FIRST DIVISION 3. ₱30,000.

00 as attorney’s
fees;
G.R. No. 154409             June 21, 2004
4. Cost of suit."4
Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, 
vs. The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
The Facts
DECISION
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under amply summarized by the trial court:
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and
‘On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at
(3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This
Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration
provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered
No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said
under the Torrens system.
sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between
the vendor and the vendees.
The Case
‘On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise
seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision 2 and the Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria
July 22, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise
No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows: Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would
mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E C I S
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria
I O N of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001,
Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees]
is SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in
declared the lot in their name.
part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from,
as follows:
‘Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved
"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the
[on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free
rightful owner and with better right to possess the
patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.
property in question, being an innocent purchaser
for value therefor;
‘On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie
"2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the
Abrigo].
following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to
[Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to
wit: ‘On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to
Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:

‘On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible
1. ₱300,000.00 plus 6% per
Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before
annum as actual damages;
the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil
Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that
damages; neither of them can physically take possession of the property in
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case
was dismissed.’5
3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of
4. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and
fees; and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].

5. Cost of suit. "After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed
Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to
As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and [petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was
Julie] Abrigo: ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and
attorney’s fees.
1. ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; "Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to
the CA]."6
2. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA
held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence
dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera. 7 Since
Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was
deemed void.
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and
found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended
Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith
and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good
faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.8
Hence, this Petition.9
Issues
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:
"1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria
Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid.
"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a
purchaser for value in good faith.
"3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better
title over the property in question."10
In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses
and respondent has a better right to the property.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Main Issue:
Better Right over the Property
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the
property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to
her.11 They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since
respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. 12
Law on Double Sale
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double
sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property
to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom
petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23,
1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent
Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith."
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables
transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the
first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in the application of
this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 14 which
provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument --
except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. 15 Thus, if
the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the
buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.16
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered
the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their
predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property
was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective
sales under Act 3344. 17 For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system18 because, during the sale,
Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering
the property.19
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens
system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs
under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice
Edgardo L. Paras:
"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration
Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the
subsequent sale is registered not under the Land
Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale
is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under
Art. 1544 x x x."20
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been
issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-30522.21 The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name. 22 As a consequence
of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No.
22515 thereafter issued to respondent.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the
proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute
in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system,
petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for
purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the
sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to
another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act
3344. In that case, the "priority in time" principle was not applied,
because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the
time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same
reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De
Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must
be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-
Spouses Abrigo.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo 25 explained the difference in the
rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens
system in this wise:
"Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this
Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor
 was not anymore the owner of the land having previously
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.
"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals 26 is a case in
point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code
has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496.
Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of
the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the
original owners and was unrecorded while the second was
an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of
money filed against the said original owners. Applying
[Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, 27 this
Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be
invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale
though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this
second sale was registered. It was explained that this is
because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect
because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor
as of the time of the said execution sale." 28
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into
believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once
registered, serves as a notice to the whole world. 29 All persons must
take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.30
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer
to acquire the immovable in good faith andto register it in good
faith.31 Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur
with the registration.32We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of
Appeals,33 which we quote:
"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer
ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544
requires that such registration must be coupled with good
faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘(t)he governing
principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger
in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second
sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the
second buyer registers in good faith the second
sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of
her rights under the law, among them, to register first her
purchase as against the second buyer. But inconverso,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale
defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second
sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with
bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the
Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the
first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority
over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith
throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first
buyer’s rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by
delivery of possession.’"34 (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such
certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the
certificate.35 Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required
to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property,
since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of
title.36 Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as
regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good
title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not
recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.37
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners contend that their
prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent
and negates her good faith at the time she registered the
sale. Santiagoaffirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C.
Vitug:
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except
when the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33).
Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since
such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26
December 1984) InCruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22
June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to
merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the
second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his
deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA
99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
xxx     xxx     xxx
"Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing
for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered
by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act
496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself
expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice
prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals,
31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive
notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code;
see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs.
Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be
inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since
the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and
acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is
sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see
alsoFabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there
is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA
138)."39 (Emphasis supplied)
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,40 which
held:
"Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by
petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in
the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act
No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the
second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On
account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No.
3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good
faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for
which they had been issued certificates of title in their
names. x x x."41
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers
registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from
the issuance of the TCT in their names. 42 There was no registration
under Act 3344. InBayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale
under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land. 43 Such
registration was therefore considered effectual.
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not
on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not
register the sale.44 In Taguba, registration was not an issue.45
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the SO ORDERED.
second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the
property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago*, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was

omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why
petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:

"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been

held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration
Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as
the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs.
Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694).
On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser
acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the
certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or
encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon
its face, indicates. The only exception is where the
purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the
title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as
to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act
496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October
1988;Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court
of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"46

Respondent in Good Faith

The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether

respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. 47 After its factual
findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it
explained thus:

"x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Vera’s vendor, appears to be

the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in
the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title
and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant
[Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond
the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to
[petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole
owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her
vendor’s title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the
premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she
bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest
notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria
Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said
case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contrary
evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything
about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she
had bought the same, and only then when she bought the same, and
only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal
Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the
[Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely
was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her
vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x
x x."48

We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not

rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general
averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to
consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the
property, she would have found petitioners to be in possession. 49

This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses’ own

admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the
actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera
purchased the property.50The family members may reasonably be
assumed to be Villafania’s agents, who had not been shown to have
notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular
inspection. Thus, good faith on respondent’s part stands.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 142403. March 26, 2003
ALEJANDRO GABRIEL and ALFREDO GABRIEL, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES PABLO MABANTA and ESCOLASTICA COLOBONG,
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (Isabela Branch) and
ZENAIDA TAN-REYES, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Born of the need to protect our land registration system from being
converted into an instrument of fraud, this Court has consistently
adhered to the principle that a mere registration of title in case of
double sale is not enough, good faith must concur with the registration.
In this petition for review on certiorari, Alejandro Gabriel and Alfredo
Gabriel assailed the Decision1 dated March 30, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33941 modifying the Decision 2 dated April
12, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago, Isabela in
Civil Case No. 0399 for specific performance, reconveyance and
damages with application for preliminary injunction.
The facts are as follows:
Spouses Pablo and Escolastica Mabanta were the registered owners
of two lots located in Patul and Capaltitan, Santiago, Isabela, with an
area of 512 and 15,000 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 72705 and 72707, respectively. On
October 25, 1975, they mortgaged both lots with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as collateral for a loan
of P14,000.00.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Five years thereafter or on September 1, 1980, spouses Mabanta sold
the lots to Susana Soriano by way of a Deed of Sale of Parcels of Land
With Assumption of Mortgage. 4 Included in the Deed is an agreement
that they could repurchase the lots within a period of two (2) years.
Spouses Mabanta failed to repurchase the lots. But sometime in 1984,
they were able to convince Alejandro Gabriel to purchase the lots from
Susana Soriano. As consideration, Alejandro delivered to Susana a
500-square meter residential lot with an actual value ofP40,000.00 and
paid spouses Mabanta the sum of P5,000.00. On May 15, 1984,
spouses Mabanta executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage5 in favor of Alejandro. For her part, Susana executed a
document entitled Cancellation of Contract 6 whereby she transferred to
Alejandro all her rights over the two lots.
Alejandro and his son Alfredo cultivated the lots. They also caused the
restructuring of spouses Mabantas loan with the DBP.7 However, when
they were ready to pay the entire loan, they found that spouses Benito
and Pura Tan had paid it and that the mortgage was already
cancelled.8cräläwvirtualibräry
On August 18, 1985, Benito Tan and Alejandro Tridanio, a barangay
official, approached Alejandro to refund to him the P5,000.00 he paid
to spouses Mabanta. Alejandro refused because Tan was unwilling to
return the formers 500-square meter lot delivered to Susana as
purchase price for the lots. Thereafter, spouses Tan tried to eject
Alejandro from the lot covered by TCT No. 72707.
On September 17, 1985, Alejandro and Alfredo filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago, Isabela a complaint (involving the lot
covered by TCT No. 72707) for specific performance, reconveyance
and damages with an application for a preliminary injunction against
spouses Mabanta, spouses Tan, the DBP and barangay officials
Dominador Maylem and Alejandro Tridanio. In due time, these
defendants filed their respective answers.
During the proceedings, it turned out that it was spouses Tans
daughter, Zenaida Tan-Reyes who bought one of the lots (covered
by TCT No. 72707) from spouses Mabanta on August 21, 1985. Not
having been impleaded as a party-defendant, she filed an answer-in-
intervention alleging that she is the registered owner of the lot covered
by TCT No. 72707; that she purchased it from spouses Mabanta in
good faith and for value; that she paid their loan with the DBP in the
amounts of P17,580.88 andP16,845.17 per Official Receipts Nos.
1749539 and 1749540, respectively; that the mortgage with the DBP
was cancelled and spouses Mabanta executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale9 in her favor; and that TCT No. T-72707 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-160391 was issued in her name.
On April 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision sustaining the
right of Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel over the lot covered by TCT No.
72707 (now TCT No. T-160391), thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING Exhibit A, the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage executed by the spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica
Colobong (in favor of Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel) valid and
subsisting.
2. ORDERING the plaintiff Alejandro Gabriel to pay to the spouses
Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong the sums of P5,000.00
plus P34,426.05 (representing the loan with the DBP which plaintiff
assumed) within 30 days from receipt hereof.
3. DECLARING the deed of sale executed by the spouses Pablo
Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong in favor of Zenaida Tan Reyes
as null and void.
4. ORDERING the intervenor Zenaida Tan-Reyes to reconvey the land
covered by T.C.T. No. T-160391 in favor of Alejandro Gabriel.
SO ORDERED.
In declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale (or second sale)
of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707 between spouses Mabanta and
Zenaida Tan-Reyes, the trial court ratiocinated as follows:
But Zenaida (Tan) Reyes professes that she is a buyer in good faith
and for value. In her testimony she said that the spouses Mabanta
offered to sell the land to her on August 19, 1985. She was informed
that the land was mortgaged in the DBP. She readily agreed to buy the
land on that same day. She did not inquire further into the status of the
land. She did not go and see the land first. What she did was to
immediately go to the DBP the following day and paid the mortgage
obligation in the amount of P16,845.17 andP17,580.88 (Exhibits 1 and
2). The following day August 21, a deed of sale in her favor was
prepared and on October 17, 1985 she secured a certificate of title
(Exhibit 5). Under the above circumstances, it cannot be said that she
is a purchaser in good faith. She should have first made a thorough
investigation of the status of the land. Had she inquired, she should
have been informed that the land was previously sold to at least two
persons Susana Soriano and Alejandro Gabriel. She should also have
first visited the land she was buying. Had she done so she should have
discovered that the land was being cultivated by the Gabriels who
would have informed her that they already bought the land from the
Mabantas. The reason why she did not do this is because she
already was appraised of the status of the land by her father
Benito Tan. For reasons known only to her, she decided to buy
the land just the same.
xxxxxx
Zenaida Tan therefore is not a purchaser in good faith and she
cannot seek refuge behind her certificate of title. True, Article
1544 of the Civil Code provides that should immovable property
be sold to different vendees, the ownership shall belong to the
person who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of
property. Unfortunately, the registration made by Zenaida (Tan)
Reyes of her deed of sale was not in good faith. For this reason in
accordance with the same Article 1544, the land shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in possession. There is no
question that it is the Gabriels who are in possession of the land.
Unsatisfied, spouses Mabanta and Zenaida Tan-Reyes interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On March 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
modifying the trial courts Decision, declaring as valid the second sale
of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707 between spouses Mabanta and
Zenaida Tan-Reyes on the ground that a person dealing with
registered land may simply rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title and, in the absence of anything to engender suspicion, he is under
no obligation to look beyond it. The dispositive portion of the Appellate
Courts Decision reads:
Wherefore the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the following
modification:
1. DECLARING Exhibit A, the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage executed by the defendants-appellants spouses Pablo
Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong over lots covered by TCT Nos. T-
72705 and T-72707 valid and subsisting;
2. Ordering spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong to
surrender TCT No. 72705 to plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Gabriel;
3. Declaring the deed of sale executed over lot with TCT No. 72707
(now T-160391) by spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica
Colobong in favor of intervenor-appellant Zenaida Tan Reyes as
valid;
4. Ordering plaintiffs-appellees and any all persons claiming rights
under them to vacate Lot 3651-A now covered by TCT No. T-160391
and to deliver to intervenor-appellant Zenaida Tan-Reyes the
possession thereof;
5. Dismissing the case against defendants-appellants Benito Tan and
Purita Masa;
6. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Alejandro and
Alfredo Gabriel raise this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THE SECOND SALE OF THE DISPUTED LOT
EXECUTED BY SPOUSES MABANTA IN FAVOR OF ZENAIDA
TAN-REYES VALID UNDER ARTICLE 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
Petitioners contend that respondent Reyes is not a purchaser in good
faith since she bought the disputed lot with the knowledge that
petitioner Alejandro is claiming it in a previous sale.
In her comment on the petition, respondent Reyes maintains that the
Court of Appeals factual finding that she is a purchaser in good faith
and for value is final and conclusive. Meeting the issue head on, she
claims that there is no evidence that prior to August 21, 1985, when
she purchased the lot from respondent spouses Mabanta, she had
knowledge of any previous lien or encumbrance on the property.
For its part, respondent DBP avers that it acted in utmost good faith in
releasing the mortgaged lots to respondent spouses Mabanta who had
the loan restructured and paid the same. Also, it did not transact
business with spouses Tan.
With respect to respondent spouses Mabanta, this Courts Resolution
dated June 14, 2000 requiring them to file comment on the present
petition was returned unserved. Thus, in its Resolution dated January
22, 2001, this Court resolved to consider the Resolution of June 14,
2000 deemed served upon them.10cräläwvirtualibräry
The petition is impressed with merit.
The issue for our resolution is whether or not respondent Zenaida Tan-
Reyes acted in good faith when she purchased the subject lot and had
the sale registered.
Settled is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. In the
exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our
function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. 11 This rule,
however, is not an iron-clad rule.12 In Floro vs. Llenado,13 we
enumerated the various exceptions and one which finds application to
the present case is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court.
We start first with the applicable law.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence
thereof; to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
Otherwise stated, where it is an immovable property that is the subject
of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was
first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. 14 The
requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith
and registration in good faith.15 The rationale behind this is well-
expounded in Uraca vs. Court of Appeals,16 where this Court held:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by
the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right
over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must
be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he
governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger
in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyers right except where the second buyer registers in
good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil
Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing
of her rights under the law, among them, to register firsther purchase
as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by
the second buyer of the first sale defeats his right even if he is first to
register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544
of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the
first buyer, that before the second buyer can obtain priority over
the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e.
in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers right) from the
time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by
registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, certain pieces of evidence, put together, would
prove that respondent Reyes is not a buyer in good faith. The records
show that on August 18, 1985, spouses Mabanta offered to her for sale
the disputed lot. They told her it was mortgaged with respondent DBP
and that she had to pay the loan if she wanted to buy it.17 She readily
agreed to such a condition. The following day, her father Benito Tan,
accompanied by barangay official Tridanio, went to petitioner
Alejandros house offering to return to him the P5,000.00 he had paid to
spouses Mabanta. Tan did not suggest to return the 500-square meter
lot petitioner delivered to Susana Soriano. 18 For this reason, petitioner
refused Tans offer and even prohibited him from going to respondent
DBP. We quote the following testimony of petitioner who, despite his
blindness as shown by the records, testified to assert his right, thus:
ATTY. CHANGALE:
Q What can you say to that statement?
A That is their mistake, sir.
Q Why do you say that is their mistake?
A Because her husband and Tridanio went at home offering to return
the money but I did not accept, sir.
Q Who is this Benito Tan you are referring to?
A The husband of Pura Masa, sir.
Q What is the relationship with the intervenor Zenaida Tan?
A The daughter, sir.
Q When did Benito Tan together with Councilman Tridanio came?
A Before they went to the Development Bank of the Philippines
they came at home and I prohibit them, sir.
Q How did you prohibit them?
A No, I said please I am just waiting for the Bank to inspect then I
will pay my obligation.
xxxxxx
Q You stated earlier that you will just pay the payments. What are
those payments you are referring to?
A The payment I have given to Colobong and to the Bank, sir. They do
not want to return the payment I have given to Susana Soriano and
that is the beginning of our quarrel.19cräläwvirtualibräry
We are thus convinced that respondent Reyes had knowledge that
petitioner previously bought the disputed lot from respondent spouses
Mabanta. Why should her father approach petitioner and offer to return
to him the money he paid spouses Mabanta? Obviously, aware of the
previous sale to petitioner, respondent Reyes informed her father
about it. At this juncture, it is reasonable to conclude that what
prompted him to go to petitioners house was his desire to facilitate his
daughters acquisition of the lot, i.e., to prevent petitioner Alejandro
from contesting it. He did not foresee then that petitioner would insist
he has a prior right over the lot.
Now respondent Reyes claims that she is a purchaser in good faith.
This is preposterous. Good faith is something internal. Actually, it is a
question of intention. In ascertaining ones intention, this Court must
rely on the evidence of ones conduct and outward acts. From her
actuations as specified above, respondent Reyes cannot be
considered to be in good faith when she bought the lot.
Moreover, it bears noting that on September 16, 1985, both petitioners
filed with the trial court their complaint involving the lot in question
against respondents. After a month, or on October 17, 1985,
respondent Reyes had the Deed of Absolute Sale registered with the
Registry of Property. Evidently, she wanted to be the first one to effect
its registration to the prejudice of petitioners who, although in
possession, have not registered the same. This is another indicum of
bad faith.
We have consistently held that in cases of double sale of
immovables, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether
or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or
not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith,
that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property
sold.20 InSalvoro vs. Tanega,21 we had the occasion to rule that:
If a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has acquired
knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a
third party or that another person claims said property in a previous
sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will
not confer upon him any right.
Mere registration of title is not enough, good faith must concur with the
registration. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not
only establish prior recording of his deed, but must have acted in good
faith, without knowledge of the existence of another alienation by the
vendor to the other.22 In the old case of Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong
Machinery, Co. and Williamson, this Court ruled:
One who purchases a real estate with knowledge of a defect of
title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto
in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an
interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has
knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in
the title of his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was
no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that
such a defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title will not
make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards
develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he
had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery
had he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. x x
x 23cräläwvirtualibräry
In fine, we hold that respondent Zenaida Tan-Reyes did not act in good
faith when she bought the lot and had the sale registered.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Decision of the trial court is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138201. September 12, 2000
FRANCISCO BAYOCA, NONITO DICHOSO and SPOUSES PIO
DICHOSO and DOLORES DICHOSO and ERWIN
BAYOCA,Petitioners, v. GAUDIOSO NOGALES represented by
HENRY NOGALES, Respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the December 24, 1998 Decision of the Court
of Appeals,1 which disposed as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Appellants appeal is
DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs
against the Appellants.
SO ORDERED.2cräläwvirtualibräry
The decretal portion of the decision of the trial court affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner and entitled to the
peaceful possession of the land in question described in Paragraph 2
of the Amended Complaint, and for the defendants to refrain from
disturbing the plaintiff in his peaceful possession thereof;
(2) Ordering defendants Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso to
remove their respective houses from the premises in question within
ten (10) days after the Decision becomes final and executory;
(3) Ordering defendant Erwin Bayoca to reconvey to the plaintiff TCT
No. T-27220, and defendant Nonito Dichoso, who substituted
defendants Spouses Pio Dichoso and Lourdes Domasig as party-
defendants, to reconvey OCT No. P-11918 to the plaintiff within fifteen
(15) days after the Decision becomes final and executory, failing in
which, the Clerk of Court is ordered to execute the Deed of
Reconveyance in favor of the plaintiff;
(4) Ordering the defendants to proportionally reimburse plaintiff the
produce of the property in question, at 400 kilos of copra every 45
days, or its equivalent in money, from 1992, until they have
surrendered or turned over the possession of the land in question to
the plaintiff;
(5) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the
amount of P8,000.00 as attorneys fees, and the further sums of
P3,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses, and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Also assailed by petitioners is the April 8, 1999 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, which denied their Motion for
Reconsideration.4cräläwvirtualibräry
In essence, the petition poses a challenge against the appellate courts
conclusion that the first sale of a parcel of land to respondent
Gaudioso Nogales prevails over the second sale of the said property to
petitioners Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso and spouses Pio and
Dolores Dichoso. As such, there is no dispute as to the following facts
found by the Court of Appeals:
When the Spouses Juan Canino and Brigida Domasig died intestate,
before 1947, they were survived by their legitimate children, namely,
Preciosa Canino, married to Emilio Deocareza, Consolacion Canino,
Dolores Canino, Isidra Canino and Tomas Canino who inherited, from
their father, a parcel of land, located in Prieto-Diaz, Sorsogon covered
by Tax Declaration No. 9659, in an assessed value of P500.00, with
the following boundary owners abutting the same:
North - Vicente Dino;
West - Genaro Menor and Roman Bayle
East - Pedro Vargas and Fely Detablan
South - Bartolome Domalaon
Each of the heirs, therefore, had a pro indiviso share of the property,
Tomas Canino, being then still a minor at 17 years of age, was under
the care and custody of his sister, Preciosa Canino Deocareza. She
and her husband, Emilio Deocareza, and Tomas Canino stayed in the
said property.
On December 15, 1947, Preciosa Canino executed an unnotarized
Deed of Sale of Real Property with Right of Repurchase over a
portion of the above property, with an area of 5,000 square meters, in
favor of her sister-in-law, Julia Deocareza, the sister of her husband,
Emilio Deocareza, for the price of P200.00 (Exhibit K). Preciosa
Canino reserved her right to repurchase the said property, within five
(5) years from the execution of the said deed. Dolores and Maria
Canino affixed the imprints of their thumbmarks on the deed (Exhibits
K-1 and K-2). On February 2, 1948, Tomas Canino, who was then 17
years of age and Preciosa Canino, who was then taking care of her
brother, executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale of Real Property
with Right of Repurchase covering a portion of said property, with an
area of 5,330 square meters, in favor of Julia Deocareza, for the price
of P60.00, with a right to repurchase the said lot for the said amount,
within one (1) year from the execution of said deed (Exhibit I). On
August 29, 1948, Preciosa Canino executed another unnotarized Deed
of Sale of Real Property with Right to Repurchase over the entirety
of the property, in favor of Julia Deocareza, for the price of P270.00,
with a right to repurchase the said lot for the same price, within two (2)
years from the execution thereof. Consolacion Canino affixed her
thumbmark on said deed (Exhibit J-1). Subsequently, Tax Declaration
No. 9659 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 189, under the name
of Juan Canino.
On January 31, 1951, Preciosa Canino executed a notarized Deed of
Sale of Real Property with Right to Repurchase over the entirety of
the aforementioned property, in favor of Julia Deocareza, for the price
of P800.00, with a right to repurchase the same, for the same amount,
within one (1) year from the execution of said deed, (Exhibit H). The
parties covenanted, under said deed, that the property described
therein was unencumbered and to register the deed under Act 3344.
On the basis of said deed, Tax Declaration No. 3489 was issued over
the property, under the name of Julia Deocareza. The latter allowed
her brothers, Ambrosio Deocareza, married to Olympia Dichoso, and
Emilio Deocareza, the husband of Preciosa Canino, to occupy the said
property. However, Preciosa Canino failed to repurchase the property.
In the meantime, Gaudioso Nogales, the Appellee in the present
recourse, acquired the property abutting the property of Preciosa
Canino and her siblings, on the east, and installed a tenant thereon.
On April 29, 1968, Julia Deocareza executed an
unnotarizedCompromise Agreement, in the local dialect, in favor of
the Appellee, whereby she sold to the Appellee, for the price
ofP3,500.00, the aforesaid property she earlier purchased from
Preciosa Canino, with an area of 21,080 square meters (Exhibit L)
with the following boundary owners abutting the property:
North - Vicente Dino
East - Felix Detablan and Pedro Vargas
(now Gaudioso Nogales)
West - Genaro Donor and Roman Balle
(now Gaudioso Nogales)
South - Bartolome Dumalaon
(Exhibit L)
She promised, in said deed, to have her brothers, Ambrosio and Emilio
Deocareza, and their families, vacate the said property. On the same
day, Julia Deocareza executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Realty
Property in favor of the Appellee over the aforesaid parcel of land for
the price of P3,000.00 (Exhibit G). The aforesaid deed was registered
with the Register of Deeds on May 3, 1968, (Exhibit G-1). For a time,
the Appellee was abroad. However, when the Appellee demanded that
Ambrosio and Emilio Deocareza and their families vacate the property,
Emilio Deocareza and Preciosa Deocareza refused. The Appellee
forthwith filed a complaint, sometime in 1975, with the Regional Trial
Court of Sorgoson, against Emilio Deocareza, and Julia Deocareza
for Recovery of Possession of property entitled Gaudioso Nogales
versus Emilio Deocareza, et al. Civil Case No. 975. In his Amended
Complaint, the Appellee impleaded Preciosa Canino, as party
defendant, Julia Deocareza later filed a croslaim against Preciosa
Canino over the property.
On February 7, 1983, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision, in Civil Case No. 975 in favor of the Appellee and against
Emilio Deocareza, et al., the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered (1) ordering the
defendants Julia Deocareza and the spouses Emilio Deocareza and
Preciosa Canino to deliver possession of the land to plaintiff Gaudioso
Nogales; (2) ordering the defendants spouses Emilio Deocareza and
Preciosa Canino to pay the plaintiff the sum ofP1,500.00 every 45 days
as actual damages from the filing of the second amended complaint on
November 12, 1976 until possession of the land is delivered to the
plaintiff and to pay attorneys fees to the plaintiff in the sum of P500.00.
Costs against the defendants spouses Emilio Deocareza and Preciosa
Canino.
SO ORDERED. (Exhibit B)
Emilio Deocareza, et al., interposed an appeal, from the said Decision,
to this Court, which appeal, was docketed as CA-G.R. NO. 15135-CV.
However, the Appellants therein belatedly paid the docketing fee for
their appeal. On March 23, 1988, this Court promulgated a
Resolution dismissing the appeal. The Resolution of this Court
became final and executory on June 2, 1988 (Exhibit C).
After the remand of the records of said case to the Court a quo, aWrit
of Execution was issued by the Court a quo, dated, February 20,
1992 (Exhibit D). Emilio Deocareza and Preciosa Deocareza vacated
the property. The Appellee, through Henry Nogales, executed an
Acknowledgment acknowledging actual possession of the aforesaid
parcel of land from the Sheriff (Exhibit F). However, the
Appelleediscovered that Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso and the
Spouses Pio Dichoso and Dolores Dichoso, the Appellants in the
present recourse, claimed ownership of portion of the said property.
The Appellant Nonito Dichoso had constructed a nipa hut on a portion
of the property. The Appellant Francisco Bayoca likewise constructed
his house thereon.
In 1958, Tomas Canino, who was then about twenty-eight years old,
died intestate, without any issue. His pro-indiviso share in the property
was inherited, in equal shares, by his four (4) surviving sisters, namely,
Preciosa Canino, Isabel Canino, Consolacion Canino and Dolores
Canino who, on June 2, 1971 executed a Deed of Partition of Real
Property, declaring that, although, under Tax Declaration No. 9659,
the property covering an area of 21,000 square meters that, as early
as 1950, they had verbally partitioned the said property, with an area of
29,645 square meters, into five (5) parcels, namely Parcels A to E and
adjudicated unto each of them, in equal shares of 5,090 square
meters, the said parcels as follows:
Parcel A - Consolacion Canino;
Parcel B - Isidra Canino;
Parcel C - Tomas Canino;
Parcel D - Preciosa Canino;
Parcel E - Dolores Canino;
(Exhibit G)
However, neither Julia Deocareza nor the Appellee conformed to
the Deed of Partition.
Preciosa Canino and her siblings expressly declared, in said deed, that
the property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of
Julia Deocareza under Tax Declaration No. 3894 (Exhibit 16).
On the basis of said deed, Isidra Canino declared Parcel B, fortaxation
purposes, under her name, with Tax Declaration No. 6094 effective
1972 (Exhibit 2), which cancelled, in part, Tax Declaration No. 3489,
under the name of Julia Deocareza. On June 21, 1971, Isidra Canino
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Parcel D, with an area of
5,929 square meters, in favor of Pio Dichoso and Lourdes Donor, two
(2) of the Appellants in the present recourse, for the price of P750.00
(Exhibit 1). Isidra Canino showed to the vendees a copy of the Deed
of Partition of Real Property (Exhibit 6). The vendees declared the
said property, under their names, for taxation purposes, under Tax
Declaration No. 05079 (Exhibit 3) and paid the realty taxes due
thereon.
In the interim, a cadastral survey was conducted in Prieto Diaz.Parcel
A, adjudicated to Consolacion Canino, under the Deed of Partition was
identified, as Lot 676, with an area of more or less 5,929 square
meters; Parcel B, adjudicated to Isidra Canino, was identified as Lot
670; Parcel C, adjudicated to Tomas Canino, was identified as Lot
668; Parcel D adjudicated to Preciosa Canino, was identified as Lot
669 but with an area of 6,550 square meters, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 396; and Parcel E, adjudicated to Dolores Canino,
was identified as Lot 667.
On July 6, 1971, Isidra Canino, Dolores Canino and Consolacion
Canino, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property over a
portion of Lot 668 earlier adjudicated to Tomas Canino, under the
Deed of Partition of Real Property, with an area of 3,374 square
meters, in favor of Preciosa Canino for the price of P500.00 (Exhibit
13).
In the meantime, Pio Diochoso and Lourdes Donor applied for the
issuance of a Free Patent over Lot 670, the property they purchased
from Isidra Canino. On July 13, 1975, they were issued Free Patent
No. V-3-0770, over the property, on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-11918 was issued, under their names, by the
Register of Deeds (Exhibit 4).
On April 17, 1975, Preciosa Canino applied for and was issued Free
Patent No. V-30829, over a portion of Lot 668, with an area of 2,800
square meters. On the basis of said Patent, Original Certificate of Title
No. P-25402 was issued under the name of Preciosa Canino, on April
17, 1975, by the Register of Deeds.
On June 20, 1979, Preciosa Canino executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale, over Lot 669, with an area of 6,550 square meters, in favor of the
Appellant Erwin Bayoca, for the price of P4,000.00 (Exhibit 8). On the
basis of said deed, Tax Declaration No. 05135 was issued, under the
name of Erwin Bayoca, over said property (Exhibit 9).
On January 18, 1983, Consolacion Canino executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale, over Lot 671, with an area of 5,929 square meters, in
favor of Nonito Dichoso, one of the Appellants in the present recourse,
and a son of the Spouses Pio Dichoso and Lourdes Dichoso, for the
price of P1,300.00 (Exhibit 5).
On August 3, 1987, Dolores Canino executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property, over Lot 667, with an area of 7,090 square
meters, in favor of Appellant Francisco Bayoca, for the price ofP5,000
(Exhibit 14). On the basis of said deed, Francisco Bayoca declared the
said property, for taxation purposes, under his name (Exhibit 15).
On October 13, 1989, Preciosa Canino executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property, over the parcel of lot covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-25402, in favor of Appellant Erwin Bayoca, the
son of the Appellant Francisco Bayoca, for the price ofP5,000.00
(Exhibit 10). On the basis of said deed, Original Certificate of Title No.
P-25402 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27220 was
issued under the name of Appellant Erwin Bayoca (Exhibit 11). The
latter forthwith declared the said property, under his name, for taxation
purposes (Exhibit 12).
On September 8, 1992, the Appellee filed a complaint against the
Appellants Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso and the Spouses Pio
Dichoso and Dolores Dichoso for Accion Reinvindicatoria with
Damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. On February 15,
1994, Pio Dichoso died and was substituted by his son, the Appellant
Nonito Dichoso. With prior leave of Court, the Appellees filed
an Amended Complaint, impleading Lourdes Dichoso and Erwin
Bayoca, as parties defendants, praying that:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court
that pending hearing on the merits issue a writ of preliminary
injunction, or in the alternative, to appoint a receiver in the premises in
question so that the produce be deposited in court to be disposed of
after the termination of this case, and that after due hearing, judgment
issue:
(a) Making the injunction permanent;
(b) Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question and
entitled to the peaceful possession thereof;
(c) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises within 10 days after
the decision has become final, and to perpetually refrain from
disturbing plaintiff in his peaceful possession thereof;
(d) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff whatever produce they may
have gathered from the land in question until they have vacated or
turned over the possession to the plaintiff;
(e) Ordering defendants Erwin Bayoca, Pio Dichoso and Lourdes
Dichoso to reconvey Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27220 and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11918 to the plaintiff, and should the
said defendants refuse to reconvey the said certificates of title, the
Clerk of Court be ordered to execute the deed of reconveyance in
favor of the plaintiff within 15 days the decision becomes final and
executory;
(f) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the amount
of P12,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus P500.00 for every appearance of
his lawyer in court, P3,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses, and to
pay the costs.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the
premises. (at pages 104-105, Records)
The Appellee alleged, in his complaint, that he purchased the said
property, with an area of 21,000 square meters, from Julia Deocareza,
under the deed, Exhibit G, and thus acquired ownership thereof and
that the Appellants respectively purchased portions of said property, in
bad faith and through fraud, the Appellants knowing of the pendency
of Civil Case No. 975, before the Regional Trial Court, involving the
said property. The Appellee further alleged that the Deed of Partition
of Real Property as well as the deeds of sale executed by Preciosa
Canino, Consolacion Canino, Isidra Canino and Dolores Canino in
favor of the Appellants respectively, and Free Patent Nos. V-3-0770
and V-30829 in favor of the Spouses Pio Dichoso and Lourdes
Dichoso and Preciosa Canino, respectively, were fraudulent and that
the said Free Patent and Original Certificates of Title P-25402 and P-
11918 issued on the basis thereof and derivative titles therefrom were
null and void. The Appellants, in their Answer to the complaint,
alleged, inter aliathat Preciosa Canino and her siblings acquired just
title over the property when they executed their Deed of Partitition of
Real Property and conveyed titles to the vendees, the Appellants in
the present recourse, as buyers in good faith.5cräläwvirtualibräry
As mentioned at the outset, after hearing, the trial court ruled against
herein petitioners Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso, Erwin Bayoca,
and spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso. The trial court found and
declared, under its Decision dated March 12, 1996, that Gaudioso
Nogales had acquired ownership over the property on the basis of
the Compromise Agreement (Exhibit I) and the Deed of Absolute
Sale, (Exhibit G) executed by Julia Deocareza, who had previously
acquired ownership over the said property on the basis of the deeds,
(Exhibits H, I, J and K) as confirmed by the trial court under its
Decision, Exhibit G. Hence, the sales of portions of said property by
Preciosa Canino, who was no longer the owner thereof, to herein
petitioners were null and void. The trial court declared further that
petitioners were purchasers in bad faith.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
Hence, this recourse to this Court.
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following
issues:6cräläwvirtualibräry
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP BY
VIRTUE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TITLE ISSUED AND/OR
REGISTRATION WILL PREVAIL OVER THAT OF RESPONDENT?
WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE SAME CASE WHEN THE SAME LAND
SUBJECT OF THE CASE IS A PUBLIC LAND?
The petition lacks merit.
In fine, the main issue is who has the superior right to the parcel of
land sold to different buyers at different times by its former owners.
There is no question from the records that respondent Nogales was
the first to buy the subject property from Julia Deocareza, who in turn
bought the same from the Canino brothers and sisters. Petitioners,
however, rely on the fact that they were the first to register the sales of
the different portions of the property, resulting in the issuance of new
titles in their names. Petitioners insist that they have a better right over
respondent Nogales considering the following circumstances: (1) Pio
and Lourdes Dichoso were issued Free Patent No. V-3-0770 over Lot
670, the property they purchased from Isidra Canino on the basis of
which Original Certificate of Title No. P-11918 was issued under their
names by the Register of Deeds; (2) Erwin Bayoca acquired the
property covered by OCT No. P-25402 covering a portion of Lot 668
from Preciosa Canino, on the basis of which TCT No. 27220 was
issued in his name. As far as Nonito Dichoso and Francisco Bayoca
are concerned they declared the properties they acquired, respectively,
from Consolacion Canino and Dolores Canino, for taxation purposes.
Petitioners also assail the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that they
were purchasers in bad faith of the subject lots.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of
vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:7cräläwvirtualibräry
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
Following the above-quoted law, in the double sales of immovables,
ownership is transferred in the order hereunder stated to -
(a) the first registrant in good faith;
(b) the first in possession in good faith; and
(c) the buyer who presents the oldest title in good
faith.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the foregoing, to merit protection under Article 1544, second
paragraph, of the Civil Code, the second buyer must act in good faith
in registering the deed.9 Thus, it has been held that in cases of double
sale of immovables, what finds relevance and materiality is not
whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether
or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that
is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property
sold.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Good faith on petitioners part, as the second buyers of the subject
property, was not found by the appellate court, thus its decision
adverse to them. The Court of appeals ratiocinated thus:
Appellants insistence that they were purchasers in good faith is an
exercise in futility. What, to our mind, is decisive of the issue of who,
between the Appellee, on the one hand, and the Appellants, on the
other, is the owner of the property is Article 1544 of the New Civil Code
x x x:
xxx.
After all, the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon had already decreed,
under its Decision (Exhibit B) which the appellants did not assail, that
the Appellee was the owner of the property under the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Exhibit G) executed, by Julia Deocareza, in his favor.
The evidence on record shows that, on January 31, 1951, Preciosa
Canino and her siblings sold the property in favor of Julia Deocareza
under the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase (Exhibit H), the
culmination of the deeds of sale with right to repurchase (Exhibits I, J
and K). the latter, in turn, sold the said property to the Appellee under
the Deed of Absolute Sale, on April 29, 1968, (Exhibit G), Julia
Deocareza obliging herself to cause the eviction of her brothers,
Ambrosio and Emilio Deocareza and their families from the property,
who were at the time in possession of the property by her and
Appellees tolerance (Exhibit L). The appellee had the said Deed
of Absolute Sale (Exhibit G) registered with the Registry of Deeds
and entered in the Registry Records as Entry No. 47052, page 51,
Volume 14 of the Registry Record under Act 3344 (Exhibit G-1). The
registration of the deed, under Act 3344, constitutes constructive notice
of said sale to the whole world:
Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the
effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his
right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, civil Code; see
also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132
SCRA 700)." (Spouses Honorio Santiago versus Court of Appeals,
et al., 247 SCRA 336, at page 346)
On the other hand, the sales of portions of the property to the
Appellants, by Preciosa Canino and her siblings, occurred during the
period from June 21, 1971 to October 13, 1989 or long after the
Appellee had purchased the property (Exhibits 1, 13, 8, 5, 14, and
10). Inscrutably, too the sale to the Appellee was registered with the
Registry of properties much earlier than the registration, if any, of the
sales to the Appellants and that the Appellee took possession of the
said property much earlier than the Appellants considering that
the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is a public deed. It bears stressing that
possession, under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, includes
symbolic possession:
We are of the opinion that the possession mentioned in article 1473
(for determining who has better right when the same piece of land has
been sold several times by the same vendor) includes not only the
material but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the
execution of public instrument. (Narcisa Sanchez versus Roque
Ramos, 40 Phil. 614, at page 617, underscoring supplied).
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners
of the second sale in their favor. As stated in theSantiago case,
registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
such buyer,11 On account of the undisputed fact of registration under
Act No. 3344 by respondent Nogales as the first buyer, necessarily,
there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the
petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso
for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. It
follows that their title to the land cannot be upheld. As for petitioners
Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register the
portions of the property sold to them, and merely rely on the fact that
they declared the same in their name for taxation purposes. Suffice it
to state that such fact, does not, by itself, constitute evidence of
ownership,12and cannot likewise prevail over the title of respondent
Nogales.
Enlightening in this regard is the following commentary:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the first buyers rights except when the second buyer first
registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159
SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such
knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs.
Cabaa (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held
that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in
registering his deed of sale) citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69
SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
xxx.
Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the
registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish
Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his
standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder
would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of
Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second
buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts.
708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480;
Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). x x x.13cräläwvirtualibräry
It is worth mentioning that while the certificates of title in the names of
Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso are
indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world,
including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They
merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used
as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of others. 14The Torrens System is
intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the
certificate of registration but it cannot be used for the perpetration of
fraud against the real owner of the registered land. 15cräläwvirtualibräry

Lastly, petitioners argument that the subject property is a public

agricultural land over which the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction
over is clearly untenable. The prior grant of a free patent in favor of
petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso
removed or segregated the property subject thereof from the mass of
the public domain.16 So too, respondent Nogales had already
registered the entire property under Act. No. 3344. Indeed, registration
with the Register of Deeds of a parcel of land divests the government
of title to the land. 17 We also find that petitioners, who raised this issue
only before this Court, are now estopped from claiming that the subject
property is a public agricultural land, considering that petitioners have
actively participated in the proceedings before the lower and appellate
courts with their principal defense consisting of the certificates of titles
in their names. While it is a rule that jurisdictional questions may be
raised at any time, an exception arises where estoppel has
supervened,18 as in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

DECISION of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF THE
TITLE IN ORDER TO INQUIRE OR DISCOVER A FLAW THEREOF.
[G.R. No. 109410. August 28, 1996.] — It is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to ask for the
delivery of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title from the vendor. A
CLARA M. BALATBAT, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and purchaser of a valued piece of property cannot just close his eyes to
Spouses JOSE REPUYAN and AURORA REPUYAN, Respondents. facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then
claim that he acted in good faith and under the belief that there were
no defect in the title of the vendor. One who purchases real estate with
knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he
SYLLABUS
has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the
land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one
who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALES; TRANSFER OF inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with
OWNERSHIP; CONSUMMATED UPON ACTUAL OR the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it is not
CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY THEREOF. — Devoid of any stipulation a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state
that "ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied
fully paid the price," ownership in the thing shall pass from the vendor tokens or signs. In fine, petitioner had nobody to blame but herself in
to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold dealing with the disputed property for failure to inquire or discover a
even if the purchase price has not yet been fully paid. The failure of the flaw in the title to the property, thus, it is axiomatic that — culpa lata
buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to dolo aequiparatur — gross negligence is equivalent to intentional
revest to the seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded wrong.
or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-
payment only creates a right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation
or to rescind the contract.
DECISION
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN THE SALE IS MADE THROUGH A PUBLIC
INSTRUMENT, THE EXECUTION THEREOF SHALL BE
EQUIVALENT TO THE DELIVERY OF THE THING WHICH IS THE TORRES, JR., J.:
OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT. — With respect to the non-delivery of
the possession of the subject property to the private respondent,
suffice it to say that ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from
Petitioner Clara M. Balatbat instituted this petition for review pursuant
the time of delivery thereof, either actual or constructive. Article 1498
to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
of the Civil Code provides that — when the sale is made through a
decision dated August 12, 1992 of the respondent Court of Appeals in
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
CA-G.R. CV No. 29994 entitled "Alejandro Balatbat and Clara Balatbat,
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed
plaintiffs-appellants versus Jose Repuyan and Aurora Repuyan,
the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred. The execution of
defendants-appellees", the dispositive portion of which reads: 1 
the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the
ownership from the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the
the rights of an owner over the same. In the instant case, vendor
modification that the awards of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
Roque delivered the owner’s certificate of title to herein
P5,000.00 as costs of litigation are deleted.
privateRespondent. It is not necessary that vendee be physically
present at every square inch of the land bought by him, possession of
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
the public instrument of the land is sufficient to accord him the rights of
ownership. Thus, delivery of a parcel of land may be done by placing
The records show the following factual antecedents:chanrob1es virtual
the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by
1aw library
embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive). The provision
of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for
It appears that on June 15, 1977, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for
convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 109032 against Corazon Roque,
the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be
Alberto de los Santos, Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque and Osmundo
embodied in a public instrument.
Roque before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX. 2
Defendants therein were declared in default and plaintiff presented
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES.
evidence ex-parte. On March 29, 1979, the trial court rendered a
— A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere
decision in favor of plaintiff Aurelio A. Roque, the pertinent portion of
consent of the parties. Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the
which reads: 3 
price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of
the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not
"From the evidence, it has been clearly established that the lot in
make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most
question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51330 was
in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise
acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their
his legal remedies.
conjugal union and the house constructed thereon was likewise built
during their marital union. Out of their union, plaintiff and Maria Mesina
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE OF DOUBLE SALE OF AN
had four children, who are the defendants in this case. When Maria
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY. — Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides
Mesina died on August 28, 1966, the only conjugal properties left are
that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall
the house and lot above stated of which plaintiff herein, as the legal
be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
spouse, is entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof. With respect
recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the
to the one-half share pro-indiviso now forming the estate of Maria
person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default
Mesina, plaintiff and the four children, the defendants here, are each
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
entitled to one-fifth (1/5) share pro-indiviso. The deceased wife left no
good faith. This is an instance of a instance of a double sale of an
debt.
immovable property hence, the ownership shall vests in the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the
Property. Evidently, private respondents Repuyan’s caused the
properties, subject matter of this case consisting of the house and lot,
annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property
in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
denominated as Entry No. 5627/T-135671 on July 21, 1980. The
annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. 135671 in the Registry of
1. Of the house and lot forming the conjugal properties, plaintiff is
Property is sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves
entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof while the other half forms
notice to the whole world.
the estate of the deceased Maria Mesina;
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE VENDEE TO ASK FOR
2. Of the Estate of deceased Maria Mesina, the same is to be divided reasonable and fair, and considering the opportunities given
into five (5) shares and plaintiff and his four children are entitled each defendants to sign the deed of absolute sale voluntarily, the Court has
to one-fifth share thereof pro-indiviso. no alternative but to order, as it hereby orders, the Deputy Clerk of this
Court to sign the deed of absolute sale for and in behalf of defendants
Plaintiff claim for moral, exemplary and actual damages and attorney’s pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order to effect
fees not having been established to the satisfaction of the Court, the the partition of the property involved in this case.
same is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Without pronouncement as to costs.
A deed of absolute sale was executed on February 4, 1982 between
SO ORDERED.” Aurelio S. Roque, Corazon Roque, Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque
and Osmundo Roque and Clara Balatbat, married to Alejandro
On June 2, 1979, the decision became final and executory. The Balatbat. 12 On April 14, 1982, Clara Balatbat filed a motion for the
corresponding entry of judgment was made on March 29, 1979. 4  issuance of a writ of possession which was granted by the trial court on
September 14, 1982 "subject, however, to valid rights and interest of
On October 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a Transfer third persons over the same portion thereof, other than vendor or any
Certificate of Title No. 135671 in the name of the following persons in other person or persons privy to or claiming any rights or interest under
the following proportions: 5 it." The corresponding writ of possession was issued on September 20,
1982. 13 
Aurelio A. Roque 6/10 share
On May 20, 1982, petitioner Clara Balatbat filed a motion to intervene
in Civil Case No. 134131 14 which was granted as per court’s
Severina M. Roque 1/10 share
resolution of October 21, 1982. 15 However, Clara Balatbat failed to
file her complaint in intervention. 16 On April 15, 1986, the trial court
Osmundo M. Roque 1/10 share
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, the pertinent portion of
which reads: 17 
Feliciano M. Roque 1/10 share
"The rescission of contracts are provided for in the laws and nowhere
Corazon M. Roque 1/10 share
in the provision of the Civil Code under the title Rescissible Contracts
does the circumstances in the case at bar appear to have occurred,
On April 1, 1980, Aurelio A. Roque sold his 6/10 share in T.C.T. No. hence, the prayer for rescission is outside the ambit for which
135671 to spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan as rescissible [sic] could be granted.
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale." 6 
"The Intervenor — Plaintiff, Clara Balatbat, although allowed to
On July 21, 1980, Aurora Tuazon Repuyan caused the annotation of intervene, did not file her complaint in intervention.
her affidavit of adverse claim 7 on the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
135671, 8 to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Consequently, the plaintiff having failed to prove with sufficient
preponderance his action, the relief prayed for had to be denied. The
"Entry No. 5627/T-135671 — NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM — Filed contract of sale denominated as "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exh. 7 and
by Aurora Tuazon Repuyan, married, claiming among others that she sub-markings) being valid and enforceable, the same pursuant to the
bought 6/10 portion of the property herein described from Aurelio provisions of Art. 1159 of the Civil Code which
Roque for the amount of P50,000.00 with a down payment of says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
P5,000.00 and the balance of P45,000.00 to be paid after the partition
and subdivision of the property herein described, other claims set forth "Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
in Doc. No. 954, page 18, Book 94 of _________________ 64 contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."cralaw
__________________ PEDRO DE CASTRO, Notary Public of Manila. virtua1aw library

Date of instrument — July 21, 1980
Date of inscription -July 21, 1980 at 3:35 p.m.
TERESITA H. NOBLEJAS
Acting Register of Deeds
By:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
RAMON D. MACARICAN
Acting Second Deputy"
On August 20, 1980, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for "Rescission
of Contract" docketed as Civil Case No. 134131 against spouses
Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan before Branch IV of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint is grounded on
spouses Repuyan’s failure to pay the balance of P45,000.00 of the
purchase price. 9 On September 5, 1980, spouses Repuyan filed their
answer with counterclaim. 10  SO
In the meantime, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No.
109032 (Partition case) dated February 2, 1982, to wit: 11  Civil Case No. 109032 before the Register of Deeds of Manila. 18
"In view of all the foregoing and finding that the amount of P100,000.00
as purchase price for the sale of the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
51330 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila consisting of 84 square
meters situated in Callejon Sulu, District of Santa Cruz, Manila, to be
has the effect of being the law between the parties and should be
complied with. The obligation of the plaintiff under the contract being to
have the land covered by TCT No. 135671 partitioned and subdivided,
and title issued in the name of the defendant buyer (see page 2 par. C
of Exh. 7-A) plaintiff had to comply thereto to give effect to the contract.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against the plaintiff, Aurelio A.
Roque, and the plaintiff in intervention, Clara Balatbat, and in favor of
the defendants, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, and
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1980 as valid and
enforceable and the plaintiff is, as he is hereby ordered, to partition
and subdivide the land covered by T.C.T. No. 135671, and to
aggregate therefrom a portion equivalent to 6/10 thereof, and cause
the same to be titled in the name of the defendants, and after which,
the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P45,000.00. Considering
further that the defendants suffered damages since they were forced to
litigate unnecessarily, by way of their counterclaim, plaintiff is hereby
ordered to pay defendants the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages,
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
Costs against plaintiff.
ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
On March 3, 1987, petitioner Balatbat filed a notice of lis pendens in
 
On December 9, 1988, petitioner Clara Balatbat and her husband,
Alejandro Balatbat filed the instant complaint for delivery of the owners
duplicate copy of T.C.T. No. 135671 docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
47176 before Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
private respondents Jose Repuyan and Aurora Repuyan. 19 
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in
On January 27, 1989, private respondents filed their answer with favor of private respondents Repuyan was merely executory for the
affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaim. 20  reason that there was no delivery of the subject property and that
consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as
On November 13, 1989, private respondents filed their memorandum consummated, hence, valid and enforceable. In a decision dated April
21 while petitioners filed their memorandum on November 23, 1989. 15, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IV in Civil Case
22  No. 134131, the Court dismissed vendor’s Aurelio Roque complaint for
rescission of the deed of sale and declared that the sale dated April 1,
On August 2, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, 1980, as valid and enforceable. No appeal having been made, the
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of decision became final and executory. It must be noted that herein
which reads: 23  petitioner Balatbat filed a motion for intervention in that case but did
not file her complaint in intervention. In that case wherein Aurelio
"Considering all the foregoing, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have Roque sought to rescind the April 1, 1980 deed of sale in favor of the
not been able to establish their cause of action against the defendants private respondents for non-payment of the P45,000.00 balance, the
and have no right to the reliefs demanded in the complaint and the trial court dismissed the complaint for rescission. Examining the terms
complaint of the plaintiff against the defendants is hereby DISMISSED. and conditions of the "Deed of Sale" dated April 1, 1980, the
On the counterclaim, the plaintiff are ordered to pay defendants the P45,000.00 balance is payable only "after the property covered by
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos by way of attorney’s fees, Five T.C.T No. 135671 has been partitioned and subdivided, and title
Thousand Pesos as costs of litigation and further to pay the costs of issued in the name of the BUYER" hence, vendor Roque cannot
the suit. demand payment of the balance unless and until the property has
been subdivided and titled in the name of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library Devoid of any stipulation that "ownership in the thing shall not pass to
the purchaser until he has fully paid the price", 26 ownership in the
Dissatisfied, petitioner Balatbat filed an appeal before the respondent thing shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon actual or
Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision on August 12, constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has
1992, to wit: 24  not yet been fully paid. The failure of the buyer to make good the price
does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest to the seller unless the
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to
modification that the awards of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. 27 Non-payment only creates a
P5,000.00 as costs of litigation are deleted. right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the
contract.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
With respect to the non-delivery of the possession of the subject
On March 22, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals denied property to the private respondent, suffice it to say that ownership of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.25cralaw:red the thing sold is acquired only from the time of delivery thereof, either
actual or constructive. 28 Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that
Hence, this petition for review. — when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
Petitioner raised the following issues for this Court’s object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
resolution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library cannot be inferred. 29 The execution of the public instrument, without
actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the vendor to
the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over
I the same. 30 In the instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owner’s
certificate of title to herein private Respondent. It is not necessary that
vendee be physically present at every square inch of the land bought
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED SALE TO THE PRIVATE by him, possession of the public instrument of the land is sufficient to
RESPONDENTS WAS MERELY EXECUTORY AND NOT A accord him the rights of ownership. Thus, delivery of a parcel of land
CONSUMMATED TRANSACTION? may be done by placing the vendee in control and possession of the
land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument
II (constructive). The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a
public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DOUBLE SALE AS sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.
CONTEMPLATED UNDER ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE? 31 

A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere

III consent of the parties. 32 Delivery of the thing bought or payment of
the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure
of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at
AND FOR VALUE? most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may
exercise his legal remedies. 33 

IV Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHICH WERE NOT OFFERED?
Petitioner asseverates that the respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming the appealed judgment considering (1) that the alleged sale in
favor of the private respondents Repuyan was merely executory; (2)
that there is no double sale; (3) that petitioner is a buyer in good faith
and for value; and (4) that private respondents did not offer their
evidence during the trial.
"If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be movable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession and in the
absence thereof, to the person who present the oldest title, provided
there is good faith."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an
immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first
in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith. 34 

In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share
in TCT No. 135671 to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980.
Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque
(6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4,
1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

This is an instance of a double sale of an immovable property hence,

the ownership shall vests in the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Evidently, private
respondents Repuyan’s caused the annotation of an adverse claim on
the title of the subject property denominated as Entry No. 5627/T-
135671 on July 21, 1980. 35 The annotation of the adverse claim on
TCT No. 135671 in the Registry of Property is sufficient compliance as
mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world.

On the other hand, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens only on

February 2, 1982. Accordingly, private respondents who first caused
the annotation of the adverse claim in good faith shall have a better
right over herein petitioner. Moreover, the physical possession of
herein petitioners by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial
court on September 20, 1982 is "subject to the valid rights and interest
of third persons over the same portion thereof, other than vendor or
any other person or persons privy to or claiming any rights to interest
under it." 36 As between two purchasers, the one who has registered
the sale in his favor, has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title even if the latter is in actual possession of the
immovable property. 37 Further, even in default of the first registrant or
first in possession, private respondents have presented the oldest title.
38 Thus, private respondents who acquired the subject property in
good faith and for valuable consideration established a superior right
as against the petitioner.

Evidently, petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. In

the complaint for rescission filed by vendor Aurelio Roque on August
20, 1980, herein petitioner filed a motion for intervention on May 20,
1982 but did not file her complaint in intervention, hence, the decision
was rendered adversely against her. If petitioner did investigate before
buying the land on February 4, 1982, she should have known that
there was a pending case and an annotation of adverse claim was
made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds and she
could have discovered that the subject property was already sold to the
private respondents. It is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to
ask for the delivery of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title from the
vendor. A purchaser of a valued piece of property cannot just close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and
then claim that he acted in good faith and under the belief that there
were no defect in the title of the vendor. 39 One who purchases real
estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true
owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be
applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint
him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of
it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a
state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or
fancied tokens or signs. 40 

In fine, petitioner had nobody to blame but herself in dealing with the
disputed property for failure to inquire or discover a flaw in the title to
the property, thus, it is axiomatic that — culpa lata dolo aequiparatur —
gross negligence is equivalent to intentional wrong.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this petition for review is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15133             July 31, 1963
EMIGDIO SORIANO and BEATRIZ DE VERA, plaintiffs-appellants,  Manuel, Consorcia, Luis, and Tomas, all surnamed Magali,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI, namely: LUISA MAGALI,
LUTGARDA MAGALI, DEMETRIA MAGALI, MODESTA CALIMLIM,
LUIS MAGALI, CONSORCIA (CONCHA) MAGALI, MANUEL
MAGALI, and TOMAS MAGALI, defendants-appellees.
Roberto V. Merrera for plaintiffs-appellants.
Ramos, Nicolas, Acosta and Cuesta for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, but certified
to this Court as one involving purely legal issues. The complaint is for
recovery of a piece of land. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Judge Jesus P. Morfe presiding, gave judgment for the defendants,
appellees herein, on the following findings:
The parties to the instant case submitted no testimonial
evidence but merely documentary proofs of some of their
respective allegations.
It appears from the evidence of the plaintiffs that the
disputed Northeastern portion, consisting of 25,000 square
meters, forms part of a bigger parcel of land consisting all in
all of 317,600 square meters which, as early as July 18,
1933, was owned by and registered in the names of the
spouses Domingo Magali and Modesta Calimlim (Original
Certificate of title No. 51978, Exhibit "I"). On July 28, 1939,
said spouses sold the aforesaid Northeastern portion of said
parcel of land to the spouses Tomas Cerezo and Segunda
Soriano for P500.00, but said deed of sale (Exh. A) was
never registered and annotated on said O.C.T. No. 51878.
Said spouses Tomas Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in turn
sold the same Northeastern portion to Maximino Mamorno
for P950.00 on January 7, 1941 (Exh. B). This deed of sale
was also not registered and annotated on said O.C.T. No.
51878. On April 5, 1946 Francisca Reyes as surviving
spouse of said Maximino Mamorno sold her one-half pro
indiviso share in said Northeastern portion to the spouses
Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera for P1,000.00, and on
the same day she, as guardian of her minor children, sold
the remaining one-half pro indiviso of said Northeastern
portion to the same spouses Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de
Vera (Exhibits C and D). These two deeds of sale were on
April 9, 1946 registered under the provision of Act 3344 and
were, consequently, also not registered and annotated on
O.C.T. No. 51878. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs
Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera filed the present action
forreivindicacion of said Northeastern portion, the
defendants Modesta Calimlim and Lamberto Magali being
now in possession of said Northeastern portion and claim
ownership thereof.
Defendants' evidence (Exh- 3) on the other hand shows that
in January, 1944 Maximino Mamorno in turn sold said
Northeastern portion back to Modesta Calimlim for
P5,000.00, but instead of executing a formal deed of sale,
merely delivered to said Modesta Calimlim the muniment of
title over said land, among which were the original of the
deed of sale of July 28, 1939 by the spouses Domingo
Magali and Modesta Calimlim in favor of the spouses Tomas
Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in (Exh. 1), and the original of
the deed of sale of January 7, 1951 by the spouses Tomas
Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in favor of said Maximino
Mamorno (Exh. 2). By virtue of said verbal sale Modesta
Calimlim has been, as found by this Court in its decision of
June 26, 1956 in Civil Case No. 9618 between the same
Emigdio Soriano and Modesta Calimlim (Exh. 6), in
possession of said Northeastern portion continuously since
January, 1944 to the present time, paying the real estate tax
thereon under Tax Declaration No. 47040 (Exhs. 4 and 4 A
to 4-0, inclusive). Consequently, defendant Modesta
Calimlim, one of the registered owners of said parcel of land
covered by O.C.T. No. 51878, and her co-defendants
surviving children of the other registered owner, Domingo
Magali, are now the lawful owners of said parcel of land,
including the aforesaid Northeastern part thereof.
The defendants Luisa, Demetria and Lutgarda, all surnamed
Magali, on their part presented no evidence in their behalf.
Three errors are assigned in this appeal, namely: (1) The lower court
erred in not holding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits A & B, plaintiffs)
are valid and binding, even though not registered and annotated at the
back of original certificate of title No. 51878; (2) The lower court erred
in not holding that there was in fact no verbal sale of the property in
question (northeastern portion) made by Maximino Mamorno in favor
of defendants Modesta Calimlim; (3) The lower, court erred in not
holding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits C & D, plaintiffs) executed by
Francisca Reyes in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants were valid and
binding and conveyed the ownership of the property in question
(northeastern portion) to said appellants.
The first assignment of error misses the point made by the court a
quo in its decision. It did not say that the deeds of sale marked Exhibits
A and B were not valid and binding, but rather that they
became functus oficio and divested the vendees of their rights
thereunder upon surrender of the documents to Modesta Calimlim
when the land was "resold" to her verbally in 1944. Indeed, those two
sales are the basis of the respective claims of the parties, both of
whom derive their conflicting titles from the second vendees-appellees
by virtue of the verbal sale aforesaid, made by Maximino Mamorno in
1944, Indeed, those appellants by virtue of the two deeds executed by
Francisca Reyes, Mamorno's surviving spouse, on April 5, 1946.
The decisive questions, as raised in the second and third assignments
of error, are, first, whether or not there was in fact a sale in favor of
appellees, and second, if there was, whether or not it is superior to the
sales in favor of appellants.1äwphï1.ñët
The first question seems at first blush to be one of fact, which would
place this appeal within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. But in
reality the question refers to the correctness of the ruling of the court a
quo in admitting and giving probative value to the documentary
evidence presented by appellees. The pivotal document is their Exhibit
3, which is a sworn written statement of Ildefonso Mamorno, dated
June 10, 1946, affirming his personal knowledge that his son Maximino
had sold the disputed land to Modesta Calimlim for P5,000.00 in
January 1944; that no written instrument of sale was executed but that
all the papers (muniments of title) concerning the land were delivered
by his son to the said vendee; that his son actually received the
purchase price; and that possession of the land was thereupon
delivered to the vendee. Exhibit 3 is one of the documents submitted
before the Deputy Clerk of Court, who had been commissioned to
receive them upon motion of both parties, and no objection to the
admission of any one of them appears in the record.
True, Exhibit 3 could have been objected to because the affiant did not
testify and hence could not be cross-examined by the adverse party as
to its contents. But no such objection having been interposed, the right
of cross-examination was waived; and having thus been admitted in
evidence, the document is entitled to some probative value as to the
fact of the verbal sale. Since this fact is categorically stated in Exhibit
3, it is not a mere inference from, but rather antecedent to and
therefore justified the consideration of, the corroborative circumstantial
evidence presented by appellees, to wit: (1) actual possession of the
land by appellees since 1944; (2) possession by them of the originals
of the first two deeds of sale (Exhibits 1 and 2); (3) tax declaration in
the name of appellees; (4) receipts of tax payments made by them;
and by contrast, (5) possession by appellants of only a carbon copy
and a true copy of exhibits 1 and 2 (Exhs. A and B), respectively, as
well as their failure to declare the land in their names or to pay the
taxes thereon.

As basis of the declaration by the court a quo that since 1944

appellees had been in actual possession of the land, reliance is placed
on its finding to that effect in the decision in the previous case of
forcible entry between the same parties (Case No. 9618. Exh. 6),
which was decided in favor of appellees, who were the defendants in
that case. Appellants invoke section 7 of Rule 72, which states as
follows:

SEC. 7. Heirs of Domingo Magali judgment conclusive only

on possession, not conclusive in certain actions.—The
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall
be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action.

While it is true that the judgment in an action for forcible entry is not
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action, the rule does not say that such
facts shall have no probative value whatsoever. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary — as in the case at bar there is none — the
previous judgment on the question of material possession carries a
persuasive effect. The logic of the situation is that if Modesta Calimlim
purchased the land, albeit verbally, in 1944, the corroborative
circumstances pointed out above would not have existed. The originals
of the two deeds of sale (Exhibits 1 and 2), would not have been in the
hands of the appellees, nor would they have declared the lands in their
names nor paid the taxes thereon.

This case, therefore, should be resolved in the light of the law

governing double sale of the same property. Article 1473 of the old
Civil Code, now Article 1544, provides that if immovable property is
sold to different vendees the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property;
and should there be no inscription the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession. Appellees
obtained possession of the land in good faith in 1944; appellants never
did so. The registration by appellants of the sale in their favor was
made under Act 3344, which refers to properties not registered under
the Land Registration Act, and hence was not effective for purposes of
Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Registration of instruments, in order to
affect and bind the land, must be done in the proper registry (Secs. 50
and 51, Act 496).

The Statute of Frauds, invoked by appellants with reference to the

verbal sale to Modesta Calimlim, has no application in this case,
because the statute applies only in an executory sale of real property,
not in one which has been consummated by the delivery of the
property to the vendee.

There being no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is

affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,  On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO,
TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI,
DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY,
DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES
D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-
CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID,
SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO
M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by
her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by
her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by
her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION
FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson
and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to
the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of
the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen.
Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen,
a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed
their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending
the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise
filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The
CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of
Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that
the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations
were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties
and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they
reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during
the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be
their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
Resources to cease and desist from implementing
not more than 25 years; and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the
areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the natural resources."7
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
as follows:
process clause of the Constitution.4

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an

These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first
with respect to property rights, claims of ownership,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and
that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall
be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part
II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the
other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and
Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority
was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the Panganiban.
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said
SO ORDERED.
Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petitioners pray for the following:
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate
opinion
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59,
63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the

Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973
VICENTE E. KAYABAN and FLORENTINA LAGASCA-
KAYABAN, petitioners,  Bank * having acted in good faith is absolved of
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE VICENTE
M. SANTIAGO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch V, CFI of
Pangasinan, respondents.
Edilberto Ga. Esguerra for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor General Felix J. Bautista for
respondents.
MAKALINTAL, Actg., C.J.:
The present case started with an action for illegal detainer filed in the
municipal court of Alcala Pangasinan on April 20, 1967 and docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 246. The plaintiff was Vicente Kayaban, one
of the petitioners herein, the other petitioner being his wife Florentina
Lagasca-Kayaban; and the defendants were the spouses Benjamin
Orpindo and Leonila Aguilar-Orpindo. The property involved was Lot
No. 9, one of several lots covered by O.C.T. No. P-1214 in the
plaintiff's name. Another title, O.C.T. No. P-1215, covering other lots,
was in the name of his wife Florentina, and both were issued way back
on September 22, 1956 as a result of free patent applications filed by
them in 1955.
On July 12, 1967, just before the hearing of the illegal detainer case
was terminated in the municipal court, the Orpindo spouses, together
with Ruea Whiting Vds. de Kayaban and her children, filed a complaint
against the Kayaban spouses in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan for reconveyance of Lot No. 9, which complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-1022. Sometime later the illegal detainer
case was decided adversely to the plaintiff, who thereupon appealed to
the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case
No. U-1034.
Still later, upon a letter-complaint to the Solicitor General's Office by
the lawyer for the Orpindos, the said Office filed, on December 17,
1968, an action for annulment of the two free patent titles of the
Kayabans and for reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
The case was docketed as Case No. U-2080.
The three cases — U-1022, U-1034 and U-2080 — were consolidated
and tried jointly before respondent court, which rendered its decision
on July 31, 1970. Case No. U-1022, for reconveyance, was dismissed
and the property involved therein was declared to be the "absolute and
exclusive property of defendant Vicente Kayaban." Case No. U-2034,
for illegal detainer, was decided in favor of the plaintiff therein Vicente
Kayaban and the defendants were ordered to vacate the land and to
pay monthly rentals thereon until possession was finally restored to the
plaintiff. The losing parties in those two cases did not appeal from the
decision, which consequently became final.
The petition now before Us is by the spouses Vicente Kayaban and
Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban for review of the decision insofar as Civil
Case No. U-2080 is concerned. The dispositive portion of that decision
is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. In Civil Case No. 2080, Original Certificates of
Title Nos. P-1214 and P-1215 subject-matter
thereof and under the names of Vicente Kayaban
and Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban are hereby
declared null and void; however, they are hereby
declared to be the rightful and exclusive owners
and possessors of all the properties therein
covered, with the right to apply for the confirmation
of their titles thereto in a proper judicial
proceedings. The Philippine National
any liability, and its right to recover on the
mortgage loan may be enforced. Without
pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
The facts as found by the respondent court on the basis of the
evidence submitted by the petitioners are as follows: The lands
covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente Kayaban and his
co-heirs from their father and common predecessor-in-interest, Gabriel
Kayaban, whose last will was admitted to probate in 1923. After the
properties were partitioned, Vicente Kayaban acquired the shares of
his co-heirs by purchase and afterwards he and his wife applied for
and obtained the two free patent titles in question.
The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to be the
rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by the said
titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they be reverted to
the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null and void on the
ground that since the owners had acquired the properties partly by
inheritance from their father and the rest by purchase from their co-
heirs, and their father had been in possession thereof for many years
before them, the lands were no longer public and hence not subject to
disposition by the government under the Public Land Act. The
procedure that should have been followed, said the court, was judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title and not administrative legalization
thereof through patent application.
We find the present appeal meritorious. We note in the first place that
nowhere in the record is it shown that the complaint in Case No. U-
2080 for annulment of the appellants' titles and for reversion of the
lands covered thereby to the State was filed at the behest of the
Director of Lands. What does appear in the stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties below is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
6. That this instant case praying primarily to
declare "null and void" the Original Certificates of
Titles Nos. P-1214 and P-1215, has been initiated
by Atty. Nestor C. Fernandez upon his letter
complaint to the Solicitor General's Office;
7. That Atty. Nestor C. Fernandez is neither a
claimant, possessor, nor does he have any right
whatsoever over any portion of the lands covered
by the Original Certificates of Titles Nos. P-1214
and P-1215.
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action
for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.
In the second place, the dictum of the lower court that the appellants
chose the wrong remedy in applying for free patents instead of
obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles involves a
technicality that is of no material consequence now in view of the
declaration by the same court that the appellants are the rightful and
exclusive owners of the lands covered by said titles. Indeed, insofar as
the kind of land that may be the subject of one or the other remedy is
concerned, there is no difference between them. Both refer to public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes; both require continuous
occupation and cultivation either by the applicant himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time; and both are
modes of confirming an imperfect or incomplete title — one judicially
and the other administratively. * The fact that the appellants inherited
part of the lands in question from their father and acquired the rest by
purchase from their co-heirs does not necessarily imply that they had
become private lands in the sense of being no longer subject to
disposal under the provisions of the Public Land Act. What is not to be
denied is that in connection with their free patent applications the
appellants, as well as the Director of Lands, considered the lands as
still part of the public domain, although the appellants had an imperfect
title to them. The following statement in the decision of this court in the
case of Antonio vs. Barroga, 23 SCRA 360 (April 29, 1968) is apropos:

It is true that by filing the application for a free

patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the
invalidity of insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479
issued in the name of his predecessor-in-interest
on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made
in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor-in-
interest was the absolute owner of the property
covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied
admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency
are grounds for the annulment of the free patent
and original certificate of title in question.
Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or not
to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor
of his predecessor-in-interest and whatever the
latter's Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to
rely upon them and to consider instead that the
property covered by the Titulo Real was still a part
of the public domain. Acting accordingly he
applied for a free patent and was successful. It
must be borne in mind that its holder still had to
prove that he possessed the land covered by it
without interruption during a period of ten years by
virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal
Decree of June 25, 1880). We may well presume
that Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence
to prove this, for which reason he decided to
acquire the land as part of the public domain.
(Emphasis supplied)

Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through judicial or

administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete title is of no
practical importance. The certificates of title in either case is the same,
namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act No. 496, which, except
for some restrictions as to alienability within entitled to all the protection
afforded by the Torrens System of registration.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from (Case No. U-2080) is

reversed insofar as it declares null and void Original Certificates of
Title Nos. P-1214 and P-1215 in the names of Vicente Kayaban and
Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban, respectively. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and

Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.


FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106043. March 4, 1996.]
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION
INC. (COCLAI), Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS and the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
(NHA), Respondents.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for Petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for NHA.
Bernardito A. Florido for ATCO Enterprises.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTIONS;
CONSTRUED. — As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated
to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the
case can be heard. As such, injunction is accepted as the "strong arm
of equity or a transcendent remedy" to be used cautiously, as it affects
the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the
part of the court of its extreme necessity. Its issuance rests entirely
within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is
generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or
protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE. — Before an injunction
can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1)
there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right. Hence, it should only be granted if the party
asking for it is clearly entitled thereto.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bench, the Court
of Appeals was justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of
injunction. The reason is that, while Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible
entry was pending on appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Special
Patent No. 3551 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino which
covered the lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an Original
Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when
petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the
MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate of title had already been issued to
NHA. In view of this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint
for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City. Thus, it was only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the
Regional Trial Court, where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to
grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of
the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a
material change in the status of the parties with regard to the said land.
Clearly, the government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the
impending enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which
directs the said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their
respective possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.
4. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; TORRENS SYSTEM OF
LAND REGISTRATION; ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE,
CONCRETE AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF AN INDEFEASIBLE
TITLE TO PROPERTY. — The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-
3324) issued to respondent NHA serves as a concrete and conclusive
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property. Accordingly, once a
decree of registration is issued under the Torrens systems and the one
year period from the issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed,
without said decree being controverted by any adverse party, the title
becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED UNDER
AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, INDEFEASIBLE AS THAT
ISSUED UNDER A JUDICIAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDING. — In
the case at bench, the original certificate of title was issued by the
Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding pursuant to
Special Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of
title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the land covered
by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation
of the Public Land Law. Moreover, the said certificate of title was not
controverted by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor did it show that
the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the register of deeds
to NHA was tainted with bad faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of
title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by the register of
deeds in the regular performance of his official duty.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY;
ONLY ISSUE INVOLVED IS PHYSICAL POSSESSION AND NOT
OWNERSHIP. — In an action for forcible entry, the only issue involved
is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor ownership. As the case filed
before the lower court is only one for forcible entry, it is indicative that
the legal title over the said property is not disputed by the petitioner.
There has been no assertion of ownership over the land, only that of
prior possession. At any rate, the judgment rendered in the ejectment
case is effective only with respect to possession and "in no wise bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land."cralaw virtua1aw library
7. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLE AND DEEDS; MISCELLANEOUS SALES
PATENT; DENIAL OF APPLICATION RENDERS PETITIONER’S
SUBSEQUENT OCCUPATION ILLEGAL; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner
has no legal leg to stand as regards ownership because its
Miscellaneous Sales Application was not acted upon nor favorably
considered by the Bureau of Lands. The Bureau, through its Regional
Director, rejected the subdivision survey previously submitted by
COCLAI, in an Order, dated May 19, 1983. In effect, petitioner’s
occupation of the land in question, after the denial of its application for
Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently illegal. Petitioner’s
members have, as a consequence, become squatters whose
continuous possession of the land may now be considered to be in bad
faith. This is unfortunate because squatters acquire no legal right over
the land they are occupying.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDY; INJUNCTION;
GENERALLY MAY NOT TRANSFER PROPERTY IN LITIGATION;
CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. — Although as a general rule, a
court should not, by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this
rule admits of some exceptions. For example, when there is a clear
finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject
property is covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as
the undisputed owner. In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit
is covered by a torrens title under the name of NHA. A writ of injunction
should issue so as not to render moot and academic any decision
which the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-337 will render and
in order to prevent any irreparable injury which respondent may sustain
by virtue of the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 28, 1991, in C.A. G.R. SP No. 23080, which reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 25, dated November 17, 1988.
The antecedent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The land subject of the dispute is Lot No. 1982 of Cad. 237 consisting
of about 12.82 hectares located at Cagayan de Oro City. Said parcel of
land was formerly a timberland identified as Block No. F, L.C. Project
No. 8 of the Bureau of Forestry. On September 4, 1956, the Bureau of
Forestry released the said land as alienable and disposable public
land.
Subsequently, on January 29, 1964, the Bureau of Lands issued
Survey Authority No. 16-64 granting authority to the COCLAI to survey
the land in question for purposes of subdivision into residential lots. By
virtue of said authority, the COCLAI engaged the services of a
geodetic engineer to prepare the subdivision survey which was
submitted to the Bureau of Lands. On March 31, 1964, the Bureau of
Lands, after conducting an ocular survey, required the COCLAI, in
behalf of its members, to file a miscellaneous Sales Application over
the land in question which the latter did on August 13, 1970. The said
sales application was however held in abeyance by the Bureau of
Lands pending the final outcome of the civil case filed by the Republic
of the Philippines and the City of Cagayan de Oro against Benedicta
Macabebe Salcedo, Et. Al. for the annulment of Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-257 covering the land in question then pending before the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-41115. In said case, the
COCLAI was a party-intervenor.
Meanwhile, on August 22, 1979, the NHA filed an expropriation
proceeding before the former Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental at Cagayan de Oro City docketed as Civil Case No. 6806 to
acquire Cadastral Lot No. 1982, including the land involved in this
case, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City with an area of
224,554 square meters which was then covered by OCT No. 0-257. In
said case, the COCLAI intervened claiming that instead of being paid
the amount of P300,000.00, they prefer to acquire residential lots in
any housing area of NHA. Upon learning of the pending suit before the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-41115) involving the annulment of the title
over the same land, the NHA sought the suspension of the
expropriation proceedings.
On September 11, 1982, the Supreme Court finally resolved G.R. No.
L-41115 annulling OCT No. 0-257 and declaring the land covered
thereby as public land.
On October 8, 1982, the Solicitor General furnished the Bureau of
Lands, Manila, with a copy of the Supreme Court decision prompting
the Director of the Bureau of Lands to order the District Land Officer in
Cagayan de Oro City to take appropriate action for inventory of each
and every portion of Cadastral Lot No. 1982. In response thereto, the
Regional Land Director of Region 10 informed the Director of Lands
that the members of COCLAI were occupying portions of the said lot
by virtue of the Survey Authority issued on March 19, 1964 and the
COCLAI’s subdivision survey had already been submitted to the
Central Office for verification and approval but was held in abeyance.
On May 10, 1983, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation
No. 2292 reserving the entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982 for the
Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Project to be implemented
by the NHA. Under the said proclamation, the NHA was granted the
authority ‘to develop, administer and dispose of Lot No. 1982 located
at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, in accordance with the guidelines
of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program and the approved
development plan of the area’.
On May 19, 1983, the Bureau of Lands, through its Regional Director,
issued an order rejecting the subdivision survey previously submitted
by the COCLAI.
Sometime in November, 1986, the NHA, through its agents, Virgilio
Dacalos and Engr. Vicente Generalao, the area manager and project
engineer, respectively with the help of the policemen and claiming
authority under P.D. 1472, demolished the structures erected by the
COCLAI members. This action prompted the COCLAI to file a forcible
entry and damages case against the NHA employees and police
officers with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cagayan de
Oro City docketed as Civil Case No. 11204.
After due hearing, the MTCC on November 17, 1988 rendered
judgment ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 11204 to restore
the COCLAI members to their respective actual possession of the
portions of Lot No. 1982 but the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for
damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court in Cagayan de Oro City
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Thereafter, the prevailing
party, the COCLAI members, moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990.
While Civil Case No. 11204 was pending before the courts, the
President of the Philippines issued on July 1 1988 Special Patent No.
3551 covering the entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982, and by virtue
thereof, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City issued on
January 3, 1990 an Original Certificate of Title No. P-3324 in the name
of NHA.
Thus, on July 24, 1990, a day after the COCLAI moved for the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 11204, the NHA filed a
complaint for ‘Quieting of Title With Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction’ against the COCLAI and its president, Pablo Solomon, as
well as the City Sheriff, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-337.
Said case was assigned to Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court in
Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by Hon. Noli T. Catli. In its
complaint, plaintiff NHA alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘4) That defendant landless association laid claim of a portion of Lot
No. 1982 aforestated alleging that they are entitled to possession
thereof and, in fact, filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against certain
Virgilio Decalos, Vicente Generalao, and four (4) others, plaintiff herein
not being made a party thereto, which case is docketed as Civil Case
No. 11204 assigned to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City;
5) That on November 18, 1988 defendant landless association
obtained a favorable decision from MTCC Branch 3;
6) that pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in City of Bacolod
Et. Al. v. Hon. Enriquez Et. Al., G.R. No L-9773, May 29, 1957 the said
decision could not be enforced against plaintiff herein as it was not a
party to the said case;
7) That the claim of defendant landless association for possession of a
portion of said Lot No. 1982, subject-matter hereof, is predicated or
anchored upon the fact that said lot was declared a public land;
8) That on January 3, 1990, however, plaintiff National Housing
Authority became the absolute owner of said Lot No. 1982, now the
site of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Project, by virtue of
Special Patent No. 3551 issued by Her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, for which Original Certificate of Title No. P-3324 was
issued in its name; . . .
9) That the claim of defendant landless association has created a
cloud on plaintiff’s title to Lot No. 1982 aforementioned, which claim is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective
and unenforceable and prejudicial to plaintiff’s title, the land, subject-
matter hereof, having ceased to be a public land;
10) That defendants Solomon, Et. Al. threatened or are about to
enforce the decision in said Civil Case No. 11204 in violation of
plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
render the judgment herein ineffectual, unless restrained or enjoined
by this Honorable Court;
11) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission of the act
herein complained of;
12) That the commission of the act herein complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
13) That the plaintiff is willing and ready to file a bond executed to the
defendants in an amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court, to the
effect that the plaintiff will pay to said defendants all damages which
they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally
decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
Acting on the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
on July 24, 1990 stating thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘. . . let a RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to Defendants Pablo
Salomon and Cagayan de Oro Landless Association, Inc. and the City
Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of MTCC, Branch 3, or anybody acting in their
behalf or acting as their agent or representative. And until further
orders from this court, they are enjoined to refrain or desist from
enforcing the decision of Civil Case No. 11204 until this court resolves
this complaint.’
Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint stating,
among others, as a ground therefor that the cause of action is barred
by a prior judgment in another case. (Apparently, the NHA has filed an
action for ‘Injunction with Damages’ against COCLAI and its President
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City
docketed as Civil Case No. 89-399 to prevent the MTCC from
executing its decision in Civil Case No. 11204, but this was dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 19, 1990 on the
ground that the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204, had
been upheld by the Supreme Court when it denied NHA’s petition
for certiorari. The RTC, Branch 17, further stated that ‘. . . (I)f plaintiff
believes that it is the owner of the property subject of that civil case
(No. 11204), then it should ventilate its claim in some other case but
not in a simple case of injunction.)’
On August 10, 1990, the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-337
issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss as well as plaintiff
NHA’s prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204. The motion for
reconsideration filed by plaintiff NHA was likewise denied by the
Regional Trial Court in its Order dated August 17, 1990." 1  the property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under
Aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the NHA
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
lower court. The decretal portion of the said decision,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED the
questioned Orders of respondent judge are hereby declared null and
void and respondent judge is ordered to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to respect the possession of the petitioner over the land
subject of the dispute . . ." 2  contemplation of the Public Land Law. 12 Moreover, the said certificate
Hence, this petition.
The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling (a) that the National Housing Authority (NHA) is
entitled to the injunction prayed for; and (b) that NHA has a better right
to the possession of Lot No. 1982, as a necessary consequence of
ownership.
As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent
actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. 3
As such, injunction is accepted as the "strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy" to be used cautiously, as it affects the
respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the
part of the court of its extreme necessity. 4 Its issuance rests entirely
within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is
generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. 5
Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or
protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. 6 Before an injunction can be issued,
it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be
a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and 2) the act
against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
7 Hence, it should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly
entitled thereto. 8 In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals was
justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction. The
reason is that, while Civil Case no. 11204 for forcible entry was
pending on appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No.
3551 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino which covered the
lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an Original Certificate of
Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when petitioner moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23,
1990, a certificate of title had already been issued to NHA. In view of
this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was
only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court,
9 where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision of the
MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material change in the
status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the
government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the
said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their respective
possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.
Petitioner claims that Special Patent No. 3351 issued by then
President Corazon Aquino on July 1, 1988 and the corresponding
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Original Certificate of Title No P-
3324 in the name of NHA had entrusted only the administration of the
disputed lot to the said agency but not the ownership thereof. It also
alleges that, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2290, issued on May 10,
1985, declaring the land situated at Barrio Macabalan, Cagayan de
Oro City, as Slum Improvement Settlement (SIR) area, it is illegal for
NHA to claim ownership over the said land. Furthermore, petitioner
also claims that "respondent Court overlooked the fact that the issues
on ownership and possession are subjudice before RTC, Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case;No. 90-337 . . ." 10 Hence, it
concludes that the appellate court cannot pass upon these issues as
there is still no final judgment on said civil case.
Petitioner’s contentions are bereft of merit.
The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent NHA
serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to
the Torrens systems and the one year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being
controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and
cannot later on be questioned. 11 
Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was
issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus. it is as indefeasible as a
certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the
land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
of title was not controverted by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor
did it show that the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the
register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad faith or fraud. Hence
said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by
the register of deeds in the regular performance of its official duty. 13 
Also, OCT No. P-32324 issued in the name of respondent NHA, clearly
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said parcel of land with all the
appurtenances thereunto of right of belonging unto the NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY and to its successors-in-interest or assigns
forever, subject to private rights, if any there be." 14 
Clearly the certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but
also the right of possess on as a necessary consequence of the right
of ownership.
Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot be
denied that Proclamation No. 2290 gave authority to the NHA to
dispose of Lot No. 1982. In the said Proclamation the President of the
Philippines granted to NHA the authority to "develop, administer and
dispose" of Lot No. 1982, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City,
"in accordance with the guidelines of the Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program and the approved development plan of the
area.
On the other hand, petitioner’s only basis for claiming the disputed lot
is lawful entry and possession for an extended period of time and, as a
matter of fact, there is a final judgment in its favor in the case for
forcible entry before the MTCC. As to this, settled is the rule that, in an
action for forcible entry, the only issue involved is mere physical
possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor ownership. 15 As the case filed before the
lower court is only one for forcible entry, it is indicative that the legal
title over the said property is not disputed by the petitioner. There has
been no assertion of ownership over the land, only that of prior
possession. At any rate, the judgment rendered in the ejectment case
is effective only with respect to possession and "in no wise bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land." 16 Indeed, petitioner has no
legal leg to stand as regards ownership because its Miscellaneous
Sales Application was not acted upon nor favorably considered by the
Bureau of Lands. The Bureau, through its Regional Director, rejected
the subdivision survey previously submitted by COCLAI, in an Order,
dated May 19, 1983.

In effect, petitioner’s occupation of the land in question, after the denial

of its application for Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently
illegal. Petitioner’s members have, as a consequence, become
squatters whose continuous possession of the land may now be
considered to be in bad faith. This is unfortunate because squatters
acquire no legal right over the land they are occupying. 17 

Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a

preliminary injunction, transfer property in litigation from the
possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some
exceptions. For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership
and possession of the land or unless the subject property is covered by
a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner.
18 In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit is covered by a
torrens title under the name of NHA.

A writ of injunction should issue so as not to render moot and

academic any decision which the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
90-337 will render and in order to prevent any irreparable injury which
respondent may sustain by virtue of the enforcement of the decision of
the MTCC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court

of Appeals in C A. G.R. SP No. 23080 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part.


THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135527               October 19, 2000
Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses
PEDRO and CRISANTA SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA
OJERIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed.
Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such
property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28,
1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048,
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:2
"ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the
challenged Decision dated 26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, is AFFIRMED. No costs."
The affirmed Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the
following: (1) Land Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for
confirmation of respondent’s title to three parcels of land; and (2) Civil
Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners’ Sales
Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: 4
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. In Civil Case No. 4739 -
1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and
5388 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298
and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner-]spouses
Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x
Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos.
2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3769, which ordered the cancellation of Free Patent
Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of
Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become
final and executory;
3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo
de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of
suit.
II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 -
1. Confirming [herein respondents’] title [to] the land subject
of registration and ordering the registration thereof in the
names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of
Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - ½ share; and Cecilia P.
Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of
legal age, Filipinos, single and residents of 500-A, Fifth
Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City,
Metro Manila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino, and a
resident of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street,
Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila - ½ share; and
2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let
an order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees be
issued.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as
follows:5
"On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an
application for registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-
340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three
parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140
[PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land
identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square
meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN]
with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben,
Mariveles, Bataan, and having a total area of 401,159 square meters
or 40.1159 hectares.
"Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and
spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application
for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of
Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their
ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298
and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase
from the government through sales patents.
"The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application,
contending that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the
parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
"Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando
Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration.
"Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be
exact, on 20 February 1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary
Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio,
filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of
defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1,
Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2,
same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area
of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title
of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No.
297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065
square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of
defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo
and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of
225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with
an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares.
"In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga,
Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739 which was then assigned to said Branch
was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases assigned to
Branch 2.
"Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme
Court dated 26 April 1989 in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769
entitled ‘Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al.’ which annulled
the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the
sales patent title issued in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and
spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that
petitioners had failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which
required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and
cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which
were "incongruous with reality," bolstered the "finding that [they had]
never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property." It
explained:
"On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the
evidence presented, concluded that [herein respondents] and their
predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the subject lands
in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered
testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in
possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the actual
occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their
favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114
SCRA 946) that ‘the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he
had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to
nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.’
"On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court. x x x."6
Debunking petitioners’ reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,7 the
CA ratiocinated as follows:
"[Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court
dated 26 April 1989 in GR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent
titles of defendants-appellants Manalos and granted the issuance of
sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses.
"What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the
subject property in favor of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was
allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their part by
misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject
properties when in fact the subject properties were being actually
occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land still
formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was
declared to be public agricultural land. x x x."8
Hence, this Petition.9
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our
consideration:10
"I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in
disregarding the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753
entitled, ‘Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo
and Amparo de Ocampo, et al.,’ wherein the validity and legality of
petitioners’ TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the
land in dispute were upheld.
"II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the
cancellation of petitioners’ Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298
and T-44205 considering that private respondents are not the proper
party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners’ titles [to] the
lots.
"III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that
petitioners committed an act of misrepresentation in their Application
for Sales Patent.
"IV
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents the amount of ₱50,000.00
representing attorney’s fees."
In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the
registration of respondents’ title under the Public Land Act and (2) the
cancellation of petitioners’ Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs).
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:Registration of Respondents’ Title
Respondents’ application for registration of title to the three parcels of
land that were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public
Land Act,11 the pertinent portion of which reads:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
" x x x           x x x          x x x "
Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from
Bernardo and Arsenio Obdin,12 who in turn had been in possession of
the property since 1947. Hence, when the former filed their application
for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said
parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the Public Land
Act.
We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of
the public domain.13 Unless such assets are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 14 clarified
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the
latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.15
In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a
US military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine
government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in
1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,16 a suit involving
the same parcel of land and instituted by herein petitioners against
other claimants, the Court held:
"As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned
decision:
‘x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in
Bataan, of which the land in question forms part, was turned over to
the Philippine government, the same automatically became a
disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over
said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its
nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels of
land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19,
1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C.
Map No 26-40). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in
question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the
Philippine government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it
certified disposable only in 1971. This Court is of the conclusion that
this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation land
while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified
alienable in 1971." (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have
occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was
declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military
reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry
or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land
Act, which provide as follows:
"SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any
tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of
the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for
this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way
for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal
pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public
fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public
benefit.
SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of
section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the
President." (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners’ similar
argument that they had been occupying the property since 1944. It
ruled in this wise:
"The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land
involved in the case belong was formerly a portion of the US Military
Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was turned over to the
Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89
SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court seriously doubts whether
Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in
possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed:
‘Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
settlement on them can be acquired (Republic of the Philippines v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 73
SCRA 146).’"
We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence,
respondents have not satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the
Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have occupied the property
for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly
then, their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously
granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners’ Titles
Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because
"it is a rule that the Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent
becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon
registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of
patent."17
Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their
Sales Patents and TCTs should have been initiated by the solicitor
general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the
Public Land Act, which we quote:
"SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of
the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines."
Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for
reversion, but for reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to
file the present suit.
We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument. In an action for
reconveyance, "the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property,
in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with
a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about."18
Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because
they have not shown a title better than that of petitioners. As earlier
shown, the former have not proven any title that may be judicially
confirmed.
Moreover, respondents’ invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA19 must be
rejected. In that case, the Court noted that the allegations in the
Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving
the Motion to Dismiss, were "an assertion that the lot is private land, or
that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private
respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section
48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x." Hence, the Court ruled that respondents,
not the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit.
In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show
entitlement to the land.1âwphi1 They have not established that they
are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not
petitioners, have a better right thereto.
Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were
fraudulently obtained by petitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove
the requisite actual occupation of the land in question.1âwphi1 The
former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes,
showing that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the
property.
The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual
averments would be improper in this Decision. If petitioners’ Sales
Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to
recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the
Office of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners’ titles originated from a
grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.20 At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that
respondents have no personality to "recover" the property, because
they have not shown that they are the rightful owners thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions
of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court
are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor

General for a possible review, in its sound discretion, of the issuance
of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of herein
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National
Secondary Technical School), petitioner,  predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
vs.
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and dismissing herein petitioner's complaint, as well as its
resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of
land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On
October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the
said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of
Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965
reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This
reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to
the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the
area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now
renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter
Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its
intended projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate
said portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991
a complaint for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's favor and ordered
Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the
portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two
years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision
having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March
5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming
that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held,
contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open,
continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute
for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision
on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the
Public Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942, provides as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certification of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred
that a citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public
domain if he has possessed the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to
have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the
former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol
National School's claim over the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200
SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property.
x x x           x x x          x x x
. . . with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land.
x x x           x x x          x x x
As interpreted in several cases, when the
conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of.The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would he evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
parties had a better right to possess the lot through the erroneous Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27,
application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the
aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b)
SO ORDERED.
of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942, 2 whichprovided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public

Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable, in accordance with the District Forester's Certification
dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an
alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of
Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first
requirement.

The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol
had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since
1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands
of the pubic domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the

disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959,
much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the
conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to
the land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain.
Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given
that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol
National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:

(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a

view of preemption confers no contractual or
vested right in the lands occupied and the
authority of the President to withdraw such lands
for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve
them for public use, prior to the divesting by the
government of title thereof stands, even though
this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to
entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. 3

In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over
the land in dispute.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 107427           January 25, 2000
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77, 1which was reversed by
respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 26122. 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent court on September 30, 1992.3
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-
seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Piñas, Metro
Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married
to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the
Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which
corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria
Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of
land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was
duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria
Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 4 The case was
docketed as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the
Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed
petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor his
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land
nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years
prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public
domain.5
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account
of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before
the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally
disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria
Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo. 6
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were
forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court7where it was docketed as
Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted
his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, 8 this time alleging the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax
declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of
the lands applied for.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the
application of petitioner.9 The Solicitor General promptly appealed to
respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the
lower court's Order.10It also denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.11
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds —
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the
commencement of thirty (30) year period mandated under
Sec. 48 (b) shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in
accordance with the classification made by the Bureau of
Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in
DRAWING conclusion and inference that prior to the
declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in March 27, 1972, the
parcels of land sought to be registered by Applicant was part
of the forest land or forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeal ERRED and failed to
consider VESTED RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and
his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 1908. 12
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of
title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand, it is the
respondents' position that since the subject parcels of land were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, 13 petitioner did
not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents.
In Republic vs. Doldol,14 the requisites to acquire title to public land
were laid down, as follows —
. . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (emphasis in the original).
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that
the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or
for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued.
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove
that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with
respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land
subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary,
it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even
granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied
the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such
possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable
land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of
an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain.15

A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,16 where a

homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest
was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject
land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court
ruled as follows —

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain

belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also
states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State
(Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219
SCRA 340).

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of

State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration. The applicant must show
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. This petitioners failed to do.1âwphi1.nêt

We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent

was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the
subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable
portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their
name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the
time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as
successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the
Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the
same because the area was not yet classified as disposable
public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein
petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.

Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were
classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not
be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable. 17 In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to
disposition.18 Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.19

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry

Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which
his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the
Bureau of Forest Development20 from which no indication of such
exemption may be gleaned.

Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application

for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other
errors raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.


SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 94524 September 10, 1998
SPS. FEDERICO L. REYES AND MAXIMA DELA PAZ; SPS,
SILVINA L. REYES AND CESARIO SANTIAGO; SPS. VICENTA L.
REYES AND EMILIO ESTEBAN; SPS. IRENEO L. REYES AND
JOSEFINA DEL FIERRO; SPS. LEOVIGILDO L. REYES AND
JOSEFINA OCHOA; AND FELIX L. REYES, petitioners,  Notwithstanding the land she bought was still
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1990, in CA-G.R. CV No.
14600, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
decision of the court a quo dated April 17, 1986 is
hereby SET ASIDE and another is rendered:
a) Declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 727 in
the name of the heirs of
Antonia Labalan as null and
void and all other derivative
titles, if any there be, are
hereby ordered cancelled and
b) Declaring that the land
covered by the cancelled
certificate of title be reverted
to the State including
whatever improvements
introduced by the defendants
which are ordered forfeited in
favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. 2
The factual backdrop of the case, as accurately summarized by the
respondent court in the assailed decision, is as follows:
Antonia Labalan filed with the Bureau of Lands
Homestead Application No. 214067 on February
17, 1936 (Exh. "2"). The same was approved on
April 23, 1937. On December 28, 1937 the
applicant died survived by her children who are
the defendants in this case (Exh. "5"). Before the
application of the homestead patent by Antonia
Labalan, she was already residing in the said
place and made improvements on the land. After
her death, defendant Federico Reyes, one of her
children continued to reside therein. After the land
was surveyed, Federico Reyes filed the required
Notice of Intention to make Final Proof (Exh. "3").
On January 2, 1941, Homestead Patent No.
64863 was issued in the name of the heirs of
Antonia Labalan and the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. 727 was issued (Exh. "1").
SOMETIME in October 1968, a certain Mary
Agnes Burns, a resident of Olongapo City, filed
with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales
Application (Exhs. "O," "O-1") over a 50-hectares
property she allegedly purchased from Salvador
Moreno on November 23, 1955 (Exh. "1") located
in Matain, Subic, Zambales. Included thereat is the
property covered by O.C.T. No. 727. She allegedly
made improvements on the land. She likewise
constructed roads thereon after securing the
necessary mayor's permit (Exhs. "K," "K-1," ''K-2").
Declaring the property in her own name, she also
paid the yearly taxes from 1965-1978 (Exhs. "M"
to "M-6") and from 1979-1982 (Exh. "N").
within the Naval Reservation Area and therefore
part of the forest zone, Mary Agnes Burns
nevertheless took the risk of occupying and
improving the land after verifying that the same
would be released for private disposition.
Acting on Mary Agnes Burns' request for survey
authority, the Bureau of Lands ordered Land
Inspector Mateo D. Sicat to inspect and survey the
property In the report dated December 23, 1968
(Exh. "P"), the latter favorably recommended the
survey endorsed by District Land Officer Rodolfo
Paelmo on January 3, 1969 (Exh. "P-1"). Mary
Agnes Burns also learned from Sicat's report that
the titled property consisting of 20 hectares
adjacent to her property is owned by Natalia dela
Paz. Knowing that said property is within the forest
zone hence inalienable prior to January 31, 1961,
she reported the matter to the Solicitor General
who thereafter had the title cancelled and the land
reverted to the public domain on the basis of the
Decision dated November 9, 1981 in Civil Case
No. 299-2-0 entitled Republic of the Philippines
vs. Fabian Arcega and Natalia dela Paz (Exhs. "Q"
to "Q-4").
IN 1969, alleging that Mary Agnes Burns illegally
and forcibly entered the defendant's titled property
consisting of 6,5030 hectares, the defendants filed
a Forcible Entry Case against the former with four
(4) others in the Municipal Court of Subic,
Zambales. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
herein defendants (plaintiffs in the Forcible Entry
Case) elevated the case to the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch
III, and docketed as Civil Case No. 765-0. In the
decision dated April 17, 1986, the heirs of Antonia
Labalan were declared as the registered owner of
the land covered by Original Certificate No. 727
and therefore entitled to the possession of the
same. (Exh. "8").
IN 1980, Mary Agnes Burns filed a petition with the
Solicitor General for the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 727 on the ground that the
land covered thereby is within the forest zone. The
petition was referred by the Solicitor General to
the Bureau of Lands for investigation (Exh. "A").
Lands investigator Guillermo Venegas conducted
the investigation and submitted his report (Exh.
"B") and the supplemental report (Exh. "B-1").
Likewise, Mary Agnes Burns went to the District
Forester and requested the survey of the said land
covered by O.C.T. No. 727 and Assistant District
Forester Marceliano Pobre made the survey. By
virtue of the reports submitted by the land
inspectors and the certification issued by district
Forester Rogelio Delgado, Certification No. 65,
 showing that the land in question was found to be
within the alienable and disposable land only on
January 31, 1961 per LCM 2427. That the area
covered by O.C.T. No. 727 and the adjoining
owners of the land are still forest zone from 1941
to 1960. 3
On the basis of the reports submitted by the land inspectors and the
Certification No. 65 issued by District Forester Delgado, the Solicitor
General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (hereafter
"Republic") filed on October 23, 1981 a complaint 4 for "Cancellation of
Title and Reversion" against herein petitioners before the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Olongapo City docketed as Civil
Case No. 3271-0.
The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on April 17, 1986 on the
ground that the Republic failed to prove its allegation that the subject
land was not yet alienable and disposable at the time the Bureau of
Lands granted petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Antonia Labalan, a
homestead patent. The trial court ratiocinated in this wise:
It would be the height of injustice if the Court will
countenance the annulment of the homestead
patent granted the defendants forty five (45) years
ago and the cancellation of OCT No. 727 issued
way back in 1941 simply on the unsubstantiated
basis that the homestead patent and the title were
granted and issued when the land was still within
the forest zone. Even if it were true as contended
by the plaintiff that at the time of the granting of
patent and the issuance of OCT No. 727 in 1941
to the defendants, the land was not yet released
from the forest zone and therefore not yet
disposable and alienable, although Certification
No. 282 of District Forester Rogelio Delgado (Exh.
10) states otherwise, yet such error committed by
the government thru the Bureau of Land in
granting the homestead patent to a land not yet
alienable and disposable, was rectified by the
same government thru the then Bureau of Forestry
when it released the said land covered by the
homestead patent from the forest zone and
proclaimed it alienable and disposable in 1961 as
per Certification No. 65 (Exh. "C"). If there was an
error committed by the Bureau of Land in granting
the homestead patent of a land not yet disposable
at that time, the patentees should not be made to
suffer the consequence, it appearing that they
acted in atmost (sic) good faith and complied with
all the requirements of the Public Land Laws in
their acquisition of the homestead patent. Equity
demands that the government must not annul and
cancel the homestead patent issued in 1941 even
if the land was not yet alienable and disposable
then, for after all the said land became alienable
and disposable in 1961. 5
The Republic appealed 6 to the respondent court arguing that the trial
court erred in ruling that: (a) Homestead Patent No. 64863 and the
corresponding OCT No. 727 issued to petitioners (appellees below)
are valid and binding; (b) the petitioners have complied with all the
requirements of cultivation and occupation as required by the Public
Land Law; (c) the subsequent release of the land as alienable and
disposable in 1961 rectified or validated the grant to them or at least
gave them priority over the land; and (d) the government is estopped
from impugning the titles.
Finding the appeal meritorious, the respondent court in a decision
dated April 19, 1990, reversed the trial court, ruling that the land
subject matter of the case was part of the forest lands when
Homestead Patent No. 64832 dated January 2, 1941 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 727 were issued in the name of the petitioners.
In arriving at the said conclusion, the respondent court considered: (a)
the Certification No. 65, dated January 13, 1981, issued by District
Forester Rogelio L. Delgado (Exh. "C"), (b) the Land Classification
Map No. 2427 (Exh. "F"), and (c) the testimony of Marceliano Pobre.
The respondent court opined:
IT is a well-known doctrine that a Torrens title, as
a rule, is indefeasible, unassailable and
irrevocable. However, when the certificate of title
covers property of public dominion classified as
forest and mineral lands, any title issued on these
non-disposable lots should be cancelled even in
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value
(Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Damyung,
89 SCRA 532).
TWO certifications are in dispute in the case
before US. They are Certification No. 65 dated
January 13, 1981 and Certification No. 282 dated
November 25, 1981 which were both issued by
Rogelio L. Delgado, District Forester. Certifications
Nos. 65 and 282 respectively are hereby quoted
as follows:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
tract of land situated at
Matain, Subic, Zambales
covered by O.C.T. No. 727 of
the Heirs of Antonia Labalan,
containing an area of 6.5030
hectares as shown and
described in the attached
sketch as verified and plotted
by Forester Marceliano P.
Pobre based on the technical
descriptions appearing at the
back of the title was found to
be within
the Alienable and Disposable
Land, LC Project No. 13-G,
Subic, Zambales, certified as
such by then Director of
Forestry, Manila on January
31, 1961 per LC Map No.
2427 (Exh. "C;" emphasis
supplied);
and
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
area described in the attached
Plan as surveyed/prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Teodoro
Victoriano for Heirs of Antonia
Labalan of Subic, Zambales
containing an area of 65,030
square meters located at
Matain, Subic, Zambales after
compiling the same in our
control map was found to be
within theAlienable and
Disposable Land, Block I,
Project 13, Subic, Zambales
certified as such by then
Director of Forestry, Manila
on June 7, 1927 per LC Map
No. 6656 (Exh. "10");
(emphasis supplied).
THE apparent differences between the two (2)
certifications was first explained in the
Manifestation/Motion dated January 17, 1983 of
Forester Marceliano Pobre. . . .
NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that Rogelio L.
Delgado, the District Forester who issued the
certifications was not presented as a witness for
the plaintiff, his testimony at most would be
superfluous. Forester Marceliano Pobre actually
conducted the survey and verification and whose
findings over the status of the land in question was
the basis of the Certification No. 65 signed by
Rogelio L. Delgado in his capacity as the District
Forester.
THUS, it was held in the case of RP vs. Animas,
56 SCRA 499 that:
The defense of indefeasibility
of a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a free patent does
not lie against the State in an
action for reversion of land
covered thereby when such
land is a part of a public forest
or a forest reservation. As a
general rule, timber or forest
lands are not alienable or
disposable under either the
Constitution of 1935 or the
Constitution of 1973. Although
the Director of Lands has
jurisdiction over public lands
classified as agricultural under
the Constitution, or alienable
or disposable under the Public
Land Act and is charged with
the administration of all laws
relative thereto, mineral and
timber lands are beyond his
jurisdiction . . . when
defendant Isagani Du Timbol
filed his application for free
patent over the land in
question, the area was not a
disposable or alienable public
land but a public forest. Titles
issued to private parties by
the Bureau of Lands when the
land covered thereby is not
disposable public land but
forest land are void ab initio.
THE nature and character of a
public land made in the
investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands, is binding
on the court (Republic vs.
Porkan, 151 SCRA 88).
Prescription does not lie
against the State (Art. 1108
par. 4; New Civil Code).
Hence, the right of reversion
or conveyance to the State is
not barred by prescription.
The lower court in its decision
is of the opinion that "even if it
were true as contended by the
plaintiff that at the time of the
granting of patent and the
issuance of OCT No. 727 in
1941 to the defendants, the
land was not yet disposable
and alienable . . . yet such
error committed by the
government thru the Bureau
of Lands in granting the
homestead patent, was
rectified by the same
government thru the then
Bureau of Forestry when it
released the said land
covered by the Homestead
Patent from the forest
zone . . . Equity demands that
the government must not
annul and cancel the
homestead patent issued in
1941 even if the land was not
yet alienable and disposable
then, for after all the said
became alienable and
disposable in 1961 (pp. 323-
324. Record). We believe
though that the rule must
stand no matter how harsh it
may seem. Dura lex sed lex. 7
Dissatisfied with the said decision, petitioners now come to us raising
the following issues:
I
Whether or not Certification No. 65 relied upon in
the assailed decision of the respondent court
prevails over Certification No. 282, both issued by
the same District Officer relating to the subject
land;
II
Whether or not the testimony of Forester
Marceliano Pobre is sufficient to outweigh
Certification No. 282 and thereby accord greater
probative value to Certification No. 65;
III
Whether or not, given the legal presumptions in
favor of alienability of the subject land and the
regularity of its grant as a homestead, sufficient
substantial evidence exists on record to overcome
the said presumptions; and
IV
Whether or not, given the facts on record and the
equities of the case, assuming arguendo that the
grant of the land was flawed, the subsequent
release of said land as alienable rectified or
validated the defect or at least accords the
grantees preferential right over the same.
We shall discuss the issues raised in seriatim.
Petitioners argue that since both certifications issued by District
Forester Rogelio Delgado certify that the subject land was, according
to the land classification maps, albeit prepared on different dates,
alienable and disposable, then there should be no doubt that, even as
far back as June 7, 1927 when Land Classification Map (LCM) No.
665 8 was prepared, the subject land was already alienable and
disposable in character. Petitioners further contend that Certification
No. 282 is actually a correction of Certification No. 65 in that it was
made clear that the subject land was already classified as alienable
and disposable in 1927 and not only in 1961 as shown in LCM No.
2427 9.
We have carefully perused the record of the case and find that the two
certifications issued by Forester Rogelio L. Delgado, i.e., Certification
No. 65 dated January 13, 1981 10 and Certification No. 282 dated
November 25,
1981, 11 are not really contradictory as petitioners contend. A
comparison of the land classification maps (LC Map 665 and LC Map
2427) which were made the basis of the issuance of the said
certifications show that the subject lot is part of the unclassified public
forest when the Homestead Patent was issued to petitioners' A: I prepared a sketch map
predecessor-in-interest, Antonia Labalan. LCM No. 665, 12 which was showing their relative
the basis of Certification No. 65; reveals that the subject lot is found in locations and area of the land
the area enclosed by broken lines from points 141 to 144 13 on the side sir.
of the portion marked as "Unclassified Public Forest." As shown in
LCM No. 665, the subject lot was deliberately segregated from the
Q: Now . . . in this sketch plan
alienable and disposable portion identified as Block I, Project 13. If the
that you prepared . . . will you
subject lot was included in the area classified as alienable and
indicate here the exact
disposable as early as 1927, as petitioners claim, then it should have
location of the property
been included in the said classified portion. This explains why in the
involved in this case . . . in
LCM No. 2427, which is the basis of Certification No. 282, the subject
relation to this sketch?
lot was identified as Project 13-G, and classified as alienable and
disposable land only on January 31, 1961.
A: The area is located in
Matain, Subic, within Project
This observation is supported by the testimony of Forester Marceliano
13-G of Subic, Zambales Sir.
Pobre who surveyed and plotted the land in question. In the
Manifestation/Motion dated January 17, 1983 filed by Forester Pobre
with the trial court, he stated: Q: My question to you Mr.
witness is: will you show to
the Honorable Court the
x x x           x x x          x x x
location of the parcel of land
of the heirs of Antonia
2. That upon verification and examination of the Labalan as appearing in this
records of the Heirs of Antonia Labalan, sketch plan?
undersigned found out that the two (2)
certifications were issued by district forester
A: In front of that dogpatch in
Rogelio Delgado, one upon the request of Mary
Matain, opposite Sir.
Agnes Burns and the other issued upon request of
Federico Reyes dated January 13, 1981 and
November 25, 1981, respectively; Q: So . . . in other words
based on this plotting . . . the
land in plot falls inside Project
3. That undersigned was the one who plotted and
13-G of LC Map 2427?
prepared the map of the land owned by the heirs
of Antonia Labalan and the said land contained an
area of 6.5030 hectares located at Matain, Subic, A: Yes, sir. 15
Zambales under Original Certificate of Title No.
727, . . . .
On cross-examination, Forester Pobre declared:

4. That the certifications both issued to Mary

Q: Can you tell us how come
Agnes Burns and Antonia Labalan thru the request
the timber land was
of Mr. Federico Reyes over the said land have the
incorporated in this land
same area of 6.5030 hectares (65,030 square
classification map?
meters) of (sic) identical; to each other;

A: There was already

5. That, however, the certification issued to
classification made in Subic
Antonia Labalan which Federico Reyes submitted
before this area was made
to this Honorable Court contained some
classification.
typographical errors like "Block I, Project No. 13,
Subic, Zambales, certified as such by then
Director of Forestry, Manila on June 7, 1927 per Q: You made it understand
LC Map No. 665" that prior to 1961 there was
already land classification
map conducted?
6. That after Federico Reyes obtained such
certification I noticed that the copy left on our files
contained some errors as stated under paragraph A: Yes, your Honor.
5 of this Manifestation/Motion which should be
"Project 13-G, certified by the then Director of
Forestry, Manila as per LC Map No. 2427." When Q: And in that map it was also
said entries were discovered, we tried to contact shown that the area which are
Mr. Federico Reyes to inform him about the errors timber land and the area
but it was only too late. Recently, when Mr. which are actually disposable
Federico Reyes came back to the office, we
informed him about the errors contained in the A: Yes, your Honor.
certification issued to Antonia Labalan and I
further informed him that our file copy had already
been corrected. 14 (Emphasis Ours) Q: Do you know that map
number of the land with
respect to Subic?
Testifying on the said observation, Forester Pobre explained:
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Aside from the verification
and plotting what else did you
do? Q: What is the number?

A: 665 Sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Are you in position to tell
the Court that the location of
that land covered by that title
of Labalan in this
classification map 665.
A: I can show you the
approximate location.
Q: Are you referring to the
land titled covered by the
Labalan?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Will you bindly (sic) show
to us where that land is
located? (witness indicating
the location near Calapacuan
to that area covered by the
word Calapacuan and Mt.
Panaligan).
COURT:
And by the reason of the
place you pointed to am I
correct to say that the land is
within the alienable and
disposable portion of land
classification map 665?
A: No your Honor because it
was not released, it was not
alienable during that time.
Q: It is not within the alienable
and disposable as indicated
therein?
A: No, your Honor.
Q: Where is the alienable and
disposable and will you
indicate here?
A: Outside the right portion
sir, beyond this right sir. This
is the boundary of all this land
are all timber land.
COURT:
Q: Will you point the alienable
and disposable area in this
map?
A: This one up to here, up to
this right, below this right, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
ATTY. ROQUE: Are you saying
Mr. Pobre all of the area
comprises within the
Municipality of Subic are within
the land classification map
Project 13-G?
A: No, your Honor, a portion
only.
Q: How about Barrio Matain
was it within part of Subic was
not within Project 13-G?
A: Calapacuan, Nausog and
other barrio separate
Calapacuan, and Matain
because it is within that Project
13-G.
Q: And you agree with me Mr.
Pobre that there is something
mentioned here nor in land
classification map 2427 that
Barrio Matain, Subic is within
Project 13-G?
A: Because the barrio is within
this Project.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: What is your basis in finding
that Matain is within Project 13-
G?
A: Physically if you will go to the
area Matain is within area
Project 13-G, is within that land
classification map 665 also.
Q: Is the area in land
classification map 242 also
included in land classification
map 665?
A: Portion only sir.
Q: Like what?
A: Like Barangay Matain and
Calapacuan.
COURT:
Q: You know Barangay Matain?
A: It is now alienable sir.
Q: By following the land
classification map 2427?
A: Yes, you Honor.
Q: In land classification map
665 you want the court to
understand that Matain is not
disposable and alienable?
A: Yes, your Honor, it is within
our reservation per this map.
Q: So it is Naval Reservation?
 A: Yes, your Honor. When this
map 665 dated June 7, 1927 it
was certified.
Q: And even that time there was
already a Naval Reservation?
A: According to the map it sees
there is Naval Reservation and
classified as U.S. reservation.
Q: From here up to there, this
U.S. Naval Reservation and
cannot classified such forest.
From here to there.   (Emphasis
16
Ours)
It is clear from the foregoing that at the time the homestead patent was
issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject lot still was part of
the public domain. Hence, the title issued to herein petitioners is
consideredvoid ab initio. It is a settled rule that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property.  17
Petitioners impugn the credibility of Forester Pobre contending that his
testimony is tainted with bias.
While this Court ordinarily does not rule on the issue of credibility of
witnesses, that being a question of fact which is proscribed under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court has undertaken to do so
in exceptional situations where, as here, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals arrived at divergent conclusions on questions of fact and the
credibility of witnesses. 
18
After carefully reviewing the testimony of Forester Pobre, we are convinced
that his testimony is worthy of credence. Forester Pobre actually went to the
disputed area and conducted the verification survey on the subject lot. His
report on the survey was used as basis of Certification No. 65 issued and
signed by Rogelio Delgado in his official capacity as District Forester.
Although Rogelio Delgado was not presented as a witness, his testimony
would not be of much use since his certification was anchored on the
survey report of Forester Pobre who had actual verification on the status of
the questioned land.
Petitioners' contention that the testimony of Forester Pobre is partial in that
his survey and verification of the subject land was made at the instance of
Mary Agnes Burns who is interested in ousting them is erroneous. Forester
Rogelio Delgado conducted the verification survey on the subject lot upon
District Forester Delgado's order. He testified thus:
Q Mr. Pobre . . . you conducted
a verification survey of the land
in question at the instance of
Mary Agnes Burns is that
correct?
A Yes sir, because she came to
our office requesting for the
status of that land in Matain.
19
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q So it was not personally thru
you that the verification was
requested?
A It was thru Mr. Rogelio
Delgado sir . . . then Mr.
Delgado ordered me to conduct
the verification survey.
COURT:
Not personally to you?
A No sir.   (Emphasis Ours)
20
Thus, Forester Pobre was merely performing his official duty as a forester
when he surveyed the land in question. Moreover, the testimony of Forester
Pobre was never rebutted by herein respondents. Hence, in the absence of
any evidence showing that Pobre was biased towards any party, his
verification survey report should be accorded the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his duties as a public officer.
Petitioners also contend that the respondent Republic failed to present
sufficient and substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of the
alienability of land and the presumption that the officers who issued the
patent and the title have regularly performed their official duties.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.  21
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.   This petitioners failed to do.
22
We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belonged to the
inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title
issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the
time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-
interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then
authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified
as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein
petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
Petitioners' contention that the government is now estopped from
questioning the validity of OCT No. 727 issued to them, considering that it
took the government 45 years to assail the same, is erroneous. We have
ruled in a host of cases that prescription does not run against the
government. In point is the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals,   wherein
23
we declared:
And in so far as the timeliness of the action of the
Government is concerned, it is basic that prescription
does not run against the State. . . . The case law has
also been:
When the government is the real party in interest, and
is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and
recover its own property, there can be no defense on
the ground of laches or limitation. . . .
Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State
in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not
run against the State. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State is not barred by
prescription. (Emphasis Ours)
Finally, petitioners argue that the subsequent release of the land as
alienable cured any defect in the grant thereof.
We do not agree.
The rule is that a void act cannot be validated or ratified. The subsequent
release of the subject land as alienable and disposable did not cure any
defect in the issuance of the homestead patent nor validated the grant. The
hard fact remains that at the time of the issuance of the homestead patent
and the title, the subject land was not yet released as alienable. While we
sympathize with the petitioners, we nonetheless can not, at this instance,
yield to compassion and equity. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it
may seem. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., is on leave.

ATTY.
ROQUE:
Are you
saying Mr.
Pobre all
of the area
comprses
wit