GR Nos.
L-7618-20, Jun 30, 1955 ] his wife and children, Gunti Ampaso, his wife and children, Pasintao, his wife and four children, Laito, his wife and four
PEOPLE v. CRISPIN LAWAS +
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
In G.R. No. L-7618 (Crim, Case No. 180, Court of First Instance of Lanao), Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio, Clemente
Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Agapito Gumisad have appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
finding each of them guilty of the crime of robbery, and sentencing each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from
two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years, eight months and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party Manaronsong Lomangcolob, in the following manner;
Crispin Lawas and Agapito Gumisad, P50.00 each; Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, P266.00 each; and
Agustin Osorio, P500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. The appeal of
Agapito Gumisad has, however, been dismissed for failure on his part to file a brief. This appeal in this Court, therefore,
only refers to the others.
In G.R. No. L-7613 (Crim. Case No. 444, Court of First Instance of Lanao), Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente
Osorio hava appealed from a judgment of tha Court of First Instance of Lanao, finding them guilty of multiple murder
and sentencing each of them to suffer tha indeterminate penalty of from ten years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen years four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
In G.R. No. L-7620 (Crim. Case No. 373, Court of First Instance of Lanao), Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito
Gumisad, Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos were also found guilty of tha crime of multiple murder and sentenced to
the same penalty imposed upon Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio in Criminal Case No. 444. They have
also appealed from the decision. But the appeals of Agapito Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon have been dismissed
for failure on their part to file briefs. The case now proceeds on appeal only as to Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and
Patrocinio Pinos.
The evidence shows that on July 3, 1042 various Moros (Maranaos) from Barrio Baris, Municipality of Kolambugan,
province of Lanao, raided the barrio of Malingao, killing 11 Christian residents including men and women, wounding
two of them, and, thereafter, robbing them of their belongings. This incident was reported to the home guards, an
organization composed of ex-Philippine Constabulary soldiers and civilians whose duty it was to preserve peace and
order among the inhabit ants, protect them, and prevent the infiltration of the Japanese in their communities. The
report was made to appellant Crispin Lawas, head of the home guards in Balimbing and to Sgt. Benaojan, also head of
home guards in Salong. Upon learning of the incident, Lawas and Benaojan and some home guards proceeded to the
barrio of Malingao to check up the report. There they found the asad bodies of the Christian Filipinos killed by the
Maranaos and learned that the Maranaos who had committed the act came from the barrio of Baris. So they proceeded
to the barrio of Baris in the afternoon of July 10. Upon reaching Baris, they divided themselves into two groups, one
headed by Sgt. Benaojan and the other by Crispin Lawas. That headed by Sgt. Benaojan gathered the Maranaos around
the place of ex-Mayor Gunti, while that headed by Crispin Lawas, those that live around the house of Datu
Lomangcolob. Some seventy of them, including Manaronsong Lomangcolob. school teacher, Datu Lomangcolob Sumala,
children, Pacpac, his wife, niece and nephew, Mainanding Lomangcolob and two children, Dibton and children,
Garagabos and wife, Rutum, his wife and children, Aboli and a child, Adki's children, and others were brought by the
home guards to the barrio of Salong, where they arrived in the evening of July 10th, between seven and eight o'clock.
When the home guards were in the barrio of Baris, they or some of them took away three carabaos, two horses, and
many personal belongings, especially of Datu Lomangcolob. This is the basis of the charge of robbery.
The Maranaos were confined during the night of July 10 under guard in the house of one Restituto Requino. The next
morning, Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio began investigating the principal Moros. Some 15 of them were brought
down in groups of five before Lawas and Osorio. A table was set up near the rice mill of Pedro Lacson and there Lawas
and Osorio questioned them. In the course of the investigation, and for reasons which are disputed, the home guards
then on duty and present at the investigation fired at the Moros and most of them were killed. In the course of the
melee that followed, some of the home guards and others who could not be identified, went up the house of Restituto
Requino and fired at the woman and children who were on the second floor of the house. Some of the women and
children were stabbed. No less than 35 women and children were killed and no less than 16 of the Moros down below
were also killed. Among the killed were Datu Lomangcolob Sumala, Gunti Ampaso, Pasintao, Laito, Pacpac and Rutum.
For this killing, two charges of multiple murder were filed, one against Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente
Osorio, and another against Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad, Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos.
Insofar as the crime of robbery is concerned, principal witness Manaronsong Lomangcolob, son of. Datu Lomangcolob.
Sumala, declared that the Home guards who gathered them in . the barrio of Baris and later brought them to the
barrio . of. Salong took from them (the Maranaos) 3 carabaos worth P800, 2 horses worth P100, and jewelry and other
personal belongings worth P500. The animals were taken away by the following home guards: Lawas, 1 horse; Agapito
Gumisad, 1 horse; and Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, one carabao each. Of the accused, the
following were seen coming down from the houses of the Maranaos, bringing with them malongs, bracelets and other
personal belongings: Generoso Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon, Agustin Osorio, Clemente Osorio and
Agapito Gumisad.
Of the above-named accused, only Lawas testified, but he made no denial of the taking by him of one of the horses.
None of the briefs or memoranda filed on behalf of the appellant claims or mentions grounds why appellants should not
be held guilty of robbery, although certain discrepancies appear in Lomangcolob's testimony as to the manner in which
the said horses and carabaos ware taken. Admitting that there are discrepancies in tho said testimony as to the details
of the taking, the evidence conclusively shows that the accused designated above took the animals and properties in
question. No denial of this fact was ever made. There is insinuation that some of the animals may have been some of
those taken at the raid of Malingao, but no satisfactory evidence exists on which a finding to that effect can be
predicated. The evidence also shows that the accused were armed at the time of the taking of the animals and other
personal properties. The finding of the trial court that the accused are guilty of robbery as above-indicated is fully
supported by the evidence. There is no evidence, however, of the existence of any conspiracy among the accused in the
commission of tha acts of robbery and each one must respond for his own individual act.
As to the charge of multiple murder, tha death of about fifty of the Maranaos, including fifteen men, twenty five women
and ten children is not questioned; but the circumstances under which their death took place are the object of
conflicting evidence. The three witnesses for the prosecution claim that the Moros were fired at when Datu
Lomangcolob refused to be tied at the hands, while the defense claims that they were fired at because they attempted
to grab the arms of the home guards. The evidence submitted by both sides on this issue may be summarized as
follows:
Manaronsong Lomangcolob testified that while he and four of his companions namely, Gunti Ampaso, lacpac and Datu
Lomangcolob ware in front of the table before which Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio were making the investigation,
Lawas first asked them to sign blank papers, and that they, the Maranaos, refused; but they were beaten with rifles and
boxed, so Datu Lomangcolob enjoined him and his companions to sign the blank papers as demanded by the
investigators; that afterwards Crispin Lawas informed the Maranaos that they would be brought to Captain Morgan at
Balimbing and for this purpose their hands were to be tied; that for the purpose of tying their hands, Hermenegildo
Tabacon, one of the home guards, brought some pieces of split rattan; that as Datu Lomangcolob was approached to
have his hands tied, he refused and, thereupon, Crispin Lawas fired his revolver at him and ordered the guards to fire;
that following instructions, the home guards fired at the Moros and many of them fell down dead; that those Moros
who tried to escape were also fired at; and that after a short time Crispin Lawas ordered his men to "cease fire", and the
firing stopped.;
Pedro Lacson, a resident of Barrio Salong, corroborated tha principal parts of the above testimony of Manaronsong
Lomangcolob, declaring that he (Lacson) was under the eaves of his house observing the investigation that Lawas and
Osorio were conducting; that he noticed Lawas ordering the men to be brought down from the house of Restituto
Requino; that in the course of the investigation, Lawas said that the Moros would be brought to Balimbing where
Captain Morgan was and that the Moros were to have their hands tied; that Datu Lomangoolob expressed willingness
to go to Captain Morgan, but that he was not willing to have his hands tied; and that then a commotion ensued and
then Crispin Lawas gave his men the order to fire. In connection with the massacre of the women in the second floor of
the house of Restituto Requino, it is very clear that in the course of the shooting two persons, not companions of Lawas,
went up the house of Requino and, perhaps, helped in boloing the 15 women and children in said house.
A third witness corroborated the most important details of the above testimonies. Manking Aguam, claiming to be 11
years old when the incident took place, testified as follows: That he was with the women and children in the upper floor
of the house of Restituto Requino before the investigation began; that he saw some of the accused as they brought
down the male Maranaos for the purpose of investigation; that the firing was caused by the refusal of the Maranaos to
accede to have their hands tied as ordered by Crispin Lawas: that in the course of the shooting, Agapito Gumisad, Felipe
Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Tito Requino and Patricio Pinos shot at the women and children and stabbed them with boloes;
and that Gumisad was trying to stab him and what he did was to jump down and run away.
Only two of the accused took the witness stand, namely, Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio. Other witnesses testified for
them, but their testimonies are of no material value insofar as the main issue is concerned. Crispin Lawas testified that
upon the receipt of the report of the raid on the Christian Filipinos by the Maranaos on July 9, he met with Captain
Morgan, the head of the home guards and tha PC; that thereupon Captain Morgan instructed him to accompany Sgt,
Benaojan and proceed to Barrio Malingao to investigate the incident; that in pursuance of said order, he and Sgt.
Banaojan went to Barrio Malingao and saw the dead persons there; that he found out after investigation that some of
the Moros who made the raid came from Barrio Baris, so he and Sgt, Benaojan and their men proceeded to Baris; that
the people of that place were gathered together in the afternoon of July 10 and that they took them along to Barrio
Salong; that when they reached that place, Sgt. Benaojan ordered the Moros to stay in the house of Restituto Requino
and that this was done; that at dawn the following day, Lawas went to Captain Morgan to make a report, and that
Captain Morgan ordered him to investigate the leaders of the Moros and, afterwards, send the result of his
investigation to him; that he returned to the barrio of Salong the following morning; that at about 8:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day (July 11), he ordered a table to be placed on the ground and that the investigation of the
Moros be conducted; that the investigation took place in the following order: first Mayor Gunti, Datu Lomangcolob,
Datu Pacpac and Manaronsong Lomangcolob together; that as said investigation proceeded, the Moros suddenly
rushed at the home guards to grab their guns and so a commotion arose; that he and Agustin Osorio did not know what
had happened and upon hearing gun fire he stood astounded; that because of the presence of the women and children,
he ordered his guards to cease fire, which was done; that throughout the time of the firing, he could not do anything
but stand up; that his companion Agustin Osorio in the meanwhile lied flat on the ground; and that afterwards he went
to the middle of the place where the gathering was and found out that many Moros were dead.
For his part, accused Agustin Osorio testified that on July 10, he was ordered by Sgt. Benaojan to go to Camp 5 with 4
soldiers to investigate the maltreatment of a Christian Filipino; that on their way back from the investigation, they heard
shots coming from Barrio Malingao and so they went to that barrio and upon arriving there they found 11 Christian
Filipinos dead and 2 wounded; that he received information about the incident from one, Piano Taborada, who said that
the ones who made the raid were from Barrio Baris; that when he returned to Barrio Salong, he reported the incident to
Sgt. Benaojan; that he accompanied Sgt. Benaojan and Crispin Lawas on July 10 to Barrio Malingao where they saw 11
Christians dead and 2 wounded; that after the investigation conducted in Barrio Malingao, they went to Barrio Baris
where they arrived at five o'clock in the afternoon; that upon reaching Barrio Baris, Mayor Gunti sounded the "agong"
and the people of the barrio swarmed around them; that they brought some of the men to the barrio of Salong and
there they were ordered to sleep in the house of Restituto Requino; that after breakfast the following morning, July 11,
an investigation was to be made and after the male Moros were brought down he and Lawas began investigating them;
that after investigating 6 of the Moros, and while investigating the 7th, he immediately noticed a commotion among the
Moros and the soldiers because of the fact that the former were grabbing the firearms of the latter; that in the course
of the struggle the guns of the soldiers were exploded; that because of the noise Lawas could not give any order so he
and Lawas laid themselves down flat on the ground and after one minute in this position, Lawas ordered that the guards
cease firing and the firing stopped; that he could not tell where the firing started because at the time when it began
Lawas was dictating to him and he was writing down what Lawas dictated; and that after the firing had ceased, ha
looked around and found many teoros. dead, while the soldiers (home guards) had run away.
There is no question that before Lawas fired at Datu Lomangcolob and the home guards also fired at the other Monos,
there was a sort of commotion, evidently produced by the announcement made by Lawas that the Moros were to be
brought to Captain Morgan at Balimbing and that their hands were to be tied. The existence of this commotion is
admitted by Pedro Lacson, eye witness to the incident, who said "But then the Moros refused that they will go there
with the Christian and immediately a commotion started and because of that, Crispin Lawas ordered them to be fired
at." The issue lies on the cause or origin of said commotion, for while the prosecution contends that this was produced
by the refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, the defense claims that the commotion was produced by the
Moros suddenly rushing at the soldiers to grab their firearms, arid so they were fired at. The theory of the defense is not
warranted by the facts and circumstances proved and admitted. Had the Moros actually rushed at the soldiers to
grapple with these for the possession of the firearms, they would have mixed up with the soldiers in body struggles and
it would have been impossible for the soldiers to fire at them without hitting their own companions. Had there been a
free for all struggle for the arms of the soldiers, the latter could not have fired at and hit the Moros without hitting
others or their own companions. But only one of the home guards was wounded by a stray bullet; no others received
any injury in the course of the commotion. Besides, a volley of shots appeared to have been fired immediately when the
commotion started, as a result of which many Moros fell down dead. This would not have been the case had real
grappling for the possession of the guns taken place as claimed by the defense. If a struggle for the possession df the
firearms had taken place, the shots would have come intermittently. If there were shots made after the first volley had
been fired they were aimed at the escaping Moros. All the above circumstances belie the claim of the defense that the
Moros tried to grab the firearms of the solders, and that the latter fired at them as a consequence of the said attempt.
On the other hand, neither can the theory of the prosecution that upon refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands
tied, Lawas gave the order to fire at the Moros, be admitted on its face value. Witness Pedro Lacson, who appears to be
the most impartial of the witnesses, admits that there was a commotion, although he did not specify the nature and
character thereof. If any commotion ever existed at all, it must have bean caused by the announcement that the Moros
were to be tied. This announcement must have angered the Morors, who must have protested the act; theretofore,
they had submitted themselves to the arrest without protest or resistance. The most reasonable inference is that upon
hearing that their hands were to be tied and as the leader was going to have his hands tied and he refused or resisted,
the Maranaos must have angrily protested, showing an attitude of hostility or resistance; and this attitude must have
been interpretted by Lawas and the soldiers as a determination to resist and even to fight, Perhaps, this belief also must
have produced the impression upon the mind of Lawas that the Moros were bent on something like the use of force,
such as the grabbing of the firearms of the soldiers, and perhaps it may have been in an attempt to forestall such a
frantic and unexpected attack that Lawas gave the order to fire and that he himself fired at Datu Lomangcolob. We
think that this must have happened; that Lawas believed that the Moros were about to resist and even attempt to fight
for the arms, so he gave the order to fire.
There can not, therefore, be any circumstance that would qualify the killing of the Maranaos as murder; there was no
evident premeditation; neither was there treachery because the Moros were face to face with the soldiers; and neither
could there be abuse of superior strength because the soldiers did not expressly take advantage of their arms to
commit the offense.
On the other hand, there is no circumstance present in the killing which may sufficiently serve to mitigate the offense
that has been committed. It is possible that an attitude of hostility accompanied the refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to
have his hands tied, which attitude must have been shared by his companions; and it is also possible that the fear of
well-known Moro ferociousness could have made Lawas and his companions believe that the Moros were bent on
refusing to be tied. But there is no evidence that they went beyond showing their refusal or hostility, or an apparent act
on their part such as would induce a reasonable belief that the Maranaos were about to begin an aggression against
their captors. Their peaceful conduct at the time of their arrest and before the investigation showed that they were
submissive and obedient. No circumstance, therefore, can sufficiently justify a finding that the offense was committed
with any mitigating circumstance. The offense committed is plain, simple homicide, with respect to Crispin Lawas and
Agustin Osorio, as it is also with respect to thos3 soldiers who fired at the Moros at the time the commotion arose.
But with respect to the killing of the women and children in the upper story of the house of Restituto Requino, the
killing is plainly attended by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The women and children were defenseless;
there is no evidence that they showed any act of defiance or hostility, and while the soldiers were given an order to fire
at the Moros then on the ground, said order could not imply or include an order to go up the house and massacre the
innocent and defenseless women and children therein. Persons who participated in the killing of the women should be
made to suffer the penalty commensurate with the degree of perversity which attended this act. While evident
premeditation may not be assumed, because the massacre of the women and children was part of the impulse that
resulted in the killing of the Moros on the ground, yet the women and children were defenseless and could offer no
resistance at all. Their defenseless condition should be considered as included in the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, not as an independent circumstance of treachery. We find, therefore, that only one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime, or the killing of the women and children, and that is tha abuse of
superior strength, which aggravating circumstance raises the offense to that of murder.
The question which still has to be considered is tha determination from among the appellants of those who may be
convicted of the murder of the women and children.in the house of Restituto Requino. Witness Pedro Lacson declared
that he saw two men armed with bolos going up the house as the shooting of the Moros on the ground was in progress,
but he asserted that these did not belong to the group of home guards led by Crispin Lawas. But Manking Aguam
identified Agapito Gumisad, Felipa Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Pedro Benaojan, Tito Requino and Patricio Pinos as among
those who went up and shot or stabbed the women and children in the house. The identification is not contradicted nor
denied by the defense, but except as to Gumisad, who was well known to the witness before the incident, the
identification is not as positive and certain as to amount to proof of their identities beyond reasonable doubt. Thus
witness identified Tito Requino as one of the assailants; but Requino was never known before that time by the witness.
He also identified another as Benaojan, but the other evidence submitted by the State itself shows that Benaojan was
not present at the time of the incident. In another part of his testimony, the witness said that Tabacon, Pinos and
Generoso Osorio were among those who brought down the Moros; while in tha same testimony, he asserts it was one
old man, Mauricio Macasarte, who also went up. There was no corroboration offered by any more competent and
disinterested witness. This vacillating and doubtful identification, coupled with tha fact that the witness was only eleven
years of age at tha time of the incident and made tho identification seven years later, and that he had an interest in the
conviction of the accused, can not serve as legal basis for a finding that the persons pointed out at tha trial were in fact
the very persons who committed the murder of the women and children, With the exeeption of Agapito Gumisad and
Hermenegildo Tabacon, whose appeals have been dismissed, the other appellants Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and
Patricio Pinos can not, therefore, be found guilty of murder.
As to whether Crispin Lawas and .Agustin Osorio can be held responsible therefor, it is true that the authors of the
murder were home guards under their immediata command. But the evidence submitted fails to disclose any previous
common design to massacre all the Moros under detention, including the women and children. The evidence is to the
effect that the women and the children were not arrested or taken into custody, but that they only accompanied their
husbands and relatives who were brought for investigation. There was no evidence of a previous conspiracy by reason
of which Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio, as leaders, may be held for the murder of the women and children.
May they be held guilty of murder by induction on the basis of the order given by Lawas to fire at the Moros as the
commotion started? It is true that Lawas was the leader of the home guards in Balimbing among whom were Agapito
Gumisad, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon and Patricio Pinos. But the order given was to fire at the Moros (on the
ground), and nothing else; the order was to fire at the Moros who showed resistance or protest against his order that
they be tied. The order could not have been interpreted to mean that the women and children in the house, who did
not appear to have shown any resistance or hostility at all, should also be fired at. Lawas clearly did not intend that the
women and children inside the house should also be fired at. He can not be held guilty of the crime committed, as it has
been held that in order to make the inducer responsible for the crime committed, it is necessary that the inducement is
material land precedes the commission of the act, and that such inducement was the determining cause thereof.
"xxx, it may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature
and made in such a way that it become the determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the
intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the person so
induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the
purpose in view.
"The verb 'induce' is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there exists on the part of the inducer
the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely
the result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or
temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent
reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation, that his
suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produces a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in
applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the determining
cause of the crime." (U. S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, 218)
Neither Crisipin Lawas nor Agustin Osorio may, therefore, be held responsible for the crime of murder in connection
with the massacre of the women and children by inducement, and they must be acquitted of the charge of murder.
One last question involves the determination of the number or crimes for which each of the appellants may be found
guilty, whether each one should be considered as having committed as many crimes as there were persons who were
killed, or only for one complex crime of multiple homicide. The information is for multiple murder, and no inference can
be made therefrom, that the accused are being charged of as many offenses as there were victims. Then the evidence
positively shows that the killing was the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader to fire,
and continued with the intention to comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the leader gave the order to that
effect. There was no intent on the part of the apellants either to fire at each and everyone of the victims as separately
and distinctly from each other. It has been held that if the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal
impulse, it constitutes a single offense (Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code; People vs. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158). So also it
has been held that the act of taking two roosters belonging to two different persons in the same place and on the same
occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 237, citing
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 2, 1898 and October 4, 1905). And in the case of People vs.
Guillem, 47 0.G. No. 7, 3433, a single act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, resulting
in the death of one victim and in physical injuries on others was considered as a single act, also falling under the first
part of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It may be added that there is absolutely no evidence as to the number of
persons killed by each and every one of the appellants, so even if we were induced to hold each appellant responsible
for each and every death caused by him, it is imposible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible to ascertain the
individual deaths caused by each and everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find the appellants guilty of only one
offense, that of multiple homicide for which the penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum period.
Wherefore, in G.R. No. 7618, for robbery, the judgment of conviction appealed from is hereby affirmed, but the
maximum of the penalty imposed is hereby raised to 6 years 10 months and 1 day of prision mayor, in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of superior strength in the commission of the offense. The individual liabilities
of each of the persons sentenced for said crime are hereby also affirmed. In G.R. Nos. 7619 and 7620, the appellants
Crispin Lawas, Clemente Osorio, Agustin Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos are each found guilty of
the crime of multiple homicide and each sentenced to suffer the penalty of not less than 15 years 6 months and 21 days
nor more than 18 years 2 months and 21 days, both of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of each of the
deceased, jointly and severally, in the amount of P3,000.00, and to pay the costs proportionately.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, Accused-
Appellant.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for
shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259),
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case
No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the
names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one
[name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.
Contrary to Law. 1
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with
the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge
Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo,
inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge
Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim
Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his own will.  2
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:
In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under
then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at
the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to
maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2)
CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP,
Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have
been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of
NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his
M-14 issued firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of
INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3)
Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with
the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5)
Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor
Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were
(1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of
them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part
cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2)
the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito
Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the
lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a
little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated
(at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the
Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5
meters.
At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as
described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor
Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire,
resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run
passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside
the Octagon cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the
accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat.
Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried
to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that that happened again Mario." Meanwhile, Sgt.
Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at
the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5)
successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw
the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco -
"Mario relax ka lang" - "Mario keep calm." They stood face to face holding their rifles
and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the
possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting
Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo.
Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to
adequate medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan - injured on
his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano - injured on his right forearm and on his right
abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his Face and right shoulder. But, the three, did
not file their complaints. 3
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the
Accused-appellant is as follows:
Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan,
Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-
14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on
March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at
about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to
make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside the
said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were
seen in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify
as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his
impressions that if they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the
cockpit would surly have confiscated the same from them. It was his belief then that
they may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit. Accused thus seated himself at the
lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on
March 22, 1987.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at
the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a
gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known,
his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the
air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a
warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from different
directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush
outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused)
rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito
Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that
when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time
thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said
persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta
pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from
accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt.
Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident,
accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge
Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused surrendered
to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account
of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he surrendered, but on account of
the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo.  4
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-
appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the
prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:
From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense
cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon
Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims.
For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot
the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or
others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit
arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. "Where
there are directly conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for
the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be used as
valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony for after
all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence.
(Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17,
1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979,
94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November
25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of
the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton
and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat.
Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in the
shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the
prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose
Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational
cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses
Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up
from his seat at the lower front row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle
towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper
portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled
Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito
Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen
who was then ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering
that the cockpit arena was well lighted at that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen
coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC
Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco,
telling - "what is that happened again Mario," while the latter told him - "Mario relax
ka lang keep calm." After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of the
gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got
the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt.
Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when
the gun went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo. 5
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit
arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat.
Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already empty.
The court a quo said further:
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine
that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A: No live bullets, sir. (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990
session, stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this
gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q: How many bullets in all?
A: Twenty, sir.
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt.
Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the
cockpit arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. 157-158, record).
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know whose picture is this?
A: Picture of spent shells.
Q: How about Exh. "R-l", do you know what is this?
A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct.
1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the
accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily
surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin
Bautista (Exh. "S", p. 188, record).
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case
for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. "T", p. 187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses
namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who
narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and
convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the
deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the
late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo,
PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the
cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and
automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused
shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as
to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147
SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved
reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of
all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs.
Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of
proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from
that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA
138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity,
and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases
result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper protection of society. (People
vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt.
Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of
the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in
this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who,
aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule that they have
regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5(M), Rule 131, Revised Rules of
Court).
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even
as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he
could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit
arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much lower elevation.
The accused further contends that he could not have shot aforesaid victims, as maybe
gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the
body of the late Mayor Arreola.
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw
the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of
Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the
bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could have
been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of
the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the
accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the
gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left
portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple;
Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his
left thigh downward.
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side
of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the
upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower
abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of
the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the
point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim
Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late
Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from
the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on
the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and
the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at the
place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the
lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility of
hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the
accused stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra
testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the
debris of the said cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence
adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to
gunshot wounds - inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh.
"K").
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify
against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and
positively identified.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the
author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban
and the wounding of Benito Raquepo. 6
The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear
judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola);
(c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4)
murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one Information;  the same
being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco
is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum period,
with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the
deceased victims - Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount
of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,000.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for
payment of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario
Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand
total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein
imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection,
both without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.
2 In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused
Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10)
years and one (1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of
the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity,
plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject
to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of
successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. "K" and "K-2") the corpus delicti, presently deposited with
117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is
peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the
said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the
rules.
4. The accused to pay the costs.
5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he
underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed
in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs.
Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.

SO ORDERED.   (Emphasis ours)

7

ATTY ARRIOLA:

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed
the present appeal on the following grounds: Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?

(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in
connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and
Romeo Regunton.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of
Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come
from?
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.

(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
Tabaco.

A: I had to seek shelter, sir.

The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have
ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's
denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
appeal, 8 unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
A: He was hit, sir.
misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People
vs. de Guzman, 10 thus:
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between you know?
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the A: M-14, sir.
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
xxx xxx xxx
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to
in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the Regunton?
case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned verdict. 11
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or
disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they Q: Was that all you gathered?
testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of
Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.

1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-
xxx xxx xxx
Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it
was accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14
Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his companions. Q: How many shots did you hear?

Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows: A: Three (3) shots, sir.

COURT: Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: Yes, sir. A: They have similarity, sir.

Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic? xxx xxx xxx

A: Successive, sir. Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your
companions?

Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right
side? A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

A: None, sir. Q: Where were you facing?

xxx xxx xxx A: We were facing south the arena.

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?

A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.

A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth
(port) arm position).
Q: From what direction?

xxx xxx xxx

A: Infront of us, sir.

Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

Q: Where was he, was he in your front?

A: He fired the gun, sir.

A: He was in the first row of seats.

Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?

A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

A: Somebody was killed, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: Who was that?

Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you
returned, what did you see? A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

A: I saw two dead persons, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw? COURT:

A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir. Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola? A: Many, sir.

A: Less than a meter, sir. ATTY. VILLENA:

xxx xxx xxx Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in
succession or automatic?

Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as
you mentioned? A: Automatic, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation? xxx xxx xxx

A: An army man, sir. Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun
report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?

Q: How long have you been employed with the army?

A: He passed by our back, sir.

A: Five (5) years, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?

Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was
shot?
A: Yes, sir.

A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with a M-14 being fired?

Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say
that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir. 13

Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

A: I was outside the cockpit, sir.  12

ATTY. ARRIOLA

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:

Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor
Arreola?
ATTY. CONSIGNA:

A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat
downward, is it not?
Q: What part of the cockpit?

A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.

Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?

A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How were they arranged?

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide
yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct? A: In rows, step by step, sir.

A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir. COURT:

Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. Q: How many rows?
witness?
A: Four rows, sir. Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?

ATTY. ARRIOLA: A: Because I saw it, sir.

Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola? Q: What did you do also?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir. A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also
wounded.

Q: And how about you?

Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the
place where you stayed? Q: What happened to him?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle I was also wounded."
sir.

Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?

A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".

A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?

A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.

A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of
Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember Mayor Arreola?
if there was untoward incident that happened?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14

A: Yes, sir.

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?

ATTY. CONSIGNA:
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola? accused Mario Tabaco?

A: Yes, sir. A: Before the shooting, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm? Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the
first time prior to the shooting incident?

A: M-14, sir.
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.

Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario
Tabaco?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He sat on the first row of the seats. xxx xxx xxx

Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor
Mario Tabaco, the accused sit? Arreola was dead already?

A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir. A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.

COURT: Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?

Q: How far? A: Yes, sir, in our place.

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part of COURT:
the cockpit?

Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: A little to the west, sir.

A: In our place, sir.

Q: An you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the
cockpit?
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A: We were on the northwest.

A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he
was also hit.
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of
you?
xxx xxx xxx

A: A little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:

Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late
Arreola on the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, Q: You don't know the person who shot him?
is that what you mean?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on
Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you mean? A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir. 15

A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were
together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit
arena?
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario
Tabaco considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have
stated in your direct examination you immediately sought cover?
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the
assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated
further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen.
His account of the incident is as follows:
PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.

A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?
A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q: Where were you also?
A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened if any?
xxx xxx xxx
A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I
got down, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to
hide myself, sir. 16
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun
went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside. 17
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the
above-named eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial
of the charges against him. As between the positive identification of the accused by
the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to
make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses
of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare
denial and explanation. 18
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-
appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would
they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well settled
is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption
was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit. 19
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling
the truth when they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in
the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who
examined the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets
that hit the ex-mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the ex-mayor,
and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as
the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was
seated at the first row which was the lowest while the ex-mayor and his companions
were seated at the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is
untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first
row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped
on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired
at them. 20
The above-quoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on
the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his
assailant were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor
Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have
already been lying down when his wound was inflicted. 21
Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for
the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito
Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about
9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the
canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five
successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his way
inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit
arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his
gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near
Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun
went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also
saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away from his left side, was
hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand
corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00
o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While
thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw
accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then
about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom
he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the
cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and
position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-
appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant
change his gun position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-
appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant squeezed
the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt.
Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun from accused-
appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but
Siriban was not as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or
wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had
Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without
merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter
changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he
thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt.
Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be
sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total
disregard of the consequences it might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not
intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4)
murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four
murder charges. The trial court explained the single sentence for four murder charges
in this wise:
Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of
Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively,
should have been prosecuted under only one Information.
The law provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as
amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).
Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs.
Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of
murder, which should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4)
victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4)
murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of
fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a
complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a
single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People
vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say - as the deaths of
Oscar Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the
accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty - is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the killing
have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by
surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden
attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99
Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced
to a single Penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs.
Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and
it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo,
was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the
penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE,
to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is 17 years, 4
months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is hereby
imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus
P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN No. 1492932, "K-2" -
magazine of M-14 and Exh. "L" - Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the
accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16
armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more than five (5)
persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to witness
Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the
lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and
on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. "R"
and "R-1"). 23
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion
perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was
committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one
single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning
continuous (emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines
enunciated in People vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial
court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was
only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which
produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound
crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the
case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in
killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco
entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon,
which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle
was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several
spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated
in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the
case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case
killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which,
like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the
death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical
injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although
it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of
time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death
caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as
many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same.
Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim,
respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the
fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing
that would connect one of them with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the
trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the
person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the
several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. 30
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us
with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant
is that Art. 48, was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that
there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial
court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the
"deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the applicability of Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to
apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act;
singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The
firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of
gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a
separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed
through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and
distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:
Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two
different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced.
The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain
the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the
deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be
considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must
therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced
accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding
accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide
with Frustrated Homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be
hereby imposed.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 136149-51               September 19, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias "WARPAN," appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed "no other crime." Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession
of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was
convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several
policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct
assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four
charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations, 2 all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G.
Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information 3 was for maintaining a den for the use of
regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house
located at Rio Hondo,4 this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his
co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form." 5
The second Information6 charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it
below:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of
crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody
and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7)
rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live
[ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle
with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live
ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with
Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the
necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned
law."7
The third Information,8 for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles
and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and
attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR.,
and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14
x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at
the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the
Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at
the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said
officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the
person of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts,
and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it
was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named
police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by
the accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely:
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and
subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his
escape and has remained at-large." 9
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. 10
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed
upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as
ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a
plea of not guilty.11 After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. ‘WARPAN’ -
"1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section
15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
"3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
"4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct
Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) and to pay the costs." (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.12
The Facts
Prosecution’s Version
In its Brief,13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
"At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about
2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the
Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was
conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato
Dela Peña was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera
were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3,
1998, pp. 33-36).
"After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March
4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellant’s house, three (3) persons sitting at a
nearby store ran towards the house shouting, ‘[P]olice, raid, raid’ (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23,
1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met
by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of
the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
"SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with the first group of
policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon,
the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the
concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded
the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
"In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-
76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building.
Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered.
Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground
floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young
girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl
remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
"Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle
at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside
the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a
neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the
raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside
not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya
arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
"At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala
on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle
and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine.
He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and
another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh.
G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
"After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant’s house, Rivera, Dela Peña, Gregorio and Obut followed
and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut
presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Peña and Rivera then searched appellant’s
room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On
top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or ‘shabu’.
"Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN,
April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition],
one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1)
empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
"Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the
morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellant’s house to buy
‘shabu.’ Locson knew appellant as a seller of ‘shabu’ (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellant’s
house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellant’s house at 3:20 p.m. He
bought P300.00 worth of ‘shabu’ from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag.
Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons
already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They
asked Locson to smoke ‘shabu’ and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of ‘shabu’ he bought on
the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
"While they were smoking ‘shabu,’ Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant’s house. They all stood and
entered appellant’s compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the
back of his house. Appellant told them to escape ‘because the police are already here.’ They scampered and
‘ran away because there were already shots.’ Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore.
Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
"The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M)
narrating what transpired at appellant’s house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
"After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Peña prepared a ‘Receipt for Property
Seized’ (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Peña as
the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as
witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized
(TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
"An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26,
1997 showed that the following firearms ‘were fired’ (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial
No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal.
7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-
4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
"With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M.
Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces
of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-
1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L).
However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
"The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show
that appellant ‘had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x
been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence’ (Exh. X)" 14
Defense’s Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. 15 Hence, we quote the
pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
"Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as
‘smuggling’ (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the
Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser
Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his ‘alias’. However, he admitted that more
people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He
testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping
in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandao’s house and not in his house
because they ha[d] ‘a sort of a conference’ as Dandao’s daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the
presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went
out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested ‘xxx [at] the other side of
my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house’ (tsn, p. 7, id.). He
does not know who arrested him ‘considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate.’ He
was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and
placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the
policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the ‘policemen’ [were] ‘the one[s] who fire[d] at us’
(tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die ‘[b]ecause the door is very near x x x
the vicinity of my house’. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. ‘B-3’) which according to policemen, he used in
firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman
also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle
(Exh. ‘B-4’), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. ‘G’; ‘G-1’ to ‘G-2’), the two (2) M14 magazines with
live ammunition (Exh. ‘G-3’; ‘G-4’); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. ‘B-1’; ‘B-2’), the fifty (50) aluminum
foils each containing shabu (Exhs. ‘J-1’ to ‘J-50’) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. ‘J’, the assorted coins
placed inside a blue bag (Exh. ‘W’) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. ‘K’) all do not belong to him. He said
that the policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were
brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he
said: ‘that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence’ (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
"Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he
owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband
whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the
police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y
Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize
him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he
knows ‘for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place’, in that area
known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
"After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one
night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He
smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him
by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the
PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May
4, 1998).
"During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman,
the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that ‘it was the policeman who
shot them[,] only I do not know his name." They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges
were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
"Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls
‘Hadji Id’ at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with
Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when ‘soldiers’ entered the house. ‘(W)hen they arrived, they
kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house’ (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long
firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of
Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside
the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in
the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the
search was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that ‘it was already
late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx
Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano’ (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived ‘already late
in the afternoon, almost sundown’ (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and
a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalam’s house (tsn, pp.
9-12, id).
"Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 o’clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested
him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had ‘around
P50,000.00’ placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone
position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He
was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to
the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three
months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
"Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the
house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her
parents’ house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in
Ladjaalam, Walpan’s wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her
husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the
policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other
companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).
"Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was
sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped
near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle,
pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when
she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and ‘there was a shot.’ As
a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10,
May 5, 1998).
"Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o ‘clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar.
Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw
policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already
handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already
over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw ‘the things that
they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu‘ (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search
Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They
were being counted and placed on a table. ‘Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I
just signed the receipt (Exh. "P"; "P-1") of the things x x x taken during the search" (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8,
1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The
three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id)." 16
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had
been issued for more than one specific offense, 17 in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.18 The court a quo ruled:
"It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally ‘null and void’ because it was issued for
more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that
‘A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense xxx’. In
Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than
one offense - a ‘scatter shot warrant’ - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is
‘totally null and void.’"19 (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellant’s arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers
who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several
police officers,20 who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests
conducted on the firearms and appellant.21 Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on
his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been
no exchange of gunfire during the raid.22 The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must
prevail over appellant’s narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
"Under the circumstances, the policemen ‘had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and
confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and
confiscation of the firearm.’ Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, ‘A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.’ An offense is committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant,
when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the
accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he committed the
crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant." 23
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a
magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) 24 used by appellant against the police elements, two M14
magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.25 The trial court observed that these items were in "plain
view" of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were "evidence [of] the
commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure" 26 since appellant "had not applied
for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence." 27
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellant’s claim that the items that were seized by the
police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to
plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after
his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were
accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed
these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense. 28
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
"The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado
Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension
house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or
customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and
sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or
regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence
but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation
of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused
Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan’ that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users
who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson,
SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he
alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of
the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being
uncorroborated, Walpan’s testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the
extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the extension
house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan’ is a
weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence." 29
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellant’s liability in this manner:
"x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to
serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple
attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and
no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
"The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section
16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of
1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are
inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not
found in ‘plain view’ of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with
magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and
twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the
other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be
returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ because according to the accused the blue bag
and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the
National Treasury."30
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 38 Suffice it to state that the trial
court’s assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. 39 After carefully examining
the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellant’s claim, we cannot exempt this case
from the general rule.40 Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant
had fired upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1
Amado Mirasol Jr.41 testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?

The Issues A: Yes.

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors: Q: And it’s there where you were met by a volley of fire?

I A: Yes, Your Honor.

"The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police COURT:
officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between
Ladjaalam and the police officer.
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were
fired upon?
II

A: More or less, five (5) meters.

"The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the
scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
x x x           x x x          x x x

III
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

"The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties
[excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe
planted by the police."31 Gaganting ... I will reform that question.

In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall
also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.

The Court’s Ruling

Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?

The appeal has no merit.

A: Yes.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam
residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court "a better perspective and A: Yes.
an idea with respect to the scene of the crime." 32 We do not agree.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.33 We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic]
Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellant’s house. 34 Viewing the Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old
site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings. 35 Moreover, the question whether to view the setting woman.
of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. 36 Here, there is no
reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion. 37
 x x x           x x x          x x x Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?

PROSECUTOR NUVAL: A: At the sala set.

Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women? Q: This sala set where is this located?

A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo
Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?

Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?

A: Yes.

A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?

Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?

A: Yes.

A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and
immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the Q: Why can you identify that?
window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbor’s house.
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
COURT:
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
Reform. That is leading
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbor’s house?
This is already marked as our Exhibit ‘B-3’ with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the
raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?

x x x           x x x          x x x
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over
to the investigator.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Where did you turn it over?
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: At the crime scene.
A: Yes.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: Yes.
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the
investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam." 42
Q: Why?

What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, 43 as follows:
A: I put x x x markings.

"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, ‘do not fire at the
COURT:
second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.’
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines? A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be]
positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.

A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?

Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?

A: Yes.

A: Empty.
x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: How about the M14?

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

A: Found with [ammunition].

Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit ‘B-3’, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?

x x x           x x x          x x x
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and
traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?

Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?

A: In the corner.

A: It indicates that the gun was fired.

Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?

Q: Recently?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.

A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x.
Q: Can you identify them?

COURT:
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]

Q: There is also black residue?

Q: Where are your initials?

A: Yes.
A: On the magazines.

Q: What does it indicate?

Q: RJL?

A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.

A: RJL."44

Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized
during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were
positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open court: A: This one.

"Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness? PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit ‘B-3-A’.
nitrates.

COURT:
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.

A: Yes.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?

Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor."45 (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements 46 of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers
clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the
second element was the prosecution’s Certification 47 stating that he had not filed any application for license to
possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. 48 Further, it
should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this
weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual. 49
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is
frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were "planted," and that the entire Zamboanga
police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but
terribly difficult to disprove.50 Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police
officers,51 coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be
given much credence.52 Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed
to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his
testimony during the trial.53 He testified thus:
"Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December
1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: ‘that I was
resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house..
and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who
attacked x x x our house’; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring
to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you
heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: ‘that [o]n that afternoon of September
24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house
[were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo,
Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors[‘] house at
that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house
at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct." 54
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with
attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he
was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of
Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a
drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all
the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house
and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault 55 with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that "[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to
enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x" constituted such complex crime. 56
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional.57 Hence, for the
present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the "most serious crime," should be
imposed and applied in its maximum period. 58
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted
him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294,
and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied
the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as
worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial court’s ruling and the OSG’s submission exemplify the legal community’s difficulty in grappling with
the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section
1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer
of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the
firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty
of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course
of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside
his residence without legal authority therefor."
Citing People v. Jayson,59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this
case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot
be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision.
Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating
circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that
the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time. 60
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession
of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however.
Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso61 in the second paragraph, it seemed to have
construed "no other crime" as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is
committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime
committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of
illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A
simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can
be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be
held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 62 In this case, the plain meaning of RA
8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the
language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. 63 Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder,
illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSG’s contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be
applied in this case.1âwphi1 When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of
PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. 64 In other
words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal
possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other
amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was committed."
Furthermore, the OSG’s reliance on People v. Jayson65 is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction
of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained,
however, that "the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration."
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the
second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention
of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said
so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an
offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first
is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for
illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, 66 like alarm and
scandal67 or slight physical injuries,68 both of which are punishable by arresto menor.69 This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review.
Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the
Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence 70 to the
proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found
guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for
which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug
den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound
discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 110037. May 21, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. EDUARDO PULUSAN y
ANICETA, ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO, ROLANDO TAYAG and JOHN DOE Alias
Ramon/Efren, accused.
EDUARDO PULUSAN y ANICETA and ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Four men held a robbery of a passenger jeepney along Bulacan-Pampanga highway, divesting
all passenger of their valuables. Four of the jeepney's passengers were killed by the robbers and
the only female passenger raped repeatedly. Three victims, however, lived to tell the story - the
jeepney driver, a fifty-year old and the ravaged girl .
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecution evidence as follows:
On January 20, 1986 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Constancio Gomez was then plying
his route from Balagtas, Bulacan along the MacArthur Highway going towards Malolos, Bulacan
on board a passenger jeepney with six (6) passenger (pp. 5-6, TSN, June 10, 1986). They
included Marilyn Martinez a seventeen (17) year old student and Cresenciano Pagtalunan (p. 2,
TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 2-3, TSN, June 10, 1986). The four (4) other male passenger were
later identified to be Rodolfo Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan
(pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986; pp. 5-14, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, April 8, 1987;
Exhibits "Z", "AA', "BB", "CC").
Upon reaching Bry. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, a group of four (4) male passengers boarded the
jeepney (pp. 5-6, TSN, June 10, 1986). Two of them sat at the rearmost portion of the jeepney
fronting each other; the third sat behind the driver's seat while the fourth man sat in the middle
of the other passengers (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 22, 1986; pp. 3-5,
TSN, March 10, 1987). Sudenly, the man who was later identified to be appellant Eduardo
Pulusan, who sat behind the driver, poked a knife at Constancio Gomez and announced: "Hold-
up ito, huwag kayong kikilos (pp. 5-6, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, 9, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp
4-6, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, 9, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 4-6, TSN, March 18, 1987).
Thereafter, appellant Pulusan's three (3) companions followed suit, poked their knife and
"sumpak" (homemade shotgun) at the passengers and divested them of their valuables (p. 6,
TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 3-5, TSN, July 22, 1986; pp. 5-9, March 10, 1997). Gomez was
divested of his P100 cash money, a lighter valued at P50.00 and a fancy ring of unknown value
(pp.7-8, TSN, June 10, 1986). Cresenciano Pagtalunan, one of the passengers was similarly
divested of P110.00 in cash and a diver's watch worh P1,000.00 (TSN, pp.3-4, July 22, 1986).
Marilyn Martinez, another passenger was divested of a wristwatch worth P350.00 together with
her books, notebooks and handbag (pp. 5-7, TSN, March 10, 1987). Rodolfo Cruz was likewise
divested of a watch valued at P700.00, a wedding ring worth P500.00 and P750.00 in cash
(pp.3-8, TSN, Jan. 27, 1987). Magno Surio's watch worth P400.00, camera with flash bulb and
batteries inside and cash of more than P2,000.00 were also taken during the incident (pp. 3-7,
9-10, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; Exhs. "A", "B", "C" to "C-3"). Thereafter, appellant Pulusan took over
the wheels from driver Gomez and drove towards Pampanga. He later stopped at Quezon Road,
Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga (pp. 7 - 8, TSN, June 10, 1987). He parked the jeepney
in a "talahiban" where there were no people around except for the occupants of the passenger
jeepney (pp. 7 - 8, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 7 - 8, TSN, March 10, 1987). Afterwards, appellant
Rolando Rodriguez (Rodriguez) dragged Marilyn Martinez to the "talahiban" a few meters away
from the parked jeepney where his three (3) companions, including appellant Pulusan, were left
guarding Gomez and his other passengers (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 10-11, TSN March
10, 1987; pp. 1-13, TSN, March 18, 1987). Once at the "talahiban," appellant Rodriguez, then
armed with a kitchen knife, through force and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of Marilyn Martinez who was then still virgin (Exhibit "W"; pp. 10-13, TSN, March 10,
1987). Subsequently, appellant Pulusan followed appellant Rodriguez and Marilyn Martinez at
the "talahiban and likewise sexually abused her (pp. 14-15, TSN, March 10, 1987; Exh. "W").
Later, appellants two other companions similarly took turns in having carnal knowledge of
Marilyn Martinez at the "talahiban" (pp. 15-16, TSN, March 10, 1987). After the fourth man had
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her , he held Marilyn Martinez's wrist and they both
proceeded towards the jeepney (pp. 16-17, TSN, March 10, 1987).
Meanwhile, at the place where the jeepney was parked Gomez and one of his passengers who
were then inside the vehicle were called outside by one of appellant's companions and asked
Gomez " pare, gusto mo bang mamatay?" (p. 10, TSN, June 10, 1986). Gomez pleaded with
them that he be spared because his wife recently gave birth and he was the only breadwinner
for his family (ibid). Thereafter, he was boxed at the right jaw and told to board the jeepney
while said man, together with appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez, clubbed and stabbed the
passenger who was called with him (pp. 10-11, TSN, June 10, 1986). Subsequently, the four
called three other passengers inside the jeepney one by one. When the three (3) passengers
managed to run towards the "talahiban" but his captors pursued and eventually killed him (pp.
10-11, TSN, June 10, 1986). Subsequently, Cresenciono Pagtaluan was hit with pipe and
clubbed by appellant and their companions but one of them uttered: Pare, huwag na yan,
matanda na yan, hindi na papalag" (pp. 12-13, TSN, ibid' p. 7, TSN, July 22, 1986). Thereafter,
Gomez was ordered to start the jeepney while a shotgun was aimed at his temple and
threatened not to report the incident (ibid.) Eventually, their captors boarded Marilyn Martinez
in the jeepney and threatened her not to report the incident and sent them home. Appellants
and his companions then dispersed to different directions (pp. 12-13, TSN, June 10, 1986).
Accordingly, Gomez and his two surviving passengers Marilyn Martinez and Cresenciano
Pagtalunan, left their four (4) co-passengers who had been killed by their captors and
proceeded to the Municipal Building of Apalit, Pampanga to report the incident to the Apalit
police (p. 14, TSN, June 20, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN, July 22, 1986; p. 19, TSN, March 10, 1987).
Accompanied by the Apalit police (p. 14, TSN, June 20, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN, July 22, 1986; p.
19, TSN, March 10, 1987). Gomez and Crescenciano Pagtalunan, were immediately interviewed
by Pat. Maniago, Investigator of the San Simon (pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986). Later,
Pagtalunan stayed at the municipal building of San Simon where he remained for more than a
day (p. 10, TSN where he remained for more than a day (p. 10, TSN, July 22, 1986).
Thereafter, the joint team of the San Simon and Apalit police, including Pat. Maniago, Pfc.
Nicolas Yambao and Umali was accompanied by Gomez to the crime scene at Quezon Road,
Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon where the bodies of his four (4) male passengers were found and
which were later brought to the Funeraria Punzalan for autopsy (p. 14, June 10, 1996; pp. 3-5,
TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Pat. Emerito Maniago prepared a sketch of the crime scene (Exh. "S", p. 4,
TSsN, Dec 2, 1986). Eventually, Pat. Maniago, Pfc, Nicolas Yambao and Lino Umali returned to
the station and interviews Gomez and Pagtalunan about the description of the suspects and
conducted follow-up investigation of the case (pp. 3-4, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; Exh. "P", "P-1"; pp.
3-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986; pp. 2-9, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987). They also proceeded to Malolos, Bulacan
to coordinate with the Malolos INP for the identification of the victims' cadavers (pp. 3-4, TSN,
Dec. 2, 1986). Thereafter, Pat. Maniago prepared an "Initial Investigation Report" addressed to
Corporal Santiago Rodriguez, Station Commander of the San Simon Police Station at San
Simon, Pampanga concerning the "Robbery In Band, Rape, Multiple Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearms/Deadly Weapons" committed on or about 9:30 to 10:30 P.M. of January
20, 1986 at Quezon Road, San Pablo Propio, San Simon, Pampanga (Exh. "P", "P-1"; pp. 2-5,
TSN, Dec 16, 1986; pp. 2-16, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987; pp. 2-3, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986).
On January 21, 1986, Cpl. Santiago Rodriguez was informed of the aforesaid incident (pp. 2-3,
TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). He then instructed his men to continue investigation on the case
considering that preliminary investigation threon had been made by Pat. Maniago (pp. 3-4,
TSN, ibid.; pp. 3-6, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986).
On the same day, Marilyn Martinez, one of the surviving victims, was brought by her relatives to
the Cemtral Luzon General Hospital in San Fernando, Pampanga where she underwent physical
examination by Dr. Evelyn Macabulos, resident of the Hospital's Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department (pp. 19-20, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 6-15, TSN, May 27, 1987; Exh. "W", "W1").
Dr. Macabulos found that the patient was conscious, coherent , slightly incooperative,
distraught, untidy with soiled clothes and underwear" and that her blood pressure was 130/80
while her pulse rate was 105 per minute (pp 7-9, TSN, May 27, 1987). She noted that "her eyes
were swollen but without contusions; her heart was slightly tachycardic, regular rate rhythm
with no murmur (pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid) She also observed that she had clear breath sounds; her
breast are conical, well-developed, symmetrical with light brown nipple and areola, no
contusions noted" (ibid.). She also noted that he trunk has linear hematoma at the back which
looked like finger marks while in her extremities, there were 2 x 1.5 cm. Round hematoma at
posterior upper part of the left thigh (pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid). Dr. Macabulos further osserved that
in her external genitalia there was "scanty pubic hair, well coaptated but moderately swollen
labia minora, labia mahora also confested (sic)". She noted that the hymen had fresh
lacerations at 12 o'clock, 6 o'clock, 5 and 7 o'clock; scantly bleeding from the laceration; there
was a .3 x .3 cm. Hematoma (sic) at 12 o'clock; the patient cried and was hysterical in the
examination of her genitalia and complained of pain when application was inserted for smear;
the patient's panty was stained with blood and when smear for spermatozoa was done, none
was found (pp. 10-11, TSN, May 27, 1987; Exh. "w"). Later that day, Marilyn was confined at
the Rosary Hospital in Bulacan for 2 1/2 days so that she can recover her strength (p. 11, TSN,
March 25, 1987).
Meanwhile, the widows of the passengers who were killed during the January 20, 1986 incident
at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, including Susana Bautista Vda. De Surio, Lucila Cruz
and Corazon Dionisio, were informed that their respective husbands were among the four (4)
passengers of jeepney who were killed in San Simon, Pampanga and were invited to go to the
funeral parlor in Pampanga to make the necessary identification of the cadavers (pp. 305, TSN,
April 8, 1987; pp. 3-4, TSN, January 27, 1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987). Lucila Cruz
confirmed her husband's death when she went to San Simon, Pampanga on January 23, 1986 at
2:00 o'clock p.m. (pp. 3-4, TSN, January 23, 1987; Exh. "Z", pp. 8-9, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987). The
death of her husband Constancio Dionisio was confirmed by his widow Corazon when she went
to the funeral parlor in San Simon on January 25, 1986 (pp. 3-5, TSN, April 8, 1987). The death
of Magno Surio was also confirmed by his widow Susana Bautista Surio when she went to the
funeral parlor in San Simon accompanied by a policeman from malolos (pp.3-5, TSN, Feb. 17,
1987; Exh. "AA"; pp. 10-11, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
Dr. Maria Teresa F. Santos, Rural Health Physician of San Simon, Pampanga, who conducted
autopsy of the four (4) cadavers recovered at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, issued
Certificates of Death of Rodolfo C. Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando
Cundangan (pp. 3-4, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987; Exhs. "Z", "AA", "BB" and "CC"). The cause of death of
Rodolfo C. Cruz was "Cardio-respiratory arrest, shock hemorrhage, multiple stab wounds" (Exh.
"ZZ, pp. 8-9, TSN. Aug. 5, 1987). The cause of death of Magno dela Cruz y Surio is the same as
that of Rodolfo C. Cruz (Exh. "AA", pp. 10-11 TSN, Aug. 5, 1987). The stated cause of death of
Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan was also the same as those indicated in the
certificates of death of the other victims (Exhs. "BB", "CC"; pp. 12-14, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
Meanwhile, in the early morning of January 23, 1986, Cpl. Rodriguez received a tip from a
civilian informer that the description of one of the four (4) suspects given by Marilyn Martinez
tallied with that of appellant Eduardo Pulusan who previously had a record in their file (pp. 6-8,
TSN, Nov. 25, 1986; pp. 4-6, TSN, Sept. 7, 1987).
In the afternoon of January 23, 1986, Cpl. Rodriguez, Pat. Maniago and several policemen of
San Simon, Pampanga, together with the Pampanga P.C. Command, including Sgt. Mario Dulin,
proceeded to the residence of appellant Pulusan at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon., Pampanga (pp.
10-11, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986). When their group reached San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, they
found Honwario Pulusan, appellant Eduardo Pulusan's brother there (pp. 10-11, Nov. 25, 1986;
p. 6, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987). After interviewing him, the team learned from Honwario that
appellant Pulusan was with Rolando Rodriguez, Rolando Tayag and one Efren alias Ramon at
Bgy. Moras dela Paz, Sto Tomas, Pampanga, where Rolando Rodriguez resided (pp.2-5, TSN,
Nov. 18, 1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987; pp. 5-7, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Immediately
thereafter, the joint San Simon police and Pampanga PC Team coordinated with the Station
Commander of Sto. Tomas and proceeded to Moras dela Paz together with Honwario Pulusan
(pp. 3-5, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Upon reaching Bgy. Moras dela Paz, the team parked their
vehicle a few meters away from the residence of appellant Rolando Rodriguez (pp. 5-6, TSN,
Oct. 7, 1997). As the members of the joint PC and police team approached the residence of
appellant Rodriguez about 20 or 30 meters therefrom, they noticed four (4) persons, including
appellants Rodriguez and Pulusan, jumping and scampering away from the house (pp. 7-8, TSN,
Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 7-8, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Honwario Pulusan pointed to the police team
appellants Rodriguez and Pulusan and also and "Kuya, sumuko na kayo" (p. 8, TSN, Dec. 2,
1986). The joint police and PC team pursued them and eventually apprehended appellants
Rodriguez and Pulusan (pp. 7-8, TSN, September 9, 1987; pp. 4-6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1986).
Thereafter, Pat. Maniago, Sgt. Dulin and the Barangay Captain, returned to the house of
appellant Rodriguez, conducted a search thereon in the presence of one Gloria Bautista, siste-
in-law of Rolando and eventually confiscated several items, to wit: "one (1) camera, nikon type
with cover (Exh. "A"); one (1) pair of men's shoes, colored brown (Exh. "E"); one pair Grosby
men's shoes (while) (Exh. "G"); one (1) pair ladies shoes colored black (Melvin Trade Mark
(Exh. "H"); one (1) KNIFE 12 inches long (Exh. "J"); one (1) knife 10 inches long (Exh. "K");
one (1) sunglass (Unisex) (Exh. "I"); one (1) ladies wrist watch (Urika) (Exh. "M"); four (4) pcs.
of batteries (Exh. "C" to "C-3"); two (2) pieces of steel pipes which turned out to be an
improvised 12 gauge shotgun "paltik-sumpak" (Exh. "L", "L-1"); one (1) pants Haruta (Exh.
"F"); one (1) jacket colored green (Exh "D"); one (1) camera flasher (Exh. "B"); two (2) pieces
(live) 12 gauge shotgun ammos (Exh. "N"); and one (1) piece empty shell for 12 gauge
shotgun" (Exh. "N") (pp. 8-10, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN, Sept 9, 1987; pp. 3-9, TSN,
Dec. 9, 1986; pp. 6-10, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Afterwards, Sgt. Dulin prepared an inventory of
the recovered items (Exh. "R", "R-1", "R-2"; pp. 8-11, Sept. 9, 1987). Subsequently, appellants
Pulusan and Rodriguez, together with recovered items, were brought to the Station of the
Pampanga P.C. Command at St. Nino, San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation (p.15,
TSN, Sept. 9, 1987). A "Progress Report" relative to the arrest of appellants Pulusan and
Rodriguez and the recovery of the items from their possession was also made by Cpl. Rodriguez
(Exh. "Q", "A-1").
In the afternoon of January 23, 1986, the joint police and PC team informed the three (3)
surviving victims Gomez, Pagtalunan and Martinez that the suspects had been arrested and
invited them and the wives of the victims who were killed, including Lucila Cruz, Susanaa Surio
and Mrs. Cundangan, to go to the PC Headquaters in the morning of January 24, 1986 (pp. 15-
16, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987; pp. 10-11 TSN, Nov. 11, 1986; pp. 23-24, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986; pp. 4-
11 , TSN, Nov. 11, 1986).
In the early morning of January 24, 1986, Gomez, Marilyn Martinez and Pagtalunan, together
with the wives of those who were killed, proceeded to the PC Headquarters in San Fernando
Pampanga (pp. 15-16, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, TSN, July 29, 1986). Three persons,
including appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez, were presented to Gomez, Martinez and Pagtalunan
and they were asked if they knew them (pp. 2-3, TSN, Oct. 14, 1986) Pagtalunan pinpointed
only two of them, appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez as the persons who held them up in Malolos
on January 20, 1986 (ibid.; pp. 15-17, TSN, July 22, 1986). Gomez and Martinez also positively
identified appellants to be among the four (4) persons who committed the robbery, killing and
rape in the evening of January 20, 1986 (pp. 10-11, kTSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 20-21, TSN, March
19, 1987; Exh. "O", "O-1" to "O-3"). Pictures of the identification of appellants Pulusan and
Rodriguez by the three (3) surviving victims were taken by a commercial photographer under
the supervision of the police authorities (pp. 16-17, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, TSN, July 29,
1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, July 22, 1986; Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-2" and "O-3").
Susana Bautista Surio, widow of the victim Magno Surio, in her "Sworn Statement: identified
the camera, flash and batteries, among the items confiscated by the police at the house of
appellant Rodriguez, to be the property of her husband who used them in his work as
commercial photographer (pp. 4-11, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; Exh. "U", "U-1"; Exhs. "A", "B", "C" to
"C-3").
An information charging Pulusan and Rodriguez with the crime of highway robbery attended
with multiple homicide and multiple rape was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Malolos.1 The information was later amended to include Rolando Tayag and one John Doe alias
Ramon or Efren. The amended information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1986, along the Mac Arthur highway in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Eduardo Pulusan y Anicete and Rolando Rodriguez y
Macalino, Rolando Tayag and one John doe alias Ramon/Efren, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, armed with an improvised firearm and bladed instruments,
with intent of gain and by means of violence against and intimidation persons (sic), did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them the following
articles from the driver and the passengers of a passenger jeepney bound for the said
municipality, to wit:
From Constancio Gomez, driver:
Cash ------------------------------------------------------------------- P100.00
Lighter (Zippo brand) ----------------------------------------------- 100.00
2 fancy rings ---------------------------------------------------------- 60.00
From Cresenciano Pagtalumam, passenger:
Cash --------------------------------------------------------------------- P 110.00
Wrist watch ------------------------------------------------------------ 1,500.00
From Magno Surio, passenger:
Wrist watch, Seiko brand -------------------------------------------- P 800.00
Camera, Nikon brand ------------------------------------------------ 8,000.00
From Armando Cundangan, passenger:
Wrist watch, Seiko brand ------------------------------------------- P 700.00
Cash ------------------------------------------------------------------- 80.00
From Rodolfo Cruz, passenger:
Cash ---------------------------------------------------------------- P 700.00
Wrist watch, Seiko brand ----------------------------------------- 700.00
From Constancion Dionisio, passenger:
Cash ----------------------------------------------------------------- P 200.00
From Constancio Dionisio, passenger:
Cash --------------------------------------------------------------- P 200.00
From Marilyn Martinez, passenger:
Wrist watch Urika brand ---------------------------------- ----- P 350.00
To the damage and prejudice of the above-enumerated persons in the amounts
above-mentioned; and that by reason or on the occasion of the said highway
robbery and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the said Eduardo Pulusan y Aniceta,
Rolando Rodriguez y Macalinao and Rolando Tayag and one John Doe alias
Ramon/Efren, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, have carnal knowledge
of said Marilyn Martinez one after the other, and with intent to kill, abuse of
superior strength, cruelty, treachery and evidence premeditation, further assault,
attack strike and hack/stab with the weapons they were then provided the said
Magno Surio, Armando Cundagan, Rodolfo Cruz and Constancio Dionisio, inflicting
on the said persons serious physical injuries which directly caused their
instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Rolando Tayag and John Does alias Ramon or Efren remain at large. Pulusan and Rodriguez
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
In his defense, Rodriguez testified that he was a nephew of co-accused Eduardo Pulusan. He
denied knowledge of the crime charged against him. He asserts that he had not committed any
crime, and that in fact, he was able to get an NBI clearance as a requirement for his work as a
driver in Iraq.3cräläwvirtualibräry
As a kabo ng jueteng, he would collect bets three times a day, the last jueteng draw being at
9:30 in the evening. He would thus be home only between 11:30 and twelve midnight, as on
the night of January 20, 1986. Rodriguez presented in court to corroborate his alibi
fellow kabo Oscar Nocum, a jueteng collector named Sara Lee, and a jueteng  bettor Marilou
Garcia.
Oscar Nocum testified that Rodriguez was with him from about 9:30 in the evening of January
20, 1986, which was the time of the last jueteng draw, until midnight:4cräläwvirtualibräry
Sara lee, who lived nine houses from Rodriguez, testified that on the night of January 20, 1986
she saw Rodriguez at around eight o'clock to remit her collection. Rodriguez then came back to
her house between 10:30 and eleven o'clock because she had invited him to her daughter's
birthday celebration and because they expected to hear from him the results of
the jueteng  draw.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Marilou Garcia, also a neighbor of Rodriguez who lived six houses away, testified that she placed
a bet with Rodriguez at his house at around eight o'clock to 8:45 in the evening of January 20,
1986, afterwhich Rodriguez left. She next saw him later that evening at around 10:30 to eleven
o'clock when he passed by Garcia's house where a bingo game was in
progress.6cräläwvirtualibräry
When arrested at his house in Moras, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga, Rodriguez was with his two
children, his uncle Eduardo Pulusan and jueteng collectors, one of which was Rolando Tayag,
one of those charged with Pulusan and Rodriguez in the amended information. Pulusan was in
Rodriguez's house to invite the latter to their town fiesta. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
Eduardo Pulusan testifying in his defense asserted that on January 20, 1986, he was repairing
his house in preparation for the coming fiesta. His helper then was a certain Tony. The following
day, he also stayed at home because he helped his father in their fishpond. He did not leave his
house until around 1:30 p.m. on January 23, 1986 when he went to the house of his nephew,
Rolando Rodriguez, to invite him to the fiesta. Pulusan presented in court his mother, Agapita,
and Antonio Libid, the carpenter who allegedly repaired his house, to corroborate his alibi. Both
testified that Pulusan did not leave the house on the night of January 20,
1986.8cräläwvirtualibräry
He professed innocence because he had never been implicated in a crime, not even vagrancy.
He denied the testimony of prosecution witness Sgt. Dulin that he once had a rape case against
him.9cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 5, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Bulucan, Branch 12 at Malolos, rendered a Decision
in Criminal Case No. 9217-M as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused EDUARDO
PULUSAN y ANICETA and ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court finds them guilty of the offense of Robbery with Homicide
penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, and hereby
 sentences each of them to suffer and undergo imprisonment for life or RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with cost against said accused.
Both accused Pulusan and Roriguez are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of the late Rodolfo Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dinisio and
Armando Cundangan the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) for
each dead victim as civil indemnification for their death.
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are also hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, as indemnification to the rape victim Marilyn Martinez, the amount of
SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby further ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay moral damages to the respective heirs of the deceased Magno
Surio, Rodolfo Cruz, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan, the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby further ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay moral damages to the respective heirs of the deceased Magno
Surio, Rodolfo Cruz, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan, the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to each victim and to rape victim Marilyn
Martinez the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby furthermore ordered, jointly and
severally, to reimburse the heirs of the dead victims for the funeral expenses by
them as follows:
TWENTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P21,830.00) for deceased Rodolfo Cruz;
TEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P10,170.00)
for deceased Magno Surio;
ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) for deceased
Constancio Dionisio.
Finally, both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby ordered, jointly and
severally, to return to the victims or their heirs the items they have taken during
the robbery or to reimburse the value thereof as follows:
Constancio Gomez - a lighter worth P50.00 and cash of P100.00;
Cresenciano Pagtalunan - a driver's watch Worth P1,100.00 and cash of P110.00.
Marilyn Martinez - a wrist watch worth P350.00;
Rodolfo Cruz - a watch worth P700.00, a wedding ring worth P500 and cash
of P750.00.
As regards accused ROLANDO TAYAG and a John Doe alias 'Ramon/Efren', let the record of this
case be committed to the Archives to await their arrest and for this purpose, let an alias warrant
of arrest be issued against accused Rolando Tayag.
SO ORDERED.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Pulusan contends before this Court that the trial court erred in giving credence to his
identification by prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime; in giving
evidentiary weight to the "incredible, unreliable and inconsistent if not conflicting testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses;" in failing to give "exculpatory weight" to his alibi which was
supported by witnesses, and in convicting him even if his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Rodriguez asserts that the trial court erred in convicting him and imposing on him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and in giving credence to the evidence presented by the
prosecution.12cräläwvirtualibräry
The arguments of Pulusan and Rodriguez are anchored mainly on the issue of credibility.
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such
testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is
hereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the
false.13 Thus, the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance
which could have affected the result of the case. 14 There is no showing in the instant case of an
oversight, misundertanding or misapplication of facts on the part of the trial court that may
warrant reversal of that court" findings and conclusions.
Pulusan avers that the prosecution witnesses' identification of him as one of the robbers was not
enough to hurdle the test of certainty.15 Pulusan quotes the following portions of the testimony
of Constancio Gomez:16cräläwvirtualibräry
Q Mr. Witness before the wheel of your jeep was taken from you and (you were) told to sit at
the back, you did not recognize the faces of those persons?
A No, sir.
Q Because you did not give a glance at their faces, correct?
A When something was poked at me, I have not yet recognized them. But when I was sitted
(sic) at the back, once in awhile I glanced at them, sir.
Q Mr. Witness when one of the persons you mentioned who boarded your jeep at Tikay, Malolos,
Bulacan poked a knife at your back and announced a hold-up, you became greatly afraid Mr.
Witness, correct?
A Of course, sir.
Q You were even terrified of being killed harmed by such happening, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were very much afraid of these four men who announced the hold-up, correct?
A Yes, sir, of course, I am afraid.
xxx
Q In fact Mr. Witness when these persons announced the hold-up, specifically when one of them
was poking a knife at your back and you were terribly afraid of these four persons, you were
afraid much more to look at their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir, I am not looking at their faces because something was poked at me.
Q Now even if you were ordered to go inside the jeepney, together with the passengers and
even after one of the four men took the wheels of the jeep, you were still very afraid to look at
them, correct?
A Even if I am so afraid, sir, once in a while I glanced at them and tried to recognize them.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that when you were ordered to go inside the jeep to sit with your
passengers, they ordered the light of the jeep to be put off?
A When that was said, we were already far and all the valuables were already taken from us,
sir.
Q The light were (sic) ordered to go inside the jeep to sit with your passengers, they ordered
the light of the jeep to be put off?
A They were the ones who put off the light, sir.
Q When you said that you take a look at their faces, it means to say that you take only a
passing glance at their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you were just taking a passing glance of the faces of those four men, you did not
actually describe (sic) their faces, is that correct?
A Some of them I can describe but the others I cannot, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place where the jeep stopped, is it not a fact that the place was
dark?
A Darked (sir), sir.
Q While you were there, you were not able to recognize the faces of the four men, correct?
A No more because it was dark, sir.17 (Underlining supplied)
The quoted portion, rather than support Pulusans contention, show that Gomez, although
gripped by fear, was able to look at and see the malefactors. While it may be true that Gomez
had only occasional glances at the men, this does not mean that he could not have been able to
recognize them. The most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the
appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime was
being committed.18cräläwvirtualibräry
We also consider the following testimony of Cresenciano Pagtalunan, thus:
Q When these four passengers boarded the jeepney, was the jeepney inside lighted or not?
A The jeepney was lighted, sir.
Q Did you look at the faces of these four persons who boarded the jeepney?
A I came to know their faces when they passed by me and announced that it was a hold-up, I
happened to look at them, sir.
Q In fact you looked at their faces and you have only a glimpse of their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have glimpses of these four persons who boarded at Malolos or only one of them?
A I saw their faces because there was still light inside the jeep, sir. 19cräläwvirtualibräry
This testimony was corroborated by Marilyn Martinez who affirmed that when the four men
boarded the jeep, the light inside the jeep was still on. She was able to recognize the men
because they entered the jeep one by one. Moreover, Marilyn testified that even though the
light inside the jeep was off, because they travelled quite a long distance, lights from the
vehicles following them provided enough illumination.20 When they arrived at the
isolated talahiban in Sto. Tomas, one of the robbers switched on the headlights of the jeep.
After the repeated rape of Marilyn, the light inside the jeep was already on. 21 Furthermore,
appellant Rodriguez, who was the first to rape Marilyn, dragged her to the talahiban by passing
in from to the jeep with its headlights on. She was looking at him, pleading for
mercy.22cräläwvirtualibräry
This Court has time and again held that the relative weight and significance of evidence on
visibility depend largely on the attending circumstances and the discretion of the trial court. The
Court has considered as sufficient for identification illumination from a kerosene lamp 23 from a
flashlight,24 in the same way that the Court considered as enough lighting for identification
purposes the medium light inside a jeepney which was passing through a dark place. 25 In the
instant case, the factor of visibility was in favor of the eyewitnesses. Such identification by all of
the three prosecution eyewitnesses, not only by one, could not have been coincidental or
contrived.
In an attempt to discredit the eyewitnesses and their testimonies, Pulusan points out these
conflicting testimonies: (1) Gomez and Marilyn testified he poked a knife at Gomez while
Pagtalunan said that he was holding a sumpak; (2) Gomez testified that it was Pulusan who
brought Marilyn to the talahiban while according to Marilyn, it was Rodriguez who brought her
first to that place; (3) Gomez testified that they went to the PC headquarters the day following
January 20, 1986 while Pagtalunan testified that they did so four days later; and (4) Gomez
contradicted his testimony on direct examination that the crime transpired on January 20, 1986
by his testimony on cross-examination that the incident happened on February 20, 1986.
We find these alleged contradictions too trivial to affect the prosecutions case. Far from eroding
the effectiveness of the testimonies of these eyewitnesses, such trivial differences are in fact
indicative of veracity. 26 Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in
every detail considering the inevitability of differences in their recollection, viewpoint or
impression. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not required as long as the witnesses concur on
material points.27cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution, contrary to appellants contention has also proven beyond reasonable doubt
that the four men, Pulusan and Rodriguez included, conspired in the commission of the crime. In
conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be
deducted from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such points to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.28cräläwvirtualibräry
Pulusan and Rodriguez boarded the jeep together with two companions at the same time in
Barangay Tikay. When Pulusan announced the hold-up, Rodriguez and their companions
simultaneously brandished knives and the sumpak and divested the passengers of their money
and valuables. When the jeepney reached an isolated place, the men took turns in raping
Marilyn, inflicting physical harm on four male passengers who all succumbed to repeated
clubbing and stabbing. After the carnage, the four malefactors walked towards the same
northerly direction. Apparent then is the unity of purpose and design in the execution of the
unlawful act.29 And where the conspiracy is shown, the precise extent of participation of each
accused in the crime is secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the
conspirators.30cräläwvirtualibräry
Pulusan and Rodriguezs respective alibis cannot prosper. Apart from the fact that they situated
themselves in places not too far from the crime scene, there was no proof that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the locus criminis during its commission.31 Most of all, their
respective alibis collapse in the face of the positive identification of them as the perpetrators of
the crime.32cräläwvirtualibräry
The crime of charged in the information was highway robbery attended with multiple homicide
with multiple rape. Highway robbery or brigandage is defined in Sec. (2) of Presidential Decree
No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, as:
(t)he seizure of any person of ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away
of property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.
As manifest in its preamble, the object of the decree is to deter and punish lawless elements
who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of
the nation and stunning the economic and social progress of the people. A conviction for
highway robbery requires proof that the accused were organized for the purpose of committing
robbery indiscriminately. There is no such proof in this case. Neither is there proof that the four
men previously attempted to commit similar robberies indiscriminately. 33cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court thus correctly found Pulusan and Rodriguez guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape under Article 294(1) of Revised Penal Code. In the interpretation
of an information, controlling is not the designation but the description of the offense charged.
Under the allegations in the information, Pulusan and Rodriguez are liable under the aforesaid
article of the penal code.34cräläwvirtualibräry
We must state that regardless of the number of homicides committed on the occasion of a
robbery, the crime of still robbery with homicide. In this special complex crime, the number of
persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code.35 There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the said
Code.36 The same crime is committed even if rape and physical injuries are also committed on
the occasion of said crime. Moreover, whenever the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide is proven to have been committed, all those who took part in the robbery are liable as
principals therein although they did not actually take part in the
homicide.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rape had not been proven to be original intention of the appellants, the crime having been
committed simply because there was a female passenger in the jeep. Hence, rape can only be
considered as an aggravating circumstance and not a principal offense. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Considering the attendance of rape as a generic aggravating circumstance,
the maximum penalty of death should be imposed. However, by reason of Section 19(1), Art. III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty and
considering further that at the time the crime was committed, Republic Act No. 7659 entitled An
Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes reimposing the death penalty had
not yet been enacted, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Because reclusion
perpetua is a single indivisible penalty for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
the same shall be imposed regardless of the attending aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.39cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court gives credence to the findings of the trial court as to the items to be returned or
equivalent amount to be reimbursed to the victims of robbery, as well as the actual damages
claimed and proven by the windows of the slain, victims.
However, the civil indemnity for the heirs of the deceased victims should be increased to
P50,000.00 in conformity with jurisprudence.40cräläwvirtualibräry
As to the moral damages awarded to Marilyn Martinez, the same should be increased pursuant
to this Court's ruling that the offended party in the crime of rape is entitled to moral damages in
the amount of at least P50,000.00; but in casses where multiple rapes are committed against
one victim, as in this case where the victim suffered four rapes by four men, the victim should
be awarded no less than the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages. 41cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 5, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12 convicting appellants Eduardo Pulusan and Rolando Rodriguez of the crime of robbery
with homicide is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications that the heirs of the four (4)
slain victims shall each be entitled to an indemnity of P50,000.00 and the rape victim, Marilyn
Martinez, shall be awarded moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00. Appellants shall be
liable jointly and severally for the monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181635               November 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NONOY EBET, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00257, dated July 31, 2007, which sustained the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 86-97 dated October 12, 1999, finding appellant Nonoy Ebet guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide.
The facts, as shown in the records, are the following:
On February 3, 1997, around 7:30 p.m., three (3) men entered the house of the spouses Gabriel Parcasio and
Evelyn Parcasio. Of the three men, Evelyn recognized one of them to be appellant Ebet, having been a
constant visitor of her husband. Upon entering, one of the unidentified men poked a gun at Evelyn, while
another unidentified man wielding a knife, held Evelyn's daughter, Joan. At that moment, Evelyn saw appellant
holding a knife and standing at the door of the house. The men asked Evelyn where her husband was hiding
and compelled her to lead them to the house's underground. After the two unidentified men reached the
underground, Evelyn heard her husband shout for her and her daughters to run, which the latter did.
Thereafter, a gunshot was heard, as well as a commotion underground. Joan, after hearing the gunshot,
returned to the house fearing that her mother was shot. It was then that the men accosted her and asked for
her money. With no money to give, the men took her bag worth One Hundred Thirty Pesos (₱130.00), a wrist
watch worth One Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos (₱125.00) and Thirty Pesos (₱30.00) cash, the total of which is
Two Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos (₱285.00). When the men left the premises, Evelyn went back to their house
and saw her husband bleeding to death due to multiple stab wounds. The husband eventually died due to the
said stab wounds.
Thus, an Information3 dated July 10, 1997 was filed, charging appellant with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, which reads:
That on or about February 3, 1997, in the Municipality of Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the
said accused, in company with JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, whose identities are still unknown and at large,
armed with handgun and knife, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully and forcibly get, rob and carry away, one (1)
wrist watch worth ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS (₱125.00); one (1) school bag worth ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (₱130.00); and cash amounting to THIRTY PESOS (₱30.00), with the total
amount of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS (₱285.00), Philippine Currency, owned by JOAN
PARCASIO, to the damage and prejudice of JOAN PARCASIO.
That on the same occasion, above-named accused with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab, shot and use physical violence to the person of GABRIEL PARCASIO, JR., thus inflicting upon
the latter multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body, which caused his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned4 on September 17, 1997, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged against him.
Consequently, the trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Evelyn Parcasio and Joan Parcasio, testifying as to the facts
narrated earlier.
For his defense, appellant presented his own testimony, as well as those of Virgilio Balili, Fernando Saud and
Feliciano Jordan. Based on their testimonies, the following transpired:
On February 3, 1997, appellant was in the house of Agri Saud, which was 200 meters away from the house of
Gabriel and Evelyn Parcasio. Appellant was in the said house from 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. He was there
butchering a pig, together with Agri Saud, Efren Leon, Willy Estigoy and Feliciano Jordan. Appellant claimed
that he never left the house or the group from the time he arrived at Agri Saud's house until they dispersed
later in the evening.
The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court finds accused Nonoy Ebet
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
hereby sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs
of Gabriel Parcasio the sum of ₱50,000.00.
With costs de officio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
A Notice of Appeal6 was filed and this Court accepted the appeal. However, in a Resolution 7 dated September
15, 2004, this Court transferred the case to the CA, in conformity with People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo
y Garcia,8 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of this Court’s en banc, dated
September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving the death penalty,
pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before such cases are elevated to
this Court.
On July 31, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant shall pay ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and to return the wrist
watch, school bag and ₱30.00 in cash or pay its reasonable value in the total amount of P285.00 in case
restitution is not feasible, to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
In his Brief,10 appellant assigned the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING ANY PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE DFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE
ACCUSED.
According to appellant, the prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify him. He also argues that the trial
court, in rejecting the defense of alibi, simply adopted the general principle of alibi as a defense, being
inherently weak, but failed to point out any inconsistencies and falsities to his testimony, as well as those of
the other witnesses for the defense.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief, 11 argued the following:
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE.
II
IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSITIVE AND UNERRING IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED HIS DEFENSE OF
DENIAL AND ALIBI.
The OSG insists that the prosecution witnesses positively and categorically recognized and identified
appellant as one of the perpetrators; thus, the trial court correctly appreciated the evidence presented by the
prosecution. It further posits that appellant's defense of denial and alibi was correctly rejected by the trial court,
because those defenses cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellant.
With both arguments from the parties under consideration, this Court finds the appeal unmeritorious.
In People v. De Jesus,12 this Court had the occasion to meticulously expound on the nature of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, thus:
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the
following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into
one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property.
When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is
justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may
have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. The
prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim.
Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the
motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent
the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of
robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty
as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once
it has materialized.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit
of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime
may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.13
The trial court, in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. As it explained:
The court finds the testimonies of Evelyn and Joan Parcasio as truthworthy, honest and straightforward. It is
significant to note that the prosecution's testimonies have not been assailed. No motive was advanced by the
defense why the witnesses will falsely testify and implicate the herein accused in the commission of such a
heinous crime. Thus, it has been ruled by the Supreme Court "that when there is no evidence indicating that
the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Denial, like alibi is inherently a weak defense and
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed
the crime. (People vs. Belibet, 194 SCRA 588).
Moreover, circumstantial evidence have been duly established in the case at bar which is in conformity with
the rules of court. That accused Nonoy Ebet in the company [of] two (2) unidentified persons entered the
house of Gabriel Parcasio, once inside took [the] personal properties of Joan, daughter of Gabriel, and
thereafter the accused took turns in stabbing Gabriel Parcasio to death. 14
Appellant's main contention is that the trial court was wrong in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses. According to him, he was not positively identified by the said witnesses. However,
this Court finds otherwise.
The following are the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution which clearly show that the appellant
was categorically identified as one of the men who took part in the perpetration of the crime:
Testimony of Evelyn Parcasio:
Q Now, in that evening of February 3, 1997, was there any unusual incident that happened in your
house?
A At more or less 7:30, three (3) persons entered our house. The two (2) of them I do not know,
only one (1) I know.
Q Who is that one (1) you know?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you go down and pinpoint him?
A Witness taps the shoulder of a person who, when asked his name, he answered that he is
Nonoy Ebet.
Q How do you know him to be Nonoy Ebet? Q What was the weapon used in killing your father?

A He is always in our house. He is always eating with my husband in our house. A Hunting knife. 16

Q You said these three (3) entered your house? According to appellant, the testimony of Joan Parcasio during the trial was contrary to her earlier
statement with the police authorities of Kidapawan City, Cotabato. The police blotter 17 contains the
following:
A Yes, sir.

Entry/Date/Time
Q What happened after that?

15-02/03-97/2000H
A Upon entering the house, he poked a gun on me and one of them pointed a knife to my daughter
Joan.
-JOAN PARCASIO, 18 years old, student resident of Barangay Upper Manongol, Kidapawan,
Cotabato reported this station and requested to put on record, that they were allegedly and forcibly
Q What about this Nonoy Ebet? entered by three unidentified men while the one is wearing mask and declared hold-up. His father
GABRIEL PARCASIO, 44 years old, a farmer attempted to resist, but the assailant shot him once,
by an undetermined type of hand-gun and stabbed him for several times, hitting the different parts
A Nonoy Ebet was standing in front of the door of my house holding the knife. 15
of his body. The neighbor of the victim, wife and child, brought him to Kidapawan Medical
Specialist, but he was expired upon arrival at the said hospital. Money carting them away by the
Testimony of Joan Parcasio: perpetrators amounting to ₱30.00 Philippine currency and one wrist watch amounting to
₱1,000.00. Incident happened at about 7:00 p.m., February 3, 1997. Case referred to investigation
section for proper disposition.
Q Now, on that evening at around 7:00 o'clock of February 3, 1997, can you recall whether there
was an unusual incident that happened?
Appellant points out that the above contents of the police blotter are corroborated by the testimony
of his own witness, Virgilio Balili, who narrated that right after the commission of the crime, he was
A Yes, sir. approached by Evelyn, Jean and Joan Parcasio. When Balili asked if they knew the identities of
the perpetrators, Evelyn, Jean and Joan answered in the negative, thus:
Q Can you recall what was that unusual incident that happened?
Q When Evelyn, Jean and Joan Parcasio approached you, what did you do?
A We were robbed and my father was killed.
A I asked them if they were able to identify the perpetrators.
Q What is the name of your father?
Q And what did they tell you?
A Gabriel Parcasio, Jr.
A They answered me that they did not know the assailant. 18
Q You said you were held up, how many persons robbed you?
xxxx
A Three (3) persons.
Q You said on the way you had a conversation with Evelyn, Jean and Joan Parcasio, please tell us
what the content of your conversation? What was the subject matter of your conversation?
Q Were you able to identify them?

A I asked them to tell the truth so that we could help them.

A Only one perpetrator I know.

Q So what was the answer?

Q You said you were able to identify one of the perpetrators, if this one which you were able to
identify is inside this courtroom, please point at him?
A They answered, "What could we do because we were not able to identify those people?" 19
A Witness tapped the shoulder of a person with a stripe polo shirt and who, when asked his
name, answered Nonoy Ebet. The above argument of appellant deserves scant consideration. The incomplete entry in the police blotter
must not overcome the positive and categorical identification of appellant as one of the perpetrators. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG:
Q This Nonoy Ebet is one of those who robbed you and likewise killed your father?

The entry in the police blotter was incomplete. In fact, as stated therein, the case was referred to the
A Yes, sir. investigation section for proper disposition. It must be noted that Item No. 2 was entered at 2000 hours or 8 in
the evening or about thirty (30) minutes after the incident. The culprits, including the appellant, were still on the
loose. This explains the reason why Joan, still distraught over the sudden and unexpected death of her father,
hesitated to divulge the identity of appellant as one of the perpetrators of the gory killing of her father. 20
In People v. Sabadao,21 the appellants therein faulted two (2) prosecution witnesses for, either giving
incomplete statements or not giving any statement to the police authorities. However, this Court was not
persuaded and ruled that:
x x x It is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate. To be sure, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered to be inferior to a
testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross examination. 22
Notwithstanding the entry in the police blotter, Evelyn and Joan Parcasio, on the day after the crime was
committed, executed their respective sworn statements, positively identifying the appellant as one of the
culprits. Thus:
Evelyn Parcasio's Sworn Statement:
02. Q – Why are you here in the Office of the Investigation Section?
A – To file a formal complaint against the persons who robbed us and killed my husband.
03. Q – What is the name of your husband who was killed by the robbers?
A – Gabriel Parcasio Jr., sir.
04. Q – When and where did this incident happen?
A. - It happened on February 3, 1997 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening inside our residence at
Brgy. Upper Manongol, Kidapawan, Cotabato.
05. Q – You mentioned that you were held-up? How many are they?
A – They were three (3) of them.
06. Q – Can you recognize or identify them?
A – I could only identify one of them in the person of alias NONOY EBET.
xxxx
16. Q – You mentioned that you could only identify one of the perpetrators as one alias Nonoy
Ebet. How come that you were able to identify him?
A - Because he is always at our house conversing with my husband and sometimes eat with us. 23
Joan Parcasio's sworn statement:
02. Q – Why are you here in the Office of the Investigation Section?
A – To give my voluntary statement in connection to the complaint of my mother Evelyn Parcasio
to persons of alias NONOY EBET and his two other companions which I could not identify.
03. Q – What is the complaint of your mother against these persons?
A – For robbing us and killing my father Gabriel Parcasio, Jr.
xxxx
19. Q – You mentioned in your statement that you were able to identify one of the perpetrators as
one NONOY EBET. How were you able to identify him?
A – Because while one of his companions was holding me at the point of a knife, I saw Alias
Nonoy Ebet standing in front of our door.
20. Q – How far was he from you?
A – More or less one meter.
21. Q – Was there light at the house during that time?
A – Yes, sir.
22. Q – Do you know the person of Alias Nonoy Ebet?
A – Yes, sir. He used to go to the house and talk with my father and sometimes we served coffee
to him as merienda.24
Clearly, it is only the incomplete police blotter that appears to be inconsistent. However, the said inconsistency
has been cured by the sworn statements and the testimonies given in open court. With that in perspective, this
Court, therefore, has no reason to dispute the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge, because of his unique opportunity to
observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts - and
when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon this Court.25
Appellant further reasons out that, if it were indeed him who was seen standing near or in front of the Parcasio
family's door, that fact alone cannot be the basis to consider him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the said argument is inconsequential.1avvphi1
When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing,
unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. 26 The records are bereft of any
evidence to prove, or even remotely suggest, that appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Therefore, the
basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," applies in this case. To be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even
know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be
assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a
whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. 27 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,28 since all the conspirators are principals. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator
must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof.29
As to the failure of the trial court in finding merit to the defense of denial and alibi presented by appellant, this
Court is in complete agreement.
Appellant claims that he was butchering a pig at the house of Agri Saud located at Barangay Perez,
Kidapawan City from 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. of February 3, 1997. The said alibi has been supported by the
testimonies of two witnesses. However, appellant failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be physically
present at the place where the crime had taken place and when the crime was being committed. For alibi to
prosper, it must strictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must also be demonstrated that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed. 30
This Court has always upheld that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside
when the prosecution has sufficiently
and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony.31
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00257, which sustained with modification, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
finding appellant Nonoy Ebet guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RONALD PALEMA Y VARGAS,
RUFEL PALMEA Y BAUTISTA, LYNDON SALDUA Y QUEZON, AND VIRGO GRENGIA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
In the prosecution of robbery with homicide, the State must prove that the offender's original
intent was to commit the crime of robbery. The killing of the victim must only be incidental.
Nevertheless, the act of taking the victim's life may occur before, during, or even after the
robbery. So long as the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery,
the offense committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. 1
For this Court's resolution is a Notice of Appeal2 challenging the May 18, 2016 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06250. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial
Court's April 15, 2013 Decision4 convicting Ronald Palema y Vargas (Palema), Rufel Palmea y
Bautista (Palmea), Lyndon Saldua y Quezon (Saldua), and Virgo Grengia (Grengia) of the crime
of robbery with homicide.
Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Grengia, along with Lester Ladra y Palema (Ladra), Edwin Manzanero y
Bautista (Manzanero), and Marvin Marqueses (Marqueses), were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide in an Information 5 dated November 26, 2007, which read:cralawred
That on or about 11:05 p.m. of 10 November 2007, at the Calamba Town Plaza at Brgy. 6,
Calamba City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating, and with the accused minor Lester Ladra y Palema acting with
discernment, with intent to gain, by means [of] violence against and intimidation of persons, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal the Nokia N70 cellular phone
worth Php 13,000.00 of Enicasio Depante y Rosales against the consent of the said Enicasio
Depante y Rosales and on the occasion and by reason of the robbery, with intent to kill, abuse
of superior strength [and] cruelty, did then and there willfully and feloniously assault, maul and
stab to death Enicasio Depante y Rosales the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.
Contrary to law.6
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
On arraignment, Ladra, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, Manzanero, and Grengia pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Marvin, meanwhile, remained at large. 7
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.8
The evidence for the prosecution revealed that at around 11:00 p.m. on November 10, 2007,
Enicasio Depante (Enicasio), his common-law spouse, his son Erickson Depante (Erickson), and
his stepdaughter Jamie Rose Baya (Jamie) were sitting on the benches at the Calamba Town
Plaza. That was when three (3) men, who were later identified as Palema, Palmea, and
Manzanero, approached Enicasio.9
Suddenly, Palmea threw a punch at Enicasio in an attempt to grab his phone. Palema
simultaneously pulled out a knife and tried to stab him in the abdomen, but was warded off by
Jamie, making him drop his knife. Once he retrieved his knife, Palema stabbed Enicasio on the
right thigh, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Grengia and Saldua arrived at the scene
and joined in beating Enicasio. 10
Seated on the bench near Enicasio, Erickson stood and tried to help his father, but Ladra
stopped him. When he resisted, Ladra attempted to stab him, but he was able to evade the
attack and immediately look for a weapon. Upon reaching his father, however, he saw that
Enicasio had already collapsed from the stab wounds. Erickson brought his father to the
Calamba Medical Center, but he later died from blood loss. 11
Enicasio's family testified that they incurred medical expenses in the amount of P20,000.00,
although they were only able to keep P3,751.00 worth of receipts. 12 They, likewise, testified that
they had incurred funeral expenses worth P120,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt 13 they
submitted.14
During the case's pendency, Manzanero died as shown in his Death Certificate. 15 Thus, the
Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against him.16
Meanwhile, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia denied the accusations against them. They
insisted that while all of them were at the Plaza during the incident, they were not there as a
group, but with different people. They maintained that the police officers mistook them for the
men who attacked Enicasio. 17
Ladra, for his part, changed his plea to guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence.
The Regional Trial Court then directed him to take the witness stand to answer some
clarificatory questions.18
Ladra testified that he was with Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Marqueses, and Manzanero at the
night of the incident. All of them drunk, they decided to eat gruel at the Plaza. Later, Palema's
girlfriend approached them and complained that a man in a red shirt had acted indecently
toward her.19 Believing that the man was Enicasio, the group attacked and mugged him. When
he saw Enicasio fighting back, he took Marqueses' knife and stabbed Enicasio twice. 20
Ladra added that Grengia was not with them and did not participate in the attack. 21
In its March 6, 2012 Decision,22 the Regional Trial Court found Ladra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt:cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused minor LESTER LADRA GUILTY of "Robbery with
Homicide" and in consideration with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and
voluntary plea of GUILTY, sentenced (sic) him to the penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) day
of  Prision Mayor, as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) months and One (1) [day]
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum and ordered (sic) to pay the heirs of the victim the
following sums of money:cralawred
1. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for civil indemnity;
2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages; and,
3. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for exemplary damages.
In accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R. A. No.
9344) and jurisprudence thereto, the service of sentence is suspended and the accused is
remanded to the custody of The National Training School for Boys (NTSB) for proper disposition.
The NTSB has thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision to comply with the post sentenced
procedure of the law and submit to this Court their recommendation for disposition.
SO ORDERED.23
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
In its March 31, 2012 Progress Report,24 the National Training School for Boys recommended to
the trial court that the case against Ladra be dismissed and that he be discharged to his
parents.25
On March 5, 2013, the Regional Trial Court granted the National Training School for Boys'
recommendation and ordered that the case against Ladra be dismissed. Similarly, it ordered
that Ladra be discharged to his parents' custody. 26
On April 15, 2013, the Regional Trial Court rendered another Decision, 27 convicting Palema,
Palmea, Saldua, and Grengia of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of
the Decision read:cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Ronald Palema, Rufel Palmea, Lyndon Saldua, and
Virgo Grengia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced (sic) to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in view of the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Accused Ronald Palema, Rufel Palmea, Lyndon Saldua, and Virgo Grengia are also ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim, the following:cralawred
(a) P3,000.00 as hospital expenses;
(b) P120,000.00 for funeral expenses;
(c) P75,000.00 as moral damages[.]
The Court hereby acquits Marvin Marqueses of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.28
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
The Regional Trial Court found that the four (4) men conspired in committing the crime charged.
It brushed aside their defense of denial and decreed that they failed to offer any evidence
showing that they performed an overt act that would have prevented the assault from
happening.29
The Regional Trial Court acquitted Marqueses for the prosecution's failure to present evidence
that he participated in committing the crime.30
On appeal,31 Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in
giving credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. They maintained that while Jamie
testified that her stepfather was stabbed in the right thigh,32 the post-mortem examination
revealed that the sole stab wound sustained by the victim was on the right side of his
buttocks.33 They also questioned Erickson's ability to testify, alleging that he was not fully
focused on the incident since he was texting before the crime happened. 34
Moreover, assuming that the prosecution sufficiently identified the assailants, the men
contended that it still failed to establish the existence of conspiracy in committing the offense.
They insisted that while they allegedly attacked the victim, there was no community of interest
among them.35
In its assailed May 18, 2016 Decision,36 the Court of Appeals dismissed the group's appeal and
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. It ruled that the trial court's appreciation of the
witnesses' credibility is entitled to great respect and would not be disturbed on appeal absent
any showing that it overlooked the material facts that could have affected the results of the
case.37
The Court of Appeals further declared that while Erickson was using his phone when the incident
occurred, this did not affect the value of his testimony. It noted that since he was seated near
Enicasio at the time of the assault, it was impossible for him not to witness the events that
transpired.38
The Court of Appeals dispelled the group's claim that there was no conspiracy, ruling that the
prosecution has proved that the men acted in unison in committing the offense. It further noted
that in his confession, Ladra himself admitted the existence of conspiracy. 39
Aggrieved, the group filed a Notice of Appeal,40 which the Court of Appeals gave due course in
its June 15, 2016 Resolution. 41
In its January 11, 2017 Resolution, 42 this Court required the parties to file their supplemental
briefs. However, both accused-appellants43 and plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines,44 through the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that they would no longer
file a supplemental brief and instead adopt all the arguments they raised in their Briefs filed
before the Court of Appeals.
The issues to be resolved here are:cralawred
First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of accused-appellants
Ronald Palema y Vargas, Rufel Palmea y Bautista, Lyndon Saldua y Quezon, and Virgo Grengia
for the crime of robbery with homicide; and
Second, whether or not the acquittal of accused Marvin Marqueses is proper.
I
Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punished under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. It is perpetrated when, by reason or on the occasion of robbery, homicide is
committed.45 Article 294(1) states:cralawred
ARTICLE 294. Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons — Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:cralawred
1. The penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
To hold a person liable for this crime, the prosecution must establish the following elements with
proof beyond reasonable doubt:cralawred
(1) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and (4) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed. 46 (Citation omitted)
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in robbery with homicide, the offender's original intent
must be the commission of robbery. The killing is merely incidental and subsidiary. 47 However,
when the offender's "original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but robbery
follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts
should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex offense." 48
In People v. De Jesus,  this Court had the opportunity to comprehensively discuss the nature of
49
the crime of robbery with homicide:cralawred
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide
is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used
in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented
in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed
by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual
value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the
actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part
as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he
is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery . with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained
from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. 50 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
In convicting accused-appellants, the Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, who recounted that the accused men were the ones who had
simultaneously assaulted Enicasio. Based on their testimonies, Manzanero and accused-
appellants Palema and Palmea all approached Enicasio and took his cellphone. When Enicasio
tried to fight back, Palema stabbed him, causing him to fall. Immediately after, the other
accused joined the fray and beat Enicasio. 51
It is clear that accused-appellants' primary objective was to rob Enicasio. But, by reason or on
the occasion of the robbery, Enicasio was stabbed and died as a result.
Finally, while accused-appellants argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in giving weight to
the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, they failed to present evidence to the contrary.
Settled is the rule that "the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is
best and most competently performed by the trial [court] judge," 52 who has "the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia
available but not reflected on the record." 53 As such, this Court gives great weight and respect
to the judge's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. 54
II
Insisting on their innocence, accused-appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that
they conspired in committing the crime charged.55 They insist that while they acted
simultaneously, the prosecution failed to show that there was a unity of purpose among them. 56
Accused-appellants' argument deserves scant consideration.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Like any
other element of a crime, the existence of conspiracy must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.57
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Regional Trial Court's finding of conspiracy. It
found that accused-appellants' acts were coordinated and complementary with each other,
demonstrating the existence of conspiracy. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish
that accused-appellants came in two (2) groups. The first group—accused-appellants Palema
and Palmea, along with Manzanero—attacked Enicasio and took his cellphone. The second group
—accused-appellants Grengia and Saldua, along with Ladra—joined the fray when they saw
Enicasio fighting back.58
Notably, while accused-appellants denied participating in the crime, they all admitted that they
were at the Calamba Town Plaza during the incident. Moreover, their claim that they did not
come as a group, but were with other people, remains a bare allegation after they failed to
present the testimonies of the individuals who were supposedly with them that night.
As the Regional Trial Court correctly ruled:cralawred
Granting that they were merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him.
To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof. Accused offered no evidence that they performed an overt act neither to
escape from the company of the assailants or to prevent the assault from taking place. Their
denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with
disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense.
As both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on
the various aspects of the crime committed.59 (Citations omitted)
There is no proof of Marqueses' arraignment here. After the Warrant of Arrest issued against
him was returned, his name appeared again only in the Regional Trial Court's April 1, 2013
Order.76 There, the Regional Trial Court did not state if he was belatedly arraigned or if he made
a voluntary appearance. It merely granted the prosecution's Motion to correct the names of
Saldua and Palmea.
Without evidence of Marqueses' arraignment, the Regional Trial Court had no authority to order
his acquittal. All proceedings against him before the Regional Trial Court are deemed void.
Finally, in line with current jurisprudence,77 this Court deems it proper to impose exemplary
damages and civil indemnity, both in the amount of P75,000.00.

III
It is a basic principle in criminal law that a notice of appeal throws the entire case open for
review. Once an appeal is accepted by this Court, it will have "the authority to review matters
not specifically raised or assigned as errors by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just resolution of the case." 60 In Ramos v. People:61
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. "The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."62 (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The May 18, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06250 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The acquittal of accused
Marvin Marqueses is deemed VACATED.
Accused-appellants Ronald Palema y Vargas, Rufel Palmea y Bautista, Lyndon Saldua y Quezon,
and Virgo Grengia are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide
punished under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They are also DIRECTED to pay the heirs of the victim, Enicasio Depante
y Rosales, the amounts of: (1) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages;
(2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; (3) Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages; (4) Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-One
Pesos (P3,751.00) as hospital expenses; and (5) One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P120,000.00) as funeral expenses.

All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
Here, the Regional Trial Court acquitted Marqueses after having found no evidence of his from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction. 78
participation in the crime charged.63 However, a perusal of the records shows that Marqueses
was never arraigned. While the Regional Trial Court, in its January 8, 2008 Order,64 noted that
all the accused were present on arraignment and that they all pleaded not guilty to the crime SO ORDERED.
charged, only the names of accused-appellants Palema, Palmea, Saldua, and Grengia, as with
Ladra and Manzanero, were shown in the Certificate of Arraignment.65 Marqueses' name is
nowhere to be found.

Even during the January 17, 2008 pre-trial, Marqueses was absent.66

It bears noting that Marqueses was never arrested and remained at large. On March 12, 2008,
the Warrant of Arrest67 issued against him was returned to the trial court as he could not be
located at the given address despite effort exerted.68

Arraignment is defined as "the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right
of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 69 Its SECOND DIVISION
purpose is to notify the accused of "the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is
bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him." 70 It is
not an idle ceremony that can be brushed aside peremptorily, but an indispensable requirement G.R. No. 228951, July 17, 2019
of due process, the absence of which renders the proceedings against the accused void. 71
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JAY GODOY MANCAO,
In Borja v. Mendoza,72 this Court stressed that an arraignment not only satisfies the due process ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
clause of the Constitution, but also affords an accused an opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him or her. Through arraignment, the accused is placed in a position to DECISION
enter his or her plea with full knowledge of the consequences. 73 It is a vital aspect of any
criminal prosecution, demanded by no less than the Constitution itself.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
In People v. Verra,  this Court held that "just as an accused is accorded this constitutional
74

protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must similarly be The Case
given the chance to present its evidence in support of a charge." 75

This appeal assails the Decision1 dated September 27, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01258-MIN affirming with modification the trial court's verdict of conviction against
appellant for robbery with homicide.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
The Charge
Appellant Jay Godoy Mancao was charged with robbery with homicide under the following
Information, viz:
That on or about September 2, 2007, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, with intent to gain and to
kill, armed with bladed weapons, with force and violence, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
grabbed the neck and dragged Peter Ray Garcia Enriquez who was then seventeen (17) years
old, and then took away the latter's Nokia 6630 cellular phone, silver bracelet, necklace, wallet
containing cash of undetermined amount. Without the said victim's consent and on occasion of
the said robbery stabbed the aforementioned victim, thereby inflicting upon him fatal wounds
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim's legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 8, Davao City.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty".2 Trial followed. Manuel Bernido, Jr., Pedro
Enriquez and SPO2 Kelvin Magno testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, appellant was
the lone witness for the defense.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Manuel Bernido, Jr. testified that on September 2, 2007, around 3:30 in the morning, he was
in front of Toto's Eatery along Quirino Avenue, Davao City. About ten meters away, he saw
Peter Enriquez texting while waiting for a jeepney ride. Appellant suddenly approached Enriquez
from behind and stabbed the latter in the neck. 3 Appellant then dragged the victim toward an
alley in Barangay 9. Shocked by what he saw, he ran home. 4
Later, he saw appellant pass his house, running. Then, appellant passed his house again, this
time carrying a dipper with water. He used the water to wash away blood stains off the crime
scene and the alley where he dragged the lifeless body of his victim. 5
He called appellant and asked why he was not wearing slippers and why he was covered with
blood.6 Appellant responded he came from the Bankerohan Public Market.7 Few hours later, he
saw appellant's brother Wangyu Mancao flag down a taxicab and board the same together with
appellant.8
SPO2 Kelvin Magno testified that on September 3, 2007, around 6 o'clock in the morning, the
San Pedro Police Station received a report that a dead body was found in Barangay 9. He and
SPO2 Nelson Galban proceeded to the area to investigate. There, they found the lifeless body of
Enriquez. His cellphone, silver necklace, silver bracelet, and wallet containing cash were
missing.9
They followed a trail of blood near the body which led to the boarding house of the Mancao
brothers. After asking around, they went to the eatery where Wangyu worked. 10 Wangyu was
there. Upon seeing the police officers, he cried and confessed that appellant was involved in the
robbery and that he assisted his brother in fleeing to Maco, Davao del Norte. 11
The next day, SPO2 Magno and other police officers proceeded to Maco in search for
appellant.12 When they finally found him, he tried to escape but they were able to capture and
arrest him.13 They found in his possession a silver necklace and a pair of blood-stained pants. 14
Pedro Enriquez, the victim's father, identified the necklace in open court. He recognized it
because it was his gift to his son. He remembered the pendant bearing the letter "T". 15
Evidence for the Defense
Appellant denied the charge. He averred that he had been in Barangay Libay-libay, Compostela
Valley since September 1, 2007 to tend the land of his mother. On September 4, 2007, more
than ten people arrested him without a warrant. He was brought to the police station where he
was forced to wear a silver necklace. He discovered later on that he was already being charged
with murder for the death of victim Peter Enriquez.
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision dated September 19, 2013,16 the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
FOR THE FOREGOING, finding accused Jay Godoy Mancao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is, likewise, directed to pay moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00; civil indemnity, likewise in the amount of P50,000.00 and actual damages in the
amount of P22, 800.00.17
SO ORDERED.
It found that even in the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual taking of victim's personal
belongings, the crime of robbery with homicide was nonetheless established by circumstantial
evidence. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constituted an unbroken chain which
proved that appellant, with intent to gain, took the victim's personal property and by reason of
the robbery, killed such hapless victim.
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding him guilty of robbery with homicide
despite the alleged incredible and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; the
purported fact that he was not positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime; and the
supposed insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support a verdict of conviction. 18
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) through Solicitor General Jose C.
Calida, Assistant Solicitor Renan E. Ramos, Senior State Solicitor James Lee Cundangan and
State Solicitor Ma. Teresa Ana V. Bermejo riposted that the elements of the crime were all
proven through the direct and straightforward account of the prosecution witnesses; prosecution
witness Bernido, Jr. positively identified appellant; there was no showing of ill-motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; and appellant's defense of alibi
was inherently weak.19
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its assailed Decision20 dated September 27, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification as to the amount of damages, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court,
Davao City, is AFFIRMED but modified with respect to the award of Moral Damages and Civil
Indemnity which are hereby increased to P75,000.00 each. The damages awarded shall earn an
interest of 6% per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays anew for his acquittal. In
compliance with Resolution21 dated February 27, 2017, both the OSG and appellant
manifested22 that, in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective briefs
before the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellant's conviction for robbery with homicide?
Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
Robbery with homicide is defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, viz:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. - Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua  to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
xxxx
It requires the following elements: (1) taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed.23 A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery.24
Taking of personal
property established
through circumstantial
evidence
Here, there was no eyewitnesses to the actual taking of the victim's personal property.
Prosecution, nevertheless, proved appellant's guilt through circumstantial evidence.
Normally, the Court bases its findings of guilt on direct evidence of the commission of a
crime.25 But the lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of
the accused can no longer be proved because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant
the absence of direct evidence.26
Thus, in People v. Beriber,  the Court convicted the accused even though no direct testimony
was presented by the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty of robbery with homicide
since the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of
events enough to arrive at the conclusion that appellant was responsible for the killing and
robbing the victim. 27
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction, there must be more than one
circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven and the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.28
Here, the first two elements of robbery with homicide were established through circumstantial
evidence. SPO2 Magno testified that the object of the crime was found in appellant's possession
at the time of his arrest, thus:
Pros. Sencio: In paragraph 8 of your affidavit, you said that you and the Maco Police
immediately went to the said place and upon reaching there, it was positive that the suspect
stayed at the house and recovered from him was a silver necklace owned by the victim as well
as xxx. I am showing to you this necklace already marked as Exhibit "C", please go over this
and tell us what relation has this necklace to that necklace which you mentioned in your
affidavit?
SPO2 Magno: The same necklace that the accused was wearing.
xxx
SPO2 Magno: The necklace that was presented to me now is the same necklace that I
noticed that he was wearing at the time we arrested him. xxx
xxx
Q: By the way, this person you said that you arrested, is he present in Court?
A: Yes. He is here.
Q: Please point him out.
The witness pointed to the accused.
Pedro Enriquez testified that the necklace appellant was wearing at the time of his arrest was
the same silver necklace he gifted the victim with, viz:
Prosecutor Sencio: And what happened to the items?
A: What was only recovered is the silver necklace with the initial of my son with letter "T"
pendant.
Q: Where is that pendant?
A: The pendant is in the possession or custody of the police.
Q: Why do you know that it belongs to your son?
A: because I gave that necklace to him.
Q: If you will be shown the pendant, will you be able to identify that pendant?
A: Yes.29
xxx
Q: I am showing to you this necklace. What relation does this necklace have to that
necklace which you said belongs to your son?
A: This is the same necklace that I gave to my son.
xxx
Atty. Alonzo: You said that this necklace is with stones. Will you please show to us where are
these stones that you were referring to?
Pros. Sencio: For the record, the witness points to the pendant and there were three stones on
it.
Q: You agree with me Mr. Enriquez, that there are also similar pendants with stones that are
sold in the same store?
A: The necklaces that had a letter "P" (sic) in the place where I bought this for my son did not
have stones in it except for the one I bought. A: What I reported to the police that sometime at 3:30 in the morning, I was waiting for my
wife. I saw somebody in Barangay 9 who was stabbed xxx. 36
Q: You want to tell this Honorable Court that there is only one necklace that was sold in that
place the same with that you have purchased? xxx
A: Yes.30 (emphasis added)
Pros. Sencio: In your cross-examination, you stated that morning after or hours after the time
Under Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a person found in possession of a thing you saw the stabbing, a dead person was found, that person and the person you saw stabbed
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. 31 In the hours before, what is their relation?
case at bar, appellant failed to justify his possession of the victim's necklace. Thus the
presumption that he stole the same from the victim and that he is the perpetrator of the crime, A: The same person, the person that I saw being stabbed is the same person that was found
stands. dead after the stabbing.37
The third element i.e. animus lucrandi was similarly established by the same presumption. For
intent to gain is an internal act which is presumed from the unlawful taking by appellant of the xxx
thing subject of asportation. 32 And since the object of the crime i.e.  victim's necklace was
recovered from appellant, his intent to gain is presumed. Q: After that, what happened next?
A: He came back bringing with him a small dipper with water in it and he washed the blood
Homicide committed by stained (sic) in the alley.
reason of robbery
xxx
For the fourth element, eyewitness Manuel Bernido, Jr. testified how appellant slayed his victim,
thus: Q: What happened next?
A: The accused went back to the place of the incident and he continued to wash the blood stains
Pros. Sencio: What happened next? in the alley.
A: He stabbed the man.

To bolster Bernido, Jr.'s testimony, SPO2 Magno testified:

xxx

Q: Where was he hit? Pros. Sencio: Then, what else did you do?
A: He was hit at his neck. A: We asked bystanders, witnesses, who committed the crime, if anybody witnessed.

Q: What happened next? Q: So, when you asked those questions, what did you find out?
A: He dragged the man inside Barangay 9.33 A: Blood drips from the scene of the crime crossing the street.

xxx xxx

Q: By the way, is the man who stabbed the person, is he in Court?
A: Yes.
Q: Please point him out to the Honorable Court.
Interpreter: the witness pointed to a man inside the Courtroom wearing an orange t-shirt and
faded maong pants who when asked answered by the name Jay Godoy Mancao. 34
xxx
On cross-examination, Bemido, Jr. further testified:
A: We followed the blood stains which were already dry.
Q: Where did the blood stains lead you?
A: It led to a boarding house near the crime scene.
Q: When you arrived at the boarding house, what happened?
A: We knocked at the door but first we sought assistance from the brgy. official who
accompanied us in entering the house, but we found out that nobody was there.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: We asked around the people living near the boarding house and we were informed that the
persons living there are the Mancaos. 38

Atty. Alonzo: You want to tell us that the person who crossed that Barangay 9 towards the
person standing immediately approached him and stabbed him, is that what you mean? Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
to be clear, straightforward and consistent. They gave full credence to Bernido, Jr.'s eyewitness
A: Yes, sir. account of the victim's killing and SPO2 Magno and Pedro Enriquez's identification of the object
of the crime i.e. the victim's necklace found in appellant's possession. In any event, the courts
Q: Are you sure of that? below ruled that there is no showing that the witnesses were impelled by any improper motive
to falsely testify against appellant.
A: Yes, sir. I'm very sure.35
Suffice it to state that, in this jurisdiction, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
xxx
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grueling examination.39 Hence, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of
Q: What more or less did you report to the police?
trial courts especially when such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court, as in the case
at bar.40
The fact that the incident happened around 3:30 o'clock in the morning did not preclude
Bernido, Jr. from clearly recognizing appellant as the assailant. Bernido, Jr. was only about ten
meters away when he saw the appellant approach the victim from behind and stab the latter in
the neck.41 Appellant then dragged the victim toward an alley in Barangay 9. After the incident,
appellant passed his house not once but twice. He even had a short conversation with appellant,
asking him why his shirt was stained with blood. These numerous encounters gave Bernido, Jr.
an opportunity to ascertain appellant's identity. Thus, when he pointed at appellant during trial,
there can be no doubt that he was positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime.
In this light, appellant's denial and alibi must fail. We are replete of cases pronouncing that
denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses because they can easily be fabricated.42 These
defenses cannot prevail over the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 43 So must
it be.
In sum, the inculpatory circumstances on record are: first,  eyewitness Manuel Bernido, Jr.
testified that on September 2, 2007, around 3:30 in the morning, he saw the victim texting on
his cellphone while waiting for a jeepney ride. He also saw appellant stealthily moving from
behind toward the victim, appellant then stabbed the victim in the neck. Thereafter, appellant
dragged the victim's body toward an alley. Second,  SPO2 Kelvin Magno testified that on
September 4, 2007, when he and his team arrested appellant, they were able to recover from
appellant's possession the victim's silver necklace. Lastly,  the  victim's father Pedro Enriquez
confirmed that the silver necklace that was recovered from appellant was the necklace he gave
his son.
These circumstances, taken together, created an unbroken chain of events leading to no other
conclusion than that appellant's primary purpose was to rob the victim and the killing was
merely resorted to in order to gain easy access to the victim's personal belongings. There was
no showing, as none was shown, that the victim and appellant had known each other before the
incident happened or that they had previous conflicts which would have served as sufficient
motive for appellant to end the victim's life. The only logical conclusion is the killing was
committed on the occasion only or by reason of the robbery.
Penalty
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua  was
correctly imposed on appellant.
As for the monetary awards, the Court sustains the grant of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P75,000.00 as moral damages. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court further
awards P75,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. 44 These
amounts shall earn interest of six (6) percent per annum  from finality of judgment until fully
paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01258-MIN, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Jay Godoy Mancao is found guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.  He is ordered to pay P75,000.00 civil indemnity; P75,000.00 moral damages;
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. These amounts
shall earn six (6) percent interest per annum  from finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ZZZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in
proving the commission of rape. This is because the crime "is generally unwitnessed and very
often only the victim is left to testify for [him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when
the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer
testify." 1
This Court resolves the appeal from the Court of Appeals' February 29, 2016 Decision 2 in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06486. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's March 4, 2013
Decision3 finding ZZZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
In an October 14, 1996 Information, ZZZ was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. 4 It
read:
That on or about the 16th day of May 1996 in the evening,
in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with AAA against her will and consent and on the same occasion the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike, assault and club the said victim inflicting upon
her the following:
- Cracked temporal skull with brains coming out
- Lacerated wound (1/2) inch long below (L) labia
which directly caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs. 5 (Citation omitted)
ZZZ went at large, but he was later arrested on February 6, 2003. Upon arraignment, ZZZ
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.6
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses: (1) the victim's uncle BBB; (2) Senior Police
Officer 3 Jaime Lavarias (SPO3 Lavarias); (3) Dr. Paz Q. Mejia (Dr. Mejia); (4) Dr. Ronald
Bandonill (Dr. Bandonill); and (5) the victim's father CCC. 7
BBB testified that he was the uncle of both AAA and ZZZ. The victim's father, CCC, was his
brother, and ZZZ's mother is his second cousin. ZZZ's mother and AAA's father are relatives,
making them related.8
BBB testified that at around 7:00p.m. on May 16, 1996, he was on his way to the store to buy
cigarettes when he saw ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward the school. Though it was dark
and he was about 1 0 meters away, he was able to see them using a flashlight he was carrying.
Still, he said he presumed nothing was off, thinking they were relatives. He had merely
reprimanded them before he went on to buy his cigarette and returned home, where he had a
drinking spree with his nephews.9

The following day, news spread that AAA was missing. With his cousin Josefino Camilet, BBB
went on a search for his niece and informed barangay officials who then helped to look for her. 10
A couple of days later, the barangay officials found a lifeless AAA in a bamboo grove near the
school. BBB said that her niece's naked body had already blackened due to decomposition. On
the same day, he said he found ZZZ in his house-the last time he had ever seen him. 11
SPO3 Lavarias testified that he way AAA was found. When he and his companions went
to xxxxxxxxxxx, they saw AAA's corpse under the bamboo grove. They came to know the body's
identity through BBB, who also claimed that ZZZ was the person behind the crime. Accompanied
by BBB, the police went to ZZZ's house, but he was nowhere to be found. They proceeded to
prepare an investigation report and requested an autopsy on AAA. 12
In the police officers' Joint Affidavit, SPO3 Lavarias recalled that they went back to the barangay
on May 20, 1996 and found YYY, ZZZ's brother. YYY told them that on the night of the incident,
he was walking home with ZZZ and AAA when his brother told him to go home alone. 13
Dr. Mejia, a municipal health officer in xxxxxxxxxxx, testified that she was the physician who
conducted the initial autopsy as requested by the police officers. According to her report, there
was a crack on AAA's temporal skull and a half-inch long laceration below her left labia, while
brain matter leaked above her left ear. The doctor also noted that the body had already been
decomposing when it was found.14
Dr. Mejia, however, said that she could not give a precise medical opinion on the laceration on
AAA's labia as she was not an obstetrician gynecologist. She also could not precisely tell how
many days lapsed since AAA had died, though she testified that the cracked temporal skull may
have caused AAA's death.15
Dr. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he
conducted an autopsy on AAA on May 29, 1996. Upon examination, he found that the cadaver
was at an advanced state of decomposition, the face was contorted, the tongue was
protruding / from the mouth, and all the extremities were flexed. He noted that the contorted
face could have been either due to decomposition or due to a grimace caused by pain before
she died.16
Dr. Bandonill also observed contusions on AAA's face, right arm's anterior surface, and the front
and side parts of her thigh. He noted contusions on the genital area, which could have been
caused by a hard or blunt instrument. Clumps of dried blood from the vaginal opening could
have also been caused by a tear inside the genital area.17
From these findings, Dr. Bandonill remarked that AAA might have been sexually assaulted. He
added that AAA's death could have been caused by the traumatic cerebral contusion. 18
CCC, the victim's father, testified that AAA was 11 years old when she was raped and killed. He
showed that he spent P20,000.00 for the internment of AAA and P30,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses such as transportation costs. In anguish from AAA's death, he also asked for
damages.19
For the defense, ZZZ testified that he was 15 years old when the incident happened, as
evidenced by his birth certificate. He confirmed that he knew AAA as his cousin, and that both
resided in the same barangay. On the night of May 16, 1996, he said that he went to his
grandmother's house, where he watched television with his brother and around 20 other people
including AAA. After watching, he and his brother, YYY, returned to their sister's house to sleep.
He said that he did not notice if AAA left their grandmother's house. 20
Cansino added that when AAA was found dead, none of the barangay officials and police officers
went to his sister's house to investigate him. On May 22, 1996, his stepfather brought him to
Tarlac to work as a helper in a grocery store, where he used the alias Peter Viray to be
employed. He later found out that he was charged with rape with homicide of AAA. 21
Also testifying for the defense was YYY, ZZZ's brother, who retracted what he had said earlier
when the police interviewed him. Affirming ZZZ's testimony, he testified that on the night of the
incident, they watched television at their grandmother's house before they went home and slept
at their sister's house. 22
In a March 4, 2013 Decision,23 the Regional Trial Court found ZZZ guilty of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, the
service of sentence is hereby suspended, and in lieu of imprisonment, he is disposed with in an
agricultural camp or any other training facility that may be supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD, in accordance with Section 51 of RA 9344.
The accused is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim: Php20,000.00 as actual damages;
Php100,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; Php75,000.00 as moral damages; and
Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.24
The trial court found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution proved
ZZZ's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that there was moral certainty that ZZZ
perpetrated the crime since he had been the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared,
and he fled and hid his identity when he learned that he was a suspect. 25 The trial court ruled
that the positive identification of ZZZ prevailed over the defense of denial. It found his alibi that
he went home after watching television did not preclude the possibility that he was at the crime
scene.26
Adopting the report of the social worker who was assigned to ZZZ, the trial court found that he
acted with discernment in committing the crime against AAA. 27
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, m its February 29, 2016 Decision, 28 affirmed ZZZ's
conviction:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated March 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, xxxxxxxxxxx, in Criminal
Case No. SCC-2594 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.29
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court in relying on the testimony of BBB, who saw
ZZZ dragging AAA toward the school on the night of the incident. Aside from finding his
testimony spontaneous and convincing, it did not find any motive from BBB to wrongly implicate
ZZZ to the crime.30
The Court of Appeals ruled that although BBB did not actually see ZZZ raping AAA,
circumstantial evidence led to the reasonable conclusion that ZZZ perpetrated the crime: (1)
BBB positively identified ZZZ as the person last seen with the victim immediately before the
incident; and (2) ZZZ hid from authorities and adopted an alias. The Court of Appeals concluded
that these pieces of circumstantial evidence operated against ZZZ.31
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that between the categorical statements and the bare
denial of ZZZ, the former prevailed. While ZZZ's testimony was corroborated by his brother, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the latter could not be considered a disinterested witness. Moreover,
it found that it was not physically impossible for ZZZ to be in the crime scene since he and AAA
resided in the same barangay.32
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was correct in retroactively applying Republic Act
No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of2006. Under Section 6 of the law, a child
above 15 years old but below 18 years old is not exempt from criminal liability when the child
acted with discernment. The Court of Appeals found that ZZZ acted with discernment when he
perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place, and when he evaded arrest by fleeing to
Tarlac under an alias. It noted that even the social worker assigned to him arrived at the same
conclusion.33
As ZZZ was already above 30 years old when he was convicted, the Court of Appeals held that
the automatic suspension of the penalty as provided under Sections 38 and 40 of Republic Act
No. 9344 was no longer applicable.34

ZZZ filed his Notice of Appeal. His appeal having been given due course, the Court of Appeals
elevated the records of this case to this Court. 35
In its February 20, 2017 Resolution,  this Court required the parties to submit their
36
supplemental briefs. Both parties later manifested that they would adopt their Briefs before the
Court of Appeals. 37
Accused-appellant mainly argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt. 38
First, accused-appellant questions the credibility of BBB's testimony. He claims that contrary to
BBB's testimony, human experience dictates that BBB, as AAA's guardian, should have been
alarmed when he allegedly saw him dragging her to a dark place. He also questions BBB's story
in which AAA did not ask for help when BBB allegedly saw her being dragged.39 Moreover, he
finds it suspicious that BBB failed to find AAA's body when he purportedly searched the area
near the school, as the corpse's stench would have caught his attention. 40 He surmises that BBB
implicated him in the crime because BBB was himself investigated by the police. 41
Even assuming that he was the last person seen with AAA, accused-appellant argues that this
merely raises suspicion but is not sufficient to establish his guilt.42
Second, accused-appellant posits that even if he committed the crime, the Information failed to
allege that he acted with discernment, which meant that he should not be held criminally liable.
He posits that the trial court, in failing to conduct its own determination and merely relying on
the social worker's report, erred in ruling that he had acted with discernment. 43
Third, accused-appellant contends that he was not guilty of fleeing to evade the charge against
him. He reasons that he went to Tarlac because he was brought there by his stepfather, and as
a child, he had no choice but to follow this order. He also points out that he regularly returned
to xxxxxxxxxxx every month while he was working in Tarlac.44
Lastly, accused-appellant avers that his denial must be considered since it was corroborated by
his brother, who was with him when the crime was committed. He posits that while the defense
of denial is deemed inherently weak, the prosecution cannot profit from this alone; instead, it
should rely on the strength of its own evidence.45
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argues that the circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution proves accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.46 It avers that the circumstances in this case created
an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that accused appellant raped and killed
AAA.47
Moreover, plaintiff-appellee argues that the testimony of ZZZ's brother, YYY, deserves no
credence.48 It points out that according to PO3 Lavarias' testimony, YYY narrated on May 20,
1996 that while he was walking home with accused-appellant and AAA on the night of the
incident, his brother advised him to leave them behind. 49 In his testimony in court, however,
YYY recanted this story and stated that he went home with accused-appellant. Plaintiff-appellee
submits that YYY's narration in 1996 was more credible than his testimony, as it was taken
almost right after the incident and when he was only seven (7) years old, leaving little room for
coaching.50
Plaintiff-appellee contends that the trial court did not err in giving credence to BBB's testimony,
maintaining that there was nothing incredible in what he said: (1) he was not alarmed when he
saw accused-appellant with AAA because they were relatives; and (2) he testified that both of
them told him that they would follow him home after he had admonished them. 51 Plaintiff-
appellee also maintains that SPO3 Lavarias clarified that BBB was never a suspect in the case,
quashing accused-appellant's claim that BBB had the motive to implicate him in the crime. 52 It
echoes the settled doctrine that appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's
findings when it comes to witnesses' credibility. 53
Plaintiff-appellee asserts that the positive identification of accused appellant, taken together
with other circumstantial evidence, leads to a reasonable conclusion that he perpetrated the
crime.54
As to whether accused-appellant acted with discernment, plaintiff-appellee posits that the
allegation in the Information sufficiently met the requirement. 55 Nevertheless, should there be a
defect in the Information, plaintiff-appellee maintains that accused-appellant is deemed to have
waived his objections when he entered his plea.56 Moreover, it argues that hiding from
authorities indicates accused-appellant's discernment, as it shows that he was fully aware of his
act's consequences and depravity.57
The issues for this Court's resolution are the following:
First, whether or not accused-appellant ZZZ is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide; and
Second, whether or not the prosecution proved that accused-appellant acted with discernment.
I
In People v. Villarino,58 the elements of special complex crime of rape with homicide are the
following:
(1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such
carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. 59
The commission of the crime of rape may be proven not only by direct evidence, but also by
circumstantial evidence.60 Circumstantial evidence are "proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason
and common experience." 61
In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in
proving the commission of rape. This is because rape "is generally unwitnessed and very often
only the victim is left to testify for [him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the
complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify." 62
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the requirements for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction:
SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the following circumstantial evidence in
convicting accused-appellant: (1) BBB testified seeing him dragging AAA to the school on the
night of the incident; (2) accused-appellant's brother, YYY, testified going home with him and
AAA, but accused-appellant asked him to leave them behind; (3) after AAA's body had been
found, accused-appellant fled town and hid his identity using an alias; and (4) the post-mortem
examination conducted by Dr. Mejia and Dr. Bandonill confirmed that the cause of AAA's death
was a traumatic cerebral contusion, while the dried blood from her vagina was caused by a tear
inside the genital area.
A careful review of the records shows nothing that warrants the reversal of the trial court's and
the Court of Appeals' rulings.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court's Decision by pointing out that the sole basis of his
conviction is that he had been the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared. This is not
the case. His conviction is anchored not only on this single instance, but on the series of
circumstantial evidence against him. The circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution
constitutes an unbroken chain that leads to a reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant, and
no other person, was the author of the crime. Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt "does not
mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind."63
Moreover, there is no showing that the trial court erred in g1vmg credence to BBB's testimony.
As BBB explained, he reprimanded accused-appellant and AAA when he saw them, but he was
not suspicious since the two were relatives. Moreover, the prosecution established that BBB was
not a suspect in the crime, and nor was there any proof that BBB had motive to erroneously
implicate accused-appellant.
As this Court held in People v. Baron,64 "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance." 65 Here, it was not shown that the
trial court erred and misapprehended any fact or evidence. The trial court's findings, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on this Court.66 Thus, its findings
must not be disturbed.
Lastly, accused-appellant's denial cannot prevail over the prosecution's evidence. Although the
testimony of his brother YYY corroborated his denial, it does not escape this Court's attention
that his brother admitted in his initial testimony that he did not go home with accused-appellant
on the night of the incident. This Court has held that retractions are generally disfavored as they
are unreliable.67
Nevertheless, even if we consider YYY's more recent testimony, accused-appellant's alibi must
still fail. For his defense of alibi to be credible, he must show that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the crime scene when the crime was committed. 68 Yet, accused-appellant, who
stayed in the same barangay as AAA and the school, failed to do so.
II
Republic Act No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides the minimum
age of criminal responsibility:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under
at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of
his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings m
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
This Court has defined discernment as the "mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act."69 This is determined by considering all the facts of each
case.70
Under Republic Act No. 9344, children above 15 years old but below 18 years old who acted
without discernment are exempt from criminal responsibility. They "shall be released and shall
be subjected to an intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and
development officer, pursuant to Section 20[.]"71
On the other hand, if they acted with discernment, they shall not be exempt from criminal
responsibility. In Dorado v. People, this Court explained how the law applies to children in
conflict with the law who acted with discernment:
Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal
responsibility. Nevertheless, the said child does not immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or
she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of
determining the responsibility and treatment of the [child in conflict with the law] without
resorting to formal court proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds
provided by law are present, then the [child in conflict with the law] shall undergo the
appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal case, and trial before the courts may
proceed.
Once the [child in conflict with the law] is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not
immediately execute its judgment; rather, it shall place the [child in conflict with the law] under
suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt. During
the suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are
successful, then the court shall discharge the [child in conflict with the law]. Conversely, if
unsuccessful, then the court has the following options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to order
execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. 72 (Citations omitted)
Here, accused-appellant argues that even if he were guilty of raping AAA, he must still be
exempt from criminal liability since he was only 15 years old 73 when he committed the offense
and the prosecution failed to prove that he acted with discernment.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant acted with discernment in
carrying out the crime.74 First, he perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place. Second,
after knowing that he had been tagged as the suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing to
Tarlac and concealing his identity. Third, as confirmed by the social worker assigned to him, he
knew and understood the consequences of his acts. Lastly, Dr. Bandonill concluded that AAA
was raped by means of force, as evidenced by the contusions all over her body and by the tear
from her vaginal area.
As can be gleaned from these facts, accused-appellant committed the crime with an
understanding of its depravity and consequences. He must suffer the full brunt of the penalty of
the crime.
Considering that accused-appellant is already over 30 years old when he was convicted, the
automatic suspension of the sentence provided under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, in
relation to Section 40, may no longer be applied. While the suspension of sentence still applies
even if the child in conflict with the law is already of the age of majority at the time his
conviction was rendered, the suspension applies only until the minor reaches the maximum age
of 21.75 The provisions state:
SECTION 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
....
SECTION 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
As to the proper penalty for rape with homicide, Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
 ARTICLE 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
....
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
Thus, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape with homicide is death. Under Article 63 76 of
the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two (2) indivisible
penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Absent any aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Furthermore, since
accused-appellant was a minor when he committed the crime, he is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority under Section 68(2)77 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the
proper imposable penalty on him is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate penalty has a minimum period
within the range of prision mayor-the penalty one (1) degree lower to that provided in Article
249-and a maximum period within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence,
the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be imposed.
In accordance with People v. Jugueta,78 the proper amount of damages for the special complex
crime of rape with homicide when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua should be
P75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. This Court also
affirms the award of actual damages of P20,000.00. In addition, the damages awarded shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment
until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' February 29, 2016 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06486
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ZZZ is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the amounts of: (1) Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; (2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages; (3) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and (4) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as actual damages.
All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROMEO ASENIERO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the
assailed Decision 2 dated October 30, 2014 (Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Nineteenth (19 th )
Division (CA), in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01422, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated April 27,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Hilongos, Leyte (RTC), in Criminal Case No. H-
1263, finding herein accused-appellant Romeo Aseniero (Romeo) guilty of the crime of Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Accused Romeo was charged for the crime of Murder under the following Information:
"That on or about the 24th day of August 2003, in the Municipality of Bato, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
deliberate intent to kill employing treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack[,] stab DOMINADOR RANES with a long bolo which
the accused had provided himself for the purpose[,] thereby causing and inflicting upon the
victim multiple stabbed [sic] and hacked [sic] wounds on the different parts of his body causing
the immediate death of Dominador Ranes."4
Upon arraignment, Romeo pleaded not guilty.5
Version of the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
Roel Pilo, 19 years of age, married and a resident of Domagocdoc, Bato, Leyte is the first
witness for the prosecution. He testified that he is a friend of the victim, Dominador Reyes. He
knew the accused Romeo Aseniero because the latter lived in a neighboring barangay. On
August 23, 2003, at approximately 4:00 in the afternoon, he was at Barangay Imelda, Bato,
Leyte to attend a fiesta celebration. He was accompanied by his friend Jimmy Garong. At about
7:00 in the evening, they went to the barangay hall to see the operator of the sound system,
who was their close friend. At about 2:00 in the morning, he went to the dancing hall located
inside the plaza, just 10 meters from the barangay hall. He saw Dominador Ranes, Mario
Pelago, Analyn Gomez and Mira Pagay occupying one table. At about 5:00 in the morning, he
left the dancing hall together with the group of Dominador Ranes. On their way home, they
passed by a road in Brgy. Imelda, Bato, Leyte. Since the road was too narrow, they did not walk
side by side. Mira Pagay trailed first, followed by Mario Pelago, then Roel, and behind him were
Dominador Ranes and Analyn Gomez. Suddenly, he heard Dominador say "Aray" (Ouch!). At
that instant, he saw Dominador run past him followed by the accused Romeo Aseniero, who was
carrying a long bolo. More or less four (4) meters from where he was, Dominador stumbled,
with his back on the ground. The accused caught up with the victim and hacked him multiple
times. Prior to the stabbing, Roel Pilo did not notice that the accused was around. He recalled
that on both sides of the narrow trail, there were a lot of plants such as bamboo and coconut
trees. He was so shocked by the incident that he just stood there and watched. He asked the
accused why he stabbed the victim, to which the accused replied that he was jealous. At the
trial, Roel identified the murder weapon (long bolo) used in [the] killing of the victim.
On cross-examination, Roel Pilo admitted that it was only during the fiesta celebration that he
met the accused. At the place where the incident occurred, the grasses were short such that
any person on both sides of the narrow trail can readily be seen. He also admitted that since the
victim was walking behind him, he did not know if it was the accused who assaulted the victim
first.
The second witness for the prosecution is Analyn Gomez, single, 24 years of age, and a resident
of Brgy. Domagocdoc, Bato, Leyte. She testified that the victim was her current boyfriend at the
time of the incident and that the suspect was her former boyfriend. On August 23, 2003, she
went to Brgy. Imelda to attend the fiesta celebration. She stayed at the house of a Sangguniang
Kabataan Chairman and at about 11:30 in the evening, she went to the dance hall, together
with Mira Bagay, Dominador Ranes, Lita Reyes and Gleen Reyes. At the dance hall, [s]he saw
the accused Romeo Aseniero and his companions. Analyn and her group went out of the dance
hall at about 5:00 in the morning. On their way home to Brgy. Domagocdoc, they passed upon
a narrow road. She was walking behind Dominador on th[e] trail when Romeo Aseniero
suddenly came from behind her and stabbed Dominador in the back with a bolo. Dominador
tried to run but stumbled down twenty-five (25) feet from where he was stabbed. The accused
was able to catch up with the victim and he continued to stab the latter several times. She
shouted "No!" but the accused continued hacking the victim and even chopped off the latter's
feet. The rest of the group ran away while she hid herself behind a coffee tree, as the accused
was looking for her. She then ran towards the house of the barangay chairman of Brgy.
Domagocdoc where she reported the incident. She narrated that the reason why Romeo killed
Dominador is jealousy. She also identified the bolo used in killing the victim.
Upon clarificatory questioning by the judge, Analyn revealed that just one month after her
break-up with the accused, she started a relationship with the victim. And that based on her
observations, the accused was uneasy with her new love affair.
On cross-examination, she propounded that the reason why she broke up with the accused was
because the latter courted her cousin. She admitted that on both sides of the narrow trail are
cliffs. Before the accused stabbed the victim, the former pushed her aside but she did not fall
down the cliff as there was a rock on the side of the trail. She shouted but it was already too
late as Dominador was already stabbed in the back. During the stabbing incident, the rest of the
group ran away except for Roel Pilo. She also admitted that the accused voluntarily surrendered
to the barangay chairman.
The prosecution's third witness is Dr. Provo Quijano, 34 years of age, a resident of Brgy.
Bagumbayan, Bato, Leyte, and the Municipal Health Officer of Bato, Leyte. At the trial, he
identified the medical certificate which he issued in connection with the death of Dominador
Ranes. Since the counsel for the defense admitted the due execution of the medical certificate,
Dr. Quijano merely identified the said certificate and no longer testified as to the circumstances
surrounding the death of the victim. 6
Version of the Defense
The version of the defense, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
The first witness for the defense is Loreto Gomez Papa, 42 years of age, married,
a tuba gatherer and a resident of Brgy. Marcelo, Bato, Leyte. He testified that he knows the
accused as they are neighbors and childhood playmates. On August 23, 2003, he was at Brgy.
Imelda, Bato, Leyte attending the barrio fiesta. He was with his cousins, namely, Julie and
Bobby Papas. They stayed at the house of their friend and went to the dance hall at about 10:00
in the evening. He noticed that the accused and Analyn Gomez were inside the dance hall,
occupying different tables with their respective groups. At about 5:00 in the morning, he left the
dance hall together with his two cousins and the accused, Romeo Aseniero. Analyn and her
group were walking ahead of them at a distance of about ten (10) arms-length. Analyn Gomez
and the accused were still sweethearts and have not broken up yet, but they were quarreling at
that time. When the accused saw Analyn, he tried to go after her and her companion. He told
the accused to just leave them alone but the latter did not heed his advice. When the accused
approached Analyn, he was kicked by Dominador. Instantly, Dominador unsheathed his knife
and Romeo, in turn, unsheathed his bolo. Loreto feared that a bloody fight was forthcoming so
he ran way. His other companions also took off. Later that day, he received word that the
companion of Analyn died.
On cross-examination, he admitted that Analyn Gomez and her group left the dance hall ahead
of their group, but the accused followed them. Romeo Aseniero caught up with Analyn and her
group. He was jealous and he wanted to confront Analyn. Loreto admitted that until the time the
accused and the victim unsheathed their weapons, no altercation occurred.
The second witness for the defense is Gregorio Pol, 49 years of age, married, a tuba gatherer,
and a resident of Brgy. Marcelo, Bato, Leyte. He testified that he knew the accused because the
latter lives near their barangay. In the early morning of August 24, 2003, he was walking
behind Alin (Analyn) Gomez and accused, along with other persons. Dominador was following
the group of the accused. Suddenly, Dominador kicked the accused and stabbed him with a
knife. The accused then leaned back, unsheathed his bolo and stabbed Dominador. Gregorio
immediately ran away and did not know what happened next after the accused stabbed the
victim.
On cross-examination, Gregorio admitted that while Analyn and Dominador were walking side
by side, the accused trailed behind them and was walking fast. On re-direct, he clarified that he
saw the victim stab the accused in the chest.
The third witness for the defense is SPO3 Wilfreda Vargas, 48 years of age, married, a police
officer assigned at Matalom, Leyte, and a resident of Brgy. Tinago, Bato, Leyte. He testified that
in the early morning of August 24, 2003, the accused, accompanied by one person, surrendered
at the police station of Matalom. He personally received the accused and caused the recording of
the incident in the police blotter.
The accused did not testify in his own behalf.7
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated April27, 2010, the RTC found Romeo guilty of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused ROMEO ASENIERO is found GUILTY of
MURDER under the Revised Penal Code as amended beyond reasonable doubt and [is]
hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. And to
indemnify the heirs of Dominador Ranes the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), and to pay the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim. 9 The victim was suddenly and
unexpectedly hacked from behind by the accused.10 It further ruled that the testimonies of the
defense witnesses are incomplete and unconvincing.11 Lastly, it held that although the accused
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities, such mitigating circumstance cannot be applied
to lower an indivisible penalty.12
Aggrieved, Romeo appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision dated October 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the conviction by the RTC:
WHEREFORE, the April 27, 2010 Decision rendered by f he Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, Hilongos, Leyte finding accused-appellant Romeo Aseniero guilty of murder
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of his civil liability. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay
to the Heirs of Dominador Ranes the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
interest on all the damages herein awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of the incident
to the finality of the judgment and 12% from the finality hereof until fully paid, and to pay
costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 13
The CA held that the accused's attack on the victim was treacherously carried out. 14 At the time
of the attack, the victim was just walking with his girlfriend and companions when he was
suddenly hacked from behind by the accused.15 It further held that the testimony of Analyn
Gomez (Analyn), the victim's girlfriend, is credible and sufficient as it is corroborated by the
other witnesses in some material points. 16 Lastly, it held that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. 17
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming Romeo's conviction for Murder despite the fact that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts are generally accorded great weight; except
when it appears on the record that the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied some significant fact or circumstance which if considered, would have altered the
result.18 This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole case is thrown open for
review on issues of both fact and law, and the court may even consider issues which were not
raised by the parties as errors.19 The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 20
After a careful review and scrutiny of the records, the Court affirms the conviction of Romeo,
but only for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not proven in the killing of the victim.
Treachery not established beyond reasonable doubt
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was present, thereby making Romeo liable for Murder instead of Homicide.
On the other hand, Romeo posits that the RTC misappreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. He argues that the prosecution failed to prove that treachery was employed in the
killing of the victim. 21 The fact that the attack was sudden per se does not bespeak the
circumstance of alevosia.22 He further argues that it was the victim who first assaulted him by
kicking him.23 This was the substance of Loreto Gomez Papa's (Loreto) testimony, which was
corroborated by Gregorio Pol (Gregorio).24
On this issue, the Court rules in favor of Romeo.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.25 To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. 26 The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.27
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the elements of treachery in
the killing of the victim.
To start, based on the testimonies of the two defense witnesses the attack was preceded by an
altercation between Romeo and the victim. 28 Both Loreto and Gregorio testified that it was the
victim who first assaulted the accused. 29 This should prevail over the testimony of the
prosecution witness, Analyn, that Romeo immediately stabbed the victim, more so considering
that Analyn's testimony is uncorroborated by the other prosecution witness, Roel Pilo (Roel),
who testified that he did not see how the attack began s he was walking in front of the victim. 30
There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation between the accused and the
victim. Each of them is forewarned of an impending attack by either of them. Thus, in one case,
the Court held, "[t]here is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of
words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the
assailant towards the former."31
Certainly, the attack made by the accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the victim
who first attacked the former. Even assuming that the version of the events as narrated by
Analyn is to be considered, she also narrated that she was pushed by the accused prior to his
attack on the victim.32 Thus, this event should have made the victim aware that there was an
impending attack on him. In addition, the victim was able to defend himself from the initial
stabbing act as he had his own weapon and was able to run away from the accused. 33 The only
reason why he was not able to escape was because he stumbled down and the accused caught
up with him.34 In another case, the Court ruled that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated where the victim was forewarned of the impending attack and he could
have in fact escaped had he not stumbled.35
Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender properly appreciated
For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following requisites
must be established: first, the accused has not been actually arrested; second, the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and third, the surrender is
voluntary.36 The said requisites were sufficiently proven by the defense.
SPO3 Wilfredo Vargas testified that the accused voluntarily surrendered at the Matalom Police
Station on August 24, 2003.37 This was corroborated by Analyn who admitted that indeed
Romeo immediately surrendered to the authorities after the incident. 38 Roel likewise testified
that he accompanied the accused to the police station. 39 Thus, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Proper penalty and award of damages
Therefore, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is Homicide
and not Murder. Under Article 249 of the RPC, any person found guilty of homicide shall be
meted the penalty of reclusion temporal, a penalty which contains three (3) periods.40 Given
that Romeo voluntarily surrendered, Article 64(2) states that when only a mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the felony, the penalty shall be imposed in its
minimum period.41 Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, while the minimum penalty shall be prision
mayor in any of its periods.42 Thus, he is to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) ears and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.43
Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,44 the damages awarded in the
questioned Decision are hereby modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate
damages of P50,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Court DECLARES accused-appellant Romeo Aseniero GUILTY of HOMICIDE, with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, for which he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178541               March 27, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANGELO ZETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision dated 30 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02054,1 affirming in toto the Decision2 dated 29 November 2002 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63787, finding accused-appellant Angelo Zeta and his wife,
Petronilla Zeta (Petronilla), guilty of murder.
The facts are as follows:
On 6 November 1995, an Information 3 was filed before the RTC charging appellant and Petronilla of Murder,
thus:
That on or about the 28th day of October 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation, treachery, assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon the person of RAMON GARCIA y LOPEZ by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a .45 cal.
pistol hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby causing the instant and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said RAMON GARCIA Y LOPEZ.
When arraigned on 20 December 1995, appellant and Petronilla, assisted by their respective counsels de
parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge of murder. 4 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Aleine Mercado (Aleine), Dr. Maria Cristina Freyra (Dr. Freyra),
Police Inspector Solomon Segundo (Inspector Segundo), Rey Jude Naverra (Rey), Edwin Ronk (Edwin),
Francisco Garcia (Francisco), SPO1 Carlos Villarin (SPO1 Villarin), and SPO2 Wakab Magundacan (SPO2
Magundacan). Their testimonies, taken together, bear the following:
On 28 October 1995, at around 12:00 midnight, Edwin, Rey and a certain Melvin Castillo (Melvin) had a
drinking spree outside the house of Rey located at No. 30-B Tacio Street, La Loma, Quezon City. At about
2:00 in the morning of the same date, a car stopped in front of the three. Appellant was driving the car while
Petronilla was seated beside him. Petronilla opened the car’s window and asked Edwin if he knows Ramon
and the latter’s address at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City. Edwin replied that he did not
know Ramon or his address. Thereafter, appellant and Petronilla left on board the car and proceeded to
General Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City.5
At about 2:15 in the morning of the same date, the car boarded by appellant and Petronilla stopped in front of
Ramon’s house at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City. After parking nearby, appellant and
Petronilla alighted from the car and proceeded to Ramon’s house. Petronilla repeatedly called Ramon. Aleine
(niece of Cristina Mercado, Ramon’s common-law wife) was awakened by the repeated calls and opened the
door. Petronilla requested Aleine to call Ramon. Aleine told Petronilla that she would wake up Ramon who
was then sleeping with Cristina at the second floor of the house. Aleine invited appellant and Petronilla inside
the house but the two replied that they would just wait for Ramon outside. Aleine proceeded to the second
floor of the house and knocked at the door of Ramon’s room. Ramon woke up. Subsequently, Aleine went
downstairs and proceeded to the dining table. While Ramon was walking down the stairs, appellant suddenly
entered the house and shot Ramon several times on different parts of the body with a caliber .45 Llama pistol.
Upon seeing appellant shooting Ramon, Aleine hid inside the restroom. When the gunshots ceased, Aleine
went out of the restroom and saw Ramon sprawled and bloodied on the ground floor. 6
Edwin, Rey and Melvin were still drinking when they heard the gunshots. They rushed to the direction of
Ramon’s house. When they were nearing Ramon’s house, Petronilla suddenly stepped out of the main door of
Ramon’s house followed by appellant. Melvin uttered, "Mamamatay tao." Petronilla merely looked at them and
entered the car. Appellant also proceeded inside the car and thereafter the car sped away. 7
Subsequently, Aleine went out of the house and called for help. Edwin, Rey and Melvin approached her. They
carried Ramon and placed him inside a vehicle owned by a neighbor. While they were on their way to the
Chinese General Hospital, Ramon told Aleine that the one who shot him was "asawa ni Nellie na kapitbahay
namin sa Las Piñas." Ramon died due to gunshot wounds while being operated on at the Chinese General
Hospital. Thereafter, the police arrived at the crime scene and recovered several empty bullet shells and
slugs.8
At about 10:55 the following morning, SPO2 Magundacan received a report that a carnapped vehicle was
parked along Lakandula Street, P. Tuazon Blvd., Quezon City. SPO2 Magundacan proceeded thereat and
saw appellant about to board a car armed with a gun visibly tucked in his waist. SPO2 Magundacan
approached appellant and asked him for a license and/or registration papers of the gun but appellant did not
show any. SP02 Magundacan also inquired from Petronilla, who was inside the car also armed with a gun
tucked in her waist, if she had a license but Petronilla likewise failed to show any. Thus, SPO2 Magundacan
brought appellant and Petronilla to Police Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City, for investigation. Subsequently,
appellant and Petronilla, upon the request of the La Loma police, were turned over to the police station for
investigation as regards the killing of Ramon. Appellant and Petronilla were thereafter charged with murder. 9
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses,
to wit: (1) death certificate of Ramon; 10 (2) sworn statement of Aleine;11 (3) request for autopsy examination of
Ramon’s body;12 (4) medico-legal report issued and signed by Dr. Freyra stating that Ramon died due to
gunshot wounds;13 (5) anatomical sketch of a human body signed by Dr. Freyra indicating the location of the
gunshot wounds on Ramon’s body;14 (6) physical science report stating that a paraffin test was conducted on
both hands of Ramon and they were found negative for gunpowder nitrates; 15 (7) handwritten sketch made by
Edwin depicting the streets of Tacio and General Tinio; 16 (8) request for ballistic examination of the object
evidence recovered from the crime scene;17 (9) ballistic report issued and signed by Inspector Segundo stating
that the bullet extracted from Ramon’s body and other bullets recovered from the crime scene were similar to
the bullets of the caliber .45 Llama pistol seized from appellant; 18 (10) certification from the Personnel Division
of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) affirming that Ramon was its regular employee
from 14 February 1981 up to 27 October 1995 and that he was receiving a monthly salary of ₱13,687.00 plus
other benefits;19 (11) summary of expenses and receipts for the wake of Ramon; 20 (12) joint affidavit of SPO2
Magundacan and a certain PO2 Ronald Zamora; 21 (13) photographs showing the spot where appellant and
Petronilla stood while waiting for Ramon, the stairs where Ramon walked down shortly before he was shot
several times by appellant, the area inside Ramon’s house where appellant positioned himself while shooting
at Ramon, and the location where Ramon fell down after he was shot several times by appellant; 22 (14) nine
empty shells and seven deformed slugs fired from a caliber .45 pistol which were recovered by SPO1 Villarin
from the crime scene;23 (15) a deformed slug fired from a caliber .45 pistol which was extracted from Ramon’s
body; (16) test bullets fired from the caliber .45 Llama pistol seized from appellant; 24 (17) the caliber .45 Llama
pistol with Serial Number C-27854 seized from appellant;25 and (18) a calling card recovered from Ramon with
the print label "Cristine Rent A Car," "Angelo D. Zeta" and with telephone numbers and addresses. 26
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant, Petronilla, and Annabelle Vergara (Annabelle)
to refute the foregoing allegations. Their version of the incident is as follows:
On 27 October 1995, at about 10:00 in the evening, appellant, Petronilla and Annabelle (housemaid of the
couple) were in the couple’s house at Cainta, Rizal.27 Later, appellant took Petronilla’s caliber .38 pistol and
went to his brother’s (Jose Zeta, Jr.) house in Marikina arriving therein at around 12:00 midnight. Jose was out
of the house so appellant waited for him. At about 2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995, Jose arrived.
Thereafter, appellant demanded from Jose the return of his three firearms, one of which is a caliber .45 pistol.
Jose, however, handed only the caliber .45 pistol to appellant. Appellant berated Jose for refusing to return the
two other firearms. Irked, Jose drew a gun. Appellant also drew the caliber .45 pistol and shot Jose four times.
Jose fell down on the ground. Afterwards, appellant left the house, took Jose’s car which was parked near the
house, and proceeded to Police Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City, where he waited for a certain Tony
Tolentino whom he claims to be a policeman assigned at the Southern Police District. At about 9:00 in the
morning of 28 October 1995, the policeman on duty at Precinct 8 informed appellant that the latter’s car
parked inside the precinct was a carnapped vehicle. The policemen searched the car and found several guns
including the caliber .45 and the caliber .38. Appellant was thereupon detained and charged with illegal
possession of firearms and carnapping. 28
At about 10:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995, Petronilla received a telephone call informing her that
appellant was at Police Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City. She immediately proceeded thereat and presented
documents relative to her ownership and license of the caliber .38 seized from appellant. Thereafter, she went
home at about 11:00 in the evening. 29
On 2 November 1995, Petronilla visited appellant at Precinct 8. During the visit, Aleine arrived at Precinct 8
and pointed to appellant and Petronilla. Subsequently, appellant and Petronilla were informed by the police
that they were suspects in the killing of Ramon. Thereafter, they were charged with murder. 30
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 29 November 2002 convicting appellant and Petronilla of murder. It
held that appellant and Petronilla conspired in killing Ramon. It also ruled that Ramon’s killing was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity. In conclusion, it imposed the death
penalty on appellant while Petronilla was merely sentenced to reclusion perpetua "owing to her being a mother
and her lesser degree of participation in the killing of Ramon." The fallo of the decision reads:
Accordingly, based on the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense and finding both accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER attended by the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and nocturnity without being offset by any mitigating circumstances, the accused Angelo
Zeta is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. The wife and co-accused Petronilla Zeta, although a co-
conspirator in the commission of the offense charged, is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA owing
to her being a mother and her lesser degree of participation in the act of murder.
The accused Angelo Zeta and Petronilla Zeta are also sentenced to indemnify in SOLIDUM the heirs of the
victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Ramon Garcia; ₱146,000.00 for the hospital and burial
expenses; and ₱1,642,440.00 for the lost income of the deceased reckoned at 10 years of productive life, plus
costs.
The .45 caliber Llama pistol with Serial Number C-27854 is confiscated in favor of the Government to be kept
by the Philippine National Police as mandated by law.31
On 9 December 2002, the RTC issued an Order forwarding the records of the instant case to Us for automatic
review because of the death penalty imposed on appellant. 32
On 24 December 2002, Petronilla filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC stating that she would appeal her
conviction to this Court. 33
On 28 April 2004, Petronilla, through counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal before us 34 stating that:
After a thorough review of the available stenographic notes obtained by the close relatives of the accused-
appellant from the Regional Trial Court, the undersigned counsel found out that there are no testimonial and/or
documentary evidence presented before the lower Trial Court that could sufficiently serve as justifiable basis
to warrant the reversal of the appealed decision rendered insofar as PETRONILLA ZETA is concerned.
Moreover, the undersigned counsel sustained serious physical injuries that render difficult to further handle the
appeal that will require lengthy preparation of appellant’s brief and other legal pleadings as may be required
under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, after discussion with accused-appellant PETRONILLA ZETA, the undersigned counsel
informed her that he is now constrained to withdraw his appearance in the above-entitled appealed case.
Upon being informed of the health predicament of the undersigned counsel and after being enlightened about
the weakness of the appeal, accused-appellant PETRONILLA ZETA willfully and voluntarily decided to
WITHDRAW the appeal and do hereby signify to the Honorable Court that she is no longer interested in the
further prosecution of her appeal. She, likewise, has no objection to the withdrawal of the appearance of Atty.
Alfredo E. Anasco, as her counsel in the above-entitled case.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the above-entitled appeal be ordered withdrawn and the MOTION
TO WITHDRAW APPEAL be GRANTED, and the withdrawal of appearance of counsel be given due course.
On 28 September 2004, we issued a Resolution granting Petronilla’s motion to withdraw appeal. 35
On 22 November 2005, we issued a Resolution remanding the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.36 On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC. Thus:
Thus, after finding that the trial court’s conclusions are supported by the evidence presented and in full accord
with existing law and jurisprudence, We find no reason to set it aside.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The November 29, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63787 is
AFFIRMED.37
Appellant elevated the present case before us on the following grounds:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DID NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFY HIM;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS UNDER A SHADOW OF DOUBT.38
Apropos the first issue, appellant claims that although Edwin and Rey positively identified Petronilla as the one
who asked them about Ramon and his address shortly before the incident occurred, the two, nevertheless,
failed to identify appellant as Petronilla’s companion during the said questioning. He also argues that Aleine’s
testimony identifying him as the one who shot Ramon during the incident is not morally certain because Aleine
narrated that she saw only the side portion of his face and the color of the shirt he wore during the incident. 39
It appears that Edwin and Rey did not actually see appellant shoot Ramon during the incident. Nonetheless,
Aleine saw appellant shoot Ramon on that fateful night. Her positive identification of appellant and direct
account of the shooting incident is clear, thus:
ATTY. A. OLIVETTI (DIRECT EXAMINATION) Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court the name of the person who shot Ramon Garcia?

Q. Aleine Mercado, are you the same Aleine Mercado who is listed as one of the witnesses in this A. Angelo Zeta.
case?

Q. Where in particular did Mr. Angelo Zeta shot Mr. Ramon Garcia?
WITNESS

A. Inside our house, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how was he able to enter your house?

Q. Do you know the accused in this case?

A. Our door then was opened, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why was your door opened at that time?

Q. If they are inside the courtroom, will you identify them?

A. I heard a woman calling for my Tito Ramon and so I opened the door, sir.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time was this Madam Witness?

Q. Will you please look around and point before the Honorable Court the person of the accused in
this case?
A. 2:15.

A. Yes, sir. That man wearing yellow T-shirt and that lady who is also wearing yellow shirt.
(witness pointing to a man who when asked of his name identified himself as Angelo Zeta and to a Q. 2:15 in the afternoon?
lady beside Angelo Zeta who when asked of her name identified herself as Petronilla Zeta.)
A. 2:15 in the morning, your honor.
xxx
xxxx
Q. On October 28, 1995, at about 2:15 in the morning, do you remember if there was an unusual
incident that happened?
ATTY. A. OLIVETTI

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And who was that woman that you saw was outside calling Mr. Ramon Garcia?

Q. Will you please tell the Court briefly what that unusual incident was?
A. Petronilla Zeta, sir.

A. Tito Ramon Garcia was shot, Sir.

Q. When you opened the door and you saw this woman, what happened between you and her?

Q. And who is this Tito Ramon Garcia that you are talking about?
A. She asked me if a certain Ramon Garcia was there.

A. He is the live-in partner of my aunt Cristy.

Q. What was your reply?

Q. A while ago you mentioned that you have been living with your auntie and Tito Ramon Garcia in
A. I told her he was sleeping. He was upstairs.
Gen. Tinio, La Loma, Quezon City. Will you please describe before the Honorable Court the
residence or your house at that time where you were living with your auntie and Tito Ramon
Garcia? Q. And what did the woman do after that if she did anything?

A. It is a small house we were living in. It has a mezzanine and it measures 4 x 3 meters, sir. A. She told me to call for my Tito Ramon.

xxxx Q. What did you do after she asked you to call Mr. Ramon Garcia?

Q. Do you know the person who shot your Tito Ramon Garcia? A. I told her to enter before I call my Tito Ramon but they answered that they will remain outside.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so after they refused to enter the house, what did you do as they were asking you to call Q. As you were in the C.R., what happened?
Mr. Ramon Garcia?

A. I heard successive shots, sir.

A. I told them to wait and then I went upstairs.

Q. How long did you stay in the C.R.?

Q. What did you do upstairs?

A. Until the shots had stopped . . . Until the firing had stopped, sir.
A. I knocked at the door to wake up my Tito Ramon.

Q. And you sensed that the firing had stopped, what did you do?
xxxx

A. I slowly opened the door to take a look if Angelo Zeta and companion were still there.
Q. And was your Tito Ramon able to wake up?

Q. And what did you see?

A. When I felt that they were awakened, I went downstairs.

A. They were no longer there, sir.

Q. Where in particular downstairs did you go?

Q. And you saw that they have guns, what did you do?
A. Near our dining table, sir.

A. I went out of the C.R. and I returned to the place where I was before where I was previously
Q. How long was it from the door? How far was it from the door? standing.

A. Two-arms-length, sir, or "dalawang dipa," sir. Q. And what did you see when you reached that portion that you are talking about?

Q. And what happened as you stood by downstairs? A. I saw Tito Ramon lying frustrate and blooded.

A. While Tito Ramon was going down, sir, Angelo Zeta suddenly entered our house and Q And what did you do when you see (sic) him on that particular condition?
immediately shot him several times.

A. I peeped at the door to find out if Angelo Zeta and companion were still there.
Q. How far were you from Mr. Angelo Zeta when you saw him?

Q. And what did you see?

I withdraw that.

A. They were no longer there.

How far were you from Mr. Angelo Zeta when you saw him suddenly entered the house and shot
Mr. Ramon Garcia?
Q. And what did you do after that?

A. Less than one meter, sir.

A. I knocked at the door of the owner of the house to ask for help. 40

x x x x.
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, as in the case of
Aleine, is sufficient to support a conviction even in the charge of murder. 41
Q. Where was Petronilla Zeta at that time that the shooting occurred?

Appellant’s argument that Aleine’s testimony identifying him as the one who shot Ramon is not morally certain
A. She was outside the door, sir. because she saw only the side portion of his face and the color of the shirt he wore during the incident,
deserves scant consideration. A person can still be properly identified and recognized even by merely looking
at the side portion of his face. To be sure, Aleine recognized and identified appellant in the police line-up and
xxxx during trial as the one who shot Ramon. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of
violence committed right before their eyes, witnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals at any given time.42 A startling or frightful experience creates an indelible impression in the
Q. What did you do as you were standing and while Mr. Angelo Zeta was shooting Mr. Ramon
mind that can be recalled vividly.43 It bears stressing that Aleine was less than one meter away from appellant
Garcia inside the house?
when the latter shot Ramon. The crime scene was also well-lighted during the incident because there was a
fluorescent bulb inside the house. 44
A. When I heard two shots, I run to the C.R. or comfort room.
The testimonies of Aleine and of the other prosecution witnesses are in harmony with the documentary and
object evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies to be
credible and trustworthy. The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court. 45
Anent the second and third issues, appellant contends that his conviction is unwarranted based on the
following reasons: (1) the prosecution failed to establish any possible motive for the appellant to kill Ramon;
(2) there is an inconsistency in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses regarding the type and color of the
car boarded by appellant and Petronilla before and after the incident. Edwin testified that appellant and
Petronilla left the scene on board a gold-colored Mitsubishi Lancer; while SPO2 Magundacan narrated that
he apprehended appellant while the latter was about to board a blue Toyota Corona Macho; (3) Jose could
have been the one who fatally shot Ramon and appellant could have been mistakenly identified as Jose
because they have the same physical appearance and facial features; (4) if appellant was indeed the one who
shot Ramon, he could have immediately confessed such crime to the police just like what he did after killing
Jose; and (5) there is no proof that appellant is the husband of a certain "Mely." Ramon’s dying declaration to
Aleine was that it was the husband of "Mely," his former neighbor in Las Pinas, who shot him. Further,
Petronilla’s nickname could either be "Nellie" or "Nelia" and not "Mely" as referred to by Ramon. 46
Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused in the crime
are definitely shown, particularly when we consider that it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have
killed or committed serious offenses for no reason at all. Motive gains importance only when the identity of the
culprit is doubtful.47 Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the
perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial to the successful prosecution of a criminal case. 48 It is
obvious from the records that Aleine positively and categorically identified appellant as the person who shot
Ramon during the incident. Her testimony was corroborated on relevant points by Edwin and Rey.
There is no inconsistency in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the car boarded by
appellant and Petronilla in leaving the crime scene and, subsequently, at the time they were apprehended.
Edwin testified that appellant and Petronilla left the scene after the incident which was between 2:15 and 2:30
in the morning on board a gold-colored Mitsubishi Lancer.49 SPO2 Magundacan told the court that he
apprehended appellant at around 10:55 in the morning of the same day while the latter was about to board
a blue Toyota Corona Macho.50 In his affidavit attached to the records, Jan Ryan Zeta, son of Jose, narrated
that Jose was shot by appellant at about 4:00 in the morning of the same date. 51 Appellant admitted that after
shooting Jose on the early morning of 28 October 1995, he took the latter’s Toyota Corona Macho and
left.52 Thus, it is probable that after leaving the crime scene at La Loma on board a gold Mitsubishi Lancer at
about 2:15 or 2:30 in the morning, appellant and Petronilla then proceeded to Marikina and took Jose’s blue
Toyota Corona Macho. This explains why the car of appellant and Petronilla used in leaving the crime scene
was different from that which they used at the time of their apprehension.
Appellant’s theory of alibi that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene in La Loma when
the incident occurred because he was in Marikina, and that Jose could have been the one who fatally shot
Ramon is flimsy and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of Aleine. Appellant was
mistakenly identified as Jose because they have the same physical appearance and facial feature. In addition,
the empty bullet shells and slugs recovered from the crime scene were found to have the same characteristics
as those of the bullets of appellant’s caliber .45 Llama pistol. Further, there is no testimonial or documentary
proof showing that it was Jose who shot Ramon. Appellant himself testified that he met Jose in the latter’s
house in Marikina at about 2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995. On the other hand, the shooting of Ramon
at La Loma, Quezon City occurred at about 2:15 in the morning of the same date. Hence, it was impossible for
Jose to be at La Loma, Quezon City and to have shot Ramon at such time and place.
It is insignificant whether Petronilla was referred to by Ramon in his dying declaration as "Mely" or "Nellie." As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Ramon sustained twelve gunshot wounds and was catching his
breath when he uttered the name or nickname of Petronilla as the wife of appellant. Thus, understandably, he
could not have spoken clearly in such a difficult situation. Moreover, Ramon referred to "Nellie" or "Mely" as
his former neighbor in Las Piñas. Likewise, appellant and Petronilla admitted that Ramon was their former
neighbor in Las Piñas.53
We now go to the propriety of the penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the RTC which the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The RTC held that the killing of Ramon qualifies as murder because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime or nocturnity. It is a rule of evidence that aggravating
circumstances must be proven as clearly as the crime itself. 54
Evident premeditation qualifies the killing of a person to murder if the following elements are present: (1) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to
his resolve; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination or conception and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desired to hearken to its warning. 55
The first two elements of evident premeditation are present in the case at bar.
The time manifesting Petronilla and appellant’s determination to kill Ramon was when they, at about 2:00 in
the morning of 28 October 1995, repeatedly asked Edwin about Ramon and the latter’s address, and when
they subsequently proceeded to the house of Ramon.
The fact that appellant and Petronilla waited for Ramon, and appellant’s subsequent act of shooting him at
around 2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995 indicate that they had clung to their determination to kill
Ramon.
The third element of evident premeditation, however, is lacking in the instant case. The span of thirty minutes
or half an hour from the time appellant and Petronilla showed their determination to kill Ramon (2:00 in the
morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time appellant shot to death Ramon (2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28
October 1995) could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences
of the crime they committed.56 We have held that the lapse of thirty minutes between the determination to
commit a crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the consequences of the act. 57
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a judicial
sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to allow the conscience of the actor to
overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warning. Where no sufficient lapse of time is
appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated.58
Nonetheless, we find that treachery attended the killing of Ramon.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. 59 The essence of treachery is
a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of
the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential elements are required in order that treachery can be
appreciated: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s
safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense
or retaliation; and (2) a deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further,
this aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information and duly proven. 60
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its elements were duly established by the
prosecution.
It has been established that Ramon, still groggy after having been awakened by Aleine, was walking down the
stairs when appellant suddenly shot him. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the appellant’s attack
rendered Ramon defenseless and without means of escape. Appellant admitted that he was a member of a
gun club and was proficient in using his caliber .45 Llama pistol. 61 In fact, he was good at shooting a moving
target during his practice.62 He also stated that he owned five firearms. 63 Evidently, appellant took advantage
of his experience and skill in practice shooting and in guns to exact the death of Ramon. There is no doubt
that appellant’s use of a caliber .45 Llama pistol, as well as his act of positioning himself in a shooting stance
and of shooting Ramon several times on the chest area and on other parts of body, were obviously adopted by
him to prevent Ramon from retaliating or escaping. Considering that Ramon was unarmed, groggy from sleep,
and was casually walking down narrow stairs unmindful of the danger that lurked behind, there was absolutely
no way for him to defend himself or escape.
As regards the appreciation by the RTC of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, it should be
underscored that nocturnity or nighttime is, by and of itself, not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes so
only when (1) it was especially sought by the offender; or (2) it was taken advantage of by him; or (3) it
facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s immunity from capture. 64
Although the crime in the instant case was committed between 2:15 and 2:30 in the morning, no evidence was
presented showing that nighttime was especially and purposely sought by appellant to facilitate the
commission of the crime, or that it was availed of for the purpose of impunity. Moreover, the crime scene was
well-lighted by a fluorescent bulb. We have held that nocturnity is not aggravating where the place of the
commission of the crime was well-illuminated.65
= 28.66 x ₱82,122.00
= ₱2,354,163.99
WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 June 2006 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02054 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death
imposed on appellant is lowered to reclusion perpetua; (2) appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Ramon
Garcia the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the award
of actual damages is reduced to ₱115,473.00; and (4) the indemnity for Ramon’s loss of earning capacity is
increased to ₱2,354,163.99. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is maintained.
Appellant’s caliber .45 Llama pistol with Serial Number C-27854 is hereby confiscated in favor of the
Government.

Even if we were to assume that nocturnity was present in the case at bar, this cannot still be appreciated in
view of the presence of treachery that attended the killing of Ramon. Nighttime cannot be considered an SO ORDERED.
aggravating circumstance separate from treachery, since nighttime is absorbed in treachery. 66

Accordingly, the death penalty imposed by the RTC on appellant should be modified. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same
Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there are
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since there is no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the instant case, and treachery cannot be considered as an aggravating
circumstance as it was already considered as a qualifying circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed.67

The award of damages and its corresponding amount rendered by the RTC should also be modified in line
with current jurisprudence.

In addition to the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for Ramon’s death, the award of moral damages amounting to
₱50,000.00 is also proper since it is mandatory in murder cases, without need of proof and allegation other
than the death of the victim.68

The heirs of Ramon are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was firmly established.69

The amount of actual damages should be reduced from ₱146,000.00 to ₱115,473.00 per computation of the
official receipts attached to the records. 701avvphi1

The heirs of Ramon should also be indemnified for loss of earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the
New Civil Code.71 Consistent with our previous decisions, 72 the formula for the indemnification of loss of
earning capacity is:

Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income (GAI) - Living Expenses

= 2/3 (80 - age of deceased) x (GAI - 50% of GAI).

Ramon’s death certificate states that he was 37 years old at the time of his demise. 73 A certification from
Ramon’s employer, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, shows that Ramon was earning an annual
gross income of ₱164,244.00.74

Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of Ramon is ₱2,354,163.99,
computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 (43) x (₱164,244.00 - ₱82,122.00)