Chinese Journal of Communication

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The struggle for hegemony: the emergence of a

counter-public sphere in post-1997 Hong Kong

Paul S. N. Lee, Clement Y. K. So, Louis Leung, Francis L. F. Lee & Michael Chan

To cite this article: Paul S. N. Lee, Clement Y. K. So, Louis Leung, Francis L. F. Lee
& Michael Chan (2017) The struggle for hegemony: the emergence of a counter-public
sphere in post-1997 Hong Kong, Chinese Journal of Communication, 10:4, 338-359, DOI:
10.1080/17544750.2017.1396230

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Chinese Journal of Communication, 2017
Vol. 10, No. 4, 338–359, https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2017.1396230

The struggle for hegemony: the emergence of a counter-public sphere

in post-1997 Hong Kong
Paul S. N. Leea*, Clement Y. K. Sob, Louis Leungb, Francis L. F. Leeb and Michael
Chanb 

School of Communication, The Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong, Hong Kong;
a

School of Journalism and Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
b

Hong Kong

The present study examines the struggle for hegemony in the public sphere by two
different systems, following Hong Kong’s handover to China in 1997. It has been pos-
tulated that the new media, particularly social media, has become an important public
sphere for the citizens of Hong Kong to engage in an anti-hegemonic struggle against
China’s discursive encroachment into Hong Kong since 1997. Given that the public
platform provided by legacy media has been bought out or coopted by China, new
media has begun to serve as a subaltern public sphere to enable resisting the hegemony
imposed by China. This was analyzed through a survey conducted as part of this study,
which showed that people who are young, read the Apple Daily, have high expectations
of local autonomy, and a high regard for press freedom are prone to using social media
to obtain their social and political information. This article analyzes the implications of
the emergence of a counter-China hegemonic public sphere.
Keywords:  counter-public sphere; hegemony; one country; two systems; elites;
­counter-elites; China–Hong Kong relations

“One country, two systems”

When Hong Kong was handed over to China on 1 July 1997, the people of Hong Kong
were promised a high level of autonomy according to the “one country, two systems”
policy. China promised that Hong Kong’s existing independent institutions such as the
free press, free speech, the independent judiciary, the free economy, horse races, ballroom
dancing, etc., would remain unchanged for 50 years. At that time, China was a one-party
state with the Communist Party wielding total power, while Hong Kong was a colony run
by a governor appointed by the British government. Economically, China was a planned
socialist economy, while Hong Kong had a free economy with minimal government inter-
vention.
On the eve of Hong Kong’s handover to China, China was a relatively poor coun-
try with a GDP of approximately US$961.6 billion, as compared with the United States’
US$8608.5 billion (Trading Economics, 2017a, 2017b). Although Hong Kong was a tiny
city of only 1104 square metres and a population of 6.5 million, it had a GDP of US$171.9
billion with US$26,404 per capita (Census & Statistics Department, 1998), much higher
than China’s per capita GDP of US$1444 (Trading Economics, 2017a).

*Corresponding author. Email: paullee@hsmc.edu.hk

© 2017 The Centre for Chinese Media and Comparative Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
 Chinese Journal of Communication   339

Changes over time

The start of the twenty-first century, however, brought impressive growth to China’s econ-
omy, and today it is the second-largest economy in the world, second only to the United
States (Trading Economics, 2017a, 2017b). In 2015, China’s per capita GDP was US$6498.
Although this is still lower than that of Hong Kong (US$42,074; Census & Statistics
Department, 2017) and the United States (US$51,638; Trading Economics, 2017b), in
terms of growth rate China’s per capita GDP gain was nearly 350% in the past two decades,
while those of Hong Kong and the United States were 59% and 26% respectively.
This economic boost has been accompanied with a tremendous rise in China’s global
political power. It no longer needs Hong Kong to serve as a source of foreign direct invest-
ment; on the contrary, Hong Kong now increasingly relies on China for its economic
well-being. In 2015, the Chinese Mainland was Hong Kong’s largest source of imports,
accounting for 49% of its total imports, as well as its largest export market, accounting
for 53.7% of its total exports (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, [HKTDC], 2017).
This change in Hong Kong and China’s economic relationship also brought changes to the
“one country, two systems” policy.

China–Hong Kong conflicts

In the early days, the citizens of Hong Kong assumed that the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (Government of HKSAR) would continue to run all
its internal affairs as per usual, and that the Central Government of China would only
handle Hong Kong’s foreign affairs and defense, in line with Articles 13 and 14 of the
Hong Kong Basic Law (Constitutional & Mainland Affairs Bureau, 2015). However, as
time went by, it became evident that China wanted a secure grip on Hong Kong, which it
did by ensuring that its chief executive (CE) was under the Central Government’s control.
The so-called “831 Framework” was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (NPCSC) on 31 August 2014. It stipulated conditions which
enabled Beijing to screen candidates running to be elected as chief executive of Hong
Kong. The Framework allowed Beijing to eliminate candidates it disliked even before
the citizens of Hong Kong were able to cast their votes. This newly imposed restriction
caused an uproar, especially among Democrats, who denounced the framework as a “fake
universal suffrage” of the chief executive position. In protest, they started the Occupy
Central campaign, while college students led a general strike on 22 September 2014. These
two protests finally culminated in the 79-day-long Umbrella Movement, which received
worldwide attention.
To many of Hong Kong’s citizens, China’s sovereignty over their place is secure and
solid. Rarely has China’s claim over Hong Kong been challenged. It is only very recently
that a small part of Hong Kong’s youth has started to demand Hong Kong’s independence,
and this new development is largely a result of their democratic aspirations being frus-
trated. Even so, the demand for independence is weak. According to a survey conducted in
July 2016, only 17% of the respondents said they would support the independence of Hong
Kong after 2047 (i.e., 50 years after 1997), and 81% considered it “not possible” for Hong
Kong to become independent in the future (Centre for Communication & Public Opinion
Survey, 2016a). Hong Kong’s citizens could have hardly imagined that they would become
an issue of national security for China.
From China’s point of view, however, Hong Kong may become a potential threat to its
stability and development interests. If Chinese institutions and ideas start to be modeled
340  P. S. N. Lee et al.

along the lines of Hong Kong’s or are demanded by Chinese citizens on the Mainland,
China believes this will lead to instability and threaten the rule of the Communist Party.
For example, China believes that if the Mainland Chinese citizens demand free speech,
free press, and the freedom of assembly, it will likely result in chaos and jeopardize the
Communist Party’s rule.
The separatist forces in Xinjiang and Tibet are also a critical factor in China’s consider-
ations of Hong Kong’s democratization. Allowing Hong Kong to have a popularly elected
CE without Chinese pre-screening may result in the Central Government losing control of
the electoral process. Other provinces in China may also then demand the same autonomy
in choosing their leaders. China has to be careful to prevent Hong Kong’s liberal ideas and
institutions from spreading into China by closely censoring the Internet and controlling
cross-border flows of media from Hong Kong. China’s anxiety about this was exemplified
by the “disappearance” of five booksellers from Hong Kong, accused of trading in banned
political books, at the end of 2015. Some of them later appeared on China’s Central Televi-
sion, explaining that they had not been abducted and even confessing to their wrongdoings
(Forsythe, 2016; Phillips & Sala, 2016). These booksellers had sold Chinese books in the
Mainland that attacked or slandered Chinese government officials, including president Xi
Jinping.
Apart from using structural design to block the Democrats from gaining a majority in
the legislature, China has also tried to marginalize them by giving lukewarm responses to
Democrats’ demands for political reforms, using local pro-Beijing bodies to dub them as
“unpatriotic,” “ignorant of people’s livelihoods,” and “causing social instability.” Many
of the Democratic leaders are also denied entry into Mainland China. China seems to be
hoping that the Democrats will be marginalized enough such that the pro-Beijing camp can
finally control the legislature in Hong Kong, just like its counterpart in the neighboring
Macau that had legislated its Article 23 in Macau’s Basic Law against treason, subversion,
and secession in 2009.
However, Hong Kong is not Macau – its democratic forces and civil society are
much stronger and more deep-rooted. Thus, Hong Kong’s frustration at being denied the
chance to be a “genuine” democracy, i.e., universal suffrage of Hong Kong’s CE with-
out pre-screening, has led to a growing movement asking for its independence after the
Umbrella Movement. This sentiment is particularly strong among Hong Kong’s youth.
China now has to face not only the problem of democratization in Hong Kong but also the
germinating demand for Hong Kong’s independence.

A contest for hegemony

Pareto, the Italian political theorist and sociologist, pointed out that history is full of
conflicts, but the most historically important conflict is between the elites contending for
power (Lyttelton, 1975). Political change represents only one ruling elite being replaced by
another. He asserted that there are two types of elites in society: the governing elite and the
non-governing elite (Pareto, 1968). In the past two decades, Hong Kong has witnessed a
struggle for hegemony between the liberal-oriented elites and the pro-China counter-elites
who are backed by Beijing. China wants to practice the “one country, two systems”
approach in the Chinese way, which is in the form of a Communist party-led merger with
Hong Kong, with an emphasis on economic growth. The liberal-oriented Hong Kong
elites, however, want to see the “two systems” distinctively separated, with an emphasis on
Hong Kong’s democratization and economic growth. In the past two decades, China has
tried to marginalize the Democrats, many of whom are liberal-oriented elites, and replace
 Chinese Journal of Communication   341

them with pro-China counter-elites. The mass media is the battlefield where the struggle
for hegemony is taking place.
Gramsci, based on Marx’s concept of ideology and false consciousness, developed the
notion of “hegemony,” which is a process of manufacturing consent for and acceptance
of the existing social order (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci pointed out that the state’s coer-
cive power is used only as a last resort when hegemony fails to convince people that the
way they live is natural, preordained, and is in their best interest (Brookfield, 2005). The
ideological control often operates at the subconscious level and is enforced through the
media, schools, churches, community associations, etc. Mass media and journalism are
particularly important in articulating hegemony, since people come across them every day,
and take their news and information for granted. The mass media thus plays a particularly
important role in producing and maintaining hegemony. It is no surprise to see that China
has endeavored to control Hong Kong’s media in order to articulate a hegemony different
from that left behind by the British after 1997.
In the two decades since China’s rule, most mass media platforms in Hong Kong have
been bought out or coopted by Beijing. Before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, there
were many major independent media houses without obvious political leanings, such as
the Oriental Daily News, Ming Pao Daily News, Hong Kong Economic Journal, South
China Morning Post, Apple Daily, Television Broadcasts Ltd (TVB), and Asia Television
(ATV) (Lee & Chu, 1998). After 20 years of Chinese rule, perhaps only Radio Television
Hong Kong (RTHK; a public broadcast service), Ming Pao Daily News, and Apple Daily
could still be considered independent media houses or as media houses that do not have an
obvious pro-China stand. Many media proprietors have either been appointed as members
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) either before or since
1997, or they have been given the Grand Bauhinia Medal or Star Awards for their loyal
service. Many of them also conduct business in China (Chan, 2015; Chan & Lee, 2007;
Fung & Lee, 1994).
The development of the South China Morning Post (SCMP) in the last two decades was
illustrative of China’s growing control of Hong Kong’s media. In 1993, four years before
Hong Kong’s handover, it was purchased from Murdoch’s News Corp by the Malaysian
real estate and sugar tycoon Robert Kuok. After that, the senior management of the publi-
cation was criticized from time to time by its staff reporters and editors for censoring nega-
tive reports on China. In 2012, Wang Xiangwei, a former journalist with the China Daily,
which is a mouthpiece of the Chinese government, was appointed as the editor-in-chief of
the SCMP. Wang was known to be a member of the CPPCC in Jilin Province and suspected
to be a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member as well (Lee, 2012). In April 2016, the
paper was finally sold to the Alibaba Group, which vowed to make media coverage of
China “objective, fair and accurate” and not in the optic of Western news outlets. The
acquisition of the SCMP highlighted the inroad of Chinese capital into the media market of
Hong Kong. Before this, the ownership of Sing Pao, ATV, and the Hong Kong Economic
Journal had already been transferred to pro-China proprietors. In May 2017, TVB, which
had the highest viewership in Hong Kong, was also found to be controlled by Mainland
interests (ExCo approved “unqualified”, 2017).

Assessment of China’s hegemonic fight

The results of China’s efforts to articulate a different kind of hegemony in Hong Kong have
been mixed. Since the National Day of 1 October 2004, the HKSAR government featured
an announcement of public interest (API) on the evening newscasts of all the major televi-
342  P. S. N. Lee et al.

sion stations. The API is in fact a video featuring the national anthem of China. This feature
was highly political and symbolic of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. According to a
study by the School of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, in 1996, before the handover of Hong Kong, 39% of its citizens took pride in the
national anthem, which did not feature in any television programs at that time. In 2008,
when China hosted the Olympic Games in Beijing, the percentage of Hong Kong’s citi-
zens who felt proud of the national anthem increased to 53% and peaked to 55% in 2010.
However, in 2014, after the Umbrella Movement, the percentage dropped to 32%, lower
than that of 1996 (Centre for Communication & Public Opinion Survey, 2014a). In other
words, the mere insertion of hegemonic contents in the media does not necessarily result in
hegemonic reading by the audience (Hall, 1980; Morley, 2006).
On the other hand, in the same tracking study, it was found that, over time, the citizens
of Hong Kong have increasingly started to identify as belonging both to Hong Kong and
China. Before the handover, 33% of Hong Kong’s citizens considered themselves as both
Hongkongers and Chinese; by 2016, despite the Umbrella Movement, this mixed identity
rose to 43%, although the percentage of those who identify as being strictly Chinese, like
those on the Mainland, dropped to a record low of 9% in 2014 (Table 1). This reveals an
interesting psychology among much of Hong Kong’s population. Although many of them
identify as being Hongkongers as well as Chinese, the Chinese identity is in fact a cultural
rather than a political identity. The same study showed that the citizens of Hong Kong love
both Hong Kong and China, but that they do not have the same affinity for the CCP, which
is China’s ruling party. On an 11-point scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being “no love at all”
and 10 being “love very much,” the score in 2016 for Hong Kong was 8.15 and for China
was 6.0, whereas the score for the CCP was just 3.2 (Table 2). For many of Hong Kong’s
citizens, their Chinese identification is cultural rather than political. This partly explains
why Beijing is so uneasy about the co-existence of the two systems.

Table 1. Identity of Hong Kong’s Citizens* 1996–2016.

Hongkonger Chinese as
Hongkonger as well as well as Other/­
Year % Chinese % Hongkonger % Chinese % Refuse % Total % (N)
1996 25.2 32.9 14.7 25.7 1.5 100% (769)
1997 23.2 31.8 11.6 32.1 1.3 100% (302)
1998 28.8 30.0 15.6 24.5 1.2 100% (527)
1999 22.8 35.8 17.0 23.5 0.9 100% (533)
2002 24.8 36.0 14.5 23.6 1.1 100% (500)
2006 21.4 37.9 21.1 18.5 1.1 100% (1013)
2008 16.7 39.8 24.9 17.7 0.8 100% (1014)
2010 17.2 43.9 21.8 16.4 0.6 100% (941)
2012 23.3 41.6 22.0 12.5 0.6 100% (819)
2014 26.4 41.3 22.0 8.8 1.6 100% (810)
2016 24.0 42.8 19.9 12.2 1.1 100% (803)
*Question: How do you identify yourself? (Read out answers).
Source: Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (2016).
 Chinese Journal of Communication   343

Table 2. Love for Hong Kong, China, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).*
Average Score (N)
Year Love HK? Love the Country? Love the CCP?
2006 7.52 (1007) 6.49 (999) 2.91 (952)
2008 7.79 (1007) 6.87 (1001) 3.72 (960)
2010 7.73 (937) 6.82 (935) 4.02 (903)
2012 7.87 (818) 6.25 (814) 2.84 (796)
2014 8.23 (808) 6.09 (798) 2.99 (783)
*Question: Do you think you love Hong Kong/the country/the Chinese Communist Party? Choose from 0 to 10
points, with 0 being “not at all” and 10 being “very much.”
Source: Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (2014c).

China’s attempt to exert its hegemony in the public sphere in Hong Kong is compli-
cated by the emergence of a subaltern public sphere in the form of the new media. The
public sphere as conceived by Habermas (1987, 1989, 1992) is a unitary sphere that is open
to all, and all its members have universal access. He considered that given the rationality
of the bourgeois public sphere, it was capable of extending itself to include other classes
and groups. However, many critics have pointed out that the Habermasian public sphere in
reality privileges a particular style of “rationality” that largely favors white, wealthy males
to the exclusion of other identities, including women, the proletariat, and racial minorities
(Fraser, 1990; McKee, 2005; Negt & Kluge, 1993; Pateman, 1989; Van Zoonen, 2005).
Critics argue that there are in fact multiple public spheres – “subaltern” public spheres
that exist side by side with the dominant public sphere (Fraser, 1990; Squires, 2002).
The Umbrella Movement demonstrated clearly the existence of a counter-public sphere
(Squires, 2002) operating side–by-side with the dominant public sphere as represented by
the dominant mass media.
The public sphere of the mass media, according to Habermas (1989), has turned the
culture-debating public into the culture-consuming public, and the essence of critical-­
rational political discussions in the public sphere have been lost. Since the counter-public
was denied access to the dominant public sphere, new media emerged to serve as a subal-
tern public sphere for them. The penetration of the Internet in Hong Kong accelerated in
the early 2000s. In 2000, only 36% of households had Internet access. By 2013, Internet
penetration had gone up to 80% (Go-Globe, 2014). The launch of the smartphone further
increased the use of the Internet for the exchange of news and information. In 2011, the
smartphone had only a 35% rate of penetration, which jumped to 63% by 2013 (Crescere
Hong Kong, 2013). In 2014, the mobile penetration rate was 98%, of which 80% were
smartphones (Centre for Communication & Public Opinion Survey, 2014b).
In a study on online chat rooms, Fung (2002) found that when public voices are muted
by the authorities and the press practices self-censorship, chat rooms, as a virtual space,
represent an opportunity for the public to engage with and influence the government. The
force of the counter-China hegemony in the subaltern public sphere provided by the new
media manifested itself in the Umbrella Movement in 2014. A study conducted at the end
of the Umbrella Movement in December 2014 found that the consumption of political
news through social media was related positively to the support of the Umbrella Movement
and adversely to satisfaction with and trust in established political authorities, including
the Hong Kong SAR government, the Hong Kong police, and the Chinese Central Govern-
ment. Social media had become an “insurgent public sphere” in the Movement, putting up
344  P. S. N. Lee et al.

a strong resistance against China’s hegemonic dominance in the legacy media (Lee, So, &
Leung, 2015).
In July 2015, about seven months after the Umbrella Movement, a study showed that
the people of Hong Kong still relied on legacy media such as television channels and
newspapers as their main sources of social and political information. The study found that
64% of people considered TVB one of their four major sources of information, while 32%
chose the Apple Daily, 18% chose the Oriental Daily News, and 15% chose Facebook. The
study also showed that the majority of Hong Kong’s citizens still use television (88.8%) as
one of their four major sources of social and political information, followed by newspapers
(69%), online media (including social media; 32%), radio (16%), and friends and relatives
(8%) (Table 3) (So, 2015). As discussed earlier, most legacy media channels, including
TVB, the Oriental Daily News, Sing Tao Daily, Headline News, Hong Kong Economic
Journal, Hong Kong Economic Times, and South China Morning Post are now pro-China.
Only RTHK, Ming Pao Daily News, and Apple Daily could still be considered independent
of China’s influence.
The “liberal-oriented” elites and their followers find it increasingly difficult to exert
their influence in the mainstream media. Their views are less frequently represented in
the mainstream legacy media, with only a few exceptions like the Apple Daily, Ming
Pao Daily News, and RTHK. In the face of the shrinking public sphere for the liber-
al-oriented elites and their followers, the liberal-oriented camp needs to seek alternative
venues to re-assert its influence. Social media has become a suitable venue, since it
provides easy access to people, especially the youth, who find themselves being ignored
or under-represented in the dominant public sphere. The youth, who are “digital natives”
as opposed to “digital immigrants” from previous generations (Palfrey & Gasser, 2008;
Prensky, 2001; Wilson, 2006), do not only use social media because it is natural and
spontaneous, but also for its low cost and mobility. The influence of social media is on
the rise, and it is still largely out of China’s control due to its “individuated-networking”
nature. Social media can be considered a “semi-private space” in which the individual
has private control, making it difficult for big business or government to manipulate it.
A note has to be made about the binary division between “liberal-oriented” and
“pro-China” elites. These two categories are used in a broad sense. For example, the “liber-
al-oriented” camp refers to people who embrace the values espoused and practiced in West-
ern democracies, including the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union.
These values include freedom, democracy, human rights, judicial independence, civil soci-
ety, etc. Under this rubric, there is a broad range of participants, which includes Democrats
who have a “China heart” and hope that someday China too will become democratic, liber-
als and socialists who advocate universal values of human rights and brotherhood sharing
the idea of global citizenship, localists who clamor “Hong Kong first” while denouncing
Hong Kong’s independence, and advocates of outright independence.
Similarly, the “pro-China” camp contains people with a wide range of political orienta-
tions – people who are long-time supporters of the CCP, pro-Beijing businessmen, nation-
alists or patriots, and power-driven politicians and opportunists. It should be cautioned that
the difference between liberal-oriented and pro-China elites is just used for the sake of a
broad-brush comparison. In their struggle for hegemony, nevertheless, the alignment of the
sub-groups within the two camps is clearly seen in the context of controversial issues, such
as universal suffrage for the CE of Hong Kong in 2015 and support for Carrie Lam to run
for the CE position in 2017. The two camps’ platforms and actions are clearly distinguish-
able. Within either camp, despite varying interests and factions, the members often stand
together to counteract the opposing camp.
Table 3. Sources of Social & Political Information for Hong Kong’s Citizens 2015 (N=1006).
Television TVB Cable TV ATV Now TV Sub-Total
63.2% 12.1 6.3 6.2 87.8%
Radio RTHK Commercial Radio Other
9.3% 5.7 1.0 16.0
Newspaper Apple Oriental Ming Pao Sing Tao Sun HKEJ HKET Other
32.2% 18.3 7.3 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.4 2.4 68.8
Free Newspaper Headline am730 Sky Metro
6.9% 2.1 0.6 1.3 11.9
Online News Yahoo PassionTime Google Golden Other
10.6% 1.3 1.1 1.1 3.9 18.0
Social Media Facebook
14.7% 14.7
Friends & Relatives –
7.6% 7.6
Other –
2.0 2.0
Total 226.8%
Source: SO, Y. K. (2015, August 31). Traditional news media still holds ground. Ming Pao, p. A32.
Chinese Journal of Communication   345
346  P. S. N. Lee et al.

Hypotheses
In order to examine if the newly emerged social media has provided an alternative subal-
tern public sphere for Hong Kong’s citizens to counter China’s hegemony, we propose
several hypotheses. The following four hypotheses are related to trust in the Central
Government and views about the “one country, two systems” policy, including satisfaction
with its implementation, anticipation of the degree of Hong Kong’s autonomy, and support
for Hong Kong’s independence fifty years after 1997.

H1: The less trust one has in the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China, the
more likely it is that one will use social media for social and political information.

H2: The more one is dissatisfied with the implementation of the “one country, two systems”
policy by China, the more likely it is that one will use social media for social and political
information.

H3: The more one considers that Hong Kong should have a high amount of autonomy, the
more likely it is that one will use social media for social and political information.

H4: The more one supports Hong Kong’s independence after 2047, the more likely it is that
one will use social media for social and political information.

As the liberal-oriented camp fights against China’s encroachment upon Hong Kong’s core
values like the free press, democracy, and judicial independence, it has a strong sense
of distrust in the Central Government, which is run by the Communist Party. The CCP,
in turn, is practicing a one-party dictatorship in China. Most people in Hong Kong do
not entirely trust the Central Government to implement the “one country, two systems”
policy with good faith. This lack of trust in the Central Government is a crucial factor
working against collaboration and negotiations between the liberal-oriented elites and the
Beijing-supported counter elites.
People who have little trust in the Central Government, are discontented with the
implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy, have high expectations of local
autonomy, and strongly support Hong Kong’s independence after 2047 are likely to resist
China’s encroachment. Since the dominant public sphere, as represented by legacy media,
has been captured by China, the liberal-oriented camp needs to turn to the Internet for
social and political information.
Compared with other forms of online media, social media is more popular on and
widely accessible through mobile phones. The Umbrella Movement has sensitized many
people about social media’s rapid transmission of information. It provides a relatively
private setting in which the circulation of information can be restricted to friends and
designated people. Many online media platforms, such as Passion Times, Stand News,
Hong Kong 01, Post 852, etc., are still in infant stages and have a low viewership. Social
media platforms, on the other hand, like Facebook, have become a major source of infor-
mation for the people of Hong Kong.
One of the objectives of the counter-China hegemony is to maintain the core values of
Hong Kong. We identify three core values and posit that people who embrace these values
are likely to defend them against Beijing’s intrusion. The Central Government also resists
these three values – freedom of the press, democratic development, and judicial independ-
ence. Many of Hong Kong’s citizens are worried about the breakdown of these and other
core values due to the intrusion of China into Hong Kong’s socio-political system. These
 Chinese Journal of Communication   347

people will become part of the counter-public and are likely to use the subaltern public
sphere of social media for information more so than people who care less about these
values. This leads us to the following three hypotheses:

H5: The more one values press freedom, the more likely it is that one will use social media for
social and political information.

H6: The more one values democratic development, the more likely it is that one will use social
media for social and political information.

H7: The more one values judicial independence, the more likely it is that one will use social
media for social and political information.

Method
Sample and procedures
A telephone survey was conducted in July 2016 to assess public opinion and political
development in Hong Kong. To derive the sample, phone numbers were first generated
through systematic sampling, using the most recent residential phone directories. The last
two digits of each number were sequentially replaced with all two-digit figures from 00
to 99 to include non-listed numbers. This procedure generated a database, from which a
computer randomly selected some phone numbers. The target respondent from each house-
hold was selected using the most recent birthday method. In this way, we successfully
interviewed 1010 residents of Hong Kong aged 15 or above on the phone (with a sampling
error of 3.1% at 95% confidence level). The response rate was 43%. All data were weighted
by the proportion of gender, age, and education, according to the most recent statistics of
people aged 15 or above, issued by the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong
SAR government.

Measures
Social media use
At the time of the study, the most popular social networking sites in Hong Kong were Face-
book and the Hong Kong Golden Forum. While 24% of respondents mentioned Facebook
as the source from which they most frequently obtain social and political news, less than
1% named Golden Forum and other social networking sites. Online news sites also had
a small audience – no site was named by more than 1% of respondents as their source of
information. Facebook was therefore the most important social media and online platform
at the time of the study. The measures for social media use ranged from “Don’t use” to “121
or more minutes every day” in 7 intervals.

Consumption of social and political news

Respondents were asked if they obtained social and political news from Facebook, which
was the most important social media website in Hong Kong at the time. In total, 24% of the
respondents named it as their primary source of social and political information, ranking it
third after mainstream media channels TVB and Apple Daily, which were named as their
primary source by 63% and 36% of the respondents respectively. Similarly, respondents
348  P. S. N. Lee et al.

were also asked if they obtained social and political information from traditional media
outlets such as television channels (TVB, CableTV, NowTV), newspapers (Apple Daily,
Oriental Daily News, Headline Daily), and radio (RTHK, Commercial Radio). Respond-
ents were asked to answer “yes” (1) or “no” (0) when asked about their use of Facebook,
as well as other traditional media channels. The present study chose for further analysis
only those media platforms that were cited by at least 10% or more of the audience as their
source for social political news.

Trust in the Chinese Central Government

Respondents were asked how much they trust the Chinese Central Government on a scale
ranging from 0 (“no trust at all”) to 10 (“total trust”), with 5 being “so-so.”

Satisfaction with the implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong
Kong by the Chinese Central Government
The respondents were asked if they were satisfied with the implementation of the “one
country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong by the Chinese Central Government on a scale
ranging from 0 (“totally dissatisfied”) to 10 (“totally satisfied”), with 5 being “so-so.”

Expectation of Hong Kong’s autonomy under the “one country, two systems” policy
Respondents were asked how much autonomy Hong Kong should have under the “one
country, two systems” policy on a scale from 0 (“should have no autonomy at all”) to 10
(“should have full autonomy”).

Support for Hong Kong’s independence after 2047

The measure for this variable was a five-point scale ranging from 1 (“strongly do not
support”) to 5 (“strongly support”), with 3 being “so-so.”

Press freedom, democratic development, and judicial independence

Respondents were asked to assess the importance of the value of the freedom of the press,
democratic development, and judicial independence in Hong Kong on a scale of 0 (“very
unimportant”) to 10 (“very important”).

Findings
The sample consisted of 48% males and 52% females. We created four groups by age –
15–24, 25–39, 40–59, 60 and above. The percentage of members in each age group was 13,
23, 38, and 26% respectively. About 38% of the sample had received tertiary non-degree
education or college degrees, 33% had senior secondary school education ranging from
Form 4 to Form 7, and 29% had been educated until Form 3 or below. The sample profile
matched well with the demographics of Hong Kong’s population according to the census
figures of the HKSAR government, with some minor weighting adjustments.
The results show that except H7 – ”the more one values judicial independence, the
more likely it is that one will use social media for social and political information” – all the
other hypotheses proposed in this study are supported.
 Chinese Journal of Communication   349

People who have a lower level of trust in the Chinese Central Government (r = 0.31***),
a lower satisfaction level with the implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy
(r = 0.27***), a higher expectation of Hong Kong’s autonomy under the “one country, two
systems” policy (r = 0.13***), and stronger support for Hong Kong’s independence after
2047 (r = 0.21***) are more likely to use social media for social and political information.
The results are statistically significant at the 0.001 level (Table 4). These results indicate
that adverse views about the “one country, two systems” policy and distrust in the Central
Government play a role in people’s use of a subaltern public sphere for social and political
information, as represented by social media.
Similarly, people who consider press freedom (r = 0.17***) and democratic devel-
opment (r = 0.19***) highly important are more likely to use social media for social and
political information. The correlation between the importance of judicial independence
and social media use (r = 0.06) is statistically insignificant at a 0.05 level. However, the
significant value of this correlation is actually 0.055, which is just 0.005 beyond the normal
decision point of 0.05. In other words, a positive assessment of Hong Kong’s core values of
press freedom, democratic development, and, to some extent, judicial independence, will
contribute to people’s use of social media for social and political information.
However, the bivariate relationships may be confounded by other variables that may
also contribute to the use of social media for information. The obvious variables include
demographic factors, political orientation, and the use of legacy media. Further analysis
was conducted to examine the influence of these variables on the use of social media for
information.
We identified five sets of factors and ran a hierarchical regression analysis. The varia-
bles of trust in the Central Government, satisfaction with the “one country, two systems”
policy, expectations of local autonomy, and support for Hong Kong’s independence in
the first four hypotheses were categorized as (i) “Views about China and the ‘One Coun-
try, Two Systems’ Policy.” The other three variables pertaining to the importance of the
freedom of the press, democratic development, and judicial independence were grouped
together into a category entitled (ii) “Core Values:” we would like to see if the variables
in these two categories will continue to be influential in determining people’s use of social
media for information after controlling for other factors. (iii) “Demographics” of sex, age,
education, and family income were the third set of factors to be controlled. (iv) “Political
Camp” is another important factor to be included, in addition to (v) “The Use of Traditional
Media for Information.”
In the Political Camp category, we asked the respondents to indicate their political orien-
tations by choosing from eight categories, ranging from “localists,” “middle-­neutral,” and
“pro-establishment” to “no political orientation.” We re-grouped localists, radical Demo-
crats, and moderate Democrats into the “Liberal-Oriented Camp” and pro-­establishment,
pro-China, and business-industrials into the “Pro-China Camp”. As the present study
focuses on the contest for hegemony between these two camps, people who claimed to be
“middle-neutral” or “without political orientation” were omitted from the analysis. The
results of the hierarchical regression are shown in Table 5.
It is interesting to note that after controlling for the variables of demographics, political
camp, and legacy media, many tested variables in the earlier seven hypotheses become
insignificant in predicting the use of social media for information. These variables include
trust in the Central Government, satisfaction with the “one country, two systems,” support
for Hong Kong’s independence, importance of democratic development, and importance
of judicial independence. It is obvious that these variables’ original influence on the use of
social media diminishes after controlling for the effects of their covariates.
 350  P. S. N. Lee et al.

Table 4. Correlations between trust in central government, satisfaction with “one country, two systems,” expectation of local autonomy, support for HK’s independ-
ence, importance of core values and use of social media (Pearson r).
Satisfaction with
Trust in Chinese 1 country, 2 How much auton- Support for HK’s Importance of Importance of
Central systems omy should HK independence Importance of democratic judicial
Government implementation have? after 2047 press freedom development independence
Social Media Use −0.31*** −0.27*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.06#
N = 994 982 983 969 973 985 973 965
# ***
Significance level of p < 0.055. Significance level of p < 0.001.
 Chinese Journal of Communication   351

Table 5. Hierarchical regression of influences on the use of social media for social and political
information.
Use of Social Media for Social &
Predictors Political Information
Block 1: Demographics
  Gender (Male = 1) −0.03
 Age −0.35***
 Education 0.01
  Family income −0.03
ΔR2 0.16***
Block 2: Political camp
  Liberal-oriented vs. pro-China 0.11*
ΔR2 0.00***
Block 3: Information acquisition via traditional media
 TVB −0.07
  Apple Daily 0.11*
  Oriental Daily News −0.03
 RTHK −0.01
  Ming Pao Daily News −0.03
  Headline Daily −0.10*
ΔR 2
0.03***
Block 4: Views about China & the “one country, two systems”
policy
  Trust in Central Government −0.12
  Satisfied with “One country, two systems” implementation 0.02
  Autonomy for HK 0.11*
Support for HK’s independence 0.01
ΔR 2
0.02***
Block 5: Core Values
  Press freedom 0.17**
  Democratic development −0.07
  Judicial independence −0.06
ΔR 2
0.01***

Total adjusted R2 0.22

F 8.39***
Note: Figures are standardized beta weights from final regression equation with all categories of variables in the model.
*
Significance level of p < 0.05.**Significance level of p < 0.01.***Significance level of p < 0.001.

On the other hand, the effects of some predictors independent of the influence of others
stand out in the analysis. It should be noted that in each block that contains variables of
different natures, at least one variable has a significant impact on the use of social media
352  P. S. N. Lee et al.

for information: Age in the demographic block, Political Camp in the political orientation
block, Apple Daily and Headline Daily in the traditional media block, Expectation of Local
Autonomy in the block regarding views about China, and Press Freedom in the block on
core values.
An examination of the significant predictors in the regression shows that young age
(β = 0.35, p < 0.001), consumption of Apple Daily (β = 0.11, p < 0.05), expectation of
higher levels of local autonomy (β = 0.11, p < 0.05), and higher value placed on press free-
dom (β = 0.17, p < .01) are significant predictors for the use of social media for political
and social information (Table 5).
These results meet the researchers’ expectations, as the youth are usually more rebel-
lious and anti-establishment, especially when they have enjoyed a free style of living
in Hong Kong since birth. They find China’s paternalistic and authoritarian governance
unpalatable. The Apple Daily is known to be a long-time fighter for democracy in Hong
Kong. Its anti-China, anti-communist position has been supported by the liberal-oriented
camp since its launch in 1995. The expectation of high levels of local autonomy and a high
evaluation of press freedom have a positive predictive power regarding the use of social
media; this supports our earlier argument that people who give importance to these values
will need to find a subaltern public sphere to express and articulate their views, which the
newly emerged social media provides. The finding that the consumption of Headline Daily
(β = −0.10, p < 0.05) negatively predicts the use of social media also meets our expecta-
tions. This newspaper, distributed free in mass transit railway stations and housing estates,
is a spin-off of the Sing Tao Daily, which has been pro-establishment and pro-China for
many years. Its proprietor is a member of the CPPCC.
The most unexpected result of the regression analysis is the prediction of social media
use by the Political Camp variable (β = 0.11, p < 0.05). It shows that a pro-China orienta-
tion indeed predicts the use of social media more than a liberal orientation. This seems to
contradict our argument that the liberal-oriented camp would need to use social media as
a subaltern public sphere to regain their influence that has been lost in the dominant public
sphere of the legacy media. The result shows that the pro-China camp tends to use social
media for information more. One explanation of this unexpected result may be that after
the Umbrella Movement, the pro-China camp started to realize the impact of social media
in fostering public opinion, and it may have therefore begun to pay more attention to this
subaltern public sphere since then. Moreover, the Beijing-backed elites may want to moni-
tor and manipulate social media just as they did legacy media.
At present, there are quite a few pro-establishment social media sites. Among them,
Speak Out Hong Kong, HKGpao, and Silent Majority’s Post are the most notable pro-China
and anti-democrat platforms. These pro-establishment sites’ perspectives on local events
are very different from those of democrats. For example, on 4 October 2017, Speak Out
Hong Kong published a commentary on the imprisonment of Joshua Wong and other young
activists. It was entitled “Martin Lee is the one who destroys Hong Kong’s rule of law”
(“Martin Lee is,” 2017). It criticized Martin Lee for badmouthing Hong Kong’s judicial
system, because he challenged the attorney general’s decision to appeal for a heavier
sentence for the activists. Martin Lee is a founder of the Democratic Party and a senior
counsel in Hong Kong. It is interesting to note that on Facebook, this commentary garnered
2800 responses and 368 comments. Nearly all the comments were negative toward Lee,
who was largely branded a “traitor.” This indicates that the page has a strong pro-estab-
lishment follower base. Pro-establishment social media sites seem to play an integrative
function among their supporters, and their impact on the pro-China camp therefore cannot
be ignored.
 Chinese Journal of Communication   353

Although the pro-China orientation positively predicts the use of social media, it does
not necessarily imply that the liberal-oriented camp does not use social media. Since social
media has not yet been monopolized or controlled by the state or businesses, both camps
can use it, but probably for different purposes and carry with it very different kinds of
content. More research is needed to examine the role of social media in both the liberal-ori-
ented and the pro-China camp. A content analysis of the communication of both camps
in this subaltern public sphere will help better understand the role of social media in the
contest for hegemony between these opposing parties.

Discussion and conclusion

Although the development of online news and social media is still at early stages, their
growth in the past few years has been impressive. In fact, 2015 could be considered a
watershed year for the growth of online media. Before 2015, its impact was not obvious,
although online media channels had started to challenge the legacy media since the turn
of this millennium. Many legacy media platforms, including newspapers, television, and
radio, started to launch online versions after 2000. However, these were usually copies of
their offline version, which proved to be unattractive and difficult to use.
Things started to change in 2011 with the growing penetration of smartphones. In 2011,
the smartphone penetration in Hong Kong was 35% (Crescere Hong Kong, 2013), but by
2014 the penetration rate had reached 80% (Centre for Communication & Public Opinion
Survey, 2014b). Before then, many online news media platforms had emerged, but their
influence was minimal. The only possible exception is House News, which launched in
July 2012, following the model of the US-based Huffington Post. When it shut down two
years later, it had a recorded viewership of 300,000 per day (Cheung, 2016), but, despite
its good viewership, it failed to get enough advertising, and it shut down in July 2014,
less than two months before the 79-day Umbrella Movement. The owner alleged that he
closed the site due to the “tense social atmosphere” and “pressure on himself and his family
members.” He did not clarify where the pressure came from, but most people believed it to
be from China, as the owner was known to be a Democrat. This incident signifies that right
from the beginning, online media has served as a platform to enable the struggle against
China’s hegemony in the dominant public sphere.
Apart from House News, Passion Times, Post 852, VJ Media, and Inmediahk were also
launched before 2014. All of them started out with small amounts of capital and little influ-
ence. These online media platforms began to draw people’s attention during the Umbrella
Movement, as they provided timely updates, information, and alternative discourses about
the movement’s protestors and participants. The social force of these online news sites and
social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Twitter, was demonstrated during the
Movement.
In 2015, big capital started to invest in online news platforms. The first one was Init-
ium, launched on 3 August 2015 by a Chinese lawyer who had returned from America. It
began by hiring 60 staff members, with a monthly expenditure of approximately HK$3
million. On 11 January 2016, the HK01 was launched with an even larger capital invest-
ment. It employed 200 staff members and became the largest stand-alone online news
media platform in Hong Kong. The Apple Daily today owns the largest and most popular
online news site in Hong Kong, but it is connected closely with and supported by its print
version’s resources. Meanwhile, the owner of the defunct House News re-launched a new
online platform named Stand News in December 2014. It is run on a small scale with
only 16 staff members, with a monthly expenditure of approximately HK$500,000. In July
354  P. S. N. Lee et al.

Table 6. Ranking of top online news sites in Hong Kong (October 2016).
Rank
9 Next Media (Apple Daily, Next Weekly online)

14 Bastille Post

17 On.cc (Oriental Daily online)

32 TVB.com (TVB Jade, Pearl, News online, etc.)

42 Stand News (Formerly House News)

53 HK01

60 Mingpao.com (Ming Pao)

61 HKET.com (Hong Kong Economic Times online)

92 RTHK (Radio Television Hong Kong online)

97 Viu TV

100 HKEJ.com (Hong Kong Economic Journal, iMoney online)

Source: Alexa.com, October 2016.

2015, an English online news platform named the Hong Kong Free Press was launched
with a monthly expenditure of HK$150,000 (Ho, 2015, August 5).
The top 100 Hong Kong online sites are shown in Table 6. These sites included legacy
media’s online news editions as well as stand-alone online news sites.
Judging from the popularity ranking in Table 6, both legacy media’s online editions and
stand-alone online media platforms could have appeal. However, the growth of stand-alone
online media is impressive. The Bastille Post, Stand News, and HK01 have existed only
for a short period of time, and they have already surpassed many legacy media platforms
in terms of online reception (Table 6). The online media advertising expenditure has also
jumped from 4% of the total media expenditure in 2008 to 17% in 2015, with an average
growth of 2% each year (Statista.com, 2016). If China wants to articulate its hegemony in
Hong Kong, online media platforms will be the public sphere for this contest.
As a matter of fact, many people had already suspected the inroads of Chinese capi-
tal in online media platforms. Both Initium and HK01 are believed by some quarters to
have financial support from the Chinese government, although there is no hard evidence to
support this, and the Chief Editor of Initium has denied China’s involvement in her media
house on several occasions. At present, Democrats in Hong Kong have been cautious
and tend to distance themselves from many online news media platforms. Many of them
choose to use Stand News and the Apple Daily online, both of which are known to be
 Chinese Journal of Communication   355

pro-Democrat and against the Chinese hegemonic discourses. The Bastille Post until now
has remained less political, choosing to focus on soft news and entertainment. This explains
why it became popular in a short period of time, as audiences usually enjoy entertainment
more than political content in their media.
Given that the legacy media in Hong Kong has largely been coopted and silenced
by China since 1997, the counter-China hegemonic voice will seek alternative channels
to express itself. In the new millennium, new media provides such a platform. With the
proliferation of the smartphone in Hong Kong, online news sites as well as social media
platforms have become more popular, especially among the youth. The contest for hegem-
ony between the liberal-oriented elites and the Beijing-backed counter elites in the public
sphere will certainly continue. China will definitely put in more attention and effort to
engulf the subaltern public sphere of the Internet. With its economic and political leverage,
China will probably be able to control the online media in the future, just as it has done
with the legacy media. Nevertheless, its hegemony will not be complete with the existence
of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter.
It has been pointed out that social media platforms provide multiple channels for inter-
personal feedback, peer acceptance, and the reinforcement of group norms. They help
promote the construction of personal and group identities (Dalton, Sickle, & Weldon, 2009;
Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012). Using online news media channels, however, is
a form of public communication. Users just retrieve information from websites and some-
times choose to give feedback. Social media communication, on the other hand, is a form
of “private” communication, through which users engage in “private” exchanges with their
acquaintances and “friends.” Social media is thus an “individual” networking media platform
that has a “filtering” effect (Pariser, 2011). Users can control the content to which they are
exposed and, more importantly, they can confine their contacts to like-minded individuals and
avoid those whom they would like to ignore. This so-called “echo chamber effect” (Garrett,
2009) will reinforce existing views embraced by the counter-public. Without exposure to
opposing views, the public sphere of social media will split into opposing subaltern spheres.
China’s hegemonic discourses can hardly infiltrate the counter-China hegemonic
space. Social media as a subaltern public sphere differs from Habermas’ idea of a unitary
public sphere characterized by rational discourses. After all, subaltern counter-public
spheres emerge in response to the exclusions of the dominant public sphere (Fraser, 1990).
These counter-public spheres can serve both as places for withdrawal and as bases for
counter-hegemonic activities against mainstream discourses. Moreover, as Fraser (1990)
points out, counter-public spheres are not necessarily rational and virtuous – they can be
anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian. Social media, as a matter of fact, can accelerate the
development of a “post-truth” era. The Oxford Dictionary defines post-truth as “relating to
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than
appeals to emotion and personal belief.” Such a disregard of facts by contending parties
was seen clearly in the public opinion battle over the British referendum to leave or stay in
the European Union as well as the Trump–Clinton presidential election in 2016.
In the middle of the Trump–Clinton election campaign, an online analytics company
called Tubular Insights identified that in the sphere of online news, the InfoWars website
was generating the highest levels of engagement (in terms of likes, shares, etc.). This site
featured claims that Clinton had a secret “Satanic Network” and had Parkinson’s disease,
along with other conspiracy theories (Sillito, 2016). These unfounded stories received a
lot of attention from Trump supporters. While the counter-public’s views before Trump’s
ascendancy were not represented in the mainstream media and conventional polls, the
suffering and angry masses found their expression in new media, which did not follow the
356  P. S. N. Lee et al.

conventional rituals of objectivity, fact checking, and balanced reporting as in the case of
the elite-controlled mass media. Trump fans and Clinton haters were both reading InfoWars
and other such websites that told the “truth” that Trump supporters wanted to hear. For the
masses who have been excluded from the mainstream media, the Internet and social media
platforms thus serve as alternative channels to express their views and empower them-
selves to take collective action.
With China’s increasing efforts to dominate all of Hong Kong’s public spheres and, at
the same time, the growth of subaltern public spheres like social media platforms, people
will be divided into various issue publics and opposing camps, including pro-China hegem-
onic and counter-China hegemonic camps. In terms of political communication, Hong Kong
may return to an era of partisan journalism, much like the revolutionary and reformist press
struggle for hegemony that took place in the latter part of the Qing Dynasty (Lee, 2017).
If Hong Kong is to remain an open society, the economic and political cost of closing or
censoring all social networking sites will be high. It will ruin Hong Kong and make it just
like any other Chinese city. If China cannot settle its differences and compromise with the
liberal-oriented elites in Hong Kong, it will lead to a protracted contest for hegemony. The
pro-China and counter-China forces will polarize, escalating China–Hong Kong conflicts
further and result in general instability of Hong Kong. In the short run, it seems the impasse
could be overcome only through genuine peaceful coexistence through compromises by
the “two systems”.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
The funding for this study was provided by the School of Journalism and Communication,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Notes on contributors
Paul S. N. Lee is professor in the School of Communication at the Hang Seng Management College,
Hong Kong. He received his PhD from the University of Michigan. His research interests include
international and intercultural communication, telecoms policy, new media, and media analysis.

Clement Y. K. So is professor in the School of Journalism and Communication and Associate Dean
of Faculty of Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He received his PhD from the
Annenberg School for Communication, the University of Pennsylvania, USA. His major research
areas include Hong Kong press, politics and sociology of news, and citation and content analysis.

Louis Leung is professor in the School of Journalism & Communication at The Chinese University
of Hong Kong. His research concerns social and psychological impacts of media technologies. Dr
Leung is the editor for Chinese Journal of Communication (indexed in SSCI since 2008). His work
has appeared in many journals across disciplines including New Media & Society, CyberPsychology,
Behavior, & Social Networking, Computers in Human Behavior, Telematics and Informatics, and
Social Science and Computer Reviews, among others. He holds a PhD in Communication from The
University of Texas at Austin.

Francis L. F. Lee is professor at the School of Journalism and Communication, Chinese University
of Hong Kong. He is the lead author of Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-co-
 Chinese Journal of Communication   357

lonial Hong Kong (Routledge, 2011) and author of Talk Radio, the Mainstream Press, and Public
Opinion in Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press, 2014).

Michael Chan is an assistant professor at the School of Journalism & Communication, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong. He received his PhD from the School of Journalism & Communication,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research focuses on the uses and effects of new media
technologies on individuals and society.

ORCID
Michael Chan   http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9911-593X

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