Dao

DOI 10.1007/s11712-009-9133-x

ORIGINAL PAPER

Chinese Logic and the Absence of Theoretical Sciences

in Ancient China

SUN Weimin

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract In this essay, I examine the nature of Chinese logic and Chinese sciences in the
history of China. I conclude that Chinese logic is essentially analogical, and that the
Chinese did not have theoretical sciences. I then connect these together and explain why
the Chinese failed to develop theoretical sciences, even though they enjoyed an advanced
civilization and great scientific and technological innovations. This is because a deductive
system of logic is necessary for the development of theoretical sciences, and analogical
logic cannot provide the deductive connections between a theory and empirical
observations required by a theoretical science. This also offers a more satisfactory answer
to the long-standing Needham Problem.

Keywords Chinese logic . Chinese science . Theoretical science . The Needham problem

In this paper, I first examine the nature of Chinese logic and argue that Chinese logic is a
system of analogical inference. Then, I examine the features of theoretical sciences and
argue that Chinese sciences are not theoretical, at least not in the sense that modern sciences
are. I show that a system of deductive logic is necessary for theoretical sciences, and
analogical logic cannot provide the deductive connections between theory and experience
required in a theoretical science. As a result, the nature of Chinese logic explains why there
were no theoretical sciences in China. Since modern sciences are essentially theoretical, this
also answers the Needham problem: why they did not discover modern sciences.

1 Chinese Logic

Did the ancient Chinese have a logic? If they did, what kind of logic is it? And how should
we investigate this matter? Christoph Harbsmeier argued that the ancient Chinese had
explicitly and implicitly used almost all common valid logical forms in their argumentation.

SUN Weimin (*)

Department of Philosophy, California State University Northridge, Northridge, CA 91330-8253, USA
e-mail: weimin.sun@csun.edu
 SUN Weimin

He finds many arguments in Chinese literature that follow common valid logical forms,
such as syllogism, sorites, Modus Tollens, Modus Ponens, and a fortiori (Harbsmeier 1998:
261–286). For example, Harbsmeier cites the following story in Shi Shuo Xin Yu 世說新語 to
illustrate the implicit use of Modus Ponens:
When WANG Jung was seven years old, he was once roaming about with a group of
children and they saw a pear tree by the wayside. The tree had so much fruit that its
branches were breaking under the weight. All the children rushed forward to get the
fruit. Only Jung did not move. Someone asked him why. He replied: “If the tree by
the wayside has much fruit, that must be because the pears are bitter.” They picked
the pears and he turned out to be right. (Harbsmeier: 268–9)
The following is a case of Modus Tollens in Mencius: “For this reason there are no talented
men. If there were, I would be bound to know about them” (Harbsmeier: 283; Mencius
6B6).
Harbsmeier aims to “demonstrate that there was room in ancient Chinese culture for this
kind of [deductively valid] logical reasoning” (Harbsmeier: 265). But his method of
investigation is deeply flawed. Many cultures have used valid logical forms in their
arguments, but only a few cultures can claim to have a logic system. Harbsmeier’s approach
is more like a reconstruction of the logical reasoning of the ancient Chinese with Greek
logic (Aristotelian and Stoic logic). Though ample examples with valid argument forms can
be found in Chinese literature, this does not imply that the ancient Chinese were aware of
these logical forms. The fact that an argument can be formulated as a valid logical form
does not imply that this logical form is consciously used in logical reasoning. An argument
may be formulated in different ways, and in some cases it is even not clear whether there is
an argument (understood as a way of justification).1 In order to have a logic system, the
people need to be aware of these forms of logical arguments and use them consciously and
explicitly in their argumentation.
There is strong evidence to indicate that the ancient Chinese did not have a system of
deductive logic. First, there were no Chinese logicians who studied these forms. As a result,
the forms were never explicitly formulated, and were never used as the guide of reasoning
or the justification of arguments. Instead, many Chinese logicians (the Moist School in
particular) studied the structure of analogical inference. Second, many arguments of valid
forms can be made by intuition alone. Anyone who has taught introductory logic knows
that a student without any knowledge of deductive logic may recognize a valid argument
with their intuitions. Yet these intuitions are not always reliable. There is another story in
Shi Shuo Xin Yu: when the 10 year old KONG Rong (孔融 153–208 CE) attended a party, his
cleverness impressed all, except CHEN Wei 陳韪, who claimed: “if one is bright at a young
age, he may not be any good later.” Overhearing what Chen said, KONG Rong confronted
him: “you must have been very bright when you were young.” The fun part of the story is
that it assumes an implicit premise that Chen is not much good now. This argument is a
case of invalid argument (affirming the consequent), yet its flaw went unnoticed until the
modern age. Third, some analogical inferences are similar to syllogism. Many cases of

1
Harbsmeier is aware of these issues, as he is also concerned with how the ancient Chinese justified their
claims (Harbsmeier: 261–2). And he admits that “the ancient Chinese were more inclined to argue
‘analogically,’ by analogy or comparison, rather than logically by demonstration or proof” (Harbsmeier:
264). Yet he does not think that analogical thinking is a rational way of thinking, so he is forced to discover
deductive arguments in Chinese thinking.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

syllogistic reasoning Harbsmeier cited can be and should be understood as cases of

analogical inference.
I think Chinese logic is a system of analogical inference. We can have a very coherent
picture of logical reasoning in Chinese thoughts if we understand Chinese logic as a system
of analogical inference. From extant ancient texts, we see that analogical inferences are
prevalent patterns of argument in Chinese thought. The Daodejing of Laozi and the
Analects of Confucius do not contain many explicit arguments (the claims are often stated
but not argued), but when there is a need to justify their claims, analogical argument is the
primary means. For example, a typical pattern of persuasion in the Analects is to argue from
what was done by ancient kings or sages to what should be done by present kings or
gentlemen. We find more explicit forms of argumentations in later works such as Mencius
and Zhuangzi, and these arguments overwhelmingly are analogical inferences. Later, Xunzi
and the Moist School gave some systematic and reflective studies on the patterns of
argumentation and reasoning, which again focused on analogical inferences. Analogical
inference continued to dominate the reasoning of Chinese minds in later ages. In the Han
Dynasty there was a boom of correlative thinking when analogical inferences were
extended to cover almost everything. Even the opponents of correlative thinking cannot
avoid analogical inference. WANG Chong (王充 27–97 CE) sharply criticized DONG
Zhongshu’s correlative system, yet his reasoning also relied on analogical inference. There
were few formal studies of logic in later times, but the dominant pattern of reasoning was
analogical. Also, analogical inference was used as a way of reasoning and justification in
almost all fields of study, whether they were scientific, political, or philosophical.
We get a clearer picture of analogical inference from a detailed study of Chinese logical
works. In this essay, I will focus only on the Moist School.2 The Moist Canons contain the
richest and the deepest discussions on logic in Chinese history. Though the texts are
significantly corrupted and often hard to decipher, there is no doubt that the Canons present
a systematic study of logical reasoning and may have opened a window for us to
understand logical reasoning in ancient China.3
The Moist Canons include six parts, two canons, two corresponding explanations, and
Daqu (Big Selection) and Xiaoqu (Small Selection) which were clearly works of later
Moists. The opening statement in the canons says: “The gu (reason/cause) of something is
what it must get before it can come about” (Graham: 263). This shows that Moists required
that statements must be accepted based on good reasons; that is, they must be properly
justified. This statement is further explained in “explanations”: “Minor reason: having this,
it will not necessarily be so; lacking this, necessarily it will not be so. Major reason: having
this, it will necessarily be so; lacking this, necessarily it will not be so” (Graham: 263).
Here Moists made a distinction between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions. The
characterization of major reason implies that if the major reason is true then the conclusion
it supports must also be true. So the Moists were looking for reasons, which, if true, would
guarantee the truth of their conclusion. They were not looking for probabilistic supports.
In Xiaoqu, after stating the purpose of argumentation (demonstrating what is true and
what is false, etc.), Moists outline the nature of logic: “one (A) uses names to refer to

2
Antonio Cua argues that Xunzi’s logic is also analogical. Cua claims that Xunzi distinguishes between
explanation (shuo) and justification (bian), but understands both as analogical (in particular, in Cua’s term,
the latter is understood as analogical projection) (Cua 1985). It seems to me that Xunzi’s approach is not
much different from the Moist School, and they might represent a common feature in contemporary thought.
3
The Moist Canons were completely neglected in the later history of China. There are a lot of recent works
both in Chinese and in English devoted to the studies of Moist logic, such as A. C. Graham’s comprehensive
study Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science.
 SUN Weimin

objects, (B) uses propositions to dredge out ideas, (C) uses explanations to bring out
reasons, and (D) accepts according to the kind, proposes according to the kind” (Graham
482–3).4 This statement defines the roles of names, propositions, and arguments
(explanations). In particular, it claims that argumentation should be based on kinds (lei
類). This indicates that the argument forms the Moists were interested in are those based on
kinds. The following passage in Daqu makes the nature of argumentation explicit:
The proposition is something which is engendered in accordance with the thing as it
inherently is, becomes full-grown according to a pattern, and “proceeds” according to
the kind. It is irresponsible to set up a proposition without being clear about what it is
engendered from. Now a man cannot proceed without a road; even if he has strong
thighs and arms, if he is not clear about the road it will not be long before he gets into
trouble. The proposition is something which “proceeds” according to the kind; if in
setting up a proposition you are not clear about the kind, you are certain to get into
trouble. (Graham: 478–480)
This passage states that there are three aspects of an argument. First, one’s proposition
(thesis) must be supported by reasons; otherwise one is held to be irresponsible. This is
similar to the requirement of epistemic responsibility; that is, in order for a person to know
something, the person must be able to provide reasons to justify it.5 This shows that the
Moists understood the need of justification for one’s beliefs. Second, it claims that
justification is based on patterns (li 理). It is not very clear what the patterns refer to, but the
last statement shows that the patterns must be related to kinds, and inferences should be
carried out based on kinds. It is likely that these patterns are shared characteristics of a kind.
And there is no doubt that the arguments Moists were interested in are those based on
kinds.
What are the inferences based on kinds? Let us first take a look at what a kind is. In his
book, Harbsmeier discusses the historical development of the term “kind” (Harbsmeier:
218–229), and finds that the term “kind” (lei) had its origin in defining a racial group of a
common ancestor and was gradually extended to cover biological kinds (such as tigers and
trees) and natural kinds (such as fire and metals). Harbsmeier claims that Moists further
extended the notion of kind from natural kinds to similarity groups: “for Mo Tzu in this
dialogue a lei [類] is not just a fixed natural kind, it is a relevant similarity group, a set of
things that are similar in a relevant respect” (Harbsmeier: 224). The difference between
natural kinds and similarity groups, according to Harbsmeier, seems to be that the latter
notion understands the kind in a nominal way: “Categories were no longer entirely
traditional or given by nature. They were also conceived as set up by man” (Harbsmeier:
223). Yet Harbsmeier’s arguments for the nominal interpretation of kind are very weak, and
the texts he cites can be better understood with the realistic interpretation of kind. More
importantly, I do not think ancient Chinese philosophers were concerned with the
metaphysical nature of kinds. There are a lot of discussions on this issue today,6 yet most
of the debates put too many contemporary philosophical concerns onto ancient Chinese
philosophy.

4
Unless indicated otherwise, all translations of the Canons are from Graham 1978/2003.
5
Epistemic responsibility is a key concept in epistemology. It is required by the internalist approach to
knowledge, though not by the externalist approach, such as Goldman’s reliability theory. See BonJour 1985:
Chapter 1, for a more detailed discussion of epistemic responsibility.
6
For example, Graham has a nominal interpretation of kinds; FENG You-lan takes a stronger realist approach
(kinds as Platonic universals).
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

I think that the ancient Chinese had a naïve version of realism about kinds. They simply
understood a kind as a class of things bound together in an objective and natural way. This
implies that a kind is not arbitrarily or conventionally defined. For example, ma (horse) is a
natural kind. The ancient Chinese were certainly aware that the class of horses is different
from that of dogs, that two horses are similar, and that there are common aspects shared by
all horses. But they never bothered to explain why a horse belongs to the horse kind by the
shared attributes (universals) or by the similarity relation among their members. It never
occurred to the ancient Chinese that there is a need to explain why two horses belong to the
same class or why two horses are similar. These were simply taken for granted.
This naïve theory of natural kinds is sufficient for studies of nature and can provide
explanations and predictions of natural phenomena. The ancient Chinese understood natural
kinds in a broad way, which included not only physical and biological kinds but also kinds
in human and social affairs. For Chinese thinkers, knowledge is knowledge of kinds. All
major schools of Chinese thought emphasized the notion of kinds, though only a few of
them (such as the Moists) paid attention to formal studies of kinds and inferences based on
kinds.
What is an argument according to a kind? I think the Moists meant them to be
analogical inference. In Xiaoqu, there is a passage discussing different kinds of arguments,
such as pi 辟, mou 侔, yuan 援, and tui 推. All these arguments are analogical inferences. Pi
is a kind of argument that uses other things (as analogy) to illustrate one’s thesis; mou is an
inference between parallel kinds; yuan is to draw a conclusion which falls in the same kind
as the opponent’s position; tui is just the opposite to yuan (though their logical forms are
similar), as it aims to refute the opponent’s thesis by showing that it is in the same kind as
some ridiculously false statements. These arguments can be given a formal analysis. (1)
Yuan is of the following form: “The opponent says F(a); a and b are of the same kind; so
F(b)”; (2) Tui is of the following form: “The opponent says F(a); a and b are of the same
kind; yet it is obvious that F(b) is not the case; so we have to conclude F(a) is not the case”;
(3) Mou is of this form: “F and G are the same kind; F has property P; so G has property
P”; (4) Pi is likely of this form: “a and b are of the same kind; F(a); so F(b)”. Some people
may understand pi merely as an analogy (which aims to clarify a position), rather than an
inference (which aims to justify a position), but Moists treated this as an argument, not just
an explanation.7
The key step in the above analogical argument is to examine whether things are of the
same kind. Moists had a detailed discussion on this topic. The idea is that each kind has a
model or fa (法), which Graham translates as “standard.” Mozi explained what fa is in A-70:
“the fa is that in being like which something is so. The idea, the compasses, a circle, all
three may serve as fa” (Graham: 316). From this explanation, it seems that Mozi understood
fa not only as a typical exemplar (circle), but also as the means that can produce the typical
exemplar (compasses), and probably also as the general characteristics of a kind (the idea of
a circle, which is defined as having the same length from one center). If a kind can be
understood from the above different aspects, a statement in Xiaoqu seems to imply the
exemplars are necessary for analogical inference: “what is an exemplar (xiao 效) is what is
set up as a standard (fa), what conforms to the exemplar satisfies the standard. So what
conforms to the exemplar is true, what does not is false. This is [setting up] the exemplar”
(see Graham: 470–1; my translation). Even when the standard (fa) is understood as a

7
Today analogies are often used to explain difficult concepts and issues. Ancient Chinese thinkers used
analogies in this way, but they also used analogies as inferences to argue for their ideas and to discover new
knowledge.
 SUN Weimin

general characteristic, the actual inference still needs an exemplar that satisfies the standard.
It seems that there is no direct inference from general characteristics without an exemplar.
We can compare analogical argument with syllogistic argument: “All members of A are P; a
is a member of A; so, a is P.” Such an argument does not need exemplars, but it is not an
analogical inference anymore. Moists did have a notion of universal statements, but this
notion was discussed in the context of kinds. Moist arguments did not proceed in the
syllogistic way.8
Analogical inferences were widely used by Moists and other contemporary thinkers. For
example, when Mozi tried to persuade Gong-su-ban that it is not right for Chu to attack Song
(for the benefit of Chu), he used an exemplar that it was not right to kill a person for reward,
and Gong-su-ban agreed. Then Mozi claimed that these two cases were of the same kind, and
criticized Gong-su-ban for not knowing the kind. This argument can be formulated as the
following: “Killing a person for reward is wrong. Killing a person for reward is of the same
kind as attacking a country for benefit. So attacking a country for benefit is wrong.”
An important issue seems to arise: analogical arguments do not have a valid logical
form. The validity of an analogical argument depends on the particular kind and the
property in consideration. For example, with the typical yuan argument, if the property is
shared by all members of the kind, then it is a valid argument; otherwise it is not. If the
property is the essential property of the kind, then the inference can support counterfactual
statements and serve as an explanation. But formally speaking, analogical inferences are not
valid. You can find cases of the same argument form, which have all true premises but a
false conclusion. Does this imply that Moists (and Chinese logicians in general) had no idea
of logical validity?
I think that Moists did aim to discover valid argument patterns, though they did not
succeed in their pursuit. First, as we see above, they understood analogical inferences as
patterns of arguments rather than as particular inference. Second, they studied a variety of
patterns of inferences concerning kinds. The mou argument mentioned above is an
argument between kinds, and in Xiaoqu we see a more detailed study of this kind of
inference. The following passage summarizes five types of inference: “of the things in
general, there are cases where (1) something is so if the instanced is this thing, or (2) is not
so though the instanced is this thing, or (3) is so though the instanced is not this thing, or
(4) applies without exception in one case but not in the other, or (5) the instanced in one
case is this and in the other is not” (Graham: 485). The first type of argument includes the
following instances: “white horses are horses, so riding a white horse is riding a horse.”
“Jack is a person. To love Jack is to love people.” The second type of argument includes
cases like the following: “one’s brother is a beauty; loving one’s brother is not loving a
beauty”; “boat is wood; entering a boat is not entering wood”; “robbers are people; being
without robbers is not being without people”; and the famous one: “robbers are people;
killing robbers is not killing people.” The third type includes the following cases: “reading
a book is not a book; to love reading books is to love books”; “being about to fall into a
well is not falling into a well; to stop someone about to fall into a well is to stop him falling
into the well.”
It is quite difficult to figure out what the later Moists accomplished here. But one thing is
clear: they were trying to study the inference patterns between the kinds. The idea is to see
what kind of predicates can be extended from one kind to the other kind. The basic pattern
of the first three types of arguments is clear: there is a relation between two kinds, F and G

8
The Moists made a distinction between a true universal statement (all members of the kind have the
property) and its opposite (not all the members have the property).
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

(either F ⊆ G or not); a predicate K which can (or cannot) be attributed to the first kind; and
so the predicate K can (or cannot) be attributed to the second kind. In particular, the first
type of argument can be understood as the following form: ∀x (Fx → Gx) ├ ∀x (Fx & Kx
→ Gx & Kx). This is a valid logical form. But the other patterns are much harder to
analyze. The second type has the same kind of premises but a contrary conclusion. This
leads Chris Fraser to claim that “The grounds for rejecting ‘Killing robbers is killing
people’ reflect the fundamental orientation of the Moists’ project. The writers are not
seeking to identify formally valid inference procedures. They are investigating ways in
which formally parallel strings of claims involving terms correctly distinguished as
‘similar’ may fail to reliably produce further parallel, correct claims” (Fraser: 7.3). Yet if we
look at the above study as an attempt to find inference patterns extending from one kind to
a different (larger) kind, then it seems that Moists were looking for valid inference patterns.
I agree with Fraser that such studies are not purely formal and syntactic, as this kind of
approach to validity relies on the meanings of predicates and the nature of kinds. But their
intention was to find valid inference patterns. The inference patterns Moists aimed to find
were based on analogical inference. If we understood their effort from this perspective, we
would have a clearer understanding of Moists’ claims. For example, regarding the second
type of argument, the typical cases Moists had in mind (e.g. loving one’s brother who is a
beauty is not to love beauty, killing robbers is not to kill a person) have a common theme:
the predicate is not transferrable to the larger kind. Today our analysis of the issue is to
conclude that there are two different predicates referred to by the same word (such as
different loves and different killings). But Moists took a different approach, and seemed to
think that such predicates were context-dependent (that is, predicates might have different
uses when applied to different kinds), denying that they were ambiguous predicates.9
A different worry is that analogical arguments, in standard cases, are no different from
syllogism. As we saw earlier, if the property in consideration is shared by all members of
the kind, then a typical analogical inference is a valid argument, and it is equivalent to a
syllogistic argument. But even in such cases, analogical inferences are still different from
syllogisms in two important aspects. On the one hand, analogical inferences are more
practical than syllogisms. A kind is often hard to characterize precisely. It is often easier to
find a typical example of a kind than to define it precisely. This is true for almost all
ordinary kinds, as Wittgenstein has shown us. So an analogical inference is more practical
to use than a syllogistic one.10 On the other hand, there is a serious limitation to analogical
inferences. Typically, an analogical argument requires exemplars. These exemplars must be
observable things, and are often things you are familiar with in experience. Unobservable
entities such as atoms and genes cannot serve as exemplars. Even though some analogical
arguments are about kinds, and the properties of kinds may be unobservable (such as yin
and yang), the kinds in such arguments are natural kinds, so the typical members of these
kinds are observable. There is not a kind of completely abstract and unobservable entities in
Chinese logic. So this kind of logic cannot reason about completely abstract and
unobservable things. Syllogism has no such limitation.

9
Many predicates are context-dependent. For example, in the statements “John is a tall person” and “John is a
tall basketball player,” the predicate “tall” is used in different senses. But if we put these senses as two different
meanings of the word “tall” in a dictionary, there would be too many entries for “tall” in the dictionary.
10
The requirement of syllogism may be too strict for ordinary life arguments. The major premise of a
syllogistic argument is false in almost all the interesting cases. It is not true that all human beings have two
hands or are rational. On the other hand, an analogical argument does not rely upon the truth of a universal
statement but only an exemplar of the class. So analogical inferences are more productive in practical
reasoning and scientific discoveries.
 SUN Weimin

In summary, I have argued that Chinese logic is analogical in practice and in theory.
Analogical reasoning continued to dominate Chinese thinking until the introduction of
Western logic, though the later Chinese paid little attention to formal studies of logical
reasoning. It must be emphasized that the dominance of analogical reasoning had a huge
impact on the orientation of Chinese epistemology and sciences. In their pursuit of
knowledge, the ultimate goal of ancient Chinese philosophers and scientists was knowledge
of kinds. This was quite different from their Western contemporaries. The ancient Greeks
looked for the fundamental principles to build a system of knowledge. These fundamental
principles were regarded as self-evident and so did not need further justification. Other
statements of knowledge can be derived from these fundamental principles using deductive
logic, so that their certainty is also guaranteed. This is the case with Euclidean geometry,
and it is also the case with Aristotle’s physics. The ancient Chinese looked for the basic
kinds by which they could classify things. Typical systems of basic classification include
the theory of yin-yang, the theory of five-elements, and the theory of hexagrams in the Book
of Changes.11 One gains knowledge of things when they are put in the appropriate kinds.
One can also know about the relations between things from the relations between kinds. All
these are supported by analogical inferences.12

2 The Nature of Theoretical Sciences

As I understand it, a theoretical science has the following three features: it postulates scientific
laws to explain/predict observational events; it postulates theoretical entities and/or theoretical
properties to unify scientific explanations; and it has a deductive system that derives empirical
observations (eventually) from theoretical principles.13 I think each feature is a necessary
condition for being a theoretical science, and together they are sufficient.
Scientific laws are broadly construed as general regularities that can support
counterfactual statements. They are contrasted with accidental generalizations.14 This
understanding has no religious bearing at all and can be applied to all cultures. For
example, the statement that “water increases in volume when it freezes” is a true lawful
statement. We can find plenty of scientific laws in Chinese sciences. Yet not all sciences that
postulate scientific laws are theoretical sciences. Theoretical sciences also postulate theoretical
entities and/or theoretical properties that are not empirically observable. Atoms, bacteria, genes,
and the center of Mars’s orbit are not empirically observable. The spin and the charge of an
electron are also not directly observable. These are theoretical entities and properties. A
scientific theory postulates theoretical principles that are laws about theoretical properties or
theoretical entities. Such theoretical laws are different from empirical laws. Empirical laws are
those lawful generalizations which are not involved with theoretical entities or theoretical
properties. In other words, they are simply empirical generalizations.
11
These theories were continuously developed in China. There are two different systems of hexagrams (a
priori and a posteriori), and YANG Xiong 杨雄 of the Han Dynasty proposed a different system of 81
diagrams in his Tai-Xuan theory.
12
Contrary to what Sivin says (“Chinese had sciences but no science, no single conception or word for the
overarching sum of all of them” [Sivin 1982: 48]), if we understand Chinese sciences from analogical logic,
we have a coherent and unified picture of Chinese sciences.
13
I am aware that there are different understandings of theoretical sciences. Though my characterizations of
theoretical sciences are obviously influenced by later logical positivists (esp. Hempel), I think such an
understanding is standard among contemporary philosophers of science (many of them are not logical
positivists). To say the least, it captures the essential features of modern western sciences.
14
No doubt this is a simple characterization of scientific laws, but it is enough for my purpose in this paper.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

One may object that the theory/observation distinction does not really exist and is a
mistake of logical positivism. Many observable terms (such as “red”) are theory-laden; and
we can observe atoms and bacteria with microscopes. It can even be said that astronauts
saw high-energy electrons with their naked eyes (van Fraassen 1982: 58). These objections
are effective against the linguistic distinction that logical positivists drew between theory
and observation. But this does not imply that there is no distinction between theory and
observation. There are a couple of replies to these objections. First, when theories of atoms,
bacteria, or genes were proposed, Dalton, Pasteur, and Mendel did not have the instruments
to observe them. Also, contemporary scientists did not need to “see” them in order to accept
these theories. For these scientists, these terms are truly theoretical in the sense that they
were not observable. So the distinction could be drawn relative to a scientific background
(see Hempel 2001: 208–217). Second, as van Fraassen shows, even though the linguistic
distinction between theory and observation does not hold up, a theory/observation
distinction can be made at the ontological level. As human beings, what we can directly
observe from our senses is a biological fact independent of theories, even though we need
the theory to tell us what kind of things are observable and what are not. So the theoretical
entities and properties can be properly defined, and the notion of theoretical science is
legitimate.
Why do we need theoretical sciences? Theoretical sciences enjoy great advantages over
sciences at a purely empirical level. First, theories can offer us great insights and deeper
understandings of the world, because they can provide a unified explanation to many
diverse phenomena. In contrast, sciences at a purely empirical level generalize their
principles directly from empirical observations. For example, Snell’s law of refraction is an
empirical generalization based on observations. Descartes, on the other hand, explains the
same law from fundamental principles concerning corpuscular particles. This gives us a
deeper understanding of the phenomenon of refraction. It not only establishes the empirical
laws, but it also explains why these laws are true. Second, theoretical sciences provide more
precise solutions to a broader scope of empirical problems than do empirical sciences. The
solutions from theoretical sciences are often more precise than are those from purely
empirical sciences. The applications of empirical laws are often limited in a specific area,
while theoretical laws can be connected to many diverse areas, many of which are distinct
from the area from which the theory arises. Also, theoretical sciences can explain the
failures of those empirical laws when things fall outside the scope of empirical laws. Third,
theoretical sciences have richer resources to resolve mismatches between predictions and
empirical observations. Both Kuhn’s idea of paradigm and Lakatos’s notion of research
program aim to capture such internal dynamics of a scientific theory. As Kuhn has shown
us (Kuhn 1996), when a theory faces empirical challenges, scientists often regard them as
puzzles that can be solved within the paradigm, rather than as anomalies whose solutions lie
outside the paradigm. And they have good reason to think so because a scientific theory
offers a systematic mechanism to resolve these puzzles.
Let me use an example to illustrate the power of theoretical science. The Chinese made
beautiful porcelain, dating back thousands of years. When porcelain was first brought to
Europe from China, even the best European minds (e.g. Francis Bacon) had no idea how it
was made.15 Porcelain making is a very delicate process, which needs the right material
(clay), rigorous temperature control, proper procedure, and well-built ovens (kilns). Other

15
“Various theories had been advanced: that it was some sort of precious stone; that it was a ‘certain juice’
that coalesced underground; or that it was crushed eggshells and seashells mixed with water” (Kerr and
Wood 2004: 741).
 SUN Weimin

decorations such as colored glazes and pigment painting require more knowledge and
technology. It is no surprise that no other country had discovered the art of porcelain
making. In China, porcelain-making developed mostly by trial and error. For example, in
the case of glazes, Kerr and Wood suggest that “in many cases the celebrated qualities of
Chinese glazes were fortuitous by-products of high temperature reaction between the glaze
materials” (Kerr and Wood 2004: 608).
Chinese porcelain was highly appreciated by the European upper class, and there was a
great demand. Though there were some early imitations of Chinese models, Europe had its
first successful porcelain factory, the Meissen factory in Germany in 1710. Led by the
eminent scientist, Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus, and later by chemist Johann Böttger,
Meissen produced the first European porcelain equal to or better than the Chinese. In 1759
Josiah Wedgwood began to produce porcelain in England (he used Francis Xavier’s
description of the famous Chinese porcelain factory Jingdezhen to set up the floor
production plan (Elman 2006: 76–78)). However, Wedgwood soon produced better
porcelain than the Chinese did. So in a span of less than 200 years, Europeans found the
secret of porcelain-making and produced better porcelain products than the Chinese did.
This was only made possible by the contemporary development in sciences and technology
in Europe. Von Tschirnhaus and Böttger started as scientists. Wedgwood was also a
scientific porcelain-maker and a life-long friend of Joseph Priestly (the famous chemist),
and he was elected to the Royal Society in 1783 for his invention of a pyrometer (a
thermometer used for measuring high temperatures). Even though modern chemistry was
just beginning to mature, it offered enough theoretical guidance to rigorous experimentation
that accelerated the development of porcelain-making.
The third and last feature of theoretical sciences is that they are a system of deductive
structure. A theoretical science postulates only a few fundamental principles. Other true
propositions are derived from these fundamental principles. Euclid’s geometry provides a
paradigm example of the deductive structure of theories. It only has five postulates and all
other theorems are deduced from these five axioms plus definitions of terms.16 For a
scientific system, the end of the deductions must be empirical observations. That is, there
must be a connection between theories and empirical observations. Such a connection is
necessary in order for the theory to be tested and to be useful. Since theoretical entities are
not observable, theoretical principles alone cannot make any empirical prediction or
explanation. Some connections must be there for the theories to “touch” our experience. For
example, Rutherford’s planetary model of atomic structure is used to explain the result of the
Geiger-Marsden experiment, and Bohr’s quantum mechnical model explains Balmer’s series of
hydrogen spectrum. Such empirical evidence provides crucial support to these theories. It must
be emphasized that in a theoretical science, the connection between theory and empirical
phenomena is a deductive one. This is obvious given that a theoretical science is a deductive
system. This implies that if an empirical observation is deduced from a theory with auxiliary
assumptions, if the observation does not occur as expected, then either the theory or one of the
auxiliary assumptions must be false. If the auxiliary assumptions are true, then the theory
should be rejected. This is how experience can put great pressure on any theory, since a theory’s
predictions always put a theory at risk: it may be different from what one observes.
Modern sciences are essentially theoretical. There are three important elements to the
emergence of modern sciences: Bacon’s experimental method, Galileo’s quantitative studies

16
It should be noted that the Euclidean system is a mathematical system. Also, modern sciences regard their
basic principles as basic hypotheses rather than as self-evident truths. But they all have the same deductive
structure.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

of motion, and mechanical philosophy shared by many philosophers and scientists (such as
Hobbes, Descartes, and Bacon). Bacon famously rejected Aristotle’s physics and logic, yet
a careful reading shows that Bacon’s sciences are not sciences at a purely empirical level, as
is commonly construed. Bacon did not object to the postulation of theoretical principles,
though he cautions that one should postulate such principles based on detailed and careful
experimentations. What he objected to was the Aristotelian approach that postulates basic
principles from philosophical conjectures of first principles with little empirical evidence.
Bacon did not even object to the deductive structure of a theory, and conceded that
syllogistic logic was useful in this aspect. Galileo’s sciences are mathematical representa-
tions of the world, and they explain and predict empirical observations with unprecedented
precision. Mechanical philosophy, which aims to explain every phenomenon with only the
mechanical properties of small particles, is clearly a theory. Beginning with Descartes and
his contemporaries, the connection between mechanical philosophy and observable
phenomena was gradually made explicit by modern scientists.
The modern sciences which originated from these sources are clearly theoretical. To cite
just one example, Dalton’s atomic theory is a typical case of modern theoretical sciences.
Dalton was not the first (even among contemporary chemists) to conceive the notion of
atoms, nor the first to introduce the idea of quantity into chemistry. But “he was the first
man in the history of science to connect the experimental idea of the definite chemical
composition of matter, expressed in stoichiometric laws, with the theoretical idea of the
atomic structure of the matter” (Kedrov 1949: 648). Such deductive connections are
required for theoretical sciences, and as we’ll see, they are absent in Chinese sciences.

3 Chinese Sciences

The ancient Chinese enjoyed great success in both the technological and scientific
aspects of human affairs. For a long time, Chinese had the most civilized life, the
best understanding of the world and human society, and the most advanced technologies
in agriculture, commerce, and military. Needham’s volumes of Science and Civilization
in China leave no doubt that the Chinese had impressive knowledge in almost all
scientific fields. However, as I shall argue, there were no theoretical sciences in China.
Regarding the three features of theoretical sciences, Chinese sciences had scientific laws,
and postulated theoretical properties and entities, but did not have a system of deductive
structure.
The Chinese had theories. The theories of yin-yang, Five Elements, and Ba-gua were
widely applied in Chinese sciences. These elements are theoretical classifications of things.
There are also theoretical principles that characterize the dynamics between yin and yang,
the overcoming and the generating relations between Five Elements, and the more
complicated relations among different hexagrams. The ancient Chinese understood these
entities not as substance but as properties or functions of the things that can be observed.
For example, it is often a plant, a part of an animal, a person, or a dynasty that is attributed
to the properties of yin or yang (Five Elements should be similarly understood). So these
elements are theoretical properties. The most plausible candidates for theoretical entities
seem to be qi (the material force 氣) and li (principle 理). In particular, these two concepts
were used as theoretical entities in Neo-Confucian cosmology.
But the Chinese did not have a theory with a structure of deductive system. Many
theories are philosophical conjectures, which are never properly aligned with empirical
observations. Many applied Chinese sciences, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and
 SUN Weimin

porcelain-making, are purely empirical sciences without theoretical elements.17 Sometimes

these sciences were connected to theories of yin-yang and hexagrams, but such connections
are superficial, and they were studied and developed in such a strictly empirical manner that
they can be readily separated from the attached theories. Most discoveries in these applied
sciences were made from empirical observations and generalizations, and these discoveries
were often made by technicians or workers (who often left no name behind) rather than by
philosophical thinkers. Scientific and technological discoveries were often secretly
transmitted within a clan or a family, and were regularly lost due to social upheavals.
There were some Chinese sciences with a rich source of theoretical elements, and it is of
great interest to see whether they had a deductive structure. I will consider two subjects:
mathematics and astronomy.18 I will show that Chinese mathematics enjoyed great success,
but it does not have a deductive structure.19 Astronomy was one of the most precise
sciences in China, yet it is not a theoretical science. In contrast, Greek astronomy is highly
theoretical.
Chinese mathematics is a very mature and efficient system, developed through the years.
It made many great discoveries which preceded its Western counterparts, especially in
arithmetic and algebra.20 It has an efficient notational system to represent numbers
(including fractions). This system is in principle the same as what we use today, and with it
Chinese mathematicians did all the arithmetic calculations we do today. Chinese
mathematicians also knew how to solve simultaneous linear equations, quadratic, cubic,
and higher degree numerical equations. Chinese mathematicians invented calculating
devices such as counting rods and the abacus, and the latter of the two was an extremely
efficient and popular tool used in China and many other Asian countries. Chinese
geometrians were also very efficient at solving all kinds of practical problems. In particular,
ZU Chongzhi 祖冲之 (429–500 CE) had the most accurate computation of π in the world
until the 15th century.21
Mathematics was an important part of civil education. The earliest mathematical writing,
Zhoubi Suanjing 周髀算經, came into existence between 100BCE and 100CE. It had
important discoveries, such as Gougu theorem—the Chinese Pythagorean theorem. The
Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art (Jiuzhang suanshu 九章算術) had a systematic
study of mathematics. This book was a consummation of mathematical developments by
generations of Chinese mathematicians up to the Han Dynasty. This book had a tremendous
influence on the later development of Chinese mathematics, both in content and in format.
It became a standard mathematical textbook and was continuously commented upon by
later mathematicians. The book is divided into nine chapters. Each chapter deals with a
17
For example, in agricultural sciences, what we find from works such as Tiangong Kaiwu 天工开物 and
Qimin Yaoshu 齐民要术 are completely empirical generalizations.
18
Chinese medicine has a very complicated theoretical system, which not only utilizes yin-yang and five-
elements theory but also postulates the circulation of qi and the meridians in the human body. I think that
Chinese medicine does not have a deductive system, but rather relied primarily on analogical reasoning.
Given its vast scope, I do not have space to discuss Chinese medicine in this paper.
19
Strictly speaking, mathematics is not an empirical science. But applied mathematics is, and the Chinese
treated mathematics as an empirical subject. Also, the deductive structure of the Euclidean system had a
tremendous impact on later Western science. Chinese sciences did not have such a mathematical system to
model upon.
20
For a more detailed introduction to Chinese mathematics, refer to Needham 1959, vol. 3, Li and Du 1987,
and Ho 1985. After Jesuit missionaries brought Western algebra to China, Chinese mathematicians found out
that it was essentially the same thing as traditional Chinese mathematics, just in different notations (Ho: 110).
21
Zu gave two evaluations of π, an “inaccurate” one (22/7) which is the same as Archimedes’s evaluation,
and an “accurate” one (355/113), which is accurate to seven decimal places. Vieta of France gave an
evaluation accurate up to 10 decimal places in 1593.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

specific kind of mathematical question. For example, chapter 1 (field measurement) deals
with area and volume calculations of different geometrical shapes; chapter 8 (rectangular
arrays) offers solutions to linear equations. The questions are about practical issues, and the
book gives solutions to these questions and offers explanations for the solutions.
Nine Chapters and other mathematical books later became important components of
civil education. In the Tang Dynasty, ten books of mathematical classics (including Zhoubi
and Nine Chapters) were approved as the textbooks used by the Imperial Academy and for
civil service examinations (Li and Du: 92). In Northern Song Dynasty, there was a debate
regarding the status of mathematics in the Imperial Academy. Many people felt that
mathematics was extravagant and did not really help in running the country, and
eventually in Southern Song, the subject of mathematics was discontinued (Li and Du:
109–110). Ironically, shortly after the dismissal of mathematics from the Imperial
Academy, Chinese mathematics reached its zenith in the 13th century, as mathematical
geniuses such as QIN Jiushao 秦九韶, YANG Hui 楊輝, LI Zhi 李治, and ZHU Shijie 朱世傑
produced splendid works in mathematics which overshadowed those of contemporary
Western mathematicians.22
Despite its success, Chinese mathematics did not have an axiomatic structure. Chinese
mathematics is a system based on algorithms, but it does not give proofs. A typical Chinese
mathematical book contains solutions to typical problems (exemplars), but one never finds
a system of axioms and derived theorems.23 These solutions are algorithms in the strict
mechanical sense, and most of them give the most efficient way of computation. With these
algorithms, mathematicians can easily solve other practical issues similar to the exemplars.
But there is no proof for their truth. It seems that Chinese mathematicians are not concerned
with proving their solutions. Rather, they were satisfied with the fact that these solutions
worked. They were more concerned with how to give step-by-step instructions to solve the
problems. Practically, the axiomatic system does not add anything, and Chinese
mathematics is easier to learn and more convenient to use.
The above characteristics of Chinese mathematics can be illustrated with a case study.
One of the best Chinese mathematicians, QIN Jiushao, provided an ingenious solution to the
famous Chinese Remainder Theorem in his Nine Chapters in Mathematics (Shushu
Jiuzhang 數書九章).24 The Chinese Remainder Theorem is concerned with solving a set of
indeterminate equations, i.e. find a number N that satisfies the following equations: N≡ai
mod (Ai) i=1, 2, 3…n. In his solution, Qin gave a general solution to this problem. His
solution did not require the moduli (Ai) to be relatively prime, and he was also aware of the
condition of solvability. Only much later, Euler in 1743 and Gauss in 1801 provided the
first proof of the theorem for relatively prime moduli, and Stieltjes in 1890 provided a proof
for all moduli and specified the solvability condition (Libbrecht: 380). But Qin did not give

22
One possible explanation for the boom is that the scholars dismissed from the Imperial Academy had to
teach mathematics for a living and were free to teach any student. QIN Jiushao said he learned his
mathematics from a recluse scholar. Another thing worthy of notice is that these four masters of mathematics
did not seem to know one another’s work, which would be impossible if there was an organized institute of
mathematics. In the end, individual efforts were not enough to sustain continued growth.
23
The famous gougu theorem was simply stated without proof in both Zhoubi and Nine Chapters. In his
commentary on Nine Chapters, LIU Hui 劉徽 of the Han Dynasty gave some comments on gougu
theorem which can be interpreted as a proof by rearrangement, yet it should be understood as an
explanation, not a proof.
24
The book is a comprehensive mathematical classic, which discusses 81 questions from nine categories
(similar to Jiuzhang Suanshu), covering a variety of fields such as astronomy, agriculture, taxes, finances,
market exchanges, military strategies, and architecture. Libbrecht presents a detailed study in English
(Libbrecht 1973).
 SUN Weimin

any proof (for the existence of a solution to the equations); he simply gave an algorithm that
one could follow step by step to find a solution.
This is typical of all Chinese mathematics. Yet why did Chinese mathematicians only give
algorithms? Were the minds of Chinese mathematicians too practical to notice the need of
proof? This seems to be a common assumption, which leads Libbrecht to ponder why Chinese
mathematicians aimed to study questions that were not derived from everyday life (Libbrecht:
99). Yet this is a false assumption. Chinese mathematicians were not merely interested in
solving practical questions. We can clearly see this from QIN Jiushao’s preface to Sushu
Jiuzhang. He claimed in the very first statement: “The Six Arts of the teaching of the Zhou
were truly made complete by mathematics” (in Libbrecht: 55), and extolled its great
application in things great and small. He lamented that the art of mathematics was not highly
regarded by scholars after the Han Dynasty, and that mathematical studies were often left to
surveyors and calculators, who knew only basic mathematics. But these people were not real
mathematicians, and he cited music as an analogy: “in the field of music, there are conductors
who can only arrange the sounds of the bells and sounding stones, but is it permissible to say
that ‘to produce complete harmony with heaven and earth’ merely consists in this?” (ibid,
56).True mathematics is concerned with the Dao of heaven. It can uncover the laws of heaven
and affairs of humans, so that we can predict future events and act upon these predictions.
Qin’s understanding of mathematics was typical among Chinese mathematicians. It is quite
clear that Chinese mathematicians did have theoretical interests. So the absence of axiomatic
structure needs a different explanation, which, I think, can be found in the basic orientation of
Chinese epistemology. Chinese thinkers pursued the knowledge of kinds. After the knowledge
of kinds is attained, the essential properties of things can be known by classifying them into
appropriate kinds. Similarly, if a mathematical question can be classified into a kind whose
exemplar cases have been given a solution, then the solution to this question is found, since all
issues of the same kind share the same pattern (algorithm). We need to discover the patterns, but
there is really no need to prove the truth of these patterns from more basic principles. Consider
an empirical statement, “dogs bark.” If I know the statement already (as a property of “dog”
kind), what is the point of proving it? For the ancient Chinese, there was no essential
difference between mathematical truths and empirical truths. So it is understandable that
Chinese mathematicians never felt the need to prove their solutions. Why do you need to
prove something you already know to be true (from experience)?25
Chinese astronomy provides us with a great case study of empirical sciences. It was the
most exact science among Chinese sciences, and its precision and accuracy is certainly
comparable to its Western counterpart. Empirically, Chinese astronomers had one of the
most complete and accurate observations of the sky among all cultures. Theoretically,
Chinese astronomers conceived cosmological theories and mathematical theories to explain
and predict a variety of regular heavenly phenomena. However, Chinese astronomy was not
really a theoretical science, and there are significant differences between Chinese
astronomy and Greek astronomy. There were at least three cosmological theories available
by the Han Dynasty. The oldest one was Gai Tian 蓋天 (covering sky) theory, which was
formulated in detail in Zhoubi Suanjing. This theory says that the round heaven is like a

25
This is especially the case with geometry. Chinese mathematicians gave formulas to calculate the areas or
the volumes of different shapes, but did not give any proof why these formulas are true. This may greatly
frustrate Western geometricians, but it is just natural for the Chinese. If the formula is right, what does a
proof add to it? Mikami had a similar observation with Japanese mathematics (which is essentially the same
as Chinese mathematics): “The old Japanese seem to have considered mathematics as a branch of natural
science; mathematical rules or methods devised or used by them were all treated as a kind of art. They never
thought of demonstration” (Mikami 1913: 166).
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

hemispherical cover, and the square earth is like a basin turned upside down. There is a
constant distance of 80, 000 li between the heaven and the earth. The sun is attached to the
heavens, and besides moving along with the heaven’s daily rotation, the sun shifts its
position between the seasons. The Hun Tian 渾天 (celestial sphere) theory, as ZHANG Heng
張衡 explains, says that the heaven is like a hen’s egg, while the earth is like the yolk of the
egg and lies alone in the center. The heaven is supported by qi, and the earth floats on the
waters. The third, Xuanye 宣夜 (infinite empty space), theory claims that the sun, the moon,
and the stars float freely in the infinite empty space. All are condensed vapor (qi). The
theory also noted the regressions of planets and the movements of the sun and the moon
themselves, and offered an explanation that these objects are not attached to anything (e.g.
the heaven) and move by their own nature (see Needham 1959: 210–224).
Xuanye theory, despite its similarity to modern astronomy, did not have much influence
in Chinese astronomy. There was a rigorous debate between the Gaitian and Huntian
theories, and the Huntian theory dominated Chinese astronomy after the Han Dynasty.
Based on the Huntian theory, ZHANG Heng made his famous armillary spheres (huntian yi
渾天儀), which were perfected by later astronomers (especially GUO Shoujing 郭守敬 of the
Yuan Dynasty). The Huntian theory is very similar to the Greek two-sphere theory, which
was the foundation of Western astronomy until Copernicus. So it seems that we have a clear
example of a theoretical science in China. Yet this similarity is only apparent. The theory
played very different roles in their systems. Different from Greek astronomy, Chinese
cosmological theories were not based on a geometrical system. As a result, these theories
only provided a theoretical framework, but were never connected with observation in a
precise way. The Huntian theory offered a basic cosmological model, helped to explain
some phenomena (such as eclipses), and assisted in observation. But it was not used to
make precise predictions. Armillary spheres were very useful in observations and
explanations but were rarely used for prediction of heavenly phenomena.26 The precise
prediction of regular heavenly phenomena was handled in a separate subject, the science of
calendar-making. However, this science had no theoretical elements at all.
The Chinese understood the calendar in a very broad sense, as it determined not only the
length of a year, solstices, and equinoxes but also aimed at discovering other heavenly
regularities, such as solar and lunar eclipses and planetary motions. Chinese calendar-
making is a complicated mathematical theory based on cycles of motion (see Sivin 1969).
Let me use the Quarter Day system of the Han Dynasty to illustrate it. The system says that
the moon repeats its monthly motion in 29 and 499/940 days, and the sun repeats its yearly
motion in 365 and a quarter days. The motions of the sun and the moon (and other planets)
are understood as constant cycles that repeat themselves forever. Chinese astronomers then
calculate the larger cycle in which both the sun and the moon return to the same position,
by finding the lowest common multiples of these two cycles, and that is a cycle of 19 years
(or 235 months). This is to say that both the sun and the moon repeat their exact positions
every 19 years. This cycle is called the Rule Cycle, and astronomers treat it as a basic cycle.
With this basic cycle, they predict the relative locations of the sun and the moon at any time
(assuming they move at a constant speed, which later Chinese astronomers realized is not
true). If we consider other regular heavenly objects such as planetary motion, the basic
cycle becomes much larger (e.g., the Great Planetary Conjunction Cycle is 138,240 years),

26
This is especially obvious with the motion of planets. Greek astronomy designed geometrical models to
explain the complex patterns of planet motion. Chinese astronomy never figured out the orbits of planets, and
treated many phenomena involved with planet motions as unpredictable events (which were given
astrological explanations).
 SUN Weimin

yet the mathematical principle of cycle calculation is the same. This is also the strategy
utilized to predict moon and sun eclipses. If we know that the cycle of the occurrence of
moon eclipse, then we can predict its next occurrence.
The key to the cycle theory is the precise determination of observable cycles such as that
of the moon and the sun. Only after we know the durations of these cycles can we
determine the basic cycles. However, the extremely precise measurement of a month (as 29
and 499/940 days) cannot come from actual observations, so it must have been derived
from the empirical observation of the Rule Cycle (the solstice and the new moon recur on
the same day every 19 years). If this is the case, cycle theory cannot explain more than what
has been observed: the greater cycle is not derived from empirical observations but is
directly observed.27 Furthermore, any change in empirical observation would lead to a
radically different cycle theory, which was exactly the case in the history of Chinese
calendar-making. For example, the major difference between the two competing systems,
the Quarter Day system and the Triple Concordance system, was the cycles of the sun and
the moon: the Quarter Day system used the above numbers, while the Triple Concordance
system claimed that a lunar month is 29 and 43/81 days, and a year is 365 and 385/
1539 days. Also, though it can be argued that the science of calendar-making has a
mathematical structure, it is essentially an algebraic manipulation of empirical observations
of heavenly regularities. It does not have any theoretical components.
In summary, Chinese astronomy was not a theoretical science. The cosmological theories
were theoretical, but they were not connected with empirical phenomena in a proper
(deductive) way. The science of calendar-making is mathematical, but it has no theoretical
elements. Greek astronomy was very different. Consider Ptolemy’s system in Almagest,
which presents a geo-centered two-sphere geometrical system. In this system, the
geometrical motions attributed to planets and the sun, such as deferent and epicycle,
eccentric, and equant, are not directly observable. These theoretical concepts played crucial
roles in the system as they were used to account for empirical observations. Ptolemy’s
geometrical system had a deductive mechanism to explain and predict all observable
heavenly phenomena, including the motion of the sun and planets (relative to the heavenly
sphere), and the eclipse of the sun and the moon. So Ptolemy’s astronomy has all the
features of theoretical sciences. The geometrical system has a great advantage. Not only did
it give precise explanations and correct predictions, but it also had an internal mechanism to
accommodate mismatches between its predictions and empirical observations. In the history
of Western astronomy, Ptolemy’s system has been repeatedly revised (e.g. more epicycles
added to the system) in light of more precise observations. However, the basic ideas and the
theoretical tools remained the same, and later astronomers rarely doubted the system as a
whole. Even Copernicus used the same problem-solving mechanisms (except the notion of
equant) in his new system, which rejected some of Ptolemy’s fundamental assumptions.
Copernicus’s revolution was a direct response to the crisis encountered by Ptolemy’s

27
Sivin mentioned that there are attempts to derive the larger cycle (19 years) from the Book of Changes. We
can find an example in Han Shu (漢書): “The Book of Changes says: ‘The celestial 1, the earthly 2, the
celestial 3…. The celestial numbers are five, and the earthly numbers are five. When the numbers are
properly distributed [among the five elements], each plays a complementary part in the whole. Then
the celestial numbers are 25, the earthly numbers are 30; the numbers of heaven and earth together are
55. By this number change is brought to completion and the spiritual beings set in motion. Further,
adding the final [yin and yang] numbers gives 19; permutation has gone as far as it can and so there is
a transformation [which begins the cycle again]” (Sivin 1995: 8). This deduction hardly makes any
sense. It seems to be only an effort to attach the theory to the prestigious Book of Changes. The larger
cycle must be empirically discovered.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

system, and without the framework of the Ptolemaic astronomy the Copernican system
would not be possible.28
Chinese astronomy developed differently. It had no underlying geometrical system that
deductively connected the theory to empirical observations. Also, there was no internal
theoretical connection between different cycle theories. If a different cycle was used, then it
was a completely different theory. The cycle theory did not have a theoretical structure, and
could not offer an internal problem-solving mechanism to handle mismatches between its
prediction and observations. Actually, Chinese astronomers were so frustrated that they had
little confidence in any calendar theory. Frustrated by failures of available systems to
predict the moon eclipse, a Han official complained: “the Way of Heaven is so subtle,
precise measurement so difficult, computational methods so varying in approach, and
chronological schemas so lacking in unanimity, that we can never be sure a technique is
correct until it has been confirmed in practice—nor that it is adequate until discrepancies
have shown up” (Sivin 1995: 60).

4 The Needham Problem Reconsidered

Needham’s twenty-plus volumes of Science and Civilization in China has established beyond
doubt that the Chinese had great scientific knowledge, parallel to or better than the West, until
the Scientific Revolution. Yet even at the beginning of the project, Needham was deeply
puzzled over why the Chinese did not discover modern science.29 Needham understands
modern science as the quantitative sciences developed in Europe since the 16th century, which
are characterized as the combination of mathematized hypotheses about natural phenomena
with relentless experimentation. This problem is more pressing if we consider the fact (which
Needham formulated as the second, equally important question) that Chinese civilization,
between the 1st century and 15th century, “was much more efficient than occidental in gaining
natural knowledge and in applying it to practical human needs” (Needham 2004: 1).
The Needham problem is to explain why, in spite of great successes in earlier periods,
Chinese sciences did not develop into modern science, as its Western counterpart did. Many
ideas have been offered to explain this problem. Derek Bodde claims that Chinese written
language was too vague and ambiguous to be fit for scientific purposes. Words in literary
Chinese were used in a variety of grammatical forms, and there was no punctuation to
separate sentences. Further, Chinese literary devices and techniques “have all served to turn
Chinese scholarship away from substance and toward form, away from synthesis and
generalization and toward compilation and commentary” (Bodde: 96). Contrary to many
other experts (including Graham and Needham),30 Bodde claims that “written Chinese has,
28
Kuhn offers a good account of the transition from the Ptolemaic system to the Copernican system in his
book The Copernican Revolution. Kuhn comments: “Copernicus is frequently called the first modern
astronomer. But, as the text of the De Revolutionibus indicates, an equally persuasive case might be made for
calling him the last great Ptolemaic astronomer” (Kuhn 1957: 181).
29
Needham was not the first to be puzzled by this problem, though his approach is probably the most thoughtful and
certainly the most influential. REN Hongjun 任鴻隽, in “On the Absence of Science in China” in 1915, blames
the lack of attention to the inductive method; FENG Youlan 馮友蘭, in a similarly-titled paper in 1922, claims
that “Chinese ideal prefers enjoyment to power that China has no need of science” (see Sivin 1995: 261).
Sivin also mentioned some Western authors, such as Dubs, Bodde, and Murphey (Sivin 1982).
30
The difference here between Needham and Bodde is so great that Bodde’s monograph, which was
originally a part of SCC’s Volume 7, needs to be published separately (Bodde 1991). Note that many
Renaissance thinkers (such as Francis Bacon) also blamed language for the lack of scientific development in
the Middle Ages and advocated a new scientific language.
 SUN Weimin

in a variety of ways, hindered more than it has helped the development of scientific ways of
thinking in China” (Bodde: 95).
Needham’s own thoughts have evolved with time,31 but the main idea is constant. As a
Marxist, Needham believes that the cultural elements (of which sciences are part) are
determined by material factors, i.e. geographical, hydrological, social, and economic
factors. In particular he aims to explain the development of science and technology in
China by the mode of social production. He identifies Chinese society since the Han
Dynasty as a kind of Asiatic mode of production, which he calls bureaucratic Feudalism.
This is a society “which functioned fundamentally in a ‘learned’ way, the seats of power
being filled by scholars, not military commanders” (Needham 2004: 16). Inside this
bureaucratic society, Needham further identifies the Daoist non-intervening (wu-wei)
attitude to nature as a propitious factor that helped to advance earlier scientific
development.32 Yet this non-intervening character also discouraged the experimental
method from being fused with the mathematics of the scholars that is necessary for modern
science. As Needham puts it, “In medieval China there had been more systematic
experimentation than the Greeks had ever attempted, or medieval Europe either, but so long
as ‘bureaucratic feudalism’ remained unchanged, mathematics could not come together
with empirical Nature-observation and experiment to produce something fundamentally
new” (Needham 2004: 17). This is because “experiment demanded too much active
intervention, and while this had always been accepted in the arts and trades, indeed more so
than in Europe, it was perhaps more difficult in China to make it philosophically respected”
(Needham 2004: 17–18). There are also sociological explanations to the Needham problem,
which often aim at narrower and more specific causes. Toby Huff blames the Chinese
higher education system and the legal-political system in general for failing to create a
neutral sphere of intellectual autonomy independent from state authorities (Huff 1995: 316–7).
Justin Lin (1995) believes that it is the system of civil-service examination that diverted
curious geniuses from scientific investigations.
I will not examine these proposals in this paper.33 Interesting as it is, the Needham
Problem may not be the most pressing problem. Einstein once commented:
The development of Western science is based on two great achievements: the
invention of the formal logical system (in Euclidean geometry) by the Greek
philosophers and the discovery of the possibility of finding out causal relationships
by systematic experiment (during the Renaissance). In my opinion one should not be
astonished that the Chinese sages have not taken those steps. The astonishing thing is
that those discoveries were made at all. (Einstein 1963: 142)
So it could be just lucky that modern sciences were discovered at all, or at least it was a
chance event that it was discovered by the Europeans in the 16–17th centuries. The
Needham problem is narrow in its scope: it focuses on a specific historical period in a
specific region. Similar questions can be asked about India and Islamic states: why did not

31
In a paper written in 1946, Needham claims that “there was no modern science in China because there was
no democracy” (Needham 1969: 152).
32
Needham has high praise for Daoism, and not much love for Confucianism, which he regards as an
inhibitory factor for scientific development. He also extols the organic thought in Chinese philosophy, which
he contrasts with mechanical philosophy. Needham believes that mechanical philosophy is necessary for the
development of modern science, but organic philosophy is for the present and the future science. See
Nakayama 1973 for further discussion.
33
Some of them are based on false or partially false premises (Bodde); others do not offer a sufficient answer
to the Needham problem, as will be clear from the discussion below.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

modern science emerge in those societies which also had great accomplishments in science
and technology? For such questions about particular historical events, it seems that the best
we can do is to have some social/economic explanations.
But there is a more general question to investigate: in the long history of China, the
Chinese did not have theoretical sciences. Why did the Chinese fail to develop theoretical
sciences at all? The failure is especially egregious. It is not just with a particular time, since
there were no theoretical sciences in the long history of Chinese civilization. It is not just
with a particular culture: China went through many dynasties that had very different socio-
political structures and religious and cultural systems. And it is not a problem only at a
social-political level: there were also no traces of individual scientists who had developed
theoretical sciences. So the really puzzling problem is why the Chinese did not have
theoretical sciences at all. Since modern sciences are essentially theoretical sciences, if we
can find out what inhibits the Chinese from developing theoretical sciences, then we also
have a good answer to the original Needham problem.
Also, modern Western sciences did not develop in a vacuum. Some recent studies argue
that theoretical sciences emerged long before the 16th century. Later Greek sciences of the
Hellenistic period were not essentially different from modern sciences. This says that
theoretical sciences were not new inventions of the Renaissance, but a rediscovery of a
much older tradition. Lucio Russo argues persuasively that theoretical sciences flourished
in the Hellenistic period (Russo 2004). Euclid, Archimedes, Hipparchus, Ptolemy, and
Galen are just some famous names from many scientists in this period who made great
discoveries in many different fields. They developed advanced sciences that are essentially
theoretical, and applied them to empirical matters with great success. Unfortunately,
sciences were gradually lost in the Roman Imperial period when the Hellenistic kingdoms
were annexed by the Roman Empire. Books were destroyed, scholars were killed or
enslaved, and students were nowhere to be found. In the dark ages, people did not even
know what had been accomplished by Hellenistic sciences, except from piecemeal
information that was often misunderstood. Fortunately, some of the theories were preserved
and studied by the Arabs and were translated and gradually recovered around the time of
the Renaissance. This set the stage for later development by Galileo, Descartes, and others,
and its outcome is what we know today as modern science. Due to advances in technology
and changes in social structure,34 mathematics and sciences developed at a much faster
rate and had a greater scope of applications. Yet, there is no essential difference between
modern sciences and Hellenistic sciences.
In contrast, there was no theoretical science in China at all. Impressed by the practical
success of Chinese sciences, Needham failed to recognize that there were essential
differences between ancient Chinese sciences and Western sciences before the scientific
revolution. The real puzzle seems to be: why did China miss not just ONE opportunity to
develop theoretical sciences in modern times, but failed to develop any theoretical science
at all? If the Greeks could develop theoretical sciences, why couldn’t the Chinese? This
puzzle cannot be explained by social and cultural conditions alone. From the late Zhou to
the Qing Dynasty, Chinese societies went through many social-political and ideological
changes which were often dramatically different from each other. Even Confucianism was
not always the dominant theme in a society (e.g. Qin Dynasty, Yuan Dynasty, and Tang
Dynasty to a lesser degree). Bureaucratic government was not firmly established until the
Tang Dynasty, and the contents of civil-service examination varied greatly in different

34
Social-economic-political factors are certainly important for scientific development. It is just that these
factors alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation to the Needham problem, broadly construed.
 SUN Weimin

dynasties. Also, different religious and philosophical ideas were prevalent at different times.
Furthermore, social and cultural factors work best with explaining the general direction of
scientific development, but cannot sufficiently explain why there was no individual effort to
develop theoretical sciences. There was no trace of any theoretical science in any field of
scientific studies, including the higher sciences of scholars such as astronomy and the lower
empirical subjects of artisans such as porcelain-making.
I think the analogical nature of Chinese logic may help us resolve this puzzle. As I have
argued earlier, a distinct feature of Chinese logic is the dominance of analogical inference
and the lack of attention to deductive inference. This direction of Chinese logic had a deep
impact on other parts of Chinese civilization, especially on Chinese sciences. Chinese
scientists implicitly or explicitly relied on analogical inference in their scientific studies.
The goal of Chinese scientists was to know kinds, not to build systems. Chinese scientists
and philosophers did not see the need of proving their beliefs based on fundamental
principles in a deductive system. Instead, analogical inferences were the primary means in
their pursuit of knowledge. Given the basic role that logic plays in our inquiry, this
orientation of analogical logic affected almost all philosophers and scientists at different
times, regardless of the social-political situations. Yet typical analogical inference relies
upon observable exemplars to draw the inference, so analogical inferences are limited in the
sphere of observable entities. Therefore, the logical connection from unobservable entities
to observable phenomena cannot be supported by analogical reasoning. Also analogical
logic cannot provide a deductive structure for a theory. Formally speaking, the analogical
inferences are invalid arguments that cannot guarantee the truth of their conclusions even
when all their premises are true. Since most theoretical sciences postulate theoretical
entities and all of them require that theoretical elements be deductively connected to
empirical phenomena, theoretical sciences cannot be supported by analogical logic. This
indicates that the dominance of analogical reasoning in Chinese thought is a crucial
reason that, in the long history of Chinese civilization, there was no trace of theoretical
sciences.35
The analogical nature of Chinese logic can also explain the great successes in Chinese
sciences (i.e. the second part of the Needham problem). Analogical logic is extremely
conducive to empirical generalizations, and the knowledge about kinds becomes an explicit
goal of scientific inquiry. Analogical inference is also easy to learn and to use and has a
practical advantage over syllogistic inference. Basically, analogical logic can do everything
that a formal deductive logic can do at an empirical level of scientific study. So it is no
surprise to see that Chinese sciences flourished within the framework of analogical logic.
The ancient Chinese had plenty of theories. They also had advanced mathematics to have
adequate quantitative representation of the world. And they did not lack experimental spirit.
The only missing link to theoretical science is the deductive connection between theories and
empirical observation. The dominance of analogical thinking in China decided the fate of
ancient Chinese sciences. Analogical logic is a great tool for the expansion of empirical
knowledge, but it also determines that Chinese sciences cannot be theoretical sciences.36

35
There are cases of deductive inferences in Chinese sciences (such as YANG Xiong’s Eight Refutations of
Gai-tian Theory). But these were mostly an unconscious use of deductive logic. There was no conscious and
systematic effort to utilize deductive logic in scientific explanation or theory building.
36
A natural question to ask is why the Chinese did not develop deductive logic while the Greeks did. G. E.
R. Lloyd suggests that reasoning and argumentation have different purposes in Chinese and Greek society.
The Chinese were more concerned with persuading the ruler, while the Greeks had to be ready to defend
themselves in the people’s court (Lloyd 2004: ch. 4). The detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Chinese Logic and Theoretical Sciences

Acknowledgment I would like to thank Chris Fraser, Sir Geoffrey Lloyd, Nathan Sivin, and two
anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful comments. This project was supported by California
State University Northridge Tseng Family Research Grant.

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