EPZA v.

Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

F:
The San Antonio Development Corporation was the
owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA
expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that
the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a
petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair
and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower.
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following
the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations
used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial
law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those
documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory.VV.

Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

F:
Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from
Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of
the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal orcert i orari, as the law or rules of court may provide final
judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.

(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there
at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing
their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the
EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However,
if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as,
not to be flippant, dead meat.

(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given asupersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.The EO defined the prohibition,

convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried out
forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play.

(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The
phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.VV.

Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

F:

On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for

the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224
authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands
sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC
challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.

HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public
use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban
renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a
public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because
of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in
sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal
hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the
NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be
applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the
number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested
with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose
objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more
suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the
same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being
encroachments on judicial prerogatives.VV.