AMBRAY VS TSOUROUS

G.R. NO. 209264, JULY 05, 2016

QUESTION:

M criminal case for falsification of public document against D and C, but they were acquitted for
failure of prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. M later filed an annulment of
title, reconveyance and damages against D and C alleging that the deed of sale in favor of D and
C were null and void because the signatures of C and E, the original owners of the property, were
forgeries.

To support their claims, M presented the Questioned Documents Report No. 266-397 dated
March 24, 1997 issued by a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner ,
stating that the signatures of C and E on the Deed of Sale, when compared to standard sample
signatures, are not written by one and the same person. The trial court ruled in favor of M,
declaring that was able to prove the spurious and dubious origin of the deed of sale. Is the trial
court correct?

ANSWER:

No.

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be
proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto, jurisprudence
states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and
fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically
present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of
an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. The admissibility of E’s
former testimony in the present case finds basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
or the "rule on former testimony" which provides: Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a
former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to
cross-examine him.

In this case, between the Questioned Documents Report and the testimony given by E in the
falsification case in support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary weight in
favor of the latter.

Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the Deed of Sale was of spurious origin.
ILAO-QUIANAY V MAPILE
G.R. NO. 154087, OCTOBER 25, 2005

QUESTION:
M filed a case for quieting of title against R regarding the property of B, which was alleged
conveyed in favor of R during B’s lifetime. However, during the lifetime of B, he filed a petition
for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of the title of the property, but the court later
discovered that B’s claim was false. The trial court ruled in favor of R. On appeal, M questioned
the probative value given by the trial court in admitting the testimony of the notary public who
notarized the petition filed by B where M was not named a party. M argued that the court failed
to take into account the conflicting testimonies of handwriting experts presented by the parties. Is
the objection of M valid?

ANSWER:

No.

Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given at a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given at a former proceeding
obtains in this case. Not only were petitioners not parties to the former proceeding and hence
without opportunity to cross-examine the notary public, there was also no proof that the notary
public was already deceased or unable to testify. Hence, the testimony should not have been
accorded any probative weight.

MARCOS V. HEIRS OF NAVARRO

G.R. NO. 198240, JULY 03, 2013

QUESTION:
Y claimed ownership of a lot in Masbate based on a an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
where A, the common ascendant of X and Y, donated the property to Y. Believing that the
affidavit is a forgery, tX requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. M, the PNP
handwriting expert, found that the signature of A in the affidavit and other signatures were not
the same.

X sued Y for annulment of a deed of donation. During pre-trial, Y moved to disqualify M as a

witness arguing that the trial court did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit.
Is the contention of Y correct?

ANSWER:

No.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of
the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit: The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence.

Here, M has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the
Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. The value of
her expert opinion cannot be determined if she is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.

TABAO V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 187246, July 20, 2011

QUESTION:
When T was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street, it suddenly ramped on an
island divider, bumping R who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, R was thrown
into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, L’s speeding car ran over R’s body. R died.
T and L was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The prosecution presented
V who witnessed the accident.

The lower court convicted T and L.

On appeal, T claims that V is not a credible witness due to inconsistencies between his affidavit
and court testimony. He likewise claims that the lower court violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the
Revised rules of Court when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior
Inspector who testified that the petitioner’s car could not have bumped the victim because the
latter’s body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side. Are the arguments of T tenable?

ANSWER:

No.

Jurisprudence shows that eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive
of the success or failure of the prosecution. Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a
witness’ affidavit and testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex
parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer.

The general rule – that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and
his statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him – is not without exception, as when
the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail of the incident that one relating the
incident as an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the
sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court

Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence. The use of the word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony
does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony
of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of
any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the
court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the
applicable law.

An eyewitness account established that the petitioner’s vehicle actually hit R. At any rate, V was
able to sufficiently explain the discrepancies between his affidavit and court statements. Victor
reasoned out that the secretary who typed his affidavit made a mistake; and explained that he
signed the affidavit despite the inaccuracies in paragraph 2 because the secretary told him, “kasi
ho magugulo ang naimakinilya na.” The Police Inspector was also not an eyewitness to the
incident; his testimony was merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by another
police officer who himself did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in the police
inspector’s testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved
in the incident.

PEOPLE V ADOVISO
G.R. NOS. 116196-97, June 23, 1999

QUESTION:
A was charged with two counts of murder for the killing of E. A claimed that during the incident,
he was having drinks in a store a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. The store
owner and his drinking buddy corroborated A’s alibi. The defense also offered in evidence the
testimony of a polygraph examiner of the NBI, who conducted a polygraph test on him, who
opined that A’s polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception
to pertinent questions relevant" to the investigation of the crimes. The trial court convicted A. On
appeal, A argues the following: that eyewitnesses B and V presented an incredible story because
B was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree and V could not have
identified who killed his grandfather because of the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp
being carried by his grandfather; the negative result of the polygraph test should be given weight
to tilt the scales of justice in his favor. Are the arguments of A tenable?

ANSWER:

No.
Jurisprudence provides that Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or
not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that
when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their
assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced
by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps,
flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient
illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious. In addition, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests
when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of
a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that
polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.

The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, stating that much faith and
credit should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive.

In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place - the one placed inside the
camalig and that held by E as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. A’s
contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was
placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, V was not describing either of the gas lamps during the
incident. The defense counsel at the trial and appellant's counsel misunderstood the testimonies
of V and his grandmother on that matter.

A also has not advanced any reason why this rule (on polygraph tests) should not apply to him.

UNITED STATES of America v. Richard RIDLING

350 F. Supp. 90 (1972) Crim. A. No. 46732
United States District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.
October 6, 1972.

This is a perjury case. The Defendant is alleged to have made statements under oath before a
Grand Jury which he knew were false. He has pleaded not guilty. As a part of his defense, he has
indicated his intention to offer testimony of one or more polygraph experts who, he asserts will
testify that, as a result of their tests, it is their opinion that he is telling the truth when he makes
the statements that are alleged to be the basis for this indictment. The Court ordered a pretrial
evidential hearing on the admissibility of the tests and the opinions of the polygraph experts.
Is the polygraph result admissible as evidence?

Yes.

The evidence of polygraph experts pertaining to the polygraph examination of the defendant and
their opinions will be admitted subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. The parties will meet and will recommend to the Court three competent polygraph experts
other than those offered by the defendant.
2. The Court will appoint one or more of the experts to conduct a polygraph examination.
3. The defendant will submit himself for such examination at an appointed time.
4. The expert appointed by the Court will conduct the examination and report the results to the
Court and to the counsel for both the defendant and the government.
5. If the results show, in the opinion of the expert, either that the defendant was telling the truth
or that he was not telling the truth on the issues directly involved in this case, the testimony of
the defendant's experts and the Court's expert will be admitted.
6. If the tests indicate that the examiner cannot determine whether the defendant is or is not
telling the truth, none of the polygraph evidence will be admitted.
In the event the defendant declines to participate or cooperate in the test, none of the polygraph
evidence will be admitted.

BRUNKER V CUMMINS
133 IND. 443 NOVEMBER 28, 1982

QUESTION:
An owner of the building leased the top floor to a lodge. Lodge members would
usually traverse a walk which ran along the side of the building in going to and
departing from the lodge. A barrel was rolled upon the walk, near the platform, by an
agent of the owner and left during the night. In coming out of the lodge, X struck his
foot against the barrel and was thrown down. During the trial, the owner’s counsel
was permitted to propound to him the interrogatory whether the distance of the barrel
from the wall was safe for a man to walk with safety and in allowing the answer it
elicited to go to the jury. The court allowed the testimony to go to the jury. Is the court
correct?

ANSWER:

No.

Jurisprudence dictates that opinions are, as a general rule, incompetent. This rule is
one of wide sweep, and, although broken by important exceptions, it always prevails
where there are no peculiar features of the particular case carrying it from under the
general rule and placing it among the exceptions. Opinion evidence is not admissible
when the facts upon which the opinion is based can be given to the jury, and the jury
is as capable of drawing correct inferences from them as the witness.

In this case, the court violated the rule forbidding the expression of opinions by
witnesses, in allowing this testimony to go to the jury. The question called for an
opinion upon two points, one, the negligence of the appellee, the other, the freedom
from fault of the appellant. The question could not possibly be answered without
embracing in the answer the appellee’s opinion of what one using the walk could
safely do, and upon this point there could be no opinion without mentally deciding the
extent to which the walk was obstructed, and the degree of care exercised by the
person passing along it, so that in answering the question the appellee, of necessity,
gave an opinion on two important points upon which it was the exclusive province of
the jury to formulate a judgment and give it expression in their verdict. It is
unnecessary to refer to authorities in support of the general proposition that the
testimony of witnesses must, as a general rule, be confined to the statement of facts,
since there is no diversity of opinion upon the general question. It may be necessary
— at all' events it is proper — -to refer to the exceptions to the general rule. It is safe
to assume at the outset, that where the facts can be fully placed before the jury,
opinion evidence, even from experts, is incompetent if the facts are of such a nature
that jurors are as well qualified to form an opinion upon them as the witnesses.

Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954)

There was a collision between a car driven by P and a truck owned by D. At trial, T testified that,
from his observations, he believed that the collision took place on D’s side of the highway. T
was a law enforcement officer with 17 years of experience in investigatin accidents. He arrived
at the accident scene an hour and twenty minutes after its occurrence, but before the damaged
vehicles had been moved and the highway opened to traffic.

Is the location of a collision the proper subject of expert testimony by a witness who personally
observed the scene of the collision shortly after its occurrence and who had many years of
experience in investigatin such collisions?

YES.

Whether an expert is sufficiently qualified to give an opionion is withint htediscreion of the trial
court.

In a case decided in the highest appellate court in California, the Court said:
Thus, expert testimony is admissible or not dependent upon whether the subject matter is
within common experience or whether it is a special field where the opinion of one of
skill and experience will be of greater validity than that of the ordinary juryman. It is
quite obvious that the conclusion, based upon the facts of the particular case, as to just
where a collision between two vehicles occurred, may be so obvious that any reasonable
person, trained or not, can draw that inference from the facts. It is equally clear that cases
may occur where the opinions of trained experts in the field on this subject will be of
great assistance to the members of the jury in arriving at their conclusions. In such cases
a traffic officer who has spent years investigating accidents in which he has been required
to render official reports not only as to the facts of the accidents but also as to his opinion
as to their causes, including his opinion, where necessary, as to the point of impact, is an
expert. Necessarily, in this field, much must be left to the common sense and discretion
of the trial court. (Citing cases.)"

In the case at hand, contrary inferences as to which side of the road the accident occurred on
were earnestly argued by opposing counsel from the physical facts existing immediately after the
accident. It would seem, therefore, that this is not a case where the conclusion as to where the
collision occurred is so obvious that any reasonable person, trained or not, could easily draw the
inference. Rather, it would seem to be a case where trained experts in the field would be of
considerable assistance to the jurors in arriving at their conclusions.

The Court is of the opinion that under the circumstances as they existed and in considering the
evidence introduced at the trial, the opinion of the witness Holcomb was properly admitted. It
was the view of this Court at the time the ruling was made during the trial that the subject was a
proper one for the admission of an opinion of a concededly qualified expert. The physical facts
and circumstances found immediately after the accident prompted contrary inferences to be
argued with equal earnestness by able and experienced counsel. The witness had personally
observed the physical facts and circumstances soon after the accident occurred, before the
damaged vehicles had been moved, and before the highway had been opened to other traffic, and
the witness was qualified through long years of experience in the investigation of automobile
accidents. Where the inference or conclusion to be drawn is not so obvious that it can be said that
the jurors were as equally competent to reach it as one skilled through long experience, then the
opinion of one who is so skilled is not only admissible but may be of aid to the jurors.

PEOPLE V DURANAN
G.R. NOS. 134074-75, JANUARY 16, 2001

QUESTION:

A was charged with 2 counts of rape. N, the complainant, who was 25 years old at the time of
incident, is considered as retarded and finished up to the 6th grade only. During the trial, the
prosecution presented the complainant, her mother and the attending medico-legal. The trial
court convicted A. On appeal, A contended that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s
mental age was not proven arguing that the essential element for rape is a psychiatric evaluation
of the complainant’s mental age. In this case, only the mother of the complainant testified as to
the N’s mental age. Is the objection of A valid?

ANSWER:

No.

Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may
be received in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of
a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner,
habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the
factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. In this
case, the mother testified on the mental condition of her daughter.

Therefore, the objection of A is not valid.