudicial confession of Macarubbo, as it was not affirmed in open court and the latter even denied
having executed the statement.[73]
The contention of appellants has no merit. The trial court never admitted Macarubbo's sworn statement
for the purpose offered by the prosecution,[74] but only as part of the testimony of SPO4 Cudal.
Appellants were not convicted based on the said sworn statement, but rather on the credible testimony
of the victim,[75] and her positive identification of the culprits.[76]
The claim of appellants that their arrest was irregular, which consequently rendered their detention
illegal, cannot be considered in this appeal as the matter was not raised at the opportune time. Records
reveal that warrants for the appellants' arrest were indeed issued on January 19, 1996 and February 1,
1996.[77] Appellants, likewise, entered their pleas[78] without moving for the quashal of the information.
As we held in People v. Bongalon,[79] in such case, the defect of the arrest and detention are cured
thereby:
Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to
move to quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or
the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed
by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the
person arrested submits to arraignment without objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the
issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the defect of
that detention.[80]
Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan does not conclusively suggest that
Clarissa was raped, for during the examination, her deportment was not of that of a rape victim and the
examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible assault.[81]
The said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when
there is complete penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a
slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes place. [82] Partial penile
penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in either case. [83] Dr.
Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the victim, which bolsters Clarissa's recount that
she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped.
The common defense of alibi used by the appellants cannot, moreover, prevail over Clarissa's clear and
convincing narration of the events that transpired and her positive identification of her assailants. It is a
time-honored rule that alibi is a weak defense when unsubstantiated by credible and plausible
testimonies.[84] To merit approbation, clear and convincing evidence must be adduced that the accused
was in a place other than the situs of the crime at the time the crime was committed, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have committed the crime.
Willy Suyu, a tricycle driver, relied solely on his testimony to prove his alibi that he and his wife were in
Hot Spring, had lunch with the spouses Tuliao, and arrived home at 6:00 p.m. He and his wife had
dinner at 8:00 p.m., he drank beer in the house of his neighbor James Taccad, and finally went to bed at
9:00 p.m. However, appellant failed to present his wife, and the spouses Tuliao to corroborate his
testimony, and he gave no justification for his failure to present any of them as witnesses. The records
show that the distance from Willy Suyu's house to Capitol Hills can be negotiated in 15 minutes by
tricycle; hence, it was not impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Macarubbo testified that he left Tuguegarao City on January 13, 1996; and arrived in the house of his
aunt, Emma Pagulayan and worked in her farm; he was shot at the thigh on January 17, 1996.
However, appellant Macarubbo failed to present his aunt and his friend, Joel Iringan, to corroborate his
alibi. Moreover, it is incredible that Macarubbo did not even know who shot him despite his claim that
the perpetrator was known to his friend, Iringan. Rodolfo Suyu's claim that he was in his house in
Alimannao, Tuguegarao City on the night in question is equally weak, for he failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be near the DECS (now DepEd) and COA buildings in the city.
For his part, appellant Cainglet failed to present any record from the Night Hawk Security Agency to
prove that on January 13, 1996, at 7:15 p.m., he was conducting a roving inspection at the Corinthian
Gardens in Quezon City, as he claimed; neither did he present the driver of his employer who was
purportedly with him at the time.
After going over the voluminous records, We find no error in the aforesaid observations of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of
the facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. [85] Again, these weak defenses
cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.[86] Clarissa, in
this case, as aforesaid, passed the test of credibility in her account of her ordeal; positively identified her
assailants; and had no ill-motive to falsely implicate them to the commission of a crime, other than her
desire to seek justice for a wrong. Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually abused, she
says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her person, provided her
testimony meets the test of credibility. [87]
Conspiracy to commit the crime was also correctly appreciated by the trial court. Indeed, "at the time of
the commission of the crime, accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design
to rob the victim and although only two of them, through force and intimidation, raped Clarissa, the
failure of Macarubbo and Willy Suyu to prevent its commission although they were capable would make
their act to be the act of all."[88] We have previously ruled that once conspiracy is established between
several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the
rape committed by any of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he
endeavored to prevent the other from committing rape. [89]
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The law provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; (4) the robbery is
accompanied by rape.[90]
The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and
the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the
robbery. We note that aside from raping the victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her
sexual organ. Appellant Suyu, thus, committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article 266-A,
paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353.[91] Also, aside from Rodolfo Suyu, Cainglet raped the victim.
Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes
committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and
indivisible felony of robbery with rape.[92]
As to the damages, the RTC only awarded actual damages of P| 1,510.00 and civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 to Clarissa. In line with settled jurisprudence, however, this Court rectifies the same and
orders all ppellants to, jointly and severally, pay Clarissa Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by Francis Cainglet; and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. [93]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that all the appellants are also ordered
to, jointly and severally, pay Clarissa Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the rape by Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 s moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the rape by Francis kinglet; and P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198020 July 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 041552 affirming with modification the August 24, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 30, San Jose, Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding appellant
Joseph4 Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide instead
of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On March 21, 2004, an information5 for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was filed
against appellant, to wit:
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, while armed with a firearm,
after gaining entrance into the residence of his victim, with intent to gain, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from Elmer
Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take
and steal the money, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there feloniously shoot said
Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which caused his death, to the prejudice of
his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.
Dr. Peñafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, examined the corpse
of Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem Report 7:
Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted edges at the mid left frontal area.
Hematoma formation is noted at the site of entry.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted edges
of the point of entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close
range.8
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was on his way
home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the light of a
bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun
to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away.
When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went home
and reported the incident the following morning.9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s house to collect
his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s house. He inquired from appellant if the
victim was around. Appellant responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while
Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the
victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.10
The victim’s mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial expenses in the
amount of ₱33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas
City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur
and charged with the crime of "robbery with murder."11 Appellant’s brother, Benjamin, tried to
corroborate his testimony.12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative testimony of the
prosecution’s witnesses deserved more weight than the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi. Thus,
finding the prosecution’s witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the victim to be by reason of the
robbery, the RTC decision’s decretal portion read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Joseph Barra
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 291(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay the surviving heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages in the amount of Php55,579.80, as moral damages in
the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he abides by the disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners during his confinement, otherwise he shall only be entitled to
four-fifths (4/5) thereof.13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide. It stated that:
Regarding the trial court’s finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Lagdaan, WE
will not disturb the same as it is well supported by the evidence on record and in accord with prevailing
law and jurisprudence. However, WE disagree with its determination of the nature of the crime that
accused-appellant committed. Instead of robbery with homicide at its consummated stage, accused-
appellant should have been declared guilty only of attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the government to establish
robbery is the statement of De la Peña that when accused-appellant reached the victim’s place, the
latter barged into the said residence, poked a gun at the victim’s forehead, demanded money and when
the victim refused to accede to his demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence
was presented to establish that accused-appellant took away the victim’s money or any property, for
that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly
established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which provides –
"When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the
person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions
of this Code."
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he commenced the commission of
robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce robbery
by reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the crime of homicide is
bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellant’s intent to rob the victim. That motive was
manifested by accused-appellant’s overt act of poking a gun at the victim’s forehead demanding money
from the latter. When the victim refused to accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former.
The killing was an offshoot of accused-appellant’s intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent
on resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the victim’s failure to give his money, the crime of
robbery was, however, not consummated. 15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows –
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the following:
a) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
e) the cost of suit.16
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011. 17
After appellant’s confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant manifested that they would
adopt the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu of supplemental briefs. 18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution. Appellant stated that the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses were rife with
inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant argued that the elements for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the award of
damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that:
Findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative weight of the
testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court
in observing at close range the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the said witnesses as they testify,
unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which
if considered will change the outcome of the case. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, he does not
present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored, misunderstood and
misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of the case. We also found, after reviewing the records,
nothing that would indicate any misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the part of the
appellate court that would substantially alter its conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In People v. Quemeggen,20 this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the prosecution for appellant
to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. (Citation
omitted.)
In the case before us, appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the
victim’s refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in the
head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was
not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime
appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code
states:

Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. — When by
reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty
of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.

The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v. Macabales, 21 to wit:

The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) There
is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give
his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason
that the victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus
punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the
maximum penalty of reclusion pe1petua.1âwphi1

Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of existing rules and
recent jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need not be disturbed. 22

However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest
at the legal rate of 6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 23

WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04I55
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages shall be increased to
₱30,000.00 and all monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017
RAMON AMPARO Y IBAÑEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated
January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33336.
Information was filed against Ahmed Alcubar y Sabiron (Alcubar), Roberto Guarino y Capnao (Guarino),
Juanito Salmeo y Jacob (Salmeo), and Ramon Amparo y Ibañez (Amparo) for robbery. The
Information3 reads:
That on April 26, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, all the accused conspired and confederated
together and helped one another armed with deadly bladed weapons and therefore in band, with intent
of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by boarding a passenger jeepney with
Plate No. DGM-407 at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and T. Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and
immediately poked said arms upon RAYMOND IGNACIO y GAA, and announced the holdup, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, robbed and carried away the Nokia 6680 worth
[P]14,000.00, Philippine Cu[r]rency, of said Raymond G. Ignacio against his will, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the same amount as aforesaid.
Contrary to law.4
The accused were arraigned and they pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
Raymond Gaa Ignacio (Ignacio) testified that on April 26, 2007, he was riding a jeepney going to Lawton
when two (2) men boarded the jeepney along T. Mapua Street. 6 One of them sat beside him, pointed a
knife at him and declared a hold-up.7 He was ordered to take his necklace off and hand over his mobile
phone.8
Ignacio then heard a gunshot, causing the robbers to be rattled and drop their knives on the jeepney
bench.9 A police officer arrived and ordered the robbers to alight from the jeepney. 10 Four (4) men, later
identified as Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo, and Amparo, were handcuffed and taken to the police station.11
Ignacio identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one who
announced the hold-up.12 He also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the front seat
beside the driver.13 He admitted that he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time
of the incident.14 However, he testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench when
the police fired the warning shot.15
SPO3 Renato Perez (SPO3 Perez) testified that on the day of the incident, he was about to report for
work when he noticed a commotion inside a passenger jeepney.16 He then saw Alcubar embracing a
man later identified as Ignacio, while pointing a "stainless one[-]foot long double bladed fan knife" at
him.17 He followed the jeepney and fired a warning shot.18 Later, he arrested Alcubar.19
SPO3 Perez ordered the other three (3) men to alight from the jeepney when the other passengers
pointed them out as Alcubar's companions.20 Another police officer arrived and helped him make the
arrest.21 Upon frisking the men, he recovered a balisong from Guarino, an improvised kitchen knife from
Salmeo, and a fan knife from Amparo.22 He also testified that he invited the other passengers to the
police station to give their statements but only Ignacio went with him. 23
Amparo, on the other hand, testified that on April 26, 2007, he was in Carriedo, Quiapo, Manila, working
as a parking attendant when a person he did not know arrived and arrested him. Later, he was brought
to the Philippine National Police Anti-Carnapping Unit where he saw Ignacio for the first time.24
On March 3, 2010, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 rendered a Decision 25 finding the
accused guilty of robbery in band. The dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in band
defined and punished under Art. 294 in relation to Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to its commission granting the accused the benefit of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, all the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
The accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive imprisonment under Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Their bodies shall be committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National
Penitentiary, Muntinglupa (sic) City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.
SO ORDERED.26
All the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. 27 Amparo, in particular, argued that he and Salmeo
should be acquitted since the witnesses for the prosecution did not testify that they performed any act in
furtherance of the robbery.28
On January 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision29 dismissing the appeal.
The Court of Appeals noted that Amparo had abandoned his earlier defense of alibi, and was arguing
that there was no evidence that he actively participated in the commission of the robbery. 30 It found,
however, that he was "caught red-handed"31 with a weapon during the robbery, which was sufficient to
establish that he had a common unlawful purpose with the rest of the accused. 32
Amparo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 33 which was denied in the Resolution34 dated November 29,
2012. Hence, the Petition for Review35 was filed.
Petitioner argues that Ignacio did not implicate him as a co-conspirator in his testimony since he did not
even witness how the weapon was allegedly recovered by the police.36 He points out that the bank
employee who allegedly pinpointed him as part of the group, and the police officer who allegedly
recovered the bladed weapon from him were not brought to court to testify.37 He asserts that he was
arrested, not for his participation during the robbery, but due to his alleged possession of a bladed
weapon, which was a violation of the city ordinance. 38
In its Comment,39 the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the prosecution was able to prove
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It points out that direct proof is unnecessary to prove
conspiracy since conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused that they all had a common
purpose.40 It argues that the prosecution was able to show that petitioner and his co-accused had the
common objective of committing an armed robbery inside the jeepney and armed themselves with
knives to accomplish their objective.41
In his Reply,42 petitioner insists that the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses failed to implicate
him as a co-conspirator.43 He also argued that there was no proof that a knife was recovered from his
person, and other than this allegation, the prosecution was unable to prove that he committed any other
overt act constituting the crime of robbery. 44
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with band.
Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by use of force,
violence or intimidation.45 Under Article 294 (5)46 in relation to Article 295,47 and Article 29648 of the
Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the
robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can
be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime. 49
Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime
is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage50 under Presidential Decree No.
532.51 It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized
themselves for the purpose of committing that crime. 52
In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of
robbery in band.
Ignacio testified on cross-examination that Guarino announced a holdup, and that Alcubar pointed a
weapon at him, forcing him to take off his necklace and hand over his mobile phone.53 He did not see
what petitioner was doing at the time of the incident since petitioner and his co-accused Salmeo were
seated beside the driver.54 Ignacio's failure to see what petitioner was doing during the robbery is
justified considering that the configuration of a jeepney bench makes it hard to see precisely what
passengers seated in the front seat are doing.
Ignacio was also able to testify that he saw both Salmeo and petitioner place their knives on the jeepney
bench when the police fired a warning shot.55 SPO3 Perez corroborated this, and testified that there
were eight (8) other passengers in the jeepney, who pointed out all four (4) of the accused. 56 After
making the arrests, the four (4) accused were frisked, and a fan knife was recovered from petitioner.57
Petitioner initially offered a defense of alibi before the trial court. 58 He abandoned this defense on
appeal after the trial court concluded that petitioner's alibi was not enough to overcome Ignacio's
positive identification.59 He then argued before the Court of Appeals that while Ignacio might have seen
him at the scene of the crime, there was no evidence of petitioner's exact involvement. 60 His changing
defenses, however, only show the weakness of his arguments. Nevertheless, a conviction stands not on
the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. 61 As discussed, the
evidence of the prosecution was strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the imposable penalty for robbery
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Article 295 of the
same Code, however, qualifies the penalty to its maximum period if the robbery is committed by a band.
Thus, the proper penalty is prision mayor in its maximum period.62
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the minimum penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, prision
mayor minimum, or from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The maximum of the penalty
shall be within the range of the medium period of prision mayor medium, or from eight (8) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to nine (9) years and four (4) months.63
The trial court imposed a penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum and ten (10) years
as maximum,64 which is not within the prescribed range. Thus, the imposable penalty must be modified
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum to nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor medium as maximum.
However, per the January 19, 201665 letter of Bureau of Corrections P/Supt. I Roberto R. Rabo,
petitioner's maximum sentence imposed by the trial court had already expired upon adjustment of his
sentence pursuant to Republic Act No. 10592.66 It is noted, however, that the Bureau of Corrections
does not detail how the maximum sentence was adjusted. Nevertheless, the service of the modified
penalty is rendered moot since the Bureau of Corrections certified that the adjusted penalty was based
on the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court. Thus, petitioner is ordered released unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause. 67
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The judgment of conviction in the Decision dated January 31,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33386 and Criminal Case No. 07-252654 is AFFIRMED. The imposable
penalty is MODIFIED. Petitioner Ramon Amparo y Ibañez is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery in band defined and punished under Article 294 in relation to Article 295 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor minimum to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor medium as
maximum.
Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 07-252654, his immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015
AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered the
residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of committing the
robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery in an inhabited house, the more serious
crime. All the accused are liable because the act of one is the act of all.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Case
Aurora Engson Fransdilla (Fransdilla), the lone appellant, seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on
February 28, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction and that of her co-
accused for robbery on the basis of conspiracy, with modifications as to the penalty imposed, under the
decision rendered on September 15, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, in Quezon
City2
As factual background, the CA adopted the summary rendered by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in its appellee's brief, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at private complainants'
residence at No. 24, Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon City, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre
saw appellant Aurora Engson in front of their gate. Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and
asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there were four (4) of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia
Yreverre, Lalaine's sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese Embassy and asked
Aurora if there was any other person whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told Lalaine
that she was from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said pretension
that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and allowed her to enter their house. When they were
already having a conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter
acceded to and handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on
dialing the telephone and even said that the person she was calling did not know how to use the
telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the telephone.
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4)
other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house. The four (4) men
stood behind Aurora who was still dialing the telephone. When Aurora told that she could not contact
the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort room, which the latter again
permitted. Aurora stood up, put down the telephone, got her bag and went to the comfort room. When
Aurora came back, she sat down again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a menstrual
period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo
Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo
Cacal was poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other men
proceeded to the kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions herded their maids,
private complainant's niece and cousin inside the bodega.
Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair and
dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal
looked around the room and when he spotted upon the vault he dropped Lalaine, opened the door and
called for his companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal and Cuanang)
carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not
to follow them and to just stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door and followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal
then brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her towards her bed and she fell.
Cacal told her to just stay, and then he searched the room. Lalaine managed to stand up but Cacal
slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came and tied her arms at her back. While she was being
tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room. It was also at the time that accused Cacal and
Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the jewelries and things they saw.
When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle downstairs, she
saw Cacal, Cuanang and their two other companions tucking their guns around their waists. Appellants
and their co-accused then left the house on board two (2) cars that were waiting for them just outside
the house, and one of which, a black Colt Mirage, was driven by accused Manuel Silao, together with
appellant Edgardo Silao who was seated at the front passenger seat.
At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her. Lalaine then
called her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident to the police authorities.
Not too long thereafter, the police investigated the incident.
In relation thereto, Lalaine executed her sworn statement on February 20, 1991 (Exhibit "J"). After said
investigation, Lalaine underwent medical examination at the East Avenue Medical Center as her hands
were bruised when she was tied by her hands and her face being slapped by one of the accused. A
medical certificate was issued in relation thereto (Exhibit "N").
Thereafter, Lalaine went to Camp Karingal at Sikatuna, Quezon City where there were at least fifteen
(15) person(s) presented before her in the police line-up, but she was not able to identify any of the
accused among said line-up.
After which, she went to the Station Investigation Division (SID) Station 4, Quezon City where she was
shown about fifty (50) pictures in order for her to identify the robbers, but she was not able to identify
any of them.
Since she failed to identify any of the malefactors, she proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Manila. She was referred to a cartographer for the sketch of herein appellants and
their co-accused as the malefactors in robbing their house (Exhibits "B", "C" and "D").
Thereafter, Lalaine proceeded to the Western Police District, Manila. There, she went to the rogues
gallery where a picture of about (5) persons were shown to her. After carefully examining the pictures,
Lalaine was able to pinpoint the picture of accused Danilo Cuanang as one of the robbers. She was
also able to identify Manuel "Sonny" Silao in a group picture where she identified accused Cuanang
(Exhibits "E" and "F") It was also in said rogues gallery that they were able to get accused Cuanang's
address at Iriga, Cubao, Quezon City. to be from PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (POEA) and once inside took, rob, and
carried away the following items therefrom, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Lalaine, together with her police officers companions, proceeded to Cuanang's indicated address. Upon nine (9) pieces of expensive jewelry .... P1 .5 M
arrival thereat, they inquired from the security guard of the townhouse if Danilo Cuanang was residing $30,000.00 (U.S. Dollars equivalent to ... 900,000.00
there, which the latter confirmed.
belonging to CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN.
On the following day Lalaine and her police companions went back to Cuanang's house. Lalaine two (2) pairs of gold earings P 10,000.00
knocked at the door and accused Cuanang himself opened the door. When Lalaine confronted him and one (1) gold necklace with pendant 180,000.00
told him that he was one of those who entered their house, the latter did not answer. Lalaine asked one (1) Louie Viton Brown Leather (sic)... 11,000.00
Cuanang if he could come with them at the PNP-SID, Station 4, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City and the
one (1) Gucci Ladies watch 13,000.00
latter acceded.
two (2) gold earrings w/diamond pendant... 80,000.00
On their way to the police station, Lalaine inquired on Cuanang about their lady companion (herein CASH MONEY 7,000.00
appellant Fransdilla), but the latter just bowed his head. When Lalaine threatened him that if he would belonging to LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in the total amount of PhP2,701,000.00,
not tell the whereabouts of their lady companion (herein appellant Aurora) he would be answerable for Philippines Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the aforementioned
all the things stolen, the latter replied that they had no share in the stolen items. Lalaine then asked the sum and in such other amounts as maybe awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
name of their lady companion and the latter said that her name was Jessica Engson (also known as
Aurora Engson Fransdilla) and she was living in Antipolo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Cuanang also CONTRARY TO LAW.4
volunteered himself to accompany them to Aurora's house provided that they should not hurt him. At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Agreeing thereto, the group of Lalaine, accompanied by Cuanang, proceeded to Aurora's house at the
given address. Upon arrival thereat, Lalaine inquired from a child if Aurora was awake, and upon
asking, she saw appellant Aurora who was trembling at that time. Lalaine noticed that Aurora was 1. The identity of all the accused as indicated in the information.
nervous and even told her that Lalaine was able to remember her face. Appellant even voluntarily told 2. The accused Manuel Silao and Edgar Silao are brothers and first cousins of
Lalaine that she would tell her the whole truth. She (Aurora) told that she was instructed by her private complainant Cynthia Yreverre and prosecution witness Lalaine Yreverre.
companions Edgar (Silao), Sonny (Manuel Silao) and Danilo Cacal. Lalaine even confronted her when 3. The accused Manuel Silao had entered the house of complainant on several
she implicated her cousins (Sonny and Edgar). occasions to visit relatives.
4. The accused Edgardo Cacal is the driver of Manuel Silao and knows Manuel's brother
Upon reaching PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, Lalaine and her police companions rested accused Edgar Silao.
for a while before they proceeded to 921 Adelina St., Sampaloc, Manila, where accused Manuel 5. The accused Manuel Silao has a pending criminal case for illegal possession of
"Sonny" Silao lived. Upon reaching the said address, Lalaine knocked at the gate, and a maid opened firearms before the RTC, Manila.
the same and allowed them to enter the house. In the house, Lalaine asked the maid where Sonny's 6. The accused Manuel Silao is the owner of one Cal. 9mm Springfield bearing Serial
room was and the latter said it was on the third floor. When Lalaine and her police companions were No. 64624 with one magazine containing eight (8) ammunitions, although only 4 were
going upstairs, they passed by the second floor and saw accused Cacal sitting on a folding bed. She delivered to the Court.
then told her police companions that that man (Cacal) was among those who entered and robbed their 7. The accused were all investigated in connection with the instant case, without the
house, Cacal just remained silent. Thereafter, the group proceeded to the third floor of the house, assistance of counsel.
knocked at the door and it was Manuel's (a.k.a. Sonny) wife who opened it. At this point, Manuel (a.k.a. 8. The person depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit "E" is accused Manuel Silao
Sonny) was lying on the bed and holding his gun, thus, Pat. Randy Quitoriano immediately handcuffed while the one in the photograph marked as Exhibit "D" is accused Danilo Cuanang.
him. Lalaine's group invited Manuel and Danilo to go with them at the police station; both acceded. 9. On February 20, 1991, Edgar Silao was in Quezon City.5

On March 21, 1991, Lalaine went back to the PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, where she
was informed that they (Rod Fortaleza's group) were able to recover some money (dollar bills) from
appellant Edgardo Silao. When these dollar bills were shown to her, she recognized that these were the
same dollar bills withdrawn by her sister Cynthia from the RCBC Bank as the bills bear red markings
(Exhibits "M" to "M-5".3
Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged with robbery under the following information, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by
means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence of CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y
PANGANIBAN located at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, this City, by pretending
The prosecution presented complainants Lalaine Yreverre and Cynthia Yreverre, NBI Illustrator Amando
Mendoza, SPO2 Randolf Quitoriano, RCBC Manager Ma. Teresa Jamir, Joel Yreverre and Dr. Richard
Pascual as its witnesses during the trial on the merits. On its part, the defense relied on Celia Syquian,
Edgardo Y. Silao, Dominador Pilar, Lourdes Samson Lopez, and Danilo Cuanang as witnesses.
As stated, the RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery, decreeing in its decision of
September 15, 1999, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA,
EDGARDO CACAL Y SANCHEZ, DANILO CUANANG Y VALDEZ, MANUEL SILAO Y YREVERRE and
EDGARDO SILAO Y YREVERRE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery
punished under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and in the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences
said accused to imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusión temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS oí reclusión temporal as maximum. Said accused
are likewise ordered to indemnify the herein private complainants the amount of TWO MILLION TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, the value of the property taken less the amount recovered, and to pay
the amount of PhP200,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.6
As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and circumstances either proved by the Prosecution or
admitted by the Defense established her having conspired with her co-accused in committing the
offense charged.7
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified the penalty imposed by the
RTC, as follows:8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 15, 1999 of the trial court is affirmed subject to the
modification that accused-appellants and accused are sentenced to an imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusión temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Rejecting the claim of insufficiency of the proof of conspiracy raised by Fransdilla, the CA observed that
the clear and categorical testimony of Lalaine positively showed that Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her
common design with the other accused to commit the robbery,9 stressing that "it is a common design
which is the essence of conspiracy, though the conspirators may act separately and on different manner
but always leading to the same unlawful result." It adverted to Fransdilla's various acts as evincing her
role in the concerted resolve to commit the robbery, such as introducing herself to Lalaine as a
representative of the POEA in order to gain access into the house; trying to distract Lalaine by using the
telephone, asking for a cigarette, going to the bathroom, and pretending that she was then having her
menstrual period in order to have her cohorts enter the house; and peeping inside the bedroom when
her co-accused were tying Lalaine up to enable themselves to search for and take away jewelry and
other valuables inside the latter's bedroom without hindrance.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issue
The accused still insists on her innocence, protesting that the CA erred in affirming the conviction
despite the failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator in robbery.10
Ruling of the Court
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.
Conspiracy of Fransdilla with
her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt
It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present evidence in her defense during the trial. On
appeal, the core of her contentions in the CA was that the Prosecution did not establish her having
conspired with the other accused in committing the robbery. She reiterates such contentions here,
stating that the State's formal offer of evidence did not include any reference to any evidence
specifically incriminating her.
The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions.
Our review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's contentions, the State
competently and credibly established her active participation in the execution of the robbery through
Lalaine's testimony detailing her specific acts, as follows:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, do you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened on that particular date
and time on February 20, 1991 between 3:00 o'clock to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What was it?
A- On February 20, 1991, between 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon while I was resting at our sala I
saw them and I met them at the gate and I asked the lady because there were four of them I asked the
lady to come in.
Q - How did the lady come in?
A - When I saw the lady I asked the lady what is her purpose and she said I am from the POEA and she
is looking for my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - When she inquired about my sister I told her that my sister Cynthia Yrreverre is in Japan embassy
and she said if there is any other person she could talked to.
Q - What was your answer?
A - When she said that she is from POEA I recommended myself to her and I said you can talk to me
and I allowed her to enter our house, sir.
Q - After you allowed that lady who represented herself to you that she is from the POEA to enter, what
happened next?
A - I let her enter our house and I inquired and asked from her who are the persons she know in POEA,
sir.
Q - And what happened next after that?
A - She mentioned a name whom according to her from the POEA but I do not remember anymore, sir.
Q - What happened next after that?
A - While we were chatting or conversing for a while she asked if she can use our telephone, sir.
Q - And what was your answer to that?
A - I said yes and I handed to her the cordless telephone, sir.
Q - What happened after you gave the telephone to the lady who represented herself that she is from
the POEA?
A - After I gave the cordless telephone she keep on dialing, dialing and dialing and according to her she
constantly dialing the number and she even remarked: "the person she is calling does not know how to
use the telephone"...
Q - What happened after that remarks?
A - She still kept on dialing and she remarked that she did not know how to use the phone...
 my attention was focused on her, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - After that, she asked for a cigarette sir. Q - What happened after that?
A - While my attention was with Aurora Engson Fransdilla, Cacal approached me and poked the gun on
Q - Did you give to the lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA a cigarette? my neck, sir.
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
Q - What happened next after that? A - After I gave the cigarette the four (4) men entered suddenly and A - And he announced hold-up.
came in our house.
Q - Who announced that hold-up?
Q - Where did they come from? A - Cacal, sir.
A - I do not know, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
Q - From what direction of the house they came from Miss Witness, do you know? A - While Cacal poked a gun at my neck Cuanang and the two other men went to the kitchen to which I
A - They came from the outside of the gate, sir, and suddenly entered our house, sir. could see very well in my position from where I stood, sir.

Q - When for the first time did you see that lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA and COURT:
the four (4) men burged (sic) in your house? Q - How many men went to the kitchen?
A- Last February 20, 1991 only, sir. A- The three (3) others went to the kitchen, sir.

xxxx ATTY. COPE:

Q - What happened next?
ATTYl COPE: A - While Cacal was poking the gun at my neck, I saw Cuanang and the two (2) men herded our maids
Q - Miss Yrreverre, would you look around the courtroom and pinpoint if that lady who represented my one cousin and my niece, sir in the bodega, sir.
herself from the POEA is here present?
A - Witness is pointing to a lady wearing black and when asked by the interpreter she answered to the Q - What happened next?
name of Aurora Engson Fransdilla. A - And our maids and my niece and my cousin were locked inside the bodega, sir.

xxxx Q - Where is this bodega located Miss Witness?

Q - Miss Yrreverre, what happened after four (4) men suddenly entered your residence on that
particular date and time you mentioned earlier?
A - As I was looking on the lady dialing, kept on dialing the number in the telephone I saw the four (4)
men standing behind the lady, sir.
A - In our kitchen, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A — While Cacal who was still poking the gun at my neck held and pulled the tail of my hair and
dragged me upstairs and brought me upstairs to the room of my sister Cynthia Irreverre, sir

Q - And when you saw the lady, you are referring to Aurora Engson Fransdilla? Q - What happened next?
A - Yes, sir. A - While I was at the room of my sister Cynthia and while the gun was still poked at my neck and still
held by Cacal he looked around the room, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - When we were in the sala we were talking Aurora Engson Fransdilla remarked she can not really Q - What happened after that?
contact the number as it was busy, sir. A — While I was looking around the room he saw the vault of my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.

Q - What happened next after that? Q - What happened next then?

A - And Aurora Engson Fransdilla after which asked if she can use the comfort room to which I agreed,
sir.
Q - What happened next?
A - She stood up and put down the cordless telephone and took her bag because she wanted to get a
napkin as she said she still has to call up before going to the comfort room, sir.
A- Suddenly he dropped me and opened the door and shouted that one (1) of your should come up.
Q - What happened after that?
A- While they carried the vault of my sister downstairs Cuanang came up and Cuanang carried the vault
with Cacal and before they went down they told me, Cacal told me that you should not follow us. You
should stay here.

Q - What happened next? xxxx

A - After which she sat down again and crossed legs and remarked that she had a monthly period so
ATTY. COPE: Q - What happened after that?
Q - Miss Yrreverre, will you please describe the vault which Cuanang and Cacal got from the room of A - While I was being tied by Cuanang at my back Aurora Engson Fransdilla peeped inside my room,
your sister Cynthia Yrreverre? sir.
A - Witness is demonstrating the size of the vault it is a small one it is as small television.
Q - Is that Aurora Engson Fransdilla the lady who represented to you from the POEA?
ATTY. VALDEZ: A - Yes, sir.
Can we measure that Your Honor.
Q - What happened after that while you were hogtied by Cuanang and Aurora Fransdilla peeped into
COURT: your room?
You agree on the size. A - While my hands was (sic) tied, that was the time Cacal and Cuanang took my jewelries, sir.

WITNESS: COURT:
A- Witness is pointing half of the area of the table which is more or less 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 cubic feet. Q - Where did she get those pieces of jewelry?
A - In my room at the headboard of my bed, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q - After Cuanang and Cacal brought out the vault from the room and you were told by Cacal to stay ATTY. COPE:
from the room and not to get out, what did you do? Q - What else if there were any taken by Cacal and Cuanang?
A - When the two (2) got out I just stay and they simultaneously closed the door, sir. A - Many sir.

Q - What happened next then? Q - What are those?

A — When they closed the door I got the courage to open the door and followed them, sir. A - They took the following: two pairs of gold earrings, one gold necklace with pendant, one Loui(s)
Vuitton brown leather, one Gucci Ladies watch, two gold earrings with diamond pendant and cash
Q - What happened then? money of SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS.
A - I went down the stairs when I was at the middle of the stairs Cacal turned his back and he saw me
and came after me and brought me up to my room, sir. ATTY. COPE:
Q - This one gold necklace with pendant how much did you buy this?
Q - How far was your room to the room of your sister Cynthia Yrreverre? A- I bought that for PI80,000.00, sir.
A - Just near sir, the dividing portion for the room of my niece is so near.
COURT:
Q - What happened after Cacal brought you to your room? How many karats this gold necklace?
A - While I was in my room he pushed me towards my bed, sir.
WITNESS:
Q - What happened after that? That is 18 karats gold, sir.
A - So when he pushed me and I was felt on my back he said to me just stay right there and he
searched my room (naghalughog), sir. ATTY. COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, how about the two gold earrings with diamond pendant, how much did you buy this?
xxxx A- I bought that for EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80,000.00) PESOS.

ATTY. COPE: COURT:

Q - How did you fall Miss Witness? Q - Do you know the karats of this diamond? How big is this?
A - When he pushed me I felt at my back sir and Cacal searched my room, sir. A - It is as big as big mongo, sir.

Q - What happened after that? ATTY. COPE:

A - While Cacal was searching (naghahalughog) I stood up when Cacal saw me stood up he slapped Q - This two pairs of gold earrings, how much did you buy this, how much is this?
me, sir. A-TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - What happened when you were slapped by Cacal? Q - What else?

A - He said (putang ina mo matigas ang ulo mo) son of a bitch you are hard headed. A - One gold necklace with pendant, sir.

Q - And what happened after that? Q - How much is this?

A — While I was sitting Cuanang came inside my room and he tied my hands at my back, sir A- ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (PI80,000.00) PESOS, sir.
Q - How about this Louie Vitton brown leather bag, how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for ELEVEN THOUSAND (PI 1,000.00) PESOS, sir.
Q - This Gucci ladies watch, how much did you buy this?
A-THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.
COURT:
What kind of Gucci is this, US Gucci or Hongkong?
WITNESS:
I do not remember anymore, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q - How much did you buy this?
A - I bought that for THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir. 11
The State thus discharged its burden to produce before the trial court sufficient evidence against all the
accused, including Fransdilla, that would warrant a judgment of conviction. Fransdilla's non-presentation
of her defense, despite her being directly incriminated by Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for
her specific overt acts of complicity in the robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence
unrefuted. By this the Court simply means that Fransdilla did not discharge her burden of evidence,
which is "the duty of a party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the trial until he has
established a prima facie case, or the like duty of the adverse party to meet and overthrow that prima
facie case thus established."12
As such, the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof against Fransdilla.
In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.13 For an accused to be validly held to have
conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her overt acts must evince her active part in the
execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt acts of each of the conspirators must tend to
execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the
conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was
satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had
facilitated the access into the house by representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that
respect, it is not always required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into
the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective
would be carried out.14 Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.15 Once conspiracy is
established, the act of each conspirator is the act of all.
In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Lalaine's
testimony against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct testimony showed the
latter's overt participation in the execution of the robbery, while the following circumstances indicated
the unity of action and common purpose or design to commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-
accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and her co-accused went together to the complainants' house at
around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. of February 20, 1991; (2) she talked to Joel to solicit information on the
whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning that Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside the gate
and talked to two men sitting inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be an
employee of the POEA in order to gain entry into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to
distract Lalaine in order to give her cohorts the opportunity to enter the house and commit the robbery;
(5) during the robbery, she was not tied up like the household members, but moved freely around the
house, and at one point Lalaine spotted her peeping into the bedroom where Lalaine was then being
held; and (7) she and the others fled together in two separate vehicles after the robbery.
In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the State established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt for of all the accused, including Fransdilla, for the robbery.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.
Correction of the Indeterminate Sentence
was necessary to conform to the letter and spirit
the Indeterminate Sentence Law
That the trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as minimum
to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of reclusion temporal as maximum" was a patent elementary error. Such fixing contravened the letter
and spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1 of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
The CA justifiably deemed it necessary to correct the indeterminate sentence. Under Section
1, supra, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is a penalty "within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the [Revised Penal] Code for the offense," and the maximum is "that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code."
Considering that the clear objective of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to have the convict serve the
minimum penalty before becoming eligible for release on parole pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,16 both the minimum and the maximum penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective
cannot be achieved otherwise, for determining when the convict would be eligible for release on parole
would be nearly impossible if the minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the
indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only to the fact that
such imposition would leave the period between the minimum and the maximum
penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released
from serving said period in whole or in part."17
3.
Crime committed was the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
Citing Napolis v. Court ofAppeals.,18 the CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty
of committing the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal
Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code. Thus, it held
that the penalty for the complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code was that for the more
serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Taking into consideration that no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances were present, it set the indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
We concur with the CA.
In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States v. De los
Santos19 that when the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal
Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the latter crime (although the lighter one) should be imposed
because the violence against or intimidation of a person was the "controlling qualification," on the theory
that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver
than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation against
the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the
individual." Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepción
observed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by
breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable
effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the
Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous
decisions, if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing
any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the
same Code, the imposable penalty - under paragraph (5) thereof- shall be much lighter. To our mind,
this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling
qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with
"violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force
upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the
cases above cited - reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violation
or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art.
294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person takes
place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised
Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both provisions are
present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition — as provided in Art. 48 of said Code
— of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar,
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum
period - from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal - owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. xxx. 20
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information fully alleged the
complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery
with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code by averring that "the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon
person rob the residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently proved the commission of
the complex crime by showing during the trial that the accused, after entering the residential house of
the complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including
the vault containing Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence
against and intimidation of persons during the robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her
up, and herding the other members of the household inside the bodega of the house.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed. 21
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusión perpetua when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted;
Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by
PD No. 767).
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the
violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree
clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries
covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in
other cases. (As amended by R. A. 18).
Paragraph 5, supra, is the relevant provision, under which the penalty is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
On the other hand, Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. — Any
armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall
exceed 250 pesos, and if:
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the
following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if —
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or (3) and the actual damages of P2,250,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
receptacle; filing of the information until full payment.

2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the SO ORDERED.
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property taken does
not exceed 250 pesos.

When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos,
they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.

If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or
building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this
article shall be imposed.
Relevant are paragraph (a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA) and paragraph (b)2
(because the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs bedroom and forced it open
outside the place where the robbery was committed), supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion
temporal.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for the more
serious felony, which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by armed men punishable
by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day
to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, must be corrected to 17 years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal.

4.
Exemplary damages to be deleted
for lack of legal basis

The CA affirmed the order of the RTC for the accused to return the value of the articles stolen totaling
P2,250,000.00 and to pay to the complainants P200,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of exemplary damages as part of the civil liability in
crimes only when one or more aggravating circumstances were present in the commission of the crime.
With the conceded absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, therefore,
we delete the P200,000.00 as exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. However, interest of 6% per
annum should be imposed on the P2,250,000.00,22 to be reckoned from the filing of the information until
full payment because the value of the stolen articles, which the information individually averred, could
be established with reasonable certainty.23

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS in all respects the
conviction of accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA for the complex crime of robbery in an
inhabited house by armed men under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence
against and intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (1) she shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; (2) the award of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal basis; and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
September 26, 2018
G.R. No. 217722
JOMAR ABLAZA y CAPARAS, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the March 20, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 36343, which affirmed with modification the December 3, 2013 Judgment 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City in Crim. Case No. 384-10 finding Jomar
Ablaza y Caparas (petitioner) and his co-accused Jay Lauzon y Parrales (Lauzon) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons under paragraph 5,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner and Lauzon were charged in an Information3 which reads:
That on or about the twenty-ninth (29th) day of July, 2010, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force and violence
against the person of Rosario S. Snyder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly
grab, take, steal and carry away three (3) pcs. of necklaces worth ₱43,800.00, ₱12,800.00 and
₱13,500.00. respectively, or in the total amount of ₱70, 100.00 x x x Philippine Currency, belonging to
said complainant, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. 5 Lauzon, who was arrested after the conclusion of the pre-
trial, also entered a plea of not guilty and adopted the pre-trial proceedings insofar as petitioner was
concerned.6 Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness the victim, Rosario S. Snyder (Snyder). Snyder narrated
that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 29, 2010, she was using her cellphone 7 while walking along Jolo
Street, Barangay Barreto, Olongapo City8 when a motorcycle with two male persons on board stopped
beside her. 9 The backrider then suddenly grabbed her three necklaces: 10 one big necklace worth
₱43,800.00 and two other necklaces each with pendants worth ₱13,500.00 and ₱12,800.00,
respectively, 11 the prices of which were evidenced by the receipts issued by Eleanor Pawnshop and
Jewelry Store where she bought them. 12 Snyder further recounted that after grabbing her necklaces,
the two male persons moved a short distance 13 and then looked back at her to check if all her
necklaces were taken. Recovering from shock, Snyder managed to shout and ask for help. A tricycle
passed by and so the male persons on board the motorcycle immediately sped away. 14 Snyder asked
the tricycle driver to run after the snatchers but he unfortunately missed them. 15 Thus, Snyder went to
the Police Station to report the incident. 16
While at the police station, Snyder was shown some pictures from which she identified petitioner as the
driver of the motorcycle. 17 Snyder was certain about the identity of petitioner since she had a good look
at the robbers' faces when they looked back at her before speeding away and also because petitioner
was not wearing any helmet at that time. 18
On the same day, a policeman accompanied Snyder to the house of petitioner 19 who, when asked,
denied any involvement in the snatching incident and claimed that he was asleep at that time. 20 After a
while, Snyder and the policeman discovered that Lauzon, whom Snyder earlier learned to be the
backrider,21 was also in petitioner's house hiding under the kitchen sink. 22 Unfortunately, Snyder was
not able to recover her necklaces. 23
Petitioner served as the sole witness for the defense. Petitioner claimed that on the date and time of the
incident, he and Lauzon were asleep in his house in Purok 6, Lower Kalaklan in front of Ocean
View24 since they had a drinking spree the night before. 25 Petitioner only woke up26 when a policeman
arrived asking him if he was Jomar Ablaza. 27 Upon confirming that he was Jomar Ablaza, the
policeman told him that a woman wanted to see him. 28 However, upon seeing petitioner, the woman
told the policeman that he was not the one since the person she was looking for was "tisoy" with
tattoo. 29 Upon hearing this, the policeman reminded the woman that petitioner already had a record
with the police. 30 The policeman and the woman then simply left. 31 After two months, however,
petitioner was arrested in connection with this case. 32
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he did not know Snyder prior to the alleged incident and
that he was involved in two more cases of robbery and one for theft. 33
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Judgment34 dated December 3, 2013, the RTC lent credence to Snyder's testimony for being
candid, unwavering, clear, coherent and also because she was without any improper motive to wrongly
implicate petitioner and Lauzon. The trial court also found the elements of the crime of robbery, to wit:
(1) that there is taking of personal property; (2) the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking
is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, to be present, ratiocinating as follows:
There is taking for sure. The act of the accused riding in tandem [in] forcibly grabbing the necklaces of
Snyder from her neck exhibits not only animus lucrandi, but also violent taking. The accused did not
simply "snatch" the necklaces: they grabbed them from Snyder's neck. The accused ran away with the
necklaces in an arrogant display of their intention to deprive Snyder of possession and dominion of her
necklaces. And finally, the necklaces belonged to Snyder. She had receipts to prove her ownership.
She bought them at a jewelry store. 35
Petitioner and Lauzon were likewise found to have conspired with each other in committing the crime
charged.
Accordingly, the RTC adjudged petitioner and Lauzon as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds JAY LAUZON y FARRALES and JOMAR ABLAZA y CAPJ\R/\S guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery defined and penalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentences them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and
two (2) months as minimum to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days as maximum.
The accused are also ordered solidarily to pay Rosario Snyder the amount of Php70, 1 00.00 with
interest at 6% per annum until the full amount is paid; and to pay the cost of suit.
SO DECIDED. 36
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal 37 which was given due course in an Order38 dated December 17,
2013.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his Brief,39 petitioner argued that the RTC erred in giving credence to Snyder's testimony which was
incredible and full of inconsistencies. Petitioner pointed out that it was unlikely that, after grabbing the
necklaces and speeding away, he and Lauzon would still look back at their alleged victim, Snyder.
According to him, logic and common experience dictate that they immediately leave the crime scene
and not look back. Second, Snyder herself admitted that she was shocked; hence, it was highly unlikely
that she would have the emotional stability and mental acuity to accurately remember the robbers' facial
features. Also, Snyder did not at the outset describe the physical appearance of the persons who
robbed her; instead, she identified petitioner only after she was shown the pictures. Moreover, Snyder
was looking for a mestizo who was sporting a tattoo which thus rendered doubtful Snyder's identification
of petitioner. Third, there were several inconsistencies in the testimonies of Snyder which tended to
demonstrate the fickleness of her memory. Lastly, petitioner found it baffling why he was arrested only
after two months and not immediately after a policeman and Snyder went to his house on the day itself
of the incident. To petitioner, all these cast doubt on his supposed guilt.
Petitioner likewise argued that, even assuming he committed the acts imputed against him, the RTC
should have convicted him only of theft citing People v. Concepcion40 where the accused therein who
snatched the victim's bag was held guilty of theft and not robbery.
The CA, however, was not swayed by petitioner's asseverations and found no merit in the
appeal.1âwphi1 It saw no reason not to believe Snyder's testimony and likewise found all the elements
of robbery obtaining. In debunking petitioner's claim that the element of violence was absent, the CA
stated that the only way that the necklaces could have been taken from Snyder was through the use of
violence and physical force. The CA also concurred with the RTC's finding of conspiracy. However, it
found fit to modify the penalty decreed by the trial court and clarified that the 6% interest imposed on the
monetary award should be reckoned from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Judgment dated December 3,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellant Jomar Ablaza y Caparas is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four ( 4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight ( 8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
He is further ordered to pay private complainant Rosario Snyder interest on the award or civil liability
assessed at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date or finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED. 41
In view of the above, petitioner is now before this Court through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari imputing upon the CA the following errors:
X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT TI-II\ THIS GUILT [HAD] NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITIONER COMMITTED THE ALLEGED ACTS, THE COURT
or APPEALS GRAVEL y ERRED IN FINDING HIM LIABLE FOR ROBBERY INSTEAD OF THEFT. 42
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on Snyder's uncorroborated testimony concerning his
identification as one of the alleged robbers. Said testimony did not inspire belief since, aside from being
highly contrary to human nature and experience, it was tainted with several inconsistencies. Moreover,
the same was insufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction. While petitioner admits that a lone witness'
testimony may be sufficient to convict an accused, this is only true when the testimony is clear,
consistent, and credible, which is not the case here. Also, while a denial cannot overcome a positive
identification of the accused, the positive identification must first come from a credible witness and the
witness's story must be believable and inherently contrived, which again is not true in this case. These,
according to petitioner, negate his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Even assuming that he committed the acts imputed against him, petitioner contends that he may only
be held liable for theft. He disagrees with the CA when it held that the only way that the necklaces could
be taken from Snyder was through the use of violence and physical force. Notably, Snyder testified that
her necklaces were grabbed from her. However, a necklace can be "grabbed" and taken away without
the use of violence. In fact, Snyder did not at all allege that she was pushed or otherwise harmed by the
persons who took her necklaces. In this regard, petitioner once again invokes the ruling
in Concepcion which he believes to be squarely applicable to his case.
In sum, petitioner prays that he be acquitted of the crime charged or, in the alternative, that he be held
liable only for theft.
Respondent's Arguments
In its Comment,43 Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), avers that Snyder was able to positively identify petitioner as she saw the faces of the
perpetrators. This easily inspires belief as the incident happened at around 8:30 a.m. or in broad
daylight; the robbers' faces were in open view; and that they were just a short distance away from
Snyder when they looked back at her. Significantly, Snyder made the identification from the
photographs shown to her just immediately after the incident. And, despite being shown several
photographs of persons with police records, she was able to pinpoint petitioner as one of the
perpetrators. On the other hand, that Snyder was allegedly looking for a "tisoy" was a mere allegation of
petitioner. Anent the inconsistencies in Snyder's testimony, the OSG avers that the same referred to
trivial matters that did not affect her credibility. It, thus, posits that the credible and convincing testimony
of Snyder sufficiently established the identity of petitioner as one of the perpetrators.
The OSG likewise asserts that petitioner was correctly found guilty of robbery. According to
it, Concepcion is not applicable to this case since therein, the victim testified that her shoulder bag was
snatched but no violence, intimidation, or force was used against her by the perpetrators. However,
here, Snyder testified that her necklaces were not merely snatched but grabbed from her. Hence,
violence was used upon her person. In view of these, the OSG prays for the denial of the petition for
lack of merit.
Our Ruling
There is partial merit in the petition.
"As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not
allow the review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts." 44 Notably here, the
arguments advanced by petitioner to support his contention that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt assail Snyder's credibility as witness, specifically with respect to the latter's
identification of him as one of the perpetrators, which essentially is a question of fact. As held, if a
question posed requires the reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses, the issue is factual. 45 And,
although there are several exceptions to the rule that factual questions cannot be passed upon in a Rule
45 petition, 46 the Court does not find the existence of any in this case. At any rate, "[t]he assessment of
credibility of witnesses is a task most properly within the domain of trial courts."47
[T]he findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded
them to observe the witnesses when placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts will not
overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. Said rule finds an ever more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the CA, as in the case at hand[.] 48
Accordingly, the Court shall not depart from the findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA on the matter
of Snyder's credibility as witness and that of her testimony identifying petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that petitioner should be held liable only for theft. Indeed, the case of
People v. Concepcion49 is on all fours with the present case, viz.:
x x x Article 293 or the I Revised Penal Code (RPC)] defines robbery as a crime committed by 'any
person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.' x x x
Theft, on the other hand. is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another
without the latter's consent. x x x
By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in three ways, by using: (a) violence against any
person; (b) intimidation of any person; and/or (c) force upon anything. Robbery by use of force upon
things is provided under Articles 299 to 305 of the RPC.
The main issue is whether the snatching of the shoulder bag in this case is robbery or theft. Did
Concepcion employ violence or intimidation upon persons, or force upon things, when he snatched
Acampado's shoulder bag?
In People v. Dela Cruz, this Court found the accused guilty of theft for snatching a basket containing
jewelry, money and clothing, and taking off with it, while the owners had their backs turned.
In People v. Tapang, this Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for frustrated theft because he
stole a white gold ring with diamond stones from the victim's pocket, which ring was immediately or
subsequently recovered from the accused at or about the same time it was stolen.
In People v. Omambong, the Court distinguished robbery from theft. The Court held:
Had the appellant then run away, he would undoubtedly have been guilty of theft only, because the
asportation was not effected against the owner’s will, but only without his consent; although, of course,
there was some sort of force used by the appellant in taking the money away from the owner.
xxxx
What the record does show is that when the offended party made an attempt to regain his money, the
appellant's companion used violence to prevent his succeeding.
xxxx
The crime committed is therefore robbery and not theft, because personal violence was brought to bear
upon the offended party before he was definitely deprived of his money.
The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching
Acarnpado' s shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder
bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion's snatching of
Acampado's shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery. xx x50 (Citations omit)
Similarly in this case, Snyder's testimony was bereft of any showing that petitioner and his co-accused
used violence or intimidation in taking her necklaces. She merely stated that the perpetrators grabbed
her necklaces without mentioning that the latter made use of violence or intimidation in grabbing
them, viz.:
Q: Do you recall any untoward incident that happened while walking on [July 29, 2010]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is that incident'?
A: Suddenly somebody approached me and took my necklace.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell us how these two persons approached you?
A: While I was walking, a motorcycle stopped[,] xx x [on board it were] the driver and a backrider.
Q: Where did this motorcycle stop?
A: [Beside] me.
Q: In front of you or beside you?
A: [Beside] me.
xxxx
Q: How did these persons grab your necklace?
A: They suddenly grabbed my necklace and I was shocked. 51
The OSG argues that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence or physical force was
employed by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court, however, finds the argument to be
a pure play of semantics. Grab means to take or seize by or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take
hastily. 52 Clearly, the same does not suggest the presence of violence or physical force in the act; the
connotation is on the suddenness of the act of taking or seizing which cannot be readily equated with
the employment of violence or physical force. Here, it was probably the suddenness of taking that
shocked Snyder and not the presence of violence or physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner,
Snyder did not at all allege that she was pushed or otherwise harmed by the persons who took her
necklaces.
Besides, the use of force is not an element of the crime of simple robbery committed under paragraph 5,
Article 294 of the RPC.
The crime of robbery is found under Chapter One, Title Ten [Crimes Against Property] of the RPC.
Chapter One is composed of two sections, to wit: Section One - Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons; and Section Two - Robbery by the use of force upon things.
Robbery in general is defined under Article 293 of the RPC as follows:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal
property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
"The elements of robbery are thus: (1) there is taking of personal property; (2) the personal property
belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things."53
Note that while the fourth requisite mentions "with violence against or intimidation of persons" or "force
upon things", only the phrase "with violence against or intimidation of persons" applies to the kinds of
robbery falling under Section One, Chapter One, Title Ten of the RPC. The phrase "with force upon
things", on the other hand, applies to the kinds of robbery provided under Section Two thereof.
As mentioned, the RTC convicted petitioner of simple robbery under paragraph 5, Article 294, which
article falls under Section One. Article 294 provides:
ART 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or
on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263
[Serious Physical Injuries] shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty or reclusion temporal when by reason or on occasion of the robbery any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have
been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the
violence or intimidation employed in the commission or the robbery shall have been carried to a degree
clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries
covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period in other cases.
Hence, in determining the existence of the fourth requisite in cases of simple robbery under Article 294,
courts should look into whether the taking of personal property is with violence against or intimidation of
persons and not on whether there was force.
Now, on how to construe the phrase ''by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" as used
in Article 294, the case of People v. Judge Alfeche, Jr. 54 is enlightening:
Accordingly, the phrase ·by means of violence against or intimidation of persons· in Article 312 must be
construed to refer to the same phrase used in Article 294. There are five classes of robbery under the
latter, namely: (a) robbery with homicide (par. 1); (b) robbery with rape, intentional mutilation. or the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 (par. 2): (c) robbery with physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of Article 26) (par. 3): (d) robbery committed with unnecessary violence or
with physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263 (par. 4); and (e) robbery in other
cases, or simply robbery (par. 5), where the violence against or intimidation of persons cannot be
subsumed by or where it is not sufficiently specified so as to fall under, the first four paragraphs.
Paragraphs one to four Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against persons. The actual
physical force inflicted results in death, rape, mutilation or the physical injuries therein enumerated. The
simple robbery under paragraph five may cover physical injuries not included in paragraphs two
to four. Turns, when less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries arc inflicted upon
the offended party on the occasion of a robbery, the accused may be prosecuted for and
convicted of robbery under paragraph five.
It seems obvious that intimidation is not encompassed under paragraphs one to four since no actual
physical violence is inflicted; evidently then, it can only fall under paragraph five.
But what is meant by the word intimidation? It is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as 'unlawful coercion;
extortion; duress; putting in fear'. To take, or attempt to take, by intimidation means 'wilfully to take, or
attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm." As shown in United States vs. Osorio material
violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation, intense fear produced in the mind of the victim
which restricts or hinders the exercise of the wi11 is sufficient. x x x 55
Clearly, for the requisite of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained
less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery. Or, as illustrated in
the book of Justice Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code (Book Two), there should be some kind of
violence exerted to accomplish the robbery, as when:
Snatching money from the hands of the victim and pushing her to prevent her from recovering the
seized property.
xxxx
Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that some kind of violence had been exerted to
accomplish the snatching, and the offended party herself admitted that she did not feel anything at the
time her watch was snatched from her left wrist the crime committed is not robbery but only on simple
theft. 56
In this case, Snyder did not sustain any kind of injury at all. And as already mentioned, her testimony
was bereft of any showing that violence was used against her by petitioner and his co-accused in that
she was pushed, or otherwise harmed on the occasion of the robbery. While one can only imagine how
pulling three necklaces at the same time from the victim's neck could not have caused any mark, bruise,
or pain to the latter, suffice it to state that such a matter must have been adequately proved by the
prosecution during trial as the Court cannot rely on mere assumptions, surmises, and conjectures
especially when it is the life and liberty of the petitioner which is at stake.
As to intimidation, its non-existence in this case is not in dispute. And even if otherwise, the Court will
just the same rule against it. Per the victim's testimony, the act of the perpetrators in grabbing her
necklace was so sudden. Hence, it could not have produced fear or duress in the victim's mind as to
deprive her of the exercise of her wi11.
"Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must be
established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite
to a finding of guilt."57 Here, the fourth requisite of the crime of robbery is not obtaining considering that
the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that the taking of the necklaces was with violence against
or intimidation of persons. Accordingly, petitioner must be held liable only for the crime of theft, not
robbery.
Under Article 309(3) of the RPC as amended by Republic Act No. 10951,58 any person guilty of theft
shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the property stolen is more than ₱20,000.00 but does not exceed ₱600,000.00. Since petitioner is
guilty of the crime of theft of property valued at P70, 100.00 and, in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum term of the penalty should be within the range of one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime, which is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which ranges from two (2) months and one (1) day
to six (6) months. For this reason, the Court imposes upon petitioner the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed March 20,
2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36343, which affirmed with modification the
December 3, 2013 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City in Criminal Case
No. 384-10 finding petitioner Jomar Ablaza y Caparas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons under paragraph 5, A1iicle 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
is MODIFIED in that he is instead found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2)
years, eleven (11) months and ten ( 10) days of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182648 June 17, 2015
HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the January 7, 2008 Decision1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29634, which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman
Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple theft, defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Information4 filed against Medina states:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime thereafter, in the City of Santiago,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away the following to wit: one (1) unit alternator worth
Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00, battery worth Php2,500.00[,] and two (2) sets of tire 2.75 x 15
with mugs worth Php10,000.00 all valued at Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY LIM, represented by
PURITA LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount of Php22,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW[.]
The factual antecedents appear as follows:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered owner of a
Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an accident that caused
damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002,he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic
and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to
Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and serviceable because the under chassis was not
affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4,
2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from
Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran,
however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth
₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00, and ₱10,000.00, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry,
Medina told him that he took and installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was
also being repaired in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get
the jeep, but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before
placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put
back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint5 for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing her
brother. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.6 Subsequently, an Information was
filed before the court a quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No settlement, stipulation or admission was made by the
parties during the pre-trial.8 During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former barangay kagawad of
Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case was submitted for decision, but
without the formal offer of evidence by the defense.9
The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the
March 31, 2005 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and
considering the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The accused is likewise ordered to
indemnify Henry Lim the total amount of ₱22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina. While the trial court was not convinced with
Medina’s justification that he installed the jeep’s missing parts to the pick-up also owned by Lim, the CA
opined that his excuse is "so lame and flimsy." The CA agreed with the lower court’s findings that
Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the pickup; that unlike the pick-up, the needed
repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove that the pick-up was completely
repaired and was placed in good running condition; and that he failed to prove that the pick-up is owned
by Lim. The CA also held that the positive testimony of Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the self-
serving testimony of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to Medina’s assertion that the missing auto
parts were turned over to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim. For the CA, the
trial court correctly ruled that such claim was unsubstantiated in view of Medina’s failure to formally offer
in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt. Assuming that the exception in Mato v. CA 11 is
taken into account, the receipt could not still be considered because it was not incorporated in the
records of the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed this petition which alleges the following
errors:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION ONLY
PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. WORST, IT SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED ONLY ONE
SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS DANILO
BELTRAN THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO (2) PIECES [OF] TIRES
WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE KORANDO JEEP WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OFTHE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED NOT ON THE
STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE
RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN PHILIPPINES VS. ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO FURTIVE
TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN THE CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE
TAKING, IF AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ABUNDO VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT MARKED AS
EXHIBIT "2" FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C" FOR THE PROSECUTION
(COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS
NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST
OF JUSTICE, ONE OFTHE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.12
We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. 13 As
defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against, or
intimidation of persons or force, upon things.14 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. 15 Although proof
as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain
is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. 16 As to the concept
of "taking" –
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be
capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away."
Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require
asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal
Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed through the use of
the offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device x x x. 17
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter, battery,
and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned
by Lim.18 With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts
were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that
Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao, he
failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or corroborative
testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were
exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the
transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their
placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina adduce any justifying19 or exempting20 circumstance to
avoid criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was still in
running condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went missing by the
time the vehicle was recovered from the auto shop.21 Likewise, the testimony of Beltran is definite and
straightforward. He declared that he was not able to get the jeep in the morning of September 4, 2002
because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims could not be found, and that when he
asked Medina as to their whereabouts the latter told him that he took them, placed the starter in Lim’s
pick-up while the alternator was in the repair shop.22 Medina informed him that the jeep’s missing parts
were actually installed to Lim’s other vehicle which was also being repaired at the time. 23 However,
Beltran did not know or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina’s shop. 24 In the afternoon
of the sameday, he was able to get the jeep but not its missing parts.25 He concluded that they were lost
because he inspected the jeep.26
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,27 which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the
element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records
showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile
of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and signed.
Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation. The
physical and juridical possession of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request, with the
consent or acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by the public officials who had
legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession;
therefore, there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The
Court agreed with the observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for permission to
steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is
not felonious.28
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt 29 that he and
Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to his testimony,
Mendoza came to his (Medina’s) place and saw the subject auto parts while being transferred from the
jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina even called barangay officials and let them signed
a document to bear witness on the matter. 30 The document, dated July 25, 2002, which was marked as
Exhibit "2," was signed byMendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario Pascual
(said to be Medina’s helper), and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads).
Ostensibly, they signed the document while facing each other in front of Medina’s house. 31
In Mato v. CA,32 which referred to People v. Napat-a,33 citing People v. Mate,34 We relaxed the
application of Section 34, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court by allowing the admission of evidence not
formally offered. To be admissible, however, two essential conditions must concur: first, the same must
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.36
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it was
not formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense testimony that was duly
recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records. For its part, the CA opined that
nowhere from the case records does Medina’s acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examination,
it appears that the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt was attached as Annex "3" of Medina’s
Appellant’s Brief.37 Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece of document, especially so
since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the trial proper that said receipt be marked
as Exhibit "C."38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same would still
not exonerate Medina.1âwphi1 This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not
actually see him remove the alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and put the
same to the pick-up.39 Likewise, while Medina asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was shown
that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the pick-up, the latter was not presented as
a hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for being self-serving and
uncorroborated. Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with caution because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted. 40
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus,
courts – both trial and appellate – have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with
considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that
denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for
the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-serving negations, for
denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 41 Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any
evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court. 42
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings of the
trial court, which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that when the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon Us.43 It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below. 44 As held
in Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals:45
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and authority (Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in cases brought toit from the Court of Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising
the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of facts being conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 737).
In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to
reviewing questions of law, unless the factual findings are totally bereft of support in the records or are
so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Canete, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
171 SCRA 13).
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the
Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and are allowed only on
questions of law and only when there are special and important reasons, which we do not find in this
case (Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365).46
Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court:
Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of simple theft when the value of the stolen
property exceeds ₱22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. 47
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which,
taking into consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC. 48 As
the value of the auto parts stolen from Lim is in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable is the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309, which is the maximum of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Since the penalty prescribed is composed of only two periods, Article 65
of the RPC requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one
period of each of the three portions. Thus, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the penalty
prescribed are:
Minimum - 6 years and l day to 7 years and 4 months
Medium - 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Maximum - 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years
The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be-anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. 49 In this case, the pep.alty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the offense is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, or anywhere from
Two (2) years,. Four (4) months and One (1) day to Six (6) years. Thus, the trial court did not err when it
sentenced Medina to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6) months and Twenty-
One (21) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.50 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
January 7, 2008 Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.
29634,1 which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3),
Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the crime of simple
theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @Mera Nielles Delos Reyes was charged with the crime of
Qualified Theft in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about and sometime in July, 2004 in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the cashier of complainant
Juanita J. Flores and as such enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon her by the said
complainant, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, with grave
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away
collected money in the total amount of ₱640,353.86 to the damage and prejudice of the complainant, in
the aforementioned amount of ₱640,353.86. CONTRARY TO LAW.1
In an Order2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132,
ordered appellant's release from confinement after having posted a bond in the amount ₱100,000.00
undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. under Bond No. 8385. Appellant was
thereafter arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. 3
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged in the
business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and disposing,
selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant initially worked as Flores’ house help but was
eventually hired to work at Flores’ office performing clerical jobs like sorting invoices. When Flores’
business grew, appellant was assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and
deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant collected ₱640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However,
appellant did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores’) account. Instead, she issued 15
personal checks totaling ₱640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores’ account. All the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to "account closed." Appellant thereafter absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of ₱640,353.86.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
In a Judgment4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, found appellant guilty of the
crime of qualified theft, thus:
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took ₱640,353.86 belonging to private complainant Juanita J.
Flores, without the latter’s consent. The taking was done with intent to gain because when the
accused’s checks bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The accused’s act was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, but
rather by the use of abuse of confidence reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Thus, the
elements of theft, as well as the circumstances that made the same as qualified theft, are present in the
instant case.
Accused Nielles, on the other hand, denied having stolen and carried away ₱640,353.86. Aside from
her bare denial, she did not present any evidence to support this claim. In fact, she did not deny that the
checks were issued and deposited by her. Furthermore, she did not provide any reason or motive why
Juanita would file the present case against her. Accordingly, her denial has no basis and deserves no
consideration.5
The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Mera "Joy" Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles Delos
Reyes, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby sentences her to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to pay private complainant Juanita J. Flores
₱640,353.86 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal. At the same time, she submitted a Renewal Certificate7 of
her bond effective for the period January 18, 2008 to January 18, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on July 15, 2004, she
could not have personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts from the sub-guarantors.
She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she received/collected payments from
the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She insisted that the
prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected monies from the sub-guarantors amounting to
₱640,353.86. Appellant also theorized that she might have issued the checks in favor of the sub-
guarantors for whatever transactions they have between them; and that thereafter, when she went to
these sub-guarantors to collect their dues for private complainant, these sub-guarantors used the same
checks she previously issued as their payment for private complainant. For that reason her personal
checks were deposited in private complainant’s account.
The CA, however, in its Decision8 dated May 26, 2011, was not impressed by appellant’s protestations.
It held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission of the offense is irrelevant
since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in the Philippines, she
immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed
appellant issued 15 personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected and deposited the same to Flores’
account but were all dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare
denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her claim that she did not steal the amount of
₱640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified theft to be
present.
Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed
26 March 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 in Criminal Case No. 04-
3643 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. She is further ordered to pay Private Complainant the amount of ₱640,353.86.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution10 dated April 18, 2012, we required both parties to file their
Supplemental Briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing its
supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant maintains in her Supplemental Brief 11 that the
prosecution failed to establish that she unlawfully took the amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to Flores.
She claims that mere issuance of the checks does not prove unlawful taking of the unaccounted
amount. She insists that, at most, the issuance of the checks proves that the same was issued for
consideration. On February5, 2013, appellant furnished this Court her bond renewal certificate 12 issued
by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. effective for the period January 18, 2013 to January 18,
2014.
Our Ruling
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution satisfactorily
established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal property;2) that said property
belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the
owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence. 13 As correctly found by
the appellate court:
Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of ₱640,353.86 from her without
her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the former’s sub-guarantors. Instead,
she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and deposited the same to Private Complainant’s account which
however, all bounced for the reason "account closed". The taking of the amount collected by Accused-
appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to Private Complainant.
Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished
by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon
things as the payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as
she was known to be entrusted with the collection of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also
proven.1âwphi1 Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and responsibilities
include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits and withdrawals in behalf of
Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes due,
she would fill up the four (4) blank checks given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent
of Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession
of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in the instant
case.14
We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of taking of personal
property was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During her cross-examination, private
complainant Flores testified that upon having been apprised of the unremitted collections, she
conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who admitted making payments to
appellant.15 She also testified during cross-examination that when appellant arrived from Hongkong, the
latter went to Flores’ office and admitted to having converted the collections to her personal
use.16 Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify, appellant did not rebut Flores’ testimony. During her
direct examination, appellant only testified thus:
Atty. Regino – Question:
Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking, stealing and carrying away collected money in
the total amount of ₱640,353.86, that is owned by Juanita J. Flores. What can you say about this
allegation?
Witness:
That is not true, sir.
Atty. Regino – Question:
What is your basis in stating that?
Witness:
I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are saying and, I never signed any document with
the sub-guarantors that I [took] money from them.17
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the sub-guarantors who
admitted having made payments to appellant, the latter’s counsel no longer made further clarifications
or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores’ testimony on this fact remains on record unrebutted. Clearly, it is
futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly claim in her Brief before the appellate court that the
prosecution should have presented these sub-guarantors so they could be cross-examined.18 There is
likewise no merit in her contention that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence when they
did not present these sub-guarantors19 simply because the defense, on its own initiative, could very well
compel, thru the compulsory processes of the court, the attendance of these sub-guarantors as
witnesses.20 Moreover, we note that appellant did not even attempt to discredit the testimony of Flores
to the effect that upon her arrival from Hongkong, appellant went to Flores’ office and admitted to having
committed the offense.
Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any attempt to
explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made any mention
about the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. It was only in her
Memorandum21 filed with the trial court and her Brief22 submitted to the appellate court that the same
was discussed. However, her explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it defies belief. All that
appellant could claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that the same was for a
consideration – but omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also theorized that she might
have issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed to
elaborate on what these transactions were. In any event, if indeed appellant did not steal the amount of
₱640,353.86 belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in favor of the latter and
deposited the same in her account, albeit they were subsequently dishonored? Besides, we note that in
appellant’s Counter Affidavit23 dated August 20, 2004 subscribed before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City, she already admitted having taken without the knowledge and
consent of private complainant several purchase orders and gift checks worth thousands of pesos. She
claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and cohorts.
Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to prison. In view thereof and based on our
foregoing discussion, appellant must be ordered arrested and committed to prison to start serving her
sentence.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31635
is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 is DIRECTED to issue a warrant for
the arrest of appellant and to order her commitment at the Correctional Institution for Women, and to
submit to this Court a Report of such commitment, all within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution. The Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women is DIRECTED to confirm to this
Court the confinement of appellant within ten (10) days therefrom.

We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution established beyond SO ORDERED.
reasonable doubt that the amount of ₱640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that appellant stole the
amount with intent to gain and without Flores’ consent; that the taking was accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and that it was committed with
grave abuse of confidence.

Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is ₱640,353.86, then the imposable penalty shall be
the maximum period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or eight(8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, adding one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00. Thus,
from ₱640,353.86, we deduct ₱22,000.00, giving us a balance of ₱618,353.86 which we divide by
₱10,000.00. We now have sixty-one (61)years which we will add to the basic penalty of eight (8) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. However, as stated in Article 309, the imposable
penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus, if appellant had committed
only simple theft, her penalty would be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Considering however
that in qualified theft, the penalty is two degrees higher, then the appellate court properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.24
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta, challenging
the June 27, 2005 decision2 and the November 24, 2005 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 28369. The CA decision affirmed the January 12, 2004 decision 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 20109-R, convicting the petitioner of the
crime of qualified theft. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with Concordia O.
Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:That sometime in the month of
October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx
accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building
Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-
contract with A. Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and implement the
fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the receipt,
audit and checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site – a position of full trust and
confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR,
Inc., conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and
with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from
the Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams of different sizes
with a total value of ₱2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc.,
represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of
ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of ₱2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency. 5
Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."6 Loyao remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo Bernardo,
Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigondon, and
Apolinaria de Jesus,7 as well as documentary evidence consisting of a security logbook entry, delivery
receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The prosecution’s pieces of evidence, taken
together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building
construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the
building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its
construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the
construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It assigned the petitioner as project manager with
general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction
materials.8
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck driver, and
about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide
flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City.
Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo and several welders, including
Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams
along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio City.9
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon
that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar’s warehouse on October 12, 19, and
26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook. Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to
explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon
requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the
project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along
Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He
reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to
retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer
be found. The stolen steel beams amounted to ₱2,269,731.69.10
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not
Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr. Marigondon’s motive in
falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials. 11
The RTC’s Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision,12 the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It gave credence
to the prosecution witnesses’ straightforward and consistent testimonies and rejected the petitioner’s
bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and 3
months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to indemnify Anmar ₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest
from November 2001 until full payment, and to pay Engr. Marigondon ₱100,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA’s Ruling
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ statements, and
reiterated his status as an AMCGS employee. 13
In its June 27, 2005 decision,14 the CA brushed aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s
decision convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies
deserve full credence in the absence of any improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioner. It
noted that the petitioner admitted his status as Anmar’s employee and his receipt of salary from Anmar,
not AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner’s defense of denial for being self-serving. It, however, deleted the
award of moral damages to Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied15 the motion for reconsideration16 that followed, the petitioner filed the present
Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in the
month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., November
2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He further argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of
the steel beams since the corpus delicti was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the
issues raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness of the calibration of the evidence
by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of fact, not of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule
45 petition. In any case, the respondent contends that the evidence on record indubitably shows the
petitioner’s liability for qualified theft.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s
decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in determining
the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the
offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that
the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information
stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the
month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with
which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather by such
reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed,
as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material element of the
offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.17 Clearly, the month of November is the month right after
October.
The crime of qualified theft was committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to
another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it
be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave
abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel
beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway
and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when
he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the
authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or corpus
delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged stolen beams in court
was fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
The petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us.
"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of
the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom
or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness'
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence."19 "In theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking." 20

In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the corpus delicti.
The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating
that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on
the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner’s conviction. The security logbook
entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a
different location other than the project site.

Proper Penalty

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10
years and three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and to indemnify Anmar
₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in
failing to specify the appropriate name of the penalty imposed on the petitioner.

We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal terminology in the
imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and
accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified as under the scheme of
penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding
accessory penalties.21 Thus, the courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the RPC,
such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten days of arresto menor" not "ten days of
imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua based on Article 310 of
the RPC which provides that "the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in Article 309."221âwphi1

To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is ₱2,269,731.69.
Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds ₱22,000.00, the basic penalty
is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, to be imposed in the maximum period, which is
eight years, eight months and one day to 10 years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct ₱22,000.00 from ₱2,269,731.69, which
gives us ₱2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be divided by ₱10,000.00, disregarding any
amount less than ₱10,000.00. We now have 224 years that should be added to the basic penalty.
However, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore, had
petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty
for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27, 2005 decision and the November 24, 2005
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Criminal Case No. 03-2181 ₱55,000.00
SUPREME COURT
Manila Criminal Case No. 03-2182 ₱55,000.00

SECOND DIVISION Criminal Case No. 03-2183 ₱85,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2184 ₱350,000.00

G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014
Criminal Case No. 03-2185 ₱250,000.00
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
Criminal Case No. 03-2186 ₱20,000.00
DECISION Criminal Case No. 03-2187 ₱250,000.00

CARPIO, J.: Criminal Case No. 03-2188 ₱60,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2189 ₱150,000.00

The Case
Criminal Case No. 03-2190 ₱50,000.00
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch Criminal Case No. 03-2191 ₱46,300.00
137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts of
Qualified Theft. Criminal Case No. 03-2192 ₱205,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2193 ₱200,000.00

The Facts
Criminal Case No. 03-2194 ₱25,000.00
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
Criminal Case No. 03-2195 ₱500,000.00
(WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. 1 Criminal Case No. 03-2196 ₱500,000.00

It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds Criminal Case No. 03-2197 ₱30,000.00
ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare disbursement
vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds Criminal Case No. 03-2198 ₱400,000.00
from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This Criminal Case No. 03-2199 ₱300,000.00
procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to be standard practice at
Criminal Case No. 03-2200 ₱500,000.00
WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her
personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a Criminal Case No. 03-2201 ₱65,000.00
withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution. 3
Criminal Case No. 03-2202 ₱47,000.00
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified theft
filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total of ₱6,268,300.00, brokendown into Criminal Case No. 03-2203 ₱500,000.00
the following amounts:
Criminal Case No. 03-2204 ₱40,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2178 ₱200,000.00 Criminal Case No. 03-2205 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2179 ₱250,000.00 Criminal Case No. 03-2206 ₱35,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2180 ₱200,000.00 Criminal Case No. 03-2207 ₱500,000.0
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of the 30
cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the
basis of which these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others: That for
purposes of efficient and speedy administration of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the
pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that the actualtrial and presentation of
evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on Cases Numbers 03-2178 to
03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination of the hearing onsaid three
(3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27) counts,
considering that all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods or modus operandi
used in committing the crime charged, and involving the same accused and the same offended party[.] 4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to suffer
the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱250,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱55,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 03-2182, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱55,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 03-2183, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱85,000.00;
7. In Criminal Case No. 03-2184, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱350,000.00;
8. In Criminal Case No. 03-2185, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱20,000.00;
10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱250,000.00;
11. In Criminal Case No. 03-2188, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱60,000.00;
12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱150,000.00;
13. In Criminal Case No. 03-2190, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱4[6],300.00;
15. In Criminal Case No. 03-2192, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱205,000.00;
16. In Criminal Case No. 03-2193, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
17. In Criminal Case No. 03-2194, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱25,000.00;
18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱500,000.00;
19. In Criminal Case No. 03-2196, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱500,000.00;
20. In Criminal Case No. 03-2197, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱30,000.00;
21. In Criminal Case No. 03-2198, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱400,000.00;
22. In Criminal Case No. 03-2199, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
23. In Criminal Case No. 03-2200, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱500,000.00;
24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱65,000.00;
25. In Criminal Case No. 03-2202, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱47,000.00;
26. In Criminal Case No. 03-2203, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱500,000.00;
27. In Criminal Case No. 03-2204, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱40,000.00;
28. In Criminal Case No. 03-2205, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱400,000.00;
29. In Criminal Case No. 03-2206, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱35,000.00;
30. In Criminal Case No. 03-2207, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of ₱500,000.00.
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key
officers ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial
records of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds
which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer."6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA denied her
appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the
WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be
redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another, since the funds
undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is
obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse showing that the funds were credited to another
account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with
intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby means of a modus
operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were
made in the normal course of business and with the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was
accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the
acts were committed with grave abuse of confidence considering that her position as cashier permeates
trust and confidence.7
The Court’s Ruling
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30 cases
are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken froma fishpond or
fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or
make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to
gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused." 9
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the
association.1âwphi1 Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance
over the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing
disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not
deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194,
03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are ₱20,000.00, ₱46,300.00, ₱25,000.00,
₱30,000.00, ₱40,000.00, and ₱35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed pr is
ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below ₱12,000.00. Hence, if the crime
charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least, prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was qualified by
grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be the one "next
higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty in these six
cases should be reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-
2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The
judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the corresponding charges stands.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
March 1, 2017
G.R. No. 212815
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN, Accused-
Appellant
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the November 4, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05418, which affirmed the Decision2 dated January 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 59, Angeles City in Criminal Case No. 04-594.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan (Donia) was charged with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6539, otherwise known as AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Co-accused Val
Paulino (Paulino) and one @Ryan (Ryan), both remains at-large, were similarly charged. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November 2003, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away with them one (1) Honda TMX 155 tricycle, colored black and with Body [No.] 817,
valued at Ninety-Six Thousand ([P.]96,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, and on the occasion thereof,
Raul L. Layug, being the driver and owner of the said Honda TMX 155 tricycle, was killed with the use of
a mini jungle bolo.
Contrary to law.3
Pending Donio's arraignment, POI Emessito N. Bansagan and the National Bureau of Investigation,
Central Luzon Regional Office submitted the returns on the Warrant of Arrest against Ryan and Paulino,
respectively, stating that the said persons could not be located at the given addresses, and requested
for alias warrants against them. The trial court issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest against accused Ryan
on September 4, 2004 and against Paulino on November 4, 2004.4
At his arraignment, Donio, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
During the pre-trial conference, it was stipulated that Donio is the same person whose name appears in
the Information and was arraigned before that court.
Thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.
On November 26, 2003, six police officers of the Concepcion Police Station, Tarlac City, headed by
SP04 Leodegario Taberdo (SP04 Taberdo ), conducted a checkpoint along the junction of MacArthur
Highway in relation to the campaign of the Philippine National Police against hijacking, camapping, and
kidnapping, hailing cargo trucks and closed vans, and issuing cards to southbound vehicles.5
At 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003, a speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few meters from
the checkpoint and caught the attention of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others approached
the vehicle. The driver, later identified as Donio, was noticeably agitated while repeatedly kicking the
starter of the tricycle. When asked for his identity, he introduced himself as Raul Layug (Raul) and then
handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary license bearing the said name. The police officers asked the
driver and his companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan, to bring the vehicle, a Honda TMX 155
tricycle with Body No. 817, to the checkpoint when they failed to produce its certificate of registration
and the official receipt.6
Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They seized
the tricycle and the bolo, and then brought the three to the police station. At 9 o'clock in the morning,
Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the registration papers. The officers allowed him,
however, he did not return.7
Meanwhile, around 6:30 in morning of the same date, Rodrigo Layug (Rodrigo) was searching for his
brother Raul, the victim, who has not returned home since last night. Raul was the driver of Rodrigo's
Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817. Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver cousin from Mawaque to
ask him if he saw his brother. His cousin accompanied him to Barangay Madapdap where they found
the remains of Raul. Words spread about his death. Thereafter, a tricycle driver informed them that he
saw a vehicle similar to Rodrigo's at the Concepcion Police Station. Rodolfo, Raul and Rodrigo's other
brother, went to the station where he learned that Paulino and Ryan were released. 8
Sometime in December 2003, the brothers returned to the station upon learning that Donio was
apprehended. On December 7, 2003, the Chief of
Police summoned SP04 Taberdo to identify the driver who asked permission to retrieve the registration
papers but did not return at the Concepcion Police Station. Upon seeing Donio, the disgruntled SP04
Taberdo asked him, "Why did you do that?" He was referring to the incident when Donio did not return.
It was also that same day that he learned Donio's real identity.9
Dr. Reynaldo C. Dizon (Dr. Dizon) conducted the post-mortem examination of Raul's body and
determined that he sustained stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument.
Defense's sole witness, Donio, a 35-year-old grass cutter and a resident of Madapdap, Mabalacat,
Pampanga, denied the accusations. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long palang for
harvesting and cutting. It was not similar to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo. As a stay-in
plantation worker, he does not leave the workplace for six months. His wife visits him instead.
On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac. However, from the evening of
November 25, 2003 until the next day, he was at home after his wife fetched him to tend to their sick
child. He first learned of the carnapping charge when the police officers came to his house looking for a
certain Val Paulino. He was taken to the municipal hall where he was investigated and detained for five
days. Three officers beat and electrocuted him for three hours forcing him to admit the crime. 10
The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ENRILE U. DONIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Carnapping as defined in Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6539, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with credit of his preventive imprisonment.
Accused ENRILE U. DONIO is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Raul L. Layug the following
amounts: Fifty thousand pesos ([₱]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Twenty-five thousand pesos
([₱]25,000.00) as actual damages.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
The trial court ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime. Donio failed to
substantiate his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense or the physical
impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the
incident.12 Under the Rules, SP04 Taberdo's action as police officer enjoys the presumption of
regularity. In the absence of evidence showing that he was motivated by bad faith or ill-will to testify
against Donio, SP04 Taberdo's categorical identification of the accused stands. 13
In a Decision dated November 4, 2013, the CA denied Donio's appeal and affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The CA found his averment that he was taken from his house, tortured and made to sign a blank
sheet of paper as highly implausible. His sworn affidavit was replete with details which were unlikely the
product of creative imagination of the police. There was no proof that the police singled him out, or was
impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. The said affidavit was voluntarily and freely executed with the
assistance of counsel.14 The fallo of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.
In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief, 16 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
informed this Court that it opted not to file a supplemental brief for the same would only be a repetition
of the raised arguments considering that all relevant matters regarding Donio' s guilt for the crime of
carnapping with homicide were extensively argued and discussed in the People's Brief 17 dated July 9,
2013.
Likewise, Donio, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested his intention not to file a supplemental
brief and prayed that the case be deemed submitted for decision. 18
In essence, the issue to be resolved by this Court in this appeal is whether the prosecution has
successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping with
homicide.
After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, this Court finds no cogent
reason to reverse Donio' s conviction. At the outset, the CA noted that the prosecution should have filed
an Information for the special complex crime of qualified carnapping in aggravated form. 19 while it is
necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an
indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation
that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the
crime.20 Recently, it was held that failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate
the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. 21 The
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information determines the character
of the crime and not the caption or preamble of the information or the specification of the provision of
the law alleged to have been violated.22 In the case at bar, the acts alleged to have been committed by
Donio are averred in the Information, and the same described the acts defined and penalized under
Sections 2 and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as amended are the
following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.23
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it
must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was camapping and that the killing was
perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof "24 In other
words, to prove the special complex crime of camapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of
the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and
the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the camapping or on the occasion
thereof.25
Records show that all the elements of camapping in the instant case are present and proven during the
trial.
The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as evidenced by a Deed of Conditional
Sale in his favor.26 Donio was found driving the vehicle in the early morning of November 26, 2003, the
same day Rodrigo was looking for his missing brother Raul. Also, SP04 Taberdo positively identified
Donio as the driver he flagged down at the checkpoint in his testimony, viz.:
xxxx
Q- On or about that time 2:45 early in the morning of November 26, 2003, could you recall if there was
any unusual incident that required your attention as Police Officers manning the check-point?
A- Yes, sir.
Q - What is that incident?
A - During that time, we are issuing pass card among vehicles going to South when suddenly a
speeding tricycle approaching our PCP its engine suddenly stop.
Q- Who was driving the tricycle when the engine suddenly stop[s]?
A-The one who gave me the Driver's License was Raul Layug.
Q - If this person who gave his license as Raul Layug is here present today, will you be able to identify
him?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Will you please look around the premises of the Court and point to him.
A - This one, sir. We came to know later on that his real name is Enrile Donio.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to accused Enrile Donio.
x x x27
"Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.28 Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act.
The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the person
robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the
robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or
that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent
thereto.29 The said principle may be applied in this case as the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and carnapping being the same.30 Here, Donio failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the
checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the police officers when his identity was asked, and left
under the guise of getting the said documents. It was also established that he and the others were
strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the
trial, therefore, raises the presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful
taking of the vehicle and Raul's death.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the
motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term
"gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense
may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain.31 Donio's intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle
was proven as he and his companions were using it as means of transportation when they were
confronted by the Concepcion police officers.
Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in the instant case, We now discuss the
argument that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient to convict Donio
of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
He alleges that while it is true that criminal conviction may be predicated on a series of circumstantial
evidence, the same must be convincing, plausible and credible. It cannot be discounted that SP04
Taberdo testified only on the circumstances after the alleged carnapping. He failed to establish his
alleged participation prior to or during the actual taking of the vehicle. The facts established by SP04
Taberdo' s testimony- the Concepcion police operatives caught him in possession of the stolen tricycle
on November 26, 2003; the tricycle was registered under the name of Rodrigo; and he was in
possession of Raul's license - are insufficient bases and do not lead to an inference exclusively
consistent with his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Such contention fails scrutiny. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that
the guilt of the accused can no longer be proved by any other evidence. Circumstantial, indirect or
presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence as provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than
one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the one who committed the crime. 32 Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.33
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds that the confluence of the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence, consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt:
First, Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a checkpoint at
the junction of the MacArthur Highway by elements of the Concepcion Police Station at around 2:30 in
the morning on November 26, 2003;
Second, his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to produce its registration
papers;
Third, he was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even presented it and introduced
himself as Raul to the police;
Fourth, a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle;
Fifth, Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking for him on the
same day that Donio and the others were flagged down;
Sixth, Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003 when he
passed by at the Mawaque Terminal at the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque Road. 34
Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at around 6:30 in the morning
on November 26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia Resettlement comer Barangay
Dapdap.
Eighth, Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument as depicted in the post- He insists that he was tortured and subjected to harsh treatment during arrest.1âwphi1 He insinuates
mortem examination sketch by Dr. Dizon and reflected in the Certificate of Death, which states: that the police arrested the first person they suspected without conducting any in-depth investigation.

17. CAUSES OF DEATH: Donio maintained that he first learned of the camapping charge when the police came to his house in
I. Immediate Cause: Cardio respiratory arrest Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga on December 6, 2003. However, he also alleged that as a stay-in
Antecedent Cause: Hemo-pneumothorax L sugarcane plantation worker in Capas, Tarlac with a six-month work period ending in January, he never
Underlying Cause: Penetrating Stab Wounds, Multiple.35 left the workplace and that his wife visited him instead. Donio testified during direct and cross
Ninth, Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04 Taberdo positively identified him as the driver examination as follows:
they flagged down at the checkpoint.36
xxxx
Likewise, the victim's lifeless body was found sprawled with multiple stab wounds and was noted in a ATTY. LOPEZ
state of rigor mortis. Rigor mortis, which consists in the stiffening of the muscular tissues and joints of Q: Mr. Witness, prior to your incarceration at the Angeles District Jail, where were you residing?
the body setting in at a greater or less interval after death, may be utilized to approximate the length of A: Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, sir.
time the body has been dead. In temperate countries, it usually appears three to six hours after death Q: On November 25, 2003 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening to November 26, 2003, do you
but in warmer countries, it may develop earlier. In tropical countries, the usual duration of rigor mortis is remember where [you were] on the said dates?
twenty-four to forty-eight hours during cold weather and eighteen to thirty-six hours during summer. A: Yes, sir.
When rigor mortis sets in early, it passes off quickly and viceversa.37 Q: Where were you, Mr. Witness?
A: At home, sir.
From the foregoing, it was established that Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the Q: Who were your companions there?
evening on November 25, 2003, and that his body was discovered at 6:30 in the morning the next day. A: My family, sir, my wife and child.
Considering the condition of the body upon discovery, he could have been killed between 10:00 in the x x x x42
evening and 3:30 in the morning on the next day. Donio and his companions were hailed at the PROS. HABAN
checkpoint at around 2:3038 in the morning on November 26, 2003 aboard the missing tricycle. Taking Q: Where are you working again?
into account the distance of the Mawaque Terminal area or of the vacant lot near Barangay Dapdap A: Capas
from the junction of the MacArthur Highway in Concepcion, Tarlac and the time they were hailed at the xxx
checkpoint, it can be logically concluded that Donio and the others were in contact with Raul during the Q: How about on November 27, 2003, where were you then?
approximate period of the latter's time of death. Also, it was during that period that they gained A: At work.
possession of the vehicle. Thus, the only rational conclusion that can be drawn from the totality of the Q: How about on November 25 and 26?
foregoing facts and circumstances is that Donio and his companions, to the exclusion of others, are A: At work.
guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of killing Raul in the course thereof. Q: During the whole day?
A: Stay-in.
Q: So you never left work?
Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked permission from the officers to get A: No, sir.
the registration papers but never returned. Undoubtedly, Donio's flight is an indication of his guilt or of a Q: Never, not even Saturday and Sunday?
guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a A: No, sir.
lion.39 Q: The whole year of 2003 you never left work?
A: We stayed there for six (6) months.
This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, Q: When is the end of six months period?
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its A: January.
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. 40 The x x x 43
factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said
court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason, it is generally rejected. For the alibi to
discretion.41 In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave credence to the testimony of the prosper, the accused must establish the following: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
prosecution witness. Records are bereft of evidence which showed ill-will or malicious intent on the part offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
of SP04 Taberdo. In absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court finds that the RTC and the CA did commission.44 It must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is
not err in the findings of facts and the credibility of the witnesses. fatal to the accused.45

As for Donio's defense of alibi, he argues that it must not be looked with disfavor, as there are instances When he was confronted with his inconsistency, Donio clarified that he was in Capas, Tarlac and was
when the accused may really have no other defense but denial and alibi which, if established to be truth, fetched by his wife in the evening to attend to his sick child. We note, however, the proximity of the area
may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence is inherently weak.
of Donio’s residence with the Barangay Dapdap and Sta. Lucia Resettlement area where the victim was
found dead. To buttress his defense of alibi, Donio could have presented the testimony of a fellow
plantation worker or any disinterested witness who could have substantiated the same. Aside from his
bare allegations, he failed to present convincing evidence of the physical impossibility for him to be at
the scene at the time of carnapping. Similarly, this Court is unconvinced of his insistence that he was
tortured in view of lack of any evidence to validate the same. Thus, the uncorroborated alibi and denial
of Donio must be brushed aside in light of the fact that the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained his identity. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.46

In sum, the prosecution established through sufficient circumstantial evidence that the accused was
indeed one of the perpetrators of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

As to the imposable penalty, Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. -Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined
in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 47

The RTC is correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua considering that there was no alleged
and proven aggravating circumstance.

However, in line with the recent jurisprudence, 48 in cases of special complex crimes like carnapping with
homicide, among others, where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the amounts of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are pegged at ₱75,000.00 each .. This Court
orders Donio to pay ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the award of ₱25,000.00 as actual
damages. Also, Donio is ordered to pay the heirs of Raul interest on all damages awarded at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the Decision.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05418, finding accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant Donio
is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Raul L. Layug the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the Decision
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of
Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of
gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire
from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO
AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from
the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of
the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612
also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10
years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s finding
of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20
by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires.
Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994
and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers.
Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in
720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned
by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the
tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside
the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38)
truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant,
together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant.
Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone
tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description,
which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk
marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such
tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and
reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on
appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar
Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza
was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police
District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the
afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone
truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for
₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was
located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant entered
the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based
on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team
confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's
store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be
witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past
10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for
investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires,
including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private
complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge
that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a
certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan,
Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for ₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales
Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise
(Gold Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The
poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes
later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items
were stolen tires.7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the
possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from
ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in
proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to
prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an
Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced
by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led
to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied
the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that
Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-
eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen
tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. 15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said
tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote
the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance
of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 17 Ong, who
was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known
the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong
and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the
tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one
day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of
the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go
was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the
sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time
and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The
nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the
business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should
caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere
possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is, according to the Court,
"reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . .
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx. 22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.1âwphi1 Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article,
item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure
the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some
used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent
businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for
all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and
may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this case,
the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold
Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution
and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption
under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong
was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of ₱65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44)
tires from Philtread in the total amount of ₱223,40 1.81. 26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular.
Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned in the absence
of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of
P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012
MEL DIMAT, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have
known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.
The Facts and the Case
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law1 before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused
Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the
vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the
Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping
and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its
chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen
vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen
from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he
mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at
Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good
faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as
TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He
also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers
took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to
an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
The court also ordered him to pay ₱850,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, as well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 297942 the RTC decision but
modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum,
thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat
knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
The Ruling of the Court
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no
part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the
deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.3
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December
2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought
from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number
CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari
stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number
CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the
road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan
Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of
the vehicle’s engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a
special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal
intent.4 Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the
Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he
intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.1âwphi1
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari
to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and
official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official
receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure
to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any
certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But
this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still,
Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused
in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in CA-
G.R. CR 29794.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182424 September 22, 2014
NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the decision1 and the resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita Carganillo (petitioner). The
CA affirmed, with modification as to penalty, the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
30, Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article
315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
THE CASE
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the
amount of ₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged tobe an
"ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay Buying
Station on or before November 28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the petitioner, the
parties agreed that for every kilo of palaybought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty
centavos (P0.20). But if no palayis purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner must return
the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palayor the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week thereafter,
respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the ₱132,000.00
but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the
petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office. Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime of estafawas filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty tothe crime and denied that she entered into a "principal-agent"
agreement with, and received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owedTeresita a
balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and
1996,5 and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written
date and amount.6 She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.7
In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of estafaand
sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.8 Also, the RTC ordered the petitioner to indemnify Teresita the sum of ₱132,000.00
representing the amount embezzled and to pay the costs of suit.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction. 10 The CA held that the prosecution properly
established the elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioner’s claim that her agreement with
Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA stated that:
In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998, which-accusedappellant admittedly signed, is
clear inits tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa. Accused-appellant’s
insistence that she signed the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her admission of "the existence or
authenticity of the documentary exhibits x x x" during the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and her
own testimony x x x.
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioner’s defense that she did not personally receive a
writtenletter of demand from Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as tothe whereabouts of
the money suspected to be misappropriated isalready tantamount to a demand, and that the petitioner
failed to refute Teresita’s claim that she went to the petitioner’s house to ask for the palayand/or the
return of the ₱132,000.00.11
The CA, however, found error inthe RTC’s computation of the penalty and imposed upon the petitioner
an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00 (in
excess of ₱22,000.00), equivalent to eleven (11) years, or a total of nineteen (19) years. 12
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raisesthe sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming (with
modification)the judgment of conviction against her, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt of
the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she isnot engaged in the business of buying and selling palayand that the
"Kasunduan" between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a simple money loan.
She argues that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she never
received the ₱132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that "the offender receives the
money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same."
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision of September
10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of estafa
committed with abuse of confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, orfor administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same[;]
 (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 13
We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust the
amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palayand misappropriated it when she
failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence
by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of
agreement between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust
the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palaywith the corresponding
obligationsto (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998,
and (2) return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November 28 in the event that the petitioner
failed to make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’
rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention.Thus, when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.14 However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule,
admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the
following:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
xxxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real agreement
between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not that of a principal-
agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation with
Teresitawere vague, undated and unsigned.15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who testified
that they saw the petitioner sign the "Kasunduan" were not even certain of the real transaction between
the petitioner and Teresita.16 These findings of fact and evidence, which were affirmed by the CA, are
accorded respect and finality by this Court. Where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb these findings and to regard them not
reviewable by this Court.17
Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she had been the victim of a fraud becauseTeresita
deceived her into signing a blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had no date
and amount written on it, because Teresita led her to believe that the document would be used merely
for show purposes with the bank.18
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo causante) inducement to
the making of the contract,19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be sufficient to impress or lead
an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of each case. 21
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her Memorandum 22 to this Court,
she narrated that after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made her execute a deed of
sale over her property, which deed she refused to sign.23 This statement negates the petitioner’s self-
serving allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully
aware of the possible implications of the act of signing a document.
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in accordance with the
law.1âwphi1 We explained in People v. Temporada24 that:
"The prescribed penalty for estafaunder Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded
exceeds ₱22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e.,
from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). xxx
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional
maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every
₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. xxx To
compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions oftime each of which portion shall be deemed to
form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure,the maximum period
of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by ₱22,000.00, and the
difference shall be divided by ₱10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done
starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be
construed liberally in favor of the accused. xxx"25
In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, 26 we recognized the "perceived injustice"
brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property,
such as estafa, committed today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money
eight years ago in 1932. This Court, however, cannot modify these range of penalties in our decisions,
as such action would be an impermissible encroachment upon the power of the legislative branch of
government and would constitute proscribed judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision
dated September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 29371, finding petitioner Nenita Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa
penalized under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached
him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission
basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter
promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo
Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of
Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part
of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse
of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the
accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On
the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as
follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign
a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of
an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS
of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC
of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable
prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition
stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY
TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE
ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR
REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS
CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following
counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense
and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.
He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a
receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never
objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon
in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed
the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed
against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry
were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one
testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence
is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA
ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date
does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date
within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of
jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
1 (b) of the RPC, which reads: promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned a No, sir.9
hereinbelow.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need not even be
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
xxxx
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal as evidence is not fatal.
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 8
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in
offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other
was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all
PROS. MARTINEZ the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the
5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came? same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the
a I went looking for him, sir. proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
q For whom? jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice
a Lito Corpuz, sir. of the latter.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir. Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
q Did you know his residence? unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
a Yes, sir. respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
q Did you go there? witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
a Yes, sir. merely rely on the records of the case. 15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and
q Did you find him? binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
a No, sir. influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. 16 Truth is established not by the number
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
a I talked to him, sir. evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him? As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The
q Referring to Exhibit A-2? legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it
enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this
question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc
for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to
give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before
the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue
to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by
the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of
penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This,
however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that
the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which
reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered
by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it
may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and
shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. 18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision
and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the
same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present
but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of
the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the
first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty
is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend
the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers
the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform
the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5,
the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there
can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground
that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All
that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be
harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and
retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed
the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the
penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of
particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on
the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive. 22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current
inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would
result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered
that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be
adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the
earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not
made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of
those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of
the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the
crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon
which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be
excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions
state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
 2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value
of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the
thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any
of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty
is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment
of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same
as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the
existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto
mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender
qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation.
Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is
not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty
imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa. 23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of
Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum
amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the
penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing
stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are
not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by
prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision
correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor
medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties
are not changed, as follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1
day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 27 which
has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions
as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first
requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive
heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00
would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second
requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions
at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty
in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that
should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It
seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude
that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent
power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is
to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA: That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
because it is absurd. DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO: Yes, Your Honor.
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment. JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA: The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thank you, Dean.
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO: Thank you.
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress. x x x x29
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO: Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
Well, my presen ... (interrupted) punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court
JUSTICE PERALTA: has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right? must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the
DEAN DIOKNO: nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation. imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the
JUSTICE PERALTA: same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of
Ah ... the same crime in other jurisdictions.
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law... However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
JUSTICE PERALTA: respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it
But if we de ... (interrupted) took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account"
DEAN DIOKNO: check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and
....then.... a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
JUSTICE PERALTA: parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
...
DEAN DIOKNO: With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense
No, Your Honor. is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is
JUSTICE PERALTA: the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member
Pesos. of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s
DEAN DIOKNO: loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity
No, Your Honor. of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO: There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject
Could not be. matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example,
JUSTICE PERALTA: in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by
The only remedy is to go to Congress... the public official, thus:
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor. Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer
JUSTICE PERALTA: who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
... and determine the value or the amount. the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall
DEAN DIOKNO: permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
Yes, Your Honor. guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve
thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful
acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the
existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be
commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public
officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by
any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will
now become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public
official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government
entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of
the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is
dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the
thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may
likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and
this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00
(₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation,
which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it
is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed
without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the
penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed
is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of
the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
And, if the value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a
fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount involved
does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become
₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become
₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature
despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under
Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on
the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may
not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the
proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the
damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum),
Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article
318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or
damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also
be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215
(Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable
officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or
other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again,
based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said
proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as
the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The
answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and
other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine
its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised
Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present
times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to
conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can
decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During
the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now
pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, 37 each one proposing much needed
change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-
economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when
the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching
upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused,
which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a
person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also
ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the
death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken
which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in
increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that
would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only
imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide
for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the
amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the
mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to
cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not
they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the
prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other
interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental
penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds
₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular
course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be
meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the
Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still,
from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel
punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition
and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of
the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it
violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the
opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be
attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. 44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned ... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that
monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other is a power that belongs to the legislature.
factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before JUSTICE PERALTA:
the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, Thank you, Professor.
the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed PROFESSOR TADIAR:
upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Thank you.46
Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role
This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order
conclusion, to wit: to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged
eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
xxxx Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant
JUSTICE PERALTA: changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to
take into consideration several factors. Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of
PROFESSOR TADIAR: a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons,
Yes. which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
JUSTICE PERALTA: Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
Per capita income. intended right and justice to prevail.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA: With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all
Consumer price index. the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
PROFESSOR TADIAR: extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense
Yeah. power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard
JUSTICE PERALTA: to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party
Inflation ... as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
PROFESSOR TADIAR: penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several
Yes. other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only
JUSTICE PERALTA: pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors? can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The
economic terms. RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in
JUSTICE PERALTA: its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its
Yeah, but ... minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
PROFESSOR TADIAR: and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA: In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly
Yeah. instructive, thus:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA: With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR: ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
That is my position that the Supreme Court ... hereinbelow shall be punished by:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be. Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article
65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of SO ORDERED.
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the
latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the
amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable
should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional
₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law,
then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the
prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to
4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking.
The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.
While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition,
lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 Republic of the Philippines 1 Collar Emerald Cut Diamond P155,000.00
SUPREME COURT
Manila 1 Pendant Solo Diamante 4 kts 55,000.00
1 Set Solo Marquez Lequids 50,000.00
FIRST DIVISION 1 Set 3 Stones Diamante Lequids 47,000.00
1 Domino 12 Stones Men’s ring 35,000.00
G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008
1 Set Blue Pearl with Lequids 25,000.00
BELEN REAL, petitioner, 1 Set Corrales with broach 4,500.00
vs. KABUUANG HALAGA P371,500.00
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 45
thereof, is the August 3, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which
affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, in Criminal
Case No. 4116 finding petitioner guilty of swindling (estafa) under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
nasa mabuting kalagayan upang ipagbili ng KALIWAAN lamang sa loob ng 10 araw mula ng
aking paglagda; kung hindi ko maipagbili ay isasauli ko ang lahat ng alahas loob ng taning na
panahong nakatala sa itaas; kung maipagbili ko naman ay dagli kung [isusuli] at ibibigay ang
buong pinagbilhan sa [may-ari] ng mga alahas. Ang aking gantimpala ay ang mapapahigit na
halaga sa nakatakdang halaga sa itaas ng bawat alahas; HINDI AKO pinahihintulutang
[ipautang] o ibigay na hulugan ang alin mang alahas; ilalagak, ipagkakatiwala, ipahihiram,
isasangla o ipananagot kahit sa anong paraan ang alin mang alahas sa ibang tao.
NILAGDAAN ko ang kasunduang ito ngayon ika-10 ng January, 1989 sa Batangas City.

The facts appearing from the record are as follows: (Sgd) Belen Real Aplaya, Bauan, Bats.

LAGDA NG TAO NA TUMANGGAP NG TINITIRAHAN3

Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On
several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter
to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of
time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house at Nueva Villa Subdivision,
Barangay Alangilan, Batangas City and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she had a
buyer at that time. Because petitioner is his "kumadre," since Uy was one of the sponsors in the
wedding of petitioner’s daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy agreed. He
showed petitioner some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them.
NASABING ALAHAS SA ITAAS NITO
Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and asked about their
transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the payment was in
the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and
requested the latter to collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on January 31, 1989,
petitioner again requested him to return the following day as she had not encashed the checks yet. Uy
again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day, petitioner called him "makulit" and
"could not sleep for that matter." Petitioner further remarked that the more she would not pay Uy.

Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items selected by petitioner
and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the name Benjamin Uy at
the upper portion thereof and affixed her signature at the lower portion including her address. The
receipt reads:
KATIBAYAN
PINATUNAYAN KO na aking tinanggap kay Benjamin Uy, ang mga sumusunod na alahas: No.
1449
Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who thereafter sent a demand
letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to make good her obligation. Consequently,
Uy lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner before the City Prosecutor of Batangas.
On April 13, 1989, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC was filed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Amelia Perez-Panganiban against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty."

While admitting to have had several dealings with private complainant Uy, petitioner claimed that her
Bilang Kalakal Halaga
last transaction with him was on December 22, 1988. She denied the truth of the Katibayan, alleging
that there was a time, prior to January 10, 1989, when she got pieces of jewelry from Uy that she was
required by him to sign in a blank piece of paper.
On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision,4 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Belen Real guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, to indemnify Benjamin Uy in the
amount of P371,500.00, to pay the costs, and to suffer all the accessories of the law.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court ratiocinated:
From the evidence adduced during the trial of this case, it has been clearly established that all
the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence are present in the commission of
the offense and that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Undoubtedly, accused had received the seven (7) pieces of jewelry from Benjamin Uy on
January 10, 1989 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning at Nueva Villa Subdivision, Alangilan,
Batangas City in trust or on commission[,] with the obligation on her part to return the said
pieces of jewelry if unsold, or to deliver the proceeds of the sale, if sold within ten (10) days
from receipt. This agreement is clearly embodied in the receipt dated January 10, [1989]
signed by the accused.
That there was misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused is
very evident in this case. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the proceeds of the
sale of said jewelry items nor had she returned the same jewelry items when demanded to do
so by the private complainant shows that accused had misappropriated or converted to her
personal use the amount of P371,500.00. In fact, she even required the private complainant to
return to her house for several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him.
However, accused did not comply with her obligation.
In a litany of cases, the Supreme Court held that the failure to account upon demand, for funds
or property held in trust is a circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. In an agency for the
sale of jewelry, it [is] the agent’s duty to return the jewelry upon demand by the owner and the
failure to do so is evidence of that conversion of the property by the agent.
It was also established that there was a demand made by the private complainant from the
accused, verbal and written[,] as shown by the letter of demand which was received by the
accused.
Notably in the instant case[,] accused enjoyed the full trust and confidence of Benjamin Uy
when the latter entrusted the pieces of jewelry to the accused, it being a fact that the latter is a
"kumadre" of Benjamin Uy, the latter having been a sponsor in marriage of a daughter of the
accused, aside from the fact that previous to January 10, 1989 there had been transaction
between Benjamin Uy and accused involving a great amount of money.
Obviously, accused abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy when
she refused and failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to defraud Benjamin Uy
of P371,500.00 is[,] therefore, definitely clear.
The defense of the accused that she had not transacted with Benjamin Uy on January 10,
1989 and that her last transaction with the [latter] was on December 22, 1988 deserves not
even a scant consideration in the face of the positive declaration made by Benjamin Uy and his
witness and supported by the receipt, [Exhibit "A"], embodying their agreement.
On the allegation of the accused that she was required by Benjamin Uy to sign blank receipts
[the same] is also unbelievable considering the fact that accused had reached third year in
college and had been a sales agent of private complainant for quite a time before January 10,
1989.6
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, on August 3, 2000, affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.7 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.8
Petitioner now raises the following points:
1. That one element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC does not exist, hence,
acquittal from the crime charged is proper; and
2. That the courts below erred in imposing a penalty that contravenes the imperative mandate
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.9
Petitioner argues that a reading of the trial court’s decision reveals its total silence on the presence of
damage or prejudice caused to private complainant Uy; ergo, she could not be held guilty
of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Moreover, petitioner advances that instead of imposing a
straight penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the trial court should have imposed a penalty
with minimum and maximum periods in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The petition is in part meritorious.
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC10 are as follows: (1) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.11
Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private complainant Uy, it
cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that petitioner’s refusal to account for or
return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of
property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.12 In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not only failed to recover his
investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk
of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To assert his legal
recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.
While sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the crime charged, this Court rules, however, that the (close to additional 35 years to be exact). Hence, under the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed to
penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper. petitioner should be 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,13 in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
RPC or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.14
Specifically, the penalty provided in the RPC for estafa is as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.
On the other hand, the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. In this case, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.16
Considering the attendant factual milieu as well as the position of the Office of the Solicitor General in
the present case, this Court is convinced that the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon petitioner,
which is in accordance with law to best serve the ends of justice, should range from four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the August 3, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which
affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal as maximum.
Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Court of Appeals is hereby required to explain why he
concurred in the decision aforementioned applying the wrong penalty, the explanation to be submitted in
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, which copy is hereby directed to be furnished
upon him forthwith upon finality of this Decision.
No costs.

The penalty prescribed by Art. 315 above-quoted is composed of two periods; hence, to get the SO ORDERED.
maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods
should be divided into three. Article 65 of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the
prescribed penalty into three equal periods of time included in the penalty imposed, forming one period
for each of the three portions. Thus, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty
prescribed for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are:

Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days

Medium – 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days

Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years15

In the present case, as the amount involved is P371,500, which obviously exceeds P22,000, the penalty
imposable should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
However, Art. 315 further states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every
additional P10,000 defrauded in excess of P22,000 but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Uy exceeds the amount of P22,000 which, when
translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000 defrauded, goes beyond 20 years
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014
VILMA M. SULIMAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated July 21, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30693 which denied herein petitioner's Motion to Admit
Attached Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the appellate court's Resolution2 dated January 8,
2010, which likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated July 21,
2009.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
In six (6) Informations,3 all dated June 6, 2003,herein petitioner and one Luz P. Garcia were charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section
6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.
Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-large
despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.
The six cases were consolidated and, after trial, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3)
counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision,4 dated June 7, 2006, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds as follows:
1) In Crim. Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubtas principal of the crimes charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS each and to pay fine of ₱200,000.00 for each count.
2) In Crim. Case No. 03-216190, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic)
and to indemnify Anthony Mancera y Rey the amount of ₱120,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
3) In Crim. Case No. 03-216191, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime of Estafa and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify private
complainant Perlita A. Prudencio the amount of ₱132,460.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
4) In Crim. Case No. 03-216192, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused VILMA SULIMAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
5) In Crim. Case No. 03-216193, accused VILMA SULIMAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify
Jimmy Tumabcao the amount of ₱21,400.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in cases of
insolvency and to pay the cost.
Accordingly, the bond posted for her provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
Considering that the accused Vilma Suliman was detained from January 6, 2003 to July 23, 2004 prior
to her posting bond for her provisional liberty, her period of detention shall be credited in the service of
her sentence.
Considering that Luz Garcia has not been apprehended nor voluntarily surrendered to date, let
warrantbe issued for her arrest and let the case against her be ARCHIVED to be reinstated upon her
apprehension.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,6 but the RTC denied it in its Order7 dated January 23,
2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 21, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal filed in this case is hereby DENIED and
consequently, DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated June 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, in the City of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-216188, 03-216189, 03-216190, 03-216191
and 03-216193 are hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189 for illegal recruitment, the Court sentences
accused-appellant VILMA SULIMAN to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) for each count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-216190 for estafa involving private complainant Anthony Mancera,
the Court sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer a minimum period of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional to a maximum term of fifteen (15) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal.
 3. In Criminal Case No. 03-216191 for estafa involving private complainant Perlita A.
Prudencio, the Court sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum period
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional to maximum term of seventeen (17)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal.
4. In Crim. Case No. 03-216193 for estafa involving private complainant Jimmy Tumabcao, the
Court sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum term of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional to maximum term of six years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's counsel received a copy of the above CA Decision on May 26, 2009. 9 However, neither
petitioner nor her counsel filed a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period for
filing the said motion. Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision became final.
On July 3, 2009, petitioner, through her new collaborating counsel, filed a Motion to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration10 praying that the same be admitted in the higher interest of "substantial
justice and due process." Petitioner contended that her former counsel committed gross and
inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in failing to immediately inform petitioner about his receipt of
the subject CA Decision, thereby depriving petitioner of her right to file a motion for reconsideration
which, in turn, is a violation of her right to due process.
On July 21, 2009, the CA issueda Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 8,
2010.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE PETITIONER
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING [THAT] PETITIONER SHOULD
NOTBE BOUND BY THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF ATTY. MAYO IN NOT INFORMING HER ABOUT
HIS RECEIPT OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ADVERSE TO HER ON MAY 26,
2009 OR IN NOT FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND
INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER.12
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that she should not be bound by her counsel's
gross neglect of duty in not informing her of the adverse decision of the CA. The Court agrees with the
observation of the CA that petitioner is not entirely blameless as she was not vigilant in monitoring the
progress of her case. Evidence of her negligence is the fact that she did not make any effort to
personally follow up her appeal with her counsel. Instead, she merely relied on a certain Conrad Lucero,
the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates ofher appeal with the CA. In this respect,
the Court's ruling in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People13 is instructive, to wit:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of
procedural technique. The rationale for the rule isthat a counsel, once retained, holds the implied
authority to do all acts necessary or, atleast, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in
behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is
regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself. A recognized exception to
the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of
law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the
client’s own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his
interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in thisduty, the client should
suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the
fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer
from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to
merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not
enough.14
It may not be amiss to add that this Court notes the propensity of petitioner and her counsel to disregard
the Rules and directives of the Court. In a Resolution15 issued by this Court on March 14, 2011,
petitioner's counsel was admonished for his failure to file petitioner's Reply to Comment which was
required in an earlier Resolution issued by this Court.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provision of law.16 An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with
the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. 17 The
rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the
orderly disposition of appealed cases.18 In an age where courts are be devilled by clogged dockets, the
Rules need to befollowed by appellants with greater fidelity.19 Their observance cannot be leftto the
whims and caprices of appellants. In the instant case, petitioner remained obstinate in her non
observance of the said Rules. Such obstinacy is incongruous with her late plea for liberality in
construing the Rules. On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
In any case, even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, as it appears that petitioner
assails not only the denial by the CA of her motion to admit her belated Motion for Reconsideration but
likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for illegal recruitment and estafa, the Court still finds no
cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. Indeed, after a careful and thorough review
of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in convicting
petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.
At this point, it bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding
and conclusive on the Court.20 We emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided exceptions21 to this
rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are present
in the case.22 The petitioner must additionally show that the cited exceptional circumstances will have a
bearing on the results of the case.23 In the instant case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions are
present . Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the RTC and the CA that
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contact
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. Provided, that such non-
license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make
a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment
or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order
to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms
and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker who
has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or
morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of
foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by
the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of
the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or
member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly
orindirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary
or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor
and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories.1âwphi1 In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable.24
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established that petitioner
and her co-accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a), (l) and (m) of
RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants the amounts of ₱132,460.00,
₱120,000.00 and ₱21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private
complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said complainants after such
failure to deploy.
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by
false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. The
elements of estafaby means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.25
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her co-accused misrepresented and
falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants for employment either in
South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The misrepresentation was made prior toprivate complainants'
payment of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and
her co-accused that inducedthe private complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false
pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised
employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never
recovered. Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she
aware of the recruitment activities done by her coaccused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused
received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity
and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded. As
owner and general manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman
International. Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the business of the said
company. Petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in the face of positive assertions
made by the private complainants who had no ill motive to falsely testify against her. Indeed, of marked
relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against
petitioner other than to bring her to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment.
Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify
their hurt feelings would certainly be against human nature and experience. 26 Where there is nothing to
show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and
categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and
credence.27 In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private
complainants because the prosecution has established that petitioner was the one who offered the
private complainants an alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did
not materialize. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated July 21, 2009 and January 8, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30693, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 209655-60 January 14, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO Z. PUERTO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan (Tibayan) and Rico Z.
Puerto (Puerto) (accused-appellants) is the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 which modified the Decisions
dated December 4, 2009,3 June 24, 2010,4 August 2, 2010,5 August 5, 2010,6 January 21, 2011,7 and
August 18, 20118 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 198 (RTC) and convicted
accused appellants of the crime of Syndicated Estafa, defined and penalized under Item 2 (a),
Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1689.9
The Facts
Tibayan Group Investment Company,Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001. 10 Sometime in 2002, the SEC
conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI
was selling securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent
Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI’s
corporate registration for being fraudulently procured.11 The foregoing led to the filing of multiple
criminal cases12 for Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and directors of TGICI,13 namely, Jesus
Tibayan, Ezekiel D. Martinez, Liborio E. Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and herein accused-
appellants.14 Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against all of them; however, only
accusedappellants were arrested, while the others remained at large.15
According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita P.
Gacayan, Irma T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon, Leonida D.
Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina DelaPeña, and Rodney E. Villareal16 (private complainants) were
enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will
recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate
of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal investment and the monthly
interest earnings, respectively.17 Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was
already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to
demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave private complainants
acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be
paid. However, the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus,
they were constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI. 18
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators to
defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of
Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI.
For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI’s Articles of Incorporation was a
forgery,as she was neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI. 19
The RTC Rulings
On various dates, the RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and
Puerto of 11 counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD
1689, to wit: (a) in a Joint Decision20 dated December 4, 2009, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporalfor each count and ordering them to pay the
amounts of ₱1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez, and 119,405.23 and ₱800,000.00 to Milagros
Alvarez;21 (b) in a Joint Decision22 dated June 24, 2010, the RTC acquitted Puerto of all the charges,
but found Tibayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa, sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordering
her to pay the amounts of ₱1,300,000.00 and US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan and ₱500,000.00 to
Irma T. Ador;23 (c) in a Joint Decision24 dated August 2, 2010, the accused-appellants were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordered to pay the
amounts of ₱1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer and ₱556,376.00 to Nonito Garlan; 25 (d) in a Joint
Decision26 dated August 5, 2010, the RTC found the accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of one (1) count of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
20 years of reclusion temporaland ordering them to pay Emelyn Gomez the amount of
₱250,000.00;27 (e) in a Decision28 dated January 21, 2011, accused-appellants were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Estafa each, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal and ordered to pay Judy C. Rillon the
amount of ₱118,000.00;29 and (f) in a Joint Decision30 dated August 18, 2011, accused-appellants were
each convicted of four (4) counts of Estafa, and meted different penalties per count, as follows: (i) for
the first count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Reynaldo A. Dacon the amount of ₱100,000.00; (ii) for the
second count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay Leonida D. Jarina the amount of ₱200,000.00; (iii) for the third count, they were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years of prision mayormedium,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Cristina Dela
Peña the amount of ₱250,000.00; and (iv) for the last count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional medium, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporalmedium, as maximum, and to pay Rodney E.
Villareal the amount of ₱100,000.00.31
In the aforesaid decisions, the RTC did not lend credence to accused appellants’ denials in light of the
positive testimonies of the private complainants that they invested their money in TGICI because of the
assurances from accused-appellants and the other directors/incorporators of TGICI that their
investments would yield very profitable returns. In this relation, the RTC found that accused-appellants
conspired with the other directors/incorporators of TGICI in misrepresenting the company as a
legitimate corporation duly registered to operate as a mutual fund to the detriment of the private
complainants.32 However, the RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as the
prosecution failed to allege in the informations that accused-appellants and the other directors/
incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce
documentary evidence substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants committed Syndicated
Estafa.33
Aggrieved, accused-appellants separately appealed the foregoing RTC Decisions to the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398. Thereafter, the CA issued a
Resolution34 dated February 19, 2013 ordering the consolidation of accused-appellants’ appeals.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated June 28, 2013, the CA modified accused appellants’ conviction to that of
Syndicated Estafa, and accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life imprisonment for each
count.36 The CA also increased the amount of actual damages awarded to private complainant Clarita
P. Gacayan from ₱1,300,000.00 to ₱1,530,625.90, apart from the award of US$12,000.00.37
It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent
investors to pay its earlier investors – and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish. Inevitably, TGICI
could no longer hoodwink new investors that led to its collapse. 38 Thus, the CA concluded that as
incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-appellants and their cohorts conspired in making TGICI a
vehicle for the perpetuation of fraud against the unsuspecting public. As such, they cannot hide behind
the corporate veil and must be personally and criminally liable for their acts.39 The CA then concluded
that since the TGICI incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5) persons, accused-appellants’
criminal liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their respective penalties
increased accordingly.40 Undaunted, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph
4,
Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).– Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that there must be
a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended
party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his
money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 41
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to
death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate
of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.42
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandiof inducing the public to
invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high monthly interest
rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43 Under such lucrative promise, the
investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI
knew from the start that TGICI is operating withoutany paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it
can pay the assured profits to its investors,44 they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply
abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the
other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage ina Ponzi scheme, resulting in the
defraudation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a typeof investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns
to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors
by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In
many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to
earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate
business.45 It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is
an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme.46 It is difficult to sustain the scheme
over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue
paying the promised profits toearly investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man"
collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else
shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most. 47

In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Esta/a, committed through a Ponzi scheme,
are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than
five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the
investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the
same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants' investments,
obviously to the latter's prejudice.

Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants' conviction from simple Estafa to
Syndicated Estafa.1âwphi1 In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review.
Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court. 48 Hence, accused
appellants' appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and rendered it competent to
examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.49

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
accused appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
13 and 11 counts, respectively, of Syndicated Esta/a and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment for each count. Accused-appellants are further ordered to pay actual damages to each of
the private complainants in the following amounts: (a) ₱1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez; (b)
₱119,405.23 and ₱800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez; (c) ₱1,530,625.90 and US$12,000.00 to Clarita P.
Gacayan; (d) ₱500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador; (e) ₱1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer; (f) ₱556,376.00 to
Nonito Garlan; (g) ₱250,000.00 to Emelyn Gomez; (h) ₱118,000.00 to Judy C. Rillon; (i) ₱100,000.00 to
Reynaldo A. Dacon; (j) ₱200,000.00 to Leonida D. Jarina; (k) ₱250,000.00 to Cristina Dela Pefia; and (l)
₱100,000.00 to Rodney E. Villareal.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by Ma.
Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA)
decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289.
These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 20044 and July 26, 20045 orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest.6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689. 7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the
manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an
investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao
(Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable
companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return.8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate
amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised interests,
leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos
(₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in the name of
State Resources.9 In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his
investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred
Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (₱114,286,086.14). All these
checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust
Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks.
He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s
husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s
money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint Chester De Joya,
Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators and/or directors
of State Resources.11
On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an
information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of
arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them and the
pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). 15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin motions. 16 The petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004 order. Consequently,
the petitioners filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of
arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.17 The CA noted that Judge
Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination of the facts and
circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to him. 18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dy’s affidavits
only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa,not syndicated estafa. Under PD No. 1689, in
order for syndicated estafato exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or more persons,
and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a group of persons. In his complaint-
affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the petitioners’ false representations and was defrauded into
parting with his money, causing him damage.19 Since there was no evidence that State Resources was
formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to solicit money from other persons aside
from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for simple estafa. 20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to believe that the petitioners
committed the crime of simple estafa. 21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits shows inconsistencies in his cited factual
circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the existence of probable
cause against themfor the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend thatit was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As early as
August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the assertion that Dy
advanced funds for this corporation.22 They question the fact that it took Dy almost five years to file his
complaint despitehis allegation that he lost almost ₱100,000,000.00. 23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and void. Contrary
to the trial court’s findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD 1689 was inapplicable to
their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources was formed to solicit funds not only
from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafaand syndicated estafaare two distinct
offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners were erroneous because these warrants
pertained to two different crimes.24
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DENYthe petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the petition for
certiorarithe petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion
against the trial court for the denialof their twin motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v. Transmed
Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us, a CA
decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of review that this Court should
undertake given the distinctionsbetween the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of
the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it
ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
and not on the basis of whether the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motions was strictly legally correct.
In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is mandated to
personally determine the existence of probable cause after hispersonal evaluation of the prosecutor’s
resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions command the judge to
refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct his own
examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grantsthe trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint
orinformation. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause. 28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-
accused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that
probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to
merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not
conduct a de novohearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial determination and
see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present any evidence to
controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the suspension of
arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joya’s motions,
which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused Spouses Hao’s own petition for
review. This is not to mention the delay in the resolutionby the Department of Justice. On the other
hand, co-accused DeJoya’s motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses Hao’s
motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of warrants of
arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of the crime that in fact
happened.30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issuedafter his personal evaluation of
the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the
petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive level,
where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before the filing of
the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance
of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In
order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple
offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions, the
different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties for each are
outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this
particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the offended party on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him to part withhis money or property; and
4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State Resources and
promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business relationship with Ngo and relying
on Gracia’s attractive financial representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of
₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he eventually
advanced almost ₱100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracia’s succeeding checks representing
the earnings of his investments, however, were all dishonored upon deposit. 34 He subsequently learned
that the petitioners used his money for Danny’s construction and realty business.35 Despite repeated
demands and the petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s invested money and
its supposed earnings.36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The petitioners
inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred
was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s construction and realty business. The
petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition that as early as August
1995, State Resources had already been dissolved. 37 This admission strengthens the conclusion that
the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to persuade Dy
to part with his money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. "Deceit is the false representation
of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment
of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury."38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have placed
his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the conclusion
that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are present: 1)
estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2) the
estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted inthe
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
"samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of syndicated
estafaare present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the
petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated
against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and
directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy
exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the
corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was presented to
show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought investments from other
people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State
Resources. The general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafaallegedly
took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial ofthe
petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believethat an offense was committed by
the person sought to be arrested.41 This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s finding of probable
cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is
determined to address the necessity of placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice.42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds of probable cause
determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the petitioners
have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners
remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the
purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the court’s custodyto avoid his flight from
the clutches of justice.

Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes. Simple
estafais a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily included in another
offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.45

Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should not be
nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.

Suspension of Arraignment

Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a
petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the
President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since
this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended
indefinitely.

We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified
right.1âwphi1 In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the pendency of a petition for
review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or
to deny the motion to defer arraignment.48

As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners'
petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners' arraignment
was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend completely
lacks any legal basis.

As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the
petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the Rules in
their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest and
arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both
the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION
the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa
under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The
warrants of arrest issued stand.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the
elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to
discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the
Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that
circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands
Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of ₱200,000.00, which check was issued in
payment of an obligation, but which check when presented for encashment with the bank, was
dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of notice and several demands
made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and
refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense admitted that
the check alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 3 On its part, the
Prosecution made no admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified
that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his
wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of
Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because
he had a lending business and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he
released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he
later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay
upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him. 6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they
transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the
brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice. 7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the
amount of ₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank;
(c) Ligaray’s affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Cañada. After the RTC admitted the
exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case. 8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada,
his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with
Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that
he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check. 9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently
signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for
goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory. It is worthy
also to discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth ₱200,000.00 and I promised to settle the same last
May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in
Manila, and promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I promised with your client.
Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my
promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still to no avail
attributable to the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as collateral. This
other means is resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said
funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or before
August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial obligation.
xxxx
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he
had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the
responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the
country; that he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid
jeopardizing Cañada’s application for overseas employment. 12 The Prosecution subsequently offered
and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence. 13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:
To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to thirty
(30) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;
To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of ₱200,000.00;
To pay said complainant the sum of ₱30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting
the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover
the check despite having been informed that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray
released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check and upon Wagas’ assurance that the check
would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, 15 arguing that the Prosecution did not
establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter;
that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their
alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been
familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered
evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was
then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that the
evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there
was no compelling ground to reverse its decision. 16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail pending
appeal. The RTC granted the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00. 18 Wagas then posted bail
for his provisional liberty pending appeal.19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas’ application for
bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on
bail.20 On January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called manifestation and
compliance which the Court referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.21 On July 5, 2005, the Court, upon the OCA’s recommendation, directed
the filing of an administrative complaint for simple ignorance of the law against the RTC Judge. 22 On
September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause
the filing of the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to
explain why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously granted.23 Finally, in its
memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed
the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. 24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one
other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction
with him involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence
pointed to Cañada as the person with whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery
receipt, which had been signed by Cañada, indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT
CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in good order and condition, and that there
was no showing that Cañada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to
Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the
element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty that it was
him who had transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator
of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender
must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the
check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom
the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance
of the check by the offender.25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of
an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. 26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law
upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated
check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment
because of the insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone, thus:
Q: On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
Q: How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A: He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred bags of
rice and he will just issue a check.29
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt
with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the
telephone, to wit:
Q: After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
A: I made a demand on them.
Q: How did you make a demand?
A: I called him over the phone.
Q: Who is that "him" that you are referring to?
A: Gilbert Wagas.30
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the
need of an indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to
Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to
Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of
the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order
to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the
worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check
used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer
who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the
check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on
behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been
acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas
being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not
reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone
conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential
for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray
supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence.
Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily
identified by voice recognition or any other means. 32 Without the authentication, incriminating another
person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an
identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable
peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. 33 The identity of the caller could also be established by
the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the
telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive
characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller.34
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is
accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial
evidence. According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts in
issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face
conversations except the party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily
be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the
person with whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere statement of his identity
by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating
circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or
following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the
identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in
the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of
admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish
that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not
show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that
the Prosecution sought to elicit from him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas,
and he answered as follows:
Q: Do you know the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is present inside the courtroom […]
A: No, sir. He is not around.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela.36
During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had determined
that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice selling,
particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?
A: I know it was him because I know him.
Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused through
telephone conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused through
telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q: But still through the telephone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200 bags rice
transaction?
A: No. It was through telephone only.
Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused himself?
A: Yes. It was through Robert.
Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody other than the
accused?
A: Yes, sir.37
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he "know[s]"
him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not
support a finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from
Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus,
the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual
basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with
Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s
rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with
Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law
of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, 38 not for any
other purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility
of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had
pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation,
qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, 40 and as a
means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a
crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author
of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused.
All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence
and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be
weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and
culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt
and not for the accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent,
carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is
not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime
can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
there can be no conviction.42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake
cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the
identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, 44 even though
his innocence may be doubted.45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants. 46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was
legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we pronounce
and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on
the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of ₱200,000.00 as
actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased to (sic) the said complainant, the accused well knowing
SUPREME COURT that at the time of issue thereof, the said checks have no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
Manila bank to cover the amount of the said checks, neither will said checks be honored or paid upon
presentment, the bank dishonored and returned the said checks for the reason “account closed” or
FIRST DIVISION “stopped payment” or should have been dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the said accused,
without any valid reason, ordered her drawee bank to stop payment and despite repeated demands
accused failed and refused to deposit the amount necessary to cover the aforesaid check or to pay the
G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015 value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforesaid amounts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA, Accused- CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Appellant.
Version of the Prosecution
DECISION
In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a townmate. The latter was interested in
BERSAMIN, J.: buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to Villanueva’s
residence at Galeria de Magallanes, and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth
P1,010,000.00.5 Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight
Under review is the decision promulgated on May 25, 20041 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) of which were postdated. Villanueva signed a receipt reading as follows:6
affirming with modification the judgment rendered on January 24, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 60, in Makati City convicting Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa as defined and
August 16, 1994
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code.2 The decretal portion of the
assailed decision reads:
Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the corresponding
amount
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Julie Grace K. Villanueva of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED,
1 set diamond - P 70,000
with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed as hereinabove indicated. The Resolution of January
1 set South Sea Black w/ necklace & bracelet - 220,000
15, 2004 granting her bail pending appeal is REVOKED and her profferred bail bond is REJECTED.
1 set heart shape diamond w/ pendant (4.56 cts) - 450,000
Pursuant to Section 13, second paragraph, Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
1 set marquee xxx dia. 2 cts. - 220,000
the case, inclusive of the entire record thereof, is CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Supreme Court for
1 bracelet diamond - 50,000
review. Costs against the accused-appellant.
P1,010,000
SO ORDERED.3
paid by the following checks issued by me

Antecedents PNB #031501 - August 6, 1994 P 5,000

PNB #031531 - August 19, 1994 10,000
Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of PNB #031526 - Sept. 2, 1994 185,000
the Revised Penal Code under the information that reads: PNB #031527 - Sept. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031528 - Oct. 2, 1994 185,000
That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction PNB #031529 - Oct. 17, 1994 185,000
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and PNB #031532 - Sept. 16, 1994 85,000
feloniously by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously PNB #031533 - Oct. 16, 1994 85,000
with the commission of the fraud, following PNB checks, [to] wit: PNB #031534 - Nov. 16, 1994 85,000
P1,010,000
Check No. Date Amount
031526 9-02-94 P185,000.00
031527 9-17-94 185,000.00 with a total of One Million Ten Thousand pesos.
031528 10-02-94 185,000.00
031529 10-17-94 185,000.00 (sgd)
031532 9-16-94 85,000.00 JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
031533 10-16-94 85,000.00
031534 11-16-94 85,000.00 Madarang receive the checks because of Villanueva’s assurance that they would all be honored upon
presentment.7 However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB Check No.
131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of “Account Closed” or “Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds.”8 Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence to inform her of
the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by security guards from reaching
Villanueva. 9 Madarang resorted to sending demand letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva proved
futile.10 After Villanueva did not settle her obligations, Madarang brought the criminal complaint
for estafa11 and the corresponding Information for estafa was ultimately filed in court on September 4,
1995. On arraignment, Villanueva pleaded not guilty.12
Version of the Defense
Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang on three times. The first was at
the residence of a certain Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was selling jewelry. The second time
was at her residence in Galeria de Magallanes where Madarang arrived without prior notice at around
7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry on credit, and even
assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was dissatisfied with her purchase.
Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry, for which she issued six checks as
payment, five of which were postdated. On August 16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang for the last time
to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the checks she had previously issued and replaced
them with another set of postdated checks that were the subject of the criminal case against
her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of checks were issued as guarantee under the
agreement taht they were not to be deposited until Villanueva advised Madarang of the sufficiency of
funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she did not received any notice from Madarang regarding
the dishonor of the checks.13
Ruling of the RTC
On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as charged, 14viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court finds accused Julie Grace K. Villanueva GUILTY of
the crime of estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 818, said crime having been committed in the manner described in the
information filed on September 4, 1995.
As a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for a period of
Fourteen Years Eight Months and One Day to Twenty Years which is within the range of Reclusion
Temporal in its medium and maximum periods.
She is also ordered to pay the private complainant Mrs. Loreto Madarang the sum of Nine Hundred
Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P995,000.00) plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum until the
amount is fully paid with said interest accruing at the time the information was filed on or October 25,
1995.
The period of accused’s detention shall be credited in her favor conformably with Art. 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
She shall serve her entire sentence at the Correccional Institute for Women at Mandaluyong City.
SO ORDERED.15
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, to wit:
Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court, which is 14 years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is erroneous. Said court did not pay
obeisance to the teaching of People v. Hernando, viz:
Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:
“SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion perpetua;
x x x x.”
“x x x x
Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion temporal
is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos
but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. As
used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense. It merely describes the
penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two
thousand (P22,000.00) pesos.
“Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such as
estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.” “The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the
sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without
any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.”
Here, complainant was defrauded in the amount of seven hundred [thousand] (P700,000.00) pesos.
The fact that the amount involved in the instant case exceeds P22,000.00 should not be considered in
the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead the matter would be so taken as analogous
to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.
This accords with the rule that penal laws are construed in favor of the accused.
Applying the above-cited provision, accused shall be meted an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of
which shall be taken from the maximum period of the basic penalty, that is, reclusion temporal, to be
imposed in its maximum period, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 of the amount of the
fraud, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years.
On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance not the incremental penalty for the amount of the fraud in excess of twenty two
thousand (P22,000.00) pesos. Such penalty is prision mayor, with a duration of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years.”
Accordingly, the accused-appellant in the case at bar should be, as she is hereby, sentenced to suffer
the penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to THIRTY (30)
YEARS of reclusion perpetua as maximum.
x x x x.16
The CA then certified the case to the Court pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, Rules of Court.
Issues
Villanueva submits the following errors for our consideration:
I issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank,
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.19
III
WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT POST-DATED CHECKS.
IV
WHETHER THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, OF
ESTAFA.17
Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks, averring that: (a) the
checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed after
Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of fund; and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed
to embody the real intention of the parties.18 She argues that estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code was not committed because the checks were not executed prior to our
simultaneous with the alleged fraud; and because Madarang had instigated her to issue the checks.19
Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal
Code in issuing the seven postdated checks?
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the conviction.
Artilce 315, paragraph 2(d), of Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa) – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender has
postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or
or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been
defrauded.20 The deceit here should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be
prior to, or simultaneously with, the act of the fraud.21
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed
that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is
no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be
funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the
pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance
to her. The second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third
element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from
Villanueva the balance of P995,000.00.
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or
encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva’s account.
Villanueva posits that the receipt Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody such agreement.
This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive
the negotiable character of a check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For instance,
when there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the
checks that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be
prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that the
checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.22
Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed
agreement. The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks
by listing the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for
Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement
should have been incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in
another document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot
accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the supposed agreement that would
shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a businesswoman23 presumably
made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded checks.24 All that she is claiming here is that
the receipt did not express the true intention of the parties, implying that no written document
substantiated her alleged defense. She did not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated
into signing the receipt as written. Her self-serving statements on the agreement were entirely
inadequate to establish her assertions, for they were not proof.25

Under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D 818, the penalty
for estafa when the total value of the checks exceed P22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period (i.e, 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years), plus one year for each additional
P10,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be from six years and one
day to 12 years of prison mayor. In imposing the indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day
of prison mayor, as minimum, to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, the CA correctly
applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is well to state that reclusion perpetua merely describes in
this instance the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved.26

We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC of 12% interest accruing from the
time that the information was filed until the full satisfaction of the obligation in the amount of
P995,000.00. Conformably with the ruling in Nacar v. gallery frames27 applying Resolution No. 796 of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), said amount should earn interest of
12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest
of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004 by the Court of
Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION that the amount P995,000.00 shall earn interest 12% per
annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of
6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015
MARIETA DE CASTRO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court should
impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is
invalid, and will not attain finality.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Antecedents
The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in Malibay, Pasay
City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document committed on separate occasions in October and November 1993 by forging the
signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby
enabling herself to withdraw a total of P65,000.00 and P2,000.00 from the respective savings accounts
of Matuguina and Cornejo.
The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with the
accused within the space of a week in October – November 1993 when they went to the bank’s Malibay
branch to transact on their accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum of P500 on October 29
and left her passbook with the accused upon the latter’s instruction. She had to return two more times
before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that something wrong was going on. Learning of
Matuguina’s problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to her on November 8. On this
day, the accused came up with the convenient excuse that she had already returned the
passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and found three withdrawal slips dated
October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen
signatures of the depositor and covering a total of P65,000. It was apparent that the accused had
intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita
instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to Matuguina, a move that led to the
immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in the slips and
denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When she went back to the bank worried about
the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she met with the accused in the presence of the bank
manager. She insisted that the signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that
the passbook was still with her and kept in her house.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4
withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the
accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused’s initials on it attesting to
having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine. She
posted and released the money to the accused.
On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo,
whom they feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were
confirmed. According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and
because there were many people there at the time, she left her passbook with the accused. She
returned days later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at home. Misa now showed to
her a withdrawal slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers
appeared. Cornejo denied that it was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of
the accused were unquestionably affixed to the paper.
Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims against
her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt. She started
crying and locked herself inside the bathroom. She came out only when another superior Fed Cortez
arrived to ask her some questions. Since then, she executed three more statements in response to the
investigation conducted by the bank’s internal auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors’ accounts
from which she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.
The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina P65,000, while
Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the course of her testimony on the witness stand,
the accused made these further admissions:
(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake signatures of
Matuguina and Cornejo;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the
auditors’ questions in Exhibit M, N and O;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank. 2cralawlawlibrary
Judgment of the RTC
On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC) rendered its judgment,3 finding the
petitioner guilty as charged, and sentencing her to suffer as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of P20,000.00 from the account of
Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay BPI Family P20,000.00 and the costs of suit;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of P2,000.00 from Cornejo’s account, the
indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family P2,000.00 and the costs of
suit;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of P10,000.00 from the account of
Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum,
 to two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family
P10,000.00 and the costs of suit; and
(d) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of P35,000 from Matuguina’s account, the
indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family P35,000.00 and the costs of
suit.
cralawlawlibrary
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set aside because the
evidence presented against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-
incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and to counsel had been infringed; and (3) the evidence
against her should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or unconstitutional means rendering the
evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision4 affirming the judgment of the RTC, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of the lower court, except the provision of the
dispositive portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI Family P2,000. This must be
deleted because the accused had already paid the amount to the depositor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the award of P2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her constitutional rights
against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In behalf of the State, the Office
of the Solicitor General counters that she could invoke her rights to remain silent and to counsel only if
she had been under custodial investigation, which she was not; and that the acts of her counsel whom
she had herself engaged to represent her and whom she had the full authority to replace at any time
were binding against her.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave rise to
the accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document. She raised no challenges against such findings of fact here and in the CA, being content
with limiting herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to counsel, and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the CA, her main objection focused on the
denial of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial resulted, according to her, in
the invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.
Debunking the petitioner’s challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and to
counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect.
In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents.
Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank,
the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against
herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and
Cornejo confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the relevant portions of the decision
of the CA, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence presented
against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination. She also
contends that her rights to due process and counsel were infringed. Without referring to its name, she
enlists one of the most famous metaphors of constitutional law to demonize and exclude what she
believes were evidence obtained against her by illegal or unconstitutional means – evidence
constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold, however, that in the particular setting in which she
was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to counsel and against self-
incrimination are not apposite.
The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an official
proceeding for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against self-incrimination, when
applied to a criminal trial, is contained in this terse injunction – no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. In other words, he may not be required to take the witness stand. He can sit
mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel is expressed in the same laconic style: he shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This means inversely that the criminal prosecution
cannot proceed without having a counsel by his side. These are the traditional rights of the accused in a
criminal case. They exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal indictment and trial for a criminal
offense. But since Miranda vs Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to recognize that an accused
needs the same protections even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very inception of the
criminal process – when a person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a
person says or does during custodial investigation will eventually be used as evidence against him at
the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his eventual conviction. His trial becomes a
parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-incrimination and to counsel. This is the
logic behind what we now call as the Miranda doctrine.
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the exercise of the new
right and the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected to police
interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way. It
is when custodial investigation is underway that the certain procedural safeguards takes over – the
person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.
We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never intended to
hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime involving persons not under
restraint. The general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process, as the US Supreme Court
recognizes, which is not preceded by any restraint on the freedom of the person investigated, is not
affected by the holding, since the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-custody interrogation is not
present.
The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights that any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, a provision identical in language
and spirit to the earlier Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs. Caguioa 95 SCRA
2. As we can see, they speak of the companion rights of a person under investigation to remain silent
and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be institutionalized
by declaring that any confession or admission obtained in violation of these rights is inadmissible. But
to what extent must the rights to remain silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for the
commission of an offense? The answer has been settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia
and in the much later case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the
Miranda doctrine into the above-cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the right to remain silent and
to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies – when the official
proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no
cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the Supreme Court said very clearly that
the rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person undergoing a
normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be
considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial investigation.
She was not even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under
administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was
not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that
she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a
true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on the
soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did not get effective
legal representation from her former counsel who was already old and feeble when the case was being
heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel died during the pendency of the case, an octogenarian at
that. One can truly make a case from one’s lack of a competent and independent counsel, but we are
not prepared to say that the accused was so poorly represented that it affected her fundamental right to
due process. Except for the several postponements incurred by her counsel, there is really no showing
that he committed any serious blunder during the trial. We have read the transcripts of the trial and
failed to get this impression. The evidence against the accused was simply too overwhelming. We may
take note that once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his absences,
but she did not. She must live by that.5cralawlawlibrary
Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records, and that her
investigation as a bank employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of the
Constitutionally-protected right against self-incrimination, right to counsel and right to due process, we
find no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the conviction of the petitioner by the RTC.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document was
established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who
had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their
knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow
bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-
employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed
two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums
withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial
document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear
that the depositor concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the
amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated
without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.
Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.
According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,6 the penalty for a complex crime is that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Otherwise, the
penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial documents is punished
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one
day to six years) and a fine of P5,000.00.7 In contrast, the estafa is punished according to the value of
the defraudation, as follows: with the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the amount of
the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds P22,000.00,
the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the
total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be, in connection with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two
months) if the amount of the fraud is over P6,000.00 but does not exceed P12,000.00; with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months
and one day to two years and four months) if the amount of the fraud is over P200.00 but does not
exceed P6,000.00; and with the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two
months and one day to six months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed P200.00. 8cralawred
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the fraud was
P20,000.00; hence, the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum period. However, the RTC
and the CA fixed the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum. Such
maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short by one day, the maximum period of the penalty
being six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate sentence is
corrected to three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving P2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four months and one
day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to two years and four months of prision correccional in its
minimum period. The falsification of commercial document is penalized with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of
P5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and its penalty is to be imposed in the maximum
period, which is from four years, nine months and 11 days to six years plus fine of P5,000.00. The
penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months). Thus, the indeterminate
sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, as maximum that both the RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the error by
prescribing in lieu thereof the indeterminate sentence of two years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional plus fine of P5,000.00, as
maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving P10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the indeterminate
sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10
days of prision correccional, as maximum. However, the penalty for the falsification of commercial
documents is higher than that for the estafa. To accord with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for falsification of commercial documents (i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of P5,000.00) should be imposed in the maximum period. Accordingly, we revise the
indeterminate sentence so that its minimum is two years and four months of prision correccional, and its
maximum is five years of prision correccional plus fine of P5,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was P35,000.00, the penalty
for estafa (i.e., prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four
years, two months and one day to eight years) is higher than that for falsification of commercial
documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, was prescribed. Considering that the
maximum period ranged from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years, the CA should have
clarified whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor already included the incremental
penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Absent the clarification, we can
presume that the incremental penalty was not yet included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and
specific, the indeterminate sentence is hereby fixed at four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one year incremental penalty.
In other words, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is seven years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor.

The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the P2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case No. 94-5525 on
the ground that such amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa Cornejo. There being
no issue as to this, the Court affirms the deletion.

The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum on the remaining
unpaid sums reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is only fair and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on August 18,
2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of three years of
<I>prison correccional</I>, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of <I>prision
mayor</I>, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years of
<I>prision correccional</I>, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of <I>prision
correccional</I> plus fine of P5,000.00, as maximum;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years
and four months of <I>prision correccional,</I> as the minimum, to five years of <I>prision
correccional</I> plus fine of P5,000.00, as the maximum; and
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of
<I>prision correccional,</I> as minimum, to seven years, eight months and 21 days of <I>prision
mayor,</I> as maximum.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per annum on the
aggregate amount of P65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full payment.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
February 27, 2017
G.R. No. 211917
NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the
reversal of the Decision2 dated November 25, 2013, and Resolution3 dated February 21, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 15407 finding petitioner Norma C.
Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, while exonerating
petitioner Josephine G. Umali from the crime charged. The RTC also adjudged the petitioners jointly
and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in favor of private complainant Joan Fructoza E.
Fineza.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the
Revised Penal Code before Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following Information:
That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, defraud one JOAN FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following
manner, to wit: That Norma C. Gamaro, pretending that she is knowledgeable in the business of buy
and sell of jewelry, other merchandise and financing, assuring complainant of a sure market and big
profit lure and entice complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and the latter
purchased and delivered to her the jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage
the business for private complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from
complying, with her obligation, managed the business as her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the
sale and pledging jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused Josephine Umali work while the
checks issued by respondent Rowena Gamaro to guarantee their payment were all dishonoured for
having been drawn against insufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while accused
Rowena C. Gamaro remained at-large.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence disclosed the following facts:
Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business
venture with petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G.
Umali (Umali) and accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M.
Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who was then the manager of the said pawnshop
located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces of jewelry would then be sold for profit by
Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the Social Security System (SSS) in San Pablo City. The
proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following manner: fifty percent (50%)
would go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro
and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were placed in the possession of
Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from
their joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry. 6
The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma Gamaro,
together with her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar business with other
suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. To wind up the business, it was
agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of
jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to her by
Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the account of the Gamaros had been closed.
Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the latter
confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks. Fineza also learned
that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what
they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such
that, the latter was compelled to redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the
pawnshop tickets that it was the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who pledged
the pieces of jewelry.7
To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her
possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for the
pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer. 8
A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated
February 16, 2004, asking for the return of the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of
jewelry which were not returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting
business. The demand letter was left unanswered. 9
For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her
daughters. Umali likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro and
with Fineza. While admitting that there were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin, Frederick San
Diego, in the pawnshop where she was the manager, Umali denied that she knew where those pieces
of jewelry came from.10
On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment, as follows:
a. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined
and penalized under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences her to
suffer the indeterminate prison term of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of Prision Correccional, as
Minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
b. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal liability;
c. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine Umali to pay the private complainant
jointly and solidarily the following amounts:
1. ₱1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on February 16, 2004, until fully paid;
2. ₱50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;
3. ₱25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;
4. ₱50,000.00, for and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs.
Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau of Immigration is likewise directed to
issue a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal circumstances are as
follows:
Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO
Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority (NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San Pablo City
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated November 25, 2013, the CA
affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the CA on
February 21, 2014.
Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:
A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING
THE RTC DECISION FINDING NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER
SECTION l(B), ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE INFORMATION
ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(A) ARTICLE 315 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;
B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT
IT (RTC) RELIED ON THE FINDINGS ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
WITH SSS AGAINST NORMA GAMARO;
C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT
IT (RTC) CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY. BALDEO DESPITE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA GAMARO ADVISE
REGARDING HER CASE; AND
D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE RTC THAT NORMA
GAMARO RECEIVED THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE INCOMPETENT AND
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION ITSELF.13
The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph
from the one charged is legally permissible.
The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime,
among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.14
The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him" is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor
is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the
law. It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law.15
The controlling words of the information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the
doctrine in Flores v. Hon. Layosa16as follows:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it
states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the
designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it
[sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are
the facts alleged in the information. The Court's ruling in US. v. Lim San is instructive:
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to
say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is
immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the
crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this
doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common
sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x.17
In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by Article
315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case maybe.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud
is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that
in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
x x xx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.18
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or
fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his
money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.19
However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315, paragraph
l(b) of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa).
x x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x x xx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
x x x20
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or
other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there
is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt
thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 21
The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which
petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph l(b) instead of paragraph 2(a)?
What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of a
crime charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of the
Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry
amounting to ₱2,292,5l 9.00 on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna
Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of
complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where
petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice
of Fineza.
Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice
of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This, at least, is very clearly shown by
the factual allegations of the Information.22
There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently inform
petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa
by misappropriation. Petitioners are fully apprised of the charge against them and for them to suitably
prepare their defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right.
She was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa, because
the RTC has the discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. In the case
of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,23 We explained the rationale behind this discretion in this manner:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass
the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the
information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the
information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him,
either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those
acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense
he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights ... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines
what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone
to say what the crime is or what it is named x x x. 24
Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1 (b). As held by the CA,
Fineza positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her and
petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property
held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro
failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in trust. This already
constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use.
The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to
appropriating the same for his own personal use.25 As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the
pieces of jewelry using her own money.
The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.26
Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them, petitioner Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense, the same having been proved.
Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of
prosecution witness Atty. Baldeo violated the rule on "privileged communication between attorney and
client" for the reason that Atty. Baldeo allegedly gave petitioner Norma Gamaro "advise" regarding her
case.
The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the communication;
(2) The client made the communication in confidence;
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. 27
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must
intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.
The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.28
Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
petitioner's allegation. The testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that petitioner
Norma Gamaro was indeed engaged in the business of selling jewelry supplied by private complainant
Fineza. We note that the testimony is merely corroborative to the testimony of private complainant
Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma Gamaro. Atty. Baldeo testified primarily on the
fact that she personally saw petitioner Gamaro, on several occasions, showing the jewelry for sale to
their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered to buy the pieces of jewelry on some instances,
and she was told by petitioner Norma Gamaro that the pieces of jewelry came from Fineza. 29
The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC to dispute the defense of petitioner
Norma Gamaro that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:
Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the aforementioned administrative
case, accused Norma Gamaro's defense of denial of her participation in the business transaction
involving the sale of jewelry supplied by private complainant, fall flat on its face.30
Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the one
who received the pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest
degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. Though jurisprudence recognizes
highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the
challenged Decision.31
We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro
received some pieces of jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned the jewelry
entrusted to them by Fineza which is a clear act of misappropriation, thus:
x x x x. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and Josephine through the testimony of
Frederick San Diego is understandable.1âwphi1 The argument, however, that it was Frederick San
Diego, upon instructions of RowenaGamaro who pledged the jewelry, without the knowledge of Norma
or Josephine is unavailing. The records show that Frederick San Diego is not only a mere nephew of
Norma, and cousin to Rowena and Josephine, but also the messenger and collector of Rowena, who
had knowledge of the fact that Rowena's partner was the private complainant, Frederick San Diego also
knew that the private complainant went to the house of Norma asking the missing jewelry.
As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the private complainant to Norma Gamaro,
not Rowena Gamaro. Yet the defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the same pieces of
jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Cebuana Lhuillier, and the owner of Collette's upon instructions of
Rowena Gamaro. Clearly then, Norma turned over the said jewelry to Rowena with knowledge that they
will be pledged to the pawnshops and to the owner of Collette's. To hold otherwise would run counter to
human nature and experience.32
It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the eighteen (18) index cards given by
accused Rowena Gamaro to Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by Fineza,
with the corresponding appraised values. The due dates of the checks issued in favor of Fineza
(Exhibits "F" to "F-7"and "F-11""F-27") were also indicated on the index cards. 33 The pieces of jewelry
were pawned to various pawnshops and individuals, instead of offering them for sale. Hence, petitioner
Norma Gamaro failed to return the jewelry to the damage and prejudice of Fineza. She even offered her
house and lot to Fineza as payment for the jewelry.
the evidence adduced by the prosecution is preponderant enough to sustain appellant Umali's civil
liability. Accordingly, We agree with the court a quo’s ratiocination in this wise:
"What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by Frederick that it was Rowena
Gamaro who instructed him to pledge the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were true, then, with
more reason Josephine had knowledge as to who owns the jewelry. It may well be pointed out, as
earlier stated, that Josephine is part of the business transaction between Norma and Rowena with the
private complainant, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino
purposely to enable them to open a checking account, and it was against this account that Norma and
Rowena drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Joan from the proceeds of the sale
of the jewelry. It follows then that Josephine also knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged with
her (sic) M. Lhuillier Pawnshop Branch. x x x"
With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a quo’s ruling that herein appellants be
held jointly and solidarily liable to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there is no cogent reason to
depart from the ruling of the court a quo.36
There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts
agree on the facts.37 We, therefore, adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in
mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 2013,
and its Resolution dated February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that Fineza entrusted
the possession of the jewelry to petitioner. The CA observed that the prosecution duly proved
petitioner's misappropriation by showing that she failed to return the diamond ring upon demand. That
misappropriation took place was strengthened when petitioner Norma Gamaro informed Fineza that
they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the terms of their business agreement.

Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We note the declaration of the RTC that
Umali had knowledge as to who owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. The RTC further
pointed out that Umali was part of the business transaction between Norma Gamaro and Rowena
Gamaro with Fineza, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino to
enable them to open a checking account. It was against this account that Norma and Rowena Gamaro
drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Fineza from the proceeds of the sale of the
pieces of jewelry. These findings support the conclusion of the CA that Umali's acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt. Hence, Umali's civil liability was not extinguished by her discharge.34 We, therefore,
concur with the findings of the CA:

On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to private complainant Fineza. As may
be recalled, appellant Umali was exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding, she is not
entirely free from any liability towards private complainant Fineza. It has been held that an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt
her from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is required. 35 There is no question that
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JULY 2, 2018
G.R. No. 207711
MARIA C. OSORIO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the same to another
without the investor's consent may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to cover all
other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 challenging the January 30, 2013 Decision2 and
June 14, 2013 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34274. The assailed judgments
affirmed Maria C. Osorio's (Osorio) conviction for the crime of estafa.
In an Information, Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime during the period comprised from November 19, 2001 to January 11,
2002, in the City of Manila[,] Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O.
GABRIEL, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that her
money, if invested with Philamlife Fund Management will earn 20% interest per annum, and by means
of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL to give
and deliver, as in fact, she gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of Php200,000.00,
on the strength of the manifestations and representations of said accused well knowing that the said
manifestation and representation were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of
obtaining, as in fact she did obtain the total amount of Php200,000.00, which amount once in her
possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL in the aforesaid amount Php200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.4
Osorio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 5
The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant, Josefina O. Gabriel (Gabriel), and Alberto
G. Fernandez (Fernandez), head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department. Their
collective testimonies produced the prosecution's version of the incident.6
Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in December 2000, Osorio visited
Gabriel's store and introduced herself as an agent of the Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Company (Philam Life). As proof, Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During
their meeting, Osorio offered insurance coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel told Osorio to come back at a later
date as she needed more time to think about the offer. 7
When Osorio returned, Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package. 8 Gabriel
consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to November 2001. 9
On November 19, 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund
Management.10 The proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme11 and would
earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to
pay for her insurance premiums. Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered ₱200,000.00 to Osorio, who in
turn issued Philam Life receipts. 12
A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment of
premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would
take responsibility.13
Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset
Management (PMIAM), thanking her for investing in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM informed
Gabriel that her investment would earn interest on a semi-annual basis starting June 20,
2002. 14 Gabriel confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained
that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what had happened,
Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment. 15
On August 2, 2002, Gabriel received ₱13,000.00 from PMIAM as evidenced by PMIAM Voucher No.
001854. 16 In spite of this, Gabriel insisted on the refund. 17
Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be released
to her on May 14, 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She then visited the Philam Life
office to see Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to a certain Atty.
Cabugoy18 who sent a demand letter to Osorio. 19
Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life agent and that she was allowed to engage in other
lines of work. He stated that Osorio should not have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel's
₱200,000.00 investment.20 Although the receipts were genuine, Fernandez claimed that they should
only be issued for insurance premium payments.21
The defense presented Osorio as its sole witness. Osorio admitted that aside from being a Philam Life
agent, she was also a referral agent of PMIAM. She received ₱4,000.00 from the company as
commission for Gabriel's investment.22 She asserted that she initially planned to place Gabriel's
investment in Phil am Life but decided later on to divert it to PMIAM since the latter offered a higher rate
of return.23 When Osorio informed Gabriel of her decision, Gabriel allegedly gave her consent.24 Osorio
claimed that her husband also failed to recover his ₱300,000.00 investment in PMIAM 25 due to internal
problems with its mother company in the United States.26
On April 19, 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa.27 It ruled that Gabriel was induced to part with her money through Osorio's
misrepresentation that it would be invested in Philam Life, a company with an established reputation. It
rejected Osorio's defense that Gabriel later on consented to the placement. When she was informed of
the placement with PMIAM, Gabriel had no other choice but to agree.28
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court April 19, 2011 Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MARIA C. OSORIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four ( 4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused MARIA C. OSORIO is also directed to reimburse the private complainant, Josefina Gabriel the
sum of Php200,000.00, with legal rate of interest fixed at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the
complaint until the same is fully settled, which the accused received from the offended party.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.29
Osorio was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. She was
also directed to pay ₱200,000.00 plus six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the date of the
filing of the complaint until satisfaction. 30
Osorio appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, arguing that her act of investing Gabriel's
money with PMIAM was done in good faith. 31
On January 30, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming Osorio's conviction. 32 Osorio
moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied. 33
On August 8, 2013, Osorio filed a Petition for Review before this Court34 to which the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment. 35
In its February 10, 2014 Resolution, this Court required petitioner to file a reply to the comment on the
petition. 36 On April 24, 2014, petitioner manifested that she would no longer file a reply. 37
On June 18, 2014, this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 38 However, both parties manifested that they would no longer file their
memoranda. 39
In praying for her acquittal, 40 petitioner asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Article 3
15(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code were established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of
the private complainant was proven. Petitioner argues that she did not employ any deceit in soliciting
private complainant's investment as nothing in the records shows that she used a fictitious name or that
she pretended to possess power, agency, or certain qualifications. Fernandez, one of the prosecution's
witnesses, even admitted that she was a Philam Life agent.41
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she acted in good faith when she decided to place private
complainant's investment in PMIAM. She adds that she did not conceal this from private complainant,
who later on agreed to the placement.42
In its Comment, 43 respondent claims that the main issue raised by petitioner is factual in nature. Thus,
it is beyond the scope of review in a Rule 45 petition. Respondent argues that even if this Court
undertakes a factual review in this case, the lower courts did not err in convicting petitioner of
estafa.44 Petitioner misrepresented to private complainant that the latter's investment would be placed in
Philam Life and that its proceeds would be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums. This
misrepresentation caused private complainant to part with her money.45
The principal issue presented by this case is whether or not petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined
and punished under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The rule with respect to petitions for review brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is that only
questions of law may be raised. 46 The factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal.47
There is a question of law when "doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts
or circumstances."48 On the other hand, there is a question of fact when "the issue raised on appeal
pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."49 This includes an assessment of the probative value
of evidence presented during trial.50 If the principal issue may be resolved without reviewing the
evidence, then the question before the appellate court is one of law.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the ground
that she did not employ deceit in soliciting private complainant's funds. The determination .of whether
the element of deceit or fraud is present in a charge for estafa is a question of fact as it involves a
review of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence.51
Petitioner concedes that the case involves mixed questions of fact and law. However, she claims that
this Court is authorized to undertake a factual review if the findings of the lower courts do not conform to
the evidence on record. 52 Her contention is well-taken.
Petitioner was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
....
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:
(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense
or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage. 53
There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a). The false
pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under the first element exists when the accused uses a
fictitious name, pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business,
or imaginary transactions, or when the accused commits other similar deceits.
There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when she obtained private
complainant's money.
Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life. During
her first meeting with private complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as
proof of her identity and employment.54 Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and
Compliance Department, even admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent as of
December 2000.55
There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the authority to solicit investments for Philam
Life Fund Management. All that F emandez stated was that the issuance of Philam Life receipts to
private complainant was improper because the receipts only cover insurance premium
payments. 56 Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is presumed that petitioner was authorized to
solicit money for investment purposes.
In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the element of deceit
consisting of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise,
criminal liability will not attach. In Aricheta v. People,57 the accused was charged of estafa for selling
property that she had previously sold to a third party. She allegedly misrepresented to the buyer that
she was still the owner at the time of the sale. 58 In acquitting the accused, this Court found that the
prosecution failed to prove the alleged false representation she made:
As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged with Estafa for
allegedly selling to private complainant the subject property knowing fully well that she had already sold
the same to a third party. From this, it is therefore clear that the supposed false representation or false
pretense made by petitioner to private complainant was that she was still the owner of the property
when she sold it to private complainant.
....
The question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
alleged false representation or false pretense contained in the information.
As above explained, the alleged false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private
complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private complainant. To
prove such allegation, the prosecution should first establish that the property was previously sold to a
third party before it was sold to private complainant. The prosecution utterly failed to do this. The
fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. It made this allegation but it
failed to support it with competent evidence. Except for private complainant's bare allegation that
petitioner told her that she (petitioner) sold the property to another person, the records are bereft of
evidence showing that the property was indeed previously sold to a third person before it was sold again
to private complainant. What was shown by the prosecution and admitted by the defense is the fact that
the property is being currently occupied by a person other than private complainant. This fact does not
prove that the property was previously sold to another person before being sold again to private
complainant.59 (Citation omitted)
In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private complainant's
money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to private
complainant that the latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its
proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums.
Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise that
her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance policies.
She parted with her funds because of the representation that her investment's earnings would be
conveniently channeled to the payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of petitioner's
representations, private complainant no longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance
premiums as they fell due.60 Moreover, petitioner's issuance of Philam Life receipts61 led private
complainant to believe that her money was already as good as invested in the company.
The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other similar
deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article
3 l 5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People62 as limited to acts of
the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "other
similar deceits" cannot be construed in the broadest sense to include all kinds of deceit:
[T]he petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The
said provision reads:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new, is not the
deceit contemplated in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes
things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will
usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated unless there be
something in the context to the contrary. 63 (Citation omitted)
Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to
cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 3 15, 316, and 31 7 of the Revised Penal
Code. 64
For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
elements must exist:
(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315,
316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered
damage or prejudice. 65 (Citation omitted)
All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in
Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums.
This false representation is what induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the
payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by
placing the investment in another company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.
The present case is different from money market transactions where dealers are usually given full
discretion on where to place their client's investments.1âwphi1 In MERALCO v. Atilano,66 this Court
explained the nature of money market transactions and the corresponding liabilities that dealers may
face when dealing with their clients' investments:
[I]n money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be
placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific
securities.
Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is when an investor enters
into an investment contract with a dealer under terms that oblige the dealer to place investments only in
designated securities. Another is when there is no stipulation for placement on designated securities;
thus, the dealer is given discretion to choose the placement of the investment made. Under the first
situation, a dealer who deviates from the specified instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal
prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a civil action for recovery of the
amount invested. 67 (Emphasis in the original)
Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, she may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This rule
proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him or her. 68 An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule
120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:
RULE 120
Judgment
Section 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof - When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in
the offense proved.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply means that if there is a variance
between the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense
proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged
if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.
In Sales v. Court of Appeals,69 the accused was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article
315(2)( d) of the Revised Penal Code. She was convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code. In holding that there was no violation of the accused's constitutional right to be
informed of the accusation against her, this Court held that the elements of the crime of other deceits
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code also constitute one (1) of the elements of estafa by means
of deceit under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code:
In the information filed against her, the petitioner with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
....
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)"
Under the aforequoted provision, the elements of estafa as defined therein are as follows: (1) postdating
or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof. . . Basically, the two
essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and
competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established.
On the other hand, Article 318 of the same Code partly provides that:
"Other deceits. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage months and (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period,75 and to pay a fine of
caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or ₱200,000.00.
damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter."
SO ORDERED.
....

Clearly, the principal elements of deceit and damage are likewise present in the preceding article
cited.1âwphi1 The petitioner's conviction under the latter provision instead of that with which she was
charged was merely an application of the rule on variance between allegation and proof defined under
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that:

"Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof - When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in
that which is proved."

Simply put, an accused may be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge or of
an offense charged which is included in that which is proved. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
convicted of the crime falling under "Other deceits" which is necessarily included in the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) considering that the elements of deceit and damage also constitute
the former. Hence, the petitioner's right to be properly informed of the accusation against her was never
violated.70 (Citation omitted)

In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is
necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The imposable penalty for other deceits under paragraph 1 of Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code71 has been retained by Republic Act No. 10951. 72 Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor and pay a fine, which should neither be less than nor more than twice the
amount of the damage caused. The amount of damage caused against private complainant in this case
is ₱200,000.00.

As a final note, the defense that private complainant eventually consented to the investment in PMIAM
deserves scant consideration. Records show that private complainant asked petitioner for a refund of
her initial investment when she discovered that her investment was placed in PMIAM. 73 The ratification
allegedly given by private complainant hardly qualifies as genuine consent. When private complainant
discovered the transaction, her insurance policies had already lapsed. She was trapped in a difficult
situation where she could potentially lose another investment. Thus, she had no other choice but to
agree to the placement. The lack of genuine consent is further evidenced by private complainant's
repeated requests for a refund of her initial investment even after she received the first tranche of
interest income. 74

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals January 30, 2013 Decision and the June 14, 2013 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CR No. 34274 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Maria C. Osorio is GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2)
 Republic of the Philippines 138619 January 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
SUPREME COURT
Manila 138620 January 31, 1996 ₱3,333.33

THIRD DIVISION 138621 February 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33

138622 February28, 1996 ₱3,333.33

G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner, ₱46,666.62

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondents.
The checks were declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account." 4
RESOLUTION
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P. 22. Campos
REYES, J.: was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned. 5

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos (Campos) to
assail the Decision1 dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction of Campos for fourteen (14)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks
Law.
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14)
counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of ₱46,666.62
representing the total value of the checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full payment.

On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women's With costs.
Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor
of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. 3 Fourteen of these checks drawn against her
Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored SO ORDERED.6
when presented for payment, particularly:
Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007, the RTC of
Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos’ conviction. A motion for
Check No. Date Amount reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit.7
138609 August 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008 its
138610 August 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33 decision8 affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied via a
Resolution9 dated February 16, 2009. Hence,this petition for review on certiorari which cites the
138611 September 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33 following issues:

138612 September 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33 1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH REGISTERED
MAILIS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P. 22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE
138613 October 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
OF THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
138614 October 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS’] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF THE
138615 November15, 1995 ₱3,333.33 CHECKS’ DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR PAYMENT
[ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE THIS HONORABLE
138616 November30, 1995 ₱3,333.33 SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS AND TO LEND SUCCOR TO
[CAMPOS’] CASE.10
138617 December15, 1995 ₱3,333.33

138618 December31, 1995 ₱3,333.33 Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s issuance
that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor
from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a supposed notice of
dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also invokes good faith as she
allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her obligation after the subject checks
were dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 11
₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning
January 1996 until May 1998 if she had. not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no
knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for Campos,
these circumstances were not established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the
terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied
with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to
prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be
tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her former
counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial, 17 it is settled that the
negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason
to reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Campos.

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated
through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from FWCC, February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.
the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has
emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor,12 although not as an element SO ORDERED.
of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds
when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense
and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult
to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, 13 as it
reads:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her personal
receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of the letter
and the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. The Court has in truth
repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not
sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of
checks.1âwphi1 The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the
existence of the second element of the offense. 14

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense that she
exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were
dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that,
"[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for
the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks." 15 Clearly, this statement
was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence
referred to in her statement were receipts 16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998
and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002
GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A.
VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS.,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the decision1 dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 19621, affirming the Regional Trial Courts decision2 finding petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on
two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to
suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to be served consecutively. Also assailed
is the Court of Appeals resolution3 dated July 8, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a
term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages,
Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks:
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986 for P100,000.00,
payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986 for P115,442.65,
payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.4cräläwvirtualibräry
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later
than May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge,
Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable. 5cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May 30,
1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the
business operations of Lincoln Gerard.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang,
advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the
leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties
would be placed in our compound and under our custody.7cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 2, 1986,8 when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard,
apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them within the time prescribed
by law.9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge,
explaining Lincolns inability to fund said checks due to the strike.10 Subsequently, on June 19, 1986,
Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead
with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986, 11 despite Lincoln Gerards
protest.12cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 73260 and
73261 were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for reconsideration filed
by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his petition for review filed before the Department of Justice and
later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages docketed as Civil
Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps Dodge and the
notary public who conducted the auction sale.13 On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the
foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds thereof to Lincoln Gerards
arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as
excess.14 The court stated:
The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the amount of P254,600 as a
result of the invalid auction sale. The latter amount should be applied to the rental in arrears owed by
the plaintiff corporation to the defendant corporation (P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff corporation still
owes the defendant corporation the amount of P47,953.12 as rental arrears. In order to get the true and
real damages that defendant corporation should pay the plaintiff corporation, the balance of the rental
arrears should be deducted from the amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items belonging to
the plaintiff corporation and sold by the defendant corporation at a public auction. The net result
is P1,072,586.88. 15cräläwvirtualibräry
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and
executory.16cräläwvirtualibräry
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were remanded to the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that expanded the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty on both
counts for violation of B.P. 22,17 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six months on each
count, to be served consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, GUILTY
OF VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law on two counts.
The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
in Criminal Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41679, both of which
shall be served consecutively.
Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the Regional Trial Court
Branch 69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court has no record, this Court shall not resolve
the same because they are either Res Judicata or Pendente Litis.
SO ORDERED.18cräläwvirtualibräry
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision dated March
14, 1997, the appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under consideration is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 19cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the appellate court in a
resolution dated July 8, 1997.20 Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA decision and resolution
on the criminal cases, anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8
JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN MAGNO V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS
HONORABLE COURT LAID DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22
CANNOT BE BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTON DATED 8
JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8
JULY 1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH NOTARIAL FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE
FILING OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8
JULY 1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED
CASE (CA-G.R. NO. 20980) INVOLVING THE SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE
SAME TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8
JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN THE CASE OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON
VENUE TO JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF
VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, ARE CONTRAY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. 21cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher attached to
the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance. Petitioner contends
that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless checks in circulation, which is what
B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second check that was postdated, petitioner
contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with said check since the element of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not have known at the time of its issuance
that the postdated check would be dishonored when presented for payment later on.
Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional proscription
against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be punished not for knowingly
issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an obligation when it fell due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the notarial
foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise violation of B.P. 22
are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the five-day period,
counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the law and thus did not extinguish petitioners criminal
liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge, through the
note on the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient funds by
May 30, 1996, which assurance was final and irrevocable. 22 The OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not
distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is not, for as long as the drawer issued the
checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is dishonored upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since according to the
OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is dishonored
upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay a debt.23cräläwvirtualibräry
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodges notarial foreclosure of
Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage or prejudice to the
payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made only after the violation of the law had already
been committed. It was made beyond the five-day period, from notice of dishonor of the checks,
provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln Gerard,
Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on two counts and sentence of six months imprisonment for each
count by the respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was upheld by respondent RTC Judge Edwin
Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. But private respondent appears to have
collected more than the value of the two checks in question before the filing in the trial court of the case
for violation of B.P. 22. Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted and sentenced. To
resolve this issue, we must determine whether the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two
years prior to the filing of the information for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this case, however, does
not appear to us an appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported constitutional issue raised by
petitioner may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a case and controversy. But here we find
that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well to remember, courts do not pass upon
constitutional questions that are not the very lis mota of a case.24cräläwvirtualibräry
In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by
Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of Lincoln Gerard. It was a
condition written on the voucher for each check that the check was not to be presented for payment
without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was
unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the
companys inability to fund its checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the
voucher attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30,
1986, the checks would be presented for payment. This is final and irrevocable, according to the note
that was written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored
and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place
only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to
spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerards properties earlier impounded by
Phelps Dodge.
In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user.25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to
enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. 26 Noteworthy, in
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in
cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that
imposes penalties for retribution,27 such retribution should be aimed at actual and potential
wrongdoers.28 Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks
issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly
communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial
foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for
cash amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was
already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the
leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was
only P301,953.12.30 Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge
was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items
owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when,
almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22.
By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer
subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary. 31 That the
money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be
ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the
invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln
Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was
affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioners conviction
and sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For
Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and
auction sale as its chosen remedy.
That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in deciding
the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in
connection with the petitioners motion to quash the charges herein before they were tried on the
merits.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani:
We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both charges in Criminal
Cases Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered in Branch 69 in Civil Case No.
55276, well-written as it is, had put up a formidable obstacle to any conviction in the criminal cases with
the findings therein made that the sale by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was illegal and had
no justification under the facts; that also the proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted from
the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which
Lincoln should pay, computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the
case as the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to pay Lincoln in
damages P1,072,586.88 from which had been deducted the amount of P47,953.12 representing the
balance of the rental in arrearages; and that consequently, there is absolutely no consideration
remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks. 33cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated on
procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was the proper
remedy.34 In a petition for certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion are
considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of
worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal
laws mechanically.35 We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and
reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law
ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this
case where a debtors criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The
creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal
offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or
equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been
effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition.
We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P.
22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether
there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for
being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 41678 and 41679.
Costs de officio. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 190834 November 26, 2014
ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009, and its Resolution2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count
of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated
June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.00) for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his
campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered the
delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the printing
materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the
two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial, when
the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn against
insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner,
dated July 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the
demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a
replacement check dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced
checks, two Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), to
wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
thenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to
apply on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814 dated July 15, 1998,
payable to Cash in the amount of ₱100,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue
he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same
would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice of such dishonor failed to
pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139 – CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on
account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813 dated June 30, 1998 payable to
Cashin the amount of ₱100,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same
would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice of such dishonor failed to
pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July
20, 2007, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court decision with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931), because the lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases
where the essential ingredients of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. The decision of the
lower court with respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for
lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22
with respect to criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00 plus
costs. No findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with the lower court that the check was
paid, is affirmed and there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to pay fine, the
accused shall undergo subsidiary imprisonment of not more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the CA
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied per Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the
criminal case against him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks
even before the Informations against him were filed incourt. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court
of Appeals.6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise recommends the acquittal of petitioner,
opining that Griffith7 is applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith,the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the filing of the
Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount
greater than the value of the bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are
dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffithin applicable to the present case, because the checks subject of this case are
personal checks, whilethe check involved in Griffithwas a corporate check and, hence, some confusion
or miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the check and the corporate
treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present case are not exactlythe same as those in
Griffith, it should be noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well
existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution
to Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a
"Stop Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were
used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied with his
instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to
see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he
believed Castor's wordthat there is no longer any valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not
made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two monthsafter receiving the demand letter from private
complainant and just several days after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
accused issued a replacement check which was successfully encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to
pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This
reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of
the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of
the accused's property. In saidcase, the Court did not differentiate as to whether payment was made
before or after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that the
amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before the Information against the
accused was filed in court. In thiscase, petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks.
The Court, therefore, sees no justification for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show
that both in Griffithand in this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the
filing of the Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the
accused in Griffithshould not likewise be extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated in
Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of
worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal
laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and
reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law
ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this
case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The
creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, viaauction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal
offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or
equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been
effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition.
We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P.
22. x x x8 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, 9 the foregoing principle
articulated in Griffithwas the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein,
the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or
issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."10 To facilitate proving the second
element, the law created a prima faciepresumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit,
which is established when it is shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and,
within five banking days thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for
its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within
the five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the
violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment
withinthe period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period
would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further
elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more than a sufficient
amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president
to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no longer
tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made
beyond the grace period but two years prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected
from the proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties, with
more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.
xxxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in
possession the four buses – trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March
1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about ₱6.6
million." It thus appears that the total amount of the dishonored checks – ₱1,785,855.75 – , x x x was
more than fully satisfied priorto the transmittal and receiptof the July 9, 1992 letter of demand. In
keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to have
obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.

It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.1âwphi1 And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine
whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x
x11 (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided
for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that
the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the
crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's
sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, 12 petitioner should not be penalized although all the
elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to bepresent. The fact that the issuer of the check had
already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of
the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information incourt. The spirit of the law which,
for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be
served by penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution
for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law.

It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information
has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in
court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or
totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and
compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to
its full extent.

Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from
cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the
offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the
value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the
civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.

In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months
before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice
and equity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009, in CA-GR. CR No. 31725, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-
249932.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163938 March 28, 2008
DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among members of the bar,
but also among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what law to apply and what
penalty to impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or
arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), affirming with modification that2 of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners
Dante Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda
San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. 3 She was lying down when she heard some
noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando
Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut.4 When
she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming
to her immediate succor, the four fled.5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking
with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a
number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to
identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. 6 He also saw Rolando Buela running
away.7
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and
Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o’clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San
Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the
nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private complainant
Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and their co-accused.
The trial court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident; Rolando
Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer
at his parents’ house on occasion of the death anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also
claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja’s having gone there in the evening of December 30, 1993 and
left the place at 12:00 o’clock noontime of January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at
his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened
and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at Añgas
after having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after the
incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the
accused to corroborate their testimonies.9
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The
dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS,
SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.10
Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their appeal, they
contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court
erred in finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and credence to their
defense of denial and alibi.
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los
Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.11
In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson,
punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by
imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court,
the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should
be found liable only for arson in its simple form. 12
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The following
arguments are now raised for the Court’s consideration:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR. 13
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this part of our
penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the
guidance of the bench and bar, a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not
included in the preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes
involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one’s own property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire
to property exclusively owned by the offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a
consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution
of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613
supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance
read:
SECTION 1. Arson. – Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by
prision mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances
which expose to danger the life or property of another.
SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or
combustible materials are stored;
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education
or social services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of
persons or property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other
official proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or
private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. – The penalty in any case of arson shall be
imposed in its maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property
burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.
SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. – Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima
facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building not
necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.
 3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials
soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic
contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the
ruins or premises of the burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of
the issuance of the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have
occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or
insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a building
or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange
for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. – Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision
mayor in its minimum period.
SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. – The building which is the object of arson including the
land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof
can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due
diligence on his part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law expanded
the definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The
amendatory legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment on destructive
arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes)
was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether
the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set
on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or
to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by
two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn
or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another
violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is
no longer a capital offense.14
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners’ culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence. They argue that
the inference that they were responsible for the burning of private complainant’s hut was not duly
proven by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an
inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when
the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free."15
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only
basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances
can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. 16 Verily,
resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.17
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 18
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the circumstantial
evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut
of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00
a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners, together
with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted for
help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive
testimony.19 Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair
conclusion – the culpability of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the
circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated the arson.
Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and appellate
courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement
need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating
a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is
not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried
out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them
doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and
each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. 20
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and
Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part
of the group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of
Adelina’s house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of
interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:
Accused-appellant’s assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the accounts of the
prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved after the private
complainant shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the
part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had
prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on fire, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Very seldom such prior
agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely
documented by agreements in writing.21
Crime committed and the penalty
The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the
particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is
inhabited, and not having been established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area,
accused-appellants should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of
the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by
prision mayor.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-appellants
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period as provided under
Article 321, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1613.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range of
prision correccional.22
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No.
1613. The said provision of law reads:
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.23 Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements
here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited
house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the
statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused
will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the
information.24
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by petitioners and
their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that "accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to
the latter’s damage and prejudice."25
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were convicted by the
RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure
are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.26
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No.
1613, punishable by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified the RTC and
CA judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano, 27 the
accused was found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court
held that he should be held liable only for simple arson. The explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which
imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or
dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information
particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law
should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of
ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the
case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable
under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the
offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was
"motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be
appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or
risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing
can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple
Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house
or dwelling.28
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v.
Malngan.29 Said the Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under
Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under
Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning
of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and
other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The
classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the
commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of
innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake;
hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe
punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed
by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the
fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in
pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric
of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the
governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the purpose of
the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD
1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein." "What is controlling is not
recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied] allegedly violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited."

To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory
portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime
of Simple Arson – for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly
populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together
with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire." [Emphasis supplied]
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613 categorically
provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied]1avvphil
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable penalty
on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.30
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.

The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano. The SO ORDERED.
accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and
gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson
under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This
Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:

"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the
aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the
structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3,
Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and
liberally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the
case at bar."

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally
burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and
destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may
be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case
"notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009 decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the
August 26, 1002 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant
broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla
ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When
Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail
of water, and poured its contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10
meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric
approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not
to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. 6 The appellant also told the people around
that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. 8 Eric also
returned to his house to save his belongings.9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident,
and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been
intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his
barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in
assessing the damage.11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt angry
at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been
stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and
that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and
maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his neighbors came from
the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration. 14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the appellant
carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001. 15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law,
stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at
the ground floor before the fire broke out.16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since
these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the
totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the
crime charged.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai
Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence
since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a
conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused." 19
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the
appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around
4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he
would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the
appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant
prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the
appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his
house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted
by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s
house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant
set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors
from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the
crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or
belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and
prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire,
the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the
fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate
planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that
he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke
up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people
who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of
innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them
prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, which
reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether
the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set
on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.1âwphi1
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or
to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons."20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of
this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size,
not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes
simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity
and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and
national security implications than destructive arson. 23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that
the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social
Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That
the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to
the neighboring houses.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium period of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the
commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To seek
recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree
of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. 25

WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson
under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and

(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181409 : February 11, 2010]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, REPRESENTED BY
MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, AS ADMINISTRATRIX, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILLIAM SATO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her
husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix [1] of petitioner intestate
estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit[2] for
estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111,
Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose
and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being
one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto
attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property
belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having
died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
[s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power
of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was
made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said
Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the documents
she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having
gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my
other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later
became the second wife of my sister's widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that they
were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special
Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property
and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng
(Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita
Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and
(c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D.
Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute
sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of
her grandmother's properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the
aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting
thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned
over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has
actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the
signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her
father's orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the
same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on
June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of
the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother's estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to
refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato. x x x[3]
Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the
deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-
affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. [4] On
appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997
and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article
315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code. [5] Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:[6]
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,]
to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko
C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes,
accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell,
assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay
City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and
covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the
said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato
sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for
P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and
once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.[7]
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the
amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the
actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-
law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato's motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,[8] the trial court granted Sato's motion and ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor's contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of
affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of
the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-
Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and
Zenaida's mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-
in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only
civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family
harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is
committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against
his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil.
65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED
and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[9] (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution's motion for reconsideration[10] was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.[11]
Dissatisfied with the trial court's rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals [12] which, however, in a decision[13] dated August 9, 2007,
dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by
affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the
application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of
private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the
law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida
dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed
the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that
notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the
criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the
Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent's daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with
her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William
Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption
from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the
same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the
death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to
exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the
courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to
interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not
written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code's simple
language is most favorable to Sato.[14]
The appellate court denied reconsideration.[15] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites
the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended
party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter,
Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato's wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a
co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only
after her mother's death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came
about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida
extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship
between Sato and Zenaida's mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability
provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner's claim that
Zenaida's death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal
case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation
sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332's provision exempting a family member committing theft,
estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In
particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by
affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the
extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship
By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause[16] in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious
mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by
virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the
exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.[17] By virtue thereof, no criminal
liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;[18] by the
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;[19] by the stepfather who steals something from his
stepson;[20] by the grandson who steals from his grandfather;[21] by the accused who swindles his sister-
in-law living with him;[22] and by the son who steals a ring from his mother. [23]
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship
by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. [24] It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law
in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one's relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one's spouse, does the
extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is
why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on
the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino
author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There harmony and obviate scandal.[35] The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one
are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most
judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in
of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.[36] This is in consonance
ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt
Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the is established beyond reasonable doubt.[37]
spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the
parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.[38] The rule applies when the court
of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333). [25] is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient
to the accused.
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose
between the parties.[26] Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause.
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse's
affinity view.
blood relatives.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one
created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the
spouse when there is a surviving issue.[27] The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of
death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the
the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.[28]
justifying circumstance of defense of one's relatives under Article 11 [2] of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one's relatives
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the
under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the
under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. [29] Under this view, the
relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their
relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft,
parties.[30]
swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second
State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party
view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest. [31] On
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
affinity view is more appropriate.
falsification.[39]
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of one's living
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. [40] What
child and the surviving spouse of one's deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with
controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in
respect to his or her parents-in-law)[32] can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
the Information.[41] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
without doing violence to its language.
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. [42] It is the
exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. [43] The determination by the
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen
on the court.[44]
the solidarity of the family.[33] Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall
preserve the solidarity of the family.[34] In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple
estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the
Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to
sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in
fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign,
transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita's properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato's inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in
favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to
Manolita nor accounted for the same and despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to
deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita
(who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her.
Manolita's acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very
expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only signed and
thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of Sato's representation
that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed
that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e.,
that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato's
proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter
Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise
disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked
the document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself,
the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign
the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents,
[Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit"
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited
therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as
to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court
and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would
now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only
P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of
Manolita's properties.[45] This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were
also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa.
Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the
deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause
provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER
ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue
of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also
from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document
is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.[46] It means that the prosecution must establish
that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the
crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely,
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or
complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a
complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the
scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as
separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single
(complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally
liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the
juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest
in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public
interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. [47] Thus, the action
provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members
and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension
and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively,
when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as
a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of
the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each
other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both
felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one
criminal liability.[48] That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two
crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which
violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property), [49] a complex crime constitutes a
violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime
in itself.[50] Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes
are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a
complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same
criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is
only one criminal liability.[51] (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls
under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal
intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability. [52] The latter
category is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of
a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on
which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more
conveniently termed as component crimes. [53] (emphasis supplied)
-- ∞ -- -- ∞ -- -- ∞ --
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only
one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the evil intent of the offender is only one.[54]
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the
elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may
be determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the
liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex
crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly
disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the
plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere
material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE
A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are
as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the
document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the
document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingredient thereof.[55] In People v. Salvilla,[56] the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one
crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. [57] In this case, the crime of
falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato
to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he
used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. [58] The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.[59] In other words, the
crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. [60] Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. [61] The damage
to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. [62]
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of
public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed
the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was
consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato
later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed
the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the
SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the
public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission
of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a
deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage
would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior
thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa. [63] On the
other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a
document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her
signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification. [64]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution
dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

SO ORDERED.
TITLE XI:
Crimes against Chastity
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199100 July 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO AMARO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration is the appeal by appellant Rosendo Amaro from the Decision1 dated 30 March 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 02801, affirming the 26 February 2007 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50, which found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
On 26 May 1998, appellant was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape committed as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1998 at more or less 5:00 in the afternoon in front of Boots &
Maya located at Mal var Street, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit atthe beginning and of force and
intimidation later and with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct
one [AAA],3 a seven (7) year old girl, by forcing her and took her to his house at Bgy. Tagburos, Puerto
Princesa City and without any justifiable reason, accused detained and deprived her of her liberty for a
period of twenty eight (28) [sic] days; that while she is being detained accused ROSENDO AMARO had
carnal knowledge of said AAA all committed against her will.4
Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded. AAA, who was then only 7 years old,testified that
she was walking on her way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a
man, whom she later identified in court as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying
the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them,
she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant. When she
regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed her on the lips
and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but appellant
covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by
appellant. AAA clarified thatappellant’s penis touched the outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant because the latter
promised to bring her home.5
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, a
certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to the police
station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken away but he did nothing. 6
The prosecution also presented AAA’s mother, BBB, to corroborate her daughter’s testimony. BBB
narrated that on 26 March 1998, she was in the house when AAA came home at around noon time to
eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that she had to go backto school. At around 5:00 p.m. when AAA had not
come home, BBB went to the school to look for her. When the teacher told BBB that that school children
had already been sent home, she proceeded to the police station to report her missing daughter. After
six (6) days, AAA was found by BBB’s former employer who brought her to the police. Upon receiving a
call from the police, BBB immediately went to the police station and saw her daughter. BBB observed
that AAA was still in shock and could not walk properly so she was brought to the doctor on the
following day. She only learned that her daughter was raped after the medical examination.
Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the
latter to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to take her with
him because she was always being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching his house, appellant
entrusted AAA to the care of Florante Magay’s sister. Appellant then went back to town to attend to his
work as a mason. He only decided to go back home when he heard his name on the radio in connection
with the disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her
house in Buncag. AAA walked alone towards her house.7
On 26 February 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ROSENDO
AMARO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, as defined
and penalized under Article 342 and Article266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353
in relation to Article 48 thereof. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs. He is likewise ordered to pay the complainant-victim [AAA] the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND
(₱50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.8
The trial court found AAA’s testimony as credible and straightforward and supported by medical
findings.
From the aforesaid decision, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 March 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC. Both
parties opted not to file their Supplemental Briefs and instead adopted their Briefs filed before the
appellate court.9
In this appeal, appellant contendsthat the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction.
According to appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter was not in his custody at the time said
incident allegedly happened. Appellant adds that he entrusted AAA to the custody of Florante Magay’s
sister because he was working. Appellant also insists that AAA voluntarily went with him to his house.
Thus, the resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the
testimony of the complainant the guilt of the accused for the crime offorcible abduction with rape beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, Just to prove.
are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that (to witness)
she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape Q: When the penis of Rosendo was being tried by Rosendo to penetrate your vagina[,] what did you
under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, feel?
or(2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelveyears of A: Painful, Sir.13
age.
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the victim suffered from
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven (7) laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus. 14
year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her thathe knew her mother and that
he would bring her home.10 At her tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived by appellant. The Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. AAA’s abduction
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated and ensured by
unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of her abduction.15
deceiving minds.11 The presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape
of the victim.12
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's testimony
because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The issue
During the direct examination, AAA recounted the rape incident and positively identified appellant as the therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed
perpetrator, thus: on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound
judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
Q: When Rosendo undressed himself what happened next? witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.16
xxxx
A: He undressed me. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if
PROSECUTOR SENA: she is a minor, saysthat she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show thatrape
(to witness) has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined
Q: And after you were undressed by Rosendo what happened next? A: He kissed me. to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also
Q: Where were you kissed by Rosendo? the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
A: In lips, Sir. immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.17 Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward
Q: Only your lips was kissed by Rosendo? manner.
A: On my neck.
Q: Aside by being kissed by Rosendo, what else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina. On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi.1âwphi1 It is jurisprudential that
Q: What do you mean by "totoy?" denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
(No answer) culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
PROSECUTOR SENA: overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his involvement
(to Court) in the crime attributed to him.18 Alibi is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain
May I change the question, Your Honor. more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
COURT: evidence.19
All right.
PROSECUTOR SENA: The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetuaby
(to witness) ratiocinating, to wit:
Q: [AAA], in what part of the body of Rosendo can you find that totoy that you said?
(Witness pointed to her private part) The presence of lewd intentions is established by the conduct of the accused during the abduction.
Q: And that bilalaythat you mentioned in what part of your body can you find that? When the girl is defiled, the forcible abduction becomes the means to commit the rape, and since rape
(The same, witness pointed to her private part) is the more serious offense, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of forcible
Q: Were you able to see that totoyof Rosendo? abduction with rape is committed and penalized by reclusion perpetua, the penalty proper to rape. 20
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And how big was that?
(witness demonstrated the length more or less 5 inches) For clarity, the lower courts should have emphasized that reclusion perpetuaas the proper penalty for
Q: About how – the diameter, how big is the diameter? the crime of statutory rape was imposed in lieu of death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659.
COURT: When Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition ofdeath penalty, persons convicted of offenses
It is not necessary to prove that, the size. punished with death penalty will now be reduced to reclusion perpetua. And in line withour recent ruling
PROSECUTOR SENA: in People v. Gambao21 where we order an increase in the amount ofdamages to ₱100,000.00 each for
civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages,we deem it necessary to increase the amount of
damages accordingly.

In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from date of
finalityof this judgment until fully paid.22

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02801 is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that ROSENDO AMARO shall
pay ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on the amount of damages, reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200080 September 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARVIN CAYANAN, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant Marvin Cayanan (Cayanan) seeks a review of the Decision1 dated July 14, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 affirming with modifications the Consolidated
Decision2 dated June 16, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 77.
The RTC decision convicted Cayanan of the crimes of Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200
1) and Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1498-M-200 I), and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime without eligibility for parole.
The CA, however, increased the award of damages originally awarded by the RTC: (1) in Criminal Case
No. 1499-M-2001, from ₱50,000.00 to₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) in Criminal Case No. 1498-
M-2001,from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and from ₱50,000.00 to₱75,000.00 as moral
damages. The CA also awarded an additional₱75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No.
1499-M-2001 and₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases. 3
The prosecution established that Cayanan took advantage of 15-year old AAA4 on February 1, 2001
while the victim was alone inside her house in x x x, Bulacan. Cayanan is the victim’s brother-in-law,
being married to her older sister, and the couple lived in a nearby house. AAA was asleep when she felt
someone caressing her. It turned out to be Cayanan. He then started kissing her and told her to remove
her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly took it off and after the latter took off his own under
garment, he inserted his organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill
AAA if she resisted and informed anybody of the incident.
On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend Armina Adriano
(Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy Manalastas. Cayanan then pulled
AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and
boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop in x x x, Bulacan where he asked someone to give her
a change of clothes as she was in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her
to his sister’s house in x x x where he raped her inside a bedroom. Afterwards, a certain couple Putay
and Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office where she was asked to
execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latter’s mother and sister-
in-law who brought her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of the incidents only
after her classmate Adriano informed her family of what happened in school and of the rape incidents.
AAA testified that she did not immediately tell her family because she was still in a state of shock. 5
Adriano and the victim’s mother corroborated her testimony. A resident psychiatrist at the National
Center for Mental Health also testified that AAA was suffering from mental depressive
symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse.6
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however, did not give credit to his defense,
ruling that it is a weak defense and does not rule out the use of force given the prosecution’s evidence.
He also failed to establish the genuineness and authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA. 7
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC. 8
A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any reversible error in affirming Cayanan’s
conviction. Record shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex with him on February 1, 2001 and
threatened her and her family with physical harm. The testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated
AAA’s testimony that Cayanan forcibly took her by the school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and
thereafter raped her.1âwphi1 The defense failed to show any reason why the prosecution’s evidence
should not be given weight or credit.
Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission of the crimes. For the
Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by compelling
evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent
proof is required ― such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. 9 And while Cayanan produced two
love letters allegedly written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these letters
were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative value.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case
No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the
accused is to rape the victim.10 In this case, circumstances show that the victim’s abduction was with
the purpose of raping her. Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several
places until they reached his sister’s house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.11
Finally, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in awarding additional ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001 and₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal
cases, as these are accord with prevailing jurisprudence.12
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256
is MODIFIED in that accused appellant Marvin Cayanan is found guilty of Qualified Rape in Criminal
Case No. 1498-M-2001. In all other respects, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to
earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 13
SO ORDERED.
TITLE XII:
Crimes against Civil Status
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from
the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity
of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in
Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G.
Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the
issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned
case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the
humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the
second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or
incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more
bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO
REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING
 THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF
THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE
PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72
IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS
BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS
ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE
OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND
THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH
AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND
DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN
THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is
clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second
marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V.
Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated
March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed
by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to
and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent
married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s
petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On
November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-
Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then
legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR
A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present
evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not
charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. 12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC
held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and
Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage
with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information
be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity
of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that
his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. 17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC,
Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s
motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent
basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his
first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be
lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus
calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage
after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering
that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following
grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID
AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY
ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v.
Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their
marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the
annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted
on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The
latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint
alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy
case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on
December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her
marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply
with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner.
The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage,
respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a
declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007.
On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter
sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As
in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do
not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of
the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for
certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the
facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be
based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. 28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to
quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed30 except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the
allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as
provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that
his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage
license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be
considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. 34 It is notproper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues
require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the
proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented by
respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which
destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with
Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime
is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very
least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on
the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People36 where the accused therein was acquitted because the
elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and
void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage,
the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second
marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1âwphi1 A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person
who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him,
because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is
the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of
the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent
only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion
to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the
information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. 43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present
evidence to support his omnibus motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17,
2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina
rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18,
1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to
work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. 6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence,
he allowed her to work abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in
February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. 10 He also inquired about
her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her
day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court
that she was a resident of Tarlac City. 15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune
Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal
dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively
dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. 21 She also claimed that it was
not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. 28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28,
2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5,
2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would
be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. 32 She
insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is
obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring
her presumptive death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy
because it cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an
affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate
remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has
become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies)
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 37 This court defined
extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic
when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting
the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts
outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case,
such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation. 41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she
was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death
were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's
petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the
Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two
years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud
perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions,
and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled
with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry
of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person,
with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating
the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her
marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance;
and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the
sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is
disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent
marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will
not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if
there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of
reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee
until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second
marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
may be considered valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit
of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; therefore, lie.
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
spouse; and extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. 55
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead.
The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. 57 Only a subsequent
marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an
action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively
dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for
being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception
to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing
other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also
be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." 61 If it is terminated by
mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still
be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the
effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of
prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, 65 this remedy is not
available to her.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision
and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on
29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry,
she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She
also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven
valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on
which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had
already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his
marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without
a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission
that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court
convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for
having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner
asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their
marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage
null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to
pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The
best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their
marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of
the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she
was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of
a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts
a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated
on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior
marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the
accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-
laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R
TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity
to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on
her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision
correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted
in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an
eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly
consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice
in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty
next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of
imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one
month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise
the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned
below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the
essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her
union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate
of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. 31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and
that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to
their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent
did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who
sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years
prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that
they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized
under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the
sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression
of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief
on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as
to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy,
is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as
elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that
they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against
illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet complied with
the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the
height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when
Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar
had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one
day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and
petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our
treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims
and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court
affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus
accessory penalties provided by law. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014
NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of
bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29, 2002,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in
Criminal Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a
marriage license.4 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. 5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City.6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that
purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. 8 In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences. 9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate
reflected the civil status of the accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against
Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch
39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud
in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social
humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among
others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B.
Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith
attached as Exhibit "A" and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar. Machine copy
of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in
Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and
seek treatment by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated by the
defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the defendant at her residence in
Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo City. They went to Dainty
Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to
sign the marriage contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false
affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which
marked the start of a married life rocked with marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without
love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories
against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity,
which psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live separately
from defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo
City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed
on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with
Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa
Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo
City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case No.
23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage
between him and Socorro valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint filed by the
plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage
between them is valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his wife, the defendant in this
case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of ₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer
with counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every month
thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No. 49808,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering
him to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC
thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license,
affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of
bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his
favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the
CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 22 asserting that the civil
law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one
could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution; 23 that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25 and that his good faith and
lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit
of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually,
he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of
Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect. 28
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in
finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of
bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his
favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the
CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 22 asserting that the civil
law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one
could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution; 23 that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; 24 that, consequently, an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and
lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit
of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually,
he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of
Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution
by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the
filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the
offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the
filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy
dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is
against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed.1âwphi1 The crime of bigamy was
consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro
being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being
yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.30 "What makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People: 34 x x x Nollora may not impugn his
[subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As
we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With neither an
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the medium period of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense,
which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two years
and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29,
2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the
institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage
with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his
complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against him,
thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s subsequent
marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless,
he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the
April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry
each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together
with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians,
also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a
ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted
the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary
sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified
that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss
each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the
marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the
petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey. 7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local
civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a
certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on
him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a
blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation
of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the
couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty
provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law
which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter
law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the
petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the
petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section
39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must
appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the
prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of
the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as
the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that
a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article
6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as
husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed
by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains
that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State
cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State
cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of
giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a
regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the
prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved
is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal
marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters.
These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from
Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code
provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other
as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that
no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as
correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony:
first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer;
and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as
husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or
the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to
reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely
register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the
circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration
by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their
declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence.
Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-
motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that
no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to
the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it
is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony,
as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely
as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony
qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code
and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was
illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had
no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and
formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal.
The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a
marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above.
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the
penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the
Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations
to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted
after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the
Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The
penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage,
refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any
church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to
the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister
solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized,
or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court. [emphasis ours]
TITLE XIII:
Crimes against Honor
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 225010, November 21, 2018
ELISEO SORIANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Eliseo Soriano (petitioner) appeals through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court the Decision2 dated August 17, 2015 and Resolution3 dated May 18, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35052, which affirmed the Consolidated Judgment dated June 8, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 60 in Criminal Case Nos. IR-4848 and IR-5273,
convicting petitioner of two (2) counts of libel.
Antecedent Facts
On January 15, 1999, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads in full as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Criminal Case No. IR-4848
That on or about July 31, 1998 at Iriga City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the anchorman of a religious radio program "Ang Dating Daan" of DZAL, a
radio station in Iriga City with considerable coverage in the city and throughout Bicol Region, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously with intent to cause and expose to public
ridicule, dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the persons comprising the Jesus Miracle Crusade,
International Ministry (J[MC]IM), a religious group, publicly air in his said radio program his prepared
taped broadcast containing false, injurious, and defamatory statements with no good intention or
justifiable motive in the guise of preaching the gospel of the Lord by branding its leader as "BULAANG
PROFETA, TARANTADO AND GAGO"; its pastors as PASTOR NG DEMONYO, MGA PASTOR NA
IMPAKTO and GAGO and its members as "ISANG DAKOT NA GAGO and SIRA ULO" which in words
are quoted hereunder respectively intended for group's leader, pastors and members as follows, to wit:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Mahina yong Diyos ng gago na iyan ng Pastor na iyan. Ano ba ang itatawag mo roon kundi gago iyon.
Galit na galit noong matalo si De Venecia, kasi pinatungan niya ng kamay si De Venecia at idenekre "I
decree that you will be the next president of the Philippines" SIRA! O, ngayon nahalata mo dito sya ang
"BULAANG PROPETA x x x TARANTADONG PASTOR NYO;
"Iyang mga PASTOR NG DEMONYO sa ating panahon, bakit di mo sasabihing PASTOR NG
DEMONYO IYAN. Hindi ba iyong mga nagsasabing ang mananalo ay si De Venecia. Tapos ng nanalo
si Erap, eh, hindi ika kami papayag na umupo siya sa Malacanang. Tingnan mong KAGAGUHANG
IYON. MGA PASTOR NA IMPAKTO. MARINA IYONG DIYOS NG GAGONG PASTOR NA IYON"; and
"TARANTADONG PASTOR NYO DIYAN KA PA RIN. Eh, kahit ano ang mangyayari doon pa rin sila
talaga. lyon ang makikita mo iyon espiritu ng PAGKAPANATISMO. x x x Kaya para magrelihiyon ka
noong ganoong relihiyon DAPAT SIRA ANG ULO MO. x x x SIRA NA LANG ANG ULO MO kaya nga
mali na ang gawing ng pastor mo, doon ka pa rin. DAHIL SIRA NA ANGULO MO."
That the said broadcast in question, particularly the above-quoted statements, had for its object to
insinuate and made it understood, as was in effect understood by the public who heard it as referring to
the whole JMCIM because it was only its evangelist leader, Wilde Almeda, who placed his hands on the
head of De Venecia and decreed that he would be the next president of the Philippines before a
multitude in Luneta, Manila duly covered with nationwide telecast in a prayer rally immediately before
May 8, 1998 elections and its pastors openly supported for De Venecia, in this manner causing the
dishonor, discredit and ridicule of the persons comprising the JMCIM, wherein complainants are pastors
thereof, before the bar of public opinion, to the damage and prejduice of the said complainants in such
amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
A similar Information for Libel was filed against petitioner on June 9, 2000, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Criminal Case No. IR-5273
"That on or about July 31, 1998, between the hours of 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock in the evening- at radio
station DZAL, Iriga City, Philippines, its broadcast could reach the entire country, particularly Baao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then the anchorman of Radio Program "Ang Dating Daan" and, in a prepared tape, AIRED its radio
program at the aforesaid radio station, with the deliberate purpose of impeaching, attacking and/or
destroying the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Evangelist Wilde E. Almeda, head of the Jesus
Miracle Crusade International Ministry (JMCIM), and for the further purpose of exposing him to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously aired and/or circulated the
subject prepared tape, hereto attached as Annex "A", over the said radio station, containing false,
malicious, injurious and highly defamatory statements against the said Evangelist Wilde E. Almeda, the
pertinent portions/statements are hereunder quoted, to wit:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Iyong mga pastor ng demonyo sa ating panahon. Bakit? Bakit di mo sasabihing PASTOR NG
DEMONYO IYAN, eh, hindi ba iyong mga nagsasabing ang mananalo ay si De Venecia x x x Mahina
iyong diyos ng GAGO ano na iyon PASTOR NA IYON. Ano ba ang itatawag mo roon KUNDI GAGO
IYON. Galit na galit noong natalo si De Venecia, kasi pinatungan niya ng kamay si De Venecia at
idenekre "I decree that you will be the next President of the Philippines" SIRA!!! O ngayon nahalata dito
siya ay BULAANG PROPETA. x x x EH TARANTADONG PASTOR NYO, DIYAN KA PA RIN x x x.
GAGO IYONG PASTOR NA IYAN. x x x HUWAG SABIHIN NI ALMEDA NA IYONG ESPIRITU IYON
DIN AN[G] DIYOS. ESPIRITU NG DIYOS. IYON DIN ANG DIYOS. x x x Kaya para mag-relihiyon ka
nong ganoong relihiyon, DAPAT SIRA ANG ULO MO. Di ba iyong wala ng lohika, iyong wala ng
katwiran."
That the questioned "taped broadcast" and/or statements aired/circulated had for its object to insinuate
and make it understood, as was in effect understood and interpreted by the public who heard it; that the
pastor or person who placed his hand over the head of De Venecia and decreed the latter as the next
President of the Philippines, referred to therein, can be no other than the complaining witness
Evangelist Wilde E. Almeda, thereby in such manner deliberately and maliciously transmitting to the
public the impression that the said Evangelist Wilde E. Almeda is a "Bulaang Propeta", "IDIOT" and
"APOSTLE of DEMONS" which statements, remarks, imputations and/or insinuations are highly and
intrinsically libelous, thereby discrediting and destroying his reputation and ridiculing him (private
complainant) before the bar of public opinion and the rest of the religious
sects/denominations/congregations, to complainant's damage and prejudice in such amount as may be A) THE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
proven in court. ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
PROSECUTION PROVED THE GUILT
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 OF THE [PETITIONER] BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT SINCE:
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges. Petitioner posted cash bonds for
his provisional liberty in both cases.6
1. IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THERE WAS NO
DISCREDIT OR DISHONOR CAUSED TO
During the trial, the prosecution presented Eudes Cuadro, Joel Cortero, Jerry Cabanes, and Liza PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
Martinez as witnesses in Criminal Case No. IR-5273. Meanwhile, Joel Cortero was the sole witness in
Criminal Case No. IR-4848.7
2. IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THERE WAS NO
MALICE OR ILL WILL BEHIND PETITIONER'S
On the other hand, one Marlon Igana testified for the defense. 8
STATEMENTS
Petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence on December 22, 2008. The RTC denied it in a Resolution dated
3. IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THERE WAS NO
January 6, 2008.9
IDENTIFIABLE PERSON IN THE ALLEGED
LIBELOUS STATEMENT
Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC, found petitioner guilty of two counts of libel. The fallo of the RTC's Consolidated
B) THE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
Judgment dated June 8, 2012, is as follows:10
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this court finds the accused Guilty of the crime of Libel in WHEN IT CONVICTED PETITIONER WHEN HE
both cases and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS HA[D] NO KNOWLEDGE, MUCH MORE
(P6,000.00) for each case pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 relating to the emergent rule CONSENT, IN THE PUBLICATION OF THE
ALLEGED LIBELOUS STATEMENT[;]
of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases under the
circumstances therein specified, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

As set forth in the above discussion, no award of civil damages is given. C) THE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN ITS DECISION EFFECTIVELY CURTAILS
No costs. AND CREATES A CHILLING EFFECT ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT OF
SO ORDERED. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION[.]13

Ruling of the CA Summed up, the fundamental issue in the instant case boils down to petitioner's guilt of the two counts
of libel.
Petitioner appealed the Consolidated Judgment of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier, rendered
its Decision11 on August 17, 2015, affirming the ruling of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the Ruling of the Court
Decision reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is defined "as a public and malicious imputation of a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The Consolidated Judgment dated crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
June 8, 2012, rendered by Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Iriga City in Criminal Case Nos. IR-4848 tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
and IR-5273 is hereby AFFIRMED. memory of one who is dead."14 "[F]or an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be
present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
SO ORDERED.12 victim must be identifiable."15
Issues
Defamatory Imputation
Petitioner raised the following arguments in support of his petition:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Ruther Batuigas v. Victor A. Domingo and the People of
the Philippines,16 this Court explained the rule in the determination of defamatory imputation, viz:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of
one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed
in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense. Moreover, a charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to
suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or
persons up to public ridicule.17 (Citations omitted)
From the abovementioned tests, petitioner's words stated during the mnng of his program are clearly
defamatory. The words "GAGO", "TARANTADONG PASTOR", "PASTOR NG DEMONYO IYAN",
"BULAANG PROPETA" disparage private complainant Wilde Almeda (Almeda). As in Buatis, Jr. v.
People,18 evidence aliunde is unnecessary to establish that these words are without malice. Moreover,
examination of the statements put forth in the Information does not reveal any good intention on the part
of petitioner or any justifiable motive as to negate the presumption of malice.
Petitioner's claim that his motive was harken to other religious leaders and pastors and members of any
religious congregation not to use the institution of religion in a manner that would subject not only the
pastors and ministers of any religious congregation but also the religion itself to public distrust and
disdain,19 does not make his statements justified. His purported motive is simply not reflected in his
malicious statement and insulting labels to the pastors of Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry
(JMCIM).
Neither do we deem petitioners statements as qualifiedly privileged communications. Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, enumerates some of these qualifiedly privileged communications, as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. (Emphasis ours)
The enumeration under said article is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. They are
known as qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule
requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In other
words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged
communications enumerated above: (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters
of public interest may still be considered actionable if actual malice is proven.
Malice
Though religion is arguably a matter or subject of public interest, there is no standard by which We can
declare petitioner's statements as fair commentaries. On their own, the words used by petitioner do not
appear to debunk the purported falsities in the preachings of JMCIM but actually to degrade and insult
their pastor or founder, Almeda. We likewise cite, with approval, the CA's finding of actual malice, to wit:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity. In the instant case, no good motive can be inferred from the language used
by Soriano against private complainants. This Court can only see Soriano's apparent objective of
discrediting and humiliating private complainants as to sow the seeds of JMCIM's dissolution
and to encourage membership in his religion. x x x.20 (Emphasis our.)
Publication
"There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is
written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written."21 "Libel is
published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the
attention or notice of another person other than its author and the offended party." 22 In this case, there
is no doubt that the video footage of petitioner was published as it was broadcasted through petitioner's
radio program.
Identification
While We affirm petitioner's guilt of libel, We deem it proper to clarify that petitioner's guilt stems from
his statements against pastor Almeda and not the JMCIM, or any of its pastors. We note that aside from
mentioning Almeda's name, petitioner's statements did not refer to any specific pastor or member of the
JMCIM. In MVRS Publications, Inc., et al. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils., Inc.,23 We held:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a
class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right
of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. x x x
xxxx
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents
have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private
respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for
the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each
Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs
to a different trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious
view - some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even
blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non
believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute
this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to
every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.24 (Emphasis ours)
We find that the facts in the MVRS case is analogous to the case at bar. The Information in Criminal
Case No. IR-4848 does not refer to any specific individual or pastor but merely mentions "persons
comprising the Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry." Further, contrary to the findings of the
lower courts, We did not find anything in the records which establish or single out any specific pastor,
specifically Joel Cortero. Neither can We consider petitioner's statements, be sweeping enough as to
injure the reputation of all the members of JMCIM. Hence, We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction for
libel in Criminal Case No. IR-4848.

No violation of religious freedom

Petitioner's claim that his statements are absolutely protected by the Constitution because they are
expressions of religious beliefs do not merit any consideration. As what this Court stated in Soriano v.
Laguardia, et al.,25 "Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status
of religious speech. Even petitioner attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction."26

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated August 17, 2015 and the
Resolution dated May 18, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35052 are
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Eliseo Soriano is hereby held GUILTY of the crime of libel for in Criminal
Case No. IR-5273 and ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. IR-4848.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our
SUPREME COURT client; using carabao English.
Manila
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita
FIRST DIVISION Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his
regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.
G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for you
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner, to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a
vs. matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ, Respondents. administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities.

DECISION Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so
as we can prove "who is who" once and for all.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to
set aside the Decision1 dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 Yours in Satan name;
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him
of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution 2 dated March 13, 2000 denying (Signed)
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows: Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and
Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on her husband’s desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
made out its content. It reads:
Copy furnished:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE All concerned.
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a
Metro Manila communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched
a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.
August 18, 1995
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila
Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz’
Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995 frail health was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the
Atty. Pieraz: behest of the president of the organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan"
or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment or if
it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another
letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its
contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the
letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 19974 finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of
the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as
minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount
of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages;
to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. 5
The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is
intended not only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous
letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an
affront to his standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was representing a
client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person represented by petitioner; the letter is
libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire message
sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory
imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner,
as the intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but
instead petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic intention.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of other
persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity was also
established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s stance that the libelous
letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to
respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of petitioner’s
association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of
the defamatory imputation was to impair respondent’s reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has
in fact resulted. It also awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of
the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of
respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated January 18,
2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they
impeached the good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioner’s
claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability since he
failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a
lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called "duty" in a more
toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as
privileged.
The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:
A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL,
ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL,
DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM
HER DWELLING PLACE?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED
LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE
(sic) COMMUNICATION?
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT: THE
PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE
DID IS A CRIME?6
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of the People and respondent filed his
own Comment praying for the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties submitted
their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling in People v. Velasco7 that "if
the act/matter charged as libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another objective, the crime
is not libel;" when he made his reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to
vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized
tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in
whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under obligation to defend a client’s cause is but
a privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged communication which is lost only
by proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence of malice
in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or
there was ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory
imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings of the
CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter which was to defend the vested interest of the
estate and to abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized,
there is justification for the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening letter…using
carabao English" was due to the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does
not serve its purpose as respondent’s client has no legal right over the property and respondent did not
file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid;
that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a complementary greeting used in an ordinary
communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being communicated and
which is just the reverse of saying "Yours in Christ".
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it
must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.8
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this case.
In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other
than the person against whom it has been written.9 Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is
enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person. 10 Furthermore,
the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent
himself.
We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is defamatory and
malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety
and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.11
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the
rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on
this point: "In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are
conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
whole."
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or
ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the
effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the
offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if
any there be, from the words used in the publication. 13
Gauging from the above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by
petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao English",
"stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and
reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be
adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public
ridicule as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."14
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in
Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes
that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law). 15 A reading of petitioner’s subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco.
There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s good intention and justifiable motive for
writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his
moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs.
Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus
in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if
it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified
privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who
made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had
an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice.16
While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the
association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent
to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any
explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against
the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, "lousy" and "inutile
letter using carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs.
Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written had only the effect of maligning respondent’s
integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same
agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in
answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and
showing malicious intent on petitioner’s part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to
be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some
interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the
author of the statement.17 A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged
when it is published and circulated among the public. 18 In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated
the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer. 19 While
petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to
all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication.20 Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance
which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that
petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any
error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. 21 We find that
the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be
entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of
the actual amount thereof.22 Respondent had not presented evidence in support thereof.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive
penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of
both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,23 where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for
alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted the prison
sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the
amount of the check. We held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the
national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly,
that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the
judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. It would best serve the ends
of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness
with due regard to the protection of the social order. 24
In the subsequent case of Lim v. People,25 we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment
and merely imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of
criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued
Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that
the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of
imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. We note that this is petitioner’s first offense of this
nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who
then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief
that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact,
petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he
did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in
the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social
ends.26 Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine
of six thousand pesos.
This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the
crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,27 petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty
of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed
the penalty imposed to a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall
be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
award of compensatory damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
SUPREME COURT hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 11, 1999,
Manila its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:

SECOND DIVISION PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS

ERWIN TULFO, G.R. No. 161032 Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na
Petitioner, yata na government official sa buong bansa sa pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA,* and and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro
SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, G.R. No. 161176 nito.
JOCELYN BARLIZO, and
PHILIP PICHAY, Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.
Petitioners,
- versus - COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and Promulgated: Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
CARLOS SO,
Respondents. September 16, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.2
DECISION

Criminal Case No. 99-1599

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to
protect and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There
is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or
not that line has been crossed.
The Facts
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations
were filed on September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay City. These were
assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged
petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national
editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House,
Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles
in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25,
1999.1 The four informations read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively
of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 12, 1999,
in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:
SI ATTY. SO NG BOC
"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara
ang totoong laman ng mga container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties at taxes.

Criminal Case No. 99-1598 Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya
ng salapi yung ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig diyan sa
mga buwayang taga BOC.
That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga, ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.
of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY.
Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para
kumita ng mas mabilis.
Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka
korbata at holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!"
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.3
Criminal Case No. 99-1600
That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively
of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 19, 1999,
in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:
xxxx
"Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si
Daniel Aquino ng Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa South Harbor.
Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.
Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.
Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-release ng kanilang kargamento."
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.4
Criminal Case No. 99-1597
That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively
of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS "DING" T. SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on June
25, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:
xxxx
Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng Bureau of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at
ilang opisyales ng Remate sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko
siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC.
Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog
na ang iyong kaluluwa sa impyerno.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.5
On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were arraigned, while Barlizo and Pichay were
arraigned on December 15, 1999. They all pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.
At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that during the four dates of the publication of
the questioned articles, the complaining witness was not assigned at South Harbor; (2) that the accused
and complaining witness did not know each other during all the time material to the four dates of
publication; (3) that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the Philippines; (4) the
existence and genuineness of the Remate newspaper; (5) the column therein and its authorship and the
alleged libelous statement as well as the editorial post containing the designated positions of the other
accused; and (6) the prosecution’s qualified admission that it is the duty of media persons to expose
corruption.6
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M. Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys
Fontanilla, and complainant Atty. So. The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well.
Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo, and that the articles were untrue
because he had known Atty. So since 1992 and had worked with him in the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service Division of the Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading the
articles written by Tulfo, he concluded that they referred to Atty. So because the subject articles
identified "Atty. Carlos" as "Atty. ‘Ding’ So" of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service
Division, Bureau of Customs and there was only one Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs.7
Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified that she issued a certification in
connection with these cases upon the request of Atty. So.8 This certification stated that as per records
available in her office, there was only one employee by the name of "Atty. Carlos T. So" who was also
known as "Atty. Ding So" in the Intelligence Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service or in the entire Bureau of Customs. 9
Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer,
and that having read the articles of Tulfo, he believed that these were untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos
"Ding" So.10
Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these consolidated cases. He further testified
that he is also known as Atty. "Ding" So, that he had been connected with the Bureau of Customs since
October 1981, and that he was assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service Division at the Manila International Container Port since December 27, 1999. He
executed two complaint-affidavits, one dated June 4, 1999 and the other dated July 5, 1999, for
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600. Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases of libel against Raffy Tulfo,
brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He testified that petitioner Tulfo’s act of imputing upon him criminality,
assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor, discredit, and contempt among his co-
members in the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, co-members and
peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and employees and superior officers in the Bureau of
Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said articles. He said it also caused him and his
family sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and embarrassment. He further
testified that he included in his complaint for libel the officers of Remate such as the publisher,
managing editor, city editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), they are equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the
articles. He also testified that "Ding" is his nickname and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau
of Customs who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty. Carlos "Ding" So. 11
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he
neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a
certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by
the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people
to use other people’s names to advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had
neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of
Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So
before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had
several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.12
Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos "Ding" So when the latter filed a case
against them. He testified that he is an employee of Carlo Publishing House, Inc.; that he was
designated as the national editor of the newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of the
position are to edit, evaluate, encode, and supervise layout of the news from the provinces; and that
Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey Briones, Vice President for Editorial and Head of the Editorial
Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation in the subject articles of Tulfo, nor had he
anything to do with the latter’s column.13
Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies the news articles written by
the reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia
Bueno, as news and city editor; and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her
subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the page
assigned to her, the Metro page. She further testified that she had no participation in the writing, editing,
or publication of the column of Tulfo because the column was not edited. She claimed that none among
her co-accused from the Remate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the publication and
editing of the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given blanket authority to
write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page wherein Tulfo’s column appeared was
supervised by Bueno as news editor.14
Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. since
December 1998. He testified that the company practice was to have the columnists report directly to the
vice-president of editorials, that the columnists were given autonomy on their columns, and that the
vice-president for editorials is the one who would decide what articles are to be published and what are
not. He further testified that Tulfo was already a regular contributor.15
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN
BARLIZO and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL,
as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from P200.00 Pesos to P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under
Article 355 of the same Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences EACH of the accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum, for EACH count with accessory penalties provided by
law.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay
wrote and published the four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard, being, in the mind of the
Court, of whether it was false or not, the said articles libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual
damages, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an additional
amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages, all
with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.16
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the following errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE
APPELLANT THAT HE DID NOT CRITICIZE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WORKING AT THE
NAIA. HE CRITICIZED ANOTHER PERSON WORKING AT THE SOUTH HARBOR. HENCE, THE
ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IS LACKING.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
DISCREDIT OR DISHONOR, AS DEFINED BY JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO. 17
His co-accused assigned the following errors:
A. The trial court seriously erred in holding accused Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo
and Philip Pichay liable for the defamations contained in the questioned articles despite the
fact that the trial court did not have any finding as to their participation in the writing, editing
and/or publication of the questioned articles.
 B. The trial court seriously erred in concluding that libel was committed by all of the accused on
the basis of its finding that the elements of libel have been satisfactorily established by
evidence on record.
C. The trial court seriously erred in considering complainant to be the one referred to by Erwin
Tulfo in his articles in question.18
In a Decision19 dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration dated June 30, 2003 was filed by Tulfo,
while the rest of his co-accused filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution
dated December 11, 2003, both motions were denied for lack of merit.20
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032, seeking to reverse the Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and
Pichay brought a similar petition docketed as G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the same CA
decision.
In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were consolidated since both cases arise from the
same set of facts, involve the same parties, assail the same decision of the CA, and seek identical
reliefs.21
Assignment of Errors
Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible and relevant evidence, the Honorable CA erred in not
declaring the assailed articles as privileged; the CA erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the
court’s having incorrectly reasoned out that malice was presumed in the instant case.
II
Even assuming arguendo that the articles complained of are not privileged, the lower court,
nonetheless, committed gross error as defined by the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 45 by its
misappreciation of the evidence presented on matters substantial and material to the guilt or innocence
of the petitioner.22
Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted their own assignment of errors, as follows:
A - The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its Application of Article 360 Of The Revised Penal Code By
Holding Cambri, Salao And Barlizo Liable For The Defamatory Articles In The May 11, 12, 19 And June
25, 1999 Issues Of Remate Simply Because They Were Managing Editor, National Editor And City
Editor Respectively Of Remate And By Holding Pichay Also Liable For Libel Merely Because He Was
The President Of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. Without Taking Into Account The Unrebutted Evidence
That Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In
Question.
B - The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion In Manifestly Disregarding The
Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The
Defamatory Articles In Question.
C - The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated The Evidence In Holding That The Person Referred
To In The Published Articles Was Private Complainant Atty. Carlos So.23
Our Ruling
The petitions must be dismissed.
The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be discussed first.
In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals. 24 In
essence, he argues that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged communication" under
Borjal and that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the
burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.
This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being that Borjal stemmed from a
civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal case. Second, the ruling in Borjal was
that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant, which shall be differentiated from the
present case in discussing the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in Borjal was a
private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal
that the articles written by Art Borjal were "fair commentaries on matters of public interest." 25 It shall be
discussed and has yet to be determined whether or not the articles fall under the category of "fair
commentaries."
In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfo’s articles being qualifiedly privileged
communication is raised for the first time in the present petition, and this particular issue was never
brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus, neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly
consider and evaluate this defense. Tulfo now draws parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal,
and argues that the prosecution should have proved malice in fact, and it was error on the part of the
trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in law in Art. 354 of the RPC. This lays an
unusual burden on the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to refute a defense that Tulfo had
never raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are privileged communications must first
be established by the defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the CA. Even so, it shall
be dealt with now, considering that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review.
There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau of
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) at the
time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-on at
the Bureau of Customs, a government agency, are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of
establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged communication or are
defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be liable.
Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to
commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom
of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed
that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that right. The
recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.
The Journalist’s Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows
that the press recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this
freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists "recognize the duty
to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly." Art. VIII states that journalists
"shall presume persons accused of crime of being innocent until proven otherwise."
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalist’s Code of Ethics and exercised
his journalistic freedom responsibly.
In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in
criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than that,
and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw sa miyembro nito."26 He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged
corrupt activities.27 And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article,
challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-
expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."28
In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known
him prior to the publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-
depth research of his allegations before he published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau
of Customs.
In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for
personal gain, and even stated that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued then that it
may have been someone else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and
this person was the target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for even with the
knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used
Atty. So’s name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or
even to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.
The trial court found Tulfo’s accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of
contents of articles does not affect their privileged character. It may be that the falsity of the articles
does not prove malice. Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications.
It cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered by the mantle of
qualified privileged communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized further:
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone
does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free
expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to
account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.
There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them
much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our
democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held –
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by
one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps
within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements,
rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by
protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrinerequires that
liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of
"actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with good
faith and reasonable care." This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles.
This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to
verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of
error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or
injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover
total abandonment of responsibility.
Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances
given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of
qualified privileged communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense
in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters of public interest." While Borjal places fair
commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of
the article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from
liability. Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial
court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the
information before publishing his articles.
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of Customs and
relied only on this source for his columns, but did no further research on his story. The records of the
case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfo’s
articles related no specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public
official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as
being privileged simply because the target was a public official. Although wider latitude is given to
defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of
official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public interest involving them, such
defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech.31 Journalists still bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even
when writing about public figures or matters of public interest. As held in In Re: Emil P. Jurado:
Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the
truth; or that a newsman may ecape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against
a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of
such imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. It outrages all notions
of fair play and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists’ Code of
Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his profession to influence popular belief and shape
public opinion, to make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional honor
and repute, and when called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would
compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of those sources. 32
The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his allegations against Atty. So, only citing
his one unnamed source. It is not demanded of him that he name his source. The confidentiality of
sources and their importance to journalists are accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are
journalists making no efforts to verify the information given by a source, and using that unverified
information to throw wild accusations and besmirch the name of possibly an innocent person.
Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at least investigate their stories
before publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof. The rumors and gossips spread by
unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers or novelists who may just spin tales out
of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must be some foundation to their reports;
these reports must be warranted by facts.
Jurado also established that the journalist should exercise some degree of care even when writing
about public officials. The case stated:
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for
that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be
accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two
legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of
speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to
exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the
reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any
bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of
balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the
pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the
Philippines.33
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged
communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the
presumption of malice "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements which must be
present in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can be
dissected as follows:
In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the
following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks. 34
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no
details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless accusations,
backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or
even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of the
subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion and the legal profession. As none of the
elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfo’s articles, it cannot thus be
argued that they are qualified privileged communications under the RPC.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true," Tulfo’s articles do not meet
the standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and honesty."35 "True" is defined as
"conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest."36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these
requirements, as he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that
these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports," but merely wild
accusations.
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged
communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the
presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon the
prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should
have been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject articles.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 37 and reiterated in Flor v.
People, which should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made with actual malice,
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 38
The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with reckless
disregard of whether the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There was the finding
that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he based his writings, and that the defense presented
no evidence to show that the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because
he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was no malice attendant in his articles. The test
laid down is the "reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to meet that test.
The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered as
further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo,39 wherein publication after the commencement
of an action was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent
nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is
a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.
Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication, Tulfo also argues that the lower court
misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity of the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty.
"Ding" So, an official of the Bureau of Customs who worked at the South Harbor, whereas the
complainant was Atty. Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of
doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in the articles.
This argument is patently without merit.
The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other witnesses who identified Atty. So from
Tulfo’s articles. There is the certification that there is only one Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. And
most damning to Tulfo’s case is the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel suit against
him by Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. In this article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So,
stating that the libel case was due to the exposés Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by
Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. This last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was
in fact the target of his attacks. He cannot now point to a putative "Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or
someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real subject of his attacks, when he did not investigate
the existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor investigate the alleged corrupt acts of
Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So
referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points to one Atty. So, the complainant in the present
case.
Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged communication and the matter of the identity of the
person referred to in the subject articles, there remains the petition of the editors and president of
Remate, the paper on which the subject articles appeared.
In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they had no participation in the
editing or writing of the subject articles, and are thus not liable.
The argument must fail.
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from liability. The provision in the RPC
does not provide absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the
responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of
whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply
so states that they are liable as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper
by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they
themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the
president in the publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist,
the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their
responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge
and control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner
for the publication therein of a libelous article.40 On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager
to know and control the contents of the paper, 41 it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility
by abandoning the duties to employees,42 so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager
knew the contents of the publication.43 In Fermin v. People of the Philippines,44 the Court held that the
publisher could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of
a libelous article. The Court cited U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the persons
enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC criminally liable, and it is worth reiterating:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication
containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his
cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the
publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its
publication are liable as publishers.
xxxx
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of
the responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper was discussed. The court said, among
other things (pp. 782, 783):
"The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal
responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous article was published without his knowledge or
consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to
charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.
"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held prima facie criminally for
whatever appears in his paper; and it should be no defense that the publication was made without his
knowledge or consent, x x x.
"One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its
management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be
published what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually
concerned in the publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in
the course of his employment necessarily implies some degree of guilt or delinquency on the part of the
publisher; x x x.
"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in the newspaper without the
knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such
proprietor or manager."
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the
court held that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is
prima facie presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to
prove that he never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it was pointed out to him and
that an apology and retraction were afterwards published in the same paper, gave him no ground for
exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
"It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the publication of improper
communications, to use reasonable caution in the conduct of his business that no libels be published."
(Wharton’s Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishop’s Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs.
Wilson, 64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter
(3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was "clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was
answerable criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the
management of the paper."
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:
"An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a papers, although he did not know of its being
put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as he discovered it."
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that –
"A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both
civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in publishing it."45
Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so
too must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.
Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the punishment must still be tempered with
justice. Petitioners are to be punished for libel for the first time. They did not apply for probation to avoid
service of sentence possibly in the belief that they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v.
People,46 the Court, in a criminal case for libel, removed the penalty of imprisonment and instead
imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, 47 the accused was merely fined in lieu of the
original penalty of imprisonment and fine. Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press may
not be unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too harshly. In light of this, considering the necessity
of a free press balanced with the necessity of a responsible press, the penalty of a fine of PhP 6,000 for
each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, should suffice. 48 Lastly, the
responsibilities of the members of the press notwithstanding, the difficulties and hazards they encounter
in their line of work must also be taken into consideration.
The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides,
"Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages." There was no showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant
Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be measured, the award of actual damages cannot stand.
In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards actual and moral damages:
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he
has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be
presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of
exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,
the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that
(1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of
the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A causal relation, in fine, must
exist between the act or omission referred to in the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or
proceeding on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e. the first must be the
proximate cause and the latter the direct consequence thereof.49
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty. So deserves the award of
moral damages. Justification for the award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code,
which states that moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of
defamation. As the cases involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within the ambit of Art.
2219(7).
Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. The fact that
no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect the
offended party’s right to recover moral damages. 50
And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to state at this juncture that Tulfo’s
libelous articles are abhorrent not only because of its vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself,
but also because of their impact on members of his family, especially on the children and possibly even
the children’s children.
The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense of kinship runs deeply in a typical Filipino
family, such that the whole family usually suffers or rejoices at the misfortune or good fortune, as the
case may be, of any of its member. Accordingly, any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name and
reputation of the head of the family, as here, invariably puts the other members in a state of disrepute,
distress, or anxiety. This reality adds an imperative dimension to the award of moral damages to the
defamed party.
The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, "In
criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party." No aggravating circumstances accompanied the
commission of the libelous acts; thus, no exemplary damages can be awarded.
Conclusion
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176 are DISMISSED.
The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine
of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, while the award of actual damages and exemplary damages is DELETED. The Decision
dated November 17, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 112 in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-
1600 is modified to read as follows:

The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach and the information it imparts, it can WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN
mold and shape thoughts and opinions of the people. It can turn the tide of public opinion for or against BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL,
someone, it can build up heroes or create villains. as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the accused to pay a fine
of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 6,000) per count of libel with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of
insolvency.
It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal discussion and dissemination of ideas,
and to encourage people to engage in healthy debate. It is through this that society can progress and
develop. Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay
wrote and published the four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard whether it was false or not,
the said articles being libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay complainant Atty. Carlos T. So,
Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press must also acknowledge the corollary jointly and severally, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP 1,000,000) as moral damages. The claim
duty to publish responsibly. To show that they have exercised their freedom responsibly, they must go of actual and exemplary damages is denied for lack of merit.
beyond merely relying on unfounded rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further
investigation conducted, some shred of proof found to support allegations of misconduct or even
criminal activity. It is in fact too easy for journalists to destroy the reputation and honor of public officials, Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
if they are not required to make the slightest effort to verify their accusations. Journalists are supposed
to be reporters of facts, not fiction, and must be able to back up their stories with solid research. The
power of the press and the corresponding duty to exercise that power judiciously cannot be
understated.

But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not mean that it be totally
unfettered. It is still acknowledged that the freedom can be abused, and for the abuse of the freedom,
there must be a corresponding sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly.
It may be a cliché that the pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson to be
learned is that such a mighty weapon should not be wielded recklessly or thoughtlessly, but always
guided by conscience and careful thought.

A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective checks on government
power and abuses. Hence, it behooves government functionaries to respect the value of openness and
refrain from concealing from media corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within their
backyard. On the other hand, public officials also deserve respect and protection against false
innuendoes and unfounded accusation of official wrongdoing from an abusive press. As it were, the law
and jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of press freedom. The common but most unkind
perception is that government institutions and their officers and employees are fair game to official and
personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice on the ground is just as disconcerting. Reports and
accusation of official misconduct often times merit front page or primetime treatment, while defenses set
up, retraction issued, or acquittal rendered get no more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The unfairness
needs no belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not enough.

Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government impasse is the fact that a maliciously
false imputation of corruption and dishonesty against a public official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing
mark not only on the person but also the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public
service also unduly suffers.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
February 13, 2017
G.R. No. 211120
MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated April 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 2, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, convicting
petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of the crime of libel.
On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, 3 filed a criminal
complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of San Pablo City, which was docketed as LS. No. 04-312 and assigned to then Assistant City
Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the submission of the
parties' and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted for resolution.
In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory
hearing. Without acting on the request, ACP Sufiega-Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a
Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify), 4 the contents of which later became the subject of this libel
case.
Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of Justice,
Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed envelope and addressed to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received by its Receiving Section on August 27, 2004. As a
matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are first received and recorded at the receiving
section, then forwarded to the records section before referral to the City Prosecutor for assignment to
the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen, the son
of Nezer who is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also informed about the motion by
Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. She then asked the receiving section for a
copy of the said motion, and requested a photocopy of it for her own reference.
On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for libel on
the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). The complaint
was docketed as LS. No. 04-931 before the OCP of San Pablo City.
Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo City voluntarily
inhibited itself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its
records to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an Order designating State Prosecutor II
Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the investigation of the libel complaint.
On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable cause to file a
libel case against petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an Information charging petitioner with the
crime of libel, committed as follows:
That on or about August 31, 2004, in the City of San Pablo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, a member of the Philippine Bar with Attorney Roll No. 32322, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching, defaming
and attacking the honesty, competence, integrity, virtue and reputation of Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman
as an Assistant City Prosecutor of the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and for the further
purpose of dishonoring, injuring, defaming and exposing said Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman to public
hatred, contempt, insult, calumny and ridicule, wrote, correspond, published and filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City an undated "OMNIBUS MOTION (FOR RECONSIDERATION &
DISQUALIFY) in the case entitled "MEDEL B. BELEN, Complainant vs. NEZER D. BELEN SR.,
Respondent, "for Estafa docketed as I.S. No. 04-312, the pertinent and relevant portions are quoted
hereunder, to wit:
In the instant case, however, the Investigating Fiscal was not impartial and exhibited manifest bias
for 20,000 reasons. The reasons were not legal or factual. These reasons were based on her
malicious and convoluted perceptions. If she was partial, then she is stupid. The Investigating
Fiscal's stupidity was clearly manifest in her moronic resolution to dismiss the complaint because
she reasoned out that: (1) the lease started in 1983 as the number 9 was handwritten over the figure "8"
in the lease contract; (2) no support for accounting was made for the first five (5) years; and (3) the
dismissal of IS No. 03-14-12 covered the same subject matter in the instant case. Thus, the instant
complaint should be dismissed.
Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumption were tarnished with silver ingots.
She is also an intellectually infirm or stupidly blind. Because it was just a matter of a more studious
and logical appraisal and examination of the documents and affidavits submitted by respondent's
witnesses to establish that the lease started in 1993. All respondent's supporting affidavits of Mrs.
Leyna Belen-Ang; Mr. Demetrio D. Belen and Mr. Silvestre D. Belen (all admitted that the lease started
in 1993). Secondly, had she not always been absent in the preliminary investigation hearings and
conducted a clarificatory questioning as requested by herein complainant, as her secretary was the only
one always present and accepted the exhibits and affidavits, there would have been a clear deliverance
from her corrupted imagination. Firstly, complainant was married to his wife on August 15, 1987. Thus, it
would be physically and chronologically inconceivable that the lease for the subject lanzones be entered
by complainant and his wife, whom he met only in 1987, with respondent and his siblings in 1983.
Secondly, the payments were made in 1993 and 1994, these were admitted by respondent's witnesses
in their affidavits. Thus, it would be a height of stupidity for respondent and his witnesses to allow
complainant to take possession and harvest the lanzones from 1983 to 2002 without any payment.
Lastly, the only defense raised in the respondents witnesses' affidavits was the lease period was only
from 1993 to 1998. Thus, this is a clear admission that the lease started in 1993. Despite all these
matters and documents, the moronic resolution insisted that the lease started in 1983. For all the
20,000 reasons of the Investigating Fiscal, the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and
convoluted frame of mind - a manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity in her resolution.
Furthermore, Investigating Fiscal 's 2nd corrupted reason was the failure of complainant to render an
accounting on the 5-year harvest from 1993 to 1998. Sadly, the Investigating Fiscal was manifestly
prejudiced and manifestly selective in her rationale. Firstly, the issue of non-presentation of accounting
for the first 5 years was not raised in any of the witnesses' affidavits. A careful perusal of all their
affidavits clearly shows that the issue of accounting for the first 5-year (1993-1999) harvest was never a
defense because respondent and his witnesses knew and were informed that the lanzones harvest from
1993 to 1999 was less than 200,000. Secondly, during the respondent's 2002 visit from USA in a
meeting at the house of Mrs. Leyna Belen Agra, complainant advised respondent of this matter and
respondent acknowledged the fact that the 5-year harvest from 1993 to 1998 was abundantly
inadequate to pay the principal sum of 300,000. Thirdly, all the numbers and figures in the Lease
Contract indicated 1993 and/or 1994 - a clear indicia that the transaction covered by the instrument
started in 1993. Fourthly, the correction was made by respondent or one of his siblings, which can
easily be shown by the penmanship. Lastly, the letters of complainant to respondent clearly advised of
the non-payment of the principal and interest for the 1st 5-year. For this reason, complainant had
repeatedly agreed to the request of respondent's wife, Lourdes B. Belen and younger son, Nezer Belen,
Jr. in 2003 for meetings for resolution of the matter. But respondent's wife and younger son repeatedly
cancelled these meetings. All these factual circumstances are undeniable but were presented because
the issue of accounting was never raised.
Lastly, the invocation of the dismissal of I.S. No. 03-1412 was a nail in the coffin for the idiocy
and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal. It was her fallacious rationale that because No. 03-14-12
covered the same subject, the instant case should also be dismissed. Unfortunately, she showed her
glaring ignorance of the law. Firstly, there is no res judicata in a preliminary reinvestigation. Secondly,
the dismissal of a complaint shall not bar filing of another complaint because upon completion of the
necessary documentary exhibits and affidavits to establish probable cause another case could be filed.
Thirdly, the cause of action in the instant case is totally different vis-a-vis that in I.S. No. 03-1412.
Fourthly, the complainant is filing the instant case in his own personal capacity as "lessee" over the
entire property from 1993 to 2013. In other words, the Investigating Fiscal's invocation of the
dismissal of I.S. No. 03-1412 was clearly imbecilic and idiotic.
All these matters could have been easily established. All the idiotic and corrupted reason of the
Investigating Fiscal manifestly exposed, had the Investigating Fiscal exercised the cold partiality of a
judge and calendared the instant case for clarificatory questions. In fact, she deliberately ignored
complainant's request for, such setting despite the established doctrine in preliminary investigation that
the "propounding of clarificatory questions is an important component of preliminary investigation, more
so where it is requested in order to shed light on the affidavits >>>" (Mondia v. Deputy
OmbudsmanNisayas Are, 346 SCRA 365) Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal, despite the letter-
request for clarificatory question to shed lights of all the transaction and facts under
investigation, chose to be guided by her manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity. As a
reminder to the Investigating Fiscal, Justice Oscar Herrera, Sr., in his treatise, I Remedial Law 2000 ed.,
succinctly explained the underlying principle of fair play and justice in the just determination of every
action and proceedings is that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid
the Courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of cases before the court.
In totality, the dismissal of the instant case was based on reasons that were never raised by the
respondent. Reasons dictate and due process of law mandates that complainant be afforded
opportunity to rebut issues raised. In the instant case, manifestly established is the corrupted penchant
of the Investigating Fiscal to assume matters and presume issues not raised and decide, without
affording complainant the due process, matters totally extraneous and not raised. Thus, contrary to the
due process requirement of law, the Investigating Fiscal rendered a resolution on a matter not raised.
The question, therefore, is her reason in adjudicating without affording complainant the opportunity of
rebuttal, a matter not raised. She never ever asked these questions. She deliberately and fraudulently
concealed her biased reasoning to prevent complainant to rebut this matter. She sideswiped
complainant on matters not raised in the pleading. She was a partial and interested investigator with
clear intent to dismiss the case. This is an implied lawyering for the respondent. Thus, she should
resign from the prosecutorial arm of the government and be a defense counsel. Then her
infirmed intellectual prowess and stupid assumptions be exposed in trial on the merits under
which complainant is afforded the due process requirement of the law. At that stage of trial, she
would be exposed as a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty.
It is a sad day for a colleague in the practice of law to call for a disqualification of an Investigating Fiscal.
The circumstances of the instant case, leave no recourse for complainant but the option, in his quest for
justice and fair play and not for corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons, to strongly ask for the
disqualification of Fiscal Suñega-Lagman in the resolution of the instant motion.
In the resolution for this motion for reconsideration, the sole issue is whether based on the affidavits and
evidence adduced by the complainant probable cause exist to file a case against respondent. The
answer is YES because, all law students and lawyers, except Fiscal Suñega-Lagman, know">>> the
preliminary investigation should determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. (Webb vs. Visconde, August 23, 1995, 63 SCAD 916, 247 SCRA 652) And if the
evidence so warrants, the investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the corresponding information.
(Meralco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115835, July 5, 1996, 71 SCAD 712, 258 SCRA 280). Thus,
preliminary investigation is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. A probable
cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner ... "
That the article in question had for its object to appear and made it understood, as was in effect
understood and interpreted by the public or person/s who read it, that Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman is
an inept, ignorant, dishonest, corrupt, undeserving, unjust, unfair and incompetent prosecutor of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court entered a plea of "NOT
GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1)
complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son and representative of respondent Nezer
in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores and Gayne Garno Enseo, who are part of the
administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. For its part, the defense presented the accused
petitioner as its sole witness.
After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₱3,000.00, with
no pronouncement as to damages on account of ACP Suñega-Lagman's reservation to file an
independent civil action against him.
The trial court stressed that the following allegations and utterances against ACP Suñega-Lagman in
petitioner's Omnibus Motion are far detached from the controversy in the estafa case, thereby losing its
character as absolutely privileged communication: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the
Investigating Fiscal 's wrongful assumptions were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt
shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5)
"moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7) "manifest partiality and stupendous
stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack bereft of
any intellectual ability and mental honesty." On the element of publication, the trial court noted that the
Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to ACP Suñega-Lagman, but passed through and exposed to be
read by third persons, namely: prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo who are the staff in the
receiving section of the OCP of San Pablo City, as well as Michael Belen, the son and representative of
Nezer in the estafa case.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed
out that the defamatory matter was made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses Flores
and Enseo, who are the staff in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the Omnibus Motion filed
by petitioner, as well as Michael, son and representative of Nezer in the estafa case then being
investigated by ACP Suñega-Lagman, was furnished copy of the motion. Anent the applicability of the
rule on absolutely privileged communication, the CA ruled in the negative because the subject
statements were unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the estafa case filed
by petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on the personality,
reputation and mental fitness of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela stated that petitioner could not be
convicted of libel because the statements in his Omnibus Motion, while couched in intemperate, acrid
and uncalled-for language, are relevant to the dismissal of his estafa case, and thus falls under the
concept of absolutely privileged communication. She also said that the element of publication is absent,
because with respect to Nezer, Michael is not a "third person," i.e., a person other than the person to
whom the defamatory statement refers, but a "representative of his father." She added that while Flores
and Enseo, who are staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, had read the Omnibus Motion, they are not
"third persons" since they had a legal duty to perform with respect to the said motion filed in their office.
In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
In seeking his acquittal of the crime charged, petitioner argues that the CA erred (1) in finding him guilty
of libel despite the absence of the element of publication; (2) in ruling that the privileged communication
rule is inapplicable; and (3) in relying on the opinion of ordinary witnesses to show the presence of
malicious imputations.6
The petition lacks merit.
On the absence of the element of publication, petitioner contends that in serving and filing the Omnibus
Motion enclosed in sealed envelopes, he did not intend to expose it to third persons, but only complied
with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done. He asserts that the perusal of the
said motion by Michael, the duly authorized representative and son of the respondent in the estafa
case, as well as the two staff of the OCP - Flores and Enseo - did not constitute publication within the
meaning of the law on libel because they cannot be considered as "third persons to whom copies of the
motion were disseminated." With respect to Flores and Enseo, petitioner insists that they were both
legal recipients as personnel in the OCP where the motion was addressed and had to be filed. Stating
that the absence of publication negates malice, petitioner posits that he could not have intended to
injure the reputation of ACP Suñega-Lagman with the filing of the Omnibus Motion since it was never
published, but was sent to its legal recipients.
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone
other than the person to whom it has been written.7 A communication of the defamatory matter to the
person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem, for a man's
reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. 8 In the
same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes
sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by
person other than the offended party.9 If a sender of a libelous communication knows or has good
reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient
publication.10 The publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the
immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is
hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons. 11
In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but only complied with
the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded that the defamatory
statements in it were made known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written.
Despite the fact that the motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that
persons other than the one defamed would be able to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely
because they were filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in
the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in Manila. Then being a lawyer,
petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere private communication, but forms part of public
record when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequence of his act,12 petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the
filing and service of his Omnibus Motion. As aptly noted by the trial court:
x x x The Omnibus Motion although contained in a sealed envelope was addressed to the Office of the
City Prosecutor, San Pablo City.1âwphi1 As such, the accused fully well knows that the sealed
envelope will be opened at the receiving section, and will be first read by the staff of the Office before
the private complainant gets hold of a copy thereof. In fine, the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to
the private complainant - the person [to] whom it is written, but passed through other persons in the
Office of the City Prosecutor. At the time the accused mailed the sealed envelope containing the
Omnibus Motion addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, he knew that there exists not only a
reasonable but strong probability that it will be exposed to be read or seen by third persons. 13
It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not
satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. 14 In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the Omnibus Motion was furnished to
and read by Michael, the son and representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is
clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San
Pablo City, who had read the contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled
rule that "when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to
another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of
the communication, such communication does not amount to publication." 15 Petitioner's argument is
untenable. As mere members of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and
Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of his motion, which is
to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Suñega-Lagman
from the preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of
transmitting the motions filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
Petitioner also avers that the alleged defamatory statements in his Omnibus Motion passed the test of
relevancy, hence, covered by the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication. He asserts that the
statements contained in his motion are relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry, as they were
used only to highlight and emphasize the manifestly reversible errors and irregularities that attended the
resolution rendered by ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade.
A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad
faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or
motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by
the witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said proceedings, provided that
said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive to the
questions propounded to said witnesses.16
The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not only
because said pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also to
the undeniable fact said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal
in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for proper administration
of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain
allegations substantially true because they can be supported by evidence in good faith, the contents of
which would be under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and
illegal statements contained therein.17 In fine, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice.18
While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of absolutely privileged
communication extends to statements in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to
trial, the Court found as persuasive in this jurisdiction the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas19 which
categorically declared the existence of such protection:
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual
participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official
nature have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to
prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the
prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved false and unfounded. Furthermore, the
information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is
protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation. 20
The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice, if the
same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry. 21 Sarcastic,
pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that should
characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues. 22 As to
the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the alleged defamatory matter privileged, the
courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy and impropriety.23 In order that a matter alleged in the pleading may be privileged, it need
not, in any case, be material to the issue presented by the pleadings; however, it must be legitimately
related thereto or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry
in the course of the trial.24 What is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer,
and the words are not be scrutinized with microscopic intensity,25 as it would defeat the protection which
the law throws over privileged communication. 26
The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of San Pablo City as a remedy for
the dismissal of his estafa complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy.
An examination of the motion shows that the following defamatory words and phrases used, even if
liberally construed, are hardly 'material or pertinent to his cause, which is to seek a reconsideration of
the dismissal of his estafa complaint and the disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further acting
on the case: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful
assumptions were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and
convoluted frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5) "moronic
resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7) "manifest partiality and stupendous
stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack
bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty." These statements are neither relevant
grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid and justifiable reasons for disqualification. These
diatribes pertain to ACP Suñega-Lagman's honor, reputation, mental and moral character, and are no
longer related to the discharge of her official function as a prosecutor. They are devoid of any relation to
the subject matter of petitioner's Omnibus Motion that no reasonable man can doubt their irrelevancy,
and may not become the subject of inquiry in the course of resolving the motion. As fittingly ruled by the
trial court:
This Court has no problem with legitimate criticisms of the procedures taken during the preliminary
investigation and accused's comments pointing out flaws in the ruling of the private complainant. They
should ever be constructive and should pave the way at correcting the supposed errors in the
Resolution and/or convincing the private complainant to inhibit, as she did, from the case. Unfortunately,
the Omnibus Motion, or the questioned allegations contained therein, are not of this genre. On the
contrary, the accused has crossed the lines as his statements are baseless, scurrilous attacks on the
person of the .private complainant. The attacks did nothing but damage the integrity and reputation of
the private complainant. In fact, the attacks undermined in no small measure the faith and confidence of
the litigants in the prosecutorial service.27
Petitioner should bear in mind the rule that the pleadings should contain but the plain and concise
statements of material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. If the pleader goes
beyond the requirements of the statute, and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.28 The reason for this is that without the requirement of relevancy, pleadings could be easily
diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform the court of the issues in litigation and pervaded into
a vehicle for airing charges motivated by a personal rancor.29 Granted that lawyers are given great
latitude or pertinent comment in furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their
clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language, 30 petitioner would do well to recall that the
Code of Professional Responsibility31 ordains that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. After all, a lawyer should conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, 32 and use only such temperate
but strong language in his pleadings or arguments befitting an advocate.
There is also no merit in petitioner's theory that the test of relevancy should be liberally construed in his
favor, especially because "in the information for libel, there was no allegation of irrelevancy or
impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause"33 or the subject of the inquiry, the estafa
complaint in I.S. No. 04-312. It bears emphasis that while the relevancy of the statement is a requisite of
the defense of absolutely privileged communication, it is not one of the elements of libel. Thus, the
absence of an allegation to the effect that the questioned statement is irrelevant or impertinent does not
violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.·As
the party raising such defense, petitioner has the burden of proving that his statements are relevant to
the subject of his Omnibus Motion. For its part, the prosecution only has to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of all the elements of libel as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition status
or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or
juridical person; and (5) tendency to cause the dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed.34
Meanwhile, petitioner's reliance on People v. Andres35 is misplaced. In that case, the prosecution
argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the
judge's conclusion on the face of the information that the defendant was prompted only by good motives
assumes a fact to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant's publication is a
matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the libel complaint. The Court sustained
the trial court in dismissing the libel case on a mere motion to quash in this wise:
While there is some point in this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in
the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading
in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need to wait until trial and
produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned
imputations appear, as they seem, in this case, to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea
for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which
defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's
court, it would become evident that the fact thus alleged in the information would not constitute an
offense of libel.
As has already been said by this Court: "As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make
an alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety." Having this in mind, it
can not be said that the trial court committed reversible error in this case in finding that the allegations in
the information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication justifying the dismissal of
the case. Note that the information does not contain any allegation of irrelevancy and impertinency to
counteract the quotations from the motion for reconsideration in question.36
In stark contrast to People v. Andres, even on the face of the allegations in the information, the
defamatory statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion fail the test of relevancy in order to be considered
an absolutely privileged communication, because they are neither relevant grounds for a motion for
reconsideration nor valid or justifiable reasons for disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Finally, petitioner argues that the reliance of the CA on the statements of ordinary witnesses like
Michael, Flores and Enseo is contrary to Sections 4837 and 5038 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
because they are incompetent to testify on whether the statements against ACP Suñega-Lagman in the
Omnibus Motion constituted malicious imputations against her person.
As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his own personal knowledge39 and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the
facts testified to. Opinion evidence or testimony refers to evidence of what the witness thinks, believes
or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts
themselves.40 In this case, however, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo barely made a
conclusion on the defamatory nature of the statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion, but merely
testified on their own understanding of what they had read.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People,41 the Court stated the twin rule for the purpose of determining the meaning of
any publication alleged to be libelous: (1) that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter
such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would
naturally understand what was uttered; and (2) the published matter alleged to libelous must be
construed as a whole. "In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will
disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The
whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having
been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be from the words used in the publication." 42 As the persons who, aside
from ACP Suñega-Lagman, had also read the Omnibus Motion, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores
and Enseo are competent to testify on their own understanding of the questioned statements, and their
testimonies are relevant to the trial court's determination of the defamatory character of such
statements.
At any rate, even if petitioner's objections to the admissibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses as to their supposed opinions on his statements against ACP Suñega-Lagman were to be
sustained, the trial court still correctly determined the statements to be defamatory based on its own
reading of the plain and ordinary meanings of the words and phrases used in the Omnibus Motion, thus:
Based on the above testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on this Court's own assessment, the
statements above-quoted disturb one's sensibilities. There is evident imputation of the crime of bribery
to the effect that the private complainant may have received money in exchange for the dismissal of the
accused's complaint against his uncle Nezer Belen. There is likewise an imputation against the private
complainant as an "idiot", "imbecile" and with "stupendous stupidity". An "idiot" as defined in Meriam-
Webster Collegiate Thesaurus, 1988 Edition, p. 380, as a "fool", "moron, "stupid", "nincompoop",
"ignoramus", "simpleton", "dummy", or "imbecile". On the other hand, an "imbecile" means "retarded",
"dull" or "feeble minded. "Stupid" means lacking in or exhibiting a lack of power to absorb ideas or
impressions, or dumb. "Stupendous" means marvelous, astounding, monstrous, monumental and
tremendous. Thus, "stupendous stupidity" simply means tremendous or monstrous dumbness. Indeed,
accused's characterization of the private complainant is unkind, to say the least, which should not be
found a pleading written by a lawyer."43
Given the settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from, whether or not they are made the subject of assignment of errors, 44 the Court finds it
proper to modify the penalty of fine of Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) imposed upon petitioner.
Apropos is Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of
Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases,45 where the Supreme Court cited cases46 of
libel, indicating an emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in
such cases under the circumstances therein specified. The Administrative Circular sets down the rule of
preference on the matter of imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following
principles:

1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime of
libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code; 47

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve
the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness
of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle
to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.

The penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00, or both,
in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. The Court finds it appropriate
to increase the fine imposed upon petitioner from Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) to Six Thousand
Pesos (₱6,000.00), considering the following peculiar circumstances of the case: (1) then a practicing
lawyer himself, petitioner ignored the rules that in his professional dealings, a lawyer shall not use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, and should treat other lawyers with
courtesy, fairness and candor; (2) the barrage of defamatory statements in his Omnibus Motion are
utterly irrelevant to his prayers for a reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa case and for the
disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further acting thereon; (3) the baseless and scurrilous
personal attacks in such public document do nothing but damage the integrity and reputation of ACP
Suñega-Lagman, as well as undermine the faith and confidence of litigants in the prosecutorial service;
and (4) the lack of remorse on his part, as shown by his unfounded claim that he filed the Omnibus
Motion· in self-defense to ACP Suñega-Lagman's supposed imputation of falsification against him
without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the Decision
dated April 12, 2013 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32905, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the penalty imposed upon petitioner Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen to Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

SO ORDERED.
TITLE XIV:
Criminal Negligence
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from
the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling
on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the
line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal
before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment
of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged
in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in
S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
 The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his
bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule
125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary
question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death
for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section
21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried
in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to
produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner
sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition
with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which
was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed
that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366
and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods;
if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property
of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties
attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified
penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike
willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability
is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed
through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in
our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all
the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence
obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in
People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by
dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act
after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the
same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case
against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in
1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc,
per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People
v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in
barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court
in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from
the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it.
At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his
prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the
same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People
vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined
causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12,
1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of
double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No.
05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set
aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages
caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found
merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence
arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles
involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted.
The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for
damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash.
On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of
police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in
the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law,
for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the
accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to
prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of
the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on
appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru
reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is
whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime
is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out
of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the
inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of
the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of
the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which
are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed
in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural
rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46);
and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However,
the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either
models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and
property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge
with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned
(and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there
will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the
resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of
the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing
each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article
365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less
serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property
of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for
the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a
quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and
Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make
laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.
It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This
is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy
does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less
grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute
the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted
the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out
of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply
the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article
48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178145 July 7, 2014
REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the determination of the proper
penalty imposable upon the offenders whom they find and declare to be guilty of the offenses charged
or proved. Their correct determination is the essence of due process of law. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand
de Leon while overtaking the latter's jeep in the information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81,
in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz:
That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the motor vehicle he was then driving, with
evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, hit, bump and run over with the said
motor vehicle one Ferdinand de Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have causedthe death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of murder asa consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon. Contrary to law.1
The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:
At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep
along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old son,
as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the
baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving
his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They
had just attendeda worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad,
overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep.
Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo
had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet
while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance
of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo
at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they
went their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in
San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and
alighted therefrom. However, hewas bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and
lostconsciousness. Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie." She identified the fast
moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped on
the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-
up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass.
Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly
alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswipedby the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not
stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his
companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo
proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for two and a half
days and incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱17,800.00 OnSeptember 15, 1999, Ferdinand was
transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and
incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱66,243.25. He likewise spent ₱909.50 for medicines,
₱2,900.00 for scanning, ₱8,000.00 for doctor’s fee and ₱12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers
and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head
trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical
Center. Urbanita, received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial
assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.2
Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the petitioner of
frustrated homicide,3 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused Reynaldo Mariano
GUILTYfor the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 50 thereof and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of three (3)
years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum and is hereby directed to pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of
₱196,043.25 less ₱50,000.00 (already given) as actual damages, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and
the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA promulgated itsassailed decision on June 29, 2006, 5 modifying the felony committed
by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries,
ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIEDand accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano is
found guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty oftwo (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the amount of ₱58,402.75 as actual damages and ₱10,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.6
In this appeal, the petitioner arguesthat his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt,
and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists that he lacked
criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have
appreciated voluntary surrender asa mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of
Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand.
However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that
Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to
note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because
they have a store where he used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have
foreseen the possibilitythat Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go inside the house of his mother
where the store is also located.
xxxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed and
within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact of
speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a
reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her
to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v.
Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not frominstinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury."
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of Ferdinand, he could
have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was no oncoming
vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting
the latter or, at least, minimizing his injuries.7
The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower courts on the
circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged except for the RTC’s conclusion
that malicious intent had attended the commission of the offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by
the Court in this appellate review, for it is a well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Court. 8
"Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of failing to perform such act, taking intoconsideration his employment or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place." 9 To
constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in
the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.10 The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v. People, 11 the petitioner was found guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding
that hehad driven the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney. In Pangonorom v.
People,12 a public utility driver driving his vehicle very fast was held criminally negligent because he had
not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car. In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the
Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in
order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand,
causing the latter’s injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. "The rationale of the law," according to People v.
Medroso, Jr.:13
x x x can be found in the fact thatin quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness,
imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another,
in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application
of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We
may call the mathematical formula provided for inArticle 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of
this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant
case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to
offset them.
Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
seriousphysical injuries.1âwphi1 The error should be avoided because no person should be condemned
tosuffer a penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide for the offense charged or proved. Verily,
anyone judicially declared guiltyof any crime must be duly punished in accordance with the law defining
the crime and prescribing the punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should the
penalty exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the
essence ofdue process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty ofreckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the resulting injuries
had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Codestipulates that had the act
been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccionalin its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would have
constituted a light felony, arresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of
the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or a
penalty that in any of its periods is afflictivein accordance with Article 25 of theRevised Penal Code; a
less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty that is correctionalin its maximum period
in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the
commission of which a penalty of either arresto menoror a fine not exceeding ₱200.00, or both is
provided.
In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Codeenumerates the principal afflictive penaltiesto be reclusion
perpetua, reclusion temporal, andprision mayor; the principal correctional penaltiesto beprision
correccional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto menorand
fine not exceeding ₱200.00. Under this provision, death stands alone as the capital punishment.
The Revised Penal Codeclassifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity ofthe
physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be
guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured
person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence
ofthe physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the
power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall
have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in
which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, orshall have lost
any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or
incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of
more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccionalin its minimum
period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of
the injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with
attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision
number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods; the
case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision correccionalin its maximum period to prision mayorin
its minimum period; the case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccionalin its minimum
and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical
injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.
In its decision,14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the
inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severehead trauma; that he
had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record that he had
testified at the trial thathe was unable to attend to his general merchandise store for three months due
to temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until
October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did not fall under
Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner’s act as a grave felony
had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayorin its maximum period
to prision correccionalin its medium period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that caused the serious physical
injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felonyunder Article 25 of the Revised Penal
Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for having
incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged in for more
than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto mayorin its
minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Codeare not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering further
that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate
Sentence Lawinapplicable,15 the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto
mayorwas the correct penalty for the petitioner.
The Court agrees with the CA’s modification of the award of actual and moral damages amounting to
₱58,402.75 and ₱10,000.00, respectively.
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty. This is because the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages,
there must be competent proof of the actual loss suffered, which should be based on the amounts
actually expended by the victim,16 or other competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the
Prosecution proved the expenses actually incurred amounting to₱108,402.75, but such aggregate was
reduced by the victim’s earlier receipt of ₱50,000.00 from the petitioner in the form of financial
assistance. Hence, the victim should recover only the unpaid portion of ₱58,402.75.
Moral damages are given to ease the victim's grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably
approximate the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.17 Accordingly, the CA
properly reduced to ₱10,000.00 the moral damages awarded to Ferdinand. In addition, we impose an
interest of 6% per annum on the actual and moral damages reckoned from the finality of this decision
until the full payment of the obligation. This is because the damages thus fixed thereby become a
forbearance. The rate of 6% per annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013, issued by the
Office of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames.18 WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 29,
2006, subject to the modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight
penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual and moral damages shall earn 6%
interest rate per annum commencing from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 18, 2009 and the
Resolution3 dated January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, which
affirmed the Decision4 dated July 31, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon,
Branch 10 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9832-99, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga (Rogelio) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his
motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc 5 of the same municipality, to
bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito6 (Cherry), to
school.7 While they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right
side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the
same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land
Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. 8 In order to avoid collision, Dionesio,
Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and
collided head-on with the motorcycle.9
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr.
was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser,10 while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of
the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, 11 causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf,
Cherry,12 and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle,
stopped to help and placed the victims together13 on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy.
Bocboc,14 while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.15
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2) sisters to cater to the
victims.16 Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened
his store, and informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and
getting his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolf’s
assistance.17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia Inguito
(Clemencia), of what had transpired.18 Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital
of Maramag where they were treated.19 Operations were performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and
Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and she was confined
in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month, or until July 26, 1997.20 All the
expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information 22 charging Rogelio for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property "with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party
such help that was in his hands to give"23 before the RTC. Upon arraignment,24 Rogelio entered a plea
of not guilty.25
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane along the
descending curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of about
70 meters away, he saw the motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from
the opposite direction.26 Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land
Cruiser’s lane while Rolf was on his proper lane.27 Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid
collision, Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless, bumped
into it.28 As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the roof and the hood of
the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle
were pinned beneath the land Cruiser.29 With the use of a jack handle and the assistance of two (2)
persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both
Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims on
board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought tothe hospital, but the vehicle turned out to have
defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another vehicle instead. 30
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006 Decision), the RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide withDouble Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the
RPC.32
It held that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of
the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and
Cherry. Considering further that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims,33 the RTC sentenced him
to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and
ordered him to pay the following civil liabilities: (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of
Dionesio, Sr.; (b) ₱30,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the family; (c)
₱200,000.00 for the medical expenses incurred; (d) ₱25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during the
wake and the burial; (e) ₱30,000.00 for the damaged motorcycle; (f) ₱60,000.00 for the loss of earning
capacity; and (g) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. 34
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a Resolution36 dated February
22, 2007, reducing the penalty to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The
RTC reconsidered its opinion regarding Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid to the victims,
concluding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser
could have been his in the absence of showing who owned the same. 37 Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to
the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision38 dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA reinstated the RTC’s July 31, 2006
Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight(8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium, as maximum, and the same civil liabilities,39 hence, this petition. The Issue Before the
Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rogelio’s
conviction in accordance with the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 36540 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained
of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,
either with knowledgeof serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or
conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings
an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to
whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault. 42
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the
wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr.
and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred
was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending
towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such
circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise
ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using
the highway.43 Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a
curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction
at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of
the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence. 44 Consequently, the Court finds
that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road
while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable,
aswell as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA
and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA
Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph
of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give." Based on case law,
the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the
type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving;
and (b) requires adequate proof.45
It is well to point out that the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision found that Rogelio failed to offer any help to
the victims46 and, thus, imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree.However, upon Rogelio’s
motion, the RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion, holding that the jack handle that was used to get
the body of Dionesio,Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who
owned the same and, accordingly, reduced the penalty.47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA
which affirmed Rogelio’sconviction based on the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies presented by the prosecution
and the defense on this matter.1âwphi1 Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted that the
victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s
vehicle,48 the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim that he tried to extend help to the victims, but
when hestarted the engine with the intention to go to the hospital, he discovered that the vehicle had no
brakes.49 Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance under the
last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 50 of the
RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the
death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,51 the minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the penalty
to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of
prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its maximum, as
maximum.
As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment of "moral damages" in the amount of
₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio, Sr. should be, properly speaking, denominated as one for the
payment of "civil indemnity" as they were not awarded under the parameters of the Civil Code relevant
thereto,52 but was one "given without need of proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime
and proof of [the accused’s] responsibility for it."53 This is a palpable legal error which the Court should
correct if only for terminological propriety. With the private complainant not herein impleaded, the rest of
the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision with respect to the civil liabilities awarded should remain undisturbed.
Note that, in line with existing jurisprudence, interest atthe rate of six percent (6) per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.54

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 18, 2009 and the Resolution
dated January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, finding petitioner
Rogelio J. Gonzaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to
Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional in its
maximum, as maximum; and

(b) The award of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio Inguito, Sr. in favor of his heirs is
denominated as "civil indemnity," instead of"moral damages."

(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 204095 June 15, 2015
DR. JAIME T. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICISIMO V. AGAS, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 22, 2012
Decision1 and October 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 111910,
which affirmed the March 2, 20073 and September 23, 20094 Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
The said resolutions let stand the February 16, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the Prosecutor of
Quezon City, dismissing the complaint of petitioner Dr. Jaime T. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) for Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against respondent, Dr. Felicisimo V.
Agas, Jr. (Dr. Agas).
The Antecedents
In his Complaint-Affidavit5 for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical
Malpractice against Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in May 2003, he engaged
the services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC)for a medical check-up; that after being admitted in
SLMC on May 28, 2003,he underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid tests conducted by the
employees and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29, 2003, he was sent to the Gastro-Enterology
Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because the specialist assigned to
perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave the colonoscopy results to the attending
female anesthesiologist for the information and consideration of the assigned specialist; that, thereafter,
he was sedated and the endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he regained
consciousness, he felt that something went wrong during the procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold
clammy perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty; that he could not stand or sit upright because
he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his abdomen; that when he was about to urinate in the
comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he
was nowhere to be found; and that his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe his
critical condition and immediately referred him to the surgical department which suspected that he had
hemorrhage in his abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the ICU on May 30,
2003, he found out that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because of the internal bleeding; that
he learned that the doctors cut a portion of the left side of his colon measuring 6-8 inches because it
had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused the internal bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he
was under tremendous pain in the incision area during his recovery period in the ICU and had fever;
and that he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms, subclavian artery on the left part of his chest
and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the colonoscopy procedure
but the latter insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7, 2003,he was discharged from SLMC.
Nevertheless, he complained that he had a hard time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed
every two hours because he easily got full; that he had fresh blood stools every time he moved his
bowel; that he had lost his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he
was in good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the time of the
filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
Defense of Dr. Agas
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove the basic elements of reckless
imprudence or negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he did not know that he
would perform the procedure. He explained that before the start of the colonoscopy procedure, he was
able to confer with Dr. Cruz and review his medical history which was taken earlier by a fellow
gastrointestinal physician. He claimed that the gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedures conducted on
Dr. Cruz were completely successful considering that the latter did not manifest any significant adverse
reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that his vital signs were normal throughout the
procedure.6
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements were submitted by the Assistant Medical
Director for Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of Digestive Diseases, the
anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse attesting to the fact that the intraperitonial bleeding which
developed after the colonoscopy procedure, was immediately recognized, evaluated, carefully
managed, and corrected; that he provided an adequate and reasonable standard of care to Dr. Cruz;
that the endoscopist followed all precautionary measures; that the colonoscopy procedure was done
properly; that he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the colonoscopy procedure; that he did not
deviate from any standard medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he exercised competence and
diligence in rendering medical services to Dr. Cruz.7
Antecedents at the Prosecution Level
On February 16, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution dismissing the
complaint for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
Aggrieved, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ)but the same was
dismissed in its March 2, 2007 Resolution. Dr. Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the DOJ in its September 23, 2009 Resolution. 8
At the Court of Appeals
Not satisfied, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the unfavorable DOJ
resolutions. On May 22, 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the said DOJ resolutions. The CA
explained that, as a matter of sound judicial policy, courts would not interfere with the public
prosecutor’s wide discretion of determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation unless such
executive determination was tainted with manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. It stated that the
public prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause against Dr. Agas was in accordance with law and
that his alleged negligence was not adequately established by Dr. Cruz.
The CA also declared that Dr. Cruz failed to state in his Complaint-Affidavit the specific procedures that
Dr. Agas failed to do which a reasonable prudent doctor would have done, or specific norms he failed to
observe which a reasonably prudent doctor would have complied with. The CA pointed out that Dr.
Agas was able to satisfactorily explain in his Counter-Affidavit that the complications suffered by Dr.
Cruz was not caused by his negligence or was the result of medical malpractice. Dr. Agas explained as
follows:
That the complication was due to the abnormal condition and configuration of the digestive system,
colon in particular, of the complainant and not from any negligent act in connection with the conduct of
colonoscopy. The surgical findings (xxx) revealed marked adhesions in the sigmoid colon which is not
and never within my control. That the tear in the serosa (the outermost layer of the colonic wall which
has 4 layers) happened likely because of the marked interloop adhesions and tortuousity of the sigmoid
segment of the colon. These adhesions that connect the serosa to the peritoneal lining of each loop
detached from the serosa during the procedure. It is not possible to detect the presence of marked
adhesions prior to the endoscopic procedure because no clinical findings, laboratory tests or diagnostic
imaging such as x-ray, ultrasound or computed tomography (CT scan) of the abdomen can diagnose
these conditions. This can only be detected by surgically opening up the abdomen. Moreover, marked
adhesions and serosal tear, in particular, cannot likewise be detected by colonoscopy because they are
in the outer wall of the colon and only the inner lining of the colon is within the view of the colonoscope
(camera).9
The CA further wrote that the counter-affidavit of Dr. Agas was supported by the sworn affidavit of Dr.
Jennifel S. Bustos, an anesthesiologist at the SLMC and the affidavit of Evelyn E. Daulat, a nurse at
SLMC, both swearing under oath that Dr. Agas was not negligent in conducting a gastroscopy and
colonoscopy procedure on Dr. Cruz and the certification issued by the Hospital Ethics Committee which
stated that Dr. Cruz was given an adequate and reasonable standard of care; that Dr. Agas followed all
precautionary measures in safeguarding Dr. Cruz from any possible complications; and that the
colonoscopy was done properly.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA WAS CORRECT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DOJ THAT
NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR FILING AN INFORMATION AGAINST THE RESPONDENT,
THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
Non-interference with Executive
Determination of Probable Cause
in Preliminary Investigations
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide on matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to
substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the
Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an Information, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.
Medical Negligence and
Malpractice Not Established
In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in finding that
there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor, like in this
case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. 10
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas. Although
there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa of his
sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the
colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or
reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that
there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
Not Applicable Against Respondent
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of
an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to
meet with an explanation.11
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury;
(2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the
occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had
control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and management of the thing which caused
the injury.12
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his purported negligence in performing the
colonoscopy on Dr. Cruz was not immediately apparent to a layman to justify the application of res ipsa
loquitur doctrine.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained by Dr. Cruz was due to the abnormal
condition and configuration of his sigmoid colon which was beyond his control considering that the said
condition could not be detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr. Agas adequately explained that
no clinical findings, laboratory tests, or diagnostic imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed
tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could have detected this condition prior to an endoscopic
procedure. Specifically, Dr. Agas wrote:

On the other hand, in the present case, the correlation between petitioner’s injury, i.e., tear in the serosa
of sigmoid colon, and the colonoscopy conducted by respondent to the petitioner clearly requires the
presentation of an expert opinion considering that no perforation of the sigmoid colon was ever noted
during the laparotomy. It cannot be overemphasized that the colonoscope inserted by the respondent
only passed through the inside of petitioner’s sigmoid colon while the damaged tissue, i.e., serosa,
which caused the bleeding, is located in the outermost layer of the colon. It is therefore impossible for
the colonoscope to touch, scratch, or even tear the serosa since the said membrane is beyond reach of
the colonoscope in the absence of perforation on the colon.13

Dr. Cruz failed to rebut this.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 Republic of the Philippines injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which required suturing. The damage sustained by the
SUPREME COURT pick-up reached P106,155.00.
Manila
Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with
THIRD DIVISION Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an
Amended Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City. The information
January 11, 2016 reads:

G.R. No. 192914 "That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City,
Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the Land Transportation
NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner, and Traffic Code, in negligent, careless, imprudent manner and without precaution to prevent accident
vs. [to] life and property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color white/red bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. by PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as a result hit and bumped the [sic] motor vehicle,
Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No. NEF-266 driven and owned by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR.,
DECISION and with his wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3 years old and househelp Mezelle Jane
Silayan, 17 years old, riding with him. The Toyota pick-up was damaged in the amount of [P]105,300.00
REYES, J.: and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane Silayan
sustained the following injuries to wit:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated November 20, 2009 and the. Resolution3 dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN which affirmed with modification the Dedision4 dated April 26, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. = complete fracture of superior scapular bone right shoulder
10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.

The Antecedents = MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury

The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments5 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and = Saturing [sic] right eye area
from the assailed decision of the CA:
ROSALINDA TOOR
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along
Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their
three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and was = Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right
coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner and coming from
Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner = Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter
tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and applying the
brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed = and supracondylar femur right
into the right side of private complainant’s pick-up at a right angle.
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital,
Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the
Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open fracture of = Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
the humerus of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal femur of the right
lower extremity which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in such amount that they are entitled to under the
and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product Laboratories. law.
Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan,
who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete
fracture of the scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN
RELATION TO THE FAMILY CODE."6 (Citations omitted)
Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the Information in this case. 7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his
employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not
presented as a witness by his new counsel.8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of
an indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor maximum as minimum
and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The accused is
further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos
as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand [P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the
expenses incurred in the treatment and hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and
Mezelle Jean Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses
incurred in the repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC issued a Promulgation10 dated August 4, 2006, which included an order for the arrest of the
petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of law or
irregularities have been committed during trial that are allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He
claimed that he was not able to present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the
schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the case against him has been dismissed as private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country.11
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial filed by the petitioner.12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court pronouncing that notices
have been duly served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner was self-serving.13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006 by
registered mail to the CA, on both questions of facts and laws. 14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty
imposed, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006
Decision of the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the evidence
presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records further
reveals that the pictures taken after the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which are in whole consistent and believable thus,
debunking the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere basis of allegedly biased and
hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, there was no
existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses. 16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as baseless. 17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods that is – imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor since the petitioner has, by reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it been intentional,
would have constituted a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, in its Resolution 19 dated
June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court, praying that the
applicable law on the matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts committed by the
court a quo and by the CA be given a second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
OR TO RE-OPEN THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
ON HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE
APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioner’s motion for new trial or to re-open the
same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner,
have been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The Court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (Emphasis ours)
To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of law or irregularities
committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he had waived his right
to present evidence resulting to denial of due process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict
and rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had
already acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already an initial presentation of evidence for
the defense when his whereabouts became unknown.
The petitioner’s claims that he had not testified because he did not know the schedule of the hearings,
and mistakenly believed that the case had already been terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do
not merit our consideration.21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.22 It is established that
notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his
whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the
petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in
violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.23
In Estrada v. People,24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14,
1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was duly sent to the addresses on record of
petitioner and her counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing, they
later alleged that they were not notified of said setting. Petitioner’s counsel never notified the court of
any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong address from the very beginning, eventually
jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel were given all
the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged violation of petitioner’s right to due
process when it was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to present evidence. 25 (Citation
omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the criminal case filed against
him and was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner was not in any way
deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right,
through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings.26
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to his failure
to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the
case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to
time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is also
its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for
them.27 (Citations omitted)
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in
which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of
concern towards the incident, and the people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the
case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices
served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner himself in not exercising diligence in
informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor law which specifically
requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are sufficiently communicated
with his client.28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe,29 the Court held that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled
jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where petitioner failed to act with prudence
and diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Court’s
approval or even sympathy. It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case. x x x.30 (Citations omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless
failed to secure it."31 The Court agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a new trial may not be
had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented due to its
negligence. Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against
[the petitioner’s] substantive rights do not exist."32
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo,33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed
only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice, which is not present here.
Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.34 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion
for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial. The
Court believes that the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this
opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against
him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – x x x.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
xxxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the
doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. 35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies are
biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left without looking for an
incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented
in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses’ narrations of the accident credible and
worthy of belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all significant and substantial
points.36 These witnesses’ testimonies are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings
in his accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr., together with his family and a
househelper as his passengers, was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle position
by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the bus and explained that the
petitioner was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-up. The petitioner could not
swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to the right
instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator clearly testified that, on the basis of
data gathered, the collision was due to the error of the bus driver who was driving too fast, as evinced
by the distance from the skid marks towards the axle.37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.’s pick-up turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and
a Super 5 bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was
running fast and overtaking the big truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and
pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the impact. He went nearer the area of collision and saw
that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious.38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan on board her employer’s
pick-up, she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their vehicle was hit by the
bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up and hit her head on the ground.39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5
bus, moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and
all his passengers.40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was
moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when
the petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was moving fast,
the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of significance and influence. This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor and the conduct of the witnesses."41 The Court finds in the
instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the
witnesses against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and thus, he should be the one
blamed for the incident. The Court finds this without merit.1âwphi1
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the
right shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the
intersection, obviously to give way to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible
for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had already
slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public
market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his
speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead,
he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and
overtake the truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to
observe the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things, the
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus.42

In Dumayag v. People,43 the Court held:

Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the
right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway is
clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway,
where the driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when
overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid
collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite
direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they have
the right to pass.44 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law
provides that the one overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction
know his presence and not the other way around as the petitioner suggests.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the
Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated October 22, 2010
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information, 4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Malabon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio M.
Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having
been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in
relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement in a
narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form 212,
dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to the Office of
the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no
criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in
Criminal Case No. 6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio
Sevilla", for Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of
Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). 6 That in answer to the
question of whether there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding
to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent ofa
person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was
likewise filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found
Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed him
from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio, 7 the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer
vis-à-visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did not
intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who
actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house.
Ataround two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his
PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five o’clock that
afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed
with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims
that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice
that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor.
Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001;
that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the
typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of
Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, 8 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents
Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code hereby imposes
upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as
maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not appear to
be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public
document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would not have
accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS,
Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a
pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to
establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and
recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 11 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal case
against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in
its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he had not been a candidate
in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran and served ascouncilor of Malabon
from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to
question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a negligent
act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with malicious
intent to falsify the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of
narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the PDS without
verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a government officer, who
prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a councilor of the same city. Thus, he
should have been more mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have treated the said public
document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless Imprudence,
as defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code. x x x.12
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution13 dated October
22, 2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony of
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was
filed against him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of
public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony,
lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be
violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against
him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article
171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly
committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence,
punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document.
However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability
is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed
through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in
our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all
the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense,
and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase
as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more
accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to
property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed
penaltyfor the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. 17 (Emphasis ours) Thus, the
proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs
the merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense
charged in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the prosecution. The rules on
variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which isincluded in the
offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof the
offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved
by the prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is
whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the
intentional felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative.
Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough
falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act
of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said,
counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily includedin the offense charged
in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of
negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of
the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our Penal
Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful
falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found thatin effecting
the falsification which made possible the cashing of checks inquestion, appellant did not act with
criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of
the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts
which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case
covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of
the cases decided by this Tribunal.19 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of
falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public
documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful
act of falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In Sarep, the
petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then
filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein
did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting
the Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did
not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1
Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional
CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to
qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless
imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco,
18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes
the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and
a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It
is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial
or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C.
Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of
dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have
produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966).21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification
of public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor
as minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as
maximum.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.