LABOR LAW 2 1

Collective Bargaining—RTC Jurisdiction

HALAGUEÑA v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

October 2, 2009 | J. PERALTA

Petitioner(s): PATRICIA HALAGUEÑA, MA. ANGELITA L. PULIDO, MA. TERESITA P.

SANTIAGO, MARIANNE V. KATINDIG, BERNADETTE A. CABALQUINTO, LORNA
B. TUGAS, MARY CHRISTINE A. VILLARETE, CYNTHIA A. STEHMEIER, ROSE
ANNA G. VICTA, NOEMI R. CRESENCIO, and other flight attendants of PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES
Respondent(s): PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INCORPORATED

Doctrine: Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and
the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor
arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement. Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the
Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the
jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

CASE SUMMARY
Trigger Word(s): Unconstitutional daw ang Retirement age na 55 sa babaeng FA
FACTS: Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of PAL and are members of the FASAP. PAL and
FASAP entered into a CBA for 2000 to 2005, which stipulates (Section 144) that the Compulsory Retirement shall be
55 for females and 60 for males. Petitioners manifested that the CBA provision on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory; and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts and the removal of gender
discrimination provisions in the coming re-negotiations of the CBA. Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the RTC. PAL questioned RTC’s jurisdiction, claiming that the jurisdiction is with the labor tribunals.
HELD: The RTC had jurisdiction, because the action was not a grievance. It is a civil action to annul a provision of
the contract, and the question did not involve any determination of labor or union actions. Jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for. The issue (whether
Section 144 is unlawful and unconstitutional) cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. It requires the
application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the CEDAW. The power to apply and interpret the
constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts. Such claims fall outside the competence or expertise
ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC; and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these
agencies disappears.

FACTS
Petition for review on  certiorari  (Rule 45) to annul the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
 Petitioners (Patricia Halagueña, et.al.) were employed as female flight attendants of Philippine Airlines
(PAL) on different dates prior to 22 November 1996.
o They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a
labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of PAL’s flight
attendants, flight stewards, and pursers.
 July 11, 2001: PAL and FASAP entered into a CBA (PAL-FASAP CBA) for 2000 to 2005.
o Section 144, Part A, PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:
“A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Compulsory Retirement
Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be
55 for females and 60 for males.”
 July 22, 2003: Petitioners manifested in a letter, which was reiterated in their counsel’s letter to PAL, that:
o The provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory;
o Demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts; and
o The gender discrimination provisions be removed in the coming re-negotiations of the CBA.
 July 12, 2004: Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP, submitted their 2004-2005 CBA proposals  and
manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations as soon as possible.
 July 29, 2004: Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC, against PAL for the
invalidity of Section 144.

Hermosa | A2022
March 10, 2020
LABOR LAW 2 2
Collective Bargaining—RTC Jurisdiction

 PAL questioned RTC’s jurisdiction; the labor tribunals have jurisdiction, as it is a labor dispute.
 August 9, 2004: RTC upheld its jurisdiction, reasoning that:
o The thrust of the Petition is Sec. 144 of the CBA in violation of the Constitution, the Labor Code, and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
o The allegations in the Petition do not make out a labor dispute arising from employer-employee
relationship.
o This case is neither directed specifically against PAL, nor does it involve a claim against PAL.
o The Petition seeks a declaration of the nullity of Sec. 144, which is within the RTC’s competence, with
the allegations constituting the bases for such relief sought.
 August 10, 2004: RTC issued a TRO, enjoining PAL in implementing Section 144.
 PAL filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration and further prayed that:
o (1) Petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be denied; and
o (2) Petitioners' petition be dismissed, or the proceedings be suspended.
 September 27, 2004: RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction (enjoining PAL or any of its agents and
representatives from further implementing Sec. 144, pending the resolution of the case). HSDCTA
 October 8, 2004: PAL filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, praying that:
o RTC’s order be annulled and set aside because it was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 August 31, 2005: CA granted the PAL’s petition and ruled that:
o The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case;
 The subject matter is a labor dispute or grievance;
o RTC is ordered to DISMISS the case.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioners submit that:
o The RTC has jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and in all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
o The RTC has the power to decide issues of constitutionality or legality of Section 144;
o The labor arbiter or the NLRC has no jurisdiction since the issue is constitutional in character;
and
o Petitioners pray that judgment be rendered on the merits—declaring Section 144 void.
 PAL alleges that:
o The labor tribunals have jurisdiction, as it is a labor dispute.
 It concerns the terms and conditions of petitioners' employment—retirement age;
o The Voluntary Arbitrator have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA;
o Regular courts have no power to set and fix the terms and conditions of employment; and
o Petitioners' prayer to resolve their petition for declaratory relief on the merits is procedurally
improper and baseless.

(MAIN) ISSUE #1: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction—YES

 Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief prayed for, irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.
o In this case, the allegations plainly show that the cause of action is the annulment of Section 144.
 24. Petitioners have the constitutional right to fundamental equality with men under Section 14, Article
II, 1987 of the Constitution.
 26. Petitioners have the statutory right to equal work and employment opportunities with men under
Article 3, Presidential Decree No. 442, The Labor Code.
 27. It is unlawful, even criminal, for an employer to discriminate against women employees solely on
account of their sex under Article 135, Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 67251.
 28. This is against the CEDAW, a multilateral convention that the Philippines ratified in 1981.2
 29. This case is a matter of public interest because of PAL' violation of the Constitution and existing
laws, and also, 23 years after Senate ratified the CEDAW, discrimination against women continues.

1
Act Strengthening Prohibition on Discrimination Against Women
2
The Government and its agents, including our courts, not only must condemn all forms of discrimination against women, but must
also implement measures towards its elimination.

Hermosa | A2022
March 10, 2020
LABOR LAW 2 3
Collective Bargaining—RTC Jurisdiction

 31. Section 114 is invidiously discriminatory against and manifestly prejudicial to Petitioners because
they are compelled to retire at a lower age relative to their male counterparts.
 33. No reasonable or lawful basis to distinguish cabin attendants on the basis of sex and arbitrarily set a
lower compulsory retirement age of 55 for Petitioners for the sole reason that they are women.
 37. For being patently unconstitutional and unlawful, Section 114 must be declared invalid.
 38. Consistent with the constitutional and statutory guarantee of equality between men and women,
Petitioners should be declared entitled, like their male counterparts, to work until 60 years old.
o The Prayer is to declare Sec. 114 null and void, to the extent that it discriminates against petitioners.
 From the allegations and relief prayed for, it is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A
of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional.
o The primary relief is the annulment of Section 144.
o The subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation and exclusively cognizable by the RTC (Section 19
(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended).
o Being an ordinary civil action, it is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
 The issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code.
o It requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts, and the CEDAW;
o Power to apply and interpret the Constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
 Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani: Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves
matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC
under Article 217, Labor Code, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship,
which  can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their CBA.
 Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental,
and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the regular court.
o In this case, the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental, and the cause of action
ultimately arose from different sources of obligation,  i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.
 Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved by reference to the general civil law, the jurisdiction over
the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice, and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
o Resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures
and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law.
o Such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC
and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.

(MAIN) ISSUE #2: W/N the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators have the power to determine
and settle the issues at hand—NO
 They have no jurisdiction and competence to decide constitutional issues.
o Their exercise of jurisdiction is futile. It is like vesting power to someone who cannot wield it.
 Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.: Courts have jurisdiction over questions on constitutionality of contracts, as
the same involves the exercise of judicial power.
o Whether the case involves void or voidable contracts is still a judicial question.
 It may involve questions of fact especially with regard to the determination of the circumstances of
the execution of the contracts.
o It requires the ascertainment of applicable laws, the interpretation, and application of those laws, and
the rendering of a judgment based thereon.
 The complaint was not merely for the determination of rights under the contracts since the very
validity of those contracts is put in issue.
 Saura v. Saura, Jr.: The trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters
under their particular specialization, to insure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems.
o But it should not deprive the courts of justice of their power to decide ordinary cases that do not
require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.
 Otherwise, the creeping take-over by the administrative agencies of the judicial power vested in
the courts would render the judiciary virtually impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it
by the Constitution.

Hermosa | A2022
March 10, 2020
LABOR LAW 2 4
Collective Bargaining—RTC Jurisdiction

 Rivera v. Espiritu:3 While the petition was denominated as certiorari and prohibition, its object was actually
the nullification of the CBA. The proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, under
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
 In this case, the change in the terms and conditions of employment, should Section 144 of the CBA be
held invalid, is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the principal relief sought,  i.e.,
nullification of the alleged discriminatory provision in the CBA.
o Also, the RTC is not asked to set and fix the terms and conditions of employment but is called upon to
determine whether CBA is consistent with the laws.
 Although the CBA provides for a procedure for the adjustment of grievances, such referral to the
grievance machinery and to voluntary arbitration would be inappropriate, because the union and the
management have unanimously agreed to the terms of the CBA and their interest is unified.
 Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC: Only disputes involving the union and the company shall be
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
 In this case, the "dispute" is not between the union and PAL because both have agreed upon the provision
on "compulsory retirement".
o It is between PAL and several female flight attendants.
 Referral to the grievance machinery and to the voluntary arbitrator would be futile because PAL already
implemented Section 114.
o July 12, 2004: FASAP submitted its bargaining proposal for the remaining period of 2004-2005 of the
CBA, which includes the renegotiation of Section 144.
o However, FASAP's attempt to change the provision was shallow and superficial.
 It exerted no further efforts to pursue its proposal.
o When petitioners, in their individual capacities, questioned the legality of the compulsory retirement
before the RTC, there was no showing that FASAP endeavored to adjust, settle, or negotiate for the
removal of the difference in compulsory age retirement between its female and male flight attendants,
particularly those employed before November 22, 1996.
 In this case, the RTC is not asked to interpret Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
o Interpretation is the art of or process of discovering and ascertaining the meaning of a statute, will,
contract, or other written document. (Black's Law Dictionary)
o Section 144 is not ambiguous and does not require interpretation.
 No question regarding its implementation because it is clear in itself.
 The only controversy is its intrinsic validity.

ISSUE #3: W/N the rule that a contract freely entered between the parties should be respected, since a
contract is the law between the parties, is absolute—NO
 Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople: Principle of autonomy in contracts is not absolute.
o Article 1306, Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish stipulations, "provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy".
o Thus, provisions relating to matters of public policy are deemed written into the contract.
 Parties may not contract away applicable peremptory provisions of law dealing with matters impressed with
public interest, such as laws relating to labor and employment.
 Labor contracts are imbued with public interest and therefore are subject to police power of the state.
o A CBA is not merely contractual but impressed with public interest.
o If the retirement provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or public policy, such provisions
may be voided.

ISSUE #4: W/N Petitioners’ prayer that judgment be rendered on the merits—declaring Section 144 null and
void—be granted by the SC—NO, should be remanded to the RTC
 Appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) is generally limited only to questions of law. The SC is not a trier of facts.
 The question as to whether Section 114 is discriminatory or not is a question of fact.
o This would require the presentation and reception of evidence in order to ascertain the facts of the case and
whether it violates the Constitution, statutes, and treaties.
o A full-blown trial with the RTC is necessary.

3
A case where several employees questioned, via a petition for certiorari directly to the Supreme Court, the validity of the CBA
entered into by PAL and PAL Employees Association (PALEA), which includes the provision to suspend the PAL-PALEA CBA for 10
years.

Hermosa | A2022
March 10, 2020
LABOR LAW 2 5
Collective Bargaining—RTC Jurisdiction

RULING: Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of CA are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The RTC is DIRECTED to continue the proceedings with deliberate dispatch.

Hermosa | A2022
March 10, 2020