1.

Meaning of Public Office

G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984

BRUNO O. APARRI, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the latter in substitution
for REMEDIOS O. FORTICH, as Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL
B. HILAO, VALERIANO PLANTILLA and SEVERO YAP, as members of the
Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), respondents.

FACTS:

Fortich, in her capacity as Chairman of the NARRA Board, appointed Aparri as

General Manager in the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and prayed to annul the resolution of the
NARRA BOARD and to allow him to continue in office as General Manager until he
vacates said office. Pending the decision of the lower court, Agricultural Land
Reform Code, took effect. The said law abolished the NARRA (Sec. 73, R.A. 3844)
and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. On October 21,
1963, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that
this case has become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or

dismissal of petitioner without cause.

HELD:

No. He was removed before the expiration of his term. Under the law, a public
office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The right to hold a
public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists,
when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it.

In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by which a
public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which he was
elected or appointed. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors. The
petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term. Rather,
his right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term
to hold such office.
2. Public Office as a Public Trust

[A.M. No. P-04-1925 : December 16, 2004]

COURT PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-San Carlos City, Complainants, v. OSCAR
LLAMAS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Oscar Llamas is a brother of Judge Victor T. Llamas, who used to preside over
Branch 56 of the San Carlos RTC. Animosity between Judge Llamas and the OCC
personnel started when the latter, testified in an immorality case filed against the
former. Respondent sympathized with his brother and showed hostility towards his
co-employees. The witnesses testified that respondent was disrespectful. He
frequently leaves the office during work hours, only to be seen drinking wine with
his brother.

Respondent did not appear during the hearing, but submitted his Counter-Affidavit
denying the allegations against him. Respondent also attached his letter to Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. dated November 18, 1999, requesting that the former
be detailed to Dagupan City because of the hostile acts of some of herein
complainants.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the acts attributed to respondent
supported by substantial evidence. It opined that a cash clerk, being a judicial
employee, is expected to act with prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent may be suspended from his position in the public office.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the respondent is administratively liable for discourtesy
and disrespect to superiors and co-employees, alcohol drinking, during office hours,
tardiness, absenteeism and falsification of the leave form. As a public servant, the
former owes his loyalty, not to his brother or to any other family member; but,
rather, to the institution of which respondent is a part and, ultimately, to the public
he is sworn to serve.

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very
nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold
sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public
trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In
the case at bar, respondent did not deny all the allegations that were thrown at
him. He disrespected not only the employees, but also his very position in the
public office. Thus, he must be liable for these wrongdoings.
 3. Public Office, Not Property

G.R. No. 152295 - July 9, 2002

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684

as the Kabataang Barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB
to SK and limited SK membership to those youths "at least 15 but not more than 21
years of age.

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Montesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec,

demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Ten days
lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently,
petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763 recommending
to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding
the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their
respective bills postponing the SK elections. So, the petitioners filed the instant
petition. Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement
of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises them, preventing them from voting
and being voted for in the SK elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not public office is a property right.

HELD:

No. The Court held that a public office is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. A
public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due
process of law, but is a public trust or agency. The officers being mere agents and
not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an eligibility office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people
he represents.

Thus, no one has a proprietary right to public office.

4. Public Office, Not Contract

[G.R. NO. 142347 : August 25, 2005]

DULCE M. ABANILLA, in her capacity as General Manager of the

Metropolitan Cebu Water District, Cebu City, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, its CHAIRMAN CELSO D. GANGAN, COMMISSIONERS RAUL C.
FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, Respondents and REGIONAL DIRECTOR
OF COA REGION VII, METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT EMPLOYEES
UNION, Petitioner-in-Intervention.

FACTS:

Metropolitan Cebu Water District issued the following Resolutions giving benefits
and privileges to its personnel, one of whom is Abanilla, MCWD's General Manager,
granting hospitalization privileges, monetization of leave credits, Christmas bonus,
and longevity allowance.

MCWD and Metropolitan Cebu Water District Employees Union, petitioner-in-

intervention, executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for the
continuous grant to all its regular rank and file employees of existing benefits.

Thereafter, the Regional Director of COA Regional Office No. VII, also
a Respondent, sent MCWD several notices disallowing hospitalization benefits, mid-
year bonus, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus and longevity pay.

Aggrieved, petitioner interposed an appeal to respondent COA She cited COA

Memorandum Circular No. 002-94 providing that all benefits provided under the
duly existing CBAs entered into prior to March 12, 1992, the date of official entry of
judgment of the Supreme Court ruling in Davao City Water District, et al. v. CSC
and COA, shall continue up to the respective expiry dates of the benefits or CBA
whichever comes earlier.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the privileges granted to the employees must be disallowed.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that in government employment, however, it is the legislature
and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.

However, the Court noted that MCWD affected personnel who received the above
mentioned benefits and privileges acted in good faith under the honest belief that
the CBA authorized such payment. Consequently, they need not refund them.

Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses
they received but disallowed by the COA.
5. Eligibility

G.R. No. L-55151 March 17, 1981

DAVID AGUILA, EDITA BUENO, EVELITO ELENTO, RESURRECTION INTING,

ANTONIO LIM and WILFREDO CABARDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MELECIO A. GENATO and DOMINADOR B. BORJE, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners David Aguila and Edita Bueno are the Deputy Administrator and Director
for Cooperative Development, respectively, of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA). Petitioner Evelito Elento is the Acting General Manager of
MOELCI II, while petitioners Ressurrection Inting, Antonio Lim and Wilfredo
Cabardo, are members of its Board of Directors. Private respondent Dominador B.
Borje, representing the North District of Ozamiz City, was elected Director of
MOELCI II, to hold office as such for three years starting March 25, 1979.

Section 3, Article IV of the By-laws of MOELCI II explicitly states that no person

shall be eligible to become or to remain  a Board member of the Cooperative who
holds an elective office in the government above the level of a Barangay Captain.

Private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City in the 30 January 1980 local elections.

On January 1980, the NEA Deputy Administrator sent a telegram to the Acting
General Manager of MOELCI II stating that should private respondent Borje be
elected to the Sangguniang Bayan, he shall be considered resigned from his
position as Director for the North District of Ozamiz City, Private respondent moved
reconsideration and requested that he be allowed to serve the unexpired term of his
office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent is eligible to hold his position.

HELD:

No. The Court held that by having been elected member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, private respondent rendered himself ineligible to
continue serving as a Director of MOELCI II by virtue of the clear mandate of PD
No. 269 providing that except for "barrio captains and councilors", elective officials
are ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any cooperative. Further, the
MOELCI II, by-laws explicitly state that no person can remain a member of the
Board if he "holds an elective office above the level of barrio captain.

Eligibility to an office should be construed as of a continuing nature and must exist

at the commencement of the term and during occupancy of the office. The fact that
private respondent may have been qualified at the time he assumed the
Directorship is not sufficient to entitle him to continue holding office, if during the
continuance of his incumbency he ceases to be qualified. Private respondent was
qualified to become a director of MOELCI II at the time of the commencement of his
term, but his election as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City,
and his subsequent assumption of office, disqualified him to continue as such.
6. Time of Possession and Qualifications

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

FACTS:

Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections. Another candidate filed a petition praying that Frivaldo
be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines. At the elections, Frivaldo garnered the highest
votes and was declared the winner. Because Frivaldo lack the qualifications in
holding a public office, the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul
Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of
June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition alleging that on
June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo holds the qualifications in order to hold a public office.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now,
an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. Literally, such qualifications -- unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus
be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the
time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995.

It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a

qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration --
not the actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification".
7. Qualifications Usually Required of Public Officer

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

FACTS:

Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,

1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20,
1983. In his answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States
as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. Because of
fear that, his citizenship was merely forced upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he
was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
8. Qualifications required of a public officer

G.R. No. 90799 October 18, 1990

AUGUSTO L. GASPAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and ZENAIDA F.
LANTING, respondents.

FACTS:

Gaspar was the Chief of the Security Section of the Parks Development Office of the
City of Manila. On April 25, 1983, Gaspar was appointed to that position of
Administrative Officer II, effective on October 1, 1982.

Zenaida F. Lanting, filed with the Merit Systems Board a protest against Gaspar's
appointment as Administrative Officer II, contending that she was better qualified
for, and should have been named to, the office.

After due proceedings, the Merit Systems Board (MSB) revoked Gaspar's
appointment and directed Lanting's appointment to the office of Administrative
Officer II. Gaspar appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), however, the
CSC ultimately affirmed the judgment of the MSB.

ISSUE:

Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment

on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that under the circumstances, and in light of the relevant legal
provisions, all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. The
only function of the Civil Service Commission is to review the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. It has no authority to revoke the
appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified
for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the
appointing authority.

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the
best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or
appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in
an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such
as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may
be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of the
service. In the case at bar, therefore, the respondent Commission acted beyond the
scope of its authority and with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the petitioner's
appointment and directing the appointment in his stead of the private respondent.
9. Qualifications Prescribed by Law for Certain Officer

G.R. No. 137329               August 9, 2000

ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M.

SERIÑO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.

FACTS:

During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed
provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March
12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a
Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City which was geographically located
in the Province of Misamis Oriental, a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20
years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and
five months was at Cagayan de Oro City.

Petitioners filed a Petition before the Comelec seeking the disqualification of Ermano
on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence
requirement. In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division
denied the Petition for Disqualification.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro
City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for
the mayorship.

HELD:

The Local Government Code provides that an elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect. In the case at bar, the Comelec found that
private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano
Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973.
Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis
Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial
government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same
city. These facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan
de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office
therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in
his choice of residence.

The Court stresses that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that
officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds
of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves --
their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all
matters vital to their common welfare. In other words, the actual, physical and
personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is
substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the
voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship.

10. Meaning of Appointment

G.R. No. L-16808             January 3, 1921

ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff,
vs.
FERMIN MARIANO, defendant.

FACTS:

Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial

District. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that date. On
February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District,
and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept
appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Borromeo can be appointed without his consent.

HELD:

No. The Court held that appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power
to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for
office at pleasure. The law does not empower the Governor-General to force upon
the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby
removing him from his district. Judges of first instance are removable only through
a fixed procedure. But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of
the Philippine Islands to another, without his consent, it would require no great
amount of imagination to conceive how this power could be used to discipline the
judge or as an indirect means of removal. Therefore, Judge Borromeo can only be
appointed to another district if he accepts this appointment. The President cannot
force upon him such appointment if he declines it.
11. Elements of a Valid Appointment

G.R. No. 203372               June 16, 2015

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO
I. CADIZ

FACTS:

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil's appointment as State Solicitor II at the
OSG. Atty. Venturanza was appointed as Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon
City. Villanueva was appointed as Administrator for Visayas of the Board of
Administrators of the CDA. Rosquita was appointed as Commissioner, representing
Region I and the Cordilleras, of the NCIP. And, Atty. Tamondong was appointed as
member, representing the private sector, of the SBMA Board of Directors.

When President Aquino took his oath of office as President, he issued an executive
order which seeks to withdraw the midnight appointments that were made by the
previous administration. The then Solicitor general informed those who were
appointed that they are now terminated from their office.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void. None
of the petitioners have presented that their appointment papers were submitted
before the ban.

Under the law, appointment to a government post is a process that takes several
steps to complete. Any valid appointment. It must consist of the President signing
an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper
by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced
by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.

The well-settled rule in our jurisprudence, that an appointment is a process that

begins with the selection by the appointing power and ends with acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee, stands.

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should
be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the
time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of
the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications. There is no valid appointment if one of these elements is
lacking.
12. Power to Appoint is Discretionary

[G.R. NO. 158737 : August 31, 2004]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SATURNINO DE LA

CRUZ, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office,

DOTC, presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of
the Aviation Safety Division.

Respondent was promotionally appointed to the said position. But prior thereto, he
was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office. ATO formally filed with the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the
promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer,
claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory
requirement for said position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent's appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation

Officer was valid despite his failure to meet the minimum four-year managerial and
supervisory qualification for the position.

HELD:

Yes. Respondent has sufficiently complied with the required experience standards.
Here, the contested position required four years of work experience in managerial
position(s) per the Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s.
1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and
regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics
and regulation of the activities of flying schools Respondent would indeed lack the
required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the
managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed.
However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his
appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause.
Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air
safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all
airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of
the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his appointment.
Because of respondent's excellent credentials, DOTC strongly recommended his
promotional appointment to the contested position.

It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence
discretionary on the part of the proper authority. The appointing authority considers
not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work
experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority.
Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The
final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed.
Clearly then, there is no reason to disapprove the appointment of respondent as
Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office considering that he is fully qualified
and evidently the choice of the appointing authority.

13. Necessity of Written Appointment

G.R. No. 203655, September 07, 2015

SM LAND, INC., Petitioner, v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY AND ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ESQ., IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND CEO OF BCDA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)urge the court to reconsider its

decision in the case at bar. Respondent-movants remain adamant in claiming that
the assailed rulings of the Court would cause unwarranted and irremediable injury
to the government. In support of their contention, respondent-movants cite the
1953 case of Ykalina v. Oricio, which held that a presidential order may either be in
a written memorandum or merely verbal. They then argue that the issuance of
Supplemental Notice No. 5, effectively cancelling the Swiss Challenge of petitioner's
duly accepted suo moto proposal, was pursuant to a verbal presidential order or
instruction. And pursuant to the constitutional provision, the challenge against this
presidential directive, so respondent-movants insist, is within the jurisdiction of
Court en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a presidential order may either be in a written memorandum or

merely verbal.

HELD:

No. The Court held that while the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by
Commission, as a general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment
that a commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral
announcement of his determination by the appointing power. Based on the Court's
reasoning, the presidential order that "may either be in a written memorandum or
merely verbal " adverted to in Ykalina should therefore be understood as limited
specifically to those pertaining to appointments. Current jurisprudence, however, no
longer recognizes the validity of oral appointments and, in fact, requires the
transmission and receipt of the necessary appointment papers for their completion.

Here, it is well to recall that the President did not issue any said executive order or
presidential issuance in intimating to the BCDA that he wishes for the competitive
challenge to be cancelled.The situation, therefore, does not involve a presidential
order or instruction within the contemplation of the Constitution, and, consequently,
does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. Given the glaring
differences in context, the doctrine in Ykalina cannot find application herein, and
cannot operate to divest the Court's division of its jurisdiction over the instant case.
14. Revocation of Appointment

G.R. No. 129616            April 17, 2002

THE GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) and

RAMON ANINO, petitioners,
vs.
JULIETA MONSERATE, respondent.

FACTS:

Monserate started her government service in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port

Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to the
position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer.

In the early part of 1988, respondent applied for the permanent position of
Manager II. On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of
the PPA, appointed respondent to the position of Manager II. On the same day,
respondent assumed office and discharged the functions thereof. The CSC approved
her appointment.

Meanwhile, Anino, who ranked second to respondent filed an appeal/petition with

the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against respondent's appointment. The PPA
Appeals Board sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondent's
appointment based on Civil Service Eligibility.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was due process when respondent was replaced by petitioner
Anino from her position as Manager II, Resource Management Division, and
demoted as Administrative Officer.

HELD:

No. Respondent was demoted, not by reason of the PPA reorganization in 1988, but
due to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution. Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court
cannot accord validity to the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board
which "upholds the appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resource Management
Division Manager. Her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as
Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure
and due process. Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee
assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires
a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by
statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by
revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment
is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position,
such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and
appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever
established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her.
15. Ad Interim Appointments

G.R. No. L-19313             January 19, 1962

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

The then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad

interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the
corresponding oath.

When President Diosdado Macapagal took his oath of office, he issued an

administrative order which seeks to withdraw all ad interim  appointment made by
President Garcia after December 13, 1961. He appointed Castillo as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although
Castillo informed Aytona of his title thereto; and some unpleasantness developed in
the premises of the Central Bank. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona
was definitely prevented from holding office in the Central Bank. So, he instituted
this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto, challenging Castillo's right to
exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims he was validly
appointed. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by
Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal.

ISSUE:

Whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad
interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had
already qualified.

HELD:

Yes. The issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of
almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives,
the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments. When he
makes ad interim  appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to
be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such
selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that
will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the
appointment and where the names are to be submitted by successor, who may not
wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in
extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350
appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which
was required and expected of him.
16. Temporary or Acting Appointments

[G.R. No. 139251. August 29, 2002.]

MA. ERLY P. ERASMO, Petitioner, v. HOME INSURANCE & GUARANTY

CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner started working with respondent Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC) in 1982 as a consultant on the Project Evaluation Department, and held
various positions therein until finally, she was promoted to Vice-President of
TS/GCIG on June 15, 1992. The nature of her appointment was "promotion" and
her employment status was "temporary," since the position is a Career Executive
Service Office (CESO) and petitioner lacks the required CES eligibility.

On February 24, 1993 petitioner was administratively charged with: (1) neglect of
duty, (2) incompetence in the performance of official duties, (3) conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and (4) directly or indirectly having financial and
material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of her office. 10

In the meantime, petitioner appealed the status of her temporary appointment to

the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which issued a resolution holding that a CES
eligibility is required to a CES position.

Respondent informed the petitioner that the appointment shall be deemed

terminated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position of Vice-

President of TS/GCIG of respondent HIGC.

HELD:

No. Petitioner’s promotional appointment as Vice-President of TS/GCIG is merely

temporary in nature. This is because petitioner does not possess a career executive
service eligibility which is necessary for the position of Vice-President of TS/GCIG, it
being a career service executive office. Her new appointment, being temporary in
character, was terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power with or without a
cause, and petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure.
17. Designations

[G.R. NO. 157950 : June 8, 2005]

LIBRADA D. TAPISPISAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position
of Teacher III. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is currently
assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City.

In 1995, Sibug (Schools Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued Division

Memorandum No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P.
Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos
Elementary School. Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest contesting
such designation. The latter, however, denied the protest. Tapispisan alleged that
the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves was made with evident
favoritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and DECS rules and regulations on
promotions. The petitioner claimed that she was more qualified for promotion than
respondents Rumbaoa and Teves.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Transfer/Designation of respondents were violative of COMELEC

Resolution No. 2731 which expressly bans the transfer of officers and employees in
the civil service during the election period.

HELD:

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it, likewise,

involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office.
However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication
is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at
will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the
person named.

The designation of respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva

Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary
School merely imposed on them additional duties on top of those corresponding to
their incumbent positions at Villamor Air Base Elementary School. Such designation
did not confer upon them security of tenure in the positions which they occupy in
"acting" capacity. This point was underscored by Secretary Gloria as he explained
that the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as OIC-Head Teacher and
OIC-Principal, respectively, was temporary in nature, not a permanent transfer nor
a promotion.

As a corollary, such designation did not violate Resolution No. 2731 dated
December 5, 1994 of the Commission on Elections, which declared as a prohibited
act the transfer of officers and employees in the civil service during the election
period from January 8, 1995 up to June 7, 1995. The designation of respondents
Rumbaoa and Teves did not involve a movement from one position to another.
Neither did it involve the issuance of any appointment to the said positions in their
favor. In fact, respondents Rumbaoa and Teves retained their incumbent positions
at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School. As such, their designation could not be
considered as a "transfer" within the meaning of a prohibited act during the election
period.

18. Classes of Positions in the Career Service

[G.R. NO. 163573 July 27, 2005]

LEONORA B. IGNACIO, Petitioners, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

UNDERSECRETARY RAMON C. BACANI, ARD-OIC DIRECTOR IV PARALUMAN
G. GIRON, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ignacio was the Division Superintendent of Public Schools in Cavite City.
She went on leave from May 6 to May 17, 2002. In 2002, the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued an Order reassigning
her to the Division of Schools in Puerto Princesa City effective immediately.
However, on May 10, 2002, Undersecretary Bacani issued a Memorandum to
Regional Director Giron directing her to hold Dr. Ignacio's reassignment in abeyance
until further orders from his office. Instead of complying with the directive,
however, Dr. Ignacio filed a petition for its nullification with the Regional Office of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by alleging that her reassignment to Puerto
Princesa City was arbitrary, oppressive and contrary to law. Being a presidential
appointee with Career Executive Service (CES) Rank V eligibility, only the President,
through the DECS Secretary, could reappoint her, and such authority could not be
delegated to an Undersecretary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ignacio may be reassigned to another place.

HELD:

Yes. Ignacio was not transferred to another position of public office. She was
merely reassigned to another place wherein her service might be more needed. The
petitioner was a member of the CES with a rank of CESO V; as such, her security of
tenure pertains only to her rank and not to her office or her position. The security
of tenure of employees in the career executive service pertains only to rank and not
to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a CESO may
be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank
which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned.

Within the Career Executive Service, personnel can be shifted from one office or
position to another without violation of their right to security of tenure because
their status and salaries are based on their ranks and not on their jobs. 

The Court further held that mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel,
the better to cope with the exigencies of public service, is thus the distinguishing
feature of the Career Executive Service. 

Thus, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III, was correctly and properly appointed
by the appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which
has a corresponding CES Rank Level III.
19. Kinds of appointment in the career service

G.R. No. 99336               June 9, 1992

MELANIO S. TORIO, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL PRINTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF
THE PRESS SECRETARY and EFREN CAMACHO, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioners were the Chief of the Production Staff of the Printing Division and a
Bindery Foreman at the PIA. They continued discharging their functions in a hold-
over capacity after the PIA was merged with the GSA. Torio was temporarily
appointed as Assistant Operations Superintendent of Printing while Espanola was
appointed as Temporary Supervising Book-binder. Both appointments lapsed on
February 28, 1989. The positions of both petitioners were upgraded. This time,
another appointment was issued to Torio from temporary to permanent. Espanola,
on the other hand, was given only a notice of the upgrading of his position
inasmuch as he was already holding it in a permanent capacity.

Prior to the appointments, protests were lodged with the CSC. CSC revoked the
appointment of Torio and ordering those qualified, including Camacho, to be
evaluated for the position.

Torio alleges that at the time of his appointment, he was already a civil service
eligible. Camacho, on the other hand, avers that the Commision has the power to
review appointments for the correction of mistakes in the approval or disapproval
thereof. Moreover, at the time of Torio’s appointment, there were other qualified
eligibles who were not given the chance to be considered for the contested position
through no fault of their own. Thus, the Commission did not exceed its authority
when in the exercise of its power of review, it revoked the appointment of
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of the petitioners were valid.

HELD:

Yes. A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment.

Any irregularities in the former appointment are not to be automatically carried
over to the latter. If the protest is directed against the temporary appointment, it
would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the subsequent
permanent appointment. It is established that the questioned resolutions of the
CSC should be declared inapplicable to the petitioners because they refer to the
temporary appointments which had already lapsed when they were issued.

This Court does not overlook the fact that prior to the reorganization of the GSA,
the petitioners were holding contractual or casual employment. Employees or
officers holding permanent appointments do not automatically get appointed to the
new positions. The appointing authority is still given latitude in making his choice
considering the duty resting on his discretion to see to it that the best interest of
the public is served with each appointment he makes.

Therefore, this court held that both of the appointees possess the minimum
required qualifications in order for them to held their respective positions.

20. Kinds of appointment in the career service

G.R. No. 144153 - January 16, 2002

MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA, Petitioner, vs. MARIANO E. BENEDICTO II, TOLL

REGULATORY BOARD, GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, and RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, Respondents.

FACTS:

The then Secretary of Public Works and Highways De Jesus issued a permanent
appointment in favor of Dimayuga as Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory
Board. She exercised powers of control and supervision over the Board's three
division. At the time, the position of Executive Director II was not deemed part of
the career executive service, that is, until June 4, 1993, when it was included
therein.

Petitioner alleges that during her tenure, she became the subject of several
administrative and criminal complaints designed to coerce her removal. On the
strength of these complaints, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued
a suspension order against petitioner. As a gesture of protest, petitioner filed a
leave of absence until September 30, 1998 rather than assume a position which she
considered a demotion.

On September 28, 1998, while she was on leave, petitioner received a letter from
respondent Vigilar informing her that then President Joseph E. Estrada had
appointed respondent Mariano E. Benedicto II in her stead as Executive Director II
of the Board.

Since she had been effectively removed from her position, petitioner filed a petition
for quo warranto before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be demoted from her position.

HELD:

No. It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications. A person who does not have
the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first
place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended
to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

Evidently, private respondent's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having
taken the necessary Career Executive Service Examination to obtain the requisite
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess
the needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently,
his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV/Department Legal Counsel
and/or Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be
transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to
security of tenure. Non-eligibles holding permanent appointments to CES positions
were never meant to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of
eligibility would be a premium vesting them with permanency in the CES positions,
a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.

21. Kinds of appointment in the career service

[G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000.]

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RONALDO B. ZAMORA, and ATTY. CARINA J. DEMAISIP, Petitioners, v.
ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL, Respondent.

FACTS:

Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations in 1989. On July 28, 1994,
she was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Director of the Public
Attorney’s Office. On January 5, 1995, she was appointed by then President Fidel V.
Ramos to the rank of CESO III. On November 5, 1997, she was designated by the
Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney. On February 5, 1998, her
appointment was confirmed by President Ramos so that, on February 20, 1998, she
took her oath and assumed office.

On July 1, 1998, petitioner Carina J. Demaisip was appointed "CHIEF PUBLIC

DEFENDER" by President Joseph Estrada. Apparently because the position was held
by respondent, another appointment paper was issued by the President. On the
other hand, respondent was appointed "Regional Director, Public Defender’s Office"
by the President.

On July 7, 1998, petitioner Demaisip took her oath of office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent may be shifted from her position to another.

HELD:
Yes. CESO rank officers may be reassigned or transferred from one position to
another and from one department, bureau or or office to another provided that it is
done in good faith and in the interest of public service. Meaning, there is no
reduction in rank and in salary. Further, respondent, as a CESO, can even be
assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade. In the instant
case, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III, was correctly and properly appointed
by the appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which
has a corresponding CES Rank Level III. Indeed, even in the other branches of the
civil service, the rule is that, unless an employee is appointed to a particular office
or station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office.

The Court held that respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public
Attorney was merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to
the position of Regional Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO
rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of
tenure guarantee of the Constitution.

22. Kinds of appointment in the career service

G.R. NO. 157783. September 23, 2005]

NILO PALOMA, Petitioners, v. DANILO MORA, HILARIO FESTEJO, MAXIMA

SALVINO, BRYN BONGBONG and VALENTINO SEVILLA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte
Water District by its Board of Directors in 1993. His services were subsequently
terminated by virtue of a resolution.The Board, in the same Resolution, designated
respondent Valentino Sevilla as Officer-in-Charge.

Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for

preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC on 11 January 1996 to contest
his dismissal. He argued in his petition that his dismissal was a "capricious and
arbitrary act on the part of the Board of Directors, constituting a travesty of justice
and a fatal denial of his constitutional right to due process for the grounds relied
upon therein to terminate him were never made a subject of a complaint nor was
he notified and made to explain the acts he was said to be guilty of."

On 25 January 1996, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and want of cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be terminated from his office.

HELD:

Yes. In the case at bar, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 provides that the
general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors. An
appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary
in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when
the Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only
an expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice,
due hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from
office. 

In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly
within the wide arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the
appointing power, which in this case is the Board of Directors of the Palompon,
Leyte Water District. Here, considering that the petitioner is at loggerheads with the
Board, the former's services obviously ceased to be "pleasurable" to the latter. The
Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the General Manager
thereof the moment the latter's services cease to be convivial to the former.
Yes, as a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause provided by law. As exception to this, P.D. No. 198,
categorically provides that the General Manager shall serve at the pleasure of the
board.

23. Approval/recall of appointment by the civil service commission

G.R. NO. 152017 - January 15, 2004

OCCIDENTAL MINDORO NATIONAL COLLEGE (OMNC) and OFELIA A.

REBONG, Petitioners, v.  VIRGINIA P. MACARAIG, Respondent.

FACTS:

Virginia Sicat was appointed Secondary Assistant Principal of San Jose National High
School. This was duly attested to by the Civil Service Commission as a regular
(permanent) appointment. Macaraig and four others contested the said appointment on
the ground that as next in rank they had a preferential right to be appointed to the
vacancy. However, the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) held that all the
protestants are not employees next-in-rank and therefore cannot claim promotional
preference to the contested vacancy. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission
dismissed all the protests and gave due course to petitioners appointment. Virginia
Macaraig appealed the said resolution to the Office of the President on February 12,
1976.

On May 7, 1976, petitioner assumed the position of Assistant Principal of San Jose
National High School. But School Principal Bernabe Macaraig, Virginia Macaraigs
husband, refused to honor Sicats appointment and sought its revocation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent has a valid and subsisting appointment.

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that when respondent Macaraig was allegedly given a permanent
appointment, there was no vacant position to which said respondent could be validly
appointed. The Court unmistakably sustained the aforesaid ruling in its resolution of
December 3, 1984. As aptly contended by petitioners, respondents service with the
OMNC from May 23, 1977 to December 3, 1984 could be considered as de facto. On
December 3, 1984, respondent was divested of the position as de facto Secondary
Assistant Principal. Even assuming that respondent could continue occupying the
contested position, she would still be disqualified for promotion because in the interim,
she was administratively charged. Whether the appointment involved would have been
a promotional one or an appointment to a converted/reclassified position would not
have really mattered because in either situation, respondent would not have qualified.
In both cases, respondents employment with OMNC was severed, or putting it mildly,
she was separated from the service.

Verily, the failure to submit the alleged appointment of respondent to the Civil Service
Commission way beyond the 30-day prescribed period was a patent violation of the
aforequoted provision. Over two years had actually elapsed already. The appointment
became stale, ineffective.
24.