BAIL Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, respondents.
International Law; Extradition; Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction.—Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.—At first
glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The
modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards
the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that
the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community; Fundamental among the rights
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the rights of every
person to life, liberty, and due process.—On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights
of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951), this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United States
of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.—The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling
in Purganan is in order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court
sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights.—In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal
criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of
Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state.—Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government.” Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by
treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It
is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of
the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
trial or punishment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
machinery of criminal law”—obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.—But while extradition is not a criminal
proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of
the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also “the machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary detention
of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We further note that Section 20
allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition”; and that release from provisional
arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is
received subsequently.” Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following
the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By any standard, detention for an extended period of more
than two (2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditee’s fundamental right to liberty;
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.—Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to
bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide
for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process,
however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings—in the latter, the standard of
due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the former, the
assumption is that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice; The prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
—The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that
the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
“temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should
be granted bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of
pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines
should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process; An extraditee
should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant
is satisfactorily met.—The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by
our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases—the potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing proof” that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.—
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given
the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not
a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case,
there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight
risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia,
Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99–95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order
dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20,
2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown
Colony of Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and
Convicted Persons.” It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and
became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three
(3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of
Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then
forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of
private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained
him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the
Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of
the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent.
The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99–95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed in the
same case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.”
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing
Civil Case No. 99–95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent
judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an
Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
“In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil
liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes
of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets
of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of
the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.”
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order,
but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing
that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be
impaired, thus:
“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this
is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether
a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does
not apply to extradition proceedings. It is “available only in criminal proceedings,”
thus:
“x x x. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt” (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September
17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended”
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only
in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion” (Sec. 18, Art.
VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on
bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It can not be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.”
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the
growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the
20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being
given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations;
and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is
now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are
limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past
century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations
of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations
and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members
of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the
rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed
to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a
court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise
been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who
are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted
bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no
crime, the Court opined that “To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has
committed the most serious crime known to law”; and that while deportation is not a
criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used “is the machinery of criminal law.”
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this
Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been
filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason
why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply
for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations
of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal
law of the requesting state or government.”
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created
by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment
for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It
is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor
is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.
Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee
and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for
the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition”; and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest
and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.”
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it
was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail.
 While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that
in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from
this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the “temporary detention” is the possibility of flight
of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear
and convincing evidence.” If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—A judge issuing a warrant for the provisional arrest of an extraditee may rely on the
request for provisional arrest accompanied by facsimile copies of the outstanding warrant of
arrest by the requesting government, a summary of the facts of the case against the extraditee,
particulars of his birth and address, and intention to request his provisional arrest and the reason
therefore. (Cuevas vs. Muñoz, 348 SCRA 542 [2000])
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. (Government of the United States vs. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 [2002])
Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1)
that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (Rodriguez vs. Hon. Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Manila, Br. 17, 483 SCRA 290 [2006])
——o0o——

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in

granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate
Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence”
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and
convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to

show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis
of “clear and convincing evidence.”
  mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer
the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.”
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387. September 10, 1997.
Same; Same; Same; Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of
FLAVIANO B. CORTES, complainant, vs. JUDGE SEGUNDO B. CATRAL, Regional guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised
Trial Court, Branch 7, Aparri, Cagayan, respondent. only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.—The reason for this is plain.
Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
Criminal Law; Right to Bail; Words and Phrases; Presumption of Innocence; “Bail,”
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
Defined; Bail is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt
subject to punishment prior to conviction.—Bail is the security required by the court and given by
be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce
the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time
evidence in his own rebuttal.
and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to
honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to
Same; Same; Same; The court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction.
of the evidence for the prosecution, otherwise the order may be invalidated because the
summary of the evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s evaluation of the
Same; Same; Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of
evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution
hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his
and the defense.—Worth noting, too, is the fact that the order granting the application, as well as
recommendation.—Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The
the reduction for bail in the aforecited cases, did not contain a summary of the evidence
amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet
presented by the prosecution. In Criminal Case No. 07-874, respondent only arrived at the
reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive.
conclusion that “the evidence was not so strong to warrant the fixation of said amount” and the
Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is
observation that: “When the hearing of this petition was called, some legal skirmishes arose
required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his
between the Prosecutor and the Defense Counsel, after which, the prosecutor out of
recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account
humanitarian reason yielded and manifested that he is amenable that the accused be admitted
a number of factors such as the applicant’s character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or
to bail in the amount of P200,000.00” in Criminal Case No. 08-866. Well settled in a number of
whether he is a fugitive from justice.
cases is the rule that the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, otherwise the order granting or denying bail may be invalidated
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A summary hearing means such brief and speedy
because the summary of the evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s evaluation
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the
the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
prosecution and the defense.
—A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
Same; Same; The right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file
try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.—The procedural lapse of
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case No.
further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
sum of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the accused were still at large as he even
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
had to direct their arrest in the same order where he simultaneously granted them bail. At this
examination.
juncture, there is a need to reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed
of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
Same; Same; Judges; The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where
premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leaves the application of bail to the sound
to be curtailed.
discretion of the court.—In the recent case of Inocencio Basco v. Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, this
Court ruled that “x x x the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
Same; Same; As long as in fixing the amount of bail the court is guided by the purpose
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
for which bail is required, that is, to secure the appearance of the accused to answer charges
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce
brought against him, the decision of the court to grant bail in the sum it deems appropriate will
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has
not be interfered with.—In Criminal Case No. 08-915 for homicide filed against accused Nilo de
been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution
Rivera, complainant alleges that the amount of P14,800.00 granted by respondent as bailbond
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
of the accused is too low. Respondent judge stresses that the amount was recommended by the
prosecutor and not motu proprio by the trial court. Respondent added that the amount of bail
was appropriate inasmuch as it was fixed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Section 9
of Administrative Circular 12-94. As long as in fixing the amount of bail, the court is guided by
the purpose for which bail is required, that is, to secure the appearance of the accused to
answer charges brought against him, the decision of the court to grant bail in the sum it deems
appropriate will not be interfered with.
Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance; A judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law if
he grants bail in a murder case without conducting the requisite hearing.—In sum, we find
respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail
to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 07-874 and 08-866 without having conducted the
requisite hearing. It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged
with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is
no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court
itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the
regular seminars conducted for judges.
Same; Same; Same; Duties of Judge in Bail Applications.—Be that as it may, we
reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed: “1. In all
cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8); 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19). Otherwise, the petition
should be denied.”
Same; Same; Same; Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if
litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charged with a deficiency
in their grasp of legal principles.—With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the
Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith,
but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail
having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties
assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.
Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the
members of the Bench cannot justly be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Once again, the Court is asked to elucidate on the rules in the grant of the application
for bail.
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B.
Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed as
follows:
“1.He granted bail in murder cases without hearing: People v. Duerme, et al.,
Criminal Case No. 07-893 for murder and People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag,
Criminal Case No. 08-866 for murder; These two cases are like the case
of Teresita Q. Tucay v. Judge Roger Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 being classified
as heinous crimes there (sic) are supposedly unbailable;
2.On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda’s Criminal Case No.
11-6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm was raffled and assigned to his sala.
The provincial prosecutor granted a bailbond of P180,000.00 but it was reduced
by Judge Segundo Catral for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it—no hearing
has been made from 1995 to the present because according to his clerks, he is
holding it in abeyance. This Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda is one of the
goons of Julio ‘Bong’ Decierto his nephew who has a pending murder case;
3.Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted
with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low.
It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio ‘Bong’ Decierto;
4.Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio ‘Bong’ Decierto was sued for
concubinage and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy
Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge
Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in
Aparri spread that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban’s
house to get the envelope” ;
In his comment dated August 16, 1996, respondent judge branded the complainant
as a “self anointed concern (sic) citizen” of Aparri, Cagayan who has gained notoriety
as a character assassinator, a public nuisance and most often called speaker for hire
during election time. Respondent further laments that “a ‘ghost lawyer’ is taking
advantage of the notoriety of Mr. Flaviano Cortes by manipulating him like a robot and
letting him loose like a mad dog barking on the wrong tree and biting everybody
including the other members of the bench.”
With regard to the first charge, respondent judge, in his comment, clarified that
Criminal Case No. 07-893 is the case of People v. Willie Bumanglag y Magno for
frustrated homicide pending in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri where
the presiding judge is Hon. Virgilio Alameda. However, if the complainant is referring
to Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et al., Criminal Case No. 874 for murder pending in
Branch 7 of the RTC where respondent was then designated as presiding judge,
respondent stresses that the provincial prosecutor recommended P200,000.00 as
bailbond for each of the accused. Subsequently, in a motion for reduction of bailbond,
the resolution of the motion was submitted to the sound discretion of the court. The
court, “mindful of the fact that the prosecution is banking on weak circumstantial
evidence and guided by the factors prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular
12-94  issued an order for reduction of the bailbond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00.”
In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for murder, the
inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no bail recommended.
When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the
provincial prosecutor, the information made no mention of a bailbond. In the hearing
of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal
opted not to introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00
instead. Respondent judge “acting on the said recommendation and again guided by
the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the
evidence extant on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar
Carrao.” A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carrao’s letter dated September
3, 1996 addressed to the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by
the respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused without
conducting any hearing.
As regards the third charge concerning the illegal possession of firearm against
Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda, the bailbond recommended by the prosecutor
was P180,000.00. Accused, through counsel Atty. Bulseco, filed a motion for
reduction of the bailbond to P30,000.00. Counsel even vouched and guaranteed the
appearance of the accused in court, whenever required. The motion for reduction of
bailbond was submitted without serious opposition and the prosecutor “mindful
perhaps that there is no corpus of the crime as no firearm was caught or taken from
the possession of the accused merely submitted the same to the discretion of the
court.”
In Criminal Case No. 08-915 concerning a homicide case against Barangay
Captain Nilo de Rivero, respondent judge says that the bailbond of P14,800.00 was
recommended by the acting Officer-In-Charge (OIC) as contained in his manifestation
accompanying the information. Respondent judge then “acting on the
recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines in
fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on
record is merely circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the commission of
crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.”
Finally, respondent judge says the accusation regarding the acquittal of one
Jimmy Siriban is simply the product of a dirty imagination and is a dirty trick intended
to defame the name of his family by rumor mongers who are unwilling to come out in
the open to substantiate their accusation.
On September 9, 1996, respondent submitted his additional comment dated
September 5, 1996 informing the Office of the Court Administrator that Criminal Case
No. 07-784, referred to in the letter complainant (sic) of Mr. Flaviano Cortes, has
already been dismissed by Judge Virgilio Alameda, RTC, Branch 07, Aparri Cagayan,
in his order dated August 16, 1996. Respondent judge stresses that, as can be
gleaned from the penultimate paragraph of said order, the accused, despite reduction
of their bailbonds, remained detention prisoners because of their failure to post bond.
In his original comment, respondent stated, among others, that the evidence against
the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874 was based on weak circumstantial evidence
which prompted the court to grant them a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00.
Respondent judge noted that the complaining witnesses never appeared despite the
fact that the case had been set for hearing several times.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the
complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant that would
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against respondent judge.
In recommending the dismissal of the complaint against respondent judge, the Office
of the Court Administrator noted, “x x x complainant failed to show any indication that
bad faith motivated the actuation of the respondent in granting and reducing the
amount of bail of the accused in some of the criminal cases that were assigned in his
sala. x x x it is crystal clear that the increase or reduction of bail rests in the sound
discretion of the court depending upon the particular circumstances of the case. It
should be noted further that the reduction in the amount of bail of the accused in the
criminal cases in question were all done by the respondent with the knowledge and
conformity of the Public Prosecutor concerned. Moreover, the actions taken by the
respondent were in the exercise of judicial discretion that may not be assailed in an
administrative proceedings (sic).”
We do not agree.
Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that
the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to
answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor
the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to
conviction.
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount
fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet
reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be
excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable
notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must
be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is
required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant’s character
and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.
When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court states: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action.”
Consequently, when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into
account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but
primarily to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against
the accused.
“A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry
as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.”
Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with
murder, without having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong.
In the case of People v. Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et al., Criminal Case No. 874,
accused Ahmed Duerme together with four other persons were charged with the
crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended the sum of P200,000.00 as
bailbond for each accused. The records do not reveal whether a hearing was actually
conducted on the application for bail although respondent judge implies that there
was one, stating that “acting on this recommendation of the provincial prosecutor and
taking into account the guidelines prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular
12-94, the court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of P200,000.00 for
the provisional liberty of each of the accused.” Subsequently, counsel for accused
Ahmed Duerme filed a motion for reduction of bail. The “hearing” of the motion was
conducted on August 21, 1995 with the prosecution, not having interposed any
opposition, and submitting the resolution of the motion to the sound discretion of the
court instead. Respondent judge then issued an order granting a reduced bailbond of
P50,000.00 for accused Ahmed Duerme inasmuch as “the evidence was not so
strong to warrant the fixation of said amount.” Respondent judge, in his comment,
disclosed that the prosecution was banking on weak circumstantial evidence since
there was no eyewitness to the commission of the offense as borne out from the
affidavits and sworn statements of the prosecution witnesses. The order granting the
reduced bailbond, however, did not contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution.
In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case No. 08-866, accused
Bumanglag was charged with murder in a criminal complaint filed before the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Ana, Cagayan. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, the inquest judge issued a warrant of the arrest for the accused with no
bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court, the
information made no mention of a bailbond. Consequently, accused through counsel
filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce
evidence and recommended the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge,
“acting on said recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9,
Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence extant on record,”
issued an order granting bail to the accused in the sum of P200,000.00. Unable to
post the said bond, accused through counsel filed a motion to reduce bail. In the
course of the hearing of the petition, the public prosecutor manifested that he had no
objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge, then
“guided by the factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on record” reduced
the bail bond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 as recommended by the prosecutor.
Once again, the order granting the bail of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail
bond of P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
Respondent judge insists that in the aforecited cases, a hearing was actually
conducted on the application and motion for reduction of bail, but the public
prosecutor opted not to introduce evidence and submitted the resolution of the
petition, as well as the motion for reduction of bail, to the sound discretion of the court
instead. Respondent observed that since it is a basic principle of procedure that the
prosecution of criminal cases is under the direct control and supervision of the fiscal
or prosecutor, would it be procedurally proper for the court to compel prosecutor
Apolinar Carrao, the public prosecutor assigned in the case of People v. Rodrigo
Bumanglag, Criminal Case No. 08-866, to prove the evidence of guilt of the accused
for the crime of murder when the prosecutor candidly admitted in open court that in
his honest view, the strength of evidence on hand for the state can only prove the
crime of homicide and not murder?
In the recent case of Inocencio Basco v. Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, this Court ruled
that “x x x the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the
sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses
to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The
importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court
ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of
guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.”
The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may
rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.
Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce evidence in his own rebuttal.
Respondent judge justifies the grant of bail in the two cases by stating that the
prosecutor recommended the grant of bail. Respondent also added that in the case
of People v. Ahmed Duerme, there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the
offense as borne out from the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses. As a
matter of fact, the case had already been dismissed for failure to prosecute by Judge
Alameda inasmuch as the prosecutor himself admitted that there was lack of interest
on the part of the witnesses to pursue the case and not a single witness ever went to
court to see him.
The fact that Criminal Case No. 07-874 was subsequently dismissed by Judge
Alameda does not completely exculpate respondent judge. We need only remind him
that he is not bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits and
sworn statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly
be the basis for determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong.
Worth noting, too, is the fact that the order granting the application, as well as the
reduction for bail in the aforecited cases, did not contain a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. In Criminal Case No. 07-874, respondent only arrived
at the conclusion that “the evidence was not so strong to warrant the fixation of said
amount” and the observation that: “When the hearing of this petition was called, some
legal skirmishes arose between the Prosecutor and the Defense Counsel, after which,
the prosecutor out of humanitarian reason yielded and manifested that he is
amenable that the accused be admitted to bail in the amount of P200,000.00” in
Criminal Case No. 08-866. Well settled in a number of cases is the rule that the
court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, otherwise the order granting or denying bail may be invalidated because
the summary of the evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that even
though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet
to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent
evidently knew that the accused were still at large as he even had to direct their arrest
in the same order where he simultaneously granted them bail. At this juncture, there is
a need to reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed.
With regard to the third charge filed against respondent judge, we adopt the
findings of the Office of the Court Administrator that the complainant failed to show
that bad faith motivated the actuation of respondent judge in reducing the amount of
bail in Criminal Case No. 11250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm against Barangay
Captain Rodolfo Castaneda. Respondent judge, in granting and subsequently
reducing the recommended bailbond of P180,000.00 considered the fact that there
was no corpus of the crime as no firearm was taken from the possession of the
accused, as well as the fact that counsel for the accused vouched and guaranteed
the appearance of the accused in court whenever required. Moreover, records show
that, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, the trial of the case had already
been set for hearing but on more than one occasion, the defense counsel, as well as
the prosecutor, both moved to have it reset.
In Criminal Case No. 08-915 for homicide filed against accused Nilo de Rivera,
complainant alleges that the amount of P14,800.00 granted by respondent as
bailbond of the accused is too low. Respondent judge stresses that the amount was
recommended by the prosecutor and not motu proprio by the trial court. Respondent
added that the amount of bail was appropriate inasmuch as it was fixed in accordance
with the guidelines set forth in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94. As long as
in fixing the amount of bail, the court is guided by the purpose for which bail is
required, that is, to secure the appearance of the accused to answer charges brought
against him, the decision of the court to grant bail in the sum it deems appropriate will
not be interfered with.
With respect to the last charge, we adopt the findings of the Office of the Court
Administrator that there is nothing in the record to substantiate the allegation of the
complainant that the acquittal of a certain Jimmy Siriban by respondent judge was
tainted with irregularity. Other than his bare allegation, complainant has yet to present
evidence as to any irregularity committed by respondent judge in acquitting Mr.
Siriban.
In sum, we find respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 07-874 and 08-
866 without having conducted the requisite hearing. It is indeed surprising, not to say,
alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative cases
filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence
on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its
Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular
seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of
the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
 “1.In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2.Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra)
3.Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4.If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise, the petition should be
denied.”

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges
are enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot
be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense
is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having
already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties
assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only
be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly
be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral is

hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with the WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Note.—The judicial function of determining probable cause does not carry with it a motu
proprio review of the recommendation of the prosecutor in a capital offense that no bail shall be
granted. (De Los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA 85 [1995])

——o0o——
 A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845. October 5, 2011.
[Formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-RTJ]
ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an
accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want to release, a
hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion.—Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a
merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is to ensure
the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail
serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to
society or whom the judge may not want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before
the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in
criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: “No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of criminal action.”
Same; Same; The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its
evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.—Even where there is no petition for bail
in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate
and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the
trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The
Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation
of due process occurs.
BERSAMIN, J.:
It is axiomatic that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
without a hearing upon notice to the Prosecution. Any judge who so allows bail is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules, and is subject to appropriate
administrative sanctions.
Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta,
a prosecution for murder arising from the killing of Felomino O. Occasion, charges
Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose Branch
Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled for arraignment and trial, with gross ignorance
of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for the latter’s failure to set a
hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after
allowing bail.
Antecedents
On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino
Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail.
Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag
on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for
murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation
for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to
Judge Infante’s Branch.
On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta,
and another releasing Ancheta from custody.
On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge
Infante, filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel
Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew
Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An
Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent motion).
In the hearing of the very urgent motion on April 29, 2003, only Atty. Gacal and
his collaborating counsel appeared in court. Judge Infante directed the public
prosecutor to comment on the very urgent motion within five days from notice, after
which the motion would be submitted for resolution with or without the comment.
Ancheta, through counsel, opposed, stating that the motion did not bear the
conformity of the public prosecutor.
At the arraignment of Ancheta set on May 15, 2003, the parties and their counsel
appeared, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., the assigned public
prosecutor, did not appear because he was then following up his regular appointment
as the Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani Province. Accordingly, the arraignment was
reset to May 29, 2003.
On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion on the
ground that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public
prosecutor, and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been
authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court.
Judge Infante directed that the consideration of the bail issue be held in abeyance
until after the public prosecutor had submitted a comment, because he wanted to
know the position of the public prosecutor on Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion having
been filed without the approval of the public prosecutor.
On May 29, 2003, the public prosecutor appeared, but did not file any comment.
Thereupon, Atty. Gacal sought authority to appear as a private prosecutor. The public
prosecutor did not oppose Atty. Gacal’s request. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the
reconsideration of the grant of bail to Ancheta. In response, Judge Infante required
the public prosecutor to file his comment on Atty. Gacal’s motion for reconsideration,
and again reset the arraignment of the accused to June 20, 2003.
On June 4, 2003, the public prosecutor filed a comment, stating that he had
recommended bail as a matter of course; that the orders dated April 23, 2003
approving bail upon his recommendation and releasing the accused were proper; and
that his recommendation of bail was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutor’s right
to a bail hearing.
By June 20, 2003, when no order regarding the matter of bail was issued, Atty.
Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence
manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail.
In his motion for inhibition, Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently
required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a
judicial function; that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he
should have acted upon it with dispatch, because it was unusual that several persons
charged with murder were being detained while Ancheta was let free on bail even
without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the integrity of Judge
Infante’s court in peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration included the
alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his
refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted gross ignorance of law.
Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a
judge either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because
he did not at all know how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will
rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of a judge; that at one time,
he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or without the comment
of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed that the bail issue be
submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve the issue
only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor; that he should not be too
dependent on the public prosecutor’s comment considering that the resolution of the
matter of bail was entirely within his discretion as the judge; and that the granting of
bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for
that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
Finally, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge Infante and the public prosecutor were both
guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act  for giving undue advantage
to Ancheta by allowing him bail without his filing a petition for bail and without a
hearing being first conducted.
On July 9, 2003, Judge Infante definitively denied Atty. Gacal’s very urgent
motion.
On August 5, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCAd) received from
the Office of the Ombudsman the indorsement of the administrative complaint Atty.
Gacal had filed against Judge Infante (CPL-M-03-0581 entitled Gacal v. Infante, et
al.), forwarding the records of the administrative case for appropriate action to the
Supreme Court as the exclusive administrative authority over all courts, their judges
and their personnel.
On August 21, 2003, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) required Judge Infante to comment on the administrative
complaint against him, and to show cause within 10 days from receipt why he should
not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of
the Bar for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility pursuant to the resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
dated September 17, 2002.
On October 6, 2003, the OCAd received Judge Infante’s comment dated
September 22, 2003, by which he denied any transgression in the granting of bail to
Ancheta, stating the following:
2. At the outset, as a clarificatory note, accused Faustino Ancheta is out on
bail, not because he applied for bail duly granted by the court but because he
posted the required bail since in the first place the Fiscal recommended bail, duly
approved by the Undersigned, in the amount of P400,000.00. Underscoring is
made to stress the fact that accused Ancheta had actually never filed an
application for bail. Perforce, the court had nothing to hear, grant or deny an
application/motion/petition for bail since none was filed by the accused.
3. Thus, the twin Orders dated April 23, 2003 are exactly meant as an
approval of the bailbond (property) posted by accused Ancheta, it being found to
be complete and sufficient. They are not orders granting an application for bail,
as misconstrued by private prosecutor. (Certified true machine copy of the twin
Orders dated April 23 marked as Annex-2 and 2-a are hereto attached)
4.  On April 25, 2003, private complainant in the cited criminal case, thru
counsel (the Gacal, Gacal and Gacal Law Office), filed a “Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration or in the alternative Very Urgent Motion for this Court to Motu
Proprio Correct an Apparent Error,” praying that the twin Orders dated April 23,
2003 be reconsidered. (Certified machine copy of the said urgent motion marked
as Annex 3 is hereto attached)
5. On April 29, 2003, during the hearing on motion, the private complainant
and his counsel (private prosecutor) appeared. The Fiscal was not present. The
court nonetheless ordered the Fiscal to file his comment/s on the said motion.
The accused thru private counsel in an open court hearing opposed the subject
motion inasmuch as the same bears no conformity of the Fiscal. In that hearing,
the court advised the private prosecutor to coordinate and secure the conformity
of the Fiscal in filing his motion. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated April
29, 2003, marked as Annex 4 is hereto attached.)
6. On May 15, 2003, the scheduled date for the arraignment of accused
Ancheta, the parties and private prosecutor appeared. Again, the 1st Asst.
Provincial Fiscal, Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., failed to appear who, being the next
 highest in rank in their Office, was processing his application for regular
appointment as Provincial Fiscal of Sarangani Province. He was then the Acting
Provincial Fiscal – Designate in view of the appointment of former Provincial
Fiscal Laureano T. Alzate as RTC Judge in Koronadal City. Due to the absence
of the Fiscal and the motion for reconsideration then pending for resolution, the
scheduled arraignment was reset to May 29, 2003, per Order dated May 15,
2003, (certified machine copy of which marked as Annex 5 is hereto attached).
7.  On May 21, 2003, the Undersigned resolved to deny for being pro forma
the pending motion for reconsideration. As held in the Order of denial, it was
found that the private prosecutor was not duly authorized in writing by the
provincial prosecutor to prosecute the said criminal case, nor was he judicially
approved to act as such in violation of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The bail issue, however, was held in abeyance until
submission of the comment thereon by the Fiscal as this Presiding Judge would
like then to know the position of the Fiscal anent to the cited motion without his
approval. The arraignment was reset to June 20, 2003. Again, the private
prosecutor was orally advised to coordinate and secure the approval of the Fiscal
in filing his motions/pleadings. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated May
21, 2003 marked as Annex 6 hereto attached)
8.  On June 4, 2003, the Fiscal finally filed his “Comment on the Very
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by private complainant thru counsel
(private prosecutor). Consistently, the Fiscal in his comment recommended bail
as a matter of course and that he claimed that Orders dated April 23, 2003
approving bail upon his recommendation are proper, waiving in effect his right for
a bail hearing. (Certified true machine copy of the Fiscal’s comment marked as
Annex-7 is hereto attached).
Under date of February 16, 2004, the OCAd recommended after investigation that
the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that Judge Infante be
fined in the amount of P20,000.00, viz.:
EVALUATION: The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law (Sec. 13,
Art. III).
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged
with a capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when the evidence is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114).
With the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure as a backdrop, the question is: Can respondent judge in granting bail
to the accused dispense with the hearing of Application for Bail?
The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 03-61, entitled Benito M.
Occasion vs. Faustino Ancheta for Murder was conducted by Judge Gregorio R.
Balanag, Jr., of MCTC, Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani. Finding the existence of
probable cause that an offense of Murder was committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof, he transmitted his resolution to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, together with the records of the case, with No Bail Recommended.
Upon review of the resolution of the investigating judge by the OIC of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani, he filed the information for Murder
against accused Faustino Ancheta but a bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional
liberty of the latter was recommended. Relying on the recommendation of the
Fiscal, respondent judge granted the Application for Bail of the accused.
The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law,
Murder is considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted
in a hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable before
a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or
strong (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial
duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an application for bail is filed if the
accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the
evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if
the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be granted.
Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting the
application for bail filed by the accused (Annex “C”) based merely on the order
issued by the Fiscal (Annex “A”) recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the affidavits of
the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right
and authority to determine whether the evidence against the accused who is
charged with capital offense is strong or not.
After the respondent judge has approved the property bond posted by the
accused, the complainant, as private prosecutor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Cancel Bailbond or in the alternative, Very Urgent Motion
to Motu Proprio correct an Apparent Error. On the hearing of the Motion on 29
April 2003, the Fiscal was absent but he (the Fiscal) was given five (5) days from
receipt of the order within which to file his comment and, with or without comment
the incident is deemed submitted for resolution and, hearing of the Motion was
reset to May 15, 2003. But the Fiscal again failed to appear on said date and, the
arraignment of the accused was set on 29 May 2003. On 21 May 2003,
respondent judge resolved to deny the Motion on the ground that the private
prosecutor was not authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution’s Office
or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case, subject to the approval
of the court, pursuant to Sect. 5, Rule 110 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The need for an authority in writing from the Chief of the Prosecution’s Office
or Regional State Prosecutor to the Private Prosecutor to prosecute the case,
subject to the approval of the court, contemplates of a situation wherein there is
no regular prosecutor assigned the court, or the prosecutor assigned, due to
heavy work schedule, cannot attend to the prosecution of pending criminal cases
to expedite disposition of the case. This provision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not prevent the offended party who did not reserve, waive nor
institute separate civil action, from intervening in the case through a private
prosecutor.
Intervention of the offended party in Criminal Action—Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 11, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense (Sec. 16, Rule 110 [Supra]).
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives civil action,
 reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action (Sec. 1 (a), Rule 111 [Supra]).
The offended party in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 did not reserve his right to
institute separate civil action, he did not waive such right and did not file civil
action prior to the criminal action, so the offended party may under the law
intervene as a matter of right.
The authority to intervene includes actual conduct of trial under the control of
the Fiscal which includes the right to file pleadings. According to respondent
judge, he advised the private prosecutor to coordinate with the fiscal and secure
his approval in accord with the mandate of Section, 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rule of Criminal Procedure: On this point, respondent judge again erred. The
right of the offended party to intervene is conferred by law and the approval of
the Fiscal or even the court is not all necessary (Sec. 1 (a), Rule 111, [Supra]).
Respondent Judge, however, is correct when he stated that the motions filed by
the private prosecutor should be with the conformity of the Fiscal.
Respondent judge’s errors are basic such that his acts constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
RECOMMENDATION:  Respectfully recommended for the consideration of
the Honorable Court is the recommendation that the instant I.P.I. be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter and respondent Judge be held ordered to pay
a fine of P20,000.00.”
On March 31, 2004, the Court directed that the administrative case be docketed
as a regular administrative matter.
On December 01, 2004,  the Court denied Atty. Gacal’s ancillary prayer to
disqualify Judge Infante from trying Criminal Case No. 1138-03 pending resolution of
this administrative matter.
Ruling
We approve and adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCAd,
considering that they are well substantiated by the records. We note that Judge
Infante did not deny that he granted bail for the provisional release of Ancheta in
Criminal Case No. 1138-03 without conducting the requisite bail hearing.
I The convergence of the foregoing factors—absence of motion for admission
Bail hearing was mandatory in Criminal Case No. 1138-03
Judge Infante would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting
that the hearing was no longer necessary considering that the accused had not filed a
petition for bail; that inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed by the
accused, his twin orders of April 23, 2003 were not orders granting an application for
bail, but were instead his approval of the bail bond posted; and that Atty. Gacal’s very
urgent motion and other motions and written submissions lacked the requisite written
conformity of the public prosecutor, rendering them null and void.
We cannot relieve Judge Infante from blame and responsibility.
The willingness of Judge Infante to rely on the mere representation of the public
prosecutor that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutor’s recommendation had
been proper, and that his (public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in effect
waived the need for a bail hearing perplexes the Court. He thereby betrayed an
uncommon readiness to trust more in the public prosecutor’s judgment than in his
own judicious discretion as a trial judge. He should not do so.
Judge Infante made the situation worse by brushing aside the valid
remonstrations expressed in Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion thusly:
“This Court is not unaware that the charge of murder being a capital offense
is not bailable xxx
xxxx
The phrase “xxx application for admission to bail xxx” is not an irrelevant but
a significant infusion in the cited rule (section 8), the plain import of which is that
bail hearing is preceded by a motion/petition for admission to bail filed by a
detained accused himself or thru counsel.
The peculiar feature of the instant case, however, is the absence of a
petition/motion for admission to bail filed by the herein accused. On the
contrary, it is the consistent position of the fiscal to recommend bail since
the prosecution evidence being merely circumstantial, is not strong for the
purpose of granting bail. xxx. This court believes that bail hearing, albeit
necessary in the grant of bail involving capital offense, is not at all times
and in all instances essential to afford the party the right to due process
especially so, when the fiscal in this case was given reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, and yet he maintained the propriety of grant
of bail without need of hearing since the prosecution evidence is not
strong for the purpose of granting bail.
Further, while it is preponderant of judicial experience to adopt the fiscal’s
recommendation in bail fixing, this court, however, had in addition and in accord
with Section 6(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, evaluated the
record of the case, and only upon being convinced and satisfied that the
prosecution evidence as contained in the affidavits of all the prosecution
witnesses, no one being an eyewitness are merely circumstantial evidence, that
this court in the exercise of sound discretion allowed the accused to post bail.
xxxx
to bail filed by the accused, the recommendation of the fiscal to grant bail, the pro
forma motion of the private prosecutor for lack of prior approval from the fiscal
and this court’s evaluation of the records—sufficiently warrants the grant of bail
to herein accused.”
Judge Infante specifically cited judicial experience as sanctioning his adoption
and approval of the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the fixing of bail. Yet, it
was not concealed from him that the public prosecutor’s recommendation had been
mainly based on the documentary evidence adduced,15 and on the public prosecutor’s
misguided position that the evidence of guilt was weak because only circumstantial
evidence had been presented. As such, Judge Infante’s unquestioning echoing of the
public prosecutor’s conclusion about the evidence of guilt not being sufficient to deny
bail did not justify his dispensing with the bail hearing.
Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a
merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is
to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial;
and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an
accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want to
release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a
capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that:
“No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted
to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action.”
In Cortes v. Catral, therefore, the Court has outlined the following duties of the
judge once an application for bail is filed, to wit:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless or whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise, the petition should be
denied. [emphasis supplied]
II
Judge Infante disregarded rules and guidelines
in Criminal Case No. 1138-03
Ostensibly, Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines
on the matter of bail.
1.
In case no application for bail is filed,
bail hearing was not dispensable
Judge Infante contends that a bail hearing in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 was not
necessary because the accused did not file an application for bail; and because the
public prosecutor had recommended bail.
Judge Infante’s contention is unwarranted.
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03,
a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime.
The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence;
otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant
dispensing with the hearing. The public prosecutor’s recommendation of bail was not
material in deciding whether to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For one, the
public prosecutor’s recommendation, albeit persuasive, did not necessarily bind the
trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or not was
vested. Whatever the public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail,
was non-binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a showing that the
evidence of guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become
unavoidably controlled by the Prosecution.
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down
by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable.
He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he
could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was
weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance
of the law and the rules. 
2.
Public prosecutor’s failure to oppose
application for bail or to adduce evidence
did not dispense with hearing
That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it
recommended bail, and that the Prosecution did not want to adduce evidence were
irrelevant, and did not dispense with the bail hearing. The gravity of the charge in
Criminal Case No. 1138-03 made it still mandatory for Judge Infante to conduct a bail
hearing in which he could have made on his own searching and clarificatory
questions from which to infer the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. He
should not have readily and easily gone along with the public prosecutor’s opinion
that the evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was not strong enough to deny bail;
else, he might be regarded as having abdicated from a responsibility that was his
alone as the trial judge.
Judge Infante’s holding that circumstantial evidence of guilt was of a lesser weight
than direct evidence in the establishment of guilt was also surprising. His training and
experience should have cautioned him enough on the point that the lack or absence
of direct evidence did not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused could not
anymore be proved, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, could supplant the
absence of direct evidence.22 In short, evidence of guilt was not necessarily weak
because it was circumstantial.
Instead, Judge Infante should have assiduously determined why the Prosecution
refused to satisfy its burden of proof in the admission of the accused to bail. Should
he have found that the public prosecutor’s refusal was not justified, he could have
then himself inquired on the nature and extent of the evidence of guilt for the purpose
of enabling himself to ascertain whether or not such evidence was strong. He could
not have ignored the possibility that the public prosecutor might have erred in
assessing the evidence of guilt as weak. At any rate, if he found the Prosecution to be
uncooperative, he could still have endeavored to determine on his own the existence
of such evidence, with the assistance of the private prosecutor.
3.
Judge Infante’s granting of bail without a hearing was
censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional
competence. His role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of
the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by
incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
hearing. To accord with such precedents, the Court prescribes a fine of P20,000.00
on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.
WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINE him in the amount of
P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of
another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for
proper dissemination to all trial judges.
SO ORDERED.
Note.—If denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of
the jury. (Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471 [2008])
——o0o—— 

In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of
bail in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and
the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.27 He well knew that the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial
discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a
hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
Prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his
granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused.
Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

III
Imposable Penalty

We next determine the penalty imposable on Judge Infante for his gross
ignorance of the law and the rules.

The Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 on the respondent judge in Docena-

Caspe v. Bugtas. In that case, the respondent judge granted bail to the two accused
who had been charged with murder without first conducting a hearing. Likewise,
in Loyola v. Gabo, the Court fined the respondent judge in the similar amount of
P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused in a murder case without the requisite bail
 G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010. expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending
appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules
with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. Neither can it be correctly
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an
error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
trial.—Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
been proven, in the “dubious interval,” often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial
liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Same; Same; Appeals; The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors
in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.—Petitioner only points out the Court of
Same; Same; An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to
Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
pay a debt to society he has never owed; Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused;
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. In this connection, Lee v. People, 393
In the exercise of discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the proper courts are to be
SCRA 397 (2002) is apropos: … Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
discretion correctible by certiorari.
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately
Same; Same; Penalties; The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two
unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously
exceeding six years—the first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never
paragraph, and the second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail
circumstances.—The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first
case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a
scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism,
compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty
quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized
circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while
flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the
under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at
accused. Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending
least one of the said circumstances. The implications of this distinction are discussed with
appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
an authority in remedial law: Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
accused may be summarized in the following rules: x x x x x x x x x e. After conviction by the
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction
Same; Judgments; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; Grave
by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical
than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction—ordinary abuse of discretion is
is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x.
insufficient.—It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or
in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
Same; Same; Judicial Discretion; Words and Phrases; Judicial discretion has been
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
defined as “choice”—choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly
infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker”; The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the
end of discretion.—Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-
finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its
“discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs
the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue—whether
any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present. However, judicial discretion has been
defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined
rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion
and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in
all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Laws and rules should not be interpreted in
such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences.—Laws and rules should not
be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd
situation will result from adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by
the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed
bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the
penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where
the penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be made only if any of the five
bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The development over time of the rules reveals an
orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal—bail pending appeal
should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.—The
development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach
to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail
pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment—pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-
negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.—A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has
authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
situations. More importantly, it reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal” configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction.
Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant
to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates
the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be
as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The present inclination of the rules on criminal
procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States
where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.—The present
inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the
approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural
provisions on bail emanated. While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless
shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic
societies. In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion—particularly with respect to
extending bail—should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.
In fact, it has even been pointed out that “grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5.”
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The importance attached to conviction is
due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail.—This Court has been guided by the
following: The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that
the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends—from then on, the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.—After conviction by the trial court, the presumption
of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must
be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was
in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a
stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is
likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long
delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to
flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite
of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes.

CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his
release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the
answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the
accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the “dubious interval,” often years
long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced
to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is
admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate
court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted
accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never
owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest
in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to
efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. On the
other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime
serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized societal interests in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from court
custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of
delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending
appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that
discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but
with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
been in fact convicted by the trial court.
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.” Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. It found that petitioner.
“… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his
continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life
in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent
him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly
preferred to be attended by his personal physician.”
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be
allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s
conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima
facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application
for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but
not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending
appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for
more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
 Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. a capital offense was strong.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
We disagree.
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional
circumstance of reiteration; Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the
valid justification;
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon; from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s
of flight if released on bail; or urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal. Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is
case.” (emphasis supplied)
such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in
must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for
reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
six years’ imprisonment should automatically be granted.
at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari  to prosper,
there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
discretion.
substantive rules.
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal,
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No
capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed
Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for
earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion.
admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable
challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory
but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of ill health. By
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it
raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a
Other than the sweeping averment that “[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave
careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite
the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114,
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and
Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution,” however, petitioner
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of
However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. In this connection, Lee v.
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the
People is apropos:
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner
 “… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if
its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors
of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only
delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.” (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s
Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission
of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without
a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or
other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
remedial law:
“Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused
may be summarized in the following rules:
x x x  x x x  x x x
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not
one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x” (emphasis
supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial
law, is of the same thinking:
“Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present then bail shall be denied.” (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if
none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for
bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court’s
denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not,
by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may
either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the
appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances
that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.
 Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different
situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead,
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said
provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments  reveals that it interprets
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For
petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to
limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of
the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that,
if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be
granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding
body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts
its “discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short,
petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
requiring it to determine a singular factual issue—whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where,
between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is
“more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of
action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for
bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on
the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively
renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
”The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the
exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable
latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its
understanding of the applicable law on the matter. In view of the grave caution
required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the
accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. It
should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant, among
other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance
of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination
that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which
must be determined by the appellate court. In other words, a threshold requirement
for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended
for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. This must be so; otherwise, the
appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the
purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower
court’s exercise of discretionary power was sound, specially since the rules on
criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the
Court of Appeals except for substantial error.
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius
est exclusio alterius  rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of
the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically
refers to “the following or other similar circumstances.” Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-
negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the
penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or
revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’
imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present,
bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years
imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending
appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those
convicted of less serious crimes?
Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History and Evolution of Rule on Bail
Pending Appeal
 Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and
evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule
110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
“Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First
Instance.—After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the
Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.
—After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon
application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined.—A capital offense, as the term is used in
this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission,
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable.—No person in custody for the
commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his
guilt is strong.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
“Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
   Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined.—A capital offense, as the term is used
in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death.” (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No.
2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
“The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down
in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody, shall
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since
his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged
is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well
as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the
following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to
remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the
proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of
Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that
charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled
and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now
pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty,
the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten
(10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall
inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond
shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain
under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of
ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by
this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have
jumped his bail.” (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated
August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
“SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right.—All persons in custody shall: (a)
before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by
law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
 perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the
accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,
parole, under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal,
the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on
motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined.—A capital offense, as the term is
used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe
punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.” (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were
thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but
with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-
capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court)
discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal
favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-
capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of
right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action
where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion
perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail
pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of
post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly
identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal
under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the
“tough on bail pending appeal” configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In
particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. Under the
present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-
negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail
is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail
pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of
bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the
absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all
relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending
appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original
constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. While this is of course not
to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal
is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion—particularly with
respect to extending bail—should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and
only for strong reasons.  In fact, it has even been pointed out that “grave caution that
must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused
is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule
114, Section 5.”
 Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following: SO ORDERED.
“The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that
bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or Notes.—The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails. (Trillanes IV vs.
generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried
Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471 [2008]) 
and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in
prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued ——o0o——
that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that  
the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than  
before conviction.” (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon,
the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals (promulgated in 2001 when the present
rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise
discretion.”

A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
“SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. x x “ (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s
initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays
often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be
more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the
appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with
dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
 [ G.R. No. 236461, December 05, 2018 ]
REYNALDO ARBAS RECTO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision  dated June 29, 2017 and Resolution  dated
January 11, 2018 issued by the Thirteenth Division and Former Thirteenth Division,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146120.
The Facts
An Information  for Murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo Arbas Recto (Recto)
for the death of Margie Carlosita (Carlosita), the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of February, 2011 in the Municipality of Gen.
Mariano Alvarez, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a hard
object, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and hit one Margie Carlosita on the head and on the parts of her body
with the use of said hard object, thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic
injuries on the head and on her trunk, which caused her instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Margie Carlosita.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, on May 23, 2011, Recto's former counsel filed a Petition for Bail with the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor City, Branch 89 (RTC). However, on April 11, 2014,
the RTC issued an Order  denying Recto's Petition for Bail as it gave credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Joshua Emmanuel Rabillas (Rabillas), son of
Carlosita, that Recto was the one who killed his mother. The RTC, in denying the
Petition for Bail, noted that "without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the
case, the Court is of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is
incumbent on the part of the accused to take the witness stand to show otherwise."
Trial on the merits then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a
Demurrer to Evidence on June 22, 2015 for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty
of the crime of Murder. The RTC, however, denied the Demurrer to Evidence through
an Order  dated December 22, 2015. In the said Order, the RTC stated:
Considering, therefore, the testimony of Joshua pointing to the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime compared with the mere allegations of the accused that
the victim committed suicide, it is imperative on the part of the accused to take
the witness stand, that is, if he so desires, to support his claim that he is not
guilty as charged.
Subsequently, on April 27, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail alleging that the
prosecution was able to show that the crime charged should be Homicide only and
not Murder. He pointed out that Rabillas, who was five years old at the time of the
incident, testified that Carlosita was hit by the bottle during a quarrel over money.
Citing People v. Rivera, a case with substantially the same facts wherein the
common-law wife was killed by the common-law husband during a heated argument,
Recto argued that the case established by the prosecution was thus merely Homicide
due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On June 8, 2016, the RTC issued an Order  denying the Motion to Fix Bail. The RTC
reiterated that it was of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong and that it
was incumbent on Recto to take the witness stand and show otherwise. As Recto had
not taken the witness stand, then the RTC ruled against the Motion to Fix Bail. Recto
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC on January 29,
2016.
Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC denying his Motion to Fix Bail, Recto then filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision dated June 29, 2017, the CA affirmed the denial of Recto's
Motion to Fix Bail. The CA reasoned that Recto failed to show that the RTC's
issuance of the Order was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the CA held that ''the evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination." The CA, thus, deferred
to the RTC's assessment of the credibility of Rabillas' testimony, and also relied on its
judgment that the evidence of guilt was strong. The CA ultimately dismissed the case.
Recto then sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated January 11, 2018.
Recto thus filed this Petition on February 26, 2018. The People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment  on September 13, 2018. Recto then
filed his Reply on October 5, 2018.
Issue
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA erred in dismissing
Recto's petition for certiorari.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy when
(1) any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding. Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary
or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
In this case, the denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The Order denying the Motion to
Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
or jurisdiction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The following Constitutional provision is implemented by the following provisions of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
xxxx
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Thus, as a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail.
However, persons charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua cannot
avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong.
In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder - an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction
when it denied Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses sufficient discretion
to determine, based on the evidence presented before it during the bail hearing,
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on
the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the
prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail
was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the
evidence of guilt is strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion, and the CA thus erred in upholding the RTC's Order denying the Motion to
Fix Bail.
As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at best, only
convict him of Homicide and not Murder. The testimony of the main prosecution
witness, Rabillas, was to the effect that his mother and Recto had an argument prior
to her death. Specifically, Rabillas testified as follows:
PROSECUTOR You said a while ago that your mother had a quarrel with Recto?
DUMAUAL:
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR What did Recto do when he quarreled with your mother Margie?
DUMAUAL:
WITNESS: Pinalo po.
INTERPRETER: Make it of record that the witness ts touching his forehead with
his right hand.
Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the
commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to
retaliate or defend himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that
treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively
tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of
their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the
victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the
act without risk to the aggressor.
Applying the same principles, the Court in People v. Rivera concluded that treachery
is not present when the killing was preceded by a heated argument:
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution has not
proven that the killing was committed with treachery. Although accused-appellant
shot the victim from behind, the fact was that this was done during a heated
argument. Accused-appellant, filled with anger and rage, apparently had no time
to reflect on his actions. It was not shown that he consciously adopted the mode
of attacking the victim from behind to facilitate the killing without risk to himself.
Accordingly, we hold that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide only.
The other qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information filed against Recto - hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated June 29, 2017 and Resolution dated January
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength are likewise negated by the 11, 2018 issued by the Thirteenth Division and Former Thirteenth Division,
foregoing fact. For the circumstance of evident premeditation to be properly respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 146120
appreciated, it must first be shown that there was a sufficient lapse of time between are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor
the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to City, Branch 89 is ORDERED to fix the bail of Reynaldo Arbas Recto in relation to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. Similarly, for abuse of superior strength to Criminal Case No. B-2011-226.
be properly appreciated, there must be evidence showing that the assailants
"consciously sought the advantage" or that "there was deliberate intent on the SO ORDERED.
part of the malefactor to take advantage thereof."
——o0o——
Based on the foregoing, there is thus merit in Recto's claim that the evidence
presented by the prosecution could, at most, convict him only of Homicide and not
Murder. The RTC thus gravely abused its discretion when it denied Recto's Motion to
Fix Bail.

In the case of Bernardez v. Valera, the Court emphasized that the "evidence of guilt is
strong" standard should be applied in relation to the crime  as charged. Thus:
While the charge against petitioner is undeniably a capital offense, it seems
likewise obvious that the evidence submitted by the prosecution to the
respondent judge for the purpose of showing that the evidence of petitioner's
guilt is strong, is not sufficient to establish that the offense committed by
petitioner, if any, was that of murder. On the basis of the sworn statement of
Benedito himself petitioner could only be held liable for homicide. It must be
observed in this connection that a person charged with a criminal offense
will not be entitled to bail even before conviction only if the charge against
him is a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is
strong. In the present case, as already stated, the evidence submitted by the
prosecution in support of its opposition to the motion for bail could prove, at most,
homicide and not murder, because it does not sufficiently prove either known
premeditation or alevosia. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Plaza, the accused also filed a demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case. After a finding that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery could not be appreciated in the case, the accused also filed a motion to fix
bail. The RTC granted the motion, and its validity was upheld by the CA. Upon appeal
to the Court, it likewise upheld the grant of bail, ratiocinating that the grant of bail to
an accused charged with a capital offense depends on whether the evidence of guilt
is strong.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, the RTC should have determined
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder, as opposed to simply determining
if the evidence that he was responsible for Carlosita's death was strong. As previously
illustrated above, the evidence of Recto's guilt - for Murder - was not strong. In sum,
the RTC should have granted Recto's Motion to Fix Bail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

 G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.
. present.—The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.—In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.—It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to
prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of
bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.—
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from
the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he
can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right
to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.—All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable
as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or
not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.—For
purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should
be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its
grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial
judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997).
—In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit: 1. In all
cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.—This national commitment to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he
had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced
a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents
another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
 
The Case
 
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014  issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has
been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
 
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed
his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and
his Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by
the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder,
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and
the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong
against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact,
accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing
can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.
x x x x
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because
while he is charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may be possibly
imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this
claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he
is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. “Accordingly,
it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.”
The argument has no merit.
x x x x
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not
taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in
the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty
of the offense charged. x x x
x x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail
because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously
considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk
are among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail.
However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of
bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile
is not strong.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion
to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to
deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of
right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
x x x x
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if
ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
x x x x
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
x x x x
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
 
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances — his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into
account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
 
Ruling of the Court
 
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
 
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused
to due process and to be presumed innocent
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.  The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should
be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter
of right or of discretion
 
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
 
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained
or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or
even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua  or life imprisonment;
or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
 
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
 
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, “such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution. The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly
explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte,  viz.:
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already
ruled in People v. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail
can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case
without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the
prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong
objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the
affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing.
Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To
appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
x x x x
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them
are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused
appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and
whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114,
Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these
guidelines in an ex parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor
heard.
 
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means —
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may
be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion
of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference
to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross examination.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
 show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
4.
Enrile’s poor health justifies
his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that
he voluntarily surrendered.
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,
whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that —
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be
imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is “charged with an
offense punishable by.” It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by
the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.
 
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply because
the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by
the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from
the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release
if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of
his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition
from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at
an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from
the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on
multiple drug therapy;
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease;
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications;
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications.
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by
Holter monitoring;
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome;
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
 a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).
 
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension,
because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke;
(2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or nonfatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be
triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-
charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations
in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
x x x x
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of
Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of
Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the
best.
x x x x
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator
Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present
condition of the accused vis-à-vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if
the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those
things, Your Honor.
x x x x
 
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court
has already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the
particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the
merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and
the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; x x x
x x x x
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the
effect that the petitioner “is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of
pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis,” and that in said
institute they “have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages
when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail”; taking into
consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the
People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and
not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending
the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the
actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is
suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his
petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court has adopted
and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above quoted resolution, in
several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and
Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on
bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New
Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident
and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.
 
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
 On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a ——o0o——
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail — whose existence is either
admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice — that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the
trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest
of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same
time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective

of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To
Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ

of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014
and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan
Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of
P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—After a judgment of conviction has been rendered by the trial court and
cancellation of the bail bond of the accused, his appropriate remedy against the court’s order
cancelling his bond is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the
same regular appeal proceedings, as an incident of his appeal — the filing of a separate
petition via a special civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the
appellate court is proscribed. (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 [2007])

Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; The allowance of
bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. (Qui vs.
People, 682 SCRA 94 [2012])
 
 [ G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NOVO TANES Y BELMONTE,
respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision  dated February 21, 2018 and Resolution  dated
July 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
08305-MIN, which upheld the Orders  dated March 31, 2017 and June 27, 2017 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City (RTC) in Crim. Case No.
22306. The RTC granted the application for bail of respondent Novo Tanes y
Belmonte (Tanes), who was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The Facts
On April 6, 2011, an Informationwas filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about December 14, 2010, at about 8:20 P.M. in DARBCI
Subdivision, National Highway, General Santos City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without authority
of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell for Five
Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) to poseur buyer, one sachet containing 0.0296
grams (sic) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he filed a Petition for Bail.
The RTC conducted hearings on October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and February
3, 2017 for the bail application.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 31, 2017, the RTC issued an Order  granting Tanes' application for bail,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds
justifiable grounds to grant bail to the accused.
Accused is allowed to post bail bond for his temporary liberty in the fixed amount
of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00).
Set the continuation of trial x x x.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong because there was
doubt as to whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust operation was preserved,
explaining as follows:
The [c]ourt noted that in the affidavits of [the] prosecution's witnesses[,] there
was allegedly a previous buying transaction of shabu with the accused prior to
the buy-bust operation subject of this case. Thus, the PDEA agents had
enough time to contact the media or DOJ representatives, or any elected
public official to witness the buy-bust operation being conducted following
the report on the illegal trading in drugs by the accused, but they fail[ed] to
do so. Instead, they were just merely called to sign the inventory sheet.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The RTC ruled that the failure of the prosecution to show that the three witnesses
(i.e., media representative, DOJ representative, elected official) were also present in
the actual buy-bust operation and not only during the inventory negated the
requirement of strong evidence of the accused's guilt to justify a denial of bail.
Moreover, the RTC ruled that the defense correctly cited the case of People v. Jehar
Reyes (Jehar Reyes) in support of its argument.
The People (herein petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was
denied in an Order dated June 27, 2017.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via petition for certiorari. It alleged that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting bail to Tanes because: (1) it did not state a summary of the prosecution's
evidence in its Order, therefore, petitioner was not accorded due process; and (2) it
required the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of the buy-bust
operation and during the actual seizure of the drug, thereby extending the
requirement laid down in R.A. 9165.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision dated February 21, 2018, the CA dismissed the petition.
According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the RTC's exercise of discretion in
granting the application for bail was unsound and unguided by jurisprudence. It found
that the RTC's Order was based on jurisprudence, specifically on the rule on chain of
custody and the Jehar Reyes case, which held that the three witnesses must be
present during the buy-bust operation and the confiscation of the dangerous drugs
from the accused.
Moreover, the CA also made its own appreciation of the evidence presented and
found that "[t]he evidence presented by the prosecution in establishing that [Tanes']
guilt was strong was tarnished by a seemingly broken chain in the custody."
Specifically, the CA made the following findings:
Here, the poseur buyer testified that the representative from the media and the
elected official who signed the Inventory Sheet were absent during the actual buy
 bust operation. The said officials appear to have gone to the crime scene
only to sign the Inventory Sheet and leave after signing the The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section 13, Article III of
same. The absence of a representative from the DoJ also appears to be the Constitution:
inadequately explained as the police officers could have contacted another SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
representative from the DoJ when the other DoJ representative was unavailable.
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
It also appears that no photograph was presented showing the
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
inventory of the seized shabu in the presence of [Tanes], the representative
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
of the media, and the elective public official. There were only pictures the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
captioned "Media representative signed/witness (sic) the inventory" and "Brgy
Kagawad signed/witness (sic) the inventory" but the person who took the pictures
was not presented during the bail hearing to explain the photographs.
In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Moreover, the testimony of the buy bust team leader regarding whether SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
there was a photograph showing the inventory of the seized sachets imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an
appears to be unclear. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Further, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. The records
showed that three hearings were conducted by the trial court for the bail application.
Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is
During these hearings, petitioner was duly represented by its prosecutors. Moreover,
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of
the CA stated that petitioner failed to identify which piece/s of evidence that the
discretion if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
prosecution presented before the bail hearings was/were excluded by the RTC in
imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.[23]
weighing whether the evidence against Tanes' guilt was strong.
Procedure when bail is discretionary
Furthermore, the CA also disagreed with petitioner's assertion that the RTC Order did
not contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence.
In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter
Petitioner's MR was denied by the CA in a Resolution  dated July 11, 2018; hence,
of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
this Petition.
To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail
Petition before the Court
hearings is required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the
right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal.
In its Rule 45 Petition, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse
The court is to conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of
of discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter granted the petition for bail
merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
based solely on Jehar Reyes. In particular, petitioner claims that R.A. 9165 only
requires the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of the inventory, and
The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the
not during the actual buy-bust operation. Also, petitioner avers that the CA erred in
prosecution's evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion
affirming the trial court's ruling despite the latter's failure to appreciate the evidence of
on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
the prosecution.
Petitioner was not deprived of procedural due process
Issue
Applying the abovementioned standards to the present case, the Court finds that,
Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes'
contrary to petitioner's assertions, the trial court did observe the rules to be followed
application for bail.
in granting or denying the bail application. Records show that the RTC conducted
The Court's Ruling
hearings for the application of bail on October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and
February 3, 2017. In all these hearings, petitioner was duly represented by its
The Petition is totally without merit.
prosecutors.

The right to bail

Petitioner insists that the trial court miserably failed to state a summary or a
reasonable recital of the evidence for the prosecution. As a result, petitioner avers
that it was denied its right to due process. The Court disagrees.
In this regard, the Court finds it necessary to quote the relevant portions of the
assailed RTC Order, to wit:
Hearing on the petition ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses
to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong, to wit:
1. PSI Lily Grace M. Tadeo, the forensic chemist, who identified her
findings as contained in the Chemistry Reports Nos. D-332-2010
and D-333-2010 and the drug items;
2. PDEA Agent IO1 Mark Louis R. Degayo, team leader and
photographer;
3. PDEA Agent IO1 Vincent Quelinderino, arresting officer; and
4. PDEA Agent IO1 Rodrick I. Gualisa, poseur-buyer.
They identified accused as the person who sold the drug item during the buy
bust operation in the amount of P500.00. The inventory of evidence/property
and chain of custody were also identified.
Upon judicious and meticulous perusal of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt
is of the view that the evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong.
The [c]ourt note[s] that in the affidavits of prosecution's witnesses[,] there
was allegedly a previous buying transaction of shabu with the accused prior to
the buy-bust operation subject of this case. Thus, the PDEA agents had enough
time to contact the media or DOJ representatives, or any elected public official to
witness the buy-bust operation being conducted following the report on the illegal
trading in drugs by the accused, but they fail[ed] to do so. Instead, they were just
merely called to sign the inventory sheet.
xxxx
With the evidence presented for the consideration of the Court, the
prosecution failed to substantiate its allegation to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong. Clearly, therefore, the prosecution evidence as such does
not meet the required standard of "strong evidence" to justify the denial of the
accused's right to bail. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner assails the RTC Order because it did not contain (1) a recital of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of an actual buy-bust
operation against Tanes; or (2) a summary of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses establishing the links in the chain of custody of the confiscated drug.
However, a perusal of the RTC Order shows that it complied with the jurisprudential
standards on providing a summary of the prosecution's evidence.
In Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), the Court discussed the meaning of
"a summary of the evidence for the prosecution" as follows:
x x x The summary of the evidence shows that the evidence presented
during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented
and most importantly, considered. The summary of the evidence is the basis
for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of
evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong
based on his discretion. Thus, judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be
supported by a finding of the facts relied upon to form an opinion on the issue
before the court. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in People v. Cabral, which petitioner cites as basis, the Court ruled that the
summary "should necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the
pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. x x x An incomplete
enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the
order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable
recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution.”
Thus, what jurisprudence requires is a reasonable recital of every piece of evidence
of the prosecution - which was done in this case. Contrary to petitioner assertions, the
testimonies per se of the witnesses need not be reproduced in the Order, as long as
the same is recognized and considered by the trial court in its exercise of judicial
discretion over the bail application.
Clearly, the trial court followed the proper procedure in granting Tanes' bail
application. Having settled that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural
due process, the Court shall now deal with the propriety of granting the bail
application.
Non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody of illegal drugs negates a
strong evidence of Tanes' guilt
The main thrust of the RTC's Order granting bail is that based on the evidence
presented during the bail hearings, the prosecution failed to prove that the chain of
custody over the seized drug had been preserved; hence, the evidence of Tanes' guilt
was not strong. The Court wholeheartedly agrees.
To recall, Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The elements for conviction under said provision
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The burden is on the State
to prove not only these elements but also the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of
the law. Consequently, compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized
illegal drugs is crucial in any prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug recovered from the suspect is the
very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt.
In this regard, Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the following procedure to
be followed in order to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as
evidence: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately
after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an
elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative
from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not
practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 allow the
inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the
nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.[40] In this
connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be
physically present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized
items which, as mentioned, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and
confiscation - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several procedural
lapses concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In particular, the RTC and
the CA found that: (1) there was no representative from the DOJ present during the
buy-bust operation and the inventory; (2) the two other witnesses (i.e., the media
representative and the elected public official) were not present during the
apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but were merely called to sign the
inventory sheet; and (3) no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the
seized shabu in the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain
of custody created doubt as to the identity and integrity of the seized drug.
Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt cannot be characterized as strong.
No error in RTC 's reliance on the case of Jehar Reyes
Petitioner avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the bail
application based solely on the Jehar Reyes case. It maintains that R.A. 9165 only
requires the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of the inventory, and
not during the actual buy-bust operation.
The argument is without merit.
For reference, the relevant portion of Jehar Reyes is quoted below:
Thirdly, another substantial gap in the chain of custody concerned the
absence of any representative of the media or of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and of the elected public official during the buy-bust operation and
at the time of the confiscation of the dangerous drugs from the accused in
the area of operation. The Prosecution did not attempt to explain why such
presence of the media or DOJ representatives, and of the elected public official
had not been procured despite the buy-bust operation being mounted in the
afternoon of November 27, 2002 following two weeks of surveillance to confirm
the veracity of the report on the illegal trading in drugs by the accused. The
objective of requiring their presence during the buy-bust operation and at
the time of the recovery or confiscation of the dangerous drugs from the
accused in the area of operation was to ensure against planting of
evidence and frame up. It was clear that ignoring such objective was not an
option for the buy-bust team if its members genuinely desired to protect the
integrity of their operation. Their omission attached suspicion to the incrimination
of the accused. The trial and appellate courts should not have tolerated the buy-
bust team's lack of prudence in not complying with the procedures outlined in
Section 21(1), supra, in light of the sufficient time for them to comply. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The RTC cannot thus be faulted for relying on the clear and unequivocal ruling made
in Jehar Reyes because unless overturned, the same remains good case law. To the
contrary, Jehar Reyes has even been cited by the Court in at least six cases
subsequent to it, one of which is People v. Sagana, wherein the Court made similar
findings regarding the three witness rule. Citing Jehar Reyes, the Court therein held:
Similarly, none of the required third-party representatives was present during
the seizure and inventory of the dangerous articles. Their presence in buy-bust
operations and seizure of illicit articles in the place of operation would
supposedly guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame-up." In other
words, they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."
x x x In this case, the records were bereft of any explanation why the third-
party representatives were present only during the belated photographing
of the confiscated articles. Hence, the very purpose of their mandated
presence is defeated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that the pronouncement in Jehar Reyes as regards the presence of
the three witnesses in the buy-bust operation has also been ruled upon by the Court
in other cases. In the recent case of People v. Supat, the Court made the following
pronouncements:
Section 21(1) of RA 9165 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the
same immediately after seizure and confiscation. Further, the inventory must
be done in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a
representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official , who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be
made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not
practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing at the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. This also
means that the three required witnesses should already be physically
present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust
 operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. In other words, the buy-bust during the buy-bust operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of
team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses. drugs against Tanes is deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs, the requirement of having
The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's ruling on the merits of
the three required witnesses to be physically present at the time or near the
place of apprehension is not dispensed with. The reason is simple: it is at
the case. Indeed, there are instances when the Court had ruled that failure to strictly
the time of arrest - or at the time of the drugs "seizure and confiscation" - comply with the procedure in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not ipso
that the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their facto render the seizure and custody over the items void. In such cases, the
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against prosecution must still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
the police practice of planting evidence. (Additional emphasis and compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
underscoring supplied) properly preserved. The prosecution must be able to adequately explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses.
Also, the Court made similar pronouncements in People v. Tomawis, to wit:
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the The Court emphasizes that no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission
inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at
of additional evidence for the prosecution to prove Tanes' guilt in the main case. After
this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it
is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any all, a grant of bail does not prevent the RTC, as the trier of facts, from making a final
doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.
operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses
would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were SO ORDERED.
done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
 
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of
arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so and "calling them in" ——o0o——
to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the
drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished does not
achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or
insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and
confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of
the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the
intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the
inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated
drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In this case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed noncompliance

with the three-witness rule: first, only two witnesses were present; and second, the
two witnesses were merely "'called in" to witness the inventory of the seized drug.
Additionally, no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the
seized shabu in the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. Hence, the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the petition for bail on the ground
that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong due to doubts as regards the
preservation of the chain of custody. Such ruling by the RTC has unquestionable
jurisprudential basis. Consequently, the CA was correct in upholding the RTC.,

A final note

There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized
 G.R. Nos. 216007-09. December 8, 2015.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ and THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The general
rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari
may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error
attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case;
Exceptions.—The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the
court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down
the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding
was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Bail; Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents; Mañalac, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 206194-206207, July 3,
2013, already resolved that an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not
entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua.—The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression. Mañalac, Jr. v. People, G.R.
Nos. 206194-206207, July 3, 2013, already resolved that an accused charged with Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an actual
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Criminal Law; Complex Crimes; Penalties; Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
states that in complex crimes, “the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.”—The rulings in People v. Pantaleon, Jr., 581 SCRA
140 (2009), and analogous cases are in keeping with the provisions of the RPC. Specifically,
Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, “the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.” Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties for malversation and
falsification should be taken into account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public
funds or property if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled. On the other hand, the penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00
shall be imposed for falsification committed by a public officer. Considering that malversation is
the more serious offense, the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00
is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of “reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.”
Same; Same; In charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of
the complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the
subject of separate prosecutions.—Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must
still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the complex offense
with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate
prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as
to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.
Same; Penal Statutes; Statutory Construction; When there is doubt on the interpretation
of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.—The time-honored principle is that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. When
there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their
application is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents; For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of Malversation
of Public
 
 
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess of
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary hearing on bail application is,
therefore, unnecessary.—For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that involves an
amount in excess of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary hearing on bail
application is, therefore, unnecessary. Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377 (2006),
an affirmative relief may be obtained from the court despite the accused being still at-large.
Except in petition for bail, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs sought
by the defendant (such as a motion to set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of
bail in this case) where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
PERALTA, J.:
 
This special civil action for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to nullify and set aside the October 10, 2014 Resolution of public
respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the (i) Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to
Fix the Amount of Bail and the (ii) Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to
Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional
 Prayer to Recall/List Warrant of Arrest filed by accused Luzviminda S. Valdez,
are GRANTED.
Let the Order of Arrest issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321,
0322 and 0324 adopting the “no bail” recommendation of the Office of the
Ombudsman be RECALLED. Instead, let an Order of arrest in said cases be
issued anew, this time, fixing the bail for each offense charged in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit  executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal
and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in
Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the
Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of
expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of
Bacolod City, particularly:
1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;
2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00;
3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and
4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for Cash
Slip No. 193402.
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official
receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to
claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00
instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of P274,306.75.
The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas received the joint affidavit, which was thereafter resolved
adverse to Valdez.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-
0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the
remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under
Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48  of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All
the cases were raffled before public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended “no bail” in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and
0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued that the three cases are
bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was
alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium
period that ranged from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying
Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the maximum of the
medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition9 that the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the attending circumstances are immaterial because the
charge constituting the complex crime have the corresponding penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary.
Instead of a motion to fix bail, a summary hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt
is strong is, therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.
Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently filed
an Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation
and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest.
Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition thereto.
Later, the parties filed their respective Memorandum of Authorities.
As aforesaid, on October 10, 2014, public respondent granted the motions of
Valdez. It recalled the arrest order issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321,
0322 and 0324. In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each
offense charged in said cases in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00). Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter before Us to resolve the lone issue of whether an accused indicted for the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
The Court shall first tackle Valdez’s procedural objection. She avers that the
petition must be dismissed outright on the ground that it was filed without first filing a
motion for reconsideration before public respondent, and that, even if there are
exceptions to the general rule, this case does not fall under any of them.
We disagree.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity
for the court a quo  to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case.
However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following
exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari  is proper notwithstanding the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration: 
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
 (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and entitled to bail as a matter of right since he is charged with a crime whose penalty
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the is reclusion perpetua.
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
P22,000.00. We opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty
urgency for relief; of reclusion perpetua  and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible penalty.
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the The Court’s pronouncement is consistent with the earlier cases of People v. Conwi,
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; Jr., People v. Enfermo, and People v. Pajaro, et al. as well as with the fairly recent
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due case of Zafra v. People.
process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr.  and analogous cases are in keeping with the
opportunity to object; and
provisions of the RPC. Specifically, Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
“the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
 
maximum period.” Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the
Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties for malversation and falsification
argument, pros and cons were already raised in and passed upon by public
should be taken into account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public
respondent; thus, filing a motion for reconsideration would be an exercise in futility.
funds or property if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion
Likewise, as petitioner claims, the resolution of the question raised in this case is of
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, aside from perpetual special
urgent necessity considering its implications on similar cases filed and pending before
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the
the Sandiganbayan. As it appears, there have been conflicting views on the matter
total value of the property embezzled.  On the other hand, the penalty of prisión
such that the different divisions of the anti-graft court issue varying resolutions.
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification committed
Undeniably, the issue is of extreme importance affecting public interest. It involves not
by a public officer.  Considering that malversation is the more serious offense,
just the right of the State to prosecute criminal offenders but, more importantly, the
the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
constitutional right of the accused to bail.
Official/Public Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion
perpetua, it being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of “reclusion
Now, on the main issue:
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.”
The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression. Mañalac, Jr. v.
For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be
People14 already resolved that an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds
revisited on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. (as well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro, et
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved exceeds
al., and Zafra) was disposed in the context of a judgment of conviction rendered by
P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an actual
the lower court and affirmed on appeal by this Court. As will be shown below, the
imposable penalty of  reclusion perpetua.
appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an accused who is charged with
a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be allowed to post bail
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.
since reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely
describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the fraud involved. It was also
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: 
posited that Article 48 of the RPC applies “only after the accused has been convicted
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
in a full-blown trial such that the court is mandated to impose the penalty of the most
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
serious crime,” and that the reason for the imposition of the penalty of the most shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
serious offense is “only for the purpose of determining the correct penalty upon the recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.” This Court, through the Third even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
Division, however, denied the petition and resolved in the affirmative the issue of bail shall not be required.
whether the constitutional right to bail of an accused is restricted in cases whose  
imposable penalty ranges from  reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Citing People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al.,  in relation to Section 13, Article III of the Procedure provide:
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not
 SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall
be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)
 
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term “punishable” under the
provisions above quoted?
In Our mind, the term “punishable” should refer to prescribed, not imposable,
penalty. People v. Temporada, which was even cited by petitioner, perceptibly
distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the
felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what
is referred to as the “prescribed penalty.” For instance, under Article 249 of the
RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges
from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides
for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission
of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict.
This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the “imposable penalty.” In the
case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance
and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be
the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the
court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the
“penalty actually imposed” on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
 
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC
before conviction to determine whether the charge is bailable or not, while
the penalty actually imposed  pertains to the prison sentence upon conviction.
Hence, it is maintained that the penalty imposable for the offense charged against
private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.
The argument is erroneous.
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00, the “prescribed penalty” is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such crime be proven by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the “imposable penalty” is reclusion
perpetua  in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its maximum. The
falsification, which is the means used to commit the crime of malversation, is in the
nature of a generic aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the imposition of
the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. The phrases “shall be applied” and
“shall impose,” found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are of similar
import as the phrase “shall be imposed” found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64
refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating
circumstance/s. Finally, the “penalty actually imposed” is still reclusion perpetua,
considering that the ISL finds no application as the penalty is indivisible.
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not
confused imposable  penalty with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through
the text of the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually
meant prescribed  penalty whenever it referred to imposable  penalty. Therefore, in
essence, the ruling is correct. Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its
maximum period, there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their inception.
Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper time, therefore, to
call for the application of the penalty contemplated under Article 48 by imposing
the same in its maximum period.
For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, it is the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime
charged which should be considered and, not the penalty to be actually imposed.
Illustrative cases such as Catiis v. Court of Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu
Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.
x x x x
In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty imposable for the offense charged
that was considered for purposes of bail.
A circumspect reading of substantive law validates this view.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that:
x x x x
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, provides:
x x x x
Notably, the word used is [“punishable,”] which practically bears the same
meaning as “imposable.” It is only logical that the reference has a direct
correlation with the time frame “before conviction” since trial is yet to begin;
hence, it can only be the penalty imposable of the offense charged that can be
considered for purposes of bail.
In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In determining the
penalty imposable, it is the penalty for the most serious crime which is
considered. Between Malversation and Falsification, it is Malversation which
provides the graver penalty. As thus provided under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, “[i]f the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.”
 The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period,
or reclusion perpetua, since this will already consider the application of the
penalty in the event of a conviction.
A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states:
x x x x
The word used is “imposed,” not imposable. Thus, the reference can only
point to the time when a judgment of conviction is impending. If and when “the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period,” is thus applied in the proper application of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused. Certainly, this cannot be considered for purposes of
bail.
 
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a
complex crime, the information should allege each element of the complex offense
with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of
separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be
convicted of the offense proven.
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving
an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance,
must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it
would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime
since it is only when the trial has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as
a means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of
one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse,
none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her
the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed.
Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused
person’s constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is
not even considered as inherently grievous, odious and hateful. To note, Article 48 of
the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the constituent offenses; it
only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law.
When committed through falsification of official/public documents, the RPC does not
intend to classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving
an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic
Act No. 7659.33 If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have already considered
it as a special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with
homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused
charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when
compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable
under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that
bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed through malversation of public funds,
but the aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an
accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru
falsification of official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer
entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as
P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been contemplated
by the law.
The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to Valdez as an accused following
the rule of lenity:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The
rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him.
The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the
accused.
 
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. When there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. Since penal laws should
not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application is
consistent with the purpose and reason of the law.
For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that involves an
amount in excess of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary
hearing on bail application is, therefore, unnecessary. Consistent
with Miranda v. Tuliao,41 an affirmative relief may be obtained from the court despite
the accused being still at-large. Except in petition for bail, custody of the law is not
required for the adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion to
set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of bail in this case) where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez is entitled to bail, as a matter of right, in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. Public
respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division should be guided by the latest Bailbond
Guide. In any case, the amount should correspond to the medium penalty multiplied
by Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for every year of imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
 Notes.—To justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to
prove that the accused received public funds which he cannot account for or did not have in his
possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the funds. (Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Villeta, 635 SCRA 691 [2010])

The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be appropriated for a
public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a specific project. (De la Cuesta vs.
Sandiganbayan, First Division, 709 SCRA 631 [2013])

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