Eyas Alsharaiha 17.

40 Assignment I

Explaining the 1953 U.S. Intervention in Iran

Prologue

On January 20, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower took office as the 34th President of the United

States, and the first Republican to be elected after twenty years of Democrat control. Along with

the partisan shift, the White House retracted and reversed its policy towards Iran and its recent Na-

tionalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Eisenhower's push for a coup d‘état insti-

gated by the CIA and MI-6 stood in stark contrast with Truman's opposition to such policy. One

should wonder: what changed?

The purpose of this paper is to understand and explain the United States' intervention in

Iran in the 1953 coup. I will seek to explain why the Question of Intervention in Iran was posed to

begin with, and why covert action was chosen as an answer. As such, I will argue that the question

of intervention in Iran was posed as a result of two factors: first, British activities in Iran, and Brit-

ish diplomatic pressures and propaganda towards Washington, and second, paranoia regarding the

communist Soviet threat. In addition, I will argue that the choice of covert action was influenced

by the political beliefs of the Eisenhower Administration, and its contrast with those of Truman.

To this end, I will examine British involvement in Iran in 1951-53, its contact with the U.S.

on the matter, and its possible impact on Iran itself, and Washington‘s policies. Additionally, it is

important to study the importance of Iran to the United States, and understand American fears re-

garding Iran and a related Soviet threat. Finally, alternative theories will be studied, especially

those about American imperialism and economic ambition. These theories will be countered, in an

effort to conclude that British policy and the current Administration‘s beliefs are more probable

explanations of the intervention.

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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
Mosaddeq, Britain, and the AIOC

Mohammad Mosaddeq, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, takes center

stage in the events, as the primary target of the coup d‘état. Mosaddeq ―was the most prominent

figure in the oil nationalization movement‖, and was the main player in pushing for the nationali-

zation of the AIOC through a bill passed in May 19511, a month after he was appointed as Prime

Minster. The nationalization of the AIOC immediately became a British economic concern, and in

time, also became an American political concern.

The AIOC was one of the Britain‘s biggest assets, acting as a major supplier of the British

Empire‘s oil needs, as well as a source of its revenues. Mosaddeq‘s nationalization of the Compa-

ny was nothing short of a catastrophe for London, where he instantly became much despised.2 Be-

fore October 1952, Wm. Louis states, ―the plan to destroy the Mosaddeq government was British

in inspiration, British in the covert financial assistance proffered to [his] enemies, and British in

the actual attempts to replace him.‖3 As Mosaddeq moved further towards economic independence

from London, Britain sought to act to preserve its financial power over Iran, and resisting attempts

to corrode it.

American Fears

For the United States, on the other hand, interests in carrying out a coup in Iran are not as

obvious; Iran had no direct impact on the United States—neither militarily, nor economically.

However, the Middle East was regarded as a highly important area for the United States in the

Cold War; Louis goes as far as to describe it as ―second only to Western Europe‖ at that time4. As

1
Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1991, 58.
2
Dreyfuss, Robert. Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2005, 109.
3
Louis, Wm. Roger. "Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government." In Mohammad Mosaddeq
and the 1953 Coup in Iran, by Mark J Gasiorowski, & Malcom Byrne, 126-177. Syracuse University Press,
2004, 125.
4
Ibid, 214
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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
such, direct Soviet influence on the Middle East was a dire threat in the eyes of the United States.

This is especially true in the case of Pahlavi Iran, due to the crucial strategic economic resources

possessed by Iran and the AIOC. At a time when tensions for the Cold War are running high and

the anti-communist craze (led by Senator McCarthy) was on the rise, nothing could have been

more effective in mobilizing the attention of the U.S. government than a Communist, Soviet threat

in that area.

With a strong British – and later American – influence over it historically, Iran had always

been in the Western sphere of influence, and leaned away from the Soviet Union. One of the con-

cerns of Washington was that the recent events, however, would continue to move Iran away from

the Western sphere of influence, possibly into the Soviet sphere, or alternatively, that the USSR

would march into and take over Iran.

FEARS FROM OUTSIDE IRAN

The major external threat was the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Iran. Such possibility

was much feared at the time; it was seen as very probable by American intelligence, especially

based on observations in the north of Iran5, and the then-recent events in Czechoslovakia. Indeed,

according to Mark Gasiorowski, by 1953, the U.S. government already saw a ‗communist takeover‘

as imminent6. If that is the case, however, then why was a coup against Mosaddeq the eventual

planned course of action? One important reason for the coup was the Eisenhower‘s Administra-

tion‘s belief that Mosaddeq and his National Front party were weak, especially after the departure

of many of the latter‘s members. As such, it was the view that Moscow would either march in

when Mosaddeq walks out, as there would be no powerful, organized party other than Tudeh, or

5
According to Louis, Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government, 216, ―Foreign Service offic-
ers posted in the Northern provinces […] were warned by local Iranian officials to be ready to evacuate on
just a half hours‘ notice‖ during cross-border intelligence and destabilization campaigns conducted by the
Central Intelligence Agency, and aimed at the Soviet Union from within Iran.
6
Gasiorowski, U.S. foreign Policy and the Shah, 57
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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
that Moscow would march in after a Tudeh-inspired commotion (which was taking place) led to

internal instability.

Such belief that Mosaddeq and his National Front were weak was a result of British inter-

vention in Iran. Since 1951, Britain has been intervening and even sponsoring a series of coup at-

tempts, to regain the recently-nationalized AIOC. It was Britain‘s actions that scared many of Mo-

saddeq‘s Islamist allies, and led them to leave the National Front. Thus, the influence on U.S. di-

plomacy of British activities in Iran is evident.

American suspicions of a Soviet Invasion of Iran were genuine, and were telling of the

Administration‘s belief that the USSR prescribed to the Opportunity variant of the Offense-

Defense theory: Iran was unstable due to British intervention. The country‘s ultimate figure–the

Shah–was weak and at odds with Mosaddeq. Iran was fragile and highly conquerable, forming a

window of opportunity to the Soviets. Furthermore, Mosaddeq‘s anti-British tendencies and his

dissociation from the West meant that—even if it was stabilized—Iran had no strong ally to threat-

en or deter Soviet invasion into Iran. Eisenhower therefore agreed with Britain that Mosaddeq‘s

existence was a problem.

FEARS ON IRAN’S INTERNAL STATE

Then, there were the concerns on internal Iranian affairs. Two contradictory potential con-

cerns were monitored and debated in Washington: Iran's Communist Tudeh Party, and, Mo-

saddeq's policies of Economic independence from the West, specifically the nationalization of the

AIOC. Under Truman, it was concluded that neither was a problem: the Tudeh, though a threat,

were weak and Mosaddeq‘s policies kept them away from power. By the time Eisenhower came

into the picture, however, things were looking different.

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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
The Tudeh Party, curiously enough, was never seen by the new administration as an ―im-

mediate threat‖7. All that, despite going further in the nationalization ordeal by suggesting northern

parts of the AIOC, owned by the Soviets, to remain without nationalization, and criticizing Mo-

saddeq as operating with a pro-British Agenda8. Instead, it was Mosaddeq, again, who alarmed the

United States in the context of communism and Soviet support; Eisenhower‘s aides maintained

that Mosaddeq was ―likely to be the vehicle for communism‘s accession to power‖9; with British

PM Churchill reportedly telling the White House that Mosaddeq was ―turning increasingly into

communism‖10. This stands in much contrast with Truman‘s administration‘s belief that a resigna-

tion or overthrowing of Mosaddeq will only lead to Iran being ‗absorbed‘ by the Soviet Union11.

The main difference in the vision, believed by Eisenhower but not Truman, was articulated

by the British: Mosaddeq‘s nationalistic tendencies were equated with an ―anti-British obsession‖

that leads him to overlook the possibility of a ―communist takeover‖ through the Tudeh Party,

which was reported as being bigger and more powerful than it was by the British12. Indeed, British

rhetoric on Mosaddeq portrays him as an irrational man, ―no longer capable of rational thought‖,

and ―truly a Frankenstein‖13. Clearly, the British were going head-to-head with Dulles in over-

dramatization there.

London indeed did undertake an active effort to try to get the United States on board with a

full coup d‘état in Iran. Churchill emphasized to the Acheson, and Dulles after, that Britain expects

7
Behrooz, Maziar. "The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh." In Mohammad Mosaddeq and the
1953 Coup in Iran, by Mark J Gasiorowski, & Malcom Byrne, 102-125. Syracuse University Press, 2004,
116.
8
Ibid, 108
9
Byrne, Malcolm. "The Road to Intervention." In Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, by
Mark J Gasiorowski, & Malcolm Byrne, 201-226. Syracuse University Press, 2004, 225.
10
Behrooz, The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh, 125.
11
Byrne, The Road to Intervention, 223.
12
Louis, Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government, 128.
13
Ibid, 135.
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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
U.S. participation in Iran, as Britain has been fully supportive in Korea and the Cold War in gen-

eral.

Washington was therefore concerned about the Question of Iran, due to both the internal

state of Iran, and the threat of a Soviet intervention in Iran. The influence of British on American

concern is evident, as is the American paranoia of the intentions of the Soviet Union14. But such

American paranoia—especially in Eisenhower‘s Administration—is also related, as discussed ear-

lier, to the political views and theories believed by the politicians in power. The impact of political

views and theories is even more apparent when considering the choice of covert action as a re-

sponse to the Question of Iran.

Choosing Covert Action

As Eisenhower took office, opinion in America, especially in foreign policy circles, shifted

to align more with Britain; Mosaddeq‘s regime was viewed as heading towards the possible path of

Communism. The fear, as exaggerated as it may seem today in retrospect, was in the context of the

Korean War stalemate, with the Red Scare at its height, and after strong buildup of criticism on the

‗loss of China‘15. The loss of Iran, however, could not come as easy as the loss of China: first, due

to the importance of Iran and its resources, and second for a fear of a domino effect across the en-

tire Middle East, which was viewed as a sensitive area in the Cold War.

Another factor contributing to Eisenhower‘s distaste for Mosaddeq‘s regime is his view

that not siding with the West directly implies that the state is on the communist side. Consequently,

Eisenhower was wary early on that Iran was growing in distance with Britain. This suggests a

strong belief by Eisenhower in bandwagoning for states which are not great powers; he felt that

distancing Iran from Britain would lead to it siding with the strong Soviet Union instead, even as
14
We call it ―paranoia‖ because, in retrospect, American concerns over potential Soviet intervention of Iran
seem drastically exaggerated.
15
Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Why Did Mosaddeq Fall?" In Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, by
Mark J Gasiorowski, & Malcolm Byrne, 261-277. Syracuse University Press, 2004, 274
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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
the USSR threatened to invade. Such policy is consistent with the rest of the president‘s foreign

policy. Indeed, a belief in bandwagoning for smaller nations explains the United States‘ more ag-

gressive stance towards smaller states under a communist threat. Such belief is also shown in the

New Look‘s emphasis on military buildup and the expansion of the nuclear arsenal.

Secretary of State Dulles, who championed for the use of Rollback policy, thought this sit-

uation was most fitting: the Establishment in Iran as it stood was in itself a security threat worth

eliminating. Dulles as such convinced Eisenhower to intervene against Mosaddeq in a classic roll-

back operation, albeit covert, with Iran and Mosaddeq being the threat (and the target of the opera-

tion), not the Soviet Union.

Putting it All Together

Rollback against Iran made sense for Eisenhower, but not Truman. This can be supported

by what was discussed on his political beliefs. With an opportunistic Offense-Defense Soviet Un-

ion, a bandwagoning Iran, a tense political climate where communism is despised, and American

‗idleness‘ on China was seen as a cause of frustration, Eisenhower was compelled to act. Further-

more, it made sense to Eisenhower‘s Administration that such action be a coup d‘état; unlike Tru-

man, Eisenhower believed in rollback operations, and believed that Mosaddeq needs to be re-

moved, as it was him who was at fault for distancing himself from the British. Truman, on the oth-

er hand, was more sympathetic with nationalism movements in the third world. The fact that the

Iranian Question was a question to begin with was, however, due to British foreign policy and di-

plomacy, and an active effort to get the United States involved, in addition to intentional or unin-

tentional consequences of British covert operations in Iran.

Contending Visions

A contending explanation of the sudden shift in gears of American views towards Mo-

saddeq, however, is the motivation of economic ambitions. Indeed, the United States was compet-
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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
ing with Britain on oil in the Middle East, and viewed Mosaddeq‘s initial efforts in a favorable

light: an opportunity for economic gains. Only after Mosaddeq turned Washington down in a ―plan

to allow U.S. oil companies into Iran‖, the theory says, did the American position on Iran shift and

realign itself with the British16. As such, Truman and Eisenhower both had a vested interest in Ira-

nian oil and participation of American companies and only after the failure of such plans did for-

eign policy shift.

The explanation seems plausible and consistent with the end result; the United States

gained 40%17 of BP, the successor to the AIOC, and Iranian economic subjugation till 1979. How-

ever, for such explanation to be true, it must be reflected in secret, classified documents, which it is

not. An inspection of some released classified NSC documents hosted on the George Washington

University website18 reveals that the bulk of the concern is focused on the communist threat. The

documents are declassified top secret discussions on U.S. policy towards Iran, and as such hold

high authenticity in explaining the unspoken and genuine motivations of the administration. An

NSC policy statement proposal discussed the dangers of USSR dominance over Iran. In addition,

the statement describes ―present trends‖ towards communism as ―unfavorable‖, with doubt about

the strength of the National Front and whether it is capable of maintaining control and keeping the

communists out of the governments. ―Communist forces‖, furthermore, were studied and their in-

volvement was projected. All this, while all mentions of Iranian oil were to formulate a policy of

―U.S. aid‖ included no mention of commercial involvement or the like.

16
Dreyfuss, Robert. Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2005, 113.
17
Ibid, 109
18
Department of State. "First Progress Report on U.S. Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran." March
20, 1953. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran530320.pdf (accessed November 5,
2010), and The Executive Secretary. "NSC Report on United States Policy Regarding the Present Situation
in Iran." November 20, 1952. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran521120.pdf
(accessed November 5, 2010). Via Wikipedia
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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
Much more telling and obvious, however, is a March 20, 1953 Memo to the Executive Sec-

retary of the NSC, a top-secret progress report on the situation in Iran. In the memo, recommenda-

tion for the preparation of a defensive military intervention ―in the event of […] an attempted or an

actual communist seizure of power‖ were put forth. Furthermore, the entirety of the top-secret pro-

gress report refers to efforts to curb communist control and support a non-communist government

(though not Mosaddeq‘s). This goes to show that a genuine U.S. focus and interest in the com-

munist and Soviet control over Iran, as delusional or true as it may be, and not Iranian oil. Indeed,

concerns on communism were subject of progress monitoring, military concerns, and frequent

communication. The least one could suggest is that the fear of a political communist threat was

genuine, not just a cover.

In Conclusion—

As complicated as it may be, we can see that America‘s decision to intervene was a product

of Eisenhower and Dulles‘ beliefs, in addition to paranoia towards communism, and Soviet threats.

But, to begin with, the reason the situation in Iran descended from the nationalization of the AIOC

to an overthrow was the participation of the British, both caused by its impact on Iran, and its rela-

tionship with the U.S.

The British were responsible for shortsighted and short-lived interventions that caused

much instability in Iran. Such instability, however, was understood in Washington as a product of

Mosaddeq‘s weakness, and thus alarming it. London‘s rhetoric, also, in portraying Mosaddeq as a

crazed Frankenstein, and a vehicle for communism, was certainly effective.

The American distrust towards communism was also a key factor. America‘s belief of a

military Soviet threat to Iran might be said to be paranoid, especially considering the Soviet Un-

ion‘s history of involvement in the Middle East up to that point.

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Eyas Alsharaiha 17.40 Assignment I
Finally, Eisenhower‘s beliefs in the aggression of the Soviet Union, and its opportunistic

nature, in addition to the bandwagoning nature of a state like Iran, and his black-white approach to

the Cold War, and his increased aggressiveness to the USSR all are key factors.

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