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RACE,RIOTS,ANDREPORTING
TERRY ANN KNOPF
Cambridge, Massachusetts
over nine whites and about 39 blacks had been killed, some
300 buildings had been destroyed, and the property damage
was estimated at $400,000.
Some fifty years later a riot took place in Cleveland, Ohio,
under circumstances that were surprisingly similar. On July
28, 1968, in response to intelligence reports (later shown to
be rather shaky) that some blacks were about to stage an
armed uprising, the police sent several unmarked cars to the
area. A few hours later, a group of blacks emerged from a
house under surveillance. Almost at once, an intense gun
battle broke out between the police and the armed men.
Shortly after, sporadic looting and firebombing erupted and
continued for several days. By the time order had been
restored, 16,400 National Guardsmenhad been mobilized, at
least nine persons had been killed (including three police-
men), and the property damage losses were put at $1.5
million.
Immediately the Cleveland tragedy was described as a
deliberate plot against the police and said to signal a new
phase in the course of racial conflict. The Cleveland Press
(July 24, 1968) compared the violence in Cleveland to
guerrilla activity in Saigon and noted: "It didn't seem to be a
Watts, or a Detroit, or a Newark. Or even a Hough of two
years ago. No, this tragic night seemed to be part of a plan."
A reporter writing in the New York Times (July 28, 1968)
stated: "It marks perhaps the first documented case in recent
history of black, armed, and organized violence against the
police." Investigations later undertaken by a task force of the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at
Brandeis University, and the New York Times (which
reversed itself) cast serious doubts on the initial press reports,
while revealing the situation was far more complicated than
originally thought. The investigations suggested that, in all
probability, a series of provocative actions by the police prior
to the confrontation actually triggered the disorder.
Knopf / RACE, RIOTS, AND REPORTING [305]
reported that more than 6,000 blacks had left the city. In
fact, some blacks (though considerably under 6,000) did go
to St. Louis between May 29 and May 30, in all probability
to avoid trouble. But several days later, when the riot had
subsided, most returned to their homes. Newspapers also
overstated the situation in reporting that the mobs were
comprised of "10,000 blood-crazed whites." While the active
participants undoubtedly enjoyed the support of thousands
of bystanders along the streets, the groups of assailants were
actually quite small, usually comprised of twenty-five persons
at most.
Far more reprehensible and dangerous were the journalistic
lapses into rumor-mongering which exploited white fears.
Misreporting of testimony allegedly given at the coroner's
inquest provides an appropriate example. The St. Louis
Republic ran a banner headline: "25,000 Whites Were
'Doomed' in Negro Murder Plot." According to the account
that followed, the riot on July 2 had actually forestalled a
plot to massacre innocent women and children on July 4.
Prominent citizens were reportedly marked for assassination,
while blacks were supposedly making preparations to march
through the city, killing and plundering along the way. Other
newspapers added their own embellishments to the story.
The East St. Louis Daily Journal asserted that the invasion
army was to contain 1,500 men in three divisions. According
to its story, the invasion would have been carried out, were it
not for an alert police officer who discovered the plot. (How
convenient when the "invasion" failed to materialize!)
Following the publication of these stories, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch interviewed members of the coroner's jury and
found no evidence whatsoever to support charges of a plot.
Unfortunately, the net effect of such inflammatory stories
was to condone rather than explain the riot and to usher in
another tense period bordering on hysteria. In the weeks
following the riot, a powerful black invasion force was seen
everywhere. Frightened families were unable to sleep; some
[3101 JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES / MARCH 1974
WASHINGTON,D.C. (1919)
OMAHA(1919)
ELAINE,ARKANSAS(1919)
CHICAGO(1919)
Of all the race riots during "The Red Summer," the one
occurring in Chicago stands out as the most serious. The
violence raged for four days; 38 persons were killed, 23
blacks and 15 whites; about 1,000 persons were left
homeless.
In an exhaustive investigation made by the Chicago
Commission on Race Relations following the riot, no group
came in for more extensive criticism than the press. In a basic
sense, the press was accused of contributing to the poor state
of race relations by its handling of general news concerning
blacks. Studies conducted by the commission disclosed that
local newspapers tended to overemphasize crimes involving
blacks against whites, while underplaying crimes in which
whites were the aggressors against blacks (for example,
bombing incidents of homes in which blacks lived). The
effect was to convey a stereotyped picture to the reading
public in which the entire black race was branded as criminal.
With reference to the riot, much of the criticism concern-
ing the press centered on numerous instances in inaccuracy,
distortion, exaggeration, and sensationalism. For example,
several weeks before the riot, the press added to the tensions
in the community by misreporting an incident in which a
white saloon-keeper died of a heart attack. Accounts appear-
[316] JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES / MARCH 1974
ing in the local papers indicated that the man had been killed
by a black. That evening a raiding party of young whites
riding in an automobile fired on a group of blacks.
During and after the riot, the press continually echoed
rumors already circulating in the white community, thereby
giving them additional credence. The following list of
headlines from local newspapers is really no more than a
rundown of such rumors:
ALD. JOSEPH McDONOUGH TELLS HOW HE WAS SHOT AT ON SOUTH
SIDE VISIT-SAYS ENOUGH AMMUNITION IN SECTION TO LAST FOR
YEARS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE [Daily News, July 30, 1919].
NEGROES HAVE ARMS [Herald-Examiner, July 28, 1919 ].
FOUR BODIES IN BUBBLY CREEK [Daily News, July 29, 1919].
RED PLOT NEGRO REVOLT
I.W.W.BOMBPLANTFOUND ON SOUTHSIDE [Herald-Examiner,
January
4, 1920].
For more than a year before the riot in Los Angeles, the
local press, especially the Hearst newspapers, whipped up
anti-Mexican sentiment in the community-needlessly head-
lining every case in which a Mexican-American was arrested,
prominently displaying photographs of Mexican-Americansin
zoot-suits, and continually prodding the police to make more
arrests. The effect was to create a climate of fear and
reprisal-a conclusion reinforced by a content analysis of the
press undertaken by Turner and Surace (1956). For their
study the two researchers examined the Los Angeles Times,
the largest of the four dailies, considered responsibly con-
servative, and a newspaper with no connection with the
Hearst chain. The analysis spanned ten and one-half years,
from January 1933 until June 30, 1943, encompassing the
riot period. The findings showed the culmination of a trend
at the time of the riot in which the newspaper's references to
"Mexicans," evoking ambivalent reactions, tended to be
displaced by the term "zoot-suiter," a symbol with predom-
inantly negative connotations. Unlike the term "Mexican"
which, to some extent, conjured up visions of the distant and
romantic past, the latter phrase suggested only a sordid
picture of a social outcast, lacking in moral character and, as
befits a deviant individual, not entitled to the usual standards
of justice and fair play. The phrase was associated with sexual
offenses and other crimes, gangster activities, and even
[3181 JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES / MARCH 1974
FINDINGS
ROOTSOF MISREPORTING
the picture is the fact that these views have been modified-
but not to any great extent over time. In its section on public
opinion, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations (1922:
438-440) listed a number of beliefs held by whites against
blacks. Included in the list were the following:
NOTES
REFERENCES