Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity

North American Philosophical Publications
Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity

Author(s): Michael Della Rocca
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 265-276
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
Publications
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27743982
Accessed: 01-06-2018 00:10 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
University of Illinois Press, North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating

with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History of Philosophy Quarterly
This content downloaded from 163.178.101.95 on Fri, 01 Jun 2018 00:10:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 8, Number 3, July 1991
CAUSATION AND SPINOZAS

CLAIM OF IDENTITY
Michael Delia Rocca
SPINOZA expresses
the physical his position
in his pronouncement: "a mode ofon the relation
extension and the idea between the mental and
of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways"
(2P7S).1 At least part of what Spinoza means by this claim (which I will call
the claim of identity) seems to be that there is a full-blown numerical
identity between a mode of extension and the idea of that mode. What
further import is carried by the qualification "but expressed in two ways"
is a controversial and difficult issue which I will not address directly here
(although some of my comments about Spinozas notion of causation will
have some bearing on this point). Instead, I want to focus on the question
of whether we are in fact entitled to regard Spinoza as holding that a mode
of extension and the idea of that mode are numerically identical. This
interpretation, the numerical identity interpretation, is certainly appeal
ing since it allows us to see Spinoza as, in some way or another, a precursor
of contemporary identity theories of mind and body or mind and brain.2
But, however tempting it may be to interpret Spinoza in this way, there
is an obstacle: it has been argued that the claim that a mode of extension
and a mode of thought are numerically identical is incompatible with
certain basic features of Spinoza s system. This line of argument is pursued
in similar ways by R.J. Delahunty and Jonathan Bennett. In each case, I
will argue, the particular contradiction which the numerical identity in
terpretation allegedly faces does not actually obtain. The numerical iden
tity interpretation can avoid these inconsistencies if it can be shown that
Spinoza holds a certain thesis about causation. I will present evidence that
Spinoza does hold this thesis. But the fact that Spinoza adheres to this
position on causation puts the numerical identity interpretation in danger
of a different conflict with passages other than those which Delahunty and
Bennett emphasize in this regard.
I
Delahunty s argument relies upon Spinoza's ban on causal relations

between attributes. Spinoza introduces this ban in the following way. For
265
266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
Spinoza, there are two different kinds of causes of modes. He says that the
one substance God is the cause of each mode (lpl8 and lp25) and he says
that each mode is the effect of another mode (lp23 and lp28).3 In terms of
the distinction Spinoza draws in lpl8, the former kind of causal relation
is one of immanent causation and the latter is one of transitive causation.
(I follow here Curley's translation of "immanens " and utransient.n) It is not
important here to see what the connection is between these two different
kinds of causal relations. I simply want to note that in terms of each kind
of cause of finite modes, Spinoza erects a causal barrier between different
attributes.
For Spinoza, the cause of extended mode x cannot be God qua thinking,
but can only be God qua extended. The modes of each attribute "have God
for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which
they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other" (2p6d).
(See also 2p5 where Spinoza makes this claim for the attribute of thought
in particular.)
Spinoza makes a similar point concerning causal relations between
modes of different attributes:
The formal being of the idea of the circle can be perceived only through another
mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that mode again through
another, and so on, to infinity. Hence so long as things are considered as modes
of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the connection
of causes through the attribute of Thought alone. And insofar as they are
considered as modes of Extension, the order of the whole of nature must be
explained through the attribute of Extension alone. I understand the same
concerning the other attributes (2p7s).4
Delahunty claims that the numerical identity interpretation conflicts

with Spinozas denial of transitive causation between modes of different
attributes. He argues:
If he [Spinoza] accepted an identity theory..., then he can scarcely deny
interactionism.... If a mode of Thought, X, simply is the corresponding mode
of Extension, Y, then if X is the cause of mental mode Z, it seems to follow that
Y is also the cause of Z; and if Y is the cause of extended mode Z, then so must
X be. (This is connected with the fact that while ".. explains..." is not referen
tially transparent, ".. causes..." is arguably so....)5
This is certainly an important objection to the numerical identity interpre

tation. Any conflict between that interpretation and such a fundamental
Spinozistic position as his denial of interactionism may be grounds for
rejecting that interpretation.
Despite the importance of this objection, as far as I know, no one who
holds a numerical identity interpretation explicitly tries to meet it. There
are, however, at least two potential ways in which the numerical identity
interpretation might be defended in the face of this objection. The first
strategy would be to deny Delahunty s claim that there is a conflict between
a numerical identity position and Spinozas denial of causation between
attributes. Alternatively, we might say that although Spinoza did hold a
CAUSATION AND IDENTITY IN SPINOZA 267
numerical identity position and although Delahunty is right that there is

a conflict between such a position and Spinozas denial of interactionism,
Spinoza did not realize that there is such a conflict. The latter strategy is,
obviously, less attractive than the former. It would be acceptable only after
we've exhausted other possible interpretations of Spinoza s claim of iden
tity in order to see if any of these can do a better job of presenting Spinoza s
views as consistent. I will not undertake such a comparison here since a
more straightforward defense of the numerical identity interpretation
along the lines of the first strategy is available.
As the parenthetical comment in the quote from Delahunty suggests,
this criticism depends upon the claim that causal contexts (where transi
tive causation is concerned) are referentially transparent. This is the claim
that if one event, state, etc. causes another, then no matter how they are
described, it is true to say that they are so related. Take a sentence of the
form "x causes y" where "x" and "y" are singular terms each of which refers
to a particular event, state, etc. The above claim says that if we substitute
co-referring singular terms for either ux" or uyn or both, the result will
necessarily be a sentence with the same truth-value as "x causes y."
Delahunty s objection points out that a denial of causal interaction between
the mental and the physical and the view that each mode of extension is
identical with a mode of thought (and vice versa) are jointly incompatible
with the claim that (transitive) causal contexts are referentially transpar
ent. Thus Delahunty s objection says that the numerical identity interpre
tation must hold that Spinoza is committed to denying the transparency
of (transitive) causal contexts. This would constitute an objection to the
numerical identity interpretation only if one or both of the following were
the case:
(1) It would be absurd to attribute a denial of transparency in this case to
Spinoza since it is obviously true that (transitive) causal contexts are
referentially transparent.
(2) Spinoza explicitly commits himself to the view that (transitive) causal
contexts are transparent.
Neither of these, however, is the case. (1) is false for the following reason:
Although the claim that (transitive) causal contexts are transparent has a
great deal of plausibility and has many proponents in our day, it is not
uncontroversially true. Recently, both Mackie and Anscombe have, in
different ways, cast doubt on it.6 Thus, if the numerical identity interpre
tation must say that Spinoza is committed to denying the transparency of
causal contexts, it is not thereby attributing to him an obviously false
philosophical position.
(2) is also false: Spinoza never commits himself to the view that (transi
tive) causal contexts are transparent. In fact, he says fairly clearly that
contexts involving immanent causation are not transparent. This gives us
some reason to hold that for him transitive causal contexts are also
referentially opaque. Consider 2p6: "The modes of each attribute have God
for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which
they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other
attribute." This suggests that Spinoza would regard the following claims
as true and false respectively:
(a) The thinking substance causes mode of thought x.
(b) The extended substance causes mode of thought x.
Notice that for Spinoza (a) is true and (b) is false despite the fact that, as
he says in 2p7s, the thinking substance is the extended substance. If this
is correct, then Spinoza denies that contexts involving immanent causation
are referentially transparent.
We have reached this conclusion independently of any claim as to the
identity of modes of thought and modes of extension. But now this conclu
sion can be used to provide evidence for claiming that Spinoza would also
maintain that there is a similar failure of transparency in contexts involv
ing transitive causation and thus to provide evidence for claiming that the
numerical identity interpretation is compatible with Spinozas denial of
interactionism. Thus, consider:
(c) Extended mode x causes extended mode y.
(d) Thinking mode w causes extended mode y.
Spinoza could regard (c) as true, though (d) must be false. A proponent of
the numerical identity interpretation would say that Spinoza could regard
(c) and (d) in this way even if thinking mode w = extended mode x. Thus,
it might be argued, just as Spinoza denies that immanent causal contexts
are transparent, he denies that transitive causal contexts are transparent.
Thus, even though the numerical identity interpretation commits Spi
noza to a denial of transparency in contexts of transitive causation, that is
no reason to reject the numerical identity interpretation and, in fact, there
is independent evidence that Spinoza would deny transparency in this
case. So, there is a straightforward way in which the numerical identity
interpretation can answer Delahunty s objection.
There is, in principle, another, more radical way for the numerical identity
interpretation to avoid Delahunty s objection. The strategy here would be the
following: A proponent of the numerical identity interpretation could agree
with Delahunty that causal contexts are transparent and that a numerical
identity view is incompatible with any denial of interactionism. But this
proponent would go on to say that, contrary to appearances, Spinoza does not
want to deny interactionism. He only wants to deny a closely related position,
viz. that we can explain modes of extension in terms of modes of thought and
vice versa. The idea would be that a mode considered as physical must be
explained only in terms of other modes considered as physical; while that same
mode considered as mental must be explained only in terms of other modes
considered as mental. Such a view, it would be pointed out, does not by

itself commit one to a denial of causal interaction between the mental and
the physical. On this line of thought, since causal contexts are transparent,
even if there are no explanatory relations between the mental and the
physical there can still be causal relations.
Such a separation of causal relations and explanatory relations is a
possible position and, indeed, a popular one in contemporary philosophy.
For examples, see the references to Davidson, Follesdal, Searle and Straw
son in note 6. But, while it may be tempting to view Spinoza along these
contemporary lines, there is much evidence against doing so. Spinoza does
sometimes state his causal ban in ways that involve the notion of explana
tion?see, e.g., the long passage from 2p7s quoted earlier. But even here
Spinoza brings in the notion of causation. Notice the claim that one mode
must be perceived through another as its proximate cause. Thus, we cannot
be confident that Spinoza's strictures in this passage cover only a denial
of explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. Further,
Spinoza often states his causal ban in terms of causal relations alone,
without bringing in the notion of explanation at all. In 3p2d, Spinoza
says, "What determines the mind to thinking is a mode of thinking and
not of extension." (Later on in the demonstration, he makes a similar
claim about causation in the opposite direction.) In the preface to Part
5, while attacking Descartes's view that mind and body causally inter
act, Spinoza says, "the forces of the Body cannot in any way be deter
mined by those of the mind." (The contexts of these passages indicate
that Spinoza here means "cause" by "determine.") For these reasons, we
cannot interpret Spinoza as denying explanatory relations, but not
causal relations between the mental and the physical. Thus, for the
numerical identity interpretation, the best response to Delahunty's
objection is to claim, as I outlined above, that Spinoza simply denies the
transparency of causal contexts.
II
Bennett offers a related objection to the claim that for Spinoza a mode
of extension is identical with a mode of thought. In his book on Spinoza,
Bennett claims that in the claim of identity Spinoza "cannot be saying that
physical Pi=mental Mi; that is impossible because they belong to different
attributes."7 This point is elaborated in Bennett's "Eight Questions about
Spinoza."8 There Bennett points out that for Spinoza (1) "the modes of
extension involve the concept of extension and the modes of thought involve
the concept of thought" ("Eight Questions About Spinoza," p. 9). Since (1)
is true, he claims that if (2) each mode of extension is numerically identical
with a mode of thought, then it follows that (3) "every mode involves every
attribute." He holds that this conclusion "would bring large parts of the
Ethics to ruin" (ibid ., p. 9). Certainly it seems to conflict with 2p6d: "The
modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not
of another one." And Bennett points out that (3) would remove "Spinozas
ground for saying that we cannot explain physical actions in terms of
mental causes" (ibid ., p. 9). Bennett concludes that therefore (2) must be
rejected as an interpretation of Spinoza.
I agree that (1) should not be given up. But I think that there are two
different ways to take (3). On one way, (3) is acceptable and does not do
the damage to Spinoza's system that Bennett fears. On another way of
taking (3), it is unacceptable for the reasons Bennett states. I think that
(3) follows from (1) and (2) only when it is taken in the former, acceptable
sense. When (3) is taken in its unacceptable sense, it does not follow
from (1) and (2) and thus does not force a rejection of the numerical
identity interpretation.
To elicit the different possible senses of (3), I need to show that Spinoza
holds that x involves the concept of y only if x is caused by y. Since Spinoza
equates the notions of x involving the concept of y and x being conceived
through y (see lax5 and 2p6d), we can express the claim that I will attribute
to Spinoza as:
(e) x is conceived through y only if x is caused by y.
Evidence that Spinoza holds (e) comes from lp25:

God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their
essence. Demonstration : If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence
of things; and so (lax4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But
(lpl5) this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of things.
Here Spinoza says that if x is not caused by y, then x can be conceived

without y.9 This implies that if x is not caused by y then it is not the case
that x must be conceived through y. Expressing this latter conditional in
terms of its contrapositive, we get: If x must be conceived through y, then
x is caused by y. Or, equivalently, x must be conceived through y only if x
is caused by y. This is essentially what (e) says. The only difference between
this claim and (e) is that (e) says "is conceived" and this claim says "must
be conceived." This difference is not, however, significant in this context.
When making points about conceiving through another and conceiving
through oneself, Spinoza often glides between claims of these kinds. See,
e.g., Idef3 and its restatement in lplOd.
Further evidence that Spinoza holds (e) comes simply from the fact that
the only concepts which Spinoza says that the concept of a mode of a
particular attribute involves are the concepts of the causes of that mode.
As we have seen, Spinoza claims that God as well as certain other modes
cause a given mode. These other modes and God are also the only things
the concepts of which, according to Spinoza, the concept ofthat given mode
involves. (See 2p6 and 2p7s.)
The fact that Spinoza holds (e) enables us to rebut Bennett s objection to
the numerical identity interpretation. On that interpretation, a particular

mode of extension is identical with a mode of thought. The numerical
identity interpretation must also hold, as we have seen, that causal con
texts are referentially opaque. Thus, considered as a mode of extension, a
given mode causally follows from God considered as extended, and so the
concept of that mode qua mode of extension involves the concept of exten
sion. But, given the opacity of causal contexts, that mode qua mode of
extension has no causal relations with God considered as thinking. Thus,
a proponent of the numerical identity interpretation could say that it
follows from (e) that the concept of that mode qua mode of extension does
not involve the concept of thought. Similarly, that mode qua mode of
extension causally interacts with other modes insofar as they are modes
of extension and not insofar as they are modes of thought. Thus, it also
follows from (e) that the concept of the mode qua mode of extension does
not involve the concept of any mode of thought (or, more accurately, does
not involve the concept of any mode qua mode of thought).
Parallel arguments would show that the concept of the same mode qua
mode of thought does not involve the concept of extension or of any mode
qua mode of extension.
Thus, by virtue of (e), we can say that whether a particular mode is
conceived through extension and other modes qua modes of extension or
whether it is conceived through thought and other modes qua modes of
thought depends on what causal relations it enters into. We have also seen
that what causal relations a mode enters into depends on whether it is
considered as a mode of thought or as a mode of extension. From these two
claims, it follows that what attribute and what other modes a particular
mode is conceived through depends on whether that mode is considered as
a mode of thought or as a mode of extension. Bennett's objection assumes
that sentences of the form "x is conceived through y" are referentially
transparent. However, due to the the referential opacity which Spinoza
attributes to causal contexts and due to the connection between conception
through another and causation, sentences of that form are also referen
tially opaque. This implies that from the fact that mode of extension A is
conceived through mode of extension B and the fact that mode of extension
A = mode of thought 1, we cannot conclude that mode of thought 1 is
conceived through mode of extension B.
Thus the most we can conclude from (1) and (2) is that
(3') For each mode there is a way of considering it by means of which it involves
the concept of thought and of certain other modes of thought and there is
another way of considering it by means of which it involves the concept of
extension and of certain other modes of extension.
This conclusion, however, does not entail that there is any illegitimate
mixing of conceptual chains involving thought and conceptual chains
involving extension. In particular, this conclusion would not entail, as
Bennett fears, that one could explain physical actions in terms of mental
causes. It would only follow that each physical action is explainable
through another mode of extension and that this mode of extension is
identical with a mode of thought. This does not entail that the physical
action is explainable through that mode qua mode of thought.10 Thus, I see
no reason why Spinoza would reject (3'). If (3) is interpreted in this way,
therefore, it poses no threat to the numerical identity interpretation, even
though it follows from (1) and (2).
What we cannot conclude from (1) and (2) is that each mode qua mode of
extension involves the concept of thought and of other modes qua modes of
thought and that each mode qua mode of thought involves the concept of
extension and of other modes qua modes of extension. (On this view, senten
ces of the form "x is conceived through y" are referentially transparent.) This
kind of conclusion would be unacceptable to Spinoza?he explicitly denies it
in 2p6d. Bennett takes (3) in this sense and, as such, rightly rejects it. But he
does not see that in this sense (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) and so cannot
be used to undermine the numerical identity interpretation.
Ill
So by seeing Spinoza as denying the transparency of causal contexts we

can neutralize both Delahunty s and Bennett s objections to the numerical
identity interpretation. However, if we attribute this denial to Spinoza as
well as the numerical identity view, then the numerical identity interpre
tation faces a textual difficulty distinct from the ones that Delahunty and
Bennett envisage. This difficulty arises from Spinozas claim in 2p7s that
the claim of identity explains parallelism.
Parallelism is expressed in 2p7: "The order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things." This is, in part, the thesis that
for each mode of extension there is a mode of thought which enters into
causal relations that correspond to those that the mode of extension enters
into (and vice versa).11 Thus, if the following is a segment of the causal
chain of extended modes (ems)
emA - emB -> emC
then there are three thinking modes (tm's) related in the same way:
tml -? tm2 - tm3.
In 2p7s Spinoza says that parallelism follows from the claim of identity:
a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but
expressed in two ways....For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea
of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which
is explained through different attributes. Therefore [ideo ], whether we con
ceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of
thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order,
or one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one
another.12
However, if Spinoza does indeed deny transparency, then if he holds the

numerical identity view, he would have no ground for saying that the claim
of identity explains parallelism.
The claim of identity on the numerical identity interpretation (or, as I
will call it, the claim of numerical identity) is certainly able to explain
something that is presupposed by parallelism as I've stated it here, viz.
that for each mode of extension there is a mode of thought and vice versa.
This follows directly from the claim of numerical identity since that claim
simply states that each mode of extension is a mode of thought and vice
versa. But the claim of numerical identity is not able to explain why for
each mode of extension there is a mode of thought which enters into
matching causal relations (and vice versa). The reason the claim of numer
ical identity cannot explain this aspect of parallelism stems directly from
the fact that the numerical identity interpretation is forced to hold that
Spinoza regards causal contexts as referentially opaque. This point can be
made by considering a relatively complex segment of the causal chain of
extended modes, a segment that involves joint causes and joint effects.
Spinoza allows that there are such causal chains?see, e.g., 2def7 and 5p8.
(I) emB emE
emA -* emC -> emF -* emG
emD
The claim of numerical identity does guarantee, as I noted, that there is a

mode of thought for each of these modes of extension. Thus, without yet
indicating their causal relations, we can represent this set of modes of
thought as follows:
(II) tm2 tm5
tml tm3 tm6 tm7
tm4
The claim of numerical identity would allow us to say that tml= emA,
tm2=emB, etc. Parallelism would hold as a result of this numerical identity
only if the causal links in (I) match those in (II), that is only if tml causes
both tm2 and tm3, and if tm3 and tm4 jointly cause tm6, etc. We might
expect that since tml=emA and since emA causes both emB and emC and
since emB=tm2 and emC=tm3, it follows that tml causes tm2 and tm3,
etc. But such an inference would not be a valid one for a proponent of the
numerical identity interpretation since, on that interpretation, Spinoza
must be denying that causal contexts are referentially transparent. Given
this denial, it is compatible with the claim of numerical identity that,
although the previously noted identities hold and although the pattern of
causes and effects among extended modes is as it is depicted above,
nevertheless, the series of causes and effects among modes of thought has
a different pattern. For example, the pattern might, for all the numerical
identity interpretation says, have the following form:
(Ha) tm2 -> tm5
tml -+ tm3 -> tm6 -> tm7
tm4
If the series of causes and effects in the two different realms were as it is
depicted in (I) and (Ha), then parallelism obviously would not hold even
though each thinking mode in (lia) is identical with an extended mode in
(I) and vice versa.13
Thus the numerical identity interpretation does not provide us with a
way of showing how the claim of identity explains parallelism. This is a
defect of this interpretation since Spinoza clearly sees the claim of identity
as performing this function. This objection to the numerical identity inter
pretation is not, however, as serious as the (unsuccessful) ones Delahunty
and Bennett raise. Those objections assert that the numerical identity
interpretation conflicts with certain basic Spinozistic features, viz. the
causal and conceptual barriers between thought and extension. Spinoza
insists upon these positions often and in many different contexts. The
objection I have raised points out a conflict between the numerical identity
interpretation and Spinozas statement that parallelism follows from the
claim of identity. This statement is an important one, but it is certainly not
one that Spinoza relies upon, or emphasizes, as much as his claims about
the causal and conceptual barriers between thought and extension.
Further, one might be able to defend the numerical identity view from this
objection by saying that although the claim of numerical identity does not
explain parallelism, Spinoza thought that it did. This mistake on Spinozas
part was perhaps facilitated by the fact noted above that the claim of numer
ical identity does explain a claim presupposed by parallelism, viz. that for each
mode of extension there is a mode of thought and vice versa.
This may indeed be a legitimate response to the objection I have raised

against the numerical identity interpretation. However, as I noted before, we
should avoid adopting an interpretation that attributes a mistake to Spinoza
until we've examined other potential interpretations of Spinoza's view about
the relation between a mode of extension and the idea of that mode to see if
any of these other interpretations depicts Spinoza's view as more coherent.
A final evaluation of the numerical identity interpretation will thus have
to await such a comparison with other interpretations. I have, however,
shown that the numerical identity interpretation cannot be eliminated as
summarily as the criticisms made by Delahunty and Bennett might lead
us to believe. And, although the jury is still out on the numerical identity
interpretation, we have in the meantime discovered an important and
intriguing fact about Spinoza's notion of causation: there are strong

cations that he denies that causal contexts are referentially transparen
University of California, Berkeley

Received May 21, 1990
NOTES
1. Spinoza's Latin is: modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res,
sed duobus modis expressa . Spinoza repeats this theme of 2p7s in 2p21s and 3p2s.
Here and throughout I rely on Gebhardt's edition of Spinoza's Latin text. See C.
Gebhardt, ed., Spinoza Opera, vol. 2 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). I follow Curley's
translation and his system of numbering passages from the Ethics . See Edwin Curley,
ed. and trans., The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985). All references to works of Spinoza are to the Ethics.
2. When commentators attribute an identity view to Spinoza, they usually seem
to have numerical identity in mind. See Henry E. Allison, Benedict de Spinoza: An
Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 86; Edwin Curley,
Behind the Geometrical Method, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.
68-9, 82; Douglas Odegard, The Body Identical with the Human Mind: A Problem
in Spinoza's Philosophy" in Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, Maurice
Mandelbaum and Eugene Freeman (eds.) (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1975), pp.
67-8. See also Stuart Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism" in Freedom of Mind and
Other Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 225-6. Hampshire,
however, only claims that each mental thing is identical with a physical thing; he
does not discuss the further claim that each physical thing is identical with a
mental thing.
3. There is, however, one exception to the general claim that each mode is the
effect of another mode. The exception concerns infinite modes. Spinoza says that
many infinite modes "follow from" other such modes (lp23). This kind of relation
may constitute a causal relation between infinite modes for Spinoza. But even if
there are causal relations between some infinite modes and others, it is not the
case for Spinoza that each infinite mode is the effect of (or follows from) another
infinite mode. (And certainly, for Spinoza, no infinite mode is the effect of a finite
mode.) In lp23 Spinoza claims that some infinite modes follow not from other
infinite modes, but from "the absolute nature of some attribute of God." Since the
absolute nature of some attribute of God is, presumably, not a mode, there is then
a special case in which a mode is not caused by another mode.
4. Spinoza repeats this claim with regard to the attribute of thought in 2p9. See
also 3p2.
5. R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 197.
6. See Anscombe, "Causality and Extensionality" in The Collected Philosophical
Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe , vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1981) and Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974),
Chapter 10. See also Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1980), pp. 13-16. Proponents of the claim that causal contexts
are transparent include Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," "Causal Rela
tions," "Mental Events," in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon
F*ress, 1980); Follesdal, "Causation and Explanation: A FVoblem in Davidson's view
on Action and Mind," in LePore and McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events :
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984);
Searle, Intentionality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1 lo
ll 7; Strawson, "Causation and Explanation" in Vermazen and Hintikka (eds).,
Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
7. Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984),
p. 141.
8. A paper delivered at the 1989 Jerusalem Spinoza Conference and forthcoming
in the proceedings of that conference to be published by E. J. Brill.
9. Spinoza seems to think that lax4 supports the inference from "x is not caused
by y" to "x can be conceived without y." But lax4 says, "The knowledge of an effect
depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause." This appears to claim that
if x is caused by y then x is conceived through y. (Spinoza takes lax4 in this way
in lp3d. Represented in this way, lax4 is the converse of (e).) But from the fact
that x is not caused by y and from the fact that if x is caused by y then x is conceived
through y, it does not follow that x is not conceived through y (or that x can be
conceived without y). Thus there may be a difficulty in Spinoza's proof of lp25, but
my concern here is not with the legitimacy of the particular way in which Spinoza
supports the claim that if x is not caused by y then x can be conceived without y,
but with the fact that he does make that claim in lp25d. I am grateful to a referee
of the History of Philosophy Quarterly for calling my attention to the relevance of
Spinoza's reliance on lax4 here.
10. On this kind of point, see Douglas Odegard, "The Body Identical with the
Human Mind: A Problem in Spinoza's Philosophy," pp. 67-8.
11. I use the qualification "in part" for two reasons here. First, parallelism, I
believe, includes the claim that each idea represents its corresponding element in
extension. This feature of parallelism does not play a role in the numerical identity
interpretation, so we can omit this feature in what follows. However, the fact that
Spinoza sees the relation between parallel modes as a representation relation is
important in understanding the claim of identity though I do not have the space
to explain why here. Second, parallelism, as stated in 2p7 (and the first half of
2p7s) does not speak only of a parallelism between ideas and modes of extension,
but between ideas and things. Modes of extension are given as a particular example
of the things which parallel ideas. For our purposes, however, I can treat the claim
of parallelism made here as one concerning the causal chain of ideas and the causal
chain of extended modes only.
12. My italics. See also 3p2s (beginning).
13. This claim needs to be restricted somewhat. Even if the causal chains are as
portrayed in (I) and (lia), parallelism could still hold since when we consider the
causal chains of extended modes and of modes of thought in their entirety , there may
be a way of mapping the segment of the causal chain of extended modes in (I) onto a
segment (different from (lia)) of the causal chain of modes of thought. Similarly, there
may be a way of mapping the segment of the causal chain of modes of thought in (Ha)
onto a segment (different from (I)) of the causal chain of extended modes. If this were
the case, then parallelism could still hold. But, it is important to note that in this
situation, the parallelism would not hold as a result of the claim of numerical identity,
for in this situation, the modes parallel to one another would not be numerically
identical. The numerical identity would then be irrelevant to the parallelism.
14. I would like to thank Janet Broughton and Wallace Matson for their helpful
advice.

Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

North American Philosophical Publications