TRIAL (RULE 119) A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ)

through a panel of prosecutors made up of State Prosecutor II Ruben B. Carretas,

G.R. No. 154629. October 5, 2005. State Prosecutor Geronimo L. Sy and Prosecution Attorney Juan Pedro C. Navera.

On 11 May 2001, an Information  was filed by the panel of prosecutors with the
SPO4 MARINO SOBERANO, SPO3 MAURO TORRES and SPO3 JOSE Regional Trial Court (RTC), City of Manila. The following were charged with double
ESCALANTE, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. murder:
Jimmy L. Lopez
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Witnesses; Section 14, Rule 110 Alex B. Diloy
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure applies in equal force when the exclusion of a William L. Lopez
witness is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of (all detained)
the accused as state witness, or on some other ground.—There can be no quarrel as to the fact SPO4 Marino Soberano
that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some accused SPO3 Mauro Torres
and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is SPO3 Jose Escalante
applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the Crisostomo M. Purificacion
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate Digo De Pedro
the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of Renato Malabanan
discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the Jovencio Malabanan
requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 Margarito Cueno
be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or Rommel Rollan
should only one provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section (all under the custody of PNP-CIDG Camp Crame, Quezon City)
14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)? An amendment of the information made before plea
which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, P/Supt. Glen Dumlao
with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule P/C. Insp. Vicente Arnado
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, P/Insp. Roberto Langcauon
said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of SPO4 Benjamin Taladua
probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on SPO1 Rolando Lacasandile
some other ground. P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva
SPO1 Mario Sarmiento
Same; Same; Same; Same; When no amendment to the information is involved as a by- SPO1 William Reed
product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused to be a PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento
state witness falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119, of the Revised SPO1 Ruperto A. Nemeno
Rules of Criminal Procedure.—The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in John Does and James Does
the information but his discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before (all at large)
it rests its case, in which event, the procedural (in addition to the substantive) requirements of
Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the information is
The Information reads:
involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the
“That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the
accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom
are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: P/C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador “Bubby” Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno),
Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and
St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones, metal remoteness of the place and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring,
confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police officers
dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite.
using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully,
They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the unlawfully and feloniously kill SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL
University of the Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation. CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of their death, and
 thereafter dispose of their body (sic) by incineration, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter’s respective heirs.”
The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 41, Manila, presided by Judge Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada.
On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information which was granted and the Amended Information was admitted by the
trial court.
The Amended Information reads:
“That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom
are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao,
P/C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1
Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1
Nemeno), abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at
the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel
Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite, and with
evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and
remoteness of the place and with deliberate zintent to kill, conspiring,
confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police officers
using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill said SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and
EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of their
death, and thereafter dispose of their body by incineration, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter’s respective heirs.”
On 24 May 2001, Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan,
Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan moved to quash the Information.
Accused P/Supt. Glen Dumlao was subsequently arrested. He later executed a
sworn statement implicating other police officers to the Dacer-Corbito double murder,
specifically P/Supt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, P/Supt. Cesar Mancao, PO3 Larry Ambre
and a certain Rigor,7 all former members of the defunct Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the
double murder. He stressed that it was not him but a certain “SPO3 Allan Cadenilla
Villanueva” who was previously identified by several witnesses as one of the culprits.
This was granted by the trial court.
On 26 June 2001, in view of the sworn statement executed by Dumlao, the
prosecution filed a Motion for Reinvestigation which was granted by the trial court in
its Order dated 04 July 2001. The prosecution was ordered to terminate the
reinvestigation and submit its findings within twenty (20) days. The arraignment was
set on 30 July 2001.
On 28 June 2001, the trial court denied the joint Motion to Quash the Information
earlier filed by Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan,
Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan.
On 02 August 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a new complaint
with the DOJ against a new suspect in the same case, by the name of P/Sr. Supt.
Teofilo Viña, who was also a member of the PAOCTF.
After the reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge dated 13
August 2001, praying that P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva be discharged from the
Information, and that he be immediately released from detention. In its Order  dated
16 August 2001, the trial court granted the motion.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information dated 17 September
2001 was filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information—
(1)discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen
Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State;
(2)substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3)charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar
Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan
opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an
Opposition dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit
Amended Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers
Lopez be denied.
In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit
Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated 24 October 2001.
On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved in open court to inhibit Judge
Ponferrada from hearing the case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22
November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio.
On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court
praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01 and 24 October 2001 be
annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be
restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with said
orders. In a Resolution  dated 21 January 2002, this Court referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
On 04 April 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the present petition is
hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED.
The assailed Orders dated October 01, 2001 and October 24, 2001 which were
issued by JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in Criminal Case No. 01-
191969, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Lopez, et al.” are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR. or any person or persons acting in his stead, is/are hereby ORDERED to
ADMIT the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001 substituting SPO3
ALLAN CADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO VILLANUEVA as
accused, and charging P/Senior Supt. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, P/Senior Supt.
CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIÑA as additional accused,
and discharging or excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM L.
LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY and to CONTINUE with the proceedings therefrom
with utmost deliberate dispatch. Needless to state, the original information filed
on May 11, 2001 stands insofar as P/Senior Supt. GLEN(N) G. DUMLAO is
concerned.”
Accused Soberano, Escalante and Torres moved for the reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals Decision. In a Resolution dated 12 August 2002, the motion was denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
dated 28 August 2002 filed by Soberano, Torres and Escalante where they assign as
errors the following:
I (a)There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE
PONFERRADA GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
ADMISSION OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF
THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IN ALLOWING
THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DILOY AND THE LOPEZ BROTHERS.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT AS
CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE RRCP.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 17 OF RULE 119
OF THE RRCP IN THE DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED.
V would be violative of Section 17, Rule 119, thus:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE APPLICATION OF
SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE RRCP TO A SITUATION WHERE THE
ACCUSED HAS ALREADY BEEN ARRAIGNED AND UNDERGOING TRIAL.
Gathered from the above assignment of errors, the fundamental issue that must be
resolved concerns the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to
admit amended information excluding some of the accused named in the original
information for utilization as witnesses for the State. The key lies in the correct
interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and Section 17
of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.—When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
discharge is requested;
(b)There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c)The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d)Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e)Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part
of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The trial court, in denying the prosecution’s motion to admit amended information
discharging some accused, ratiocinated that to admit said amended information
“After study, it appearing that the Amended Information not only includes new
accused, namely, SPO3 Allen Villanueva, P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt.
Cezar Mancao and P/Supt. Teofilo Viña but excludes or discharges certain
accused, namely, Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Diloy and Glenn
 Dumlao from the original Information to be used as state witnesses, the Court is judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have
not inclined to grant the motion as it believes and so holds that in the discharge deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
of the accused to be state witnesses the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be observed and/or complied whether the information it has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on
with. Stated otherwise, to grant the motion and admit the Amended Information the reinvestigation should be the sole and only valid basis for the judge’s final
outright would violate said section which is quoted as follows. . . .” action with respect to the reinvestigation.
Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE
The Court of Appeals held the contrary view. It reasoned that Section 14, Rule 110 is RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA’s “sole and only basis” for the inclusion (or
applicable in the instant case and not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of exclusion, for that matter) of the additional accused should be the final
disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the
Criminal Procedure, thus:
Department of Justices.
“To begin with, it is undeniable, and it is necessary to point out, that Criminal
Consistent with the foregoing disquisition, We hold the opinion that Section
Case No. 01-191969 has already been filed with the Regional Trial Court of
17, Rule 119 (Trial), . . . is not applicable under the circumstances obtaining in
Manila on May 11, 2001. The Motion to Admit was filed later or on September 18,
the case at bench, although in the case of Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
2001.
We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s clarification that only when an
While it is true that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires
information, charging two (2) or more persons with a certain offense, has already
complete jurisdiction over it, We are not unmindful of the well-settled ruling of the
been filed in court will Section 9, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Rules of Court [now
Supreme Court that the determination of who should be criminally charged in
100% restated under Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Revised Rules of
court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.”
Criminal Procedure] “come into play.”
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of
Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), contemplates a situation wherein the
Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads—
Information is already filed, the accused is already arraigned, undergoing trial
“Section 14. Amendment or substitution—A complaint or information may
and the prosecution has not rested its case.
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
Here, although the original Information has already been filed, the four (4)
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
accused sought to be discharged or excluded from the Amended Information
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
have not been arraigned and no trial has been commenced. Thus, the discharge
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
or exclusion being sought by the petitioner may come under the purview
“However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
of Republic Act No. 6981, a special law which the Department of Justice is
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
called upon to enforce and implement. Considering that the State Prosecutor’s
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
disposition on the investigation in Criminal Case No. 01-191969 should be the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
sole and only valid basis of respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
considering whether the Amended Information sought to be admitted should
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
stand or not, it follows that the discharge/ exclusion of the four (4) accused
“If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
under Republic Act No. 6981 must be directed by the Department of Justice, not
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
by the court a quo. Needless to say, Section 9, Rule 119 [of the Rules of Court]
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be state
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused
witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. It is not constitutionally impermissible
shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
for Congress to enact Republic Act No. 6981 vesting in the Department of
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.”
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and
Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that
who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. (Emphasis in original)
the Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient
support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet.
Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the The petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 14 of Rule
motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on amendment of complaints.
prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to Instead, what should have been applied was Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge
conduct the same, substantially complying with such requirement under the of an accused as witness for the state. The petitioners further aver that even if it is
second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule 110, it is still necessary to seek
a “permission obtained from a court to take some action which, without such prior leave of court. The prosecution simply filed an Amended Information excluding
permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended
Jimmy and William Lopez, Alex Diloy and Glen Dumlao, without prior leave of court,
pleading, to plead several pleas.”
In the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court’s pertinent ruling,
and moved for its admission.
which We now reiterate, finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a
The petitioners also argue that while the determination of who should be criminally
charged is essentially an executive function, the discharge of an accused when an
Information had already been filed lies with the court. Further, the petitioners assert
that the Motion For Reinvestigation which was approved by the trial court is not
tantamount to a Motion For Leave to File an Amended Information as required under
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In answer to all these, the prosecution contends that the admission of the
Amended Information was not violative of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, contrary to the opinion of the trial court.
The prosecution insists that Judge Ponferrada should have just required it to
present evidence in support of the discharge for had this procedure been followed,
the fact of admission of the accused sought to be discharged into the Witness
Protection Program (WPP) would have come to light.
The prosecution likewise professes that Section 14, Rule 110 should be applied,
and not Section 17, Rule 119 for the following reasons: first, while the case was
already filed in court, the accused therein have not yet been arraigned; second, the
trial court ordered the reinvestigation of the case; and third, new evidence dictate the
necessity to amend the Information to include new accused and to exclude other
accused who will be utilized as state witnesses.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an
amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is made
before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means
that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation
is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of
discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should
the requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section
17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and
Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one
of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110.
Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused.
Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual
ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state
witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at
a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who should be
criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. The
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion
—the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. By virtue of
the trial court having granted the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former
is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the
Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion—wide and far reaching—regarding the disposition
thereof.
The foregoing discussion is qualified by our decision in the seminal case
of Crespo v. Mogul, wherein we declared that:
. . . Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
or the right of the People to due process of law.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite.
The prosecution must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the information
for purposes of utilizing him as state witness is qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information but
his discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests
its case, in which event, the procedural (in addition to the substantive) requirements
of Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the
information is involved as a byproduct of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter,
the discharge of the accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17,
Rule 119. It is fitting then to re-state the rule in Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that
—
. . . [T]he decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain
offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9  of the Rules of Court,
come into play. . . .
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the accused to be discharged
is included in the information that the prosecution must present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge in order to convince the judge, upon whom discretion rests, as to the
propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.
Having thus ruled, it now behooves upon this Court to determine whether the
Court of Appeals was correct in admitting the amended information insofar as the
discharge of JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY is concerned.
It is undisputed that the motion to admit amended information seeking the
exclusion of the above-named accused (together with P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G.
DUMLAO) was with notice to the offended party and was set for hearing. The Court of
Appeals held that the trial court’s grant of the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation
operates as leave of court to amend the information, if the situation so warrants.
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals
considering that we do not perceive here any impairment of the substantial rights of
all the accused or the right of the people to due process.
d)he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying
against other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the
immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection
provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program
shall be known as the Witness.
It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981 enumerates the requirements
before a person may be admitted to the WPP. It does not state that if an accused
cannot be admitted to the WPP, he cannot be discharged as a witness for the state.
Admission to the WPP and being discharged as an accused are two different things.
Dumlao’s being a law enforcement officer and, thus, disqualified to be under the
WPP, do not in any way prohibit him to be discharged from the information.

As we have discussed earlier in this decision, the trial court is with discretion to WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the
grant or deny the amendment of the information. In general, its discretion is hemmed Court of Appeals dated 04 April 2002 and 12 August 2002, respectively, are hereby
in by the proscription against impairment of the substantial rights of the accused or AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION to include P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO as
the right of the People to due process of law. In this case, in denying the motion to one of the accused excluded from the Amended Information dated 17 September
admit amended information, the trial court simply said that the same was violative of 2001. No costs.
Section 17, Rule 119 without stating the reasons therefor. And for this lapse, the trial SO ORDERED.
court has indeed erred.
One final point. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, it held that the discharge Note.—The discharge of an accused to become state witness has the effect of acquittal,
and a recall of that discharge may place the said accused in double jeopardy. The fact that not
or exclusion of P/Sr. Supt. Glen Dumlao from the Amended Information finds no legal
all the requisites for the discharge of a state witness are present is not a ground to recall the
basis under Republic Act No. 6981 for he is a law enforcement officer. The original discharge order. (People vs. Larrañaga, 421 SCRA 530 [2004])
information, according to the Court of Appeals, should stand insofar as Dumlao is
concerned.
——o0o——
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 6981 provides:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program.—Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before
any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a)the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special
laws;
b)his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c)he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or
there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or
corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively,
because or on account of his testimony; and
 G.R. No. 142848. June 30, 2006. and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the
proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial
prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only
EUGENE C. YU, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of
TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by
PROSECUTOR JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of
OCHOA and REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. “Engine,” respondents. the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one
certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put
by the Department of Justice, viz.: “Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic disclocation,
Criminal Procedure; Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program (WPSBP),
usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
Republic Act No. 6981; The discharge of an accused under R.A. No. 6981 is distinct from the
Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or
discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to
Procedure—the immunity provided under R.A. No. 6981 is granted by the Department of Justice
pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
(DOJ) while the other is granted by the court.—The discharge of an accused under Republic Act
appearance in investigative bodies/courts. Petitioner Webb’s challenge to the validity of R.A. No.
No. 6981 as availed of by the prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and
6981 cannot therefore succeed.
separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No.
Same; The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does
6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state
not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature.—The rule prevailing in this
witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of
jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does
discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the
not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the
other is granted by the court.
trial court on this factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion, which we find not present in the case at bar.
Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program (WPSBP); In the discharge of an
accused under R.A. No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of
Republic Act No. 6891; There is no requirement under R.A. No. 6891 that the sworn
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of Rule 119,
statement and memorandum of agreement between those sought to be discharged as state
Section 17.—Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates a
witnesses be first presented in court before an accused may be admitted to the Witness
situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned and the case
Protection and Security Benefit Program (WPSBP); The interpretation of the provisions of R.A.
is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this rule may be ordered upon motion of
No. 6981 by the Department of Justice (DOJ) deserves the respect of the court under the
the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of
principle that the determination of a government agency tasked to implement a statute is
the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. On the other hand, in the
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.—On the issue of
discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of
failure of the prosecution to present the sworn statement and memorandum of agreement
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the
between the private respondents and the DOJ, there is no requirement under Republic Act No.
requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.
6891 that the same be first presented in court before an accused may be admitted to the
WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ which is tasked to implement the provisions of Republic Act No.
Same; Same; The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
6981, has determined that the private respondents have satisfied the requirements for
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
admission under the WPSBP. This interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 by
executed; It is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in
the DOJ deserves the respect of the court under the principle that the determination of a
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program
government agency tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily
and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.—The case of Webb v. De Leon, 247
controls the construction of the courts.
SCRA 652 (1995), reiterated in the subsequent case of People v. Peralta, 387 SCRA 45 (2002),
is quite elucidating in this regard. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were
a wide range of discretion—the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus
hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in
Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program 17 November 1994, the bodies of the two victims were dug up in a shallow grave at
Barangay Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmariñas Cavite. Charged to investigate the
abduction and killing was the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). After
having conducted a thorough investigation of the case, the PACC filed charges before
the Department of Justice (DOJ) entitled, “Task Force Cabakid v. Pedro Lim,
Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and John
Does.” The same was docketed as I.S. No. 94-557 and was assigned to a panel of
Senior State Prosecutors of the DOJ. Later events that transpired as narrated by
herein petitioner Eugene Yu are not disputed.
“On December 13, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution
(Annex “C,” ibid.) in the preliminary investigation of the case, docketed as I.S.
No. 94-557 finding probable cause against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas,
Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol, Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio
Hizon and private respondents de los Santos and Ochoa for the kidnapping and
murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, Eduardo Constantino.
Petitioner and his wife, Patricia Lim-Yu, were also named respondents in I.S. No.
94-557. The charges against them however were dropped for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause. Thereafter, an information was filed against several
accused, namely private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los
Santos among others, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay
City presided by respondent judge. On December 16 and 17, 1994 after the
information was filed and while under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), private respondents Ochoa and de los Santos executed
separate sworn statements (Annexes “D” and “E,” ibid.) implicating petitioner
in the abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo Constantino. The
PACC refiled the complaint docketed as I.S. No. 94-614 for murder and
kidnapping against petitioner. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the charges, citing that the sworn statements of private
respondents were not only inadmissible in evidence but also failed to establish
probable cause against him. On January 30, 1995, the DOJ investigating panel
composed of Senior State Prosecutors Henrick Guingoyon and Ferdinand
Abesamis denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss (Annex “F,” ibid.). Thereafter,
three (3) separate informations were filed against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City. Simultaneously, petitioner filed with the
aforesaid court an omnibus motion to determine probable cause, to deny
issuance of warrant of arrest and to quash information (Annex “G,” ibid.).
On December 8, 1995, respondent judge issued a resolution (Annex “H,”
ibid.), the dispositive portion reads:
xxxx
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds that
probable cause exists against accused Eugene Yu as an accomplice in
the instant cases, and the prosecution is accordingly directed to amend
the informations filed in these cases for the inclusion of the same
accused as an accomplice within ten (10) days upon receipt of a copy
hereof. As a consequence, let a warrant for the arrest of Eugene Yu be
issued in these cases and bail for his provisional liberty is hereby fixed at
P60,000.00 each in theses cases.
“x x x x
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 6; 118-119)
Both the prosecution and the petitioner filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution. The prosecution sought to
maintain the original informations charging petitioner as principal, while the latter
sought the dismissal of the cases against him for lack of probable cause. Both
motions were denied in an order of the court a quo dated February 6, 1996
(Annex “I,” ibid.).
In a petition for certiorari, docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No.
124380 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, et al.,”
the prosecution impugned the Resolution dated December 8, 1995 and the Order
dated February 6, 1996. The petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its
Resolution dated May 14, 1996. The prosecution refiled the same titled petition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42208, “where it is
currently pending, entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eleuterio F.
Guerrero, et al.”
In the meantime, the prosecution filed a “Petition to Discharge as State
Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos”
on April 17, 1996 (Annex “J”). Petitioner opposed the motion. On March 6,
1997, respondent judge issued the impugned order, thus:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and
considerations, this Court hereby resolves to GRANT the Petition (to
Discharge as State Witnesses & Exclude from the Information Accused
Ochoa & de los Santos) filed by the prosecution for being impressed with
merit, and, accordingly, the same accused are hereby ordered
discharged and excluded from the information filed in these cases as
State Witnesses.
“SO ORDERED.” (Annex “A,” p. 31)
Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases,
claims that the orders were issued by public respondent judge with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, claiming that there is
no legal basis or justification to discharge as state witnesses accused Rodolfo
Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos (hereinafter referred to as private
respondents).”
From the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 dated
6 March 1997, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition before the Court
of Appeals. In a decision dated 30 September 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied in a resolution dated 4 April 2000.
Essentially, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no necessity for a
hearing to determine a person’s qualification as a state witness after the DOJ had
attested to his qualification. Republic Act No. 6981, Witness Protection and Security
Benefit Program (WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole authority to determine
whether or not an accused is qualified for admission into the program. The appellate
court held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981, upon the filing by the
prosecution of a petition to discharge an accused from the information, it is mandatory
for the court to order the discharge and exclusion of the accused.
From this adverse decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed
the instant petition.
 The following issues are raised for resolution:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED IS NOT A
JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISCHARGED THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE DISCHARGED AS
STATE WITNESS.
Petitioner maintains that since the private respondents were already charged along
with the other accused including him (petitioner) before they were admitted to the
WPSBP, their admission is a judicial prerogative which requires prior determination
by the trial court of their qualification as state witnesses, in accordance with Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner further asserts that the case of Webb v. De Leon, which the RTC relied
on in granting the discharge of the private respondents and their admission to the
WPSBP, does not apply. In that case, Jessica Alfaro was not charged as a
respondent before her application and admission to the WPSBP. Thus, the issue of
whether or not she can be discharged from the information upon the filing of the
petition for discharge never arose. On the other hand, petitioner contends in this case
that the private respondents were already charged along with the other accused,
including him, before they were admitted to the WPSBP and discharged as an
accused to be utilized as a state witness. Petitioner argues that if this were to be
allowed, the same is tantamount to permitting the prosecution to supplant with its own
the court’s exercise of discretion on how a case over which it has acquired
jurisdiction, will proceed.
The argument of petitioner fails to persuade.
On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads:
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6981 employed by the prosecution in the
discharge of the private respondents reads:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program.—Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before
any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a)the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special
laws;
b)his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c)he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or
there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or
corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively,
because or on account of his testimony; and
d)he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying
against other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the
immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection
provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program
shall be known as the Witness.
xxxx
SEC. 10. State Witness.—Any person who has participated in the
commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if
qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into
the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a)the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special
laws;
b)there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c)there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed;
d)his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e)he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f)he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the
court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act
shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State
Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.—When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a)There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b)There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c)The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d)Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
 (e)Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part
of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the
prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and separate from the
discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981
is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state
witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is
another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is
granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court.
Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates
a situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned
and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this rule may be
ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any stage of
the proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to
offer any evidence.
On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981,
only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure  is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.
More to the point is the recent case of Soberano v. People  where this Court held:
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one
of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of
the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the
exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when
it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on
some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on
the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet
come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is
essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. x x x. (Italics supplied.)
In this connection, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that the issuance of
a certification of admission into the program shall be given full faith by the provincial
or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the criminal complaint
or information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be
utilized as a state witness. This provision justifies the regularity of the procedure
adopted by the prosecution for the discharge of the private respondents.
The case of Webb v. De Leon, reiterated in the subsequent case of People v.
Peralta, is quite elucidating in this regard.
Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to
the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is
to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests
the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion—the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which
are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who
shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support
the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent
judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a
state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the
accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not
a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never
been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the
administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal
reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of
which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by
the Department of Justice, viz.: “Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic
disclocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of
criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have
been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective
administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting
witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in
investigative bodies/courts. Petitioner Webb’s challenge to the validity of R.A. No.
6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that the petition to discharge is not
supported by any proof or evidence. He claims that the prosecution did not establish
that the private respondents have complied with the requisites of Republic Act No.
6981 because the certificate of admission from the DOJ showing that the private
respondents were qualified, and the memorandum of agreement between the DOJ
and private respondents, as required by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6981, were not
presented before the trial court.
 We reject the argument for being vacuous. ——o0o——
As found by the DOJ, based on the extrajudicial statements executed by the
private respondents regarding their participation in the abduction and killing of Atty.
Eugene Tan and his driver, it appears that they were included in an alleged military
operation and unaware that the persons they abducted were innocent civilians
because they were misled by their military superiors into believing that these
individuals were unnamed communist rebels. From their account, private respondents
claim to have been oblivious that the persons subject of their surveillance were to be
abducted and subsequently killed.

The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be utilized
as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual
in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual issue is seldom
interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion,
which we find not present in the case at bar.

On the issue of failure of the prosecution to present the sworn statement and
memorandum of agreement between the private respondents and the DOJ, there is
no requirement under Republic Act No. 6891 that the same be first presented in court
before an accused may be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ which is
tasked to implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981, has determined that the
private respondents have satisfied the requirements for admission under the WPSBP.
This interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 by the DOJ deserves
the respect of the court under the principle that the determination of a government
agency tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated 30 September 1999 and 4 April 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
This case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,
Branch 18, for continuation of hearing to its conclusion with deliberate dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—In the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, a
witness in a legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be
admitted into the Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program subject only to the
requirements provided for under Section 4. (Acop vs. Guingona, Jr., 383 SCRA 577 [2002])

The improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract
from his competency as a witness—any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for
the discharge, and of the court in granting the petition, no question of jurisdiction being involved,
cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal provided by the Rules, and of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. (People vs. Verceles, 388 SCRA 515 [2002])
 [ G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014 ]
MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
[G.R. NO. 209215]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR.,
respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the amended decision  of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 entitled Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. v. Hon.
Zaldy B. Docena et al.
The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC Branch 170, Malabon) Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena) in issuing
the order which granted the People of the Philippines’ motion to discharge Manuel A.
Montero (Montero) as a state witness in Criminal Case No. 39225-MN.
The G.R. No. 209195 petition was filed by Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez). He
prays in this petition for the reversal of the CA’s amended decision insofar as it ruled
that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the assailed order.
The People likewise filed its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 209215. This petition
seeks to reverse the amended decision of the CA insofar as it ordered the re-raffle of
the criminal case to another R
TC judge for trial on the merits.
The Factual Antecedents
On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ
Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his
participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming
petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez’s younger brother),
Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias “Spyke,” Robert Ponce (Robert) alias “Obet,”
and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators.
The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel
casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a
cadaver, encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that
Montero pointed to.
On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an Information
before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of
murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.
Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled “Motion for the Discharge
of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection Program” pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero as a
state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.
The RTC’s ruling
On March 19, 2010, the RTC’s Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda (Judge
Almeyda) denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of
an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the most
guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The judge further ruled that
Montero’s statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record. The
prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of conviction
against Jimenez.
Montero and the People filed separate motions for reconsideration.
The July 30, 2010 order
On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge, reconsidered
and reversed Judge Almeyda’s order and ruled that the prosecution had presented
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and
unsolved had it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial confession that narrated in detail
the manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose. As the crime
was committed in secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such as Montero, could give
direct evidence identifying the other coconspirators.
Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified to be discharged as a state
witness as he does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by
direct participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without
their orders, the crime would not have been committed. Finally, Montero has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Jimenez moved for the reconsideration of Judge Docena’s ruling.

The December 29, 2010 order
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Jimenez filed a motion for
inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case on the
ground of bias and prejudice.  Judge Docena denied the motion in his order of
December 29, 2010.
The June 29, 2011 order
On June 29, 2011, Judge Docena issued an omnibus order: 1) denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2010 order; 2) denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 2010 order; and 3)
granting Manuel Jimenez III’s alternative motion to suspend the proceedings, as his
inclusion in the Information was still pending final determination by the Office of the
President.
Jimenez responded to these adverse rulings by filing with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition sought the annulment
of Judge Docena’s orders dated July 30, 2010, December 29, 2010, and June 29,
2011. The petition also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction that the CA both granted in its resolutions of December
8, 2011 and February 6, 2012, respectively .
The CA’s Decision
On May 22, 2012, the CA’s then Tenth Division, through the ponencia of Associate
Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla) rendered a decision granting
Jimenez’ petition.
However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the People, the CA reversed its
earlier ruling and issued an Amended Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose
Reyes.
The CA’s Amended Decision
The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had
complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
First, Judge Docena acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when he ruled
that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero as no other direct
evidence other than his testimony was available. Additionally, since the determination
of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is highly factual in nature, Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in largely relying on the recommendation of the prosecution to discharge
Montero as a state witness.
Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most guilty
among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty than the
principals by direct participation. To the CA, this finding is highly factual in nature and
it would not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion on factual issues in the
absence of showing that the court had acted with grave abuse of discretion.[14]
On Judge Docena’s ‘no inhibition’ order, the CA held that while the case does not call
for mandatory inhibition, it should still be raffled to another sala for trial on the merits
to avoid any claim of bias and prejudice.
The CA likewise dismissed the motion for the issuance of a show cause order which
Jimenez filed against Judge Docena.
Both Jimenez and the People moved for partial reconsideration of the CA’s order but
these motions were all denied. The denials prompted both parties to file with this
Court the present consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.
The Present Petitions
I. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition)
Jimenez raises the following errors:
First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because: 1) the
voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession of the
prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging Montero;
and 2) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because all the other
conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime.
Second, contrary to the CA’s ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the
ultimate discretion in ensuring that the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 are
complied with.
Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the present case. Chua v.
CA should not apply as it deals with two accused, one of whom was ordered
discharged.
Fourth, Montero’s testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points
as the prosecution’s own evidence contradicts his declarations.
These inconsistencies include: Montero’s statement that a “busal” was placed inside
the mouth of Ruby Rose; this statement is belied by the other prosecution witness;
Montero also never mentioned the presence of a packaging tape wrapped around the
head and neck of the recovered cadaver; in Montero’s sinumpaang salaysay, he
stated that Ruby Rose was killed by strangulation using a “lubid” but the death
certificate stated asphyxia by suffocation and not by strangulation; the identification of
the cadaver as Ruby Rose is likewise questionable as there are differences in the
height, and the dental and odontological reports of Ruby Rose and the recovered
cadaver.
Jimenez argued that these inconsistencies would require a thorough scrutiny; hence,
the immediate discharge of Montero as a state witness is suspicious.  June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements in his
Fifth, Montero appears to be the most guilty. He was the architect who designed and
actively participated in all phases of the alleged crime.
Jimenez further argued that there is no authority supporting the ruling that the
principals by inducement are more guilty than the principal by direct participation. On
the contrary, the Revised Penal Code imputes on the principal by direct participation
the heavier guilt; without the latter’s execution of the crime, the principal by
inducement cannot be made liable. Even if the principal by inducement is acquitted,
the principal by direct participation can still be held liable and not vice-versa.
Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to
conduct a prior hearing.
Finally, Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony
which was submitted to the CA.
Comment of the People
The People argued that Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing as
an issue since he raised this issue only after Judge Docena granted the motion to
discharge and not after Judge Almeyda denied the motion – an action that was
favorable to him.
It also argued that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings for Montero’s
discharge as the trial court received evidence for and against the discharge. In this
light, Judge Docena’s order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order,
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing.
The People also agreed with the CA’s amended ruling that the requirements for the
discharge of an accused as a state witness were complied with. It added that the
availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution’s possession is not a
ground to disqualify an accused from being a state witness.
It further maintained that the alleged contradictions between Montero’s statements
and other prosecution’s evidence are better resolved during trial and are irrelevant to
the issues in the present case.
For purposes of the present case, the material allegations of Montero on the identity
of the victim and the manner of her killing were substantially corroborated by the
presence of the recovered original steel casing, the drum containing a cadaver, the
place where it was found, and the cadaver’s apparel.
The People observed that Montero had already testified on direct examination on
affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he narrated in his statements the murder
of Ruby Rose and Jimenez’ participation.
Reply of Jimenez
Jimenez reiterated his allegations in the comment. He added that Montero did not
identify or authenticate his sworn statements in support of the motion for his
discharge.
According to Jimenez, the notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of Montero
rendered his discharge as a state witness moot and academic.
II. G.R. No. 209215 (The People’s Petition)
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the CA’s order to
re-raffle the case to another sala is not supported by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition.
To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven, in the
manner being done in cases of voluntary inhibition.
Jurisprudence establishes, too, that affiliation does not necessarily translate to bias. A
judge’s non-favorable action against the defense is not also necessarily indicative of
bias and prejudice.
Finally, the administrative case filed against Judge Docena is not a ground to
disqualify him from hearing the case. ]
Comment of Jimenez
The option for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide
whether or not they will desist from hearing a case. Jimenez enumerated Judge
Docena’s acts that allegedly constituted bias and prejudice:

First, Judge Docena granted the motion to discharge even though the legal
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
were not factually and legally proven. He also relied on the suggestions and
information of the prosecutors thereby surrendering his duty to ensure that the
requirements for a discharge are duly complied with.
Second, in a previous case where his fraternity brother appeared as counsel, Judge
Docena inhibited himself from hearing the case. Thus, no reason exists for him not to
similarly act in the present case where Jimenez is his fraternity brother and State
Prosecutor Villanueva was his classmate.
Third, Judge Docena granted the prosecution’s motion for cancellation of the
September 29, 2011 hearing because the state prosecutor would be attending a legal
forum. This was improper since other prosecutors were available and other
prosecution witnesses could be presented.
Fourth, Judge Docena has an uncontrolled temper and unexplainable attitude. In
Jimenez’ bail hearing, Judge Docena immediately shouted at Jimenez’ counsel when
he made a mistake.
The Issues
1) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge Montero
as a state witness; and
2) Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of Criminal Case
No. 39225-MN to another RTC branch for trial on the merits.
THE COURT’S RULING:
G.R. No. 209195
We agree with the CA’s ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion
when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a court which has
jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is clear and
patent. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error,
but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondent issuing the impugned order.
Notably, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave.
Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility
We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4), and 5(e). The
parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5(a) to (d) as the issues before
us. We shall discuss these issues separately below.
Absolute necessity of the testimony
of Montero
We see no merit in Jimenez’s allegation that no absolute necessity exists for
Montero’s testimony.
Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged
when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity
is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution’s evidence.
We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court’s pronouncement in Chua v. CA et al. is
inapplicable in the present case simply because more than two accused are involved
in the present case. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a
state witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number
of the participating conspirators.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez et al.,[44] the Court ordered the discharge of
the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his testimony is absolutely necessary to prove
conspiracy with his other co-accused. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General
that considering the circumstances of the case and that the other accused could not
be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the accused
would not come to light unless the accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for
the State. Specifically, unless accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the
government, there would be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense charged, particularly on the role of his co-accused in the
preparation and completion of the falsified loan application and its supporting papers.
Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan,[45] the Court reinstated the ruling of
the trial court which ordered the discharge of accused Ngo Sin from among the five
accused. The record justified his discharge as a state witness considering the
absolute necessity of his testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had
planned and financed the theft.
In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing
to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing.
Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in
accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the
testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his
discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the
prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice
in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not
been complied with.
The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it “a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.” Under Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power
to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
crime and the accused.
Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated
We also do not find merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s testimony cannot be
substantially corroborated in its material points and is even contradicted by the
physical evidence of the crime.
As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing where the
cadaver was found; the drum containing the cadaver which the prosecution
successfully identified (and which even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be
Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was
retrieved); the apparel worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned
personal effects, all partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn
statements of Montero.
With these as bases, Judge Docena’s ruling that Montero’s testimony found
substantial corroboration cannot be characterized as grave abuse of discretion.
Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero’s statements and the physical
evidence, such as the absence of “busal” in the mouth of the retrieved cadaver; his
failure to mention that they used packaging tape wrapped around the head down to
the neck of the victim; and his declaration that the victim was killed through
strangulation using a rope (lubid).
However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more
material than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez, at least for purposes of the
motion to discharge.
The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and
dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with during the
trial proper.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that
the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in
its material points, not on all points.
This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge under
Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the
trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the
course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial.
Montero is not the most guilty
We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is not the
most guilty.
By jurisprudence, “most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the
severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty
by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt
taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense.

What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his
co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.
Before dwelling on the parties’ substantive arguments, we find it necessary to first
correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct.
Contrary to the CA’s findings, a principal by inducement is not automatically the most
guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court in People v. Baharan did not involve
the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness.
Instead, the pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a principal by
inducement whose co-inducement act was the determining cause for the commission
of the crime.
Thus viewed, Baharan  cannot be the basis of a peremptory pronouncement that a
principal by inducement is more guilty than the principal by direct participation.
In Chua v. People, which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court
declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the
determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have
been committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the criminal
act.
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal by
inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused
and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of
private documents where the element of “damage” arose through the principal
by inducement’s encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare
that the principal by inducement is the “most guilty” (or properly, the more guilty)
between the two accused.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state
witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the
crime committed.
We cannot also agree with Jimenez’ argument that a principal by direct participation
is more guilty than the principal by inducement as the Revised Penal Code penalizes
the principal by inducement only when the principal by direct participation has
executed the crime.
We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive criminal
law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of
the particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of the discharge of an accused is
based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of several
accused in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid
admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify
truthfully.
On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA ruling that no grave
abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena ruled that Montero is not the most
guilty.
We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be found
to be the least guilty; he or she should not only “appear to be the most guilty.”
From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge
Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and
execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in
the actual killing of Ruby Rose.
While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not
indicate that he had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which
allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby
Rose which was executed by accused Lennard. Montero’s participation was limited to
providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed,
welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and,
together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box containing the cadaver into the
sea.
At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he
does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends
on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime.
The appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on
this factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes.
In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that Judge Docena did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Montero is not the most guilty.
The discharge of Montero as a state
witness was procedurally sound
We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of
hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. Jimenez did not raise
this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of
course, was favorable to Jimenez. If he found no reason to complain then, why
should we entertain his hearing-related complaint now?
The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the
proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page opposition to
the motion; filing a reply to the People’s comment; submitting his memorandum of
authorities on the qualification of Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated
opposition on the People’s and Montero’s motion for reconsideration of Judge
Almeyda’s order.
In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge Docena
for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the motion to discharge. In People v.
CA and Pring,  the Court ruled that with both litigants able to present their sides, the
lack of actual hearing is not sufficiently fatal to undermine the court's ability to
determine whether the conditions prescribed for the discharge of an accused as a
state witness have been satisfied.
Contrary to Jimenez’ argument, the  Pring ruling is applicable in the present case.
In Pring, the sworn statements of the accused sought to be discharged (Nonilo Arile),
together with the prosecution’s other evidence, were already in the possession of the
court and had been challenged by the respondent in his Opposition to Discharge
Nonilo Arile and in his Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the propriety of the
trial court’s resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile without conducting a
hearing pursuant Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (now
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
With Jimenez’ active participation in the proceeding for the motion to discharge as
outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pring should squarely apply.
Montero’s Notice of Withdrawal of
Consent is not material in the resolution
of the present case
We find no merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s submission of his notice of
withdrawal of consent and testimony of Manuel dated February 26, 2013 rendered the
present case moot, since the Court cannot consider this document in this petition.
It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate review of the CA’s
decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in
granting the motion to discharge.
Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule on the notice of
withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or presence of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. The present case is not the proper
venue for the determination of the value of the notice.
This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that Montero already testified
on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and
affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he not only
narrated the grisly murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez’ participation in
the murder.
With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation, which is
usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later changed his/her mind.
In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs to
the trial court.
Interplay between the judge and
prosecutor in the motion to discharge
an accused to become a state witness
As a last point, we find it necessary to clarify the roles of the prosecution and the trial
court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness.
This need arises from what appears to us to be a haphazard use of the statement that
the trial court judge must rely in large part on the prosecution’s suggestion in the
resolution of a motion to discharge.
In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo in ruling that the trial court must
rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer, thus:
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty
at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course
of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the
crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or possible there would be
little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely in large part upon the suggestions
and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions
as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested";
as to the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to
which of the accused is “most guilty,” and the like.
We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the wrong
impression that the trial court is a mere “rubber stamp” of the prosecution, in the
manner that Jimenez now argues.
In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a
state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic
one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice,
largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring that in requiring a hearing in support of the
discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for or
against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court’s tangible and
concrete basis – independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions – in On the allegation that Judge Docena’s uncontrollable temper and unexplainable
granting or denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that attitude should be considered as a factor, we note that the allegations and
actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both presented their perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to
sides on the merits of the motion. show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the floodgates to
abuse. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the
We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quarto should not apply to the present proceedings, and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, the Court would
case, since the principles laid down in that case similarly operate in the present case, uphold the presumption that a magistrate shall impartially decide the merits of a case.
specifically, on issue of the procedural processes required in the discharge of the
accused as a state witness. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 209195 and affirm the CA’s
amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 insofar as it found no grave abuse of
G.R. No. 209215 discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting the People’s motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness.
We find the People’s petition meritorious.
We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215  and modify the CA’s amended decision
We note at the outset that the CA did not provide factual or legal support when it in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 in accordance with our ruling that Judge Docena’s denial
ordered the inhibition of Judge Docena. Additionally, we do not find Jimenez’ of the motion for inhibition was proper.
arguments sufficiently persuasive.
SO ORDERED.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited
discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must
be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is likewise not
enough ground for their inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.
 
It is well-established that inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate
or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties. A judge, too,
is not expected to automatically inhibit himself from acting in a case involving a
member of his fraternity, such as Jimenez in the present case. 

In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
prejudice, a judge’s ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to stand.

In attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena, Jimenez must prove that the judge
acted or conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
so as to defeat the attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial judge must
possess. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge acted with
prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of his functions cannot
overcome the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts.

In the present case, Jimenez’ allegation of bias and prejudice is negated by the CA
finding in its amended decision, as affirmed by this Court, that Judge Docena did not
gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to discharge. We support this
conclusion as the cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing is not clearly
indicative of bias and prejudice.
 [ G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ROGER DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS,
RAYMOND DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, JAYSON MIRANDA Y NACPIL, ROLANDO
TALBAN Y MENDOZA, and JOEL JACINTO Y CELESTINO, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
For consideration is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to nullify the May 27, 2016
Decision and January 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139255. The challenged rulings affirmed the January 10, 2014 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 215 in Quezon City directing that the testimony of
the deceased state witness Alfred Mendiola (Mendiola) be stricken off the records of
Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431.
The Facts
On January 13, 2011, Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted in Cubao,
Quezon City by a group of men later pinpointed as the respondents herein.
Evangelista's charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija.
In connection with the incident, Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan (Parulan) voluntarily
surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and executed extrajudicial
confessions identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez (Dominguez
Brothers) as the masterminds behind the killing. This led to the filing before the
Quezon City RTC of an Information against Mendiola and the respondents for
Carnapping with Homicide under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539,[3] otherwise
known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of January 2011, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, and other persons who are at large and whose identities
and whereabouts are still to be determined, conspiring and confederating
together and helping each other, with intent to gain and to kill and by means of
violence against and intimidation of person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously take and carry away one (1) charcoal gray Toyota Land Cruiser
model 2009 with Plate No. NAI-316, Engine No. 1VD-0049539 and Chassis No.
JTMHV05J804031334, worth Php3,400,000.00, Philippine Currency, then driven
by VENSON EVANGELISTA Y VELARO and registered in the name of Future
Trade International, Inc. but already sold to Arsenio Evangelista per Deed of Sale
dated December 13, 2010, to the damage and prejudice of the owner.
That during the commission of the said offense, or by reason thereof, the said
accused, in conspiracy with one another and with intent to kill, carefully planned
the execution of their acts and with the attendant circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength, cruelty, and by means
of fire, attack (sic) and assaulted VENSON EVANGELISTA Y VALERO (sic) by
shooting him on the head, mutilated his body, and set the same on fire thereby
inflicting upon him fatal injuries which were the proximate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the late VENSON
EVANGELISTA Y VELARO.
Accused and their other unidentified cohorts committed the above attendant
circumstances in the killing of their victim because they deliberately planned the
commission of the offense consciously adopting the means and methods of
attack done suddenly and unexpectedly, taking advantage of their numbers and
strength to ensure its commission without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which the victim might make, accompanied by fraud, deceit, disguise,
cruelty and by abuse of superior strength by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the respondents, Rolando Taiban (Taiban) and Joel Jacinto (Jacinto) remained at
large. Only the Dominguez brothers and Miranda were apprehended. And during
arraignment on April 11, 2011, the three arrested respondents pleaded not guilty to
the offense.
On June 27, 2011, a hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion[5] that
Mendiola be discharged as an accused to become a state witness. On the said date,
Mendiola gave his testimony and was cross examined by the counsel for the defense.
Nevertheless, the defense manifested that the cross-examination was limited only to
the incident of discharge, and that their party reserved the right to a more lengthy
cross examination during the prosecution's presentation of the evidence in chief.
On September 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 215, before which Criminal Case No. Q-11-
168431 is pending, issued an Order granting the motion to discharge Mendiola as an
accused to become a state witness. The Order further states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the motion to
discharge accused ALFRED MENDIOLA y RAMOS from the Information to
become a state witness.
Accordingly, his testimonies given on June 27, July 8 and July 11, 2011 and all
the evidence adduced in support of the discharge hereby form part of the trial of
this case.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, by a surprise turn of events, Mendiola was found dead on May 6, 2012.
The RTC then required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
whether or not Mendiola's testimony during the discharge proceeding should be
admitted as part of the prosecution's evidence in chief despite his failure to testify
during the trial proper prior to his death.
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 10, 2014, the RTC issued the assailed Order directing that the testimony
of Mendiola be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No.Q-11-168431. The
decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the testimony of ALFRED MENDIOLA y RAMOS given on June
27, 2011 for purposes of his discharge as a state witness is HEREBY ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF THE RECORD of this case. With respect to the documents and
other evidence authenticated by Mendiola as a discharge witness, this Court will
rule upon their admissibility when the same are formally offered in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
According to the trial court, Mendiola's testimony on June 27, 2011 was offered only
for the purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a state
witness, and does not yet constitute evidence in chief. Thus, the defense counsel
limited his questions during cross-examination to only those matters relating to
Mendiola's qualifications to become a state witness and expressly reserved the right
to continue the cross-examination during trial proper. As ratiocinated by the RTC:
There is no question that when Mendiola was cross-examined, such cross-
examination was limited by the purpose of the hearing, that is, whether the court
would be satisfied of the absolute necessity of his testimony; that "there is no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution"; that his "testimony could be
substantially corroborated in its material points"; that he "does not appear to be the
most guilty"; and he "has not been convicted, at any time, of any offense involving
moral turpitude". In short, these are the purposes for the discharge hearings.  x x x
The trial court likewise cited Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, noting that
there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a regular witness during
trial proper to secure his acquittal. Noncompliance with this requirement, according to
the RTC, amounted to the deprivation of respondents of their constitutional right to
due process, and of their right to confront the witnesses against them.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The issue was elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule
65, but the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court. It thus dismissed the petition in its assailed May 27, 2016 Decision in the
following wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Orders dated 10 January 2014 and 1 December 2014 issued by public
respondent Judge Wildredo L. Maynigo in Criminal case no. Q-11-168431,
pending before Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration therefrom through its January
18, 2017 Resolution. Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issue
The primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the testimony of
Mendiola should be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431.
Petitioner posits that the right afforded to an accused to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him is not an absolute right. Hence, when respondents failed to
avail themselves of the constitutional guarantee when Mendiola gave his testimony
on June 27, 2011, they have effectively forfeited their right thereto.
The Court directed respondents to file their respective comments within fifteen (15)
days from notice. Respondent Jayson Miranda y Nacpil, in his Comment,[12] argues
that the testimony of Mendiola was offered in the discharge proceeding for the limited
purpose of qualifying the latter as a state witness, and Section 18, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court requires for the state witness to be presented again during trial proper.
Failure of the prosecution to again offer the testimony of the state witness, as part of
their evidence-in-chief, unlawfully deprived the respondents of the opportunity to
conduct a full and exhaustive cross-examination. For even though Mendiola was
cross-examined during the discharge proceedings, respondents nevertheless
intimated to the trial court that they were reserving the right to propound further
questions when Mendiola is again to take the witness stand. Miranda adds that the
respondents are just as without fault that Mendiola died without completing his
testimony.
Miranda adds that at the time Mendiola testified during the discharge proceedings, his
co-respondents Rolando M. Taiban (Taiban) and Joel C. Jacinto (Jacinto) were not
yet arrested. Thus, to allow the testimony of Mendiola to remain on record would be
tantamount to a denial of their right to cross-examine the witness against them.
On the other hand, it appears that Atty. Oscar Raro, the counsel of record for
respondent Roger Dominguez, failed to inform this Court that he has changed his
office address. Service upon counsel was therefore not actually effected.
Nevertheless, We have held time and again that notices to counsel should properly
be sent to his or her address of record in the absence of due notice to the court of a
change of address. Thus, respondent Roger Dominguez is deemed to have received
the order to comment by fiction of law and has, consequently, waived his right to
counter the allegations in the petition after fifteen (15) days from the date of his
constructive receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Atty. Jose M. Cruz, who represents
Raymond Dominguez, has likewise not filed a Comment in behalf of his client herein.
The Court resolves, however, to dispense with the same.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render
his testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible
Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. - When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part
of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (emphasis
added)
The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding
will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a
state witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and
the motion for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is
already automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431
and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule.
Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be. The
contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his possession
of all the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness. The argument of
incompleteness even contradicts respondent Miranda's own position since he does
not contest here the RTC's Order granting Mendiola's motion to be a state witness,
only the admissibility of his testimony following his demise.
Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it
mandatory that the state witness be presented during trial proper and that, otherwise,
his failure to do so would render his testimony inadmissible. On this point, Miranda,
the RTC and the CA are mistaken in their interpretation of the rule, which pertinently
provides:
Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. - The order indicated
in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused
and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the
accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance
with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.
(emphasis added)
While respondent Miranda is correct that the motion hearing is different from the
presentation of evidence in chief, it is precisely because of this distinction and
separability that the validity of the discharge proceeding should remain untouched
despite the non-presentation of Mendiola during trial on the merits. True, the provision
requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state
witness. However, noncompliance therewith would only prevent the order of
discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not speak of any penalty to the effect
of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge proceeding
inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions of a state witness
during the discharge proceedings may be admitted as evidence to impute criminal
liability against him should he fail or refuse to testify in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis for the discharge, militating against the claim of
inadmissibility.
To qualify as a state witness, the respondent must testify on the details of the
commission of the crime
That the testimony of Mendiola was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying him
as a state witness does not automatically render his statements as to the specifics on
the commission of the offense inadmissible. To recall, one of the requirements under
Section 17, Rule 119 is to establish that the erstwhile respondent does not appear to
be the most guilty among him and his cohorts. Thus, it is quite understandable that,
during the discharge proceeding, Mendiola narrated in graphic detail his entire
knowledge of the crime and the extent of the participation of each of the accused, to
wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, are you the same Alfred Mendiola[,] one of the persons being
indicted in this instant crime of Carnapping with Homicide?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Do you know the other accused in this case, Mr. Witness, namely, I will
enumerate[:] Roger Dominguez, Raymond Dominguez, Jayson Miranda[,] alias
Soy, Rolando Talban[,] a.k.a. Eduardo Fernandez[,] a.k.a. Rolly and one named
alias Joel
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Why do you know them, Mr. Witness?
A: I've been with them[,] with the group that I joined which is carnapping.
Q: In the said carnapping group that you mentioned, Mr. Witness, what is your
role?
A: I served as the buyer or as poseur buyer of the vehicle that we were supposed
to buy but actually we will carnap.
Q: What about the other named accused, No. 1 Roger and No. 2 Raymond, what
are their roles?
A: We treat them as our leader because they are the ones planning the
operations, they are the ones funding the operation, they are the ones providing
us the money every time we have the operation.
xxxx
Court: What was your last statement? Can you repeat[?]
A: They are the ones who [are] also giving us our salary or payment for ever[y]
successful operation.
Q: What about Jayson Miranda[,] alias Soy, what is his role in your group?
A: I came to know Jayson Miranda as the right hand of Roger Dominguez and he
serve[d] as my driver for four times wherein I was involved in carnapping.
Q: What about this Joel, what is his role, Mr. Witness?
A: Joel [was] introduced to me and will also be my companion who will pose as a
mechanic and will directly assist us if ever we are successful in test driving the
said vehicle.
xxxx
Q: What about Rolly or Rolando Taiban[,] also known as Eduardo Fernandez y
Lopez, what is his role in your group?
A: I was only introduced once to Rolly and I also know him as a member of the
group and he was assigned to help us on a certain operation.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you previously mentioned that you are a member of a group
headed by Dominguez brothers. How did your group operate or what was your
modus operandi?
A: The first time I met Roger Dominguez[,] he was able to tell me that theirs
system of carnapping is by poking. But after that[,] he narrated some more
regarding other systems of carnapping.
Q: And what are these other systems that were given to you or were relayed to
you?
A: One strategy is they will look for sellers of vehicles through newspapers,
magazines and internet then they will get the contact numbers of the person
selling the vehicle.
Q: And what did they do with the contact numbers given to them by the owners of
the vehicles?
A: Once contacted[,] they will schedule a meeting place of the poseur buyer and
the seller.
Q: And what else are the modus operandi of your group?
A: And if the seller agrees on the road test[,] that is the time the group of the
poseur buyer will poke and carnap the said vehicle.
Q: You continuously mentioned about, pagtutok, can you elaborate that, what, do
you mean [by] pagtutok?
A: In my experience[,] every time we are successful in convincing a seller[,] it will
be Joel who in the middle of the road testing will draw his gun and poke it to the
seller.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, you mentioned about this Toyota Land Cruiser, let's go to
that, when for the first time did you hear about this Toyota Land Cruiser?
A: The first time I heard them talking about this Toyota Land Cruiser was January
12 during night time.
Q: What year?
A: 2011, ma'am.
Q: And what did you hear about this Toyota Land Cruiser?
A: We were in Greenville Subdivision over dinner with Roger Dominguez, Ann,
Katrina Paula then Raymond Dominguez[,] together with Rolly[,] arrived.
Q: Who was the one who mentioned this Land Cruiser?
A: According to them[,] since it was night time when they say the vehicle[,] the
owner did not agree for them to road test the said vehicle.
Q: What else did Raymond Dominguez tell you?
A: After that when the owner did not agree for the road test[,] they went to a
gasoline station in Quezon City.
xxxx
Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: When Raymond Dominguez arrived[,] he gave me a number and asked me to
contact that said number claiming the owner was selling a Toyota Land Cruiser.
Q: How did Raymond Dominguez give to you that number, how?
A: From his cell phone[, ] he jotted down the number on a piece of paper[,] he
gave it to me and asked me to call it if the Toyota Land Cruiser is still for sale.
Q: Upon receiving the instructions of Raymond Dominguez[,] what did you do
with that number?
A: Before I dialed the number[,] I asked him what to tell the owner in case he
answers the call.
Q: What did Raymond Dominguez tell you?
A: I was asked to ask the owner if the Toyota Land Cruiser is still for sale and if
yes[,] then I should schedule a meeting.
xxxx
 A: Roger told me "Hoy Bakla, kung hindi mo mapapapayag na i-road test yang
Q: During the telephone conversation with as you mentioned with Boy sasakyan na iyan wag mong pilitin ha."
Evangelista[,] what did you talk about?
A: He said that it's still available, it [is] still for sale. xxxx

Q: So what was your response, Mr. Witness?
A: I asked him where and when can I see the vehicle.
Q: What did Mr. Evangelista tell you?
A: He answered within the day, the vehicle is available.
Q: Mr. Witness, while you were talking to Mr. Boy Evangelista over the phone,
where [we]re Raymond, Roger, Jayson Miranda and the rest of the accused,
where were they?
A: In the sala of the house in Greenville Subdivision, ma'am.
Q: So when Roger Dominguez made his statement[,] what happened thereafter?
A: Raymond answered[,] "[s]ige kung hindi mo kaya ako na ang bahala, pero
hindi ako aalis sa area na iyon na hindi ko tangay ang Toyota Land Cruiser".
Q: With all these statements, Mr. Witness, what happened thereafter?
A: Rolly just interrupted, "Boss, kung saka-sakaling mapapapayag natin ang
may-ari ng Toyota Land Cruiser na ipa-road test at kung sino man ang sasama
itumba na natin dahil baka makilala pa niyan pag pinakita ng QCPD yung picture
gallery ng mga carnappers dahil galing [sic] na tayo diyan noong gabing 'yon
January 13."

xxxx
xxxx
Q: So after you were already specifically assigned of [sic] your roles in the
Q: How did you end your transaction or your telephone conversation with Mr. Boy
carnapping of the Land Cruiser as well as to how to execute and realize this, how
Evangelista?
did you go about this plan?
A: When I asked the person on the other line if I can see the vehicle within the
A: Raymond was the first one who left the subdivision onboard the said Ford
day[,] Raymond signaled me to schedule a meeting around three to four that
Expedition.
afternoon.
Q: Would you recall what time was that?
A: Around 1:00 o'clock or past 1:00 o'clock.
xxxx
Q: x x x After you were able to set up a meeting with Mr. Boy Evangelista over
Q: Of what date?
the telephone regarding the Land Cruiser, what happened thereafter?
A: January 13, 2011.
A: He texted me the address where I can meet him.
Q: How about you, Mr. Witness, and the rest of the group[,] what time did you
Q: What were these instructions?
leave the apartment?
A: The first thing he told me was that he will be the first to leave the subdivision
A: After Raymond left[,] we prepared and we left the subdivision at around 2:00
onboard a white Expedition and that he instructed me to act as a poseur buyer
o'clock in the afternoon onboard a green Pajero together with Jayson and Rolly.
and to test drive the said vehicle since I will be giving it as a gift.
Q: You mentioned that you were onboard this Pajero together with Jayson and
Q: What else did Raymond tell you?
Rolly, but previously in your statement you said that Joel was also given a role by
A: He also told me that I will be with Jayson who will act as the driver of Pajero
Raymond Dominguez, so where was this Joel at that time?
which we will use in going to that place. And Joel was also with us to act as
A: We fetched Joel at SM, San Fernando, he alighted from [a] gray van before he
merchant and Rolly will act as a back up for us in case the owner will agree to a
transferred to our vehicle.
road test.
Q: How about Roger[,] how come he did not come with your group?
Q: While Raymond was giving all these instructions to you, who were present at
A: Roger, Napoleon Salamat and Ann were left in the apartment but we were told
that time?
[to] give updates to them if we were able to convince the seller.
A: Roger Dominguez, Ann, Napoleon Salamat, Rolly, Jayson Miranda alias Soy.
Q: You previously mentioned that you left the apartment at around 2:00 o'clock
xxxx
onboard a green Pajero bound to Cubao, Quezon City, what time did you arrive
at that area?
Q: So when Raymond was giving you all these instructions and these persons
A: Past 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon when we arrived at the area.
[we]re present, we [sic] first go to Roger[,] what was his reaction, what was his
reply?
Q: What was this area again, Mr. Witness?
A: No. 47 Sgt. Catolos St., Cubao, Quezon City.

Q: So upon arriving at No. 47 Sgt. Catolos St., Cubao, Quezon City[,] what
happened?
A: While we were at the front of the said residence[,] Jayson received a call from
Raymond.
xxxx
Q: So when you asked Jayson about the instructions, what did Jayson tell you?
A: According to him[,] he was instructed by Raymond to go around on the place
and look for a wider street wherein we can test drive the said vehicle.
Q: So what did you do with the instructions of Raymond Dominguez relayed to
Jayson?
A: We went around the said area.
xxxx
Q: So after complying or following the instructions of Raymond of going around
the area and looking for wider roads[,] what happened next?
A: We went back at the front of the house.
Q: Why did you go back in front of the house?
A: We were waiting for the go signal from Raymond for me to go down and check
the vehicle.
Q: What is this go signal, Mr. Witness?
A: He texted go.
Q: When you say nagtext siya, whom are you referring to?
A: Raymond Dominguez, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Upon these instructions[,] what did you do?
A: Joel and I alighted and Jayson, Rolly parked the vehicle.
Q: So upon alighting from this green Pajero together with Joel[,] what did you do?
A: After that[,] we pressed the door bell of the said house and then a small man,
who appeared to be the boy, open[ed] the gate for us.
Q: What did you tell this boy?
A: I immediately asked him the person of Boy Evangelista.
xxxx
Q: So what happened thereafter when you were ushered inside the area?
A: This boy, the small one, called someone a person with a long hair.
Q: Would you know who this person is?
A: No, ma'am, he just introduced himself as the son of Boy Evangelista and was
tasked to talk with me.
xxxx
Q: Okay, Mr. Witness, when you came face to face with this person whom you
described as one tall person with fair complexion and with long hair, what did you
talk about?
A: I asked him if the Land Cruiser I was looking at in the garage was still for sale.
Q: What was his reply?
A: He said yes.
Q: So what was your counter reply?
A: I asked how much. x x x
[Q]: And how did you reply to such price quotation of 3.4 Million[?]
[A]: I asked if it is still negotiable. x x x
Q: While you were talking with this fair complexion, tall and long hair, where was
Joel?
A: He was just checking the said vehicle, the tires and the engine.
Q: After talking about the price, what else did you talk about regarding this
vehicle?
A: Joel approached us and said the vehicle was okay and the long hair said if I
buy it then it is as if I bought a brand new.
xxxx
Q: After you were assured by this person with long hair and that it was
recommended to[o] by your mechanic Joel, what was your decision then about
the vehicle?
A: I asked the long hair if we could roadtest the vehicle that he was selling.
Q: And what was his reply?
A: He said that they don't agree with road testing especially the father.
Q: And what was your response?
A: So on my part posting as a buyer[,] I answered in a sarcastic way, "[a]no ba
naman kayong nagbebenta ng sasakyan na ganyan 3.4 Million is 3.4 Million
tapos hindi nyo papayagang i-road test, maglalabas ako ng pera."
Q: And can you tell us what was the reaction of this person whom you were
talking to when you made the sarcastic words?
A: I noticed that he was irritated by my remark and he ordered the boy, the small
one, to get the key, cellphone and his wallet.
xxxx
Q: And when this person whom you described boarded the vehicle, what were
you doing then?
A: I was still at the garage and he was the one who signal us to board on said
vehicle and he said "let's go".
Q: And where did you position yourself?
A: I positioned myself at the back of the driver.
Q: How about Joel?
A: At the right passenger seat, ma'am, beside the driver.
Q: Upon boarding this vehicle, you, Joel, and this person that you described[,]
where did you go?
A: We went around the said area but the green Pajero was following us wherein
Rolly and Jayson Miranda alias Soy were there.
Q: Why do you say that this Pajero was following you then?
A: I know that they were following us because Rolly even uttered a joke
"[s]inusundan yata tayo ng father mo ah, ayan yung Pajerong green".
Q: Why did Joel made that statement as far as you know?
A: That's a part of our strategy because the long hair might be the person to
notice that someone is following us.
xxxx
Q: So after circling the road as you mentioned[,] what happened next?
A: When Joel noticed that we were near the house of the owner[,] he immediately
pulled out his gun and poked it to the person and asking [sic] to give him the
vehicle.
Q: And what did this long hair do with that threat of Joel?
A: The long hair was able to stop the vehicle probably a house away from their
house.
Q: And what was the reaction of this person whom you said was poked by a
gun?
A: He raised his gun and said "[m]aawa na po kayo sa akin[,] may pamilya po
ako."
xxxx
Q: And at that time, where was Joel and Rolly whom you previously said was
following the Land Cruiser?
A: Joel remained at the vehicle poking his gun while Rolly suddenly alighted from
the Pajero and boarded the Land Cruiser and sat on the driver seat and pushed
the long hair at the back portion of the said vehicle.
Q: After Rolly boarded the Land Cruiser and pushed this person with long hair at
the back[,] what happened next?
A: Rolly went inside the vehicle through the driver side and after pushing the long
hair, he also followed him, so we were all at the back, me the long hair and Rolly.
Q: While you were inside the vehicle[,] what were you doing at the time? A: While
I was seated at the back of the driver seat I was texting Roger and informing him
that the vehicle and the owner were already taken. And Rolly was trying to put up
packaging tape on the eyes and mouth of the long hair and also his hands were
tied behind his back with the packaging tape. After he was tied with packaging
tape[,] he was asked to lie facing down at the back and he was covered with a
blanket which he took from his back pack.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, while Rolly was doing this to the long hair whom you just
described[,] what was Joel doing?
A: Joel was the one driving the Land Cruiser away from the area.
xxxx
COURT. How about you[,] what were you doing then when Rolly was putting a
packaging tape to the long hair?
A: I was sending text messages to Roger that we were able to take the vehicle.
xxxx
Q: Now, from Cubao, Quezon City, where did you go, where did you proceed
then?
A: After we passed through the NLEX, what happened was the green Pajero was
ahead of us and we were following it and the Expedition was following us.
Q: In that period of time that you were traveling[,] what happened inside the Land
Cruiser while you were with this long hair, Joel and Rolly, what happened?
A: Rolly took the wallet of the long hair and gave it to me and the cellphone was
handed to Joel, the necklace, bracelet and the money were taken by Rolly.
Q: You said that this wallet was handed to you by Rolly, what did you do with the
wallet?
A: I opened the wallet and it contained Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) case
[sic], Driver's License and that is where I saw that the name of the long hair was
Venson Evangelista...
Q: From NLEX[,] where did you go thereafter?
A: Joel called someone, I don't know who among the Dominguez brothers he
was talking to, but he was given instruction that we should proceed to a safe
house in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
xxxx
Q: So what time did you arrive at [sic] Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Past 5:00, ma'am.
Q: Upon reaching that safe house[,] what happened there?
A: When we arrived there[,] Roger Dominguez was standing at the gate of the
safe house and a green Lancer car was parked there.

xxxx
Q: What happened to the safe house after you arrived and when you saw Roger
and Ann?
A: When I saw Roger and his girlfriend Ann, I alighted from the Land Cruiser.
xxxx
Q: What about Venson Evangelista, the long hair, where was he?
A: He was still with Rolly lying face down inside the vehicle.
xxxx
Q: So when you approached Roger Dominguez, what happened then?
A: He told me that Ann will bring me to SM San Fernando and to wait for his text
or call if ever he will fetch me.
xxxx
Q: So when you were given instructions by Roger[, ] what did you do thereafter?
A: When I was approaching the Lancer where Ann was there[,] Roger whistled at
me.
Q: So when Roger whistled at you[,] what did you do?
A: I approached the brothers.
Q: And when you approached[,] what happened?
A: He ordered me to place used tires and a gallon of gasoline at the green
Pajero.
xxxx
Q: And what vehicle did they use in fetching you at SM San Fernando?
A: The Land Cruiser we used before I was brought to SM San Fernando.
xxxx
Q: Would you know who is the owner of the vehicle, the Land Cruiser?
A: That was the vehicle that we took on that day from the long hair.
xxxx
Q: After you were fetched by Roger and Ann using that Land Cruiser[,] where did
you go?
A: We went to Kapalangan, Calumpit, Bulacan.
xxxx
Q: Upon arriving at the Greenville Subdivision[,] what did you observe?
A: We were the only ones who were there. After we alighted from the vehicle[,]
Roger immediately replaced the plate number of the vehicle with the plate
number we took from the person when we were at the Kalapangan.
xxxx
Q: Now we go back, Mr. Witness, to this long hair. Would you know, Mr. Witness,
as to what happened to the gagged and hog-tied long hair after you last saw him
hours earlier stay inside the Land Cruiser before you left for SM?
A: Roger Dominguez, Ann and I were having dinner already, Roger Dominguez
received a call from Jayson and the reason why I know it came from Soy [is]
because Roger answered "Soy".
Q: And what did you hear?
A: I heard that Roger Dominguez was asking Soy "[s]igurado kang patay na,
sigurado kang sunog na, sigurado kang hindi na makikita yan?"
xxxx
Q: So when Jayson Miranda informed you what is his present to you[,] what was
his response?
A: I asked him "kanino yan" and he said it's with the long hair and when I asked
him the whereabouts[,] he said "patay na, sunog na".
Q: What did he tell you as to how Venson Evangelista was killed? x x x
A: He narrated it, he said that he was first shot and his body was inserted inside
two used tires after that they poured gasoline and he was burned in a rice field
somewhere in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot subscribe to Miranda's postulation that the above narration is extraneous
to the purpose of qualifying Mendiola as a state witness. On the contrary, they were
essential in establishing that he is not the main perpetrator of the murder of Venson
Evangelista, rendering him eligible as a state witness under Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court.
In any event, even assuming arguendo that the foregoing details are not germane to
the purpose for which the testimony of Mendiola was offered, it was nevertheless
incumbent upon respondents to have timely objected against the line of questioning
for irrelevance. As prescribed by Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
Noteworthy is that Miranda never raised in his Comment that he and his co-
respondents have timely raised an objection when Mendiola delved into the
particulars of the crime in his testimony. They are, thus, precluded from belatedly
questioning the relevance of the said details.
Respondents had the opportunity to cross-examine Mendiola
What is more, embedded in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court is the guideline
for perpetuating the testimony of a deceased witness during criminal trial, viz:
RULE 115
Rights of Accused
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
xxxx
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (emphasis
added)
Verily, the sole condition imposed for the utilization of the testimony of a deceased
witness is that the opposing party had the opportunity to cross-examine the same. In
this regard, respondents lament that they were deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine Mendiola upon his passing prior to being presented as a witness during trial
proper. Hence, they argue that Mendiola's testimony ought to be stricken off the
records.
We are not persuaded.
One of the most basic rights of an accused person under our justice system is the
right to confront the witnesses against him face to face. Subsumed under this right of
confrontation is the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. And as
the Court has elucidated in People v. Seneris (Seneris), the right, though
fundamental, may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the same. As the case instructs:
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principles
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given
the opportunity to confront and cross examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus, where a
party has had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-
examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will
be received or allowed to remain in the record. (emphasis added, citations
omitted)
Here, respondents have to realize that their option to not ask for a continuance and
reserve the right to continue with their line of questioning for trial proper instead
carried inherent risks, including their present predicament. Respondents ought to
have been aware that their decision would pave the way not only for the termination
of the discharge proceedings, but also for the eventual application of the last
paragraph of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court should the RTC resolve to
discharge Mendiola as a state witness, as it in fact did. The assumption of the risk, to
Our mind, amounted to a waiver of any objection as to the admissibility of Mendiola's
testimony during the discharge hearing.
Furthermore, Seneris elucidates that the testimony of the deceased prosecution
witness shall not be expunged from the records if the defense was able to conduct a
rigorous and extensive cross-examination prior to the witness' demise. As held:
Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of private respondent
of the deceased witness was extensive and already covered the subject
matter of his direct testimony as state witness relating to the essential
elements of the crime of parricide, and what remained for further cross-
examination is the matter of price or reward allegedly paid by private respondent
for the commission of the crime, which is merely an aggravating circumstance
and does not affect the existence of the offense charged, the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in declaring as entirely inadmissible the
testimony of the state witness who died through no fault of any of the
parties before his cross-examination could be finished. (emphasis added)
In the case at bar, the records disclose that Mendiola was cross examined at length
for his testimony by the counsels of Miranda and the Dominguez brothers. More, such
cross-examination already covered the details of the commission of the offense, to
wit:
ATTY. PEREZ for JAYSON MIRANDA
Q: You admitted in your Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 20, 2011 that
before the alleged carnapping and slaying of Mr. Venson Evangelista, you called
Mr. Boy Evangelista over the cellphone, did you recall saying this, Mr. Witness? x
xx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, it is a fact that you arranged in [sic] meeting with the Evangelistas before
the alleged carjacking and slaying of Mr. Venson Evangelista?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: And when Venson Evangelista told you that the Land Cruiser is still available,
you asked him if you could road test the vehicle, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And is it not a fact, that Mr. Venson Evangelista initially refused to have the
vehicle road tested, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this is now the point, Mr. Witness, when you uttered the following
remarks: "3.4 million yang sasakyang binibenta mo, hindi mo ipaparoad test", do
you recall saying that?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: If not for your remark, the remark which I have said a while ago, Venson
Evangelista would not have agreed to the road test?
A: That was the reason why I went there and it was my job to convince the owner
to have the vehicle road tested so, I have to do my part, sir.
xxxx
Q: It was when you are about to go back to the residence of Mr. Venson
Evangelista, it was at that point when Joel allegedly poked his gun against a [sic]
person of Mr. Venson Evangelista, do you recall saying this?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, after allegedly seizing the vehicle and the person of Mr. Venson
Evangelista, you proceeded to Mabida, Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: During the 50-minute travel, never did it occur to you to object to the alleged
plan to kill Mr. Venson Evangelista?
A: When I first saw that the victim was being half-tied [sic] and placed packaging
tape on his mouth and hands and eyes, I was not able to say a word because as
far as I know, I was hired only to sell total wrecked, flooded and carnapped
vehicles and I never thought that I would be part of the group that would kill, sir.
ATTY. OSCAR RARO for the Dominguez Brothers
Q: Now what time did you arrive at Sgt. Catolos Street, 3:00 o'clock?
A: Around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.
Q: And how long did it take you to convince Venson to road test the vehicle?
A: 10 to 20 minutes, sir.
Q: And after that you went around that place, twice and then you proceeded to
NLEX?
A: After convincing him, we directly go out to road test the vehicle twice and go
around the area of Sgt. Catolos Street in Cubao then after which we stopped
near their house then we proceeded directly to NLEX[,] sir.
xxxx
Q: What time did you arrive at Mabalacat, Pampanga?
A: Almost 6:00 in the evening, sir.
xxxx
Q: You stated on page 17 of the transcript of stenographic notes on June 27,
2011 that the Dominguez brothers are the ones planning the operation and
funding it, you stated that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But aside from your statement, do you have any other proof or witness that
can corroborate this?
A: Probably what I can say is that the things that I saw, I had experienced and
the orders that I have received from them, that's the reason why I am saying that
they are the ones funding and planning all these things because all the orders
that I followed came from the two (2) brothers, sir.
xxxx
Q: And you also stated and I was fascinated by this story on your direct that
before you leave for SM, you were ask[ed] to find used tires and a gallon of
gasoline and load it at the green pajero while at Mabalacat?
A: I did not say that I was asked to look for used tires because there are so many
scattered tires in that safe house. I was just asked to pick up used tires and get
one (1) gallon of gasoline and bring them inside the green pajero, sir.
Q: How many people were there at the time you were ask[ed] to bring these tires
to the green pajero?
A: Me, Raymond Dominguez and Roger Dominguez were there. Ann was inside
the gray lancer. Inside the land cruiser were Joel, Rolly and the long hair who
was covered with a blanket and Jayson Miranda was inside the pajero while I
was loading the said items, sir.
COURT: But you were the only one who loaded the two (2) used tires and a
gallon of gasoline inside the vehicle?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Without anybody helped [sic] you?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Respondents' reservation for trial proper of the right to further cross examine
Mendiola did not diminish the sufficiency of the opportunity that they were given to
confront the adverse witnesses. Notwithstanding the said reservation, Mendiola's
testimonies and admissions as regards the particulars of the crime already formed
part of the records of the case when the RTC granted his motion to be declared a
state witness. Respondents' constitutional rights were not violated since the fair
hearing envisaged by criminal due process had been complied with when the
counsels for the respondents conducted a rigorous and exhaustive cross-examination
of the deceased witness during the discharge hearing.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May
27, 2016 Decision and January 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139255 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of
Alfred Mendiola in Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 215 in Quezon City is hereby REINSTATED. With respect to the
documents and other evidence authenticated by Mendiola during the discharge
proceeding, the RTC shall rule upon their admissibility when the same are formally
offered in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——
RE-OPENING OF CASE
G.R. No. 161330. February 20, 2007.
RENE CABARLES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Motion to Reopen Case; Requisites; A motion to reopen a case to
receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural
recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage, which deficiency was
remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on 1 December 2000.—
A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was
nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long,
established usage. This lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. The April 1,
2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119
and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the
judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of
the order.
Same; Same; Due Process; The court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears, and the only controlling guideline
governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice; While a judge is allowed to
reopen a case before judgment is rendered, a hearing must first be had, and where the judge
does so without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and the accused an
opportunity to manifest their position on the matter, the same constitutes grave abuse of
discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution.—Generally, after the
parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence
only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where
no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after
either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is
rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling
guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of
reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, while Judge Maceda
is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing
must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and
hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position
on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against
the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be heard.
The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express
language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Same; Same; Same; Waiver; Participation by the defense counsel in cross-examining
the witness for the prosecution and in the proceedings after the case was reopened by the judge
without prior hearing does not amount to a waiver of the accused’s objection to the order
reopening the case—to be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.—Although the
defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the
case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s
objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.
Here, Cabarles filed the present petition seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda
before Pedrosa was cross-examined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosecution’s formal
offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its admission on the
ground that the same was inadmissible having been received by the court after Judge Maceda
issued the questioned order.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Although the matter of reopening a case for reception
of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial
action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably; The presence
of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent
upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.— Although
the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically,
capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this particular case, the prosecution was given ample
opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take
full advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such
opportunities. Contrary to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was
not deprived of its day in court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with the trial
court’s calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the prosecution did not push through and
some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing dates which
were different from those assigned for reception of prosecution’s evidence, still the prosecution
had a total of four hearing dates when it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June
20 and 27, and August 1, 2001. The presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the
responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of
ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.
Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Nowhere is the guaranty of right to speedy
disposition of cases more significant and meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the
fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake; The right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements
of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.—On Cabarles’s right to a
speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the Constitution, all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and
meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the
accused as well, are at stake. Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the
case is mooted by our nullification of Judge Maceda’s April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy
disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition; A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.—It is necessary to stress that a direct
recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance
of the hierarchy of courts. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within
their respective regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking
any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice.
This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts
determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of its docket.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
raised.—Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of this
case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of
this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against him was filed way back
in June 1999, and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further
delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has
full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new provision,
and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to
resolve the issues raised in this petition.
Same; Remand of Cases; Due Process; To order the remand of a criminal case to the
court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the
constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case.—As
a final word, we find the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the case of People v. Monje, 390
SCRA 160 (2002), instructive: A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the
trial court for further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it
failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous precedent.
Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because
whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the
prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence which should have been
presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to
the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the
constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The
lamentable failure of the prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the
State and the private offended party, should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the
extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the Order1 issued by respondent Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in Criminal Case No. 99-0878, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rene “Nonoy” Cabarles y Adizas, for murder, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. The questioned Order dated April 1, 2003
cancelled the scheduled promulgation of judgment and reopened the case for
reception of evidence from two prosecution witnesses who were not presented during
trial.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder under the following
information:
“The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE “NONOY” CABARLES Y
ADIZAS of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and stab with a deadly weapon (fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the
following dates, to wit: pre-trial on November 22, 2000; presentation of prosecution’s
evidence on April 18, May 4, 11, 18, and 23, 2001; and presentation of defense
evidence on June 20 and 27, July 4 and 18, and August 1, 2001.
The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa, the
mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged eyewitness; Carlos Callosa,
brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Police Senior Inspector of the
Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory to testify on the contents of the
death certificate of Antonio Callosa.
Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on
the first four hearing dates. Instead, trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001
when the prosecution called Carlos Callosa to the witness stand. Since defense
counsel agreed to stipulate that Carlos would testify on matters in his May 13,
1999 Sinumpaang Salaysay, his testimony was dispensed with.
The second prosecution witness, Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos, was
presented in court during the June 20, 2001 hearing. His testimony was likewise
dispensed with after defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Police Inspector Parejos
would testify on what was in the spot report of the stabbing incident. In the June 20,
2001 hearing, the prosecution said it would offer its evidence and rest its case should
the People fail to present a witness at the next scheduled hearing.
When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the prosecution failed to present a
witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen appeared during the said hearing. Records
show that four subpoenas were issued to Pedrosa informing her that she had to
appear on November 22, 2000, April 11 and 18, May 11 and June 20,8 and August 1,
2001. The first subpoena was personally received by her; the second subpoena by
her husband, Salvador Pedrosa; and the third and fourth subpoenas had no proofs of
service. Meanwhile, the three subpoenas issued to Dr. Salen requiring his attendance
on May 11 and 23,  June 20,  and August 1, 2001, were all returned with the notation
“addressee moved.” There was no evidence, however, that subpoenas were issued to
these two witnesses requiring their attendance for the June 27, 2001 hearing, which
would explain why they were absent. Taking into consideration the absence of a
subpoena issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen and notwithstanding the vehement
objection registered by Cabarles, Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a last chance
but warned:
“… It is however understood whether the subpoena is actually issued and served
or not upon the prosecution witnesses and service of such subpoena or notice
will not relieved (sic) the prosecution to make a formal offer of evidence should
the prosecution failed (sic) to present any witness in the next scheduled hearing.”
With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution rested its case and
formally offered its evidence.
Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it was
denied by Judge Maceda. Two witnesses were called for the defense, accused
Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a fisherman.
A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge
Maceda motu proprio issued the questioned order reopening the case. In it, he
observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a
miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates
specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard,
the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing
dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that
there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued
to Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a date assigned
for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that another
subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen requiring them to appear on May 11
and June 20, 2001. But, the May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001
because the judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was
concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the prosecution. Judge
Maceda further observed that the May 18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and
May 25, 2001 was likewise not a hearing date set by the court. According to Judge
Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four
hearing dates and there was either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued
or there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution
should have been given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the
doctor. His order in part read:
“… As a consequence[,] the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is canceled. Set
the reception of the testimony of the eye witness and the doctor on May 1, 2003
at 2:00 [p.]m. to enable the prosecution to avail [of] the last chance granted by
this Court.
Issue the corresponding subpoena to Imelda Pedrosa and Dr. Romeo T.
Salen directing them to appear on the aforesaid date and time, to be served by
the Branch Sheriff who is required to make a prompt return thereof.
SO ORDERED.”
Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated April
25, 2003 and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of
Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was duly
served, but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to
the SPD Crime Laboratory. Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa, the
prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8, 2003 hearing.
Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the
prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional
hearing dates.1
Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her
direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition
questioning Judge Maceda’s order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public
Attorney’s Office conducted its crossexamination of Pedrosa.
On July 24, 2003, the defense counsel agreed on the facts contained in the death
certificate of the victim, so the testimony of Dr. Salen was dispensed with. Thereafter,
Judge Maceda set the date for the reception of evidence on the civil aspect of the
criminal case on August 14, 2003, when Carlos, the deceased’s brother, was recalled
to the witness stand.
Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.
 On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the promulgation of judgment and
ordered the case archived pending this Court’s resolution of the case.
In his petition, Cabarles raises as issues the following:
[1]WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.
[2]WHETHER PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS VIOLATED.
Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April
1, 2003 Order reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the
testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case? Did
the said order violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of his
case?
upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order
intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional
and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of
the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling
will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A
motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered,  and
even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling
guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.28 This
remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is
On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his
rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda
discretion when he ordered the reopening of the case before promulgation of
issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without giving the
judgment although both parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a
prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This
case may only be reopened after a judgment of conviction has been made but before
failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due
its finality, as provided in Section 24, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be
Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case under Section 24
heard.30 The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to
presupposes that judgment has already been promulgated, which is not the case
the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
here. According to petitioner, the cases cited by the People are not at all applicable in
this case since they were tried and decided before the introduction of Section 24
Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
in the proceedings after the case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does
not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be
For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal. Here, Cabarles filed the present
Section 24 is a new provision which merely formalized the long accepted practice of
petition seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa was
judges of reopening a case to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case,
crossexamined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosecution’s formal offer of
jurisprudence providing that a judge has the discretion to reopen a case even before
evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its admission on
promulgation of judgment still holds.
the ground that the same was inadmissible having been received by the court after
Judge Maceda issued the questioned order.
After a thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties, we find that the
petition is meritorious.
On the second issue, Cabarles maintains that contrary to Judge Maceda’s
observation, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its case as seen
A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it
by the issuance of several subpoenas to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues
was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance
that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty and should not be made to wait
from long, established usage.24 This lack of a specific provision covering motions to
indefinitely for prosecution witnesses to testify. To do so would violate his
reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect
constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his case. According to
on December 1, 2000.
Cabarles, the reopening of the case is clearly detrimental to him since it meant
another day in prison.
The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following
The OSG counters that the reopening of the case was made in accordance with
requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a
Section 24 since the prosecution is entitled to the reopening of the case to prevent a
judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or
miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Cabarles’s right to a speedy trial had not been
violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution witness are excluded
when computing the time within which trial should start under Section 3,32 Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is
largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action
must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this
particular case, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its
witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of
the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such
opportunities. Contrary to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the
prosecution was not deprived of its day in court. While it may be true that due to some
confusion with the trial court’s calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the
prosecution did not push through and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa
and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing dates which were different from those assigned
for reception of prosecution’s evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing
dates when it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and
August 1, 2001. The presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility
of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring
the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.
Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third
requirement of Section 24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to
reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having
been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.
On Cabarles’s right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the
Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful than in criminal cases
where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake.
Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the case is mooted by
our nullification of Judge Maceda’s April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy
disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.37 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
With regard to the OSG’s allegation in its Comment and Memorandum, that
Cabarles failed to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts since the petition for
certiorari was filed directly with the Supreme Court, Cabarles insists that he is a
detention prisoner needing immediate resolution of his case. He also argues that this
case not only involves grave abuse of discretion but also a pure question of law
involving the application of Section 24, which is a new provision.
It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. This
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court of
Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their respective
regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any
of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his
choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The
hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus,
petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial court
should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is the
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of its docket.
Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of
this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against
him was filed way back in June 1999,41 and almost eight years thereafter, no
judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of the instant
petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to
take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted
by the nature of the issues raised.42 Since Section 24 is a new provision, and
considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary
to resolve the issues raised in this petition.
As a final word, we find the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the case
of People v. Monje instructive:
“A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for
further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it
failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a
dangerous precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the
floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of
acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to
be allowed to augment its evidence which should have been presented much
earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to the
court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence would
violate the constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy
determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the prosecution to fill the vital
 gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private offended party,
should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the
prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence.
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice
must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to
punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her
family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all
individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political
persuasion—whether privileged or less privileged—to be invoked without fear or
favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not
called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order
dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this
case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the
records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its
appropriate action without further delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Where the trial court judge was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that have so far been presented, and that the evidence for the
prosecution was insufficient to convict, he, motu proprio, should have called additional witnesses
for the prosecution for the purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with
reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. (Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379
SCRA 345 [2002])

A trial court is not in error if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both
sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or
recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to particular facts involved
in the case—a judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his
testimony. (People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 [2003])

——o0o——
 [ G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018 ] Contrary to law.

CECILIA RIVAC, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated January 11,
2016 and the Resolution dated April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 34247, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Cecilia Rivac (Rivac) for the
crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information  filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, Branch 14 (RTC), charging Rivac of the crime
of Estafa, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on about the 4th day of August 2007, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused received for
sale on consignment from Asuncion C. Fariñas the following pieces of jewelry as
follows:
1. One (1) set diamante P 125,000.00
2. One (1) set heart shape with titus 85,000.00
3. One (1) pc. 7 days bangle 80,000.00
The prosecution alleged that on August 4, 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store
owned by private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas (Fariñas) where she received
from the latter several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate amount of P439,500.00,
which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis,as evidenced by a document
called jewelry consignment agreement (consignment document). Fariñas and Rivac
agreed that after seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of
the sold jewelry or return the unsold jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the
same. However, despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform
what was incumbent upon her, causing Fariñas to send her a demand letter. This
prompted Rivac to go to Fariñas's store and offer her a parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-936  as partial payment for the jewelry.
However, Fariñas refused the offer as she discovered that the property was involved
in a land dispute, and instead, reiterated her demand that Rivac return the pieces of
jewelry or pay their value in cash.
During arraignment, Rivac pleaded "not guilty" and maintained that her liability is only
civil, and not criminal, in nature. She narrated that she asked Fariñas for a loan as
she badly needed money for her husband's dialysis, to which the latter agreed. As
such, she went to Fariñas's store and handed over OCT No. 0-936 and other
supporting documents to the latter as collateral. In turn, Fariñas gave her the amount
of P150,000.00 and asked her to sign a blank consignment document. She further
averred that she was able to pay interest for several months but was unable to pay
the entire loan. According to Rivac, Fariñas told her that she would foreclose the
collateral. Thereafter, she sent her a letter demanding payment of the principal
amount of P280,000.00 plus interest.

4. One (1) pc bracelet w. charm 55,000.00 The RTC Proceedings

5. One (1) set rositas w. bagets 45,600.00
6. One (1) pc. charm tauco w. pendant 48,900.00
Total             P439,500.00
In a Judgment  dated September 30, 2010, the RTC found Rivac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional,  as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ordered her to pay Fariñas the amount of P439,500.00
and the costs of suit.

with a total value of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P439,500.00) under the express obligation to remit the
proceeds of the sale or if not sold, to return the pieces of jewelry to Asuncion C.
Fariñas not later than August 11, 2007, but far from complying with her obligation
and despite repeated demands, said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the pieces of jewelry, to the damage and prejudice of Asuncion C.
Fariñas in the aforestated amount.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
crime charged, under the following circumstances: (a) Rivac received the pieces of
jewelry from Fariñas, as evidenced by the consignment document which contains her
signature; and (b) she failed to either return said jewelry or remit its proceeds to
Fariñas after the lapse of the seven (7)-day period agreed upon by them, to the
latter's prejudice. In this regard, the RTC did not give credence to Rivac's theory that
she was only made to sign the consignment document as proof of her loan to Fariñas,
ratiocinating that absent any of the allowed exceptions to the parol evidence rule, she
is not allowed to present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the said
document.[16] It further pointed out that the only reason why Fariñas had possession of
OCT No. 0-936 was because Rivac herself offered the same as partial payment, but
the former ultimately decided against accepting it as such.[17]
After the promulgation of the aforesaid Judgment and before it lapsed into finality,
Rivac moved to reopen proceedings on the ground that she intends to present the
testimonies of Fariñas and a certain Atty. Ma. Valenie Blando (Atty. Blando) to prove
the true nature of her transaction with Fariñas. In an Order  dated January 6, 2011,
the RTC, inter alia, partly granted the motion insofar as Fariñas's testimony was
concerned, as the apparent revision of her recollection of events could not have been
anticipated during the course of the trial. It, however, denied the same as to Atty.
Blando's testimony, opining that there was no showing that Rivac could not present
her during the trial proper.[21] Consequently, the Court re-took Fariñas's testimony,
where she "clarified" that she now remembered that the consignment document never
became effective or enforceable as she did not allow Rivac to take the jewelry
because she has yet to pay her outstanding loan obligation plus interest.
In an Order  dated April 18, 2011, the RTC affirmed its assailed Judgment. It held that
Fariñas's testimony was in the nature of a recantation, which is looked upon with
disfavor by the courts. Moreover, the RTC pointed out that there have been various
circumstances prior to the promulgation of the assailed Judgment where she could
have "correctly recollected" and revised her testimony, such as when she: (a) sent a
demand letter to Rivac; (b) reiterated her demand during barangay
conciliation; (c) executed her complaint-affidavit for the instant case; (d) paid the filing
fee for the case; and (e) testified before the court. Further considering that the
retraction does not jibe with Rivac's testimony, the RTC found the same to be
unworthy of credence.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision  dated January 11, 2016, the CA upheld Rivac's conviction. Preliminarily,
it held that the RTC erred in allowing the reopening of the case, since it had already
promulgated a ruling therein.[29] In this regard, the CA opined that the RTC
proceedings after the promulgation of its ruling can be likened to a new trial, which is
likewise improper as the grounds for its allowance are not extant.
Anent the merits, the CA held that all the elements of Estafa defined and penalized
under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are present, as the prosecution had established
that Rivac misappropriated the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry consigned to her
by Fariñas, considering her failure to either return the jewelry or remit its proceeds at
the end of the agreed period, obviously to the prejudice of Fariñas.[31] Notably, the CA
stated that Fariñas's recantation is not only looked upon with disfavor for being
exceedingly unreliable, but also that the same does not necessarily vitiate her original
testimony.
Undaunted, Rivac moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution  dated April 14, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that it
was improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings; and (b) upheld Rivac's
conviction for the crime of  Estafa.
The Court's Ruling
The petition must be denied.
I.
Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the
reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At any time before
finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion,
with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
granting it." In Cabaries v. Maceda, the Court expounded on the novelty, nature, and
parameters of this rule, to wit:
A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it
was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and
acceptance from long, established usage. This lack of a specific provision
covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000.
x x x Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following
requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the
finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on
his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of
justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence
should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons,
and in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only
after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence,
but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before
finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline covering a motion to
reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case
was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

In this light, the CA clearly erred in holding that: (a) it was improper for the RTC to
reopen its proceedings because the latter court had already promulgated its
judgment; and (b) assuming arguendo that what it did was a new trial, there were no
grounds for its allowance. To reiterate, a motion to reopen may be filed even after the
promulgation of a judgment and before the same lapses into finality, and the only
guiding parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC correctly
allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Fariñas's subsequent testimony in
order to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially,
determine whether or not the latter is indeed criminally liable.
II.
Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
Guided by this consideration, the Court affirms Rivac's conviction with modification as
to the penalty, as will be explained hereunder.
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:
Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the
offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
deliver or to return the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the
money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand
by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
In Cheng v. People, the Court further elucidated:
The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return
should be made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of
using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it
to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, the legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of
the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of
their whereabouts. (Emphases and underscoring in the original)
In this case, the facts clearly show the existence of all the elements of the crime
charged, considering that: (a) Rivac received various pieces of jewelry from Fariñas
on a sale-on-consignment basis, as evidenced by the consignment
document; (b) Rivac was under the obligation to either remit the proceeds of the sale
or return the jewelry after the period of seven (7) days from receipt of the
same; (c) Rivac failed to perform her obligation, prompting Fariñas to demand
compliance therewith; and (d) Rivac failed to heed such demand, thereby causing
prejudice to Fariñas, who lost the pieces of jewelry and/or their aggregate value of
P439,500.00.
In an attempt to absolve herself from liability, Rivac moved to reopen the
proceedings. Upon the partial grant thereof, Rivac presented the testimony of no less
than Fariñas, who then testified that she now remembers that the consignment
document never became effective nor enforceable, as she did not allow Rivac to take
the jewelry because she has yet to pay her outstanding loan obligation plus interest.
However, as correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Fariñas's testimony partakes of a
recantation, which is aimed to renounce her earlier statement and withdraw the same
formally and publicly. Verily, recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation.
The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of
the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the
rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually
through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable as there is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.
Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which, when coupled with
the retraction, raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can
retractions be considered and upheld. In People v. Lamsen, the Court made a
thorough discussion on the nature and probative value of recantations, as follows:
Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly
taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions
precisely sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the
witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule
 will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. x x x
This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies
previously given in court. The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly
held suspect, and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of
repudiation are frequently and deservedly subject to serious doubt.
x x x Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a
prosecution witness after the judgment of conviction has already been
rendered, "it is too late in the day for his recantation without portraying
himself as a liar." At most, the retraction is an afterthought which should
not be given probative value.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is
retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the
same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony
solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly,
and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly
analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a
complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going
through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused
arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the
accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining
witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the
truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And in situations,
like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit
subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by
the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is
presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte  are
generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
(Emphases and underscoring in the original)
Here, Fariñas's testimony during the reopened proceedings was supposedly her
"correct recollection" of the events that transpired in connection with the instant
criminal case filed against Rivac. However, after a scrutiny of the same, the Court
sees no sufficient reason to overturn Rivac's conviction for the crime charged. As
aptly observed by the RTC, Fariñas had various opportunities to make a "correct
recollection" of her testimony, and yet she did not do so. Thus, Fariñas's act of
making a complete turnaround in her testimony at the time when a judgment of
conviction had already been promulgated is suspect. Coupled with the RTC's
observation that the retraction is highly inconsistent with Rivac's own testimony,
Fariñas's recantation should be seen as nothing but a last-minute attempt to save the
latter from punishment.  Clearly, Rivac's conviction of the crime charged must be
upheld.
III.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Rivac, it is worthy to point out that pending
resolution of this case before the Court, Republic Act No. (RA) 10951[49] was enacted
into law. As may be gleaned from the law's title, it adjusted the values of the property
and damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the
present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the Revised Penal
Code was enacted in 1932.[50] While it is conceded that Rivac committed the crime
way before the enactment of RA 10951, the newly-enacted law expressly provides for
retroactive effect if it is favorable to the accused, as in this case.
Section 85 of RA 10951 adjusted the graduated values where penalties for Estafa are
based. Portions pertinent to this case read:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885,
Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is further
amended to read as follows:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). –Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
xxxx
Thus, applying the provisions of RA 10951, as well as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and taking into consideration that the aggregate value of the misappropriated
jewelry is P439,500.00, Rivac must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in this case.
Finally, Rivac must be ordered to pay the value of the misappropriated pieces of
jewelry, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this ruling until fully paid.[51]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 11, 2016 and the
Resolution dated April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34247
finding petitioner Cecilia Rivac GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa,  defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and ordering her to pay private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas the amount of
P439,500.00 plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

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