II. Ownership the PNP-HPG, is unavailing.
Petitioner had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner of
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.3 Right to recover
d.3.b Recovery of personal property – Replevin, Rule
60 Rules of Court
G.R. No. 205998. April 24, 2017.*
WILLIAM ANGHIAN SIY, petitioner, vs. ALVIN TOMLIN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought
to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains
the same.—In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner
or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who
is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.” “Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in
an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be
shown that he is ‘the owner of the property claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The
plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the
property and his legal basis therefor.
Civil Law; Agency; In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually
leave them, together with all the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with
secondhand car traders they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles for actual
viewing and inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages, or showrooms, and to
enable the traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is, without having to inconvenience the
owners with random viewings and inspections of their vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an
agency relationship is created between the vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as
agents.—In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually leave them,
together with all the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with secondhand
car traders they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles for actual viewing and
inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages, or showrooms, and to enable the
traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is, without having to inconvenience the owners with
random viewings and inspections of their vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an agency relationship
is created between the vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as agents. The situation is
akin to an owner of jewelry who sells the same through an agent, who receives the jewelry in trust and
offers it for sale to his/her regular clients; if a sale is made, the agent takes payment under the
obligation to remit the same to the jewelry owner, minus the agreed commission or other compensation.
Same; Same; Implied Agency; The basis of agency is representation and the same may be
constituted expressly or impliedly. In an implied agency, the principal can be bound by the acts of the
implied agent. The same is true with an oral agency.—The basis of agency is representation and the
same may be constituted expressly or impliedly. In an implied agency, the principal can be bound by
the acts of the implied agent. The same is true with an oral agency. Acting for and in petitioner’s behalf
by virtue of the implied or oral agency, Ong was thus able to sell the vehicle to Chua, but he failed to
remit the proceeds thereof to petitioner; his guarantee checks bounced as well. This entitled petitioner
to sue for estafa through abuse of confidence. This is exactly what petitioner did: on May 18, 2011, he
filed a complaint for estafa and carnapping against Ong before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof.
Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right
of possession over the vehicle. His argument that respondent is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter
nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite
having been apprised of petitioner’s earlier November, 2010 “Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with
the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the proceeds of
the sale.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the October 9, 2012 Decision and February
19, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) which respectively granted the
respondent’s Petition for Certiorari and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124967.
Factual Antecedents
 
In July 2011, petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (RTC) a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for
Replevin5 against Frankie Domanog Ong (Ong), Chris Centeno (Centeno), John Co Chua
(Chua), and herein respondent Alvin Tomlin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
11-69644 and assigned to RTC Branch 224.
In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover
with Plate Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from Alberto Lopez III (Lopez) on July 22,
2009; that in 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who owned a
secondhand car sales showroom (“Motortrend” in Katipunan, Quezon City), after the latter
claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; that Ong failed to remit the proceeds of
the purported sale nor return the vehicle; that petitioner later found out that the vehicle had
been transferred to Chua; that in December 2010, petitioner filed a complaint before the
Quezon City Police District’s Anti-Carnapping Section; that Ong, upon learning of the
complaint, met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle; that Ong still failed to
surrender the vehicle; that petitioner learned that the vehicle was being transferred to
respondent; and that the vehicle was later impounded and taken into custody by the PNP-
Highway Patrol Group (HPG) at Camp Crame, Quezon City after respondent attempted to
process a PNP clearance of the vehicle with a view to transferring ownership thereof.
Petitioner thus prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the return of the vehicle to him,
and that the defendants be ordered to pay him P100,000.00 attorney’s fees and the costs of
suit.
After hearing the application, the trial court issued a July 29, 2011 Order decreeing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and with the ADMISSION of the plaintiff’s
Documentary Exhibits in support of this Application, issue a Writ of Replevin in favor of
the plaintiff subject to the posting of the bond in the amount of EIGHT MILLION PESOS
(Php8,000,000.00) to be executed in favor of the defendants for the return of the said
property if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse parties of such
sum as they may recover from the applicant in this action.
SO ORDERED.
 
Petitioner posted the required P8 million bond which was approved by the trial court. A
Writ of Replevin was then issued.
 The subject vehicle was seized by the court-appointed special sheriff who then filed the
corresponding Sheriffs Return.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of
Replevin, dismiss the Complaint, and turn over or return the vehicle to him. Respondent
claimed that he is the lawful and registered owner of the subject vehicle, having bought the
same and caused registration thereof in his name on March 7, 2011; that the Complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 should be dismissed for failure to pay the correct amount of
docket fees; that the Complaint is defective for failing to allege the correct and material facts
as to ownership, possession/detention by defendant, warranty against distraint/levy/seizure,
and actual value of the vehicle; and that the implementation of the writ was attended by
procedural irregularities.
Particularly, respondent argued that petitioner could not prove his ownership of the
vehicle as the only pieces of evidence he presented in this regard were a manager’s check
and cash voucher as proof of payment, and the affidavit of Lopez attesting to the sale
between him and petitioner which are insufficient; that in fact, he is the registered owner of
the vehicle, as shown by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration dated March 7,
2011 issued in his name by the Land Transportation Office (LTO); that it has not been
shown that he wrongfully detained the vehicle, as petitioner was never in possession
thereof, since the same was already detained and seized by the HPG at the time; that
petitioner failed to allege, as required under Section 2 of Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure14(1997 Rules), that the vehicle has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from
such seizure or custody; and that petitioner failed to allege the actual market value (P4
million) of the vehicle, and instead, he intentionally understated its value at only P2 million in
order to avoid paying the correct docket fees.
As for the alleged procedural defects, respondent claimed that the sheriff implemented
the writ against the HPG, which is not a party to the case; that the Complaint must be
dismissed for failure to pay the correct docket fees based on the actual value of the vehicle;
and that the trial court acted with undue haste in granting the writ of replevin.
Finally, respondent argued that he is the true owner of the subject vehicle as he was
able to register the transfer in his favor and obtain a certificate of registration in his name;
and that as between petitioner’s documentary evidence and his official registration
documents, the latter should prevail.
Petitioner filed his Opposition/Comment to the omnibus motion.
 
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 21, 2011, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s Omnibus
Motion for lack of merit. It held that respondent’s remedy is not to move to quash the writ of
replevin, but to post a counterbond within the reglementary period allowed under the 1997
Rules; that for failure to post said counterbond, respondent’s prayer for the return of the
vehicle to him is premature; that the issues of ownership and insufficiency of the allegations
in the complaint are best determined during trial; and that an allegation of undervaluation of
the vehicle cannot divest the court of jurisdiction.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but he was rebuffed just the same.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
124967 claiming as he did in his Omnibus Motion that the trial court should have dismissed
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 on account of failure to pay the correct docket fees, defective
complaint, procedural irregularities in the service of the writ of replevin, the fact that he is
the registered owner of the subject vehicle, and for the reason that the trial court irregularly
took cognizance of the case during the period for inventory of its cases. Respondent sought
injunctive relief as well.
On October 9, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition. It held
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for failure of petitioner to
pay the correct docket fees, since petitioner misdeclared the value of the subject vehicle at
only P2 million in his Complaint, when the market value thereof was around P4.5 million to
P5 million; that this misdeclaration was undertaken with the clear intention to defraud the
government; and that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2,
Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules, in that he gave a grossly inadequate value for the subject
vehicle in the Complaint and failed to allege therein that the vehicle has not been distrained
or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution
or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
The CA added that it was improper for the sheriff to serve a copy of the writ of replevin
upon the respondent on the day following the seizure of the subject vehicle, and not prior to
the taking thereof; that the trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction when it seized and detained the vehicle on the basis of an improperly served
writ; and that respondent was correct in moving to quash the writ, as the proper remedy in
case of an improperly served writ of replevin is to file a motion to quash the same or a
motion to vacate the order of seizure, and not to file a counterbond as the trial court
declared.
The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorariis hereby
GRANTED with the following effects:
1) [T]he Order dated 21 November 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
2) [T]he Order dated 13 March 2012 similarly rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
3) Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 224 is hereby DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction;
4) The subject Range Rover with plate number ZMG 272 should be RETURNED to the
Philippine National Police-Highway Patrol Group for its proper disposition and
finally;
5) Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.
 SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its assailed February 19, 2013 Resolution, the CA
remained unconvinced. Hence, the present Petition.
 In a November 10, 2014 Resolution,  this Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition.
Issues
 
Petitioner pleads the following assignment of errors:
I court in misdeclaring the value of the subject vehicle; that while they need not be
WHETHER X X X THE TRIAL COURT HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION WITH
PRAYER FOR REPLEVIN.
II.
WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE ALL THE MATERIAL
FACTS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AND AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT UNDER
SECTIONS 2 & 4, RULE 60 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
III.
WHETHER X X X THE SHERIFF PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED THE WRIT OF
REPLEVIN BY SERVING THE SAME TO ANY PERSON WHO IS IN POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT THEREOF.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and set aside and that, instead,
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 be reinstated, petitioner argues that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the replevin case considering the payment of docket fees based on a
valuation of the subject vehicle arrived at in good faith by petitioner, who in estimating the
vehicle’s value took into consideration various factors such as depreciation, actual
condition, year model, and other circumstances; that the payment of an inadequate docket
fee is not a ground for dismissal of a case, and the trial court may simply allow the plaintiff
to complete the payment of the correct docket fees within a reasonable time; and that his
eventual submission to the trial court’s valuation of P4 million and his willingness to pay the
bond and corresponding docket fee proves his good faith and sincerity.
On the issue relating to his supposed defective complaint on account of insufficient
allegations made therein, petitioner contends that there is nothing in the 1997 Rules which
requires him to copy the requirements in Section 2 of Rule 60 and incorporate them to the
letter in his complaint, as the rule merely requires an applicant in replevin to show the
circumstances in his complaint or affidavit of merit, which he claims he did.
Finally, petitioner insists that the writ of replevin was properly served upon respondent.
He did not address the issue relating to the sheriff’s service of summons, the writ of
replevin, and the corresponding order of the trial court on the day following the seizure and
detention of the subject vehicle, arguing rather sweepingly that it is sufficient for the sheriff
to have served respondent with a copy of the writ of replevin, together with the complaint,
affidavit, and bond. He conceded that respondent was in constructive possession of the
vehicle, as he was the registered owner thereof.
In his Reply, petitioner retorts that the Petition is grounded on questions of law; that
even though respondent was able to register the vehicle in his name, he is nonetheless a
buyer and possessor in bad faith, and thus, the transfer of ownership over the subject
vehicle in his favor is illegal; that a criminal case for estafa relative to the vehicle is pending
against Ong, Chua, and Centeno; that Lopez’s purported sale to Chua was anomalous; and
that respondent should have filed a counterbond.
 
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment, respondent essentially counters that the Petition should be dismissed
as it raises issues of fact; that a liberal application of the rule requiring the payment of
correct docket fees cannot apply to petitioner’s case since he intentionally defrauded the
stated verbatim, the enumeration of required allegations under Section 2 of Rule 60 must
still be specifically included in a complaint for replevin or in the accompanying affidavit of
merit; that petitioner failed to show that he is the owner of the vehicle or that he is entitled to
its possession, and that the vehicle is wrongfully detained by him, and that it has not been
distrained, seized or placed under custodia legis; and that he is a buyer in good faith and for
value.
 
Our Ruling
 
The Petition must be denied.
“In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the
owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the
defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.”  “Rule
60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to
apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is ‘the owner of the property
claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be the owner so
long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal basis
therefor.”
In Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court likewise held that —
x x x It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. A person “entitled to the
possession” of the property also can, as provided in the same paragraph cited by the
trial court, which reads:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.—Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must
show . . .
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it,
or is entitled to the possession thereof; x x x
 
As correctly cited by respondent in his Comment:
x x x [A] party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts
that he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof. It must be borne in mind that replevin is a possessory action the gist
of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis
that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be replevied.
Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin
must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the
writ should not be issued.
 
Petitioner admits and claims in his pleadings that on July 22, 2009, he purchased the
subject vehicle from Lopez, who executed and signed in blank a deed of sale and
surrendered all documents of title to him; that he did not register the sale in his favor, such
that the vehicle remained in the name of Lopez; that in September 2010, he delivered the
subject vehicle, together with all its documents of title and the blank deed of sale, to Ong,
with the express intention of selling the vehicle through the latter as broker/secondhand car
dealer; that Ong appears to have issued in his favor two guarantee checks amounting to
P4.95 million; and that these checks bounced.  Thereafter, Ong was able to sell the vehicle
using the deed of sale executed and signed in blank by Lopez to Chua, who secured a
certificate of registration in his name. Chua then sold the vehicle, via a Deed of Sale of
Motor Vehicle dated December 7, 2010, to respondent, who caused registration of the
vehicle in his name on March 7, 2011. Apparently, Ong did not remit Chua’s payment to
petitioner, prompting the latter to file formal complaints/charges for 1) estafa and
carnapping on May 18, 2011 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
and 2) carnapping on June 15, 2011 before the PNP-HPG in Camp Crame, Quezon City
against Ong and Centeno. It appears as well that prior to the filing of these formal
complaints, or sometime in November 2010, petitioner appeared before the Quezon City
Anti-Carnapping Unit based in Camp Karingal, Quezon City and, claiming that the subject
vehicle was carnapped, filed a “Failed to Return Vehicle” report; that on February 23, 2011,
petitioner, respondent, Ong, and Chua appeared at Camp Karingal to shed light on the
claimed carnapping; that the parties were requested to voluntarily surrender the subject
vehicle, but the request proved futile; and that petitioner was instead advised to file
appropriate charges and file a complaint with the PNP-HPG in order to include the subject
vehicle in the “hold order list.”
This Court is not unaware of the practice by many vehicle buyers and secondhand car
traders of not transferring registration and ownership over vehicles purchased from their
original owners, and rather instructing the latter to execute and sign in blank deeds of sale
covering these vehicles, so that these buyers and dealers may freely and readily trade or
resell the vehicles in the secondhand car market without difficulty. This way, multiple
transfers, sales, or trades of the vehicle using these undated deeds signed in blank become
possible, until the latest purchaser decides to actually transfer the certificate of registration
in his name. For many car owners-sellers, this is an easy concession; so long as they
actually receive the sale price, they will sign sale deeds in blank and surrender them to the
buyers or dealers; and for the latter, this is convenient since they can “flip” or resell the
vehicles to the public many times over with ease, using these blank deeds of sale.
In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually leave them,
together with all the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with
secondhand car traders they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles
for actual viewing and inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages,
or showrooms, and to enable the traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is,
without having to inconvenience the owners with random viewings and inspections of their
vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an agency relationship is created between the
vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as agents. The situation is akin to an
owner of jewelry who sells the same through an agent, who receives the jewelry in trust and
offers it for sale to his/her regular clients; if a sale is made, the agent takes payment under
the obligation to remit the same to the jewelry owner, minus the agreed commission or other
compensation.
From petitioner’s own account, he constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to sell
the vehicle, surrendering to the latter the vehicle, all documents of title pertaining thereto,
and a deed of sale signed in blank, with full understanding that Ong would offer and sell the
same to his clients or to the public. In return, Ong accepted the agency by his receipt of the
vehicle, the blank deed of sale, and documents of title, and when he gave bond in the form
of two guarantee checks worth P4.95 million. All these gave Ong the authority to act for and
in behalf of petitioner. Under the Civil Code on agency,
Art. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal,
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form.
 Art. 1870. Acceptance by the agent may also be express, or implied from
his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
“The basis of agency is representation and the same may be constituted expressly or
impliedly. In an implied agency the principal can be bound by the acts of the implied agent.”
The same is true with an oral agency.
Acting for and in petitioner’s behalf by virtue of the implied or oral agency, Ong was thus
able to sell the vehicle to Chua, but he failed to remit the proceeds thereof to petitioner; his
guarantee checks bounced as well. This entitled petitioner to sue for estafathrough abuse of
confidence. This is exactly what petitioner did: on May 18, 2011, he filed a complaint
for estafa and carnapping against Ong before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the
owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his
ownership, petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle. His argument that
respondent is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the purchase
and registration of the vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite having been apprised of
petitioner’s earlier November, 2010 “Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with the PNP-
HPG, is unavailing. Petitioner had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner
of the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the
proceeds of the sale.
Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle
at the time he filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July 2011, petitioner may not seek a return
of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from
Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner
thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession. For this reason, the CA was correct in
decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-69644, although it erred in ordering the
return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG, which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its
custody. As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must
return the same to respondent.
Petitioner cannot be allowed to cut his losses by ostensibly securing the recovery of the
subject vehicle in lieu of its price, which Ong failed and continues to fail to remit. On the
other hand, Ong’s declarations contained in his Affidavit,  to the effect that petitioner
remains the owner of the vehicle, and that Chua came into illegal possession and
ownership of the same by unlawfully appropriating the same for himself without paying for it,
are unavailing. Faced with a possible criminal charge for estafa initiated by petitioner for
failing or refusing to remit the price for the subject vehicle, Ong’s declarations are
considered self-serving, that is, calculated to free himself from the criminal charge. The
premise is that by helping petitioner to actually recover his vehicle by insisting that the same
was unlawfully taken from him, instead of remitting its price to petitioner, Ong expects that
he and petitioner may redeem themselves from their bad judgment; for the petitioner, the
mistake of bestowing his full faith and confidence upon Ong, and blindly surrendering the
vehicle, its documents of title, and a deed of sale executed and signed in blank, to the latter;
and for Ong, his failure to remit the proceeds of the sale to petitioner; and petitioner might
then opt to desist from pursuing the estafa and other criminal charges against him.

Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, there is no need to discuss the
other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 9, 2012 Decision and February 19,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124967 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that the subject Land Rover Range Rover, with Plate Number ZMG 272
and particularly described in and made subject of these proceedings, is ORDERED
RETURNED to respondent Alvin Tomlin as its registered owner.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Agency can be express or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of
action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. (Oliver vs. Philippine Savings Bank, 788 SCRA 189 [2016])

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels
may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who
wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. (Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Alibudbud, 791
SCRA 134 [2016])
 
——o0o——
 II. Ownership
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.3 Right to recover
d.3.c Recovery of real property
- Forcible Entry
G.R. No. 158554. May 26, 2005.
SPS. RONALD HUTCHISON and VALENTINE NAVALLE-HUTCHISON,
petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE M. BUSCAS, respondent.
Actions; Evidence; In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it.—In civil cases, the law
requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proving it. This evidentiary rule is based on the principle that the suitor who relies upon the
existence of a fact should be called upon to prove it. Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a
better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title
thereto. In the case at bar, we find that respondent failed to establish these two (2) legal requirements.
Ownership; Land Titles; A party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that
was the object of the deed.—The first requisite: the identity of the land. In an accion reinvindicatoria,
the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he
is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.Anent the second requisite, i.e., the
claimant’s title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over
the parcel of land that was the object of the deed. Respondent sought to prove these legal requisites by
anchoring his claim on the Quitclaim Deed over a portion of land which was executed by Arrastia in his
favor. However, a cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed shows that the subject land was described,
thus: x x x a portion of that property situated at San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga which portion subject of
this sale consists of 7,581 square meters more or less, as indicated particularly in the herein attached
plan marked as Annex “A” and made an integral part hereof, and the subject property with an “X” sign.
Same; Same; What defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument but the
boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.—The Quitclaim Deed specified
only the extent of the area sold, i.e., 7,581 sq. m. of Arrastia’s land. Annex “A” of the Deed, where the
entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and where the specific portion of the property sold to
respondent was marked, was not presented by respondent at the trial. As the Deed itself failed to
mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale, it cannot be successfully used by
respondent to identify the area he was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. Indeed, the
presentation of the Annex “A” is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in
the instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.
Same; Same; Actions; In an action to recover real property, the settled rule is that the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s title.—It bears stressing
that in an action to recover real property, the settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s title. This requirement is based on two (2)
reasons: first, it is possible that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in
dispute, and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an
issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. In the case
at bar, as respondent failed to prove his title to and identity of the contested land, there exists no legal
ground upon which to turn over the possession of the disputed area to him.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar concerns a boundary dispute involving 6,471 square meters of land in San
Juan, Lubao, Pampanga. Petitioner spouses RONALD and VALENTINE HUTCHISON seek
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated
February 19, 2003, holding that respondent ENRIQUE M. BUSCAS is entitled to the
possession of the disputed area.
The records show that on October 1, 1987, petitioner spouses purchased from V.A.
Development Enterprises, Inc. a 76,207-sq. m. land (designated as Lot No. 7216) in San
Juan, Lubao, Pampanga. They occupied the land after a title was issued in their names.
On August 22, 1989, one Juanita Arrastia, the owner of a lot adjacent to that of
petitioner spouses, sold a portion of her land to respondent. The transaction, covering 7,581
sq. m. (designated as Lot No. 7047-A), was evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of
respondent. Respondent occupied 1,100 sq. m. of his land. However, he failed to register
the portion of the lot in his name and title to the property remained in Arrastia’s name.
On January 10, 1995, respondent commissioned geodetic engineer Narciso Manansala
to survey his property. Manansala prepared a sketch/subdivision plan of respondent’s lot.
His survey revealed that 6,471 sq. m. thereof was occupied by petitioner spouses.
Respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner spouses to vacate the encroached area.
Petitioner spouses refused and insisted that it was part of their land. Thus, respondent filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 1329) against petitioner spouses before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lubao, Pampanga. After trial, the MTC ruled in favor of
respondent. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case. It
ruled that MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter as it is a boundary dispute and
the proper action should have been an accion reinvindicatoriabefore the RTC.
Consequently, respondent filed a case for accion reinvindicatoriaagainst petitioner
spouses with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga. At the trial, respondent adduced in evidence
the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area. He likewise testified on the
survey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic engineer, Angelito H. Nicdao, testified
that in the unlawful detainer case earlier filed by the respondent, he was directed by the
MTC judge hearing the case to conduct a verification survey of the parties’ lots. In
compliance with the order, he surveyed the two (2) lots using the title of petitioner spouses
and the records of the Bureau of Lands. His survey revealed that petitioner spouses
encroached on 6,471 sq. m. of the adjacent land claimed by respondent. Respondent
offered in evidence the verification plan and report of Nicdao relative to his survey.
On the part of petitioner spouses, petitioner Valentine Hutchison testified that she
purchased Lot No. 7216 in Lubao, Pampanga, covering an area of 76,207 sq. m., and title
thereto was duly issued in her name and that of her spouse.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that respondent’s
Quitclaim Deed was not sufficient proof of ownership; that respondent failed to clearly
identify the property claimed as it was only marked with an “X” sign, and; that petitioner
spouses, as registered owners, are entitled to possession of the disputed lot.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that
respondent is entitled to possession of the disputed area as he was able to prove his claim
of ownership and the identity of the subject land.
Hence, this appeal where petitioner spouses assign the following errors:
I particularly in the herein attached plan marked as Annex “A” and made an integral part
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE RESPONDENT
SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED THE PROPERTY HE SEEKS TO RECOVER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT
THE TITLE OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS THE
QUITCLAIM DEED OVER A PORTION OF LAND.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE
RESPONDENT STRENGTHENED HIS “TITLE” BY THE SURVEY HE CAUSED TO BE
PREPARED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE
RESPONDENT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HIS
PROPERTY WAS ENCROACHED UPON BY THE PETITIONERS.
V of the contested area and respondent’s ownership thereof. The records show that when
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE
RESPONDENT “IS DECLARED OWNER OF THE 6,471 SQUARE-METERS
DISPUTED LOT, AND THE PETITIONERS ARE THUS ORDERED TO VACATE THE
SAME.”
Petitioner spouses contend that there was a gross misapprehension of facts by the Court of
Appeals and its legal conclusions were contrary to law and jurisprudence. They assert that
respondent failed to identify the portion of land he was claiming and prove his ownership
thereof. They allege that: (a) respondent’s identification of his 7,581 sq. m. property with a
mere “X” mark on the Annex “A” of the Quitclaim Deed is insufficient as the attached Annex
“A” was not presented at the trial, and; (b) the surveys conducted by the geodetic engineers
cannot be used to identify respondent’s lot as they were based on the records of the Bureau
of Lands and not on the document of title of respondent.
We find for the petitioner spouses.
In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. This evidentiary rule is based on the
principle that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to
prove it.
Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.In
the case at bar, we find that respondent failed to establish these two (2) legal requirements.
The first requisite: the identity of the land. In an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is
claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Anent the second
requisite, i.e., the claimant’s title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a
right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed.  Respondent
sought to prove these legal requisites by anchoring his claim on the Quitclaim Deed over a
portion of land which was executed by Arrastia in his favor. However, a cursory reading of
the Quitclaim Deed shows that the subject land was described, thus:
x x x a portion of that property situated at San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga which portion
subject of this sale consists of 7,581 square meters more or less, as indicated
hereof, and the subject property with an “X” sign.
Thus, the Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area sold, i.e., 7,581 sq. m. of
Arrastia’s land. Annex “A” of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly
described and where the specific portion of the property sold to respondent was marked,
was not presented by respondent at the trial. As the Deed itself failed to mention the metes
and bounds of the land subject of the sale, it cannot be successfully used by respondent to
identify the area he was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. Indeed, the presentation
of the Annex “A” is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned
in the instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its
exact limits.
Neither can the surveys of the lots of petitioner spouses and respondent prove the identity
geodetic engineers Manansala and Nicdao surveyed the lands, they merely relied on the
self-serving statement of respondent that he owns the portion of the lot adjacent to
petitioner spouses. They were not shown the Deed of Quitclaim and its Annex “A” or any
other document of title which described the specific portion of the land allegedly conveyed
to respondent. Thus, the surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to prove the identity of
the land sold to respondent and his ownership thereof.
Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are
the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. In the case at bar, the identity of
the land claimed and respondent’s ownership thereof are the very facts in issue. The best
evidence to prove these facts is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex “A” where respondent
derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a part was described with
particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof. Respondent’s failure to adduce in
evidence Annex “A” of the Quitclaim Deed or produce secondary evidence, after proof of its
loss, destruction or unavailability, is fatal to his cause.
Finally, it bears stressing that in an action to recover real property, the settled rule is
that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s
title. This requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is possible that neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in dispute, and second, the burden of
proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an issue for he who relies
upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. In the case at bar, as
respondent failed to prove his title to and identity of the contested land, there exists no legal
ground upon which to turn over the possession of the disputed area to him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated February 19, 2003, is hereby reversed and set aside. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, dismissing the complaint
for accion reinvindicatoria in Civil Case No. G-3183, is reinstated. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Notes.—Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary injunction,
transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some
exceptions, such as when the subject property is covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties
as the undisputed owner. (Cagayan De Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. [COCLAI] vs.
Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220 [1996])

A registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by
reason of laches. (Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181 [1996])

——o0o——
 II. Ownership
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.3 Right to recover
d.3.c Recovery of real property
- Unlawful detainer
G.R. No. 150633. November 12, 2003
HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR, Represented by CLETO MELCHOR,
petitioners, vs. JULIO MELCHOR, respondent.
Actions; Ejectment; Pleadings and Practice; In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the test for determining the sufficiency of those
allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer of the plaintiff.—Petitioners filed a summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 of the Rule, two separate remedies are available—one for forcible
entry and another for unlawful detainer. Petitioners maintain that while the Complaint does not support
a cause of action for forcible entry, the allegations therein certainly indicate one for unlawful detainer.
They add that they did not commit any jurisdictional infirmity in failing to allege prior physical
possession, because that fact is not an element of unlawful detainer. We do not agree. Even if
petitioners may be correct in saying that prior physical possession by the plaintiff need not be alleged in
an action for unlawful detainer, the absence of such possession does not ipso facto make their
Complaint sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MTC. In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. The test for determining the sufficiency of those
allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Forcible Entry” and “Unlawful Detainer,”
Distinguished.—It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a
case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions, which deal with physical or de
facto possession, may be distinguished as follows: “(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must
allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while
in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry,
the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initiobecause he acquires possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but
becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the
plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction
must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.”
Same; Same; Same; In order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owner’s permission
or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.—Neither was unlawful detainer
satisfactorily alleged. In determining the sufficiency of a complaint therefor, it is not necessary to
employ the terminology of the law. Not averred in this case, however, were certain essential facts such
as how entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started. Petitioners merely alleged their
ownership of the land, which had supposedly been possessed by respondent since 1947. There was
no allegation showing that his possession of it was initially legal—by virtue of a contract, express or
implied—and that it became illegal after the expiration of his right to possess. Neither did the Complaint
claim as a fact any overt act on the part of petitioners showing that they had permitted or tolerated
respondent’s occupancy of the subject property. It is a settled rule that in order to justify an action for
unlawful detainer, the owner’s permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the
possession. Furthermore, the complaint must aver the facts showing that the inferior court has
jurisdiction to try the case; for example, by describing how defendant’s possession started or continued.
Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a
valid cause for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Municipal Trial Court does not have jurisdiction to
hear the case.—Since the Complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the appellate court was correct in holding that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Same; Same; Same; When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper
Regional Trial Court.—Verily, the failure of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does not
leave them without any other remedy. Under the proper circumstances, what may be filed is a case
either for accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or
an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. This principle was laid down
in Ong v. Parel as follows: “The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. “If
private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before
the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal
trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of
the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or
held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.”
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Municipal Trial Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported unlawful detainer
suit, if the complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to nullify the August 16, 2001 Decision and the October 18, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 63465. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated
February 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela which
embodied the assailed judgment in Civil Case No. 20-1125 and affirmed the Decision
dated September 1, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, dismissing
the complaint for ejectment of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 2325, entitled ‘Heirs of
Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto Melchor v. Julio Melchor,’ is hereby AFFIRMED
and REITERATED.
“Costs against the petitioners.”
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
“Petitioners, who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the owners, by
way of succession, of the subject property allegedly in possession of respondent JULIO
MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion of the twenty (20) hectares of land
 registered in the name of PEDRO MELCHOR, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title
No. 1-6020 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela. The said property was purchased by
the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO MELCHOR, the deceased father of
herein respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the lifetime of the late DEMETRIO
MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of Saledated February 14, 1947
between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR was made to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 4, 1953, which was subsequently
approved. Since February 14, 1947 up to the present, petitioners further allege that
respondent has been occupying the subject property and has been harvesting crops
thereon and using it for grassing cows and carabaos.
“A demand letter dated August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the petitioners to the
respondent, demanding him to vacate and surrender the said property, but the latter
refused. The disagreement reached the barangay authorities, which case was not
amicably settled, resulting in the issuance of a certification to file action.
“Petitioners filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of
Cauayan, Isabela which they subsequently refiled in their Second Amended
Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31, 2001, to accommodate
additional allegations therein.
“For his part, the defendant (now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325principally
raised the matter of ownership by alleging affirmative/special defenses, among others,
that the parcel of land in possession of the defendant is registered in the name of
ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased mother of the defendant, as per Transfer of
Certificate of Title No. T-274828 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela, and that the same
property is now owned by the defendant and his three (3) sisters and one (1) brother,
having inherited the same from their late mother, ANTONIA QUITERAS.
“The Decision dated September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC Judge
BERNABE B. MENDOZA, was rendered in favor of the respondent, the pertinent
portions of which read:
‘There is no allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the land
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
‘The dispossession was made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper
remedy.
‘WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case.
‘No pronouncement as to costs.
‘SO ORDERED.’
“On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela, presided over
by Executive Judge HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, rendered, together with another related
complaint for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No. 20-1126, the Joint Decision dated February
5, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
‘1.Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, ‘Heirs of Liberato
Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of Julio Melchor.’ Costs against the appellants.
‘2.Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, ‘Heirs of Demetrio
Melchor, et al. vs. Julio Melchor.’ Costs against the appellants.
‘SO ORDERED.’ ”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to make
a case for unlawful detainer. It opined that the MTC had never acquired jurisdiction over the
case, because there was no allegation that the parties had entered into a contract—express
or implied—or that there was possession by tolerance.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the proper remedy should have been a
plenary action for recovery of possession, not a summary action for ejectment.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raised only one alleged error:
“The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second Amended
Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action for x x x unlawful detainer.”
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Lone Issue: Sufficiency of the Complaint for Ejectment
Petitioners filed a summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1 of the Rule, two separate remedies are available—one for forcible entry
and another for unlawful detainer. Petitioners maintain that while the Complaint does not
support a cause of action for forcible entry, the allegations therein certainly indicate one for
unlawful detainer. They add that they did not commit any jurisdictional infirmity in failing to
allege prior physical possession, because that fact is not an element of unlawful detainer.
We do not agree. Even if petitioners may be correct in saying that prior physical
possession by the plaintiff need not be alleged in an action for unlawful detainer, the
absence of such possession does not ipso facto make their Complaint sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the MTC.
In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint. The test for determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
plaintiff.
A review of the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these pertinent
allegations: the absolute owner of the subject land was their father, Demetrio Melchor, who
bought it on February 14, 1947 from respondent’s father, Pedro Melchor; being the heirs of
Demetrio Melchor, petitioners became the owners of the property by reason of succession;
as such, they sent a formal demand letter to respondent, who had been using the property
since February 14, 1947, for grazing cows and carabaos and for planting crops; and in that
letter, they asked him to vacate and surrender the property, but he failed to do so.
Accordingly, petitioners prayed for judgment ordering respondent to vacate the property
and to pay P500,000, which represented the income earned from February 14, 1947 to the
present, as well the costs of the suit.
It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a
case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions, which deal with physical
or de factopossession, may be distinguished as follows:
“(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior
physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the
possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is
originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of
 possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was
jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the
set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.” rules on summary ejectment.”

As correctly held by the appellate court, “[f]orcible entry must be ruled out as there was no WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
allegation that the petitioners were denied possession of the subject property through any of against petitioners.
the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70 [of the Rules of Court].” SO ORDERED.

Neither was unlawful detainer satisfactorily alleged. In determining the sufficiency of a Notes.—Pendency of an action questioning the ownership of property will not abate ejectment
complaint therefor, it is not necessary to employ the terminology of the law. Not averred in suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein. (San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA
this case, however, were certain essential facts such as how entry was effected, or how and 145[1994])
when dispossession started. Petitioners merely alleged their ownership of the land, which
Execution pending appeal in ejectment cases is governed by Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
had supposedly been possessed by respondent since 1947. There was no allegation Court, not Section 2, Rule 39. (San Manuel Wood Products, Inc. vs. Tupas, 249 SCRA 466 [1995])
showing that his possession of it was initially legal—by virtue of a contract, express or
implied—and that it became illegal after the expiration of his right to possess.
——o0o——
Neither did the Complaint claim as a fact any overt act on the part of petitioners showing
that they had permitted or tolerated respondent’s occupancy of the subject property. It is a
settled rule that in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owner’s permission or
tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession. Furthermore, the complaint
must aver the facts showing that the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case; for
example, by describing how defendant’s possession started or continued.

The prayer of petitioners contradicts, however, the existence of possession by

tolerance. It must be noted that they seek to be paid P500,000 as payment for the use of
the property by respondent from 1947 to the present. This allegation implies that they never
permitted him to possess the land.

Since the Complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the appellate court was correct in holding that the MTC
had no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Verily, the failure of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does not leave
them without any other remedy. Under the proper circumstances, what may be filed is a
case either for accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better
right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property.

This principle was laid down in Ong v. Parel as follows:

“The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.
“If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and
she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she
should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful, detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the
property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the
physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
 II. Ownership
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.3 Right to recover
d.3.c Recovery of real property
- Accion Publiciana
G.R. No. 181368.  February 22, 2012.
GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, MONICA S. TOLENTINO,
GUSTAVO S. TOLENTINO, JR., MA. MARJORIE S.
TOLENTINO, MARILYN S. TOLENTINO, MICHAEL GLEN S. TOLENTINO, MYLENE S.
TOLENTINO, MILAGROS M. GUEVARRA, MA. VICTORIA T. RAMIREZ, LORENZA
T. ANDES, MICHAEL T. MEDRANO and JACINTO T. MEDRANO, petitioners, vs.
PACIFICO S. LAUREL, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA LAUREL-ASCALON, CONSUELO T.
LAUREL, BIENVENIDO LAUREL, HEIRS OF ARCHIMEDES LAUREL, TEODORO
LAUREL, FE LAUREL-LIMJUCO and CLARO LAUREL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pre-trial; If the party who failed to appear at the pre-trial is the
plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.—
The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the
plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant,
the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every
chance to air their side and even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default.
Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and
disregarded the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case
without any valid cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex
parte due to the continued failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did so in
accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to the constitutional
guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that they were denied due process.
What the fundamental law prohibits is total absence of opportunity to be heard. When a party has been
afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following: (a) The possibility of an amicable
settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification of the
issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The limitation of
the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g)
The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) The advisability or necessity of suspending
the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.—In The
Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, 630 SCRA 607 (2010), the Court
held that pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it
serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation. The Court said that: The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be
overemphasized. In Balatico v. Rodriguez, the Court, citing Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance
of pre-trial, thus: Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it
was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the
subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as “the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon
justice in the nineteenth century,” pre-trial seeks to achieve the following: (a) The possibility of an
amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification
of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of
obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The
limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) The advisability or necessity
of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
action.
Civil Law; Property; Land Titles; Certificate of Titles; It is a rule that a certificate of title cannot be
the subject of collateral attack; To permit a collateral attack on the title would reduce the vaunted legal
indefeasibility of a Torrens title to meaningless verbiage.—It is a rule that a certificate of title cannot be
the subject of collateral attack. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that: Section
48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack.—A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. Petitioners’ attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927, issued in the name of respondents, is
incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a
direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. To permit
a collateral attack on the title, such as what petitioners attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal
indefeasibility of a Torrens title to meaningless verbiage.
Same; Same; Reversion; All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.—It must be pointed out that
notwithstanding petitioners’ submission that the subject property is owned by the Republic, there is no
showing that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) or its representatives initiated an action for
reversion of the subject property to become part of the public domain. All actions for the reversion to
the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. Unless and until the land is reverted to the State by virtue of a judgment of a court of
law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the Torrens certificate of title thereto remains valid and binding
against the whole world.
Same; Same; Accion Publiciana; Possession; Words and Phrases; An accion publiciana is a
plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order to determine the better
and legal right to possess, independently of title. The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is
to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership,
the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property.—It must be emphasized that the action filed before the trial court is an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order
to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. The objective of the plaintiffs in
an accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise
the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has
the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of
the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue
of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Land Registration; Certificate of Titles; It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.—Respondents’ title over the
subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration
that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the
ownership of the land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, the Court held that the age-old rule
is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
Same; Same; Ownership; As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents
have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.—
Petitioners’ argument that an accion publiciana is not the proper remedy available for the respondents,
because more than ten (10) years had already elapsed since the dispossession of the respondents’
property, does not hold water. As the registered owners, respondents’ right to evict any person illegally
occupying their property is imprescriptible. In the case of Labrador v. Perlas, 627 SCRA 265 (2010),
the Court held that: x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally
occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v.
Court of Appeals, we held, thus: As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents
have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it
be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners’ occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any
time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred
by laches.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
78676.
The factual milieu follows.
Respondents, in their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, alleged that they are
the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Balugo, Tagkawayan,
Quezon, with an area of 1,056,275 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-43927. For several years, petitioners have been in actual possession of the
western portion of the said property with a total area of 620,000 square meters which they
tried to develop into fishponds. In the years 1993 and 1994, respondents informed
petitioners, through Gustavo C. Tolentino, Sr. (Gustavo) who was then representing them,
that the area they are occupying was inside the respondents’ property and, therefore, they
should vacate and leave the same. Gustavo, however, asked for time to verify respondents’
claim. If found to be true, then the petitioners were willing to discuss with respondents the
improvements that they have introduced on the subject area. Respondents have waited for
almost a year for the outcome of the intended verification, but they waited in vain until
Gustavo died. Petitioners continued to develop the area they were occupying into
fishponds, thereby manifesting their unwillingness to vacate the premises and restore the
possession thereof in favor of respondents. Hence, respondents filed a suit against
petitioners to recover the property and demand payment of unearned income, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit.
Petitioners, as defendants in the trial court, averred in their Answer that the subject
property is owned by the Republic and they are occupying the same by virtue of a Fishpond
Lease Agreement entered with the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay over the
property is lawful.
On August 27, 1996, petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at the
pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the pre-
trial conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which petitioners
were notified, petitioners failed to appear. Hence, on March 21, 2000, the trial court issued
an Order allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte,  instead of declaring
petitioners in default.
After the ex parte  hearing for the reception of evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, thus:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered to wit:
(a) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] George S. Tolentino, Monica S.
Tolentino, Gustavo S. Tolentino, Jr., Ma. Marjorie S. Tolentino, Marilyn S. Tolentino,
Michael Glenn St. Tolentino and Mylene S. Tolentino, their assigns, heirs and
representatives to leave and vacate the portions of land they are occupying which are
part of and inside Lot 647-E of the Subdivision Plan Csd-5627-D, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-43927 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
immediately upon this decision becoming final and executory;
(b) Commanding the aforementioned defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiffs [respondents herein] the reasonable rental value of the
areas occupied by the aforesaid defendants [petitioners herein] at the rate of
P20,000.00 per annum from October 13, 1995 until possession thereof is returned to the
plaintiff. [respondents herein]; and
(c) Enjoining the aforementioned defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff [respondents herein] attorney’s fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus litigation expenses in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the CA. The CA
dismissed petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising
the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR DAY IN COURT.
2. WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER TO INCLUDE THE GOVERNMENT
THRU THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN THIS CASE FOR A COMPLETE
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FINDS APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT ACCION PUBLICIANA WAS THE PROPER ACTION TO
BE INSTITUTED IN THIS CASE.
Petitioners maintain that they were denied their day in court, because they were not
allowed to present their evidence before the trial court which resulted in the denial of their
right to due process.
We perused the records of the case and failed to see the lack of due process claimed
by petitioners. On the contrary, petitioners were given more than ample opportunity to be
heard through counsel. Lest it be forgotten, petitioners were first declared in default on
August 27, 1996, for their failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. However, the trial
court set aside the default order and the pre-trial conference was set and reset for several
times. Nonetheless, petitioners failed to appear on January 9, 1998, March 2, 1998, May 18,
1999, and March 21, 2000, prompting the trial court to allow the respondents to present their
evidence ex parte.
Thereafter, judgment was rendered.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Section 4. Appearance of parties.—It shall be the duty of the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only
if a valid cause is shown therefor, or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes
of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear.—The failure of the plaintiff to appear when
so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.”
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the
defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given
the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood
being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even
reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding, petitioners and
their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the legal
processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid
cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex
parte due to the continued failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did
so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to
the constitutional guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that they
were denied due process. What the fundamental law prohibits is total absence of
opportunity to be heard. When a party has been afforded opportunity to present his side, he
cannot feign denial of due process.
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the Court held
that pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings
for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not
indeed its dispensation. The Court said that:
“The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In Balatico
v. Rodriguez, the Court, citing Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of pre-trial,
thus:
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases.
Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory
under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as “the most
important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century,” pre-
trial seeks to achieve the following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative
modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g)  The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment,
or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.”
Petitioners’ repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply
with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial court was essentially
due to their fault.
Petitioners’ assertion that it was necessary to include the government, through the
Department of Agriculture, as a party to the case, in order to have a complete determination
of the case, is specious, as the same was never raised before the RTC and the CA. It is
settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process
impel this rule.
In the same manner, the Court cannot consider petitioners’ allegation that respondents’
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to the cause of the respondents, as this
was not raised before the trial court.
In substance, the appeal of petitioners hinges on their possession over the subject lot
by virtue of an alleged Fishpond Lease Agreement with the Department of Agriculture. They
questioned the validity of the respondents’ title by claiming that since the property is owned
by the government, it is part of the public domain and, therefore, cannot be privately owned
by the respondents. The petitioners’ submission is not meritorious.
It is a rule that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:
“Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack.—A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in
a direct proceeding in accordance with law.”
Petitioners’ attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927, issued in the name of
respondents, is incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in
an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of
the judgment granting the title. To permit a collateral attack on the title, such as what
petitioners attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title to
meaningless verbiage.
It must be pointed out that notwithstanding petitioners’ submission that the subject
property is owned by the Republic, there is no showing that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) or its representatives initiated an action for reversion of the subject property
to become part of the public domain. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. Unless and until the land is reverted to the State by virtue of a judgment of a
court of law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the Torrens certificate of title thereto
remains valid and binding against the whole world.
Besides, it must be emphasized that the action filed before the trial court is an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil
proceeding in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title.
The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.
This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property.
of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without which the award
is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture.
In the present case, the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses was mentioned
only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any prior explanation and
justification in its body, hence, the same is baseless and must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
78676, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—Since the award of exemplary damages is proper in this case, attorney’s fees and cost of
the suit may also be recovered as provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. (Sunbanun vs. Go,611
SCRA 320 [2010]).

An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by TCT No. T-43927, registered in reality independently of title; The objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession
the name of the respondents. On the other hand, petitioners do not claim ownership, but only, not ownership. (Modesto vs. Urbina, 633 SCRA 383 [2010]).
allege that they are leasing the portion they are occupying from the government.

Respondents’ title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is ——o0o—— 
a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, the Court held that the age-old rule
is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

Petitioners’ argument that an accion publiciana is not the proper remedy available for
the respondents, because more than ten (10) years had already elapsed since the
dispossession of the respondents’ property, does not hold water. As the registered owners,
respondents’ right to evict any person illegally occupying their property is imprescriptible. In
the case of Labrador v. Perlas, the Court held that:
“x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally
occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by
laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a
right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners’
occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right
is never barred by laches.”

As a final note, the Court finds no factual and legal basis for the award of attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses. The settled rule is that the matter of attorney’s fees cannot be
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The same goes for the award of
litigation expenses. The reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the
decision of the court  The discretion of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208
 II. Ownership
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.3 Right to recover
d.3.c Recovery of real property
- Accion Reivindicatoria
G.R. Nos. 185857-58. June 29, 2016.*
 
TRIFONIA D. GABUTAN, deceased, herein represented by her heirs, namely: Erlinda
Llames, Elisa Asok, Primitivo Gabutan, Valentina Yane; BUNA D. ACTUB, FELISIA
TROCIO, CRISANTA D. UBAUB, and TIRSO DALONDONAN, deceased, herein
represented by his heirs, namely: Madelyn D. Reposar and Jerry Dalondonan, MARY JANE
GILIG, ALLAN UBAUB, and SPOUSES NICOLAS & EVELYN DAILO,
petitioners, vs. DANTE D. NACALABAN, HELEN N. MAANDIG, SUSAN N. SIAO, and
CAGAYAN CAPITOL COLLEGE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 194314-15. June 29, 2016.*
 
DANTE D. NACALABAN, HELEN N. MAANDIG, and SUSAN N. SIAO, as HEIRS OF
BALDOMERA D. VDA. DE NACALABAN, petitioners, vs. TRIFONIA D. GABUTAN,
BUNA D. ACTUB, FELISIA D. TROCIO, CRISANTA D. UBAUB, and TIRSO
DALONDONAN, deceased, herein represented by his heirs, namely: Madelyn D. Reposar
and Jerry Dalondonan, MARY JANE GILIG, ALLAN UBAUB, and SPOUSES NICOLAS &
EVELYN DAILO, CAGAYAN CAPITOL COLLEGE, represented by its President, Atty.
Casimiro B. Suarez, Jr., private respondent; HON. LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA (Associate
Justice), HON. PAUL L. HERNANDO (Associate Justice), HON. NINA G. ANTONIO-
VALENZUELA (Associate Justice), HON. EDGARDO T. LLOREN (Associate Justice),
HON. MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS (Associate Justice), and HON. JANE AURORA C.
LANTION (Associate Justice, Acting Chairman), COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE
ORO CITY (former Special Twenty-Second Division), public respondents.
Civil Law; Implied Trusts; Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides in part that there is an implied
trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another
for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.—Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides
in part that there is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party
but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The
former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. The trust created here, which is also referred to
as a purchase money resulting trust, occurs when there is (1) an actual payment of money, property or
services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; (2) and such consideration must be
furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. These two elements are present here.
Same; Reconveyance; An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to
the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to
compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.—Having established the creation
of an implied resulting trust, the action for reconveyance filed by Gabutan, et al., the heirs of Melecia in
whose benefit the trust was created, is proper. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him. It will not
amount to a collateral attack on the title, contrary to the allegation of Nacalaban, et al.
Same; Same; Prescription; Implied Trusts; An action for reconveyance based on an implied or a
constructive trust prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance
of the certificate of title over the property. However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of
the property.—An action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust prescribes 10
years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is imprescriptible
if the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for
reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. The reason is that the
one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one
who is in possession.
Same; Sales; Buyers in Good Faith; Whether one is a buyer in good faith and whether due
diligence and prudence were exercised are question of fact.—Whether one is a buyer in good faith and
whether due diligence and prudence were exercised are questions of fact. As we have already
mentioned, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. We see an exception, however, to this general rule relative to the finding that the
College is a buyer in good faith. We hold that the RTC’s finding that the College is a buyer in good faith,
which finding was upheld by the CA, was based on an obvious misapprehension of facts and was
clearly not supported by law and jurisprudence.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; The sole issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
—We are aware that in the ejectment case, the MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the College. We
emphasize, though, that the ruling on the College’s better right of possession was without prejudice to
the eventual outcome of the reconveyance case where the issue of ownership was fully threshed out.
We have held that the sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When
the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Thus, the ruling on the ejectment case is not
conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
JARDELEZA, J.:
 
Before us are consolidated petitions questioning the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision
dated December 11, 2008 and Resolution dated August 17, 2010 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68960-MIN and C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 53598-MIN. In G.R. Nos. 185857-58, the heirs of
Trifonia D. Gabutan and Tirso Dalondonan, Buna D. Actub, Felisia Trocio and Crisanta D.
Ubaub (Gabutan, et al.) filed a partial appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari,
seeking to reverse the portion of the CA Decision declaring Cagayan Capital College (the
College) as a buyer in good faith. The other petition, G.R. Nos. 194314-15, is one
for certiorari filed by Dante D. Nacalaban, Helen N. Maandig, and Susan N. Siao as heirs of
Baldomera D. Vda. de Nacalaban (Nacalaban, et al.). It seeks to annul the CA Decision and
Resolution which sustained the action for reconveyance filed by Gabutan, et al.
 
The Antecedents
 
On January 25, 1957, Godofredo Nacalaban (Godofredo) purchased an 800-square-
meter parcel of prime land (property) in Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City from Petra,
Fortunata, Francisco and Dolores, all surnamed Daamo. Pursuant to the sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-22597 covering the property was issued in the name of
Godofredo. He thereafter built a house on it.
Godofredo died on January 7, 1974. He was survived by his wife, Baldomera, and their
children, Dante, Helen, and Susan. On March 19, 1979, Baldomera issued a Certification  in
favor of her mother, Melecia. It provided, in effect, that Baldomera was allowing her mother
to build and occupy a house on the portion of the property.11 Accordingly, the house was
declared for taxation purposes. The tax declaration  presented in evidence showed that
Melecia owned the building on the land owned by Godofredo.
Baldomera died on September 11, 1994.  On July 3, 1996, her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Sale  (Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale) where they adjudicated unto themselves the property and sold it to the College.
On August 22, 1996, TCT No.
T-2259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-111846 covering the property was issued in the name
of the College.
Melecia died on April 20, 1997 and was survived by her children, Trifonia, Buna, Felisia,
Crisanta, and Tirso.
In a letter dated May 5, 1997, the College demanded Trifonia D. Gabutan, Mary Jane
Gilig, Allan Ubaub, and Evelyn Dailo, the heirs of Melecia who were occupying the house on
the property, to vacate the premises.
On July 7, 1997, Gabutan, et al. filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Real Property,
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Partition and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Attachment and Injunction against Nacalaban, et al. and the College. They alleged that: (1)
Melecia bought the property using her own money but Godofredo had the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in his name instead of his mother-in-law; (2) Godofredo and Baldomera were
only trustees of the property in favor of the real owner and beneficiary, Melecia; (3) they only
knew about the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale upon verification with the Registry of
Deeds; and (4) the College was a buyer in bad faith, being aware they were co-owners of
the property.
In its Answer with Affirmative Defenses, the College claimed that it is a buyer in good
faith and for value, having “made exhaustive investigations and verifications from all
reliable sources” that Melecia and her heirs were staying in the property by mere tolerance.
It alleged that: (1) in the tax declaration of the residential house, Melecia admitted that the
lot owner is Godofredo; (2) the occupancy permit of Melecia was issued only after
Godofredo issued a certification to the effect that Melecia was allowed to occupy a portion of
the property; and (3) the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was published in three
consecutive issues of Mindanao Post, a newspaper of general circulation.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,  Nacalaban,  et al. denied the allegations of
Gabutan, et al. They claimed to have acquired the property by intestate succession from
their parents, who in their lifetime, exercised unequivocal and absolute ownership over the
property. Nacalaban, et al. also set up the defenses of laches and prescription, and
asserted that the action for reconveyance was improper because the property had already
been sold to an innocent purchaser for value.
On September 10, 1997, the College filed a separate Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
and Damages with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) against Trifonia, Mary Jane,
Allan, Evelyn and Nicolas Dailo (Heirs of Melecia). In their Answer with Affirmative and/or
Negative Defenses with Compulsory Counterclaim, the Heirs of Melecia claimed that they
own and possess the property in co-ownership with Nacalaban, et al. and Gabutan, et
al. because it was purchased by Melecia, their common predecessor. They also claimed
that the house in which they reside was constructed at her expense. The College had prior
knowledge of this co-ownership, and hence, was a purchaser in bad faith. The Heirs of
Melecia also raised the defense of forum shopping in view of the pendency of the action for
reconveyance. They then concluded that in view of the issues and the value of the property,
as well, the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case.
The MTCC found it had jurisdiction to hear the case and ruled in favor of the College: 
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered ordering each of the defendants to:
a.) Immediately vacate the property of the plaintiff;
b.) Pay the plaintiff the monthly use compensation for the continued use of the
property at the rate of P500.00 per month from MAY 5, 1997 until the property is
actually vacated;
c.) Pay the plaintiff Attorney’s fees amounting to P5,000.00 per defendant;
d.) Pay for litigation expenses at the rate of P1,000.00 per defendant.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC’s Decision in all respects,
except that the Heirs of Melecia were given 30 days from notice to vacate the property.
They filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Thus, the Heirs of Melecia filed a
petition for review before the CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 53598.
Meanwhile, in the reconveyance case, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
Gabutan, et al. The RTC found the testimonies of their witnesses credible, in that the money
of Melecia was used in buying the property but the name of Godofredo was used when the
title was obtained because Godofredo lived in Cagayan de Oro City while Melecia lived in
Bornay, Gitagum, Misamis Oriental. Thus, the RTC held that a trust was established by
operation of law pursuant to Article 1448 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the
RTC’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, and this Court hereby:
1. Declares that the Spouses Godofredo and Baldomera Nacalaban held the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2259 issued in the name of Godofredo
Nacalaban married to Baldomera Dalondonan issued on January 13, 1959 in trust for
Melecia Vda. de Dalondonan with the Spouses as the trustees and Melecia Vda. de
Dalondonan as the cestui que trust;
2. Declares that upon the death of Melecia Vda. de Dalondonan on August 20,
1997, the ownership and beneficial interest of the foregoing Land passed to the plaintiffs
and individual defendants by operation of law as legal heirs of Melecia Vda. de
Dalondonan;
 3. Nullifies the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Sale
executed by the individual defendants on July 30, 1996 and known as Doc. No. 326;
Page No. 67; Book No. XX; Series of 1996 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public
Victoriano M. Jacot with respect to the Extrajudicial settlement by the individual
defendants of the land referred to above;
4. Declares that defendant Cagayan Capitol College was a buyer in good faith and
for value of the land referred to above, and, accordingly, declares that said defendant
now owns the land;
5. Orders defendant Cagayan Capitol College to inform this Court in writing within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision the amount of the purchase price of the land
referred to above bought by it from the individual defendants the amount of which
should approximate the prevailing market value of the land at the time of the purchase;
6. Orders the individual defendants namely, Dante D. Nacalaban, Helen N.
Maandig, and Susan N. Siao, jointly and severally, to deliver and turn over to the
plaintiffs, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, plaintiffs’ shares of the
proceeds of the sale of the land referred to above the amount of which is equivalent to
five-sixth (5/6) of said proceeds with the remaining one-sixth (1/6) to be retained by the
individual defendants as their share by virtue of their being the legal heirs of Baldomera
D. Nacalaban.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties filed separate appeals from this Decision before the CA. In a Resolution
dated October 7, 2004, the CA consolidated both appeals.
The CA rendered its Decision on December 11, 2008 dismissing the consolidated
appeals and affirming in  toto the RTC Decisions in the unlawful detainer case and the
action for reconveyance. The CA held that: (1) the defense of co-ownership based on an
implied trust by a defendant in an unlawful detainer case shall not divest the MTCC of
jurisdiction over the case; (2) the dead man’s statute does not apply because Gabutan, et
al.’s counsel did not interpose any objection when the testimony of Crisanta Ubaub was
offered and Gabutan, et al.’s counsel even examined her;  (3) Nacalaban, et al.’s claim that
Gabutan, et al.’s witnesses are not competent to testify on matters which took place before
the death of Godofredo and Melecia is without merit because Gabutan, et al. have not
specified these witnesses and such hearsay evidence alluded to; (4) the parole evidence
rule does not apply because Melecia and Nacalaban, et al. were not parties to the Deed of
Conditional Sale; (5) the action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed because
Gabutan, et al. are in possession of the property; and (6) the College is a buyer in good
faith.
Nacalaban, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but it was
denied in a Resolution dated August 17, 2010. Hence, they filed the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, where they allege that: (1) the action for reconveyance already
expired;65 (2) for an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have
passed into the hands of another who bought the property in good faith and for value; and
(3) the title of Godofredo under TCT No. T-2259 which was issued on January 13, 1959
could not be attacked collaterally.
On the other hand, Gabutan, et al. filed the present petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, seeking a partial appeal of the CA Decision. In their petition, Gabutan, et al. allege
that the College is not a buyer in good faith because it did not buy the property from the
registered owner. Since Godofredo was the registered owner of the property and not
Nacalaban, et al., the College should have exercised a higher degree of prudence in
establishing their capacity to sell it. Further, despite knowing that other persons possessed
the property, the College did not inquire with Gabutan, et al. the nature of their stay on the
property. Under Section 1, paragraph 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the publication of the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was also without prejudice to claims of other persons who
had no notice or participation thereof. Finally, Gabutan, et al. argue that they cannot be
ejected from the property because there is no evidence to show that their stay was by mere
tolerance, and that Melecia was a builder in good faith.
Considering that the petitions assail the same CA Decision and involve the same
parties, we issued a Resolution  dated December 13, 2010 consolidating them.
 
The Issues
 
The issues for resolution are:
1. Whether the petition for certiorari of Nacalaban, et al. shall prosper;
2. Whether the action for reconveyance was proper; and
3. Whether the College is a buyer in good faith.
 
Our Ruling
 
I. The petition for  certiorari of Nacalaban, et al.  is a wrong remedy
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to obtain a
reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is an appeal. The Resolution
dated August 17, 2010 of the CA, which affirmed its Decision dated December 11, 2008,
was a final resolution that disposed of the appeal by Nacalaban, et al. and left nothing more
to be done by the CA in respect to the said case. Thus, Nacalaban, et al. should have filed
an appeal in the form of a petition for review on certiorari and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, which is a special civil action.
Rule 65 is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. This extraordinary
action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we held that appeal would still be the proper remedy from a
judgment on the merits, final order or resolution even if the error ascribed to the court
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of
power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out
in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal
prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that
there should be no appeal. We have always declared that a petition for certiorari is not a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or
negligence.
Here, Nacalaban, et al. received the assailed Resolution dated August 17, 2010 on
September 7, 2010. Under the Rules of Court, they had 15 days or until September 22,
2010 to file an appeal before us. Nacalaban, et al. allowed this period to lapse without doing
so and, instead, filed a petition for certiorari on November 5, 2010. Being the wrong remedy,
the petition of Nacalaban,  et al. is, therefore, dismissible. Although there are exceptions82 to
this general rule, none applies in this case.
 In spite of the consolidation we have ordered, we cannot treat the petition of
Nacalaban, et al. as one under Rule 45. We have the discretion to treat a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari as a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari if (1) the petition is filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred;
and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. The first and third
requisites are absent in this case. To reiterate, the petition was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period of filing a petition for review on certiorari. As will be discussed, we also
find no compelling reason to relax the rules.
II. The action for reconveyance filed by Gabutan, et al.  is proper
a. An implied resulting trust was created between Melecia and Godofredo
We stress at the outset that the question of existence of an implied trust is factual,
hence, ordinarily outside the purview of Rule 45. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts whose findings, when aptly supported by evidence, bind us.
This is especially true when the CA affirms the lower court’s findings, as in this case. While
we, under established exceptional circumstances, had deviated from this rule, we do not
find this case to be under any of the exceptions. Even if we were to disregard these
established doctrinal rules, we would still affirm the assailed CA rulings.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides in part that there is an implied trust when
property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another
for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee,
while the latter is the beneficiary. The trust created here, which is also referred to as a
purchase money resulting trust, occurs when there is (1) an actual payment of money,
property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; (2) and such
consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. These two
elements are present here.
Gabutan, et al., through the testimonies of Felisia, Crisanta, and Trifonia, established
that Melecia’s money was used in buying the property, but its title was placed in
Godofredo’s name. She purchased the property because Felisia wanted to build a
pharmacy on it. On one occasion in Melecia’s house, and when the entire family was
present, Melecia gave Godofredo the money to purchase the property. Melecia entrusted
the money to Godofredo because he was in Cagayan de Oro, and per Melecia’s instruction,
the deed of sale covering the property was placed in his name. It was allegedly her practice
to buy properties and place them in her children’s name, but it was understood that she and
her children co-own the properties.
Melecia built a residential building on the property, where her daughter Crisanta and
some of her grandchildren resided. Godofredo also thereafter built a house on the property.
Twice, he also mortgaged the property to secure loans. Melecia allowed him to do so
because she trusted him. After Godofredo’s death, and when Baldomera fell ill, there were
family discussions to transfer the title in Melecia’s name so Melecia’s children can divide it
together with the rest of Melecia’s properties. The plans, however, always fell through.
Both the RTC and CA found credence on these pieces of testimonial evidence that an
implied resulting trust exists. Reliance on these testimonies will not violate the parol
evidence rule, as Nacalaban, et al. once raised. In Tong v. Go Tiat Kun, we ruled that since
an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be
evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parol
evidence to prove their existence. What is crucial is the intention to create a trust. We
cautioned, however, that the parol evidence that is required to establish the existence of an
implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or
indefinite declarations. The testimonies of Felisia, Crisanta, and Trifonia satisfy these
requirements. They are consistent and agree in all material points in reference to the
circumstances behind the arrangement between Melecia and Godofredo. We agree with the
RTC when it said that this arrangement among family members is not unusual, especially in
the 1950s.
Nacalaban, et al., on the other hand, denied the arrangement between Melecia and
Godofredo, and maintained that it was really the latter who purchased the property from its
original owners, as evidenced by their possession of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the
title being in Godofredo’s name.  It is telling, however, that Nacalaban, et al. failed to provide
the details of the sale, specifically with regard to how Godofredo could have been able to
afford the purchase price himself, which would have directly refuted the allegation that
Melecia’s money was used in the purchase. As the RTC aptly observed, if Godofredo really
bought the property with his own money, it was surprising that Baldomera did not transfer
the title of the property to her name when Godofredo died in 1974. Baldomera did not do so
until her death in 1994 despite being pressed by her siblings to partition the property. The
RTC correctly deduced that this only meant that Baldomera acknowledged that the property
belongs to Melecia.
Having established the creation of an implied resulting trust, the action for
reconveyance filed by Gabutan, et al., the heirs of Melecia in whose benefit the trust was
created, is proper. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to
the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him. It will not
amount to a collateral attack on the title, contrary to the allegation of Nacalaban, et al. We
explained in Hortizuela v. Tagufa:
x x x As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an
action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. In an action for reconveyance,
the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but,
respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or
reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is
always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for
value.
There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be
questioned through a direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take
into account that in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected
as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being sought is the transfer of
the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful owner
or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in
whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is
entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.
 
The fact that the property was already titled in Godofredo’s name, and later transferred
to the College, is not a hindrance to an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust.
The title did not operate to vest ownership upon the property in favor of the College. As held
in Naval v. Court of Appeals:
x x x Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it
may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
 
Moreover, the body of the Complaint filed by Gabutan, et al.shows that it is not only for
the reconveyance of the property but also for the annulment of TCT No. T-111846 issued in
the name of the College.107 Gabutan, et al. questioned the validity of the sale to the College
and claimed co-ownership over the property. Thus, we can rule on the validity of TCT No. T-
111846 since the Complaint is a direct attack on the title of the College.
b. The action for reconveyance is imprescriptible because the plaintiffs are in
possession of the property
 
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust prescribes 10
years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title
over the property. However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the
property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which
does not prescribe.  The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land
claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only
by one who is in possession.
The fact of actual possession of Gabutan, et al. of the property, during the lifetime of
Melecia and even after her death, is an undisputed and established fact. The College has
even filed an ejectment case against the Heirs of Melecia for this reason.  Thus, their
complaint for reconveyance is imprescriptible. It follows, with more reason, that Gabutan, et
al. cannot be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set
up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.111
III. The property shall be reconveyed to the estate of Melecia
a. The Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale executed
between Nacalaban, et al. and the College is void
Having established the creation of an implied resulting trust between Melecia and
Godofredo, the law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property
and its title in favor of the true owner. The true owner, Melecia, died in 1997 and was
succeeded by her children and grandchildren. The property, therefore, must be reconveyed
to her estate.
The execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale between Godofredo’s heirs and the
College will not defeat the legal obligation to reconvey the property because at the time of
its execution in 1996, Melecia was still alive. Hence, Nacalaban, et al.did not have the right
or authority to sell the property. Nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one
owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller
can transfer legally. Nacalaban, et al. cannot find refuge in their argument that the property
was registered in their father’s name and that after his death, his rights passed to them as
his legal heirs. To repeat, title to property does not vest ownership but is a mere proof that
such property has been registered.
b. The College is a buyer in bad faith
Despite the finding that the property was owned by Melecia and upon her death, by her
heirs, the lower courts still sustained the ownership of the College of the property on the
ground that it is an innocent purchaser for value. The lower courts’ findings are grounded on
the following: (i) Gabutan, et al.’s claim was never annotated on Godofredo’s title; (ii) the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was duly published and the College was able to effect the
transfer of the title in its name; (iii) Baldomera issued a certification in favor of Melecia
allowing her to occupy a portion of the lot; and (iv) the tax declaration showed that Melecia
owned only the building on the land owned by Godofredo.
The RTC reiterated the rule that the buyer of a land registered under the Torrens
System may rely upon the face of the certificate of title and does not have to look beyond it.
The CA, on the other hand, held that when taken together, these facts would reasonably
constitute enough reason for the College or any buyer to conclude that the property is free
from any adverse claim, thereby making any further investigation unnecessary. Absent any
showing that the College knew of the actual arrangement between Godofredo and Melecia,
it must be deemed a buyer in good faith.
Gabutan, et al. alleged that the lower courts erred in ruling that the College is a buyer in
good faith, raising the following: (1) Nacalaban, et al. are not the registered owners of the
property; Godofredo is the registered owner who died on January 7, 1974; (2) not being the
registered owners, the College, as buyer, is expected to examine not only the certificate of
title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the
title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the property; and (3) the College knew
that other persons possessed the property so it should have first established the capacity of
the Nacalaban children to sell the property.
Whether one is a buyer in good faith and whether due diligence and prudence were
exercised are questions of fact. As we have already mentioned, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We see
an exception, however, to this general rule relative to the finding that the College is a buyer
in good faith. We hold that the RTC’s finding that the College is a buyer in good faith, which
finding was upheld by the CA, was based on an obvious misapprehension of facts and was
clearly not supported by law and jurisprudence.
 In Bautista v. Silva, we reiterated the requisites for one to be considered a purchaser in
good faith:
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair
price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the well-
founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the property
and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further
inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree
of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions
concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in
possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of
any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or
restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on
notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the
certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the
seller’s title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. Under such
circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he relied on
the face of the title; he must now also show that he exercised reasonable precaution by
inquiring beyond the title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a
buyer in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Thus, the College, which has the burden to prove the status of being a purchaser in
good faith, is required to prove the concurrence of the above conditions. This onus
probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith.
We find that the College failed to discharge this burden.
Firstly, as correctly pointed out by Gabutan, et al., Nacalaban, et al. are not the
registered owners of the property, but Godofredo. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, we held:
However, it is important to note that petitioners did not buy the land from the
registered owner, Dionisio Santiago. They bought it from his heirs, Maria dela Cruz and
Jose Santiago.
Where a purchaser buys from one who is not the registered owner himself, the law
requires a higher degree of prudence even if the land object of the transaction is
registered. One who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer
the land.
 
Secondly, the College was aware that aside from Nacalaban, et al., the Heirs of
Melecia, were also in possession of the property. The College cited the tax declaration
which bore an annotation that Melecia owned a residential building and Godofredo owned
the lot. Also, apart from filing an ejectment case against the Heirs of Melecia, the College
retained part of the purchase price for the demolition of Melecia’s building as well.
In  Occeña v. Esponilla,  we held that petitioner-spouses were not purchasers in good
faith when they merely relied on the representation of the seller regarding the nature of
possession of the occupants of the land:
In the case at bar, we find that petitioner-spouses failed to prove good faith in their
purchase and registration of the land. x x x At the trial, Tomas Occeña admitted that he
found houses built on the land during its ocular inspection prior to his purchase.  He
relied on the representation of vendor Arnold that these houses were owned by
squatters and that he was merely tolerating their presence on the land. Tomas
should have verified from the occupants of the land the nature and authority of
their possession instead of merely relying on the representation of the vendor
that they were squatters, having seen for himself that the land was occupied by
persons other than the vendor who was not in possession of the land at that time.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 
Although the College in its Answer alleged that it made an exhaustive investigation and
verification from all reliable sources and found that the possession of Melecia and her heirs
was merely tolerated, it failed to specify who or what these sources were. There is no
evidence that the College did inquire from Melecia or her heirs themselves, who were
occupying the property, the nature and authority of their possession. It is not far-fetched to
conclude, therefore, that the College merely relied on the representations of the sellers and
the documents they presented. In this regard, the College is not a buyer in good faith.
The “honesty of intention” which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. If the land
purchased is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must be
wary and must investigate the rights of the actual possessor. Without such inquiry, the
purchaser cannot be said to be in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.
We are aware that in the ejectment case, the MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the
College. We emphasize, though, that the ruling on the College’s better right of possession
was without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the reconveyance case where the issue of
ownership was fully threshed out. We have held that the sole issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however,
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.136 Thus, the ruling on the ejectment case is not
conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 194314-
15 is DENIED and the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 185857-58
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 2008 and its
Resolution dated August 17, 2010 are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Cagayan Capitol College is hereby declared a buyer in bad faith, who has no right to
possession and ownership of the property;
2. Nacalaban, et al. are ordered to return the purchase price paid on the property to the
College, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from July 23,
1997 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction;139
3. The Register of Deeds is ordered to cancel TCT No.
T-111846 in the name of the College; and
4. The property should be reconveyed to the Estate of the late Melecia Dalondonan with
the institution of the proper proceedings for its partition and titling.
SO ORDERED.
 Notes.—In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is who
between the contending parties has the better right to possess the contested property independent of
any claim of ownership. (Fernandez, Sr. vs. Co, 625 SCRA 370 [2010])
Implied trusts arise by legal implication based on the presumed intention of the parties or on
equitable principles independent of the particular intention of the parties. (Estate of Margarita D.
Cabacungan vs. Laigo, 655 SCRA 366 [2011])
 ——o0o——
 II. Ownership
E. Limitations to the Right of Ownership
e.1 Those imposed by the State in the exercise of its
inherent powers (General Limitations) - Arts. 435 & 436,
NCC
- Eminent Domain
G.R. No. 195003. June 7, 2017.*
 
CITY OF BATANGAS, represented by Hon. Severina Vilma Abaya,1 in her capacity as City
Mayor of Batangas, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and
SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V., respondents.
Local Government Units; Ordinances; Time and again, the Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that in
order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned
Local Government Unit (LGU) to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law.—The requisites for a valid ordinance are well-established. Time and again, the
Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not
prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not
be unreasonable.
Same; Local Autonomy; Police Power; Delegation of Powers; In furtherance of the State’s policy
to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the national legislature delegated the exercise of
police power to local government units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Such delegation can be found in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which embodies the general welfare clause.—Police
power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, police power
primarily rests with the State. In furtherance of the State’s policy to foster genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, the national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local government units
(LGUs) as agents of the State. Such delegation can be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which
embodies the general welfare clause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since Local Government Units (LGUs) exercise delegated police
power as agents of the State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal,
the State.Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause may not
subvert the State’s will by contradicting national statutes.—Since LGUs exercise delegated police
power as agents of the State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal,
the State. Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause may not
subvert the State’s will by contradicting national statutes. Thus, in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 439 SCRA 326 (2004), the Court struck down an ordinance enacted by Batangas City which
granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod the power to fix subscriber rates charged by CATV providers
operating within the former’s territory, as this directly violated a general law which grants such power
exclusively to the National Telecommunications Commission. In so ruling, the Court stressed that
municipalities are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by a statute involving the same
subject matter.
Civil Law; Water Code; Water Permits; The privilege to appropriate and use water is one which
is exclusively granted and regulated by the State through water permits issued by the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB).—The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources. Under Article 3 thereof,
water resources are placed under the control and regulation of the government through the National
Water Resources Council, now the NWRB. In turn, the privilege to appropriate and use water is one
which is exclusively granted and regulated by the State through water permits issued by the
NWRB. Once granted, these water permits continue to be valid save only for reasons spelled out under
the Water Code itself.
Same; Same; Same; The Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the
Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground
water which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB).—The avowed purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, as stated in its whereas
clauses, is the protection of local aquifers for the benefit of the inhabitants of Batangas
City. Accordingly, the Assailed Ordinance mandates all heavy industries operating along Batangas Bay
to use seawater in the operation of their respective facilities, and install desalination plants for this
purpose. Failure to comply with this mandatory requirement would have the effect of precluding
continuous operation, and exposing noncompliant parties to penal and administrative sanctions. There
is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the Water
Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water
which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the
Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering
the Assailed Ordinance ultra vires. Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and
void. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies with the other substantive
requirements for a valid ordinance — i.e., that the ordinance is fair and reasonable.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Findings of Fact; The Supreme Court (SC), not being a trier of
facts, accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of fact of the trial court, especially where, as
here, they have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA); accordingly, these findings will not be
disturbed.—This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords the highest degree of respect to the findings
of fact of the trial court, especially where, as here, they have been affirmed by the CA; accordingly,
these findings will not be disturbed. To be sure, such findings are binding and conclusive upon this
Court, and it is not the Court’s function in a petition for review oncertiorari to examine, evaluate or
weigh anew the probative value of the evidence presented before the trial court. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the Court finds that none is present in this case.
Ordinances; Presumption of Validity; The presumption of validity ascribed to an ordinance
prevails only in the absence of some factual foundation of record sufficient to overthrow the assailed
issuance.—Consequently, since it has been established that Batangas City did not have factual basis
to justify the purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City cannot invoke the presumption of
validity. As held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
20 SCRA 849 (1967), which Batangas City itself cites in its
Petition, the presumptionof validity ascribed to an ordinance prevails only in the absence of som
efactual foundation of record sufficient to overthrow the assailedissuance. In this case, the
presumption of validity ascribed to the Assailed Ordinance had been overturned by documentary and
testimonial evidence showing that no substantial diminution in the supply of ground water in the
Tabangao-Malitam watershed had occurred in the last three (3) decades, and that no threat of
depletion of ground water resources in said watershed existed.
CAGUIOA, J.:
 
The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not intended to create
an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions independent of the
sovereign state. As agents of the state, local governments should bear in mind that the
police power devolved to them by law must be, at all times, exercised in a manner
consistent with the will of their principal.
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari3 (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court against the Decision4 dated May 25, 2010 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution5 dated
December 30, 2010 (Assailed Resolution) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90373 rendered by the
Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA). The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem
from an appeal from the Decision dated June 29, 2007 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas City (RTC), Branch 84 in SP Civil Case Nos. 7924-7925, declaring as invalid
Ordinance No. 3, Series of 2001, (Assailed Ordinance), enacted by theSangguniang
Panlungsod (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of the City of Batangas (Batangas City).
 
The Facts
 
Batangas City is a local government unit created by virtue of its charter, Republic Act
No. 5495 (RA 5495). Under RA 5495, Batangas City constitutes a political body corporate,
and is endowed with powers which pertain to a municipal corporation.9 TheSangguniang
Panlungsod is the legislative body of Batangas City.
Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a duly organized Philippine
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and distribution of petroleum
products. PSPC owns and operates a refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas City
(Tabangao Refinery).
Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX) is a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines. In furtherance of the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD
87) to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum, the Department of
Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38) with SPEX under which SPEX
was tasked to explore and develop possible petroleum sources in North Western Palawan.
SPEX’s exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source of natural gas in the
Malampaya field off the shores of Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya
Project. The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-kilometer offshore
pipeline for the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to Batangas, for treatment in
PSPC’s Tabangao Refinery.
On May 28, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance which
requires heavy industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial
jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater
as coolant for their industrial facilities.15 The pertinent portions of the Assailed Ordinance
state:
SECTION 3. MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR THE APPROVAL OF HEAVY
INDUSTRIES ALONG THE BATANGAS CITY PORTION OF BATANGAS BAY AND
OTHER AREAS.—In addition to the requirements provided by laws and ordinances, the
City Government shall not grant permit or clearance or its approval for any project or
program involving the construction or establishment of heavy industries along the
Batangas City portion of the Batangas Bay and other areas delineated as Heavy
Industrial Zone without the required DESALINATION PLANT for use of sea water
instead of underground fresh water for cooling system and industrial purposes.
SECTION 4. GRACE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR HEAVY INDUSTRIES.—All heavy
industries already established or approved by the City Government prior to the enactment
of this Ordinance, including those to be established, are granted a period of five (5)
years, counted from the date of approval of this Ordinance, to install [a] desalination
plant.
SECTION 5. AUTHORITY TO GRANT EXEMPTION FROM THE
CONSTRUCTION OF DESALINATION PLANT.—The City Mayor with the concurrence
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod may grant exemption for a given period to an industry
from installation or construction of DESALINATION PLANT on the basis of the following
conditions:
5.1. The exemption will not adversely affect the environment, public health, public
safety and the welfare of the people, more particularly, the local aquifers, as
shown by a comprehensive ground water assessment or comprehensive
hydrological study conducted by the industry and presented by the industry
applying for exemption.
5.2. The industry or proposed project will support economic-based activities and
provide livelihood, employment, vital community services and facilities while
at the same time posing no adverse effect on the community.
5.3. A public hearing is conducted.
5.4. Such other reasonable conditions which the City Mayor may require with the
concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
x x x x
SECTION 7. PENAL CLAUSE.—Any person who shall authorize the start of the
construction, development or operation of any project considered as heavy industry
without the approval of the government authorities herein mentioned shall suffer an
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of
P5,000.00.
If the violator is a juridical person or association, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the owner, President, project manager and/or persons directly in charge of the
construction, development and operation of the project.
SECTION 8. POWER OF THE CITY MAYOR TO ISSUE A CEASE AND DESIST
ORDER.—The City Mayor, upon knowledge of the violation of this ordinance shall issue
a cease and desist order for the stoppage of the construction, development or operation
of the project or industry and shall exercise all powers necessary to give effect to the
said order.
SECTION 9. ADMINISTRATIVE FINE.—An administrative fine/penalty of
P5,000.00 per day of violation of this ordinance shall be imposed upon the owner,
President, project manager, and/or persons directly in charge of the construction,
development and operation of the project or industry.
 
The Assailed Ordinance was approved by the city mayor on June 7, 2001.
Heavy industries subject of the Assailed Ordinance had until May 28, 2006 to comply
with its provisions.17 Among the facilities affected by the Assailed Ordinance is PSPC’s
Tabangao Refinery.
 
Proceedings before the RTC
 
On May 23, 2006, PSPC filed against Batangas City and theSangguniang Panlungsod a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity (PSPC Petition) before the RTC praying that the Assailed
Ordinance be declared null and void. The PSPC Petition was raffled to Branch 84, and
docketed as SP Civil Case No. 7924.  Thereafter, SPEX filed a petition-in-intervention
(Intervention) praying for the same relief.
JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation (JG Summit) and First Gas Power Corporation
(First Gas) filed similar petitions docketed as SP Civil Case Nos. 7925 (JG Summit Petition)
and 7926 (First Gas Petition), respectively. These petitions were likewise raffled to Branch
84, and consolidated with the PSPC Petition for joint trial.
For its part, PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes an invalid exercise of
police power as it failed to meet the substantive requirements for validity. Particularly, PSPC
argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes the Water Code of the Philippines (Water
Code), and encroaches upon the power of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) to
regulate and control the Philippines’ water resources.23 In addition, Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to sufficiently show the factual or technical basis for its
enactment. In this connection, PSPC alleged that the Assailed Ordinance unduly singles out
heavy industries, and holds them solely accountable for the loss of water and destruction of
aquifers without basis, resulting in the deprivation of their property rights without due
process of law.
On the procedural aspect, PSPC contended that the Assailed Ordinance was not
posted or published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, nor were public
hearings or consultations involving concerned parties conducted thereon. Further, there are
no records showing that the Assailed Ordinance, as approved by theSangguniang Panlung-
sod, was forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Batangas after it
was approved by the city mayor, as required by Section 56 of the Local Government Code
(LGC).
SPEX essentially adopted the allegations of PSPC and prayed for the same relief,
asserting that it possesses material and direct interest in the subject matter of the PSPC
Petition.
In response, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsodmaintained that they have
the power to enact the Assailed Ordinance pursuant to the general welfare clause under the
LGC. According to them, the rationale of the Assailed Ordinance is to stop PSPC and other
industries similarly situated from relying “too much” on ground water as coolants for their
machineries, and alternatively promote the use of seawater for such purpose, considering
that fresh ground water is a “perishable commodity.” Further, Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod countered that the “regulation or prohibition” on the use of
ground water is merely incidental to the main purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, which is to
compel heavy industries such as PSPC to construct desalination plants. Hence, provisions
having regulatory and prohibitive effect may be taken out of the Assailed Ordinance without
entirely impairing its validity.
Further, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod took exception to PSPC’s
allegations and asserted that the Assailed Ordinance had been published in Dyaryo Veritas,
a newspaper of general circulation in the area. Moreover, Batangas City and
theSangguniang Panlungsod claimed that a joint public hearing on the Assailed Ordinance
had in fact been conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, where PSPC was duly represented. In addition, Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod argued that the requirement of referral of ordinances to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan applies only to tax and other revenue measures.
Finally, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod averred that since PSPC and
SPEX, along with other concerned heavy industries, essentially question the former’s
authority to regulate and prohibit the use of fresh ground water, they should have first
referred their grievances to NWRB by filing a complaint for adjudication on the threatened
revocation of their existing water permits.34
On June 21, 2007, the RTC resolved the First Gas Petition by issuing a Decision
declaring the Assailed Ordinance null and void.
Subsequently, on June 29, 2007 the RTC rendered a Decision, this time resolving the
PSPC and JG Summit petitions. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
It is evident that from foregoing factual milieu and parameters, the questioned
ordinance is INVALID, as it is hereby declared INVALID, in its entirety for want of
necessity and for not conducting prior public hearing, and for violating the due process
clause of the Constitution with respect to its (sic) Sec. 8, City Ordinance No.3, [S]. 2001.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PSPC’s witness Engineer Joeffrey Caranto
(Engineer Caranto) who conducted a hydrogeology study on the Tabangao-Malitam
watershed from which PSPC sources fresh ground water. The RTC summarized the
findings of said study in this wise:
1. A water balance x x x calculation of the Tabangao-Malitam groundwater system
shows that the natural recharge (replenishment) rate far exceeds the current
demand for water in the area.
Hence, there is no threat ofdepletion of the ground
water resource[s] in the Tabangao-Malitam[w]atershed that purportedly may 
result from PSPC’s deep wellpumping.
2. Water levels in the PSPC wells have not lowered significantly over the last
three (3) decades, indicating that there is no substantial diminution of the
supply of ground water.
3. Among the four PSPC wells, only one [1] well shows very slightly elevated levels of
chloride at 300 milligrams per liter which however is very low compared to
seawater (which measures 20,000 milligrams of chloride per liter). The chloride
levels in the other nearby PSPC wells are all within drinking water standards and
have not increased in the last four (4) decades of
usage. This indicates that salt water intrusion is notoccurring in the PSPC we
lls. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC also noted that the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to consult the NWRB
before enacting the Assailed Ordinance, thereby encroaching upon its authority. Anent
Section 8, the RTC concluded that the power granted to the city mayor to cause the
issuance of cease and desist orders against the use of ground water without prior notice
and hearing constitutes a violation of the due process clause.
Proceedings before the CA
Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod filed separate notices of appeal from
the decisions resolving the PSPC, JG Summit and First Gas petitions.
The appeals against JG Summit and First Gas were raffled to the Fourth Division (CA
Fourth Division) and were docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 90324 (JG Summit Appeal) and
90365 (First Gas Appeal), respectively. Meanwhile, the appeal filed against PSPC and
SPEX was raffled to the Tenth Division (CA Tenth Division), and docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 90373 (PSPC Appeal).
 In the PSPC Appeal, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod, as appellants,
averred that the RTC failed to consider the testimonies of barangay captains Joel Caaway
and Calixto Villena of Barangays Tabangao Aplaya and Pinamucan, respectively, who
testified that some wells in their areas had dried up, while others had begun to produce salt
water. These testimonies, according to Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
serve as sufficient factual bases for the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance, as “there
could be no higher degree of evidence than the actual experience of the inhabitants in the
area.”
On May 28, 2009, the CA Fourth Division issued a Joint Decision resolving the JG
Summit and First Gas
appeals. TheJoint Decision affirmed the RTC’s decisions in SP Civil CaseNos. 7924-
7925 (involving JG Summit and PSPC) and 7926(involving First Gas).
On October 15, 2009, the CA Tenth Division directed Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod on one hand, and PSPC and SPEX on the other, to file their
respective memoranda on the filing of separate appeals, and the implications of the Joint
Decision of the CA Fourth Division on the resolution of the PSPC Appeal.
In their Joint Memorandum, PSPC and SPEX averred that the Joint Decision in the JG
Summit and First Gas appeals bars a contrary decision in the PSPC Appeal, pursuant to the
principle of judicial stability. PSPC and SPEX further contended that the filing of multiple
appeals involving the same issues and parties was tantamount to forum shopping.50
In their defense, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsodclaimed that the filing
of separate appeals was made necessary by the fact that the separate decisions of the RTC
in SP Civil Case Nos. 7924-7925 and 7926 were issued more than fifteen (15) days apart.
On the basis of the submissions of the parties, the CA Tenth Division issued the
Assailed Decision dismissing the appeal filed against PSPC and SPEX for lack of merit. The
relevant portions of the Assailed Decision read:
City Ordinance No. 3, S. 2001 contravenes Presidential Decree No. 1067,
better known as “The Water Code of the Philippines” as it is an encroachment
into the authority of the [NWRB]. The use of water resources is under the
regulatory power of the national government.This is explicit from the provisions of
the Water Code which states that —
“The utilization, explo[i]tation, development, conservation and protection of water
resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the government through the
[NWRB].”
Although respondent-appellants insist that the city ordinance is not an absolute
prohibition but merely a regulation on the use of fresh ground water for cooling systems
and industrial purposes the argument cannot justify the attempt to usurp the NWRB’s
power to regulate and control water resources. Moreover, not only does the city
ordinance prohibit or regulate the use of fresh ground water in disregard of previously
granted water permits from the NWRB but also directs the installation of desalination
plants for purposes of utilizing sea water, without the requisite water permit from the
NWRB.
x x x The police power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.
Without the concurrence of these two requisites, the ordinance will not muster the test of
a valid police measure and should be struck down. The trial court aptly examined the
city ordinance against the requirement of reasonable necessity and correctly concluded
that the subject ordinance failed to prove that it was reasonably necessary to prohibit
heavy industries from using ground water and requiring them instead to construct
desalination plants. There must be a reasonable relation between the purposes of the
police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Arbitrary invasion of
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be allowed even under
the guise of protecting public interest. It has not been sufficiently demonstrated that
there exists no other means less intrusive of private rights that would equally be
effective for the accomplishment of the same purpose.
With the foregoing premises considered, there is no more necessity to address the
other errors raised in the instant appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 29 June 2007
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, in SP Civil Case No.
7924, declaring invalid City Ordinance No. 3, S. 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod filed a Motion for
Reconsideration53 (MR) dated June 21, 2010, which the CA Tenth Division subsequently
denied through the Assailed Resolution. The CA Tenth Division found that the MR merely
reiterated the arguments relied upon in the appeal, which were already passed upon in the
Assailed Decision.
Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod received a copy of the Assailed
Resolution on January 13, 2011.
On January 25, 2011, Batangas City filed the present Petition. Notably, the Petition does
not name the Sangguniang Panlungsod as party,56 and only the signature of then city mayor
Severina Vilma Abaya appears on the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached thereto.57
PSPC and SPEX filed a Motion for Additional Time58 dated April 1, 2011, praying for a
period of ten (10) days therefrom to file their comment. Thereafter, PSPC and SPEX filed a
Second Motion for Additional Time dated April 11, 2011, praying for an additional period of
seven (7) days to file said comment. Finally, PSPC and SPEX filed their Joint Comment on
and/or Opposition to the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Joint Comment/Opposition) dated
April 25, 2011 on even date.
Batangas City failed to timely file its reply to the Joint Comment/Opposition, prompting
them to file a Manifestation and Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply (Manifestation
and Motion) dated December 12, 2011  The Manifestation and Motion prayed that it be
granted twenty (20) days therefrom to file its reply. Accordingly, Batangas City filed its Reply
dated December 21, 2011 on even date.
The Issue
 
The sole issue for this Court’s determination is whether the CA erred in affirming the
RTC’s Decision which declared the Assailed Ordinance invalid.
The Court’s Ruling
 
Batangas City contends that it has the legal authority to enact ordinances in the
exercise of its police power for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of its
inhabitants. Thus, it asserts that it has the power to regulate PSPC’s and SPEX’s right to
use ground water, as continued use would be injurious to public interest.
 Further, Batangas City insists that there is factual basis to justify the enactment of the
Assailed Ordinance.66 As testified to by barangay captains Joel Caaway and Calixto Villena,
a gradual change in the quality and quantity of ground water had taken place due to the
increase in the number of industrial plants along Batangas Bay.67 According to Batangas
City, these testimonies should be given more weight, since they are based on “actual facts
and experience.”
These assertions lack merit.
The amendment of the Petition should be allowed in the interest of justice.
 
At the outset, the Court notes that Batangas City erroneously referred to the Joint
Decision issued by the CA Fourth Division in the JG Summit and First Gas appeals as the
subject of this Petition, instead of the Decision issued by the CA Tenth Division resolving
the PSPC Appeal. Batangas City sought to correct this error in its Reply, thus:
1. After diligent and careful review [of] the Petition for Review submitted by the
undersigned, it was found out that there was an error which was inadvertently
committed in the first paragraph of the fifth (5th) page of the Petition;
2. The first paragraph on page 5 of the Petition for Review on Certiorari x x x.
x x x x
Should be amended to appear as:
“On June 13, 2007, herein Petitioner City Government of Batangas received the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84 of Batangas City ruling in
favor of Respondents, [PSPC] and Intervenor [SPEX] x x x. Petitioner filed its
Notice of Appeal x x x on 26 July 2007. The case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the Tenth Division rendered the 25 May 2010 favoring [PSPC] and
SPEX x x x. The City Government of Batangas filed a Motion for
Reconsideration x x x. The motion was denied by the Tenth Division of the Court
of Appeals in its resolution dated 30 December 2010 x x x. Hence, now this
Petition.”69 (Emphasis omitted)
 
Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack of any
evidence showing that Batangas City’s error resulted from anything more than
inadvertence, the Court resolves to permit the amendment of the Petition in the interest of
substantial justice.
The Assailed Ordinance is void for being  ultra vires, for being contrary to existing
law, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual basis for its
enactment.
 
The requisites for a valid ordinance are well-established. Time and again, the Court has
ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable.
Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid
exercise of its police power. This claim is erroneous.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State.
In furtherance of the State’s policy to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the
national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local government units (LGUs)
as agents of the State.72 Such delegation can be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which
embodies the general welfare clause.
Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is incumbent
upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the State. Necessarily, therefore,
ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause may not subvert the State’s will
by contradicting national statutes. Thus, in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court struck down an ordinance enacted by Batangas City which granted the Sangguniang
Panlungsod the power to fix subscriber rates charged by CATV providers operating within
the former’s territory, as this directly violated a general law which grants such power
exclusively to the National Telecommunications Commission. In so ruling, the Court
stressed that municipalities are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by a
statute involving the same subject matter, hence:
In De la Cruz v. Paraz, we laid the general rule “that ordinances passed by virtue of the
implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws
or policy of the State.”
x x x x
In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has
made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that
the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality,
under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller v. State, it
was held that: “Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality
authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are
specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it
attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute
of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of
statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the
rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State. ” A reason advanced for this
view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal
corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV
operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or
approve a resolution in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general
character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is
frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant
of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to
the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a
municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with
the general law. x x xEmphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the control and regulation
of the use of water may be made subject of a city ordinance under the regime of the Water
Code — a national statute governing the same subject matter.
 The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, conservation and protection of water resources. Under Article 3 thereof, water
resources are placed under the control and regulation of the government through the
National Water Resources Council, now the NWRB. In turn, the privilege to appropriate and
use water is one which is exclusively granted and regulated by the State through water
permits issued by the NWRB.  Once granted, these water permits continue to be valid save
only for reasons spelled out under the Water Code itself.
Conversely, the power to modify, suspend, cancel or revoke water permits already
issued also rests with NWRB.
On the other hand, the avowed purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, as stated in its
whereas clauses, is the protection of local aquifers for the benefit of the inhabitants of
Batangas City. Accordingly, the Assailed Ordinance mandates all heavy industries operating
along Batangas Bay to use seawater in the operation of their respective facilities, and install
desalination plants for this purpose. Failure to comply with this mandatory requirement
would have the effect of precluding continuous operation, and exposing noncompliant
parties to penal and administrative sanctions.84
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the
provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and
regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code,
pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in
excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance ultra vires.
Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and void. Thus, it
becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies with the other substantive
requirements for a valid ordinance — i.e., that the ordinance is fair and reasonable.
In any case, it bears emphasizing that the measure of the substantive validity of an
ordinance is the underlying factual basis for which it was enacted. Hence, without factual
basis, an ordinance will necessarily fail the substantive test for validity.
Batangas City’s failure to prove the existence of factual basis to justify the enactment of
the Assailed Ordinance had already been passed upon by the lower courts. The Court
quotes, with approval, the Joint Decision of the CA Fourth Division:
To prohibit an act or to compel something to be done, there must be a shown
reason for the same. The purpose must also be cogent to the means adopted by the law
to attain it. In this case, as seen in the “whereas clause,” the purpose of the ordinance is
to protect the environment and prevent ecological imbalance, especially the drying up of
the aquifers of Batangas City. In effect, the drying up of aquifers is being blamed on the
establishments and industries such as petitioner-appellees here. It would have been
acceptable had there been a specific study or findings that the local government
conducted (sic) and not just its reliance on the complaints of some constituents who
merely made its conclusion that the drying up of wells or its salination was due to the
“heavy industries” use of ground water.
In addition, if appellants were convinced that those industries adversely affect the
environment and specifically the water resource in Batangas City, there would be no
exemptions, as provided in Section 5 of the Ordinance, as it would negate the purpose
of the law.
It thus becomes apparent that the ordinance was come up with in an arbitrary
manner, if not based purely on emotive or flawed premises. There was no scientific
standard or any acceptable standard at all that the ordinance was based on. x x x
 
While the Joint Decision resolves the JG Summit and First Gas appeals, these cases,
pertain to the same appeal filed by Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod from
the Decision of the RTC nullifying the Assailed Ordinance. As aptly put by the CA in the
present case:
The factual antecedents and legal issues in the present C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90373 are
identical to those of C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 90324 and
90365. Theassignment of errors in the present appeal are but a restatement of the
errors raised in the two consolidated appeal cases, which errors havealready bee
n exhaustively passed upon by the Court’s Fourth Divisionin its Joint Decision da
ted May 28, 2009, weighing pieces of evidencethat are now the very same pieces 
of evidence presented forconsideration in this appeal. x x x86 (Emphasis supplied)
 
This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords the highest degree of respect to the
findings of fact of the trial court, especially where, as here, they have been affirmed by the
CA; accordingly, these findings will not be disturbed. To be sure, such findings are binding
and conclusive upon this Court  and it is not the Court’s function in a petition for review
on certiorari to examine, evaluate or weigh anew the probative value of the evidence
presented before the trial court. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the Court
finds that none is present in this case.
Consequently, since it has been established that Batangas City did not have factual
basis to justify the purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City cannot invoke the
presumption of validity. As held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,89 which Batangas City itself cites in its
Petition, the presumption of validity ascribed to an ordinanceprevails only in the abse
nce of some factual foundation of recordsufficient to overthrow the assailed issuanc
e.90 In this case, the presumption of validity ascribed to the Assailed Ordinance had been
overturned by documentary and testimonial evidence showing that no substantial diminution
in the supply of ground water in the Tabangao-Malitam watershed had occurred in the last
three (3) decades, and that no threat of depletion of ground water resources in said
watershed existed.
 
Final Note
 
While the Assailed Ordinance has been struck down as invalid, the pronouncements
hereunder should not be misconstrued by heavy industries to be carte blanche to abuse
their respective water rights at the expense of the health and safety of the inhabitants of
Batangas City, the environment within which these inhabitants live, and the resources upon
which these inhabitants rely. The Court recognizes fresh ground water as an invaluable
natural resource, and deems it necessary to emphasize that Batangas City is not precluded
from exercising its right to protect its inhabitants from injurious effects which may result from
the misuse of natural water resources within its territorial jurisdiction, should these effects
later arise, provided that such exercise is done within the framework of applicable national
law, particularly, the Water Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review oncertiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90373 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
  
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