SPOUSES RAFAEl BENITEZ AND relationship between the parties.
Also, due
AVELINA BENITEZv. CA, SPOUSES
RENATO MACAPAGAL AND
ELIZABETH MACAPAGAL
FACTS:
On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael
and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-
square-meter parcel of land with
improvement from the Cavite Development
Bank. Subsequently, private respondents
Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a
361-square-meter lot covered by TCT No.
40155.
On September 18, 1986, they filed a
civil case against petitioners for the
recovery of possession of an encroached
portion of the lot they purchased. The
parties were able to reach a compromise in
which in which private respondents sold
the encroached portion to petitioners at
the acquisition cost of P1,000.00 per
square meter.
Private respondents purchased still
another property, a 285.70 square-meter-
lot covered by TCT No. 3249-R, adjacent to
that of petitioners. After a relocation
survey was conducted, private respondents
discovered that some 46.50 square meters
of their property was occupied by
petitioners' house. Despite verbal and
written demands, petitioners refused to
vacate.
Respondents then instituted a case for
ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC
ruled in favor of the respondents which the
CA affirmed.
Petitioners insist that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case at bar because its
real nature is accion publiciana or recovery
of possession, not unlawful detainer. It is
not forcible entry because private
respondents did not have prior possession
of the contested property as petitioners
possessed it ahead of private respondents.
It is not unlawful detainer because
petitioners were not the private
respondents' tenants nor vendee unlawfully
withholding possession thereof. Said court
also has no jurisdiction to impose payment
of "rentals" as there is no lessor-lessee
to their alleged good faith, they claim the
pre-emptive right to purchase the litigated
portion as a matter of course.
Private respondents counter that
petitioners are estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the MeTC after they
voluntarily participated in the trial on the
merits and lost; that there is no law giving
petitioners the option to buy the
encroached property; and that petitioners
acted in bad faith because they waived in
their deed of sale the usual seller's
warranty as to the absence of any and all
liens and encumbrances on the property,
thereby implying they had knowledge of
the encroachment at the time of purchase .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the possession of the
portion of the private respondents' land
encroached by petitioners' house can be
recovered through an action of ejectment
RULING:
YES. The jurisdictional requirements
for ejectment, as borne out by the facts,
are: after conducting a relocation survey,
private respondents discovered that a
portion of their land was encroached by
petitioners' house; notices to vacate were
sent to petitioners, the last one being dated
October 26, 1989; and private respondents
filed the ejectment suit against petitioners
on January 18, 1990 or within 1 year from
the last demand.
That petitioners occupied the land
prior to private respondents' purchase
thereof does not negate the latter's case
for ejectment. Prior possession is not
always a condition sine qua non in
ejectment. This is one of the distinctions
between forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is
deprived of physical possession of his land
or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he must
allege and prove prior possession. But in
unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right
thereto under any contract, express or
implied. In such a case, prior physical
possession is not required.

In the case before us, considering that
private respondents are unlawfully
deprived of possession of the encroached
land and that the action for the recovery of
possession thereof was made within the
one- year reglementary period, ejectment
is the proper remedy. The MeTC of San
Juan had jurisdiction. In addition, after
voluntarily submitting themselves to its
proceedings, petitioners are estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC. This
Court will not allow petitioners to attack
the jurisdiction of the trial court after
receiving a decision adverse to their
position.
Article 448 of the Civil Code is
unequivocal that the option to sell the land
on which another in good faith builds,
plants or sows on, belongs to the
landowner. The option is to sell, not to buy,
and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a
declaration of the builder, planter, or
sower's bad faith shifts this option to him
per Article 450 of the Civil Code. This
advantage in Article 448 is accorded the
landowner because "his right is older, and
because, by the principle of accession, he
is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing." There can be no pre-
emptive right to buy even as a compromise,
as this prerogative belongs solely to the
landowner. No compulsion can be legally
forced on him, contrary to what petitioners
asks from this Court. Such an order would
certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the
lower courts were correct in rejecting the
petitioners' offer to buy the encroached
land.
VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996.
ROMERO, J.:
In the case at bar, the subject land
was the direct result of the dumping of
sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill operations. The
accretion was man-made or artificial. The
requirement that the deposit should be due
to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. Petitioners' submission not
having met the first (that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible) and second (that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the
river) requirements of the rules on
alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a
riparian owner.
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel
of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed
as a result of sawdust dumped into the
dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river.
Antonio Nazareno is an owner of a titled
property situated beside an accretion area
along the banks of Cagayan River. Jose
Salasalan & Leo Rabaya leased parcels of
land from Nazareno. When Salsalan &
Rabaya stopped paying rentals, Nazareno
filed an ejectment suit. The Municipal Trial
Court ruled in favor of Nazareno; the RTC
affirmed the decision. Thus, Nazareno filed
an application with the Bureau of Lands to
perfect his title
over the accretion area being claimed by
him.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents
Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the
subject lots on which their houses stood
from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of
1982, private respondents allegedly
stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for
ejectment with the MTC. A decision was
rendered against private respondents,
which decision was affirmed by the RTC.
The decision of the lower court was finally
enforced with the private respondents
being ejected from portions of the subject
lots they occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno filed
an application with the Bureau of
Lands to perfect his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him.
This application was protested by
private respondents before the Bureau
of Lands.
Respondent Land Investigator (Avelino G.
Labis) recommended to the Regional
Director that the Survey Plan in the name
of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that
private respondents be directed to file
appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands (Roberto
Hilario) ordered the amendment of the
survey plan in the name of Antonio
Nazareno by segregating therefrom the
areas occupied by the private respondents
who, if qualified, may file public land
applications covering their respective
portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for
reconsideration with respondent
Undersecretary of the Department of
Natural Resources (Rolleo Ignacio) and
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands
who denied the motion. Respondent
Director of Lands (Abelardo Palad) then
ordered him to vacate the portions
adjudicated to private respondents and
remove whatever improvements they have
introduced thereon. He also ordered that
private respondents be placed in
possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio
Nazareno's motion for reconsideration,
petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno
and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case
before the RTC for ANNULMENT of the
verification, report and
recommendation, decision and order of
the Bureau of Lands.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies which
resulted in the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC for
failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as the present case does not fall
within the exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Hence, this petition.
PETITIONERS CLAIMS:
1) The subject land is private land
being an accretion to his titled
property, applying Article 457 of the
Civil Code which provides:
To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of
the waters.
2) The accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or current of the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ CLAIMS:
1) The subject land is a public land.
2) Petitioners are estopped from
denying the public character of the
subject land because the mere filing
of Miscellaneous Sales Application
constituted an admission that the
land being applied for was public
land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is
public land.
HELD:
Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property
under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires
the concurrence of these requisites :
(1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and
imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers (or the sea coast).
These are called the rules on alluvion
which if present in a case, give to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of
waters.
The word "current" indicates the
participation of the body of water in the
ebb and flow of waters due to high and low
tide. Petitioners' submission not having
met the first and second requirements
of the rules on alluvion, they cannot
claim the rights of a riparian owner.
This court agrees with private respondents
that petitioners are estopped from denying
the public character of the subject land
because the mere filing of Miscellaneous
Sales Application constituted an admission
that the land being applied for was public
land.
The accretion was man-made or
artificial. The requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of
the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art.
457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Putting it differently,
alluvion must be the exclusive work of
nature.
Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et
al., 11 where the land was not formed solely
by the natural effect of the water current of
the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it was deemed a man-
made accretion and, as such, part of the
public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the
direct result of the dumping of sawdust by
the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to
its sawmill operations. Even if this Court
were to take into consideration petitioners'
submission that the accretion site was the
result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor
consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil
and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River
bounding his land, the same would still be
part of the public domain.
This Court agrees with petitioners that
administrative remedies have been
exhausted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL
FACTS
In 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased,
filed an application for foreshore lease
covering a tract of foreshore land in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area
of approximately 17 hectares. This
application was denied. Subsequently,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also
now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a
fishpond application with the Bureau of
Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore
land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.
Director of Fisheries gave due course to his
application but only to the extent of 7
hectares of the property.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan,
had opposed the application. It appealed to
the Secretary of Natural Resources who,
however, affirmed the grant. Executive
Secretary similarly affirmed.
On the other hand, in 1960, Sinforoso
Pascual filed an application to register and
confirm his title to a parcel of land,
situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan with
an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual
claimed that this land is an accretion to his
property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by OCT. It is
bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay
River, on the western side by the Bulacan
River, and on the northern side by the
Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and
meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing
sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso
Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner.
The Director of Forestry, through the
Provincial Fiscal, opposed Pascual's
application the same being a portion of the
public domain and, therefore, it belongs to
the Republic. Navarro thereupon filed an
opposition to Pascual's application.
Navarro claimed that the land sought to be
registered has always been part of the
public domain, it being a part of the
foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the
subject property by virtue of a fishpond
permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries
and confirmed by the Office of the
President; and that he had already
converted the area covered by the lease
into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land
registration case, Sinforoso Pascual filed a
complaint for ejectment against Emiliano
Navarro. The defendants in the case were
alleged to have built a provisional dike
thereon: thus they have thereby deprived
Pascual of the premises sought to be
registered.
The case was decided adversely against
Pascual. Pascual appealed to the CFI The
appealed case for ejectment was
consolidated with the land registration
case and was jointly tried by the court a
quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the
consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died
and was substituted by his heirs, the herein
petitioners. Pascual died and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein private
respondents.
CFI ruled against heirs of Pascual. On
appeal, the IAC reversed the findings of the
court a quo and granted the petition for
registration of the subject property but
excluding therefrom 50 meters from corner
2 towards corner 1; and 50 meters from
corner 5 towards corner 6.
ISSUE: May the land sought to be
registered be deemed an accretion in the
sense that it naturally accrues in favor of
the riparian owner or should the land be
considered as foreshore land?
RULING: The land should be considered
as foreshore land.
The Court found merit in the petition.
Private respondents' claim of ownership
over the disputed property under the
principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of private respondents' own
tract of land reveals its northeastern
boundary to be Manila Bay. Private
respondents' land, therefore, used to
adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and
not any of the two rivers whose torrential
action, private respondents insist, is to
account for the accretion on their land. In
fact, one of the private respondents,
Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court
that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit
the disputed land being part of the bay's
foreshore but, after he had planted palapat
and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the
land began to rise.
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the
location of: (a) the disputed land; (b)
private respondents' own tract of land; (c)
the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers; in front of their land on the
northern side lies now the disputed land
where before 1948, there lay the Manila
Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed
to the action of either or both of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should
have been deposited on either or both of
the eastern and western boundaries of
private respondents' own tract of land, not
on the northern portion thereof which is
adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking,
thus, is the third requisite of accretion,
which is, that the alluvium is deposited on
the portion of claimant's land which is
adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact
that private respondents' own tract of land
adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is
obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is
already settled as to what kind of body of
water the Manila Bay is.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not
on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
what used to be the foreshore of Manila
Bay which adjoined private respindents'
own tract of land on the northern side. As
such, the applicable law is not Article 457
of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land
was formed, is not difficult to discern from
the facts of the case. As the trial court
correctly observed:
"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of
the land subject matter of these cases
shows that on the eastern side, the
property is bounded by Talisay River, on
the western side by Bulacan River, on the
southern side by Lot 1436 and on the
northern side by Manila Bay. It is not
correct to state that the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion
because the two rivers both flow towards
Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight
while the Bulacan River is a little bit
meandering and there is no portion where
the two rivers meet before they end up at
Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to
the property belonging to Pascual cannot
be considered an accretion [caused by the
action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual x x x has not
presented proofs to convince the Court
that the land he has applied for
registration is the result of the settling
down on his registered land of soil, earth
or other deposits so as to be rightfully be
considered as an accretion [caused by the
action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457
finds no applicability where the accretion
must have been caused by action of the
bay."
The conclusion formed by the trial
court on the basis of the foregoing
observation is that the disputed land is part
of the foreshore of Manila Bay and
therefore, part of the public domain.
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES,
ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO ROBLES,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY
RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF
CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES,
ALBERTO PALAD JR. in his capacity as
Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON
in his capacity as District Land Officer
of the Bureau Of Lands, respondents.
FACTS:
Leon robles primitively owned the subject
land situtated in Morong, Rizal. He
occupied the same openly and adversely
and declared the same in his name for
taxation purposes as early as 1916. When
Leon Robles dies, his son Silvino Robles
inherited the land and declared in in his
name for taxation purposes and paid the
corresponding taxes thereon.
Upon the death of Silvino Robles, his
children inherited the property. They took
adverse possession of the said property
and paid the taxes thereon. The task of
cultivating the land was assigned to their
brother Lucio Robles while the task of
paying taxes thereto, to their co-heir and
half brother Hilario Robles who is married
to Andrea Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the
tax declaration of the parcel of land in the
name of Silvino Robles was cancelled and
transferred to Exequiel Ballena, the father
of Andrea Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel
Ballena secured a loan from Antipolo Rural
Bank. The tax declaration was later
transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural
Bank and later to the name of Hilario
Robles and wife. In 1966, Andrea Robles
secured a loan from Cardona Rural Bank,
Inc., using the tax declaration as security.
For failure to pay the mortgage debt,
foreclosure proceedings were had and
defendant Rural Bank emerged as the
highest bidder during the auction sale. On
September 25, 1987, Cardona Rural Bank
sold the same to Spouses Vergel and Ruth
Santos.
In September 1987, the Petitioners
filed a Petition for Quieting of Title against
the Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
RTC: The subject land is a property of heirs
of Silvino Robles (Petitioners)
CA: Reversed RTC. It held that Petitioners
no longer had title to the subject property
as to entitle them to file a petition for
quieting of title in view of their failure to
redeem the same within the extension
granted by the Rural Bank.
ISSUE: Is CA correct in ruling that the
Petitioner no longer had title to the subject
property?
RULING: No, CA is not correct.
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is
essential that the mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the property to be
mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is
void. In the present case, it is apparent that
Hilario Robles was not the absolute owner
of the entire subject property; and that the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully
ascertaining his title thereto, failed to
observe due diligence and, as such, was a
mortgagee in bad faith.
First, the bank was utterly remiss in its
duty to establish who the true owners and
possessors of the subject property were. It
acted with precipitate haste in approving
the Robles spouses loan application, as
well as the real estate mortgage covering
the disputed parcel of land. Had it been
more circumspect and assiduous, it would
have discovered that the said property was
in fact being occupied by the petitioners,
who were tending and cultivating it.
Second, the bank should not have relied
solely on the Deed of Sale purportedly
showing that the ownership of the disputed
property had been transferred from
Exequiel Ballena to the Robles spouses, or
that it had subsequently been declared in
the name of Hilario. Because it was dealing
with unregistered land, and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction
between Hilario and his father-in-law
Exequiel were suspicious, the bank should
have exerted more effort to fully determine
the title of the Robleses. Rural Bank of
Compostela v. Court of Appeals invalidated
a real estate mortgage after a finding that
the bank had not been in good faith. The
Court explained: "The rule that persons
dealing with registered lands can rely
solely on the certificate of title does not
apply to banks." In Tomas v. Tomas, the
Court held:
"x x x. Banks, indeed, should exercise
more care and prudence in dealing
even with registered lands, than
private individuals, for their
business is one affected with public
interest, keeping in trust money
belonging to their depositors, which
they should guard against loss by
not committing any act of
negligence which amounts to lack of
good faith by which they would be
denied the protective mantle of land
registration statute, Act 496,
extended only to purchasers for
value and in good faith, as well as to
mortgagees of the same character
and description. x x x."
Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual
that, notwithstanding the banks insistence
that it had become the owner of the subject
property and had paid the land taxes
thereon, the petitioners continued
occupying it and harvesting the fruits
therefrom.
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to
have mortgaged the disputed property not
as absolute owner but only as a co-owner,
he can be adjudged to have disposed to the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his
undivided share therein. The said bank,
being the immediate predecessor of the
Santos spouses, was a mortgagee in bad
faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the
entitlement of the Santos spouses, who
merely stepped into the shoes of the bank,
only to what legally pertains to the latter --
Hilarios share in the disputed property.
SC likewise noted that there was no
repudiation of the co-ownership by Hilario.
It said that Hilario effected no clear and
evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It
is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order
that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-
owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have
possession of the subject property; neither
did he exclude the petitioners from the use
and the enjoyment thereof, as they had
indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise,
his act of entering into a mortgage contract
with the bank cannot be construed to be a
repudiation of the co-ownership. As
absolute owner of his undivided interest in
the land, he had the right to alienate his
share, as he in fact did. Neither should his
payment of land taxes in his name, as
agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as a repudiation of the co-
ownership. The assertion that the
declaration of ownership was tantamount
to repudiation was belied by the continued
occupation and possession of the disputed
property by the petitioners as owners.

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES et. al., v.
CA and CAMILO AVILES
G. R. No. 95748, 21 November 1996,
THIRD DIVISION, (PANGANIBAN, J.)
“The construction of the bamboo
fence enclosing the disputed property and
the moving of earthen dikes are not the
clouds or doubts which can be removed in
an action for quieting of
title.Determination of boundaries is
appropriate in adversarial proceedings
where possession or ownership may
properly be considered.”
Plaintiffs aver that they are actual
possessors of a parcel of land situated in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly
described as fishpond, cogonal,
unirrigated rice and residential land
with an area of 18,900 square meters.
This property is the share of their father,
Eduardo Aviles and brother of the
defendant, in the estate of their deceased
parents.
Since 1957, Eduardo Aviles was
in actual possession of the afore-
described property. In fact, the latter
mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank
and Philippine National Bank branch.
When the property was inspected by a
bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the
presence of the boundary owners,
defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles
and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin pointed to
the inspector the existing earthen dikes as
the boundary limits of the property and
nobody objected. When the real estate
mortgage was foreclosed, the property
was sold at public auction but this was
redeemed by plaintiff’s mother and the
land was subsequently transferred and
declared in her name.
On March 23,1983 defendant Camilo
Aviles asserted a color of title over the
northern portion of the property with an
area of approximately 1,200 square meters
by constructing a bamboo fence and
moving the earthen dikes, thereby
molesting and disturbing the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs over said
portion. He also admitted the agreement of
partition executed by him and his brothers,
Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance
therewith, the total area of the property is
46,795 square meters and the area alloted
to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square
meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles
is 16,214 square meters more or less,
while the area alloted to defendant Camilo
Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or
less. The respective area(s) alloted to them
was agreed and measured before the
execution of the agreement but Camilo was
not present when the measurement was
made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller
area because his brother Eduardo
asked him that he wanted a bigger
share because he has several children
to support. The portion in litigation
however is part of the share given to him in
the agreement of partition. At present, he
is only occupying an area of 12,686 square
meters which is smaller than his actual
share of 14,470 square meters.
The decision of the RTC dated
December 1987 dismissed the
complaint for an action to quiet the title
for lack of basis and merits and to employ
the services of a Land Surveyor to relocate
and determine the extent and the boundary
limit of the land of the defendant. The CA
affirmed in part the decision of the trial
court, reasoning that a special civil action
for quieting of title is not the proper
remedy for settling a boundary dispute,
and that petitioners should have instituted
an ejectment suit instead.
Petitioners assert that private
respondent is occupying the disputed lot
because he claimed it to be part of his
share in the partitioned property of his
parents, whereas petitioners are claiming
the said lot as part and parcel of the land
allotted to Eduardo Aviles, petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest. They contend that
they have been occupying the aforesaid
land as heirs of Eduardo Aviles in
open, actual, continuous, peaceful,
public and adverse possession against
the whole world. Further, they argue
that, if indeed the disputed lot belonged to
private respondent, why then did it take
him almost 26 long years from June 27,
1957 or until March 27, 1983 to assert his To avail the remedy of quieting of
ownership; why did he not assert his title, a plaintiff must show that there is an
ownership over the property when Eduardo instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
Aviles was still alive; and why did he not proceeding which constitutes or casts a
take any action when the mortgage over cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the
the disputed property was foreclosed? owner’s title to or interest in real property.
Thus, petitioners have wholly
Private respondent corrects the misapprehended the import of the
petitioner’s claim in regard to the date foregoing rule by claiming that respondent
when he had the bamboo fence Court erred in holding that there was no
constructed. He alleges that the petitioners evidence of any muniment of title,
maliciously concocted the story that proceeding, written contract, and that
private respondent had purportedly there were, as a matter of fact, two such
encroached some 1,200 meters on their contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of
property when, in fact, he was merely Partition executed by private respondent
repairing the old bamboo fence existing and his brothers (including the petitioners
where it had always been since 1957 father and predecessor-in-interest), in
which their respective shares in the
ISSUE: inherited property were agreed upon, and
Whether or not the CA is correct (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the
that the complaint for the quieting of title redemption by petitioner Anastacia vda. de
is not the proper remedy of the case and it Aviles of the subject property in a
should be ejectment. foreclosure sale. However, these
documents in no way constitute a
RULING: cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of
YES. The facts presented petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises
unmistakably constitute a clear case of from the parties’ failure to situate and fix
boundary dispute, which is not cognizable the boundary between their respective
in a special civil action to quiet title. properties. The only controversy is
Quieting of title is a common law remedy whether these lands were properly
for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt measured. There is no adverse claim by
or uncertainty with respect to title to real the defendant which is apparently valid,
property but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and
Art. 476. Whenever which constitutes a cloud thereon. The
there is a cloud on title to real construction of the bamboo fence enclosing
property or any interest the disputed property and the moving of
therein, by reason of any earthen dikes are not the clouds or doubts
instrument, record, claim, which can be removed in an action for
encumbrance or proceeding quieting of title.
which is apparently valid or
effective but is, in truth and in An action to quiet title or to remove
fact, invalid, ineffective, cloud may not be brought for the purpose
voidable, or unenforceable, and of settling a boundary dispute.
may be prejudicial to said title, we hold that the trial court and CA cannot,
an action may be brought to in an action for quieting of title, order the
remove such cloud or to quiet determination of the boundaries of the
the title. claimed property, as that would be
tantamount to awarding to one or some of
An action may also be brought the parties the disputed property in an
to prevent a cloud from being action where the sole issue is limited to
cast upon a title to real whether the instrument, record, claim,
property of any interest encumbrance or proceeding involved
therein. constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners
interest or title in and to said property.
Such determination of boundaries is
appropriate in adversarial proceedings
where possession or ownership may
properly be considered and where
evidence aliunde, other than the
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding itself, may be introduced. An
action for forcible entry, whenever
warranted by the period prescribed in Rule
70, or for recovery of possession de facto,
also within the prescribed period, may be
availed of by the petitioners, in which
proceeding the boundary dispute may be
fully threshed out.
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION
DEL CAMPO v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE
REGALADO, SR.
[G.R. No. 108228. February 1, 2001]
Facts:
The Bornales (Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo,
Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita)
were the original co-owners of a lot in
Capiz. Salome had sold her 4/16 share to
Daynolo with Salome, Consorcia and
Alfredo signing the Deed of Absolute Sale,
which had described the metes and bounds
of the property. Daynolo immediately took
possession and mortgaged the portion to
Regalado. Later, three of the eight co-
owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome,
Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square
meters of said lot to Jose Regalado,
Sr. Simplicio Distajo, heir of Daynolo, had
paid the mortgaged debt and redeemed the
lot from Regalado, who executed a Deed of
Discharge of Mortgage in favor of
Daynolo’s heirs (Simplicio Distajo, Rafael
Distajo and Teresita Distajo). They sold the
redeemed portion to the spouses Del
Campo and Quiachon. Meanwhile,
Regalado had caused the reconstitution of
the OCT initially reflecting the share of the
Bornales but the title was later transferred
to Regalado, who had the entire property
subdivided and titled into smaller lots.
The spouses Del Campo brought this
complaint for the repartition, resurvey and
reconveyance of lot against the heirs of
Regalado (deceased) with the following
contentions, they: (1) Owned the portion of
land erroneously included in the TCT in the
name of Regalado; (2) Had occupied the lot
as a residential dwelling ever since their
purchase of it from the Distajos; (3) Had
declared the land for tax purposes and paid
the corresponding taxes; and (4) Presented
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
between Soledad and Salome, Deed of
Mortgage and Deed of Discharge of
Mortgage signed by Regalado and Deed of
Absolute sale showing their purchase.
The trial court dismissed the complaint.
Salome could alienate her pro-indivisio
share but could not have validly sold an
undivided portion of the lot by metes and
bounds to Soledad, from whom the Del
Campos had derived their title. Del Campos
could not have a better right to the
property even if they were in physical
possession and had declared for tax
purposes because mere possession cannot
defeat the right of Regalado, who had a
Torrens title.CA had affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical
portion of an undivided property held in
common be valid?
Ruling:
The mere fact that Salome purportedly
transferred a definite portion of the co-
owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad
does not per se render the sale a nullity.
This much is evident under Article
493[10] of the Civil Code and pertinent
jurisprudence on the matter.
The binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so.
Applying this principle to the instant case,
there can be no doubt that the transaction
entered into by Salome and Soledad could
be legally recognized in its entirety since
the object of the sale did not even exceed
the ideal shares held by the former in the
co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed
of sale executed between the parties
expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot
162 sold to Soledad would be taken from
Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said lot,
which the latter could validly transfer in
whole or in part even without the consent
of the other co-owners. Salomes right to
sell part of her undivided interest in the co-
owned property is absolute in accordance
with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person in its enjoyment. Since
Salomes clear intention was to sell merely
part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our
view no valid objection can be made
against it and the sale can be given effect
to the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle
that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of
a particular portion of a co-owned property
prior to partition among all the co-
owners. However, this should not signify
that the vendee does not acquire anything
at all in case a physically segregated area
of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to
him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided
interest could properly be the object of the
contract of sale between the parties, what
the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale
are the same rights as the vendor had as
co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to
the consideration given under their
transaction. In other words, the vendee
steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
owner and acquires a proportionate
abstract share in the property held in
common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-
owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when
the sale was made in her favor. It follows
that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could
not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose
Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at
that time, the ideal shares held by the
three co-owners/vendors were equivalent
to only 10/16 of the undivided property less
the aliquot share previously sold by Salome
to Soledad. Based on the principle that no
one can give what he does not
have, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could
not legally sell the shares pertaining to
Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate
more than his share in the co-ownership.
We have ruled many times that even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
of the entire property by one co-owner will
only transfer the rights of said co-owner to
the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a
new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of
the shares which Salome, Consorcia and
Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad
retained her rights as co-owner and could
validly transfer her share to petitioners in
1951. The logical effect of the second
disposition is to substitute petitioners in
the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the
land. Needless to say, these rights are
preserved notwithstanding the issuance of
TCT No. 14566 in Regalados name in 1977.
Consequently, respondents are
estopped from asserting that they own the
subject land in view of the Deed of
Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage
executed between Regalado and
petitioners predecessor-in-interest. As
petitioners correctly contend, respondents
are barred from making this assertion
under the equitable principle of estoppel
by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his
privies are precluded from asserting as
against the other and his privies any right
or title in derogation of the deed, or from
denying the truth of any material fact
asserted in it. A perusal of the documents
evidencing the mortgage would readily
reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had
declared herself absolute owner of the
piece of land now being litigated. This
declaration of fact was accepted by
Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly,
his heirs cannot now be permitted to deny
it.
Although Regalados certificate of title
became indefeasible after the lapse of one
year from the date of the decree of
registration, the attendance of fraud in its
issuance created an implied trust in favor
of petitioners and gave them the right to
seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully
obtained by the former. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust
ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But
when the right of the true and real owner
is recognized, expressly or implicitly such
as when he remains undisturbed in his
possession, the said action is
imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a
suit for quieting of title. Having established
by clear and convincing evidence that they
are the legal owners of the litigated portion
included in TCT No. 14566, it is only
proper that reconveyance of the property
be ordered in favor of petitioners. The
alleged incontrovertibility of Regalados
title cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents because certificates of title
merely confirm or record title already
existing and cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner or be used as
a shield for the commission of fraud.
VILMA QUINTOS v. PELAGIA I.
NICOLAS, et al., G.R. No. 210252,
June 16, 2014 THIRD
DIVISION (VELASCO, JR., J.)
Quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. No co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
Petitioner and Respondent’s parents,
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were
the owner’s of the subject property
situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C,
Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.
By 1999, both Bienvenido and
Escolastica had already passed away,
leaving to their ten (10) children ownership
over the subject property. Subsequently,
sometime in 2002, respondent siblings
brought an action for partition against
petitioners. For failure of the parties, as
well as their counsels, to appear despite
due notice, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent siblings instead resorted
to executing a Deed of Adjudication on
September 21, 2004 to transfer the
property in favor of the ten (10) siblings.
As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was
issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds
of Tarlac in the names of the ten (10) heirs
of the Ibarra spouses.
Subsequently, respondent siblings
sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
property in favor of their co-respondents,
the spouses Recto and Rosemarie
Candelario on April 17, 2007.TCT No.
390484 was partially canceled and TCT No.
434304 was issued in the name of the
Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.
On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a
complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages against respondents. They
averred that they have been in adverse,
open, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the property for over four (4)
decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable
title thereto. They also deny any
participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deed of Adjudication
Respondents countered that petitioners’
cause of action was already barred by
estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of
petitioners offered to buy the 7/10
undivided share of the respondent siblings.
They point out that this is an admission on
the part of petitioners that the property is
not entirely theirs. In addition, they
claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra mortgaged the property but because
of financial constraints, respondent
spouses Candelario had to redeem the
property in their behalf. Not having been
repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the
Candelarios accepted from their co-
respondents their share in the subject
property as payment. Lastly, respondents
sought, by way of counterclaim, the
partition of the property.
The trial court that dismissed Civil
Case. The court did not find merit in
petitioners’ asseverations that they have
acquired title over the property through
acquisitive prescription.
CA issued the assailed Decision
denying the appeal. Ultimately, the
appellate court upheld the finding that
petitioners and respondent spouses
Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in
favor of the respondent spouses.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able
to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’
counterclaim for partition is already barred
by laches or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in
approving the subdivision agreement as
basis for the partition of the property.
RULING:
1. No. Petitioners were not able to prove
equitable title or ownership over the
property
Quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. For an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or
efficacy. In the case at bar, the CA
correctly observed that petitioners’ cause
of action must necessarily fail mainly in
view of the absence of the first requisite.
Their alleged open, continuous,
exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of
the subject property is belied by the fact
that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered
into a Contract of Lease with the Avico
Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot
without any objection from the petitioners.
Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence
tending to prove that Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra transferred the
ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s
claim. On the contrary, on May 28, 1998,
Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of Sale
covering half of the subject property in
favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of
petitioners alone.
As such, there is no reason to
disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10
siblings inherited the subject property from
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and
after the respondent siblings sold their
aliquot share to the spouses Candelario,
petitioners and respondent spouses
became co-owners of the same.
2. No. The counterclaim for partition is
not barred by prior judgment. Res judicata
precludes parties from relitigating issues
actually litigated and determined by a prior
and final judgment.
3.
In the case at bar, respondent
siblings admit that they filed an action for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52,
which the RTC dismissed through an Order
dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the
parties to attend the scheduled hearings.
Respondents likewise admitted that since
they no longer appealed the dismissal, the
ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot
be disputed that the subject property in
Civil Case No. 02-52 and in the present
controversy are one and the same, and that
in both cases, respondents raise the same
action for partition. And lastly, although
respondent spouses Candelario were not
party-litigants in the earlier case for
partition, there is identity of parties not
only when the parties in the case are the
same, but also between those in privity
with them, such as between their
successors-in-interest.
However, dismissal with prejudice
under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to
ask for partition at any time, provided that
there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto
is Article 494 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
Thus, the law provides that each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common. Court hold
that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to
Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or
not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed
to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the
action for partition will never be barred by
res judicata. There can still be res judicata
in partition cases concerning the same
parties and the same subject matter once
the respective shares of the co-owners
have been determined with finality by a
competent court with jurisdiction or if the
court determines that partition is improper
for co-ownership does not or no longer
exists.
In the case at bar, however, the co-
ownership, as determined by the trial
court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario.
Consequently, there is no legal bar
preventing herein respondents from
praying for the partition of the property
through counterclaim.
The counterclaim for partition is not
barred by laches. Laches is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which––by the exercise of due diligence––
could or should have been done earlier.
As correctly appreciated by the lower
courts, respondents cannot be said to have
neglected to assert their right over the
subject property. They cannot be
considered to have abandoned their right
given that they filed an action for partition
sometime in 2002, even though it was later
dismissed. Furthermore, the fact that
respondent siblings entered into a Contract
of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co.
over the subject property is evidence that
they are exercising rights of ownership
over the same.
4. The CA erred in approving the
Agreement for Subdivision.
Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that
partition shall either be by agreement of
the parties or in accordance with the Rules
of Court. In this case, the Agreement of
Subdivision allegedly executed by
respondent spouses Candelario and
petitioners cannot serve as basis for
partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial
order, herein respondents admitted that
the agreement was a falsity and that
petitioners never took part in preparing the
same. The "agreement" was crafted
without any consultation whatsoever or any
attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable
terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked
the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to
approve the agreement in spite of this fact
would be tantamount to allowing
respondent spouses to divide unilaterally
the property among the co-owners based
on their own whims and caprices. Such a
result could not be countenanced.
To rectify this with dispatch, the case must
be remanded to the court of origin, which
shall proceed to partition the property in
accordance with the procedure outlined in
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 135602             April 28, 2000
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND
PURIFICACION R.
SERASPI, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON
RECASA,respondents.
FACTS:
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two
parcels of land.
PARCEL 1: A parcel of cocal land located at
Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan, declared
in the name of Marcelino Recasa.
PARCEL 2: A parcel of cocal land located at
Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan, declared
in the name of Purificaciin Seraspi.
During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted
three (3) marriages. At the time of his
death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children
from his three marriages. In 1948, his
intestate estate was partitioned into three
parts by his heirs, each part corresponding
to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa,
representing the heirs of the first
marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the
estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the
second marriage. On June 15, 1950,
Dominador, representing the heirs of the
second marriage, in turn sold the share of
the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion
Seraspi whose heirs are the present
petitioners. The sale included the property
sold by Patronicio to Dominador.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from
the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the
security of the lands in question to finance
improvements on the lands. However, they
failed to pay the loan for which reason the
mortgage was foreclosed and the lands
were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder.
Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI
to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico
Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of
the property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to
administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon
Recasa, Marcelino's child by his third wife,
taking advantage of the illness of Quirico
Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due to a
stroke, forcibly entered the lands in
question and took possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands
from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a
complaint against Simeon Recasa for
recovery of possession of the lands.
TRIAL COURT:
Ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that
they had acquired the property through a
sale and acquisitive prescription.
COURT OF APPEALS:
The Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that the action of the Seraspis was
barred by the statute of limitations.
CA said that while petitioners were able to
establish the identity of the property as
well as the credibility of their title (the
elements required to prove one's claim for
recovery of property), the action was
barred by prescription. It held held that an
action for recovery of title or possession of
real property or an interest therein can
only be brought within ten (10) years after
the cause of action has accrued. Since the
action for recovery of possession and
ownership was filed by petitioners only on
April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years
after their predecessor-in-interest had
been allegedly deprived of the possession
of the property by private respondent, it
was held that the action had prescribed.
ISSUE:
(1) whether petitioners' action is barred by
extinctive prescription (NO); and
(2) whether private respondent Simeon
Recasa acquired ownership of the
properties in question through acqu
isitive prescription. (NO)
SC RULING:
The Arradaza case cited by the CA  involves
acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription.
Moreover, the facts in that case arose
before the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, what was applied was sec. 41
of the Code of Civil Procedure which
provides that title by prescription is
acquired after ten (10) years, in whatever
manner possession may have been
commenced or continued, and regardless
of good faith or with just title. In this case,
however, what is involved is extinctive
prescription, and the applicable law is Art.
1141 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1141 (CIVIL CODE). Real actions
over immovables prescribe after thirty
years. This provision is without prejudice
to what is established for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights by
prescription.
On the issue of whether respondents
has acquired ownership of the two
lands by prescription.
The ff. Provisions are relevant:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of
dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with
just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real
rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real
rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion
and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary, depending on whether the
property is possessed in good faith and
with just title for the time fixed by law.
Private respondent contends that he
acquired the ownership of the
questioned property by ordinary
prescription through adverse
possession for ten (10) years.
The contention has no merit, because he
has neither just title nor good faith. As
Art. 1129 provides that for purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right. In the case at bar,
private respondent did not acquire
possession of the property through any of
the modes recognized by the Civil Code: (1)
occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3)
law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6)
tradition in consequence of certain
contracts, and (7) prescription.
Recasa could not have acquired ownership
over the property through occupation
since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the
ownership of a piece of land cannot be
acquired by occupation. Nor can he base
his ownership on succession for the
property was not part of those distributed
to the heirs of the third marriage, to which
private respondent belongs. It must be
remembered that in the partition of the
intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the
properties were divided into three parts,
each part being reserved for each group of
heirs belonging to one of the three
marriages Marcelino entered into. Since
the contested parcels of land were
adjudicated to the heirs of the first and
second marriages, it follows that private
respondent, as heir of the third marriage,
has no right over the parcels of land.
While, as heir to the intestate estate of his
father, private respondent was co-owner of
all of his father's properties, such co-
ownership rights were effectively dissolved
by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of
Marcelino Recasa.
Neither can private respondent claim good
faith in his favor.1âwphi1 Good faith
consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom the possessor received
the thing was its owner but could not
transmit the ownership thereof. Private
respondent entered the property without
the consent of the previous owner. For all
intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
However, the Court notes that petitioners
have not acquired the property through
any of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership. Their claim of
ownership is based on the contract of sale
they had with Rata, but this by itself is
insufficient to make them owners of the
property. For while a contract of sale is
perfected by the meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price, the ownership
of the thing sold is not transferred to the
vendee until actual or constructive delivery
of the property. Hence, the maxim non
nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia
dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere
agreements but tradition transfers the
ownership of things). Consequently,
petitioners are not the owners of the
property since it has not been delivered to
them. At the time they bought the property
from Rata in 1983, the property was in the
possession of private respondent. But this
does not give private respondent a right to
remain in possession of the property.
Petitioners' title to the property prevails
over private respondents' possession in
fact but without basis in law. As held
in Waite v. Peterson, when the property
belonging to a person is unlawfully taken
by another, the former has the right of
action against the latter for the recovery of
the property. Such right may be
transferred by the sale or assignment of
the property, and the transferee can
maintain such action against the
wrongdoer.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED, and private respondent
Simeon Recasa is ordered to return the
possession of the contested parcels of land
to petitioners as heirs of Quirico and
Purificacion Seraspi.
DOMINGO, MINELIO and FILOMENO
CATAPUSAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al.
FACTS
The parties in this case are the children of
the second marriage (petitioners) and the
heirs of the first marriage (respondents)
contracted by Bonifacio Catapusan
(father), claiming ownership of a parcel of
land located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal
(hereinafter referred to as Wawa lot).
The petitioners filed an action for partition
of the Wawa lot, which they allegedly co-
own with their half-brothers and half-
sisters. Petitioners contend that the said lot
belongs to their father Bonifacio and
should therefore be partitioned among the
heirs of the first and second
marriages. In support thereof, they
presented the tax declarations of the Wawa
lots with four (4) adjacent lot owners.
Respondents asserted that the Wawa lot
was originally owned by Dominga (first
wife’s mother) and inherited by Narcissa
(first wife) as her paraphernal property.
Upon Narcissa’s death, the Wawa lot
passed to her four children who are the
predecessor-in-interest of respondents.
These children possessed and occupied the
Wawa lot and secured tax declarations
thereon in their names.
Respondents likewise alleged that they had
been in open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the said lot for
more than 50 years when the suit was filed
in 1974. They also invoke laches and
prescription against petitioners action.
In response, petitioners argue that their
action had not lapsed since respondents
repudiated the co-ownership only in 1968.
They also questioned the respondents lack
of documentary proof (like titulo real) with
regard to Dominga and Narcissa’s title, as
the two lived during the Spanish era.
After trial, the lower court dismissed the
complaint, declared the respondents as the
true and lawful owners of the Wawa lot and
granted the counterclaim for P10,000.00
attorneys fees. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC, but set
aside the award of attorneys fees.
ISSUE
(1) Whether an action for partition includes
the question of ownership; YES.
(2) Whether Bonifacio had title to the
Wawa lot, NO. and
(3) Whether petitioners action is barred by
laches and/or prescription. NO.
HELD
In actions for partition, the court cannot
properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle
the issue of ownership, the first stage in an
action for partition. Needless to state, an
action for partition will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule
69 requires the party filing the action to
state in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title to the real estate. Until
and unless the issue of ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the properties.
Anent the second and third issues, it is a
basic rule of evidence that the party
making an allegation has the burden of
proving it by preponderance of evidence.
In this case, petitioners evidence of their
fathers (Bonifacio) ownership of the Wawa
lot are the tax declarations of the adjacent
lot owners and the testimonies of some
witnesses who merely saw Bonifacio
working on the lot.
On the other hand, respondents presented
tax declarations which indicated that the
same lot is owned by their predecessors-in-
interest, the children of the first marriage,
evidence which carry more weight as they
constitute proof of respondents ownership
of the land in their possession. The
statement in the neighboring lot owners
tax declarations is not a conclusive proof
that Bonifacio owned the surrounded lot.
The possession contemplated as foundation
for prescriptive right must be one under
claim of title or adverse to or in concept of
owner. Possession by tolerance, as in the
case of petitioners, is not the kind of
possession that may lead to title by
prescription. It is the respondents’ open,
continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession far beyond the 30 year
extraordinary period for acquisitive
prescription, coupled with the tax
declarations of their predecessors-
ininterest,
that constitutes a superior weight of
evidence that clinched their claim. Being
an action involving property, the
petitioners must rely on the strength of
their own title and not on the weakness of
the respondents claim.
ZOSIMA VERDAD v. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
The written notice of sale is
mandatory. This Court has long established
the rule that notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still
entitled to a written notice from the selling
co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and
status.
Facts:
Zosima Verdad, a purchaser of a 248-
square meter residential lot in Butuan City.
Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales (Private
respondent), seeks to exercise a right of
legal redemption over the subject property
and traces her title to the late Macaria
Atega, her mother-in-law, who died
intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted
two marriages: (1) with Angel Burdeos; and
(2) following the latter’s death, with
Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own
death, Macaria was survived by her son
Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by
her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela
Lozada of the first marriage and her
children of the second marriage, namely,
David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo
Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. Socorro
Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who
himself, sometime after Macaria’s death,
died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the
heirs of Ramon Burdeos – his widow
Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children
Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to Zosima
Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot
supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In
a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14
November 1982, it would appear, however,
that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00.
Zosima explained that the second deed was
intended merely to save on the tax on
capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March
1987 while she was at the City Treasurers
Office. The next day, she sought the
intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of
Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the
redemption of the property. She tendered
the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The
latter refused to accept the amount for
being much less than the lots current value
of P80,000.00. No settlement having been
reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa,
Socorro, et al., on 16 October 1987,
initiated against Zosima an action for Legal
Redemption with Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC-Butuan.
The RTC ruled that Socorro’s right to
redeem has already lapsed. On appeal, the
CA reversed the RTC ruling, explaining
that she can redeem the inheritance rights
of her late husband. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Socorro C. Rosales incapacitated to
redeem the property, being merely the
spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria,
and not being a co-heir herself in the
intestate estate of Macaria?
RULING:
NO. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-
law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by
affinity), is not an intestate heir of her
parents-in-law; however, Socorro’s right to
the property is not because she rightfully
can claim heirship in Macaria’s estate but
that she is a legal heir of her husband,
David Rosales, part of whose estate is a
share in his mother’s inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived
his mother’s(Macaria) death. When
Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate
passed on to her surviving children, among
them David Rosales, who thereupon
became co-owners of the property. When
David Rosales himself later died, his own
estate, which included his undivided
interest over the property inherited from
Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro
and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on
succession.
When their interest in the property was
sold by the Burdeos’ heirs to Zosima, a
right of redemption arose in favor of
private respondents, thus:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to
be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the
place of one who acquires a thing by
purchase or dation in payment, or by any
other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may
exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any
of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
The Court holds that the right of
redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice
of the sale was given by the Burdeos’ heirs
(vendors) to the co-owners required under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption
had yet to commence when Socorro sought
to exercise the right of redemption on 31
March 1987, a day after she discovered the
sale from the Office of the City Treasurer
of Butuan City, or when the case was
initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the
trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory.
This Court has long established the rule
that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a
co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a
written notice from the selling co-owner in
order to remove all uncertainties about the
sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its
efficacy and status.
Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, relied upon by Zosima in contending
that actual knowledge should be an
equivalent to a written notice of sale, the
Court made it clear that it was not
reversing the prevailing jurisprudence – a
written notice of sale is mandatory.
ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO
BISMORTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD
represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana
Abad Paghubasan
G.R. No. 108558 | June 21, 2001 |
PANGANIBAN, J.
It must be stressed that possession and
ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining
to one person is completely subjected to
his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, one of which is the right to dispose
of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the
other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right. Literally, to possess means to
actually and physically occupy a thing with
or without right. Possession may be had in
one of two ways: possession in the concept
of an owner and possession of a holder.
Possessors in the concept of owners may
be the owners themselves or those who
claim to be so. On the other hand, those
who possess as mere holders acknowledge
in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong.
FACTS:
This case involves declaration of ownership
filed before the RTC of Naval of an
unregistered parcel of land at Antipolo,
Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square
meters.
Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claims to be the
owner as successor in interest
(granddaughter) of one Andrea Elaba,
daughter of Maria Montes and Borja Elaba.
Maria Montes appears to be a sister of
Ignacio Montes, in whose name the tax
declaration for the property in question
was issued for the year 1912.
The property in question has been in the
possession of the defendants (heirs of
Esteban Abad), although the house
standing thereon appears to have been
constructed by Marcelo Tabuso, father of
plaintiff Andrea Tabuso. The plaintiff
herein, presented a tax declaration No.
3705 in the name of Ignacio Montes for the
year 1912 in order to support her claim.
However, the land taxes thereon for the
years 1944 to 1947 were paid only in 1981.
The defendants, on the other hand, aver
that the land in question was originally
owned by Maria Montes which was later
donated to Isabel Elaba through an ancient
document executed on September 24,
1923. Isabel in turn sold the land to
Esteban Abad on May 5, 1948.
The defendants were able to present the
original tax declaration in the name of
Ignacio Montes superseded by that of
Isabel Elaba and of that of Esteban Abad.
The land taxes due thereon for the years
1947 to 1982 were paid by Isabel Elaba,
Esteban Abad and Nemesio Abad. The land
in question is tenanted by one Valentin
Poblete in accordance with a lease contract
executed by defendant Nemesio Abad, one
of the heirs and co-owners of the land.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the
court dismissed the complaint and declared
the defendant the lawful owners of the land
in question. The Court of Appeals upheld
the findings of the trial court.
ISSUE: To whom should the ownership of
the land be vested?
RULING: The ownership should be vested
to the respondents. After a careful
examination of the issues involved, the
evidence adduced, and the arguments or
issues raised by both parties, this Court
rules that the totality of the evidence
presented leans heavily in favor of herein
private respondents.
The Court agrees with the findings of the
Court of Appeals that for a period of more
than 60 years, private respondents have
been able to establish that they are the
owners of the lot; and that for said period,
they have been in open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the same.
Both the trial and the appellate courts
were likewise correct in giving weight to
the testimony of Atty. Jose Gonzales. He
testified that being, the owner of the
adjacent land, he had personal knowledge
of the simple fact that the land in question
was owned by private respondents, who
were in actual, open and continuous
possession thereof. Significantly, while he
was private respondent’s counsel, he was
presented by petitioners themselves.
Having done so, they are bound by his
testimony, even if it is hostile.
The only substantial argument of
petitioners supporting their claim of
ownership is their construction of a small
house (barong-barong) on the property, as
acknowledged in private respondent’s
letter of Notice to Vacate.
It must be stressed that possession and
ownership are distinct legal concepts.
In this case, the evidence shows that the
occupation of the property by petitioners is
not in the concept of owners, because their
stay is merely tolerated. This finding is
bolstered by the fact that Petitioner Andrea
Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso,
who was merely allowed by the previous
owner, Esteban Abad, to construct a small
house on the lot. As held in Caniza
v.Court of Appeals, an owners act of
allowing another to occupy his house,
rent-free, does not create a permanent
and indefeasible right of possession in
the latter’s favor.
Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private
respondents are not in actual possession of
the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is
not necessary that the latter actually stay
on the property in order to prove
ownership of the same. As found by both
the trial and the appellate courts, since the
acquisition of the subject property by
private respondents, they had religiously
paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of
the co-owners executed a lease contract
over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are
clearly consistent with ownership.
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and
RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO,
petitioners, vs. HONORATA MENDOZA
BOLANTE, respondent. [G.R. No.
137944. April 6, 2000, PANGANIBAN,
J.]
Tax receipts and declarations are prima
facie proofs of ownership or possession of
the property for which such taxes have
been paid. Coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership.
By acquisitive prescription, possession in
the concept of owner -- public, adverse,
peaceful and uninterrupted -- may be
converted to ownership. On the other
hand, mere possession and occupation of
land cannot ripen into ownership.
Prior to 1954, the land situated in Bangad,
Binangonan Rizal was originally declared
for taxation purposes in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza, father of Honorata
Bolante. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the
basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in
the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the
contested lot was cancelled and
subsequently declared in the name of
Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and
Sinforoso are brothers. Margarito also has
three children, namely: petitioners
Fernanda and Ruperta, and Miguel
Mendoza.
Honorata is the present occupant of the
land. Earlier, in 1975, Honorata and
Miguel, during the cadastral survey, had a
dispute on the ownership of the land. After
trial, the court a quo rendered its
judgment, declaring that the parcel of land
covered by a tax declaration in the name of
Margarito belong to his heirs, and ordering
respondent Honorata to vacate the
property and deliver possession thereof.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court
because the genuineness and the due
execution of the affidavit allegedly signed
by the Honorata and her mother had not
been sufficiently established. It also held
that the probative value of petitioners tax
receipts and declarations paled in
comparison with Honorata’s proof of
ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual,
physical, exclusive and continuous
possession by respondent since 1985
indeed gave her a better title under Article
538 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1. Is the affidavit presented by the
petitioners admissible in
evidence?
2. Who enjoys the preference of
possession?
3. Does "actual and physical
coupled with the exclusive and
continuous possession by
respondent of the land since
1985" prove ownership of a land?
4. Who has acquired ownership over
the disputed land?
RULING:
Admissibility of the Affidavit
The affidavit is inadmissible. Petitioners
dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit
was not the best evidence of their father's
ownership of the disputed land, because
the "affiant was not placed on the witness
stand." They contend that it was
unnecessary to present a witness to
establish the authenticity of the affidavit
because it was a declaration against
respondent's interest and was an ancient
document.
The petitioners’ allegations are untenable.
Before a private document offered as
authentic can be received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be
proved first. In this case, one of the affiants
happens to be the respondent, who is still
alive and who testified that the signature in
the affidavit was not hers. A declaration
against interest is not admissible if the
declarant is available to testify as a
witness. The affidavit cannot also be
considered an ancient document because
such document must on its face appear to
be genuine. The petitioners herein failed,
however, to explain how the purported
signature of Eduarda Apiado (Honorata’s
mother) could have been affixed to the
subject affidavit if, according to the
witness, she was an illiterate woman who
never had any formal schooling. This
circumstance casts suspicion on its
authenticity. Furthermore, the affidavit in
question does not state how the ownership
of the subject land was transferred from
Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza.
By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.
Preference of Possession
Respondent Honorata enjoys
preference of possession. Petitioners
contend that respondent came into
possession through force and violence,
contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
We concede that despite their
dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did
not lose legal possession because
possession cannot be acquired through
force or violence. To all intents and
purposes, a possessor, even if
physically ousted, is still deemed the
legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who
can prove prior possession, regardless
of its character, may recover such
possession.
However, possession by the petitioners
does not prevail over that of the
respondent. Possession by the former
before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
latter also acquired it before 1985. The
records show that the petitioners’
father and brother, as well as the
respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession
of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied
and cultivated by the respondent's father
(Sinforoso), who was the brother of
petitioners' father (Margarito), as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425.
When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito
took possession of the land and cultivated
it with his son Miguel. At the same time,
respondent and her mother continued
residing on the lot. When respondent came
of age, she paid realty taxes for the years
1932- 1948. Margarito declared the lot for
taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its
realty taxes beginning 1952. When he died,
Miguel continued cultivating the land. As
found by the CA, the respondent and her
mother were living on the land, which was
being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he
was physically ousted by the respondent.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code,
the respondent is the preferred
possessor because, benefiting from her
father's tax declaration of the subject
lot since 1926, she has been in
possession thereof for a longer period.
On the other hand, petitioners' father
acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Possession of Better Right
NO. The presumption in Article 541 of
the Civil Code is merely disputable; it
prevails until the contrary is proven.
That is, one who is disturbed in one's
possession shall, under this provision, be
restored thereto by the means established
by law. Article 538 settles only the
question of possession, and possession is
different from ownership. Ownership in
this case should be established in one of
the ways provided by law.
Issue of ownership
The respondent has acquired
ownership over the land. Ownership of
immovable property is acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession
for ten years. Being the sole heir of her
father, respondent showed through his tax
receipt that she had been in possession of
the land for more than ten years since
1932. When her father died in 1930, she
continued to reside there with her mother.
When she got married, she and her
husband engaged in kaingin inside the
disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed
until 1953 when the petitioners' father
claimed the land. But by then, her
possession, which was in the concept
of owner -- public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted -- had already ripened
into ownership. Furthermore she herself,
after her father's demise, declared and
paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax
receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation, when coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property,
can be the basis of a claim for
ownership through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-
two years of farming the subject land, did
not acquire ownership.
It is settled that ownership cannot be
acquired by mere occupation. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility
toward the true owner, occupation and
use, however long, will not confer title
by prescription or adverse possession.
Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that
their possession was public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Although their father and
brother arguably acquired ownership
through extraordinary prescription
because of their adverse possession for
thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed
ownership cannot extend to the entire
disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners'
contention that their ownership of the
disputed land was established before
the trial court through the series of tax
declarations and receipts issued in the
name of Margarito Mendoza. However,
tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie
proof of ownership or possession of the
property for which taxes have been
paid. In the absence of actual public
and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.
Thus, petitioners' claim of ownership of the
whole parcel has no legal basis.
ANASTACIA QUIMEN vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS
G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996,
BELLOSILLO, J.
In easement of right of way, that easement
where the way is shortest and will cause
least prejudice shall be chosen. However,
if the two circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way where damage
will be least shall be used even if not the
shortest route.
FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen together with her
brothers and sister inherited a property in
Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property among themselves, with the share
of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road. The share of
Anastacia, located at the extreme left, is
bounded on the right by the property of
Sotero. Located directly behind the lots of
Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their
brother Antonio. In 1982 Yolanda Oliveros
purchased the lot behind Anastacia’s.
According to Yolanda, when she was
offered the property, she was hesitant to
buy, as it had no access to a public road.
But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy
the lot with the assurance that she would
give her a right of way on her adjoining
property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on
the lot she bought using as her passageway
to the public highway a portion of
Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda
finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact Anastacia thereafter
barred her from passing through her
property. Yolanda filed an action praying
for a right of way through Anastacia's
property. But the trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action;
explaining that the right of way through
Sotero's property was a straight path and
to allow a detour by cutting through
Anastacia's property would no longer make
the path straight. Hence the trial court
concluded that it was more practical to
extend the existing pathway to the public
road by removing that portion of the store
owned by Sotero, blocking the path as that
was the shortest route to the public road.
Appeal by respondent Yolanda, the CA
reversed the lower court and held that she
was entitled to a right of way on
Anastacia’s property and that the way
proposed by Yolanda would cause the least
damage and detriment to the servient
estate.
Issue:
Should a right of way be granted on
Anastacia’s property? Yes.
Ruling:
Petitioner strongly maintains that the
proposed right of way is not the shortest
access to the public road because of the
detour and that, moreover, she is likely to
suffer the most damage as she derives a
net income of P600.00 per year from the
sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and
considering that an avocado has an
average life span of 70 years, she expects a
substantial earning from it. But we find no
cogent reason to disturb the ruling of
respondent appellate court granting a right
of way to private respondent through
petitioner's property. The voluntary
easement in favor of private respondent,
which petitioner now denies but which the
court is inclined to believe, has in fact
become a legal easement or an easement
by necessity constituted by law.
Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly
states that the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. The
criterion of least prejudice to the servient
estate must prevail over the criterion of
shortest distance although this is a matter
of judicial appreciation. While shortest
distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there
are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand,
the longest distance may be free of
obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass through. In other
words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause
the least damage should be chosen.
However, if these two (2) circumstances do
not concur in a single tenement, the way
which will cause the least damage should
be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
This is the test.
between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to
provide egress to a public highway, and
another right of way which although longer
will only require an avocado tree to be cut
down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
SPOUSES CESAR AND RAQUEL STA.
MARIA AND FLORCERFIDA STA.
MARIA v. CA AND SPOUSES ARSENIO
AND ROSLYN FAJARDO
FACTS
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and
Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners
of a piece of land, Lot No. 124 of the
Obando Cadastre, containing an area of
1,043 square meters, located at Paco,
Obando, Bulacan. They acquired said lot
under a Deed of Absolute Sale. Plaintiffs
aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a
fishpond , on the northeast portion thereof;
by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on
the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a
portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by
Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and
Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest;
and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto
family, on the northwest.
On February 17, 1992, plaintiff
spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against
defendants Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria or
Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the
establishment of an easement of right of
way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot
124, is surrounded by properties belonging
to other persons, including those of the
defendants; that since plaintiffs have no
adequate outlet to the provincial road, an
easement of a right of way passing through
either of the alternative defendants'
properties which are directly abutting the
provincial road would be plaintiffs' only
convenient, direct and shortest access to
and from the provincial road; that
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have
been passing through the properties of
defendants in going to and from their lot;
that defendants' mother even promised
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant
the latter an easement of right of way as
she acknowledged the absence of an
access from their property to the road; and
that alternative defendants, despite
plaintiffs' request for a right of way and
referral of the dispute to the barangay
officials, refused to grant them an
easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an
easement of right of way on the lots of
defendants be established in their favor.
Consequently, defendants filed their
answer alleging that the granting of an
easement in favor of plaintiffs would cause
them great damage and inconvenience;
and that there is another access route from
plaintiffs' lot to the main road through the
property of Florentino Cruz which was
likewise abutting the provincial road and
was being offered for sale.
The lower court rendered the
assailed decision granting plaintiffs' prayer
for an easement of right of way on
defendants' properties. The trial court
found that based on the Ocular Inspection
Report there was no other way through
which the private respondents could
establish a right of way in order to reach
the provincial road except by traversing
directly the property of the petitioners. It
further found that (a) no significant
structure, save for a wall or fence about
three feet high, would be adversely
affected; (b) there was sufficient vacant
space of approximately 11 meters between
petitioners' houses; and (c) petitioners'
property could provide the shortest route
from the provincial road to the private
respondents' property. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court was
correct in granting the easement.
RULING:
YES. All told, the findings of fact of
both courts satisfied the following
requirements for an estate to be entitled to
a compulsory servitude of right of way
under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par.
1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity
(Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate
(Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650).
As to such requisites, the Court of Appeals
made the following disquisitions:
Anent the first requisite, there is no
dispute that the plaintiffs-appellees'
property is surrounded by other
immovables owned by different
individuals. The ocular inspection
report submitted to the lower court
reveals that:
The property of the plaintiffs,
spouses Arsenio and Roslynn
Fajardo, is completely
surrounded with adobe fence
without any point of egress
and ingress to the national
road. Said plaintiffs' property
containing an area of 1,043
square meters and covered by
OCT No. O-6244 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
was situated directly behind
defendants' property which
abuts the national road.
Defendants, spouses Cesar and
Racquel Sta. Maria, are the
absolute owners of the parcel
of land with an area of 537
square meters and embraced
under TCT No. T-37.762(M)
situated on the left side
abutting the national road with
their house thereon made of
wood and hollow blocks, while
defendant Florcerfida Sta.
Maria is the absolute owner of
a parcel of land with a similar
area of 537 square meters and
covered by TCT No. T-
37.762(M) situated on the
right side and likewise
abutting the national road with
 an impressive house thereon of
modern vintage made of strong
materials. As depicted in the
rough sketch hereto attached,
plaintiffs have absolutely no
means of ingress and egress to
their property as the same is
completely isolated by
properties owned by other
persons. On the left side is the
property of Florentino Cruz, on
the right side is the property
reportedly owned by the
Jacintos; and on the front
portion are properties owned
by defendants. . . . .
Plaintiffs-appellees' property is
likewise without adequate outlet to a
public highway. The existing
passage way for people ("daang
tao") at the back of plaintiffs-
appellees property leading to the
provincial road (TSN, May 17, 1993,
p. 12) cannot be considered an
adequate outlet for purposes of
establishing an easement. Article
651 of the Code provides that "(t)he
width of the easement of right of
way shall be that which is sufficient
for the needs of the dominant estate,
and may accordingly be changed
from time to time." Thus in the case
of Larracas vs. Del Rio (37 Official
Gazette 287), this Court had
occasion to rule that "it is not
necessary for a person, like his
neighbors, to content himself with a
footpath and deny himself the use of
an automobile. So in an age when
motor cars are a vital necessity, the
dominant proprietor has a right to
demand a driveway for his
automobile, and not a mere lane or
pathway" (Cited in Tolentino, ibid.,
p. 391).
The second requisite for the
establishment of an easement of
right way, i.e., payment of
indemnity, is likewise present in this
case. Plaintiff-appellee spouse
Roslynn Fajardo testified on direct
examination that they are willing to
pay the corresponding damages
provided for by law if granted the
right of way (TSN, November 5,
1992, p. 11).
The third requisite is that the
isolation of plaintiffs-appellees'
property should not have been due
to their own acts. In the case under
consideration, the isolation of their
lot is not due to plaintiffs' acts. The
property they purchased was
already surrounded by other
immovables leaving them no
adequate ingress or egress to a
public highway.
Going now to the fourth requisite of
"least prejudice" and "shortest
distance," We agree with the lower
court that this twin elements have
been complied with in establishing
the easement of right of way on
defendants-appellants' properties.
It has been commented upon that
where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate,
and the easement may be
established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be
chosen. But if these two
circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be
used, even if it will not be the
shortest. And if the conditions of the
various tenements are the same, all
the adjoining owners should be cited
and experts utilized to determine
where the easement shall be
established (Tolentino, ibid., pp.
108-109, citing Casals
Colldecarrera).
In the case at bar, the ocular
inspection disclosed that there are
three options to the plaintiffs-
appellees as a route to reach the
national road, to wit:
(1) To traverse directly
through defendants'
property which is the
shortest route of
approximately 20 to 25
 meters away from the
national road;
(2) To purchase a right of
way from the adjoining
property of Florentino
Cruz on the left side of
their property; and
(3) To negotiate with
Jacinto family on the right
side of their property.
In all instances, no significant
structures would be adversely
affected. There is sufficient
vacant space between
defendants' houses of
approximately 11 meters. The
distance of defendant
Florcerfida's house with the
adjoining adobe wall
separating that of the property
of defendants Cesar and
Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4
meters, while the space
between the adobe wall and
that of the latter's house is
about 7 meters or a total of 11
meters vacant space for
purposes of a right of way. On
the other hand, plaintiffs may
negotiate with a right of way
with Florentino Cruz on the
left side of their property
although the same is quite
circuitous. Lastly, the option
through the property of the
Jacinto on the right side is very
circuitous and longer. The
route involves a total of about
50 yards as it has to go
straight to the right of about
35 yards and turn left of about
another 15 yards before
reaching the common right of
way.
Among the three (3) possible
servient estates, it is clear that
defendants-appellants' property
would afford the shortest distance
from plaintiffs-appellees' property to
the provincial road. Moreover, it is
the least prejudicial since as found
by the lower court, "(i)t appears that
there would be no significant
structures to be injured in the
defendants' property and the right-
of-way to be constructed thereon
would be the shortest of all the
alternative routes pointed to by the
defendants" (p. 4, RTC, Decision; p.
223, ibid.).
Petitioners' reliance on Costabella
Corporation v. Court of Appeals to support
their first assigned error is misplaced. In
said case we reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting a compulsory
easement of a right of way to the private
respondents therein because of the
absence of any showing that the "private
respondents had established the existence
of the four requisites mandated by law." As
to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed
out; thus: "Neither have the private
respondents been able to show that the
isolation of their property was not due to
their personal or their predecessors-in-
interest's own acts." In the instant case,
the Court of Appeals have found the
existence of the requisites. The petitioners,
however, insist that private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest have, through
their own acts of constructing concrete
fences at the back and on the right side of
the property, isolated their property from
the public highway. The contention does
not impress because even without the
fences private respondents' property
remains landlocked by neighboring estates
belonging to different owners.
The petitioners try to convince us that
there are two other existing passage ways
over the property of Cruz and over that of
Jacinto, as well as a "daang tao," for
private respondents' use. Our examination
of the records yields otherwise. Said lots of
Cruz and Jacinto do not have existing
passage ways for the private respondents
to use. Moreover, the Ocular Inspection
Report reveals that the suggested
alternative ways through Cruz's or
Jacinto's properties are longer and
"circuitous" than that through petitioners'
property. This is also clear from the Sketch
Plan submitted by the private respondents
wherein it is readily seen that the lots of
Cruz and Jacinto are only adjacent to that
of private respondents unlike that of
petitioners which is directly in front of
private respondents' property in relation to
the public highway.
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the
easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. Where
there are several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, and the easement
may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause
the least damage should be chosen. The
conditions of "least damage" and "shortest
distance" are both established in one
tenement — petitioners' property.
As to the "daang tao" at the back of private
respondents' property, it must be stressed
that under Article 651 the width of the
easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be
changed from time to time. Therefore, the
needs of the dominant estate determine the
width of the easement. The needs of
private respondents' property could hardly
be served by this "daang tao" located at the
back and which is bordered by a fishpond.
Cristobal vs. CA
291 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Petitioners own a house and lot situated in
Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City.
Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the
other hand, is the owner of the adjoining
subdivision which once included the
disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2,
with areas of 164 square meters and 52
square meters, respectively. Lots 1 and 2
were originally part of a private road
known as Road Lot 2. Petitioners were
using Road Lot 2 in going to and from the
nearest public road. When Visayas Avenue
became operational as a national road
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before
the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to
convert Road Lot 2 into residential
lots. The petition was granted, hence, Road
Lot 2 was converted into residential lots
designated as Lot 1 and Lot
2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold
both lots to Macario Pacione in whose
favor Transfer Certificates of Title were
correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario
Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and
daughter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus
and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione
spouses, who intended to build a house on
Lot 1, visited the property and found out
that the lot was occupied by a squatter and
a portion was being used as a passageway
by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue.
When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, the spouses started
enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.
Petitioners instituted an action for
easement of right of way with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO. At the instance of
the parties, the trial court ordered an
ocular inspection of the property. Deputy
Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr., submitted his
Report relative to the ocular inspection
indicating that there is another way from
the Visayas Ave. to the plaintiffs lot.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint holding that
one essential requisite of a legal easement
of right of way was not proved, i.e., the
absence of an alternative adequate way or
outlet to a public highway.
CA: Confirmed RTC Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the essential
requisites of a legal easement of right of
way were established.
HELD: No.
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of
right of way, the preconditions provided
under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code
must be established. These are: (1) that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity
has been paid; (3) that the isolation was
not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and, in so far as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. The burden of proving the
existence of these prerequisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is
clearly absent. As found by the trial court
and the CA, an outlet already exists, which
is a path walk located at the left side of
petitioners property and which is
connected to a private road about 500
meters long. The private road, in turn,
leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about
2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas
Avenue. This outlet was determined by the
court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of
the dominant estate, hence petitioners
have no cause to complain that they have
no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by
petitioners to prove that the easement they
seek to impose on private respondents
property is to be established at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate. For
emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters
and an improvident imposition of the
easement on the lot may unjustly deprive
private respondents of the optimum use
and enjoyment of their property,
considering that its already small area will
be reduced further by the
easement. Worse, it may even render the
property useless for the purpose for which
private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very
nature, and when considered with
reference to the obligations imposed on the
servient estate, an easement involves an
abnormal restriction on the property
rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on
the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the owner of the dominant estate to
establish by clear and convincing evidence
the presence of all the preconditions before
his claim for easement of right of way may
be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in
this regard.
On the question of adequacy of the existing
outlet, petitioners allege that the path walk
is much longer, circuitous and
inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one
has to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right to a
private road, then enter a vacant lot, and
turn right again to exit from the vacant lot
until one reaches petitioners property.
Admittedly, the proposed right of way over
private respondents property is the most
convenient, being the shorter and the more
direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it
is not enough that the easement be where
the way is shortest. It is more important
that it be where it will cause the least
prejudice to the servient estate. As
discussed elsewhere, petitioners failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed
right of way shall be at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and
SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the
registered owner of a parcel of land in
Quezon City. He bought the same from
Pacific banking Corporation, the
mortgagee of said property. The bank had
acquired it form the Spouses Maximo and
Justinina Gabriel at public auction. When
Petitioner bought the parcel of land, there
was a small house on its southeastern
portion which occupied a one meter of the
two meter wide easement of right of way
the Spouses Gabriel previously granted to
the Espinolas, predecessors in interest of
private respondents in a Contract of
Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to
Petitioner, even before he bought the land,
the Gabriels had constructed the
abovementioned small house that
encroached upon the two-meter easement.
Petitioner was also unaware that Private
Respondents had previously filed a civil
case for easement and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Spouses Gabriel.
On 15 May 1991, the trial court
issued a TRO ordering the Gabriels to
provide a right of way and to demolish the
small house encroaching on the easement.
The Gabriels filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Thus,
they filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
which dismissed the petition and upheld
the RTC issuance. This became final and
executor on July 31, 1992. When the
Sheriff tried to demolish the small house
pursuant to the writ, Petitioner filed a
Third Party Complaint with prayer to quash
the writ of demolition.
Petitioner argued that the easement cannot
be enforced against him since the same is
not expressly stated or annotated on the
Torrens title conformably with Section 39
of the Land Registration Law. He further
argued that not being party to the previous
civil case, the contract of easement
executed by the Gabriel in favor of the
Espinolas could not be enforced against
him.
ISSUE: WON the easement in the subject
property binds petitioner.
RULING: Yes. The easement in the instant
petition is both (1) an easement by grant or
a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement
by necessity or a legal easement. A legal
easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private
interest, and becomes a continuing
property right. As a compulsory easement,
it is inseparable from the estate to which it
belongs, as provided for in said Article 617
of the Civil Code. The essential requisites
for an easement to be compulsory are: (1)
the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has
been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals have declared the
existence of said easement (right of way).
This finding of fact of both courts below is
conclusive on this Court, hence we see no
need to further review, but only to re-
affirm, this finding. The small house
occupying one meter of the two-meter wide
easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents cement mixer and motor
vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the
needs of private respondents. It is well-
settled that the needs of the dominant
estate determine the width of the
easement. Conformably then, petitioner
ought to demolish whatever edifice
obstructs the easement in view of the
needs of private respondents estate.
Petitioners second proposition, that
he is not bound by the contract of
easement because the same was not
annotated in the title and that a notice of
lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the
easement was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, is obviously
unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in
the nature of legal easement that the
servient estate (of petitioner) is legally
bound to provide the dominant estate (of
private respondents in this case) ingress
from and egress to the public highway.
Petitioners last argument that he was
not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and
that he had not been given his day in court,
is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec. 47, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final
orders. The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final
order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of
the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same
capacity;
COSTABELLA CORPORATION v. CA,
KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC. et al.
FACTS
Petitioner owns the real estate
properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122
and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre, situated at
Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City,
on which it had constructed a resort and
hotel. The private respondents, on the
other hand, are the owners of adjoining
properties more particularly known as Lots
Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon
Cadastre.
Before the petitioner began the
construction of its beach hotel, the private
respondents, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial
road, passed through a passageway which
traversed the petitioner's property. In
1981, the petitioner closed the
aforementioned passageway when it began
the construction of its hotel, but
nonetheless opened another route across
its property through which the private
respondents, as in the past, were allowed
to pass. Later, or sometime in August,
1982, when it undertook the construction
of the second phase of its beach hotel, the
petitioner fenced its property thus closing
even the alternative passageway and
preventing the private respondents from
traversing any part of it.
As a direct consequence of these
closures, an action for injunction with
damages was filed against the petitioner by
the private respondents.
In their complaint, the private
respondents assailed the petitioner's
closure of the original passageway which
they claimed to be an "ancient road right of
way" that had been existing before World
War II and since then had been used by
them, the community, and the general
public, either as pedestrians or by means
of vehicles, in going to and coming from
Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of the
country. The private respondents averred
that by closing the alleged road right of
way in question, the petitioner had
deprived them access to their properties
and caused them damages. They likewise
alleged that the petitioner had constructed
a dike on the beach fronting the latter's
property without the necessary permit,
obstructing the passage of the residents
and local fishermen, and trapping debris
and flotsam on the beach; that the debris
and flotsam that had accumulated
prevented them from using their properties
for the purpose for which they had
acquired them.
Petitioner denied the existence of an
ancient road through its property and
counter-averred, among others, that it and
its predecessors-in-interest had permitted
the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous
use of, or passage through, its property by
the private respondents and others by
mere tolerance and purely as an act of
neighborliness. It justified the walling in of
its property in view of the need to insure
the safety and security of its hotel and
beach resort, and for the protection of the
privacy and convenience of its hotel
patrons and guests. At any rate, the
petitioner alleged, the private respondents
were not entirely dependent on the subject
passageway as they had another existing
and adequate access to the public road
through other properties.
With respect to the dike it allegedly
constructed, the petitioner stated that
what it built was a breakwater on the
foreshore land fronting its property and not
a dike as claimed by the private
respondents. Moreover, contrary to the
private respondents' accusation, the said
construction had benefitted the community
especially the fishermen who used the
same as mooring for their boats during low
tide. The quantity of flotsam and debris
which had formed on the private
respondents' beach front on the other hand
were but the natural and unavoidable
accumulations on beaches by the action of
the tides and movement of the waves of the
sea. The petitioner's answer then assailed
the private respondents' complaint for its
failure to implead as defendants the
owners of the other properties supposedly
traversed by the alleged ancient road right
way, indispensable parties without whom
no final adjudication of the controversy
could be rendered.
The trial court ruled that private
respondents had acquired a vested right
over the passageway in controversy based
on its long existence and its continued use
and enjoyment not only by the private
respondents, but also by the community at
large. The petitioner in so closing the said
passageway, had accordingly violated the
private respondents' vested right.
 Both parties elevated the trial
court's decision to the CA, with the
petitioner questioning the alleged "vested
right" of the private respondents over the
subject passageway, and the private
respondents assailing the dismissal of their
complaint insofar as their prayer for the
demolition of the petitioner's "dike" is
concerned.
In its decision, CA held as without
basis the trial court's finding that the
private respondents had acquired a vested
right over the passageway in question by
virtue of prescription. The appellate court
pointed out that an easement of right of
way is a discontinuous one which, under
Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only
be acquired by virtue of a title and not by
prescription. Thus the appellate court: (1)
granted the private respondents the right
to an easement of way on the petitioner's
property using the passageway in question,
unless the petitioner should provide
another passageway equally accessible and
convenient as the one it closed; (2)
remanded the case to the trial court for the
determination of the just and proper
indemnity to be paid to the petitioner by
the private respondents for the said
easement; and (3) set aside the trial court's
award of actual damages and attorney's
fees.12
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA’s decision
was erroneous.
RULING:
YES. It is already well-established
that an easement of right of way, as is
involved here, is discontinuous15 and as
such cannot be acquired by prescription. 16
Insofar therefore as the appellate court
adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood
correct. Unfortunately, after making the
correct pronouncement, the respondent
Appellate Court did not order the reversal
of the trial court's decision and the
dismissal of the complaint after holding
that no easement had been validly
constituted over the petitioner's property.
Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering
the passageway in issue as a compulsory
easement which the private respondents,
as owners of the "dominant" estate, may
demand from the petitioner the latter
being the owner of the "servient" estate.
It is provided under Articles 649 and
650 of the New Civil Code that:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person
who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to
demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment
of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established
in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient
estate.
In case the right of way is limited to
the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its
crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the
payment of the damage caused by
such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if
the isolation of the immovable is due
to the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of
way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
Based on the foregoing, the owner of
the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four requisites,
to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to
the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right
of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the
existence of the foregoing pre-requisites
lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
Here, there is absent any showing
that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four
requisites mandated by law. For one, they
failed to prove that there is no adequate
outlet from their respective properties to a
public highway. On the contrary, as alleged
by the petitioner in its answer to the
complaint, and confirmed by the appellate
court, "there is another outlet for the
private respondents to the main road."
Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals
likewise admitted that "legally the old road
could be closed."19 Yet, it ordered the re-
opening of the old passageway on the
ground that "the existing outlet (the other
outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff." 20 On
this score, it is apparent that the Court of
Appeals lost sight of the fact that the
convenience of the dominant estate has
never been the gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way.21 To be sure, the
true standard for the grant of the legal
right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is
already an existing adequate outlet from
the dominant estate to a public highway,
even if the said outlet, for one reason or
another, be inconvenient, the need to open
up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
For to justify the imposition of an easement
or right of way, "there must be a real, not a
fictitious or artificial necessity for it."
Further, the private respondents
failed to indicate in their complaint or even
to manifest during the trial of the case that
they were willing to indemnify fully the
petitioner for the right of way to be
established over its property. Neither have
the private respondents been able to show
that the isolation of their property was not
due to their personal or their predecessors-
in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private
respondents failed to allege, much more
introduce any evidence, that the
passageway they seek to be re-opened is at
a point least prejudicial to the petitioner.
Considering that the petitioner operates a
hotel and beach resort in its property, it
must undeniably maintain a strict standard
of security within its premises. Otherwise,
the convenience, privacy, and safety of its
clients and patrons would be compromised.
That indubitably will doom the petitioner's
business. It is therefore of great
importance that the claimed light of way
over the petitioner's property be located at
a point least prejudicial to its business.
Hence, the Private respondents' properties
can not be said to be isolated, for which a
compulsory easement is demandable.
ENCARNACION VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 77628. March 11, 1991.
FERNAN, C.J.:
It is the needs of the dominant
property which ultimately determine the
width of the passage; and these needs may
vary from time to time.
Since the easement to be
established in favor of petitioner is of a
continuous and permanent nature the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private
respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta
Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of
two adjacent estates situated in Buco,
Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the
dominant estate which has an area of 2,590
square meters and bounded on the North
by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto
Magsino, on the south by Taal Lake, on the
East by Felino Matienzo and on the West
by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-
own the 405-square-meter servient estate
which is bounded on the North by the
National Highway (Laurel-Talisay
Highway), on the South by Tomas
Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto
Magsino and on the West by Felipe de
Sagun. In other words, the servient estate
stands between the dominant estate and
the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was
not yet enclosed with a concrete fence,
persons going to the national highway just
crossed the servient estate at no particular
point. However, in 1960 when private
respondents constructed a fence around
the servient estate, a roadpath
measuring 25 meters long and about a
meter wide  was constituted to provide
access to the highway. One-half meter
width of the path was taken from the
servient estate and the other one-half
meter portion was taken from another lot
owned by Mamerto Magsino. No
compensation was asked and non was
given for the portions constituting the
pathway.
It was also about that time that petitioner
started his plant nursery business on his
land where he also had his abode. He
would use said pathway as passage to the
highway for his family and for his
customers. Petitioner's plant nursery
business flourished and with that, it
became more and more difficult for
petitioner to haul the plants and garden
soil to and from the nursery and the
highway with the use of pushcarts. In
January, 1984, petitioner approached the
servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de
Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun)
and requested that they sell to him one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to
be added to the existing pathway so as to
allow passage for his jeepney to be used to
transport his plants. His request was
turned down by the two widows and
further attempts at negotiation proved
futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before
the RTC seek the ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF EASEMENT OF A RIGHT OF WAY
OVER AN ADDITIONAL WIDTH OF AT
LEAST TWO (2) METERS over the De
Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.
During the trial, the attention of the lower
court was called to the existence of another
exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters
away from the dominant estate. The lower
court dismissed petitioner's complaint,
ruling that:
xxx The plaintiff has an adequate
outlet to the highway through the
dried river bed where his jeep could
pass.
The reasons given for his claim that
the one-meter passageway through
defendants' land be widened to two
and one-half meters to allow the
passage of his jeep, destroying in the
process one of the concrete fences
and decreasing defendants' already
small parcel to only about 332.5
square meters, just because it is
nearer to the highway by 25 meters
compared to the second access of 80
meters or a difference of only 65
meters and that passage through
defendants' land is more convenient
for his (plaintiffs) business and
family use are not among the
conditions specified by Article 649 of
the Civil Code to entitle the plaintiff
to a right of way for the passage of
his jeep through defendant's land.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and rejected
petitioner's claim for an additional
easement. It opined that the necessity
interposed by petitioner was not
compelling enough to justify interference
with the property rights of private
respondents – the only reason why he
wanted a wider easement through the De
Sagun's estate was that it was more
convenient for his business and family
needs.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is
entitled to a widening of an already
existing easement of right-of-way.
HELD:
We reverse. Petitioner has sufficiently
established his claim for an additional
easement of right of way. While there is a
dried river bed less than 100 meters from
the dominant tenement, that access is
grossly inadequate.
Generally, the right of way may be
demanded:
(1) when there is absolutely no access to
a public highway, and
(2) when, even if there is one, it is
difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient.
In the present case, the river bed route is
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no ingress nor egress from the
highway. For the jeep to reach the level of
the highway, it must literally jump four (4)
to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the
rainy season, the river bed is impassable
due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used
at certain times of the year. With the
inherent disadvantages of the river bed
which make passage difficult, if not
impossible, it is if there were no outlet at
all.
Where a private property has no access to
a public road, it has the right of easement
over adjacent servient estates as a matter
of law.
With the non-availability of the dried river
bed as an alternative route to the highway,
we transfer our attention to the existing
pathway which straddles the adjoining
properties of the De Sagun heirs and
Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against
petitioner his candid admission in open
court that he needed a wider pathway for
the convenience of his business and family.
We cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting
that which is convenient. But certainly that
should not detract from the more pressing
consideration that there is a real and
compelling need for such servitude in his
favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that
"(t)he width of the easement of right of way
shall be that which is sufficient for the
needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time."
This is taken to mean that under the law, it
is the needs of the dominant property
which ultimately determine the width
of the passage. And these needs may vary
from time to time. When petitioner started
out as a plant nursery operator, he and his
family could easily make do with a few
pushcarts to tow the plants to the national
highway. But the business grew and with it
the need for the use of modern means of
conveyance or transport. Manual hauling
of plants and garden soil and use of
pushcarts have become extremely
cumbersome and physically taxing. To
force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the
highway, exposed to the elements and to
the risk of theft simply because it could not
pass through the improvised pathway, is
sheer pigheadedness on the part of the
servient estate and can only be counter-
productive for all the people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a
passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a
reasonable and necessary aspect of the
plant nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one
and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of
the pathway will reduce the servient estate
to only about 342.5 square meters. But
petitioner has expressed willingness to
exchange an equivalent portion of his land
to compensate private respondents for
their loss. But unless and until that option
is considered, the law decrees that
petitioner must indemnify the owners of
the servient estate including Mamerto
Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2
meter was taken to constitute the original
path several years ago. Since the easement
to be established in favor of petitioner is of
a continuous and permanent nature, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate
pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code
which states in part:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person
who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to
demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment
of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established
in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient
estate.
x x x           x x x          x x x

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion is
hereby declared entitled to an additional
easement of right of way of twenty-five (25)
meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2)
meters wide over the servient estate or a
total area of 62.5 square meters after
payment of the proper indemnity.
ADRIANA DIONISIO, ET AL vs. JUDGE
RODOLFO ORTIZ OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 89 AND PABLO TAN
GONZAGA
The controversy in the instant case arose
from the private respondents' act of
opening a new gate along Howmart Road
claiming an easement of right of way in
their favor.
The facts are as follows:
The petitioners are co-owners of lots
contiguous to each other situated in the
Sitio of Kangkong, District of Balintawak,
Quezon City.
The private respondents are also co-owners
of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned
by the petitioners. Lot 272-B has an area of
1,427 sq. m. which was later subdivided
into two lots where Lot 272-A was assigned
to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant
to a memorandum agreement executed by
and between them. They are also owners of
another lot at the upper portion of Lot 272-
B with an area of 914 sq. m.
By virtue of an agreement entered into
between the owners of the contiguous lots
and the members of the Quezon City
Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a
right of way was granted over Howmart
Road which is a private road traversing the
contiguous lots owned by the petitioners,
among others, in favor of the QCIEA
members. In return for its use, QCIEA paid
compensation to the petitioners for this
right of way. The private respondents are
bona fide members of the QCIEA.
In order to have access to Howmart Road,
there is a gate in private respondents' 914
sq. m. lot fronting Howmart Road and
another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of
the subdivision of Lot 272, the private
respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-
B also fronting Howmart Road which is
now the gate in question.
Maxima Dionisio, ordered the digging of
four holes in a parallel line and afterwards
put up steel posts wielded to a steel plate
in front of the newly constructed gate of
private respondents amidst the latter's
protestations. The petitioners claim that
the surreptitiously constructed gate
opened directly into the house of Maxima
Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise
pollution arising from the respondents'
delivery trucks and service vehicles.
On November 7, 1989, the private
respondents instituted a civil action for
damages against the petitioners. The
complaint sought the immediate issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
the petitioner to remove the barricade
erected by them in front of the iron gate.
RTC: granted the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering the
defendants to remove the barricade
Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed
the barricade in front of the gate of the
private respondents after they failed to
obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO)
from the Court of Appeals enjoining the
lower court from implementing its order.
CA: dismissed the petition on the ground
that the issue has already become moot
and academic since the petitioners have
already complied with the Order of the
lower court.
ISSUE: whether or not the private
respondents have an easement of right of
way over Howmart Road.
RULING:
The private respondents' claim that they
have every right to use Howmart Road as
passageway to EDSA by reason of the fact
that public respondents are bonafide
members of the QCIEA which has a
standing oral contract of easement of right
of way with the petitioners. The contract is
still subsisting even after its alleged
expiration in December, 1988 as evidenced
by the two (2) letters signed by Maxima
Dionisio and Atty. Telesforo Poblete,
counsel for the Dionisio Family addressed
to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in
the compensation for said right of way. In
such a case, it is alleged that the
petitioners did not have the right to put the
barricade in question in front of the private
respondents' gate and stop them from
using said gate as passageway to Howmart
Road.
There is no question that a right of way
was granted in favor of the private
respondents over Howmart Road but the
records disclose that such right of way
expired in December, 1988. The continued
use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEA
including the private respondents is by the
mere tolerance of the owners pending the
renegotiation of the terms and conditions
of said right of way. This is precisely shown
by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting
for an increase in compensation for the use
of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of
the parties as to the consideration, among
others, no contract of easement of right of
way has been validly entered into by the
petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private
respondents' claim of an easement of right
of way over Howmart Road has no legal or
factual basis.
Not having any right, the private
respondents are not entitled to the
injunctive relief granted by the lower
court.
The records show that there are two (2)
gates through which the private
respondents may pass to have direct
access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate
which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the
southern gate along Howmart Road. The
records also disclose that the petitioners
and the other lot owners previously
prohibited and prevented members of
QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim
that they were forced to open a new gate
by reason of the subdivision of Lot 272
where a wall was constructed between
these 2 lots is untenable. The private
respondents can not assert a right of way
when by their own or voluntary act, they
themselves have caused the isolation of
their property from the access road. Article
649 of Civil Code justifies petitioners'
claim, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person
who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to
demand a right of way through the
neigboring estates, after payment of
the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established
in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient
estate.
In case the right of way is limited to
the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its
crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the
payment of the damage caused by
such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if
the isolation of the immovable is due
to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)
(Emphasis supplied)
The construction of a wall between the 2
lots leaving only a small passageway
between them is an act imputable to the
private respondents which precludes them
from asserting a right of way. The opening
of the new gate would definitely be very
convenient to the private respondents but
mere convenience is not enough to serve as
basis for the assertion of a right of way.
It was therefore inaccurate for the lower
court to state that the private respondents
have shown a clear right to justify the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction when the facts and
circumstances of the case do not warrant
it. In such a case, certiorari will lie to
correct the abuse of discretion committed
by the lower court. Such task was
incumbent upon the Court of Appeals when
the petitioners filed their petition
for certiorari before it questioning the
propriety of the Order of the lower court.
The respondent Court, however, dismissed
the petition on the ground that the issue
was already moot and academic upon the
petitioners' compliance with the Order of
the respondent Judge.
The fact that the barricade constructed by
the petitioners was already removed upon
the issuance of the questioned preliminary
injunction does not make the petition moot
and academic as ruled by the Court of
Appeals. The granting of the writ and the
subsequent compliance should not preempt
the determination of the issue brought
before it. The validity of the Order was
precisely the subject of the petition
for certiorari. As aptly explained in the
case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v.
Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 [1983]
CABATINGAN vs. CABATINGAN
FACTS: On February 17, 1992, Conchita
Cabatingan executed in favor of her
brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a
Deed of Conditional Donation Inter vivos
for House and Lot covering one half
portion of the former’s house. Four other
deeds of donations were executed by
Conchita Cabatingan bestowing upon the
other Petitioners various parcels of land.
These Deeds of Donation contain similar
provisions, to wit:
“That for and in consideration of the love
and affection of the DONOR for the
DONEE, the DONOR does hereby , by
these presents, transfer, covey, by way of
donation, unto the DONEE the above
described property, together with the
buildings and all improvements existing
thereon, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR,
the present donations shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect;”
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan
died.
Upon learning of the existence of the
foregoing donations, respondents filed an
action for annulment of the said Deeds of
Donations. Respondents alleged that
through their sinister machinations and
taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingans
fragile condition, caused the execution of
the deeds of donation and that the
documents are void for failing to comply
with the formalities of wills and testaments
considering that these are donations mortis
causa.
ISSUE: WON the donation made by the
decedent is inter vivos or mortis causa.
RULING: Mortis Causa.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of
disposition is not transferred to the done
while the donor is still alive. In determining
whether the donation is one of mortis
causa, the following characteristics must
be taken into account:
1. It converys no titile or ownership to
the transferee before the death of
the transfero; or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer
shoul be revocable by the transferor
at will ad nutum but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed.
In the present case, the nature of the
donations as mortis causa is confirmed by
the fact that the donations do not contain
any clear provision that intends to pass
proprietary rights to the petitioners prior
to the death of Cabatingan. The phrase to
become effective upon the death of the
DONOR admits of no other interpretation
but that Cabatingan did not intend to
transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioner
themselves expressly confirmed the
donations as mortis causa in following
Acceptance and Attestation causes, to wit:
“That the DONEE does hereby accept the
foregoing donation mortis causa under the
ters and conditions set forth therein, and
avail herself of this occasion to express her
profound gratitude for the kindness and
generosity of the DONOR.
SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and
DONEE at the foot of this Deed of Donation
mortis causa, which consist of two (2)
pages xxx.
As the donation is in the nature of mortis
causa disposition, the formalities of a will
should have complied with under 728 of
the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is
void and would produce no effect.
Considering that the disputed donations
are donations mortis causa , the same
partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions and as such, said deeds must be
executed in accordance with the requisite
on solemnities of wills and testaments
under Art. 805 and 806 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
ART. 805. Every will, other than
holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testators name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by
him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof ,
except the last, on the left margin, and all
the paghes shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written,
and the facts that the testator signed the
will and evry page thereof , or caused some
other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnesses and signed the will and all the
pages therefo in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language
not known to the witness, it shall be
interpreted to them.
ART. 806. Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court.
The deeds in question although
acknowledged beforea notary public, the
documents were not executed in a manner
provided for under the above-quoted
provisions of law.
IGNACIO GONZALES et al., v. CA,
ESTANISLAO SALVADOR et. al.
G.R. No. 110335, 18 June 2001, THIRD
DIVISION, (MELO, J.)
“Registration is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and effective. However, in
order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the Registry of
Property.”
FACTS:
The now deceased spouses Ignacio
Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the
registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural land situated at
Cabanatuan City and denominated as Lot
551-C and Lot 552-A. Lot 551-C contains
an area of 46.97 hectares while Lot 552-A
contains an area of 37.5735 hectares.
Herein petitioners are the successors-in-
interest or the children and grandchildren
of said Gonzales spouses. On the other
hand, private respondents are the farmers
and tenants of said spouses who have been
cultivating the parcels of land even before
World War II either personally or through
their predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales
died intestate and appointed as
administratrix of her estate was petitioner
Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of
said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a
Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972
conveying his share of the property,
specifically Lot No. 551-C, in favor of his
14 grandchildren. The said donation was
not registered. Thus, when Presidential
Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27- Decreeing The
Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage
of the soil, transferring to them the
Ownership of the Land they till and
providing the instruments and mechanism
therefor) took effect on October 21, 1972,
the landholdings of the spouses Gonzales
were placed under Operation Land
Transfer by virtue of said decree, and
private respondents were accordingly
issued the corresponding Certificates of
Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents.
On March 5, 1974, the Lilia Gonzales
filed an application for retention with
the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
requesting that their property be excluded
from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer. On September 3, 1991, DAR
Secretary Benjamin Leong issued an order
declaring that the subject landholdings
covered by the deed of donation are
exempt from Operation Land Transfer,
and cancelling the Certificates of Land
Transfer issued in favor of private
respondents. He reasoned that donation
had been duly accepted by the donees who
were already of legal age on the date of the
donation and by the legal guardians of the
donees who were still minors at that time,
and the donor having known of said
acceptance, the donation had therefore
been perfected in accordance with the law,
and the donees had acquired a valid title to
the portion donated on the date the
instrument was executed.
Private respondents filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which rendered its decision on
March 15, 1993, reversing the action of
the DAR and upholding the certificates
of land transfer and emancipation
patents.
Petitioners insist that the deed of
donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales
validly transferred the ownership and
possession of Lot 551-C which comprises
an area of 46.97 hectares to his 14
grandchildren. They further assert that
inasmuch as Lot 551-C had already been
donated, the same can no longer fall within
the purview of P.D. No. 27, since each
donee shall have a share of about three
hectares only which is within the
exemption limit of seven hectares for each
landowner provided under P.D. No. 27.
ISSUE:
Whether the property subject of the
deed of donation which was not registered
when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be
excluded from the Operation Land
Transfer.
RULING:
Article 749 of the Civil Code
provides inter alia that "in order that the
donation of an immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article
709 of the same Code explicitly states that
"the titles of ownership, or other rights
over immovable property, which are not
duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry
of property shall not prejudice third
persons." From the foregoing provisions, it
may be inferred that as between the
parties to a donation of an immovable
property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public
document. Registration is not necessary
for it to be considered valid and
effective. However, in order to bind
third persons, the donation must be
registered in the Registry of Property.
Although the non-registration of a deed of
donation shall not affect its validity, the
necessity of registration comes into play
when the rights of third persons are
affected, as in the case at bar.
It is undisputed in this case that the
donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in
favor of his grandchildren, although in
writing and duly notarized, has not been
registered in accordance with law. For this
reason, it shall not be binding upon private
respondents who did not participate in said
deed or had no actual knowledge thereof.
Hence, while the deed of donation is valid
between the donor and the donees, such
deed, however, did not bind the tenants-
farmers who were not parties to the
donation.
Unregistered deed of donation
cannot operate to exclude the subject
land from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No.
27, which took effect on October 21, 1972.
To rule otherwise would render ineffectual
the rights and interests that the tenants-
farmers immediately acquired upon the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27, especially so
because in the case at bar, they have been
cultivating the land even before World War
II. Accordingly, the Certificates of Land
Transfer and the Emancipation Patents
respectively issued to private respondents
over the land in question cannot be
cancelled. It should be noted that one of
the recognized modes of acquiring title
to land is by emancipation patent which
aims to ameliorate the sad plight of
tenants-farmers. By virtue of P.D. No. 27,
tenants-farmers are deemed owners of the
land they till. This policy is intended to be
given effect by a provision of the law which
declares that, "the tenant-farmer, whether
in land classified as landed estate or not,
shall be DEEMED OWNER of a portion
constituting a family size farm of five (5)
hectares if not irritated and three (3)
hectares if irrigated" (P.D. No. 27, third
paragraph). It may, therefore, be said that
with respect to Lot 551-C, private
respondents became owners thereof on
October 27, 1972, the day P.D. No. 27 took
effect.
Petitioners maintain that private
respondents knew of the donation as
evidenced by the affidavit and
testimony of Francisco Villanueva and
Abad Dela Cruz. This contention is
unacceptable. Villanueva testified that as
the overseer of Ignacio Gonzales, he was
tasked to inform his co-tenants about the
donation. However, the records show that
Villanueva has transferred his right to
cultivate the land to a certain Bemardo
Esguerra as early as 1965 leading one to
logically conclude that Villanueva was no
longer a tenant, much more an overseer,
when the donation was executed in 1972.
On the other hand, Dela Cruz, in an
Affidavit executed on May 28, 1992, denied
testifying before Atty. Romeo Bello at the
Office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to the effect that he and his co-
tenants were aware of the donation. He
declared that he had no knowledge of the
donation made by Ignacio Gonzales, nor
did he have any idea that an investigation
was conducted by DAR on said matter.
Likewise, petitioners claim that
private respondents had been sharing their
produce with the donees or the
grandchildren of Ignacio Gonzales,
suggesting thereby that private
respondents have recognized the donees as
the new owners of the land. Again, we find
this argument to be unfounded. The
evidence on record reveals that the
tenants-farmers paid their rentals to
Ignacio Gonzales and not to the
grandchildren.
Petitioners contend that the deed of
donation was not registered because of the
pendency of the intestate proceedings and
the fact that property had been mortgaged
to PNB. This argument was correctly
rejected by the Court of Appeals because
the pendency of the intestate proceedings
and the real estate mortgaged to the PNB,
do not preclude the registration annotation
of the donation at the back of the
certificate of title covering the land.
Republic of the Philippines v. Leon
Silim
G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001
Facts:
Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a
5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of
Donation, respondents imposed the
condition that the said property should "be
used exclusively and forever for school
purposes only." This donation was
accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District
Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of
Acceptance and/or Confirmation of
Donation. A school building was
constructed on the donated land. However,
the Bagong Lipunan school building that
was supposed to be allocated for the
donated parcel of land could not be
released since the government required
that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament
Buendia was authorized to officially
transact for the exchange of the old school
site to a new and suitable location which
would fit the specifications of the
government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and
Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of
Exchange whereby the donated lot was
exchanged with the bigger lot owned by
the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school
buildings were constructed on the new
school site and the school building
previously erected on the donated lot was
dismantled and transferred to the new
location. The Silim spouses learned of the
Deed of Exchange when they learned that
Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated
property. They filed a complaint to annul
the donation claiming that there was no
valid acceptance made by the donee and
that there was a violation of the condition
in the donation.
Issue:
(1) Was there a valid acceptance based on
Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC?
(2)Was the condition in the donation
violated?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. There was a valid acceptance. The
last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: “If the
acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.” The
purpose of the formal requirement for
acceptance of a donation is to ensure that
such acceptance is duly communicated to
the donor. Here, a school building was
immediately constructed after the donation
was executed. Respondents had knowledge
of the existence of the school building. It
was when the school building was being
dismantled and transferred to the new site
and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated
property that respondents came to know of
the Deed of Exchange. The actual
knowledge by respondents of the
construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that
the acceptance of the donation by the
donee be communicated to the donor.
Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee
to “accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a
special power for the purpose, or with a
general and sufficient power; otherwise the
donation shall be void.” The respondents
claim that the acceptance by Buendia of
the donation was ineffective because of the
absence of a special power of attorney
from the Republic of the Philippines. The
donation was made in favor of the Bureau
of
Public Schools. Such being the case,
Buendia’s acceptance was authorized
under Section 47 of the 1987
Administrative Code which states: SEC. 47.
Contracts and Conveyances
. - Contracts or conveyances maybe
executed for and in behalf of the
Government or of any of its branches,
subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, whenever demanded by
the exigency or exigencies of the service
and as long as the same are not prohibited
by law.
(2)No. The condition was not violated. The
exclusivity of the purpose of the donation
was not altered or affected when Buendia
exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It
was in furtherance and enhancement of the
purpose of the donation. The acquisition of
the bigger lot paved the way for the
release of funds for the construction of
Bagong Lipunan school building which
could not be accommodated by the limited
area of the donated lot.
RICKY Q. QUILALA v.GLICERIA
ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA,
INES REYES and JOSE REYES, G.R. No.
132681, December 3, 2001, FIRST
DICISION (YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.)
 Donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee,  and is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. Acceptance may
be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document, and the donor must know
the acceptance by the donee.
Catalina Quilala executed a respondents'
"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in
favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of
land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The deed
of donation was registered with the
Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT
No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No.
143015 was issued in the name of Violeta
Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina
Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died
on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala
alleges that he is the surviving son of
Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria
Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes
and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's
only surviving relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity, executed a
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate,
dividing and adjudicating unto themselves
the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984,
respondents instituted against petitioner
and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar
of Deeds of Manila, an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation inter
vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No.
143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala.
Subsequently, respondents withdrew their
complaint as against Guillermo T. San
Pedro and he was dropped as a party-
defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of
donation, although signed by both Catalina
and Violeta, was acknowledged before a
notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
Consequently, there was no acceptance by
Violeta of the donation in a public
instrument, thus rendering the donation
null and void. Furthermore, the trial court
held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS
records does it appear that Violeta was
Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was
referred to therein as an adopted child, but
there was no positive evidence that the
adoption was legal. On the other hand, the
trial court found that respondents were
first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However,
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving
a will, the trial court ruled that
deed of extrajudicial
settlement cannot be registered.
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid
decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court
by dismissing the complaint for lack of
cause of action without prejudice to the
filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's
alleged last will and testament.
ISSUE: Is the donation executed by
Catalina in favour of Violeta valid?
RULING:
Yes. As a mode of acquiring
ownership, donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee, and is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee, provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by
law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the
property. The acceptance, to be valid, must
be made during the lifetime of both the
donor and the donee. It may be made in the
same deed or in a separate public
document, and the donor must know the
acceptance by the donee.
In the case at bar, the deed of
donation contained the number of the
certificate of title as well as the technical
description of the real property donated. It
stipulated that the donation was made for
and in consideration of the "love and
affection which the DONEE inspires in the
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and
generosity."This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally
defined as "an act of liberality whereby a
person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it."

The donee's acceptance of the
donation was explicitly manifested in the
penultimate paragraph of the deed, which
reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives
and accepts the gift and donation
made in her favor by the DONOR
and she hereby expresses her
appreciation and gratefulness for
the kindness and generosity of
the DONOR.
Here, the second page of the deed of
donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one
witness on the left-hand margin, and by the
donee and the other witness on the right
hand margin. Surely, the requirement
that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand
margin of the instrument is not
absolute as mandated by Presidential
Decree No. 1529. The intendment of the
law merely is to ensure that each and every
page of the instrument is authenticated by
the parties. The requirement is designed to
avoid the falsification of the contract after
the same has already been duly executed
by the parties. Hence, a contracting party
affixes his signature on each page of the
instrument to certify that he is agreeing to
everything that is written thereon at the
time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the
location of the signature is merely
directory. The fact that one of the parties
signs on the wrong side of the page does
not invalidate the document. The purpose
of authenticating the page is served, and
the requirement in the above-quoted
provision is deemed substantially complied
with.
In the same vein, the lack of an
acknowledgment by the donee before the
notary public does not also render the
donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot
be considered a private document in part
and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a
notary public converts the deed of donation
in its entirety a public instrument. The fact
that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of
no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged
as a free and voluntary act. In any event,
the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only.
Her acceptance, which is explicitly set
forth on the first page of the notarized
deed of donation, was made in a public
instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court,
not being a trier of facts, cannot make a
determination of whether Violeta was the
daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner
is the son of Violeta. Suffice it to state that
the donation, which we declare herein to
be valid, will still be subjected to a test on
its inofficiousness under Article 771,in
relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the
Civil Code.
G.R. No. 77425             June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP
OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.
IGNAO, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES
EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA
RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA
GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.
FACTS:
On November 29, 1984, private
respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint
for nullification of deed of donation,
rescission of contract and reconveyance of
real property with damages against
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao
and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus,
Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, before the RTC-
Cavite.
Private respondents alleged that on August
23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro
and Martina Rieta (now both deceased)
executed a deed of donation in favor of the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
covering a parcel of land located at Kawit,
Cavite. The deed of donation allegedly
provided that the donee shall not dispose
or sell the property within a period of one
hundred (100) years from the execution of
the deed of donation, otherwise a violation
of such condition would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation
and the property would revert to the estate
of the donors. It is further alleged that in
June 1980, and while still within the
prohibitive period to dispose of the
property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop
of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite
owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was
allegedly transferred, executed a deed of
absolute sale of the property subject of the
donation in favor of petitioners Florencio
and Soledad C. Ignao (consideration:
P114,000. 00). As a consequence of the
sale, a TCT 115990 was issued by the
Register of Deeds in November 1980 in the
name of said petitioner spouses.
Spouses Ignao filed a motion to dismiss
based on the grounds that (1) herein
private respondents, as plaintiffs therein,
have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the
complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman
Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a
motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the
first two (2) grounds of which were
identical to that of the motion to dismiss
filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third
ground being that the cause of action has
prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that he is
not a real party in interest and, therefore,
the complaint does not state a cause of
action against him.
TRIAL COURT:
Dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the cause of action has prescribed.
COURT OF APPEALS:
Holding that the action has not yet
prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents. It REMANDED the
case to the lower court for further
proceedings. It relied on the rule that a
judicial action for rescission of a contract is
not necessary where the contract provides
that it may be revoked and cancelled for
violation of any of its terms and conditions.
It called attention to the holding that there
is nothing in the law that prohibits the
parties from entering into an agreement
that a violation of the terms of the contract
would cause its cancellation even without
court intervention, and that it is not always
necessary for the injured party to resort to
court for rescission of the contract. It
reiterated the doctrine that a judicial
action is proper only when there is absence
of a special provision granting the power of
cancellation.The case was brought to the
SC.
PETITIONERS’ POSITION
The cause of action of herein private
respondents has already prescribed,
invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(t)he donation shall
be revoked at the instance of the donor,
when the donee fails to comply with any of
the conditions which the former imposed
upon the latter," and that "(t)his action
shall prescribe after four years from the
non-compliance with the condition, may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
ISSUE/ RULING
1)Has the action prescribed?
NO.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of
the Civil Code an action for the revocation
of a donation must be brought within four
(4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation, the same is not
applicable in the case at bar. The deed of
donation involved herein expressly
provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the
condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not
necessary for the reason that the very deed
of donation itself declares it so. If the
donors and the donee contemplated a court
action during the execution of the deed of
donation to have the donation judicially
rescinded or declared null and void should
the condition be violated, then the phrase
reading "would render ipso facto null and
void" would not appear in the deed of
donation.
In the case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et
al., the validity of a stipulation in the deed
of donation providing for the automatic
reversion was upheld because said
stipulation is in the nature of an agreement
granting a party the right to rescind a
contract unilaterally in case of breach,
without need of going to court. Upon non-
compliance with the conditions, the
donation is automatically revoked without
need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
Judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement
providing for rescission even without
judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission
was proper.
When a deed of donation, expressly
provides for automatic revocation and
reversion of the property donated, the
rules on contract and the general rules on
prescription should apply, and not Article
764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of
said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy, the Court is of the opinion
that the stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation, without prior judicial action for
that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is
sustained, the decision of the court will be
merely declaratory of the revocation, but it
is not in itself the revocatory act.
The Court of Appeals committed no error
in holding that the cause of action of herein
private respondents has not yet prescribed
since an action to enforce a written
contract prescribes in ten (10) years.
Article 764 was intended to provide a
judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
contravention of conditions specified in the
deed of donation if and when the parties
have not agreed on the automatic
revocation of such donation upon the
occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein. That is not the
situation in this case.
2)Should the action be dismissed?
YES.
The action should be dismissed on the
ground that private respondents have no
cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents
is based on the alleged breach by
petitioners of the resolutory condition in
the deed of donation that the property
donated should not be sold within a period
of one hundred (100) years from the date
of execution of the deed of donation. Said
condition, according to the Court,
constitutes an undue restriction on the
rights arising from ownership of
petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to
public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring
ownership, results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to
the donee. Once a donation is accepted,
the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated. Although the donor
may impose certain conditions in the deed
of donation, the same must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy. The condition imposed in
the deed of donation in this case
constitutes a patently unreasonable and
undue restriction on the right of the donee
to dispose of the property donated, which
right is an indispensable attribute of
ownership. Such a prohibition against
alienation, in order to be valid, must not be
perpetual or for an unreasonable period of
time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code
illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be
considered applicable by
analogy.1âwphi1 Under the third
paragraph of Article 494, a donor or
testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
Article 870, on its part, declares that the
dispositions of the testator declaring all or
part of the estate inalienable for more than
twenty (20) years are void.
The Court held that the prohibition in the
deed of donation against the alienation of
the property for an entire century, being
an unreasonable emasculation and denial
of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, as specifically stated
in said statutory provision, such condition
shall be considered as not imposed. No
reliance may accordingly be placed on said
prohibitory paragraph in the deed of
donation. The net result is that, absent said
proscription, the deed of sale supposedly
constitutive of the cause of action for the
nullification of the deed of donation is not
in truth violative of the latter hence, for
lack of cause of action, the case for private
respondents must fail.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN,
represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA,
and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BULACAN,
MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.
G.R. No. 132964 18 February 2000,
BELLOSILLO, SECOND DIVISION
Facts
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born
American citizen, is the son of the spouses
Simeon Guzman, a
naturalized American citizen, and Helen
Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In
1968, Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs
Helen and David an estate consisting of
several parcels of land located in Bulacan.
Helen and David executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating
to themselves all the property belonging to
the estate of Simeon (registered with taxes
thereon paid). Sometime in 1981, Helen
executed a quitclaim conveying to David
her ½ share of the property from Simeon’s
Estate under the deed of extra-judicial
settlement (the document does not appear
to be registered). She subsequently
executed another quitclaim confirming the
first quitclaim executed in 1981 and
conveying all of her remaining properties
in the Philippines in favor of David.
In 1994, the Republic through the OSG
filed a petition for Escheat praying that
David’s interest be
forfeited. The RTC ruled that the two
quitclaims had no legal force and effect so
that the ownership of the property subject
thereof remained with Helen. The CA
dismissed the OSG’s appeal OSG maintains
in its appeal to the SC being an American
citizen could not validly acquire one-half
(1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels
of land by way of the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim as they are in reality donations
inter vivos. David maintains, on the other
hand, that he acquired the property by
right of accretion and not by way of
donation, with the deeds of quitclaim
merely declaring Helen's intention to
renounce her share in the property and not
an intention to donate, even if there was,
the donation does not indicate acceptance
of the alleged donation.
Issue
Was the OSG correct in maintaining that
the transfer of property in this case was a
donation?
Ruling
No, not all the elements of a donation inter
vivos is present in this case.
There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the
patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the
donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of
liberality or animus donandi. When applied
to a donation of an immovable property,
the law further requires that the donation
be made in a public document and that
there should be an acceptance thereof
made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document. In cases where
the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor
should be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments.
A perusal of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim
reveals that Helen intended to convey to
her son David
certain parcels of land located in the
Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim
she executed in 1981 which likewise
declared a waiver and renunciation of her
rights over the parcels of land. The
language of the deed of quitclaim is clear
that Helen merely contemplated a waiver
of her rights, title and interest over the
lands in favor of David, and not a donation.
In her deposition, Helen stated that had
she really intended to donate the
properties it would have
been more convenient to sell them and give
the proceeds to David. It appears that
foremost in Helen's mind was the
preservation of the Bulacan realty within
the bloodline of Simeon from where they
originated, over and above the benefit that
would accrue to David by reason of her
renunciation. The element of animus
donandi therefore was missing.
As to acceptance, the court finds no merit
in the Republic’s argument that the SPA
executed by
David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela
manifests his implied acceptance of his
mother's alleged donation.
The SPA merely acknowledges that David
owns the property referred to and that he
authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in
his name. There is no intimation, expressly
or impliedly, that David's acquisition of the
parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's
possible donation to him and we cannot
look beyond the language of the document
to make a contrary construction as this
would be inconsistent with the parol
evidence rule.
Moreover, it is mandated that if an
acceptance is made in a separate public
writing the notice of the
acceptance must be noted not only in the
document containing the acceptance but
also in the deed of
donation. However, the inexistence of a
donation does not render the repudiation
made by Helen in favor of David valid.
There is no valid repudiation of inheritance
as Helen had already accepted her share of
the inheritance when she, together with
David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation
does not ipso facto operate to convert the
parcels of land into res nullius to be
escheated in favor of the Government. The
repudiation being of no effect whatsoever
the parcels of land should revert to their
private owner, Helen, who, although being
an American citizen, is qualified by
hereditary succession to own the property
subject of the litigation.
SPS. GESTOPA VS. CA
Doctrine:
“A limitation on the right to sell during the
donors' lifetime implied that ownership had
passed to the donee and donation was
already effective during the donors'
lifetime”.
Facts:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were
the owners of six parcels of unregistered
lands. They executed three deeds of
donation mortis causa for four parcels of
land (parcels 1-4) in favor of private
respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All
deeds contained the reservation of the
rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or
revoke the donation during their lifetime,
and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the
properties donated during the donors'
lifetime, if deemed necessary. Thereafter,
Diego, with the consent of his wife,
executed a deed of donation inter vivos
covering the aforementioned parcels of
land plus two other parcels again in favor
of Mercedes. This contained two
conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land
during their lifetime, and that (2) the
donee cannot sell or dispose of the land
during the lifetime of the said spouses,
without their prior consent and approval.
Mercedes caused the transfer of the
parcels' tax declaration to her name and
paid the taxes on them. Subsequently, the
Danlags sold parcels 3 and 4 to petitioners,
Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On
September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed
a deed of revocation recovering the six
parcels of land subject of the mentioned
deed of donation inter vivos.
Consequently, Mercedes filed with the RTC
a petition against the Gestopas and the
Danlags, for quieting of title over the above
parcels of land. She alleged that she was
an illegitimate daughter of Diego, and that
she lived and rendered incalculable
beneficial services to Diego and his
mother, Maura, when the latter was still
alive. In recognition of the services she
rendered, Diego executed a Deed of
Donation, conveying to her the six parcels
of land. Through machination, intimidation
and undue influence, Diego persuaded the
husband of Mercedes, Eulalio, to buy two
of the six parcels covered by the deed of
donation. She alleged that she had not
been guilty of any act of ingratitude, and
that respondent Diego had no legal basis in
revoking the subject donation.
The trial court rendered a decision against
Mercedes, declaring the donation void and
upholding the sale to the Gestopas as valid.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
trial court. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue: Is the donation made by the
Danlags in favor of Mercedes valid?
Held: YES.
Crucial in resolving whether the donation
was inter vivos or mortis causa is the
determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over
the properties upon the execution of the
deed.
In ascertaining the intention of the donor,
all of the deed's provisions must be read
together. The deed of donation, in favor of
Mercedes contained the following:
"That for and in consideration of the love
and affection which the Donor inspires in
the Donee and as an act of liberality and
generosity, the Donor hereby gives,
donates, transfer and conveys by way of
donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs,
assigns and successors, the above-
described parcels of land; That it is the
condition of this donation that the Donor
shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the
land during his lifetime and that of his
spouse and that the donee cannot sell or
otherwise, dispose of the lands without the
prior consent and approval by the Donor
and her spouse during their lifetime; That
for the same purpose as hereinbefore
stated, the Donor further states that he has
reserved for himself sufficient properties in
full ownership or in usufruct enough for his
maintenance of a decent livelihood in
consonance with his standing in society;
That the Donee hereby accepts the
donation and expresses her thanks and
gratitude for the kindness and generosity
of the Donor.”
Note first that the granting clause shows
that Diego donated the properties out of
love and affection for the donee. This is a
mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates
that the donor intended to transfer the
naked ownership over the properties. As
correctly posed by the CA, what was the
need for such reservation if the donor and
his spouse remained the owners of the
properties? Third, the donor reserved
sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society,
indicating that the donor intended to part
with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the
donee accepted the donation. In the case of
Alejandro vs. Geraldez, we said that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the
donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form
of a will, are not required to be accepted
by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
Consequently, the CA did not err in
concluding that the right to dispose of the
properties belonged to the donee. The
donor's right to give consent was merely
intended to protect his usufructuary
interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a
limitation on the right to sell during the
donors' lifetime implied that ownership had
passed to the donees and donation was
already effective during the donors'
lifetime. The attending circumstances in
the execution of the subject donation also
demonstrated the real intent of the donor
to transfer the ownership over the subject
properties upon its execution. Prior to the
execution of donation inter vivos, the
Danlag spouses already executed three
donations mortis causa. As correctly
observed by the CA, the Danlag spouses
were aware of the difference between the
two donations. If they did not intend to
donate inter vivos, they would not again
donate the four lots already donated mortis
causa. Petitioners' counter argument that
this proposition was erroneous because six
years after, the spouses changed their
intention with the deed of revocation, is not
only disingenious but also fallacious.
Petitioners cannot use the deed of
revocation to show the spouses' intent
because its validity is one of the issues in
this case.
Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax
declarations in her name cannot be a basis
in determining the donor's intent. They
claim that it is easy to get tax declarations
from the government offices such that tax
declarations are not considered proofs of
ownership. However, unless proven
otherwise, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official
duties. We find that petitioners did not
overcome this presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the tax declarations.
Petitioners also assert that since private
respondent purchased two of the six
parcels of land from the donor, she herself
did not believe the donation was inter
vivos. As aptly noted by the CA, however, it
was private respondent's husband who
purchased the two parcels of land. On the
alleged purchase by her husband of two
parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the
purchase was without private respondent's
consent. Purchase by her husband would
make the properties conjugal to her own
disadvantage. That the purchase is against
her self-interest, weighs strongly in her
favor and gives credence to her claim that
her husband was manipulated and unduly
influenced to make the purchase, in the
first place.
Was the revocation valid? A valid donation,
once accepted, becomes irrevocable,
except on account of officiousness, failure
by the donee to comply with the charges
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.
The donor-spouses did not invoke any of
these reasons in the deed of revocation.
Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in
prohibiting the donor to gather coconut
trees and her filing of instant petition for
quieting of title. There is nothing on
record, however, showing that private
respondent prohibited the donors from
gathering coconuts. Even assuming that
Mercedes prevented the donor from
gathering coconuts, this could hardly be
considered an act covered by Article 765 of
the Civil Code.
Finally, the records do not show that the
donor-spouses instituted any action to
revoke the donation in accordance with
Article 769 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, the supposed revocation on
September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.
RODOLFO NOCEDA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA
ARBIZO DIRECTO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]
Doctrine:
The Act of Usurpation by the donee of the
donor’s land is an act of ingratitude. The
law does not require conviction in order to
revoke the donation; only preponderance
of evidence is needed in an action to
revoke instituted by the donor.
Note: An action for revocation of a
donation based on ingratitude must file the
action to revoke his donation within 1 year
from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee (not from the
occurrence of the act of ingratitude).
FACTS:
Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter,
grandson, and widow, respectively of the
late Celestino Arbizo) extra-judicially
settled a parcel of land. Directo’s share
was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got
13,294 square meters, and the remaining
41,810 square meters went to Maria
Arbizo. On the same day, Directo donated
625 sq.m. of her share to her nephew.
However, a few months later, another
extra-judicial settlement-partition of the
same lot was executed. 3/5 of the lot was
awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo
and Noceda (daughter and grandson) got
only 1/5 each.

Sometime on the same year when the
partitions happened, the nephew (donee)
constructed his house on the land donated
to him by Directo. On the other hand,
Directo fenced the portion allotted to her
in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding
the donated portion, and constructed
thereon three huts. Around 3 years later,
the nephew removed the fence earlier
constructed by Directo, occupied the 3
huts, and fenced the entire land of Directo
without her consent. The latter demanded
Noceda to vacate her land, but Noceda
refused.
Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against
Noceda before the lower court. A survey
was conducted and it was found that the
area stated in the settlement was smaller
than the actual area of the lot. The TC
declared the second extra-judicial
settlement-partition and the deed of
donation revoked (because of ingratitude).
The court ordered the nephew (done) to
vacate and reconvey the property to
Directo. CA affirmed.
The nephew contends that there was no
real partition and thus, there is no basis for
the charge of usurpation and ingratitude.
He also contends that granting revocation
is proper, the 1 year period for such
revocation has already lapsed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in revoking
the deed of donation
RULING: NO
The court held that:
“We find unmeritorious petitioner’s
argument that since there was no effective
and real partition of the subject lot there
exists no basis for the charge of usurpation
and hence there is also no basis for finding
ingratitude against him.
It was established that petitioner Noceda
occupied not only the portion donated to
him by Directo but he also fenced the
whole area of Lot C which belongs to
Directo; thus, petitioner’s act of occupying
the portion pertaining to Directo without
the latter’s knowledge and consent is an
act of usurpation which is an offense
against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a
donee against the donor. The law does not
require conviction of the donee; it is
enough that the offense be proved in the
action for revocation.
Donee alleged that he usurped donor’s
property in the 1st week of September
1985 while the complaint for revocation
was filed on September 16, 1986; thus,
more than one (1) year had passed from
the alleged usurpation by petitioner of
private respondent’s share in Lot 1121.
Article 769 expressly states that:
a. The donor must file the action to revoke
his donation within one year from the
time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the done; and that;
b. It must be shown that it was possible
for the donor to institute the said action
within the same period. The
concurrence of these two requisites
must be shown by the donee in order to
bar the present action, which he failed
to do so. He reckoned the one year
prescriptive period from the occurrence
of the usurpation and not from the time
the latter had the knowledge of the
usurpation. He also failed to prove that
at the time Directo acquired knowledge
of his usurpation, it was possible for
him to institute an action for revocation
of her donation.
ELOY IMPERIAL v. CA, RTC OF
LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR.,
et al. G.R. No. 112483, October 8,
1999, THIRD DIVISION (Gonzaga-
Reyes, J.)
FACTS:
In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m² parcel
of land to his acknowledged natural
son Eloy Imperial. However, in 1953,
Leoncio filed a copmplaint for annulment of
the sale alleging that he was deceived by
his son. They entered into a compromise
agreement that Leoncio will recognize the
validity and legality of the sale but Eloyhas
to sold the 1000m² to Leoncio. In 1962,
Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted child,
substituted him in the execution of the
compromise agreement. However, in 1977,
Victor died single and without issue.
After 4 years, Ricardo, Victors’s natural
father, died too. Cesar and Trasa, children
of Ricardo, filed a complaint
for annulment of the donation. A motion to
dismiss was filed on the ground of res
judicata. The trial court dismissed the case.
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of
the trial court and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed
an Amended Complaint alleging that
the conveyance impaired the legitime of
Victor. The RTC ruled that the donation is
inofficiousimparing the legitime of Victor.
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Issue/s
1. Do the private respondents have a
right to question the donation?
2.Is the RTC correct in applying
30years as the prescriptive period for
reduction of inofficious donations?
Held:
1. Yes. Petitioner sources his argument
from Article 772 of the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor’s
death have a right to the legitime and their
heirs and successors in interest may ask
for the reduction of inofficious donations.
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died
on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who
was entitled to question the donation.
However, instead of filing an action to
contest the donation, Victor asked to be
substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No.
1177 and even moved for execution of the
compromise judgment therein. No
renunciation of legitime may be presumed
from the foregoing acts. It must be
remembered that at the time of the
substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the
execution of the compromise judgment. He
was not a party to the compromise
agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession
does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express
act on the part of the heir. Thus, under
Article 1051 of Civil Code: The repudiation
of an inheritance shall be made in a public
or authentic instrument, or by petition
presented to the court having jurisdiction
over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings. Thus, when Victor substituted
Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the
latter’s death, his act of moving for
execution of the compromise judgment
cannot be considered an act of
renunciation of his legitime. He was,
therefore, not precluded or estopped from
subsequently seeking the reduction of the
donation, under Article 772. Nor are
Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is
expressly recognized under Article 772,
and also in Article 1053: If the heir should
die without having accepted or repudiated
the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.
2. No. The sense of both courts that this
case is a “real action over an immovable”
allots undue credence to private
respondents’ description of their
complaint, as one for “Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession of Property”, which suggests
the action to be, in part, a real action
enforced by those with claim of title over
the disputed land. Unfortunately for
private respondents, a claim for legitime
does not amount to a claim of title. In the
recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of
Appeals , we declared that what is brought
to collation is not the donated property
itself, but the value of the property at the
time it was donated. The rationale for this
is that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence, any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir or donee.
What, then, is the prescriptive period for
an action for reduction of an inofficious
donation? The Civil Code specifies the
following instances of reduction or
revocation of donations: (1) four years, in
cases of subsequent birth, appearance,
recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four
years, for non-compliance with conditions
of the donation; and (3) at any time during
the lifetime of the donor and his relatives
entitled to support, for failure of the donor
to reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant
case, the reduction of which hinges upon
the allegation of impairment of legitime,
are not controlled by a particular
prescriptive period, for which reason we
must resort to the ordinary rules of
prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
actions upon an obligation created by law
must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues. Thus, the
ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations,
required under Article 771 of the Civil
Code, to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs. From when
shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The
case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864,
which involved the reduction for
inofficiousness of a donation propter
nuptias, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon
the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly
so, since it is only then that the net estate
may be ascertained and on which basis, the
legitimes may be determined. It took
private respondents 24 years since the
death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The
action, therefore, has long prescribed.
SPOUSES ROMULO and SALLY
EDUARTE v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE
(substituted by ALEXANDER
CALAPINE and ARTEMIS CALAPINE)
G.R. No. 105944, 9 February 1996,
Francisco J.
FACTS.
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner
of a parcel of land located in San Cristobal,
San Pablo City.
He executed a deed entitled “Pagbibigay-
Pala” (Donacion Inter Vivos) ceding ½
portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria.
Another deed identically entitled was
purportedly executed by Pedro Calapine
ceding unto Helen the whole of the parcel
of land, on the basis of which the OCT was
cancelled and a new one issued in her
name. Helen Doria donated a portion of the
land to the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc., consequently, a TCT was
issued in its name. Thereafter, Helen Doria
sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the
spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the
parcel of land, save the portion of 700
sq.m. on which Helen Doria’s house has
been erected. Claiming that his signature
to the deed of donation was a forgery and
that, she was unworthy of his liberality,
Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen
Doria, Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc., and the spouses Romulo and
Sally Eduarte to revoke the donation made
in favor of Helen, and to declare null and
void the deeds of donation and sale in favor
of the Church and the spouses Eduarte.
Spouses Eduarte prayed that the action
against them be dismissed and damages be
paid to them. The Church manifested its
willingness to reconvey part of the
property donated to them Helen Doria,
thus having executed the corresponding
deed of reconveyance, the case against
them was dismissed. After plaintiff’s death,
he was substituted by his nephews,
Alexander and Artemis Calapine.
RTC ruled in favor of Pedro Calapine. CA
affirmed this ruling.
ISSUE.
Are the spouses buyers in good faith of the
donated property?
HELD
YES, Petitioners dispute the lower courts
conclusion and argue that although there
were other occupants in the subject
property, no adverse claim was made by
the latter as they were mere tenants
therein, thus, petitioners were not obliged
to make any further inquiry because the
property being sold was covered by a
certificate of title under Helen Doria’s
name. We agree with petitioners. The rule
is well-settled that mere possession cannot
defeat the title of a holder of a registered
torrens title to real property. Moreover,
reliance on the doctrine that a forged deed
can legally be the root of a valid title is
squarely in point in this case:
Although generally a forged or fraudulent
deed is a nullity and conveys no title,
however there are instances when such a
fraudulent document may become the root
of a valid title. One such instance is where
the certificate of title was already
transferred from the name of the true
owner to the forger, and while it remained
that way, the land was subsequently sold to
an innocent purchaser. For then, the
vendee had the right to rely upon what
appeared in the certificate. Where there
was nothing in the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership
of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the Torrens Title
upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the
rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title
which the Torrens System seeks to insure
would entirely be futile and nugatory.
When herein petitioners purchased the
subject property from Helen Doria, the
same was already covered by TCT No. T-
23205 under the latter’s name. And
although Helen Doria’s title was
fraudulently secured, such fact cannot
prejudice the rights of herein petitioners
absent any showing that they had any
knowledge or participation in such
irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged
to look beyond the certificate of title which
appeared to be valid on its face and sans
any annotation or notice of private
respondent’s adverse claim.
Contrary therefore to the conclusion of
respondent Court, petitioners are
purchasers in good faith and for value as
they bought the disputed property without
notice that some other person has a right
or interest in such property, and paid a full
price for the same at the time of the
purchase or before they had notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in
the property.
Petitioners also argue that the offense
imputed to herein donee Helen Doria -
falsification of a public document - is
neither a crime against the person nor
property of the donor but is a crime against
public interest under the Revised Penal
Code, the same is not a ground for
revocation. In support of this contention,
petitioners cite the following portions
found in Tolentino’s Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code: Offense
against Donor - x x x. The crimes against
the person of the donor would include not
only homicide and physical injuries, but
also illegal detention, threats and coercion;
and those against honor include offenses
against chastity and those against the
property, include robbery, theft,
usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc.
(5 Manresa 175-176). This assertion,
however, deserves scant consideration. The
full text of the very same commentary cited
by petitioners belies their claim that
falsification of the deed of donation is not
an act of ingratitude, to wit: Offense
Against Donor. All crimes which offend the
donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation. There is no doubt, therefore,
that the donee who commits adultery with
the wife of the donor, gives cause for
revocation by reason of ingratitude. The
crimes against the person of the donor
would include not only homicide and
physical injuries, but also illegal detention,
threats, and coercion; those against honor
include offenses against chastity; and those
against the property, include robbery,
theft, usurpation, swindling, arson,
damages, etc. [Manresa 175176].[5].
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted
by petitioners because it totally controverts
their contention. As noted in the aforecited
opinion all crimes which offend the donor
show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation x x
CITY OF ANGELES VS CA, TIMOG
SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION G.R. No. 97882. 1996
FACTS:
In a Deed of Donation , private respondent
donated to the City of Angeles, 51 parcels
of land situated in Barrio Pampang, City of
Angeles (50,676 sq m). The amended deed
provides that: “ The properties donated
shall be devoted and utilized solely for the
site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Any
change or modification in the basic design
or concept of said Sports Center must have
the prior written consent of the DONOR.
The properties donated are devoted and
described as ‘open spaces’ of the DONOR’s
subdivision, and to this effect, the DONEE,
upon acceptance of this donation, releases
the DONOR and/or assumes any and all
obligations and liabilities appertaining to
the properties donated. On 1988,
petitioners started the construction of a
drug rehabilitation center on a portion of
the donated land. Upon learning thereof,
private respondent protested such action
for being violative of the terms and
conditions and also offered another site for
the rehabilitation center. However,
petitioners rejected the alternative because
the site was too isolated and had no
electric and water facilities. Private
respondent filed a complaint for breach of
the conditions imposed in the amended
deed of donation and seeking the
revocation of the donation. Petitioners
admitted the commencement of the
construction but alleged that the
conditions imposed in the amended deed
were contrary to Municipal Ordinance No.
1, Series of 1962, otherwise known as the
Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality
of Angeles.
ISSUE: Whether a subdivision
owner/developer is legally bound under
Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate to
the city or municipality the “open space”
allocated exclusively for parks, playground
and recreational use.
HELD:
PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines open
space as an area reserved exclusively for
parks, playgrounds, recreational uses,
schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals,
health centers, barangay centers and other
similar facilities and amenities.
These areas reserved for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use shall be
non-alienable public lands, and non-
buildable. No portion of the parks and
playgrounds donated thereafter shall be
converted to any other purpose or
purposes. ’“Upon their completion x xx, the
roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds
shall be donated by the owner or developer
to the city or municipality and it shall be
mandatory for the local government to
accept; provided, however, that the parks
and playgrounds may be donated to the
Homeowners Association of the project
with the consent of the city or municipality
concerned. x xx.” (amended sec. 31, PD
957)It is clear from the aforequoted
amendment that it is no longer optional on
the part of the subdivision owner/developer
to donate the open space for parks and
playgrounds; rather there is now a legal
obligation to donate the same. Although
there is a proviso that the donation of the
parks and playgrounds may be made to the
homeowners association of the project with
the consent of the city of municipality
concerned, nonetheless, the
owner/developer is still obligated under the
law to donate. Such option does not change
the mandatory character of the provision.
The donation has to be made regardless of
which donee is picked by the
owner/developer. The consent requirement
before the same can be donated to the
homeowners’ association emphasizes this
point. We hold that any condition may be
imposed in the donation, so long as the
same is not contrary to law ,morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The
contention of petitioners that the donation
should be unconditional because it is
mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216
does not provide that the donation of the
open space for parks and playgrounds
should be unconditional. To rule that it
should be so is tantamount to unlawfully
expanding the provisions of the decree. In
the case at bar, one of the conditions
imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation
is that the donee should build a sports
complex on the donated land. Since P.D.
1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9%
of the gross area allotted for parks and
playgrounds is “non-buildable,” then the
obvious question arises whether or not
such condition was validly imposed and is
binding on the donee. It is clear that the
“non-buildable”character applies only to
the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is
any excess land over and above the3.5% to
9% required by the decree, which is also
used or allocated for parks, playgrounds
and recreational purposes, it is obvious
that such excess area is not covered by the
non-buildability restriction. Inasmuch as
the construction and operation of the drug
rehabilitation center has been established
to be contrary to law, the said center
should be removed or demolished. At this
juncture, we hasten to add that this Court
is and has always been four-square behind
the government’s efforts to eradicate the
drug scourge in this country. But the end
never justifies the means, and however
laudable the purpose of the construction in
question, this Court cannot and will not
countenance an outright and continuing
violation of the laws of the land, especially
when committed by public officials.