Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab

(Established by Punjab Act No. 12 of 2006)

Bhadson Road, Sidhuwal, Punjab
(Accredited ‘A’ Grade by NAAC)

Project Submission
of
Political Science

for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Vth Semester
Session 2019-2020

Topic: Understanding the Islamic Cold War: Saudi-Iranian Rivalry

Submitted by: Arnav Srivastava

Roll No.: 17064
Group No.: 6
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. INTRODUCTION – AN UNKNOWN WAR ................................................................................ 2

A.1. Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 3

A.2. Contemporary Relevance: International Politics ........................................................... 3

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CLAIM TO LEAD ISLAM ................................................. 3

B.1. Origins ............................................................................................................................ 4

B.2. The Iran-Iraq War: An Opportunist Political Gimmick ................................................. 4

B.2.1. The 1987 Mecca Incident ........................................................................................ 5

B.3. Shift from Islamic Fundamentalism to Hegemonic Control: Current Perspectives ....... 5

B.3.1. Irreconcilable Geopolitical Aspirations: Leader of the Islamic World .................. 6

C. WARFARE TACTICS: SUPPORTING ADVERSARIES AND MANUFACTURING INSURGENCIES6

C.1. The Syrian Civil War ..................................................................................................... 7

C.2. Yemeni Civil War .......................................................................................................... 7

D. NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: A POTENTIAL ARMAGEDDON? ..................................................... 8

D.2. Iran’s Dangerous Nuclear Ambitions ............................................................................ 8

D.2. The Saudi Push: Friendship With Pakistan .................................................................... 8

E. MODIJI AND THE MIDDLE EAST: A NEW PARADIGM IN WORLD POLITICS ....................... 9

F. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 9

G. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 10

- Journal Articles Referred To- ............................................................................................ 10

-News Clippings Referred to- .............................................................................................. 10

-Books Referred To- ............................................................................................................ 11

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A. Introduction – An Unknown War

Whenever the term ‘cold war’ is used in academic works, the very first reference is the one
fought between the United States and the USSR (now Russia) for the better part of the 20th
century. The bipolar world became the battleground for the supreme powers to assert their
dominance and warp the international community in a perennial sense of tension and paranoia,
best remembered in popular culture in the 1964 film ‘Dr Strangelove’.1 Not only was the war
compelled by the very existence of the other side to engage in a zero-sum competition, but the
underlying conflict was that of an ideological divergence between capitalism and communism.2
In modern politics, a new kind of proxy war rages. The middle east, which has historically
been, and contemporarily remains an area of significant interest for States primarily due to the
region’s oil-rich reserves, saw a radical change in its regional dynamics in 1979, setting Iran
and Saudi Arabia as protagonists of the Middle East’s own version of the Cold War.3 Although
the scale of war is limited to the region itself, its influence and place in international discourse
and politics remains stout.
The countries’ numerous differences have often set them on a colliding course, pitting them
against each other in various proxy wars, and yet somehow the two have managed to avoid
war. he relative weakness of state authority in early twentieth-century Gulf history made the
task of stabilizing the region arduous. This barred Saudi Arabia and Iran from retaining lasting
ties of major significance, which was further complicated by Iran’s foreign policy outlook.4
Other than sharing religious turmoil and interstate crises, the two countries also have strikingly
similar and troublesome historical origins. The relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have
been conditioned by many factors, from the religious divide between Shia and Sunni
interpretations of Islam to the regional role played by external forces, such as the US.5
Since the birth of the Islamist, revolutionary and Persian-rooted Islamic Republic of Iran, the
default relationship has been one of regional rivalry. There are two camps–-the Shia led by Iran
and the Sunni led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia–-that are colliding in several places, from
Syria to Yemen. It is a clash of divergent religious branches but above all of power and strategic
interests. Thus far the tensions have, to some extent, been kept under control. But they may

1
Scarlett Higgins, Purity of essence in the Cold War: Dr. Strangelove, Paranoia, and Bodily Boundaries, Textual
Practice, 32:5, 799-82 (2018) .
2
Raymond Garthoff, “Why did the Cold War arise, and why did it end?”, 16 Diplomatic History 287-93 (1992).
3
Panaite, Atena C., "Cold War in the Middle East: Iran and Saudi Arabia" (2017). Open Access Theses. 69.
4
Banafsheh Kayoush, “Saudi Arabia and Revolutionary Iran” in ‘Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?’,
Palgrave MacMillan, New York 39-40 (2016).
5
Rafael Bardaji, Religion, Power, and Chaos in the Middle East, 15 EUR. VIEW 87-95 (2016).

2 | Page
well escalate in the near future.

A.1. Literature Review

The current research work becomes an essential academic realization due to the increasing
importance of the middle east in shaping international relations and the changing world of
global politics. The prospective vacuum of a superpower in the region is another exciting
dimension of this largely unexplored scholarly territory. The most prominent academic work
on the issue, told from a journalistic perspective is Dilip Hiro’s seminal ‘Cold War in the
Islamic World’. The research borrows many facets from the work, mainly the realist
practitioner’s narrative that brings out the atrocities of the war-torn region. Various other
sources have been referred and consulted to prepare a comprehensive draft in understanding
the rivalry’s composition in the geopolitics of the region.

A.2. Contemporary Relevance: International Politics

This ‘hegemonic rivalry’6 is both interesting and extremely relevant to studies of modern-day
state relations. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two major powers of the Middle East, leading the
blocks of Shiite and Sunni states, respectively. Their relationship is crucial for the future of the
world’s most tormented region, and as of 2017 no comprehensive or satisfactory explanation
to this puzzle has been put forward. The topic is even more fascinating considering the turmoil
of the region, the numerous wars it has witnessed, and the vast power both countries possess.
The interface between Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the growing instability in the region due to
the Syrian war make for a prospectively dangerous and large-scale war that might get out of
bounds in future and presents itself as a major deterrent to global peace.7

B. Historical Background: The Claim to Lead Islam

At the face of it, the struggle between the two countries to assert dominance over the region
and increase their influence over its functioning might seem to be an outcome of USA’s Iraq
invasion. But the roots go much deeper and find substance in the two countries’ lofty ambitions
to be recognized as the leader of Islam in the new world order.8

6
Ali Fatollah-Nejad, an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Program at Harvard, postulates that
both the countries have been engaged in a hegemonic rivalry over power and influence, marked by differences in
sectarianism, nationalism, revolutionary ideology, competition over regional hegemony, oil prices, attitudes
towards the US military presence in the Gulf, and towards the Hajj, since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. For
detailed discussion on the same, see I. BERMAN, IRAN'S DEADLY AMBITION: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S QUEST FOR
GLOBAL POWER, NEW YORK (2015).
7
Supra, note 6, BERMAN, at 8.
8
Amanda Erickson, “What’s Behind the feud between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Power”, The Washington Post, 20
Dec. 2017; see Ali Fatollah’s hypothesis and analysis of the formation of the two countries.

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 B.1. Origins

The Iranian revolution of 1979 is a pivotal historic instance in Iran’s short-lived existence as
an independent state. The rebels threw out the US-backed and installed monarch, which
facilitated the transition from an Imperialist Monarchy to a Republic. After its approval of a
theocratic constitution in December,9 immediate nationwide uprisings against the new
government began with the 1979 Kurdish rebellion and the Khuzestan uprisings, along with
the uprisings in Sistan and Baluchestan and other areas. Over the next several years, these
uprisings were subdued in a violent manner by the new Islamic government. The new
government began purging itself of the non-Islamist political opposition, as well as of those
Islamists who were not considered radical enough. Although both nationalists and Marxists
had initially joined with Islamists to overthrow the Shah, tens of thousands were executed by
the new regime afterwards.10
Saudi Arabia didn’t fare better in terms of violence and religious dominance in its history. The
emergence of what was to become the Saudi royal family, known as the Al Saud, began
in Nejd in central Arabia in 1744, when Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the dynasty, joined
forces with the religious leader Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,11 founder of the Wahhabi
movement, a strict puritanical form of Sunni Islam.12 This alliance formed in the 18th century
provided the ideological impetus to Saudi expansion and remains the basis of Saudi Arabian
dynastic rule today.13 The first “Saudi state” established in 1744 in the area around Riyadh,
rapidly expanded and briefly controlled most of the present-day territory of Saudi
Arabia,14 sacking Karbala in 1802 and capturing Mecca in 1803, but was destroyed by 1818 by
the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha.

B.2. The Iran-Iraq War: An Opportunist Political Gimmick

In 1980, Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of revolutionary unrest in Iran and quell
the revolution in its infancy. Fearing a possible revolutionary wave that could threaten Iraq's
stability and embolden its Shia population, Saddam launched an invasion on 20 September,
triggering the Iran–Iraq War which lasted for eight years and killed hundreds of thousands.

9
Jahangir Amuzegar (1991). The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy.
SUNY Press. pp. 4, 9–12.
10
Cheryl Benard (1984). "The Government of God": Iran's Islamic Republic. Columbia University Press. p. 18.
11
Bowen, Wayne H. (2007). The History of Saudi Arabia.
12
Harris, Ian; Mews, Stuart; Morris, Paul; Shepherd, John (1992). Contemporary Religions: A World Guide.
p. 369.
13
Faksh, Mahmud A. (1997). The Future of Islam in the Middle East. pp. 89–90.
14
Murphy, David (2008). The Arab Revolt 1916–18: Lawrence Sets Arabia Ablaze. pp. 5–8.

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Saddam had reportedly secured Saudi support for Iraq's war effort during an August 1980 visit
he made to Saudi Arabia.15 This was in addition to financial and military support Iraq received
from neighbouring leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates, in part to hedge Iranian power and prevent the spread of its revolution.
American support for Iraq during the war had profound effects on Iran. The United States'
defense of Saddam and its role in blocking investigations into Iraq's use of chemical
weapons on Iranian soldiers and civilians convinced Iran to further pursue its
own unconventional weapons program. The government has also used American hostility to
justify foreign and domestic policies, including its nuclear program and crackdowns on internal
dissent.16
Apart from the Iran–Iraq War, Iran and Saudi Arabia engaged in tense competition elsewhere,
supporting opposing armed groups in the Lebanese Civil War, the Soviet–Afghan War, and
other conflicts. After the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to support different
groups and organizations along sectarian lines such as in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq.

B.2.1. The 1987 Mecca Incident

In response to the 1987 Mecca incident in which Shia pilgrims clashed with Saudi security
forces during the Hajj, Khomeini stated: "These vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers
which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back...Mecca is in the hands of a
band of heretics”.17 Iran also called for the ouster of the Saudi government.18

B.3. Shift from Islamic Fundamentalism to Hegemonic Control: Current

Perspectives

The Saudi–Iranian rivalry is not sectarian in nature nor is it the continuation of a supposedly
ancient enmity between the Sunni and the Shiite branches of Islam. Rather, such interpretation
is an integral part of an imperial divide-and-rule policy that most recently flourished during the
first decade of the 2000s. The US-led “regime change” in Iraq in 2003 and the dismantling of
Saddam Hussein’s Baathist state paved the way for Iran’s rise in power, which peaked in the
mid-2000s at a time when the US occupation found itself entrenched in a “quagmire”. Since
then, Iranian policy has arguably been marked by a degree of hubris, especially in Iraq and

15
Gibson, Bryan R. (2010). Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War,
1980-1988. ABC-CLIO. pp. 33–34.
16
Kinzer, Stephen (October 2008). “Inside Iran's Fury”. Smithsonian Magazine.
17
Gaub, Florence (February 2016). “War of words: Saudi Arabia v Iran”, European Union Institute for Security
Studies (EUISS).
18
Wallace, Charles P. (3 August 1987). “Iran Asks Overthrow of Saudi Rulers Over Riots: Tehran Stand on Mecca
Clash Adds to Tensions; Police Accused of Following U.S. Instructions”, Los Angeles Times.

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Syria. Yet, there is sectarian dimension to this rivalry – with (a) 1979 and (b) 2003 being the
watershed moments.19 Not only that it reserved Iran – a predominately Shia country within a
predominantly Sunni Islamic-majority world – the central place within a newly to be
established pan-Islamic Middle East, its concomitant political message was clearly directed at
Iran’s neighbouring Arab Sunni rulers dubbed illegitimate and acting as pawns of malign
external forces (imperialism and Zionism), provoking Shia uprisings there.20

B.3.1. Irreconcilable Geopolitical Aspirations: Leader of the Islamic World

Iran’s claim since the 1980s to constitute the nucleus – Umm al‐Qura, literally “the mother of
all cities” – of the entire Islamic world, as reflected in the Supreme Leader’s title “Commander
of the Faithful” (Amir‐ol‐mo’menin) or “Commander of the Affairs of the Muslims of the
World” (Vali Amr‐e Moslemin‐e Jahân), colludes with the similar claim put forward by KSA,
whose King since 1986 has been granted the title “Custodian of the Tow Holy Mosques”
(Khâdim al-arameyn ash-Sharifeyn), to be the leader of the Islamic world. This competition
plays out on a number of levels, ranging from regional geopolitical alignments, their respective
media engaging in sectarian propaganda, up to the Hajj pilgrimage.

C. Warfare Tactics: Supporting Adversaries and Manufacturing Insurgencies

The use of surrogate or ‘proxy’ actors within the context of ‘irregular’ or guerrilla conflict
within or between states constitutes a phenomenon spanning nearly the whole of recorded
human military history. Yet it is a phenomenon that has also acquired urgent contemporary
relevance in the light of the general evolution of conflict in Ukraine and the current Middle
East. The rise of proxy forces as major military and political actors in South-East Asia and the
Middle East in recent years clearly demands scholarly attention, not least since the
phenomenon has become both near-endemic and also shows signs of overlapping into the
European security sphere.21
Both the sides support opposite sides in regional conflicts and often indulge in manufacturing
them wherever they aren’t present. This segment o the project focuses on three major ongoing
clashes in the region, wherein both the parties seem relentless in their pursuit to outdo the other
at the cost of peace and risk of destabilization.

19
Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York & London, 2006),
pp. 143–144, “Despite the pan-Islamic nature of Ayatollah Khomeini’s “export of the revolution” discourse, it
has had a sectarian appeal”.
20
Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a–Sunni Divide (New
York, 2017), p. 147.
21
Alex Marshall, “From Civil War to Proxy Wars: Past History and Current Dilemmas”, 27 Small Wars &
Insurgencies 183-195 (2016).

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 C.1. The Syrian Civil War

Syria has been a major theatre in the proxy conflict throughout its ongoing civil war, which
began in 2011. Iran and the GCC states have provided varying degrees of military and financial
support to opposing sides, with Iran backing the government and Saudi Arabia supporting rebel
militants. Syria is an important part of Iran's sphere of influence, and
the government under Bashar al-Assad has long been a major ally. During the early stages of
the Arab Spring, Supreme Leader Khamenei initially expressed support for the revolutions
in Tunisia and Egypt, characterizing them as an "Islamic awakening" akin to its own revolution
in 1979. When protests broke out in Syria, Iran changed its position and condemned them,
comparing the uprising to its own presidential election protests in 2009 and accusing the United
States and Israel of being behind the unrest.22
The war threatens Iran's position, and Saudi Arabia and its allies have sided with Sunni rebels
in part to weaken Iran. For years Iranian forces have been involved on the ground, with soldiers
in Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps facing heavy casualties.23 In 2014, with no end in sight
to the conflict, Iran increased its ground support for the Syrian Army, providing elite forces,
intelligence gathering, and training. Iran also backs pro-Assad Hezbollah fighters.24

C.2. Yemeni Civil War

Yemen has been called one of the major fronts in the conflict as a result of the revolution and
subsequent civil war.25, 26 Yemen had for years been within the Saudi sphere of influence. The
decade-long Houthi insurgency in Yemen stoked tensions with Iran, with accusations of covert
support for the rebels. A 2015 UN report alleged that Iran provided the Houthi rebels with
money, training, and arms shipments beginning in 2009.27 However, the degree of support has
been subject to debate, and accusations of greater involvement have been denied by Iran. 28,
29
The 2014–2015 coup d'état was viewed by Saudi leadership as an immediate threat, and as

22
Khalaji, Mehdi (27 June 2011). "Iran's Policy Confusion about Bahrain". The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.
23
Johnson, Henry (30 October 2015). "Mapping the Deaths of Iranian Officers Across Syria". Foreign Policy.
24
Saul, Jonathan; Hafezi, Parisa (21 February 2014). "Iran boosts military support in Syria to bolster Assad".
Reuters
25
Reardon, Martin (26 March 2015). "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 'Great Game' in Yemen". Al Jazeera.
26
Malsin, Jared. "Yemen Is the Latest Victim of the Increase in Iran-Saudi Arabia Tension". Time (11 January
2016).
27
Landry, Carole (30 April 2015). "Iran arming Yemen's Huthi rebels since 2009: UN report". Yahoo News.
Agence France-Presse
28
Schmitt, Eric; Worth, Robert F. (15 March 2012). "With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast
Role". The New York Times.
29
Bayoumy, Yara; Ghobari, Mohammed (15 December 2014). "Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen's
Houthis". Reuters.

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an opportunity for Iran to gain a foothold in the region. In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition
of Arab states, including all GCC members except Oman, intervened and launched airstrikes
and a ground offensive in the country, declaring the entire Saada Governorate a military target
and imposing a naval blockade.

D. Nuclear Arms Race: A Potential Armageddon?

Although both Iran and Saudi Arabia signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons in 1970 and 1988 respectively, a potential nuclear arms race has been a concern for
years. Both governments claim that their programs are for peaceful purposes, but foreign
governments and organizations have accused both of taking steps to obtain nuclear weapons
capabilities.

D.2. Iran’s Dangerous Nuclear Ambitions

Iran's ongoing nuclear program began in the 1950s under the Shah in cooperation with the
United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The cooperation continued until the
Iranian Revolution in 1979.30 Sanctions have been in place since then and were expanded in
2006 with the passage of United Nation Security Council Resolution 1737 and Resolution
1696 in response to Iran's uranium enrichment program. The JCPOA, as the Iran nuclear deal
is officially known, was signed amid great fanfare during the time of the Obama administration
in 2015.31 Despite the short-term restraints on Iran’s uranium enrichment, it suffers from
material deficiency to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capability.
President Trump announced on 8 May 2018 that the United States would unilaterally
withdraw from the JCPOA and reinstate previous sanctions against Iran in addition to
imposing new sanctions.32 .

D.2. The Saudi Push: Friendship With Pakistan

Saudi Arabia has considered several options in response to the Iranian program: acquiring its
own nuclear capability as a deterrent, entering into an alliance with an existing nuclear power,
or pursuing a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement. It is believed that Saudi Arabia
has been a major financier of Pakistan's integrated nuclear program since 1974, a project begun
under former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 2003 it was reported that Saudi Arabia
had taken the "strategic decision" to acquire "off-the-shelf" atomic weapons from Pakistan,

30
Roe, Sam (28 January 2007). "An atomic threat made in America". Chicago Tribune.
31
Supra, note 6, BERMAN, at 27.
32
Landler, Mark (8 May 2018). "Trump Withdraws U.S. From 'One-Sided' Iran Nuclear Deal". The New York
Time.

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according to senior American officials.33 In 2003, The Washington Times reported that
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had entered a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation to provide
the Saudis with nuclear weapons technology in return for access to cheap oil for Pakistan.34

E. Modiji and the Middle East: A New Paradigm in World Politics

Since the Hon’ble PM of India, Shree Narendra Damodardas Modiji has assumed the reigns in
2014, India’s attitude towards the Middle East has been one of positive reinforcement and
peaceful cooperation. The ‘Modi Doctrine’35 has primarily assimilated its attention towards a
“look West policy”,36 which has elucidated India’s ambitions to assume the power vacuum of
a superpower in the region since America’s withdrawal.37 Since coming to office in 2014, Modi
has pushed an aggressive strategy of partnering with key regional powers like Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Israel in a bid to attract investments and forge deeper security
partnerships. In doing so, he has largely ignored Iran and broken with India’s Cold War-era
legacy in the region of merely “balancing” between key actors.38

F. Conclusion

A combination of Khamenei’s position as the ultimate commander-in-chief and his ideas of

standing up to the United States and KSA have tied Rouhani’s hands regarding the foreign
policy. Rouhani’s idea of returning Iran to international respectability and attracting foreign
investment has been suppressed by the Ayatollah’s vision of an independent and strong Iran.
From a realist perspective, it can be questioned whether or not this aggressive regional foreign
policy has been rational and beneficial for Iran and in accordance with the systemic pressure
The US sanctions seem to have momentarily derailed the Iranian push for regional hegemonic
control. But, in this scenario, the question is whether Iran will back down and return to the
negotiating table or whether they will instead maintain its geopolitical aspirations in the pursuit
of regional hegemony and risk turning the “Islamic Cold War“ into a hot one.39

33
Harnden, Toby; Lamb, Christina (17 May 2015). "Saudis 'to get nuclear weapons'". The Times.
34
De Borchgrave, Arnaud (22 October 2003). "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact: Islamabad trades
weapons technology for oil". The Washington Times.
35
Anirban Ganguly, The Modi Doctrine: New Paradigms in India's Foreign Policy, Wisdom Tree, 2018.
36
Guy Burton, “India’s Look West Policy Under Modi”, Middle East Institute, 6 Aug. 2019.
37
Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughhead, “A U.S. Withdrawal will cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East”, Foreign
Policy, 17 Dec. 2019.
38
“The Reality behind the Saudi-India Ties, Economic Times, 3 Nov. 2019.
39
Gustav Skjold Bang Dahl, “Understanding the ‘Islamic Cold War’: How can the growing rivarly between Iran
and Saudi Arabia and their behaviour in recent years best be explained using IR theory”, The International
Relations of the Middle East, Oct. 2018.

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G. Bibliography

- JOURNAL ARTICLES REFERRED TO-

• Alex Marshall, “From Civil War to Proxy Wars: Past History and Current Dilemmas”, 27
Small Wars & Insurgencies 183-195 (2016).
• Cheryl Benard (1984). "The Government of God": Iran's Islamic Republic. Columbia
University Press. p. 18.
• Gaub, Florence (February 2016). “War of words: Saudi Arabia v Iran”, European Union
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
• Gibson, Bryan R. (2010). Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and
the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988. ABC-CLIO. pp. 33–34.
• Gustav Skjold Bang Dahl, “Understanding the ‘Islamic Cold War’: How can the growing
rivarly between Iran and Saudi Arabia and their behaviour in recent years best be explained
using IR theory”, The International Relations of the Middle East, Oct. 2018.
• Jahangir Amuzegar (1991). The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis'
Triumph and Tragedy. SUNY Press. pp. 4, 9–12.
• Panaite, Atena C., "Cold War in the Middle East: Iran and Saudi Arabia" (2017). Open
Access Theses. 69.
• Rafael Bardaji, Religion, Power, and Chaos in the Middle East, 15 Eur. View 87-95 (2016).
• Raymond Garthoff, “Why did the Cold War arise, and why did it end?”, 16 Diplomatic
History 287-93 (1992).
• Scarlett Higgins, Purity of essence in the Cold War: Dr. Strangelove, Paranoia, and Bodily
Boundaries, Textual Practice, 32:5, 799-82 (2018) .
• Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughhead, “A U.S. Withdrawal will cause a Power Struggle in the
Middle East”, Foreign Policy, 17 Dec. 2019.

-NEWS CLIPPINGS REFERRED TO-

• Amanda Erickson, “What’s Behind the feud between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Power”, The
Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2017;
• Bayoumy, Yara; Ghobari, Mohammed (15 December 2014). "Iranian support seen crucial
for Yemen's Houthis". Reuters.
• De Borchgrave, Arnaud (22 October 2003). "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact:
Islamabad trades weapons technology for oil". The Washington Times.
• ET, “The Reality behind the Saudi-India Ties, Economic Times, 3 Nov. 2019.

10 | Page
• Harnden, Toby; Lamb, Christina (17 May 2015). "Saudis 'to get nuclear weapons'". The
Times.
• Johnson, Henry (30 October 2015). "Mapping the Deaths of Iranian Officers Across
Syria". Foreign Policy.
• Khalaji, Mehdi (27 June 2011). "Iran's Policy Confusion about Bahrain". The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy.
• Landler, Mark (8 May 2018). "Trump Withdraws U.S. From 'One-Sided' Iran Nuclear
Deal". The New York Times.
• Landry, Carole (30 April 2015). "Iran arming Yemen's Huthi rebels since 2009: UN
report". Yahoo News. Agence France-Presse
• Malsin, Jared. "Yemen Is the Latest Victim of the Increase in Iran-Saudi Arabia
Tension". Time (11 January 2016).
• Reardon, Martin (26 March 2015). "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 'Great Game' in Yemen".
Al Jazeera.
• Roe, Sam (28 January 2007). "An atomic threat made in America". Chicago Tribune.
• Saul, Jonathan; Hafezi, Parisa (21 February 2014). "Iran boosts military support in Syria to
bolster Assad". Reuters
• Schmitt, Eric; Worth, Robert F. (15 March 2012). "With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran
Seeks Wider Mideast Role". The New York Times.
• Wallace, Charles P. (3 August 1987). “Iran Asks Overthrow of Saudi Rulers Over Riots:
Tehran Stand on Mecca Clash Adds to Tensions; Police Accused of Following U.S.
Instructions”, Los Angeles Times.

-BOOKS REFERRED TO-

• Banafsheh Kayoush, “Saudi Arabia and Revolutionary Iran” in ‘Saudi Arabia and Iran:
Friends or Foes?’, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 39-40 (2016).
• Bowen, Wayne H. (2007). The History of Saudi Arabia.
• Cheryl Benard (1984). "The Government of God": Iran's Islamic Republic. Columbia
University Press.
• Faksh, Mahmud A. (1997). The Future of Islam in the Middle East.
• Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a–
Sunni Divide (New York, 2017).

11 | Page
• Harris, Ian; Mews, Stuart; Morris, Paul; Shepherd, John (1992). Contemporary Religions:
A World Guide.
• Murphy, David (2008). The Arab Revolt 1916–18: Lawrence Sets Arabia Ablaze.
• Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New
York & London, 2006).

12 | Page