FOE: 189

G.R. No. L-1800             January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority

Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

Ramon Diokno for petitioner.

City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of

the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel
the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon,
November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the
groun that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after
mature deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947,
without prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that
it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights,
and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing
their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body
of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following
legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays,
disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks,
cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants."

Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844
and 1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace,
and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:
 "SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept
free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians,
and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or
regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the
celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron
saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the
Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, where such
athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of
any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit
therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or
specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or
procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall
be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade
or procession."

As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the
holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif section
1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may be applied
by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.

Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the
Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder.

After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer
upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit,
to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held.

Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire,
312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing that
"no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special
license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing committee,"
was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board
unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the
United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes firming the judgement of the
State Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using the public streets for a parade
or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as
the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession,
with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper
policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... ."

We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as
conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount
to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings,
parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or
violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the
use of streets, parks, and the other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444
of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to
restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong
Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it
does not have. Besides, the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are
executive and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the
faithful performance and execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised
Administrative Code), the ligislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances
regulating reasonably the excercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets
and other public places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him
unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its
impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented.

In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under
Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of public
streets, the council has no power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets
until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such
permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them.

The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W., 1104,
held the following:

"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also,
in substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the
unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it,
when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void
because "it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or partiality
and oppression prevented." and that "when we remember that action or nonaction may
proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other
improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and
exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of
being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who
gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single
individual with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to
pronounce it inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its
discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress
them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or
any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be
exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon
any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."

In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or persons,
or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through the public
streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, flags, ... without first having
obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said city;" was held by the Supreme Court
of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held:

". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it
is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as
 will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the limitations
and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles
of law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under the constitution than under the
common law."

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and
disorder in cities than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable
precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair
scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress
lawful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."

"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized
countries, for people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or
reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music of various
kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for
the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce
some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural
product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors in furthering them. ... When
people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or public
security, they become unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . ."

"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances,
or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private
mischief, that the law interferes."

"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and
because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an
unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all, must be permanent,
legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."

In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city ordinance
which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any kind, to parade any of
the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical instruments,
without the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants were members of
the Salvation Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding
the ordinance invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive;
they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on
official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the right to assemble
and worship accordingto the dictates of one's conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable
manner and for a lawful purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights
of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions allows great latitude in public parades and
emonstrations whether religious or political ... If this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council
shut off the parades of those whose nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion,
and permit like parades of those whose nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their
discretion to exercise power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions
violated. ... Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of
city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than partial and discriminating in its practical operation.
The law abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)

In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court of
Colorado, in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of Walsenburg,
which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or association to use the street
of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage without first obtaining
a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do," held the following:

"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets is
conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a citizen of
the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be excercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or
denied." Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S.
Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.

[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use
of public streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569; 61 S.
Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the following appears; "The
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order
upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all,
it cannot be disregarded by the attempted excercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the
familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal
command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his
opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional
excercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that
control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the
opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemorially associated with resort to public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58
S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949 [953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437];
Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of Irvington]; 308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146,
150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct.,
900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."

[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the
uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say who
shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. No standard
of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief
of police may for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any
group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:

"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public
streets in a lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and
we therefore hold it null and void."

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.
S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of
a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks, or public
buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots,
disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the
facts and circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a
permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in the course of its opinion in support of
the conclusion said:

". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to
use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.

"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its
face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of
official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that
such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the
record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views
on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a
substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."

Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides
that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes,
cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple
reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board
requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or substantive power independent
from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is
required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover "one of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to any other body or authority," except certain powers of local government,
specially of police regulation which are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal
corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of streets
and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the
Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that
the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same
power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the
same power by the Municipal Board.

Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred,
upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from
ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions of section 2444 (u) of
the same Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such
grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other
public places for processions, parades, or meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons
stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted, specially in Willis Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra,
wherein the question involved was also the validity of a similar statute of New Hamsphire. Because
the same constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same
objections to a municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are
applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited power to any officer either of the municipal or
state governments. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As
stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The discretion with which the council is vested is
a legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to
confer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."

It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative Code
apparently in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255- 261, but
evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision under a mistaken
conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered.
The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the
Philippines was clearly an unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power
to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting been held, it was his duty to have
the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844, which is punishable as misdemeanor
by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. For, according to the decision, "the
doctrine and principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist
Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public
meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite
rebelious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the
duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there
is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the
refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in
Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience
in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse
the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of
free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly
'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:

"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men
feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage
of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .

"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .

"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition
of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the
means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the
 law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S.
Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable
objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is
ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

CONTRACTS CLAUSE: 218

G.R. No. 134269               July 7, 2010

THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA,
MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 134440

JOSE MARIE V. AQUINO, minor and represented by his parents DR. ERROL AQUINO AND
ATTY. MARILYN AQUINO; LORENZO MARIA E. VELASCO, minor and represented by his
parents FRANCISCO VELASCO AND ROSANNA VELASCO; CHRISTOPHER E. WALMSLEY,
minor and represented by his parents GERALD WALMSLEY AND MA. TERESA WALMSLEY;
JOANNA MARIE S. SISON, minor and represented by her parents BONIFACIO SISON AND
JOSEPHINE SISON; and MATTHEW RAPHAEL C. ARCE, minor and represented by his
parents RAPHAEL ARCE AND MA. ERISSA ARCE, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA,
MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION and LAWPHIL,
INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 144518

AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA,

MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF MUNTINLUPA, THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., SPOUSES FELIPE
AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIFTEENTH
DIVISION), Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

At bar are three consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari all concerning the operation of a
preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village, more particularly on a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 149166. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 134269 and
134440 assail the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096,
dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, which enjoined said school’s continued
operation on the ground that the same is in violation of the Deed of Restrictions annotated on the
title of the subject property that limits the use of the lot to the establishment thereon of a preparatory
(nursery and kindergarten) school. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 challenges the Court of Appeals’
Decision3 dated August 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, which upheld the validity of a
Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance.
The zoning ordinance, as corrected by the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies
the subject property as "institutional" where the operation of a grade school is allowed.

FACTS

The factual and procedural antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:

Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses
Jose and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary
Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in TCT No. 149166 issued to the spouses
Alfonso, as had been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions indicated that:

2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such
installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.4

ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang
Village, including the above restrictions on TCT No. 149166, to the association of homeowners
therein, the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).

In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC),
a preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was
expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross, which provided
additional grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled advanced.

AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLC’s and
the spouses Alfonso’s violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the
same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school and from operating the
nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.5

Injunction Case

On October 13, 1992, AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an action for
injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant
spouses, particularly of the Deed of Restrictions, the contents of which likewise appear in the Deed
of Absolute Sale. It also alleged violation of Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-01
(MMC No. 81-01), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National
Capital Region and Barangay Ordinance No. 03, Series of 1991. MMC No. 81-01 classified Ayala
Alabang Village for zoning purposes as a low-density residential area, or R-1, thereby limiting the
use of the subject property to the establishment or operation of a nursery and kindergarten school,
which should not exceed two classrooms. The aforementioned barangay ordinance, on the other
hand, prohibited parking on either side of any street measuring eight meters in width. TLC is
adjacent to Balabac and Cordillera Streets, which are both less than eight meters in width. AAVA
prayed that defendants be restrained from continuing the operation of the school. The Complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2950, and was raffled to Branch 65.

On November 24, 1992, owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC, namely the spouses Ernesto
and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, and LawPhil, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the adjacent property owners), filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, seeking
the same relief as AAVA and prayed for damages.

On July 22, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA, disposing of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, defendants are ordered to cease and desist at the end of the schoolyear 1994-95
from operating The Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a
maximum of two (2) classrooms in accordance with the Deed of Restrictions, and to pay the plaintiff
the following:

1) ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees

2) costs of this suit.

The complaint-in-intervention is dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs-in-intervention to show by

preponderance of evidence that they are entitled to the damages prayed for.6

The RTC ruled that the operation of the grade school and the nursery and kindergarten classes in
excess of two classrooms was in violation of a contract to which the defendants are bound. The RTC
emphasized that the restrictions were in reality an easement which an owner of a real estate may
validly impose under Article 688 of the Civil Code. The RTC also agreed with the plaintiffs therein
that by allowing parking on either side of the streets adjacent to the school, the defendants likewise
violated Barangay Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1991.

On August 19, 1994, TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Decision. They alleged in the Motion that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-
39 reclassifying the subject property as "institutional," there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to
uphold the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the spouses Alfonso. The adjacent property owners
did not move for a reconsideration of, nor appeal from, the said Decision insofar as it dismissed their
Complaint-in-Intervention.

In an Order dated March 1, 1995, the RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its earlier
Decision.  The decretal portion of the RTC Order reads:
1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court dated 22 July 1995 is hereby reconsidered and set aside
and the Complaint and Complaint-in-Intervention filed on 13 October 1992 and 24 November 1992,
respectively, are dismissed.7
The RTC ruled that with the reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the
subject property, the earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced. Citing Ortigas & Co.
Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co.,8 it decreed that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power by the municipality.

On March 22, 1995, AAVA moved for a reconsideration of the above RTC Order. On July 21, 1995,
the RTC denied the said Motion.

AAVA filed a Notice of Appeal on August 4, 1995. The Appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
51096.

On November 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the March 1, 1995
RTC Resolution:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated March 1, 1995 of the lower court in Civil Case No. 92-2950
is hereby SET ASIDE. The earlier decision of the said court dated July 22, 1994 is Reinstated. Costs
against defendants-appellees.9

On December 4, 1997, TLC and the spouses Alfonso moved for a reconsideration of the said
Decision. On February 5, 1998, petitioners in G.R. No. 134440, namely, Jose Marie V. Aquino,
Lorenzo Maria E. Velasco, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael
C. Arce (Aquino, et al.), alleging that they are minor children who suffer from various learning
disabilities and behavioral disorders benefiting from TLC’s full-inclusion program, filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene and their own Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by TLC and the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., for being proscribed by Section 2, Rule 1910 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate Petitions
for Review with this Court challenging the July 2, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
Petition of TLC and the spouses Alfonso, filed on July 9, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No. 134269.
The Petition of Aquino, et al., filed within the extended period on August 21, 1998, was docketed as
G.R. No. 134440.

Zoning Ordinance Case

In the meantime, on October 3, 1994, while the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses
Alfonso was still pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan,
passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel
of land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the
description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang."
This is the same ordinance which was used as basis by the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 92-2950,
when it reversed its own Decision on Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated March 1, 1995.
Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V is the subject property wherein TLC is located.

On November 29, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the Metropolitan Manila
Zoning Administration Office, informing the latter of the enactment of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-
179. On December 1, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition for the approval of
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed an Opposition.

On June 26, 1995, the HLURB issued its Resolution on the Petition of the Municipality of Muntinlupa,
the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, we defer action to the Muntinlupa SB Resolution No.

94-179 and remand the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required
public hearings as mandated by Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991, of the Metro Manila Council
entitled "Uniform Guidelines for Rezoning of the Metro Manila Area."11

According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an
error but an actual rezoning of the property into an institutional area, and therefore remanded the
same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public hearings. The
Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the
Office of the President.

On July 27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an alleged typographical error in Ordinance
No. 91-39, and therefore does not need for its validity compliance with the mandatory requirements
of notice and hearing pursuant to Resolution No. 12, series of 1991,12 of the Metropolitan Manila
Council:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, dated June 26, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Resolution No. 94-179
of the Sanguniang Bayan (now Sangguniang Panglungsod) of Muntinlupa is declared valid.13

In said Decision, the Office of the President likewise turned down the alternative prayer of oppositors
AAVA and the adjacent property owners that the Office of the President should recognize the Deed
of Restrictions on the subject property and restrict the use thereof in accordance therewith. The
Office of the President ruled on this matter that:

Turning to the alternative relief being sought by the oppositor [that the Office of the President should
recognize the Deed of Restrictions], the same cannot be granted. The reason is simple. No less than
Ayala Corporation – in consenting to the transfer from the Yusons to the Alfonsos of the subject
property – agreed that the "lot (shall) be used for school and related activities", thereby effectively
freeing the appellants from the deed restriction that the "Lots (shall) be used exclusively for
residential purposes." This is not all. Prior to its sale, the property in question was already used for
school purposes.

Further the aforementioned Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance itself classifies the area occupied by the
appellants’ school as an "institutional zone" and not a residential area. And the fact that TLC is not
the only school operating within the AAV – De la Salle-Zobel, Benedictine Abbey School, Woodrose
School, to name a few, conduct classes within the plush village – renders unpersuasive appellees’
line that "x x x Through the illegal operation of their school, the parties-in-interest appellants spouses
Alfonso have effectively violated the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of the residents
of the Village x x x."14 (Boldfacing supplied; underscoring and italization are present in the original.)

AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The
Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54438.
On August 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision slightly modifying the Decision of
the Office of the President:

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the ruling therein passing upon the effect of Ordinance No. 91-39 on the Deed
of Restrictions imposed on the subject property is hereby VACATED.15

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the President that being merely a rectifying issuance
and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing.16 However, the Court of Appeals found the Office of the
President to have exceeded its authority when it ruled17 that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its
force and effect in view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39. According to the Court of Appeals,
the Office of the President effectively overruled said appellate court’s Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
51096 wherein it ruled that the reclassification under Ordinance No. 91-39 does not have the effect
of nullifying the Deed of Restrictions at the back of the title of the subject property, inasmuch as
there is no conflict between the Ordinance and the Deed of Restrictions.18

On October 3, 2000, AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed the third consolidated Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court assailing the above Court of Appeals Decision. This Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 144518.

ISSUES

Though later in time, we shall first determine the issue in G.R. No. 144518, as the validity of
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 impinges on the issue of the legality of operating a grade school
in the subject property, which is the main issue in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440. We shall then
resolve the issue in G.R. No. 134440 on whether Aquino, et al., should be allowed to intervene in the
injunction case against TLC. Thereafter, we shall rule on the merits of G.R. Nos. 134269 and
134440 by deciding once and for all whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined
from continuing the operation of a grade school in the subject property.

The main issues to be decided by this Court, culled from the consolidated Petitions, are therefore the
following:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in denying Aquino, et al.’s Motion to
Intervene; and

3. Whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the
operation of a grade school in the subject property.

As regards the third and decisive issue, the parties further exchanged their views on the following
two sub-issues:

a. Whether or not Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly corrected by

Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of
Restrictions on the subject property; and

b. Whether or not AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.

 RULINGS

Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179

AAVA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President
that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning
enactment, and therefore did not have to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing which
are required for zoning ordinances. Notice and hearing are required under the Uniform Guidelines
for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of
the then Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).

In asserting that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment, AAVA faults
the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals in allegedly accepting hook, line and sinker the
assertion of the ENCRFO Regional Officer and the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself that
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was passed merely to correct a typographical error in Appendix B
of Ordinance No. 91-39.19 AAVA adopts the HLURB finding that it was allegedly:

[H]ard to believe that the denomination in the text of Block 1 and instead of Block 3 as an
institutional zone was an accident of (sic) mere oversight, the numbers 1 & 3 are not adjoining each
other, but are separated by the number 2. TLC’s position would have been worth considering had
the erroneous phrase typed been Block 2 for then it is more plausible and probable for the typist to
have mistyped a "2" instead of a "3." Besides, Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near each other on the
map. Finally, if it were an error, it is surprising that no one noticed it until after a court had ruled
against a party, who now seeks to use said correcting ordinance in its defense.20

We are not persuaded.

The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses:

SAPAGKAT, ang Sanguniang Bayan ng Muntinlupa ay pinagtibay ang Kautusang Bayan Bilang 91-
39 na nagsasaad ng bagong pagreresona ng Bayan ng Muntinlupa;

SAPAGKAT, sa pagrerepaso sa nabanggit na kautusang bayan ay napag-alamang nagkaroon ng

isang "typographical error sa Appendix B" nito;

SAPAGKAT, sa halip na Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang, ang nailagay o nai-type sa hindi
sinasadyang dahilan ay Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang;

SAPAGKAT, ang pagtatamang ito sa teksto ng Appendix B na nakapaloob sa institutional zone ay

hindi makakaapekto sa ibang bahagi o kabuuang nilalaman at itinatakda sa kautusang bayan bilang
91-39.21

Even more telling that there was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39
is the fact that both the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village
show that the subject property, described as "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" is
classified as "institutional." On the other hand, neither the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa nor that
of the Ayala Alabang Village classify "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" as institutional.
The official zoning map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance, without which
said ordinance would be considered void.22 Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39 expressly
provides that the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa shall be made an integral part of said ordinance.
Both the MMC and the HLURB Board of Commissioners approved the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa. Furthermore, the very reason for the enactment of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-
39 is the need to accomplish an updated zoning map, as shown by the following clause in MMC’s
Resolution No. 2, series of 1992:

WHEREAS, the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, approved on 10 December 1991

Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 rezoning the entire municipality (as shown in the accompanying
zoning map and described in the attached Appendix "B") as a response to the need to have an
updated zoning map. x x x.23 (Emphases supplied.)

It is furthermore noted that TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s claim that Lot 25, Block 1, Phase 5 of
Ayala Alabang has been and remains to be a residential lot24 has never been rebutted by AAVA. As
regards the comment that Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near the map, we agree with TLC and the
spouses Alfonso that this bolsters their position even more, as the distance would make it difficult to
commit an error on the map. It is much more plausible to mistype a single digit than to mistake an
area for another that is far away from it.

It is therefore crystal clear that there was a typographical error in Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No.
91-39. AAVA, however, furthermore claims that even assuming arguendo that there was a
typographical error in the said zoning ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate a new zoning
ordinance, following all the formalities therefor, citing the leading case of Resins, Incorporated v.
Auditor General.25

Again, we disagree.

Resins was decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the judiciary should not interfere
with the workings of the executive and legislative branches of government:

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive – on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
– the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.26

In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was an error in the printing of the statute, unlike
in the case at bar where it is the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which seeks to correct its
own error in the printing of the ordinance. While it would be a violation of the principle of separation
of powers for the courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute, there would be no violation of said
principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same entity which committed the
error. In Resins, there is a presumption of regularity in favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts
should not speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179
which is entitled to a presumption of regularity.

Finally, AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with
the HLURB under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order No. 648.27 AAVA reminds us that the
decisions of administrative agencies on matters pertaining to their jurisdiction will generally not be
disturbed by the courts.28

We should remind AAVA that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the case at
bar, affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, which had set aside the HLURB ruling. The
authority of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of
the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true that courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies,29 it should be noted that the HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the
rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area. The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted Resolution
No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and this approval should be given more weight than the
disapproval of the HLURB since it was the MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the
Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance
alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.

In sum, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by
the lack of notice and hearing as AAVA contends.

Motion to Intervene of Aquino, et al.

It is recalled that the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Aquino, et al., was filed on February 5, 1998,
which was three months after the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals had already
rendered its Decision dated November 11, 1997 setting aside the RTC Resolution which had been in
favor of TLC and the spouses Alfonso.

Aquino, et al., premised their intervention on their being grade school students in the School of the
Holy Cross, wherein they allegedly benefit from the full-inclusion program of said school. Under said
full-inclusion program, Aquino, et al., who claim to suffer from various learning disabilities and
behavioral disorders, are enrolled full-time in educational settings enjoyed by regular, typically
developing children. Aquino, et al., alleges that TLC is the only educational institution in the
Philippines that offers a full-inclusion program, adding that other schools offer only partial integration
programs wherein children with special needs join their typically developing classmates only in
certain classes.

Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent that
Aquino, et al., would not still be in grade school at this time, thus rendering their alleged interest in
this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al., claim to represent other special children since the
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Motion for Leave to Intervene bore no indication that it was
intended as a class action; they merely sought to represent themselves. Since the interest of
Aquino, et al., in the instant case is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm the denial of their
Motion for Leave to Intervene before the trial court.

Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that Aquino, et al.’s, interest in the injunction suit had
not yet been mooted, we nevertheless find no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ denial of their
Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., was denied in the same Resolution wherein the Court
of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses Alfonso. The ground for
the denial of Aquino, et al.’s, Petition is Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
which provides:

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)

This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to
intervene may be filed "before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous
doctrines on the interpretation of the word "trial," with one decision holding that said Motion may be
filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision,30 while another stating that it may be filed at
any time before the rendition of the final judgment.31 This ambiguity was eliminated by the present
Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed "at any time before rendition of the
judgment by the trial court," in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the
amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered
its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its
own Decision on appeal.

Aquino, et al., claim that they could not have intervened in the case earlier, as the full-inclusion
program was allegedly commenced by defendants TLC and the spouses Alfonso only in 1997.
However, said defendants cannot be benefited by their allegedly recent introduction of a full-
inclusion program. While we sympathize with the plight of the minor intervenors, we cannot allow
that a program commenced by the defendants way beyond the institution of the case in 1992 could
be considered as a valid defense. To do so would put into the hands of the defendant in a case the
power to introduce new issues to a litigation on appeal with the assistance of intervenors.

Injunction against the operation of the School of the Holy Cross

Effect of Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Resolution No. 94-179 to the Deed of Restrictions

In reversing itself on Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC cited the Ortigas32 case and held that the
earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced due to the reclassification by Muntinlupa
Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject property.

In Ortigas, the restriction of exclusive use for residential purposes was contained in the Deeds of
Sale of the subject properties at the insistence of developer Ortigas & Co. and was annotated in the
corresponding titles thereof. Therein defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co. eventually acquired the
subject properties from the successor-in-interest of the original buyers; the deeds of sale and the
TCTs issued likewise reflected the same restriction. However, the then Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal passed a Resolution declaring the area to which the subject property is situated
as an industrial and commercial zone. Ortigas & Co. later on sued Feati Bank, seeking an injunction
to restrain the latter from completing a commercial bank building on the premises. This Court held
that the Mandaluyong Resolution was passed in the exercise of police power.33 Since the motives
behind the passage of the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to
a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the
Constitution will not bar the municipality’s exercise of police power.34

As previously stated, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the original
RTC Decision enjoining TLC and the spouses Alfonso from the operation of the school beyond
nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms. The Court of Appeals held
that there is no conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited the use of the property for
the establishment of a preparatory school, and the provisions of the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance
No. 91-39, which reclassified the subject property as "institutional." The Court of Appeals continued
that there are valid grounds for it not to apply the Ortigas case cited by the RTC Resolution, holding
that while the subject property in said case was found in an area classified as industrial and
commercial, "a study of the location of defendants’ school would clearly reveal that the same is
situated within a residential area – the exclusive Ayala Alabang Village."35

TLC and the spouses Alfonso insist on the applicability of Ortigas in the case at bar, and likewise
cited Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.36 in order to drive home its point that reclassification
of properties is a valid exercise of the state’s police power, with which contractual obligations should
be reconciled.
AAVA counters that even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not operate to
automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence since the better policy is to reconcile
the conflicting rights and to preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other, citing the case
of Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court.37 AAVA thus adopt the finding of the Court of Appeals that
even assuming that the subject property has been validly reclassified as an institutional zone, there
is no real conflict between the Deed of Restrictions and said reclassification.

A careful study of the pertinent documents yields the conclusion that there is indeed a way to
harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions and the assailed zoning
ordinance.

To recall, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 149166 covering the subject property provides:

PE-222/T-134042 – RESTRICTIONS – The property cannot be subdivided for a period of fifty (50)
years from the date of sale. The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such
installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. x x
x.38 (Emphasis ours.)

It is noted that the above restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory (nursery
and kindergarten) school, without regard to the number of classrooms. The two-classroom limit is
actually imposed, not by the Deed of Restrictions, but by MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region, which classified
Ayala Alabang Village as a low density residential area or an "R-1 zone." The principal permitted
uses of a "low-density residential area" or "R-1 zone," the classification of the subject property if not
for the correction under Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, is listed in Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 as follows:

In R-1 districts, no building, structure or land used, and no building or structure shall be erected or
altered in whole or in part except for one or more of the following:

Principal Uses

1. One-family dwellings;

2. Duplex type buildings;

3. Churches or similar places of worship and dwelling for the religious and seminaries;

4. Nursery and kindergarten schools, provided that they do not exceed two (2) classrooms;

5. Clubhouses, lodges and other social centers;

6. Parks, playgrounds, pocket parks, parkways, promenades and playlots;

7. Recreational uses such as golf courses, tennis courts, baseball diamonds, swimming
pools and similar uses operated by the government or private individuals as membership
organizations for the benefit of their members, families or guests not primarily for gain;

8. Townhouses.39 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the following are the principal uses of an institutional site, the classification of the
subject property by virtue of Ordinance No. 91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution
No. 94-179:

Institutional

Principal Uses

1. Barangay health centers;

2. Day-care centers;

3. Puericulture centers;

4. Clinics, family planning clinics and children’s clinics;

5. Nursery and kindergarten schools;

6. Elementary schools;

7. Elementary and high school;

8. Local civic centers, local auditoriums, halls and exhibition centers;

9. Churches, temples and mosques;

10. Chapels;

11. Barangay centers;

12. Maternity hospitals;

13. National executive, judicial, legislative and related facilities and activities;

14. Government buildings;

15. Tertiary and provincial hospitals and medical center;

16. National museums and galleries;

17. Art galleries;

18. Planetarium;

19. Colleges or universities;

20. Vocational and technical schools, special training;

21. Convents and seminaries;

 22. Welfare and charitable institutions;

23. Municipal buildings;

24. Fire and police station buildings;

25. Local museum and libraries;

26. University complexes; and

27. Penal institutions.40 (Emphasis supplied.)

The jurisprudence cited by TLC and the spouses Alfonso requires a meticulous review. We find that
a clarification of the doctrines laid down in the aforestated cases of Co, Ortigas, and Presley is in
order.

In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted differently by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, this
Court, in upholding the exercise of police power attendant in the reclassification of the subject
property therein over the Deed of Restrictions over the same property, took into consideration the
prevailing conditions in the area:

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone,
was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of
traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal
Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court added:

Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now
unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential
purposes, defendants-appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated
under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes. In Burgess v.
Magarian, et al., it was held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are binding on all
subsequent purchasers x x x." However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein
contained a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or
abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other agreement between parties." In the case at
bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the subject property, though declared as an
institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential
lots. Verily, the area surrounding TLC did not undergo a radical change similar to that in Ortigas but
rather remained purely residential to this day. Significantly, the lot occupied by TLC is located along
one of the smaller roads (less than eight meters in width) within the subdivision. It is understandable
why ALI, as the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller, preparatory school that will
generate less traffic than bigger schools. With its operation of both a preparatory and grade school,
TLC’s student population had already swelled to around 350 students at the time of the filing of this
case. Foreseeably, the greater traffic generated by TLC’s expanded operations will affect the
adjacent property owners enjoyment and use of their own properties. AAVA’s and ALI’s insistence
on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or (2) the obtainment of the approval of the
affected residents for any modification of the Deed of Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand,
the then Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have any special justification for declaring the
subject lot as an institutional property. On the contrary, Engr. Hector S. Baltazar, the Municipal
Planning and Development Officer of Muntilupa, testified that in declaring the subject property as
institutional the municipality simply adopted the classification used in a zoning map purportedly
submitted by ALI itself. In other words, the municipality was not asserting any interest or zoning
purpose contrary to that of the subdivision developer in declaring the subject property as
institutional.

It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently conflicting rights of the parties herein pursuant to the
aforementioned Co case. In Co, agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a demolition order, filed a
complaint for maintenance of possession with the Court of Agrarian Relations of Quezon City. The
landowner challenged the jurisdiction of the court arguing that the classification of the subject
property therein from agricultural to a light industrial zone. This Court denied the applicability of the
reclassification, and clarified Ortigas:

This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is settled
that it can legally do so, being an exercise of the police power. As such, it is superior to the
impairment clause. In the case of Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, for example, we held that a municipal
ordinance establishing a commercial zone could validly revoke an earlier stipulation in a contract of
sale of land located in the area that it could be used for residential purposes only. In the case at bar,
fortunately for the private respondent, no similar intention is clearly manifested. Accordingly, we
affirm the view that the zoning ordinance in question, while valid as a police measure, was not
intended to affect existing rights protected by the impairment clause.

It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to
preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other. x x x.42 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air subdivision likewise restricted its use for a residential
purpose. However, the area (Jupiter Street) where the lot was located was later reclassified into a
high density commercial (C-3) zone. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) sought to enjoin petitioner
therein from operating its Hot Pan de Sal Store, citing the Deed of Restrictions. We allowed the
operation of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of Restrictions, but not without examining
the surrounding area like what we did in Ortigas:

Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The
records indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have already sprouted in
this area. We, therefore, see no reason why the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from
putting up her hot pan de sal store. Thus, in accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the
respondent court's decision has to be reversed.43

Furthermore, we should also take note that in the case of Presley, there can be no reconciliation
between the restriction to use of the property as a residential area and its reclassification as a high
density commercial (C-3) zone wherein the use of the property for residential purposes is not one of
the allowable uses.
Alleged estoppel on the part of AAVA from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions

TLC and the spouses Alfonso’s main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions
on their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts. TLC and the
spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a setting aside of said
restrictions:

1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had previously
approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24 classrooms, which approval
is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site Development Plan with the
signature of Frank Roa himself.44

2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA, through its
president Jesus M. Tañedo, authorized through a letter the construction of a new "school
building extension."45

3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly
proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development Officer Engineer
Hector S. Baltazar, who said:

Engineer Baltazar:

There was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village, in fact, was the
one who submitted this map of theirs. In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is the developer of
the Ayala Alabang Village whom we know "na maayos naman ang kanilang zoning," we just adopted
what they submitted to us. Whereas, the other areas are "talagang pinag-aralan pa namin."46

TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered institutional in the
Official Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission of the latter constitutes an intent to have
the subject property reclassified as institutional.

4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its letter
dated July 24, 1991, wherein it stated:

This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C. Gonzales concerning the proposed
expansion of the school curriculum to grade school of the Learning Child Pre-school owned by Mrs.
Mary Anne Alfonso.

Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe that it is
a worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to
such proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.47

We are not convinced.

Estoppel by deed is "a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and
his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts
asserted in it."48 We have previously cautioned against the perils of the misapplication of the doctrine
of estoppel:

Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied,
estoppel becomes a most effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man’s
mouth from speaking the truth and debars the truth in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be
sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential
elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. x x x.49

TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA’s
acts so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions.

In numbers 1 and 2 above, TLC and the spouses Alfonso claim that the previous approvals by AAVA
of the construction of additional classrooms allegedly constitute a revocation of the Deed of
Restrictions. However, as we have previously discussed, the two-classroom restriction is not
imposed in the Deed of Restrictions but rather in MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. The alleged assent of
AAVA to the construction of additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of the
Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the subject property "exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which
may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage school
vehicles."

The circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no intention on
the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive its right to have said restrictions
enforced. Frank Roa’s signature in the Site Development Plan came with the note: "APPROVED
SUBJECT TO STRICT COMPLIANCE OF CAUTIONARY NOTICES APPEARING ON THE PLAN
AND TO RESTRICTIONS ENCUMBERING THE PROPERTY REGARDING THE USE AND
OCCUPANCY OF THE SAME."50 The Site Development Plan itself was captioned "The LEARNING
CHILD PRE-SCHOOL,"51 showing that the approval was for the construction of a pre-school, not a
grade school. AAVA’s letter dated March 20, 1996 contained an even more clear cut qualification; it
expressly stated that the approval is "subject to the conditions stipulated in the Deed of Restrictions
covering your above-mentioned property, which states, among others, that the property shall be
used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a PREPARATORY (NURSERY
AND KINDERGARTEN) SCHOOL."

We furthermore accept AAVA’s explanation as regards the March 20, 1996 letter that at it had to
allow the construction of the new school building extension in light of the trial court’s Orders dated
March 9, 1995 and August 3, 1995. It should be noted here that AAVA was the party appealing to
the Court of Appeals as the trial court decision favorable to them had been reversed by the same
court on Motion for Reconsideration.

Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot be
considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case.
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule:

Sec. 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

We have to clarify that ALI’s statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The
general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions
on the title of the subject property, expressly state that: "2. Compliance with the said restrictions,
reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala
Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns,
or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association."52 As such, it appears that Ayala
Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is
therefore covered under the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given
in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or
other person jointly interested with the party.53 (Emphasis supplied.)

However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1
concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional
which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions. As
regards the act in number 2, the statement in ALI’s July 24, 1991 letter that it believes the expansion
of TLC is a "worthy undertaking," it should be pointed out that ALI’s purported assent came with
conditions:

Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe that it is
a worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to
such proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.

It is true that the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) Board does not have the authority on its
own to alter the Deed of Restrictions for Ayala Alabang Village, and the approval of Ayala is an
indispensable condition precedent to any change in the restrictions. However, we feel that any
change in the restrictions for Ayala Alabang should be concurred to by the AAVA Board on the
premise that any change in the restrictions affects the general welfare of the community which is the
primary concern of the AAVA Board. On this same premise, we have imposed as an additional
condition to our approval of the change in restrictions, that such change should be approved by the
residents of the Village or by the residents of the particular district where the school is situated, at
the option of the Board. We feel that the concurrence of not only the AAVA Board but also of the
residents of the Village or of the affected district (as the case may be) is fair and reasonable under
the circumstances. 54 (Emphases supplied.)

As previously stated, a majority of AAVA’s members, on April 5, 1992, voted to ratify the Board of
Governors’ resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented. Therefore, the
conditions for ALI’s approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions, namely the concurrence of
the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of the village, were clearly not met.

Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the case furthermore shows that AAVA consistently
insisted upon compliance with the Deed of Restrictions:

1. Petitioner Mary Anne Alfonso, as directress of TLC, wrote AAVA on May 20, 1991
requesting "reconsideration and approval to modify the restrictions at our property at 111
Cordillera to include the establishment and maintenance of a grade school" and avowed to
make a similar representation to ALI.55 AAVA replied on June 26, 1991 with a letter stating
that the matter of interpretation or relaxation of the Deed of Restrictions is not within its
power, but of ALI, and thus referred the request to the latter.56 ALI wrote AAVA on July 24,
1991 stating that while it interposes no objection to the modification of the restrictions on the
subject property, any change on such restrictions should be concurred in by AAVA’s Board
of Governors and approved by the residents of the village, particularly the residents of the
district where the school is situated.57 AAVA’s Board of Governors, during its regular meeting
on August 27, 1991, voted unanimously to retain the restrictions and recommended said
retention to ALI.58

2. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on October 25, 1991 requesting a reconsideration of
the decision of AAVA’s Board of Governors.59 On October 31, 1991, AAVA wrote ALI to
 inquire about the reasons for the restrictions.60 ALI replied that the restrictions were imposed
because the school sites located along small roads had to be limited to small nursery
schools since the latter generate less traffic than bigger schools. ALI reiterated that the
residents should be consulted prior to any change in the restrictions.61 In the meantime, TLC
proceeded to operate a grade school on the subject property. On February 27, 1992, AAVA’s
former counsel wrote TLC a letter demanding that they suspend the enrollment of students
other than for pre-school.62

3. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on March 11, 1992, reiterating their request to operate
a grade school in the subject property. 63 On March 24, 1992, the Board of Governors of
AAVA affirmed its earlier decision to retain the restrictions. On March 27, 1992, AAVA replied
to the spouses Alfonso’s letter informing them of the denial.64

4. On April 5, 1992, during AAVA’s annual membership meeting, the spouses Alfonso
appealed directly to the members of AAVA. Majority of AAVA’s members voted to ratify the
Board of Governor’s Resolutions,65

5. On April 24, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA another letter requesting that it be
allowed to continue holding classes for Grades I to III at their premises for at least the
coming school year, since they needed time to relocate the same outside the village.66 AAVA
replied on April 30, 1992, explaining that the Board of Governors has to follow the April 5,
1992 decision of the members and demanded that the TLC close its grade school in the
coming school year.67

6. On June 4, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote to AAVA again, appealing to be allowed to
continue in their premises for three more months, June to August, after which they solemnly
promised to move the grade school out of the village, possibly in TLC’s former school site in
B.F. Homes Parañaque.68 AAVA replied on June 16, 1992 denying their request, and
demanded that TLC cease its operation of a grade school on the subject property.69

7. In view of the continued operation of the grade school, AAVA sent letters to TLC on
August 17 1992 and September 4, 1992 demanding that the latter immediately cease and
desist from continuing and maintaining a grade school in the subject property.70

From the foregoing, it cannot be said that AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions. Neither could it
be deemed estopped from seeking the enforcement of said restrictions.

DISPOSITION

This Court hereby resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision
ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the
Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. Pursuant to Muntinlupa Ordinance
No. 91-39, as corrected under Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, we therefore delete the
two-classroom restriction from said Decision.

This Court, however, understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the current
students of the School of the Holy Cross, who are innocent spectators to the litigation in the case at
bar. We therefore resolve that the current students of the School of the Holy Cross be allowed to
finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The school,
however, shall no longer be permitted to accept new students to the grade school.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:

1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2,
1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the
defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning
Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is
deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child
School’s grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said
school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade
school shall no longer be permitted.

2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it
dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E.
Veloso, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is
hereby AFFIRMED.

3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong
Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance is
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS: 247

[G.R. No. L-22476. February 27, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SENANDO

PANGANIBAN, SAMSON PANGANIBAN, ELEUTERIO PANGANIBAN and
ROBERTO FLORES, Defendants-Appellants.

Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Felipe S. Abeleda and Wenceslao M. Adviento, for Defendants-Appellants.

 SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT,

ENTITLED TO RESPECT BY APPELLATE COURT. — As far as credibility is concerned,
the findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to see, hear and observe
the witnesses testify and to weigh their testimonies will be accorded the highest
degree of respect by this Tribunal. The rule is for this Court to desist from
disturbing the conclusion of the trial court concerning the credibility of the
witnesses.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; SELF-DEFENSE, UNTENABLE DUE TO NUMBER OF

WOUNDS. — In view of the number of wounds received by the deceased, nineteen
(19) in number, the plea of self-defense cannot be seriously entertained. This has
been constantly held by this Court in a span of 60 years.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of conviction for the murder of Almaquio Martinez,

appellants Senando Panganiban and Samson Panganiban having been found guilty
as principals, the former sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
the latter to suffer an indeterminate sentence of from ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum, and appellants Eleuterio
Panganiban and Roberto Flores as accomplices on whom were imposed respectively
the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum
and the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum for appellant Flores, he being entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority being only sixteen years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense, with each and everyone of the above appellants
being likewise sentenced to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P6,000.00 and with each one being liable for one-fourth of
the costs.

There is no dispute as to the death of Almaquio Martinez being due to acute

hemorrhage arising from the multiple wounds sustained by him, the injuries
consisting of a total of nineteen wounds, seven located on the head, ten on the
right upper extremity, one on the lower extremity and one on the back with
fractures on the skull, right arm and legs, as well as contusions and abrasions on
the left upper arm and the back. 1

It is indisputable likewise that what subsequently became a grisly tragedy had its
origin in a carabao owned by the deceased, Almaquio Martinez, having been gored
by a carabao, belonging to one Rufino Prado, which was then being tended by
appellant Samson Panganiban, with consequent damage to a portion of the palay
crop of the former. The incident took place on November 15, 1959 in Barrio San
Pedro, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. The matter was sought to be settled by Emilio
Lida, barrio lieutenant of San Pedro, who, on November 17, 1959, drafted a
document entitled Kasunduan, 2 pursuant to which Samson Panganiban promised
to lend his carabao to Martinez while the injury lasted and also to pay him one (1)
cavan of palay after harvest to compensate him for the loss of a portion of his crop.

It likewise appeared that it was not until November 24th that Almaquio Martinez
could get hold of the carabao owned by Samson Panganiban. He tried to return it
that afternoon of that same day, but there was no one in the house of Panganiban
to receive it. He brought it instead to the barrio lieutenant, Lida, and left it under
his care for the night, promising to return in the morning expecting Samson
Panganiban and his uncle, Eleuterio Panganiban, one of the appellants, to meet him
there. There was a misinterpretation of such failure of the deceased to return the
carabao on November 24th, Eleuterio Panganiban, thinking that in violation of the
agreement, Martinez deliberately hid the carabao.

The finding of the lower court as to the particulars preceding the fatal encounter
could be briefly summarized thus: At past noon, the next day, November 25th at
the yard of the barrio lieutenant, Lida, Eleuterio who was unarmed, Senando
Panganiban, another appellant, and Samson, each of whom was armed with a bolo,
and Roberto Flores, the last of the accused-appellants, who was holding a scythe
and a piece of wood, were gathered. At that time, the wife and daughter
respectively of the barrio lieutenant, Emilia Gagnao and Milagros Lida, were in the
house, having returned from harvesting palay, the wife then finishing her lunch
while the daughter, who had just finished eating, was sitting at the balcony reading
comics. Appellants at the time were sitting on a pile of wood in the yard, about 17
meters away from the balcony. The deceased, Almaquio Martinez, soon made his
appearance. He inquired from Emilia Ganao, who was then by the kitchen window,
whether time barrio lieutenant was there. Upon receiving a negative answer, he
went to the place where the four appellants were seated.

The version of the killing as accepted by the lower court could be summed up thus:
The four appellants stood up. Eleuterio Panganiban talked to Martinez, while his
three co-appellants surrounded the latter in a semi-circle. They conversed briefly.
Then Martinez was heard by Milagros Lida saying in Visayan: "Gindala ko diri para
maayos sang mahusay", which means "I brought it here so that the matter may be
settled amicably." Without further ado, Eleuterio Panganiban suddenly hit Martinez
on the face and knocked him down. Then Roberto Flores, kicked him on the legs as
a result of which Martinez "was placed in a lying position face upwards." From
behind, Samson Panganiban hacked him on the nape with a bolo; while almost
simultaneously, Senando Panganiban struck him with his bolo on his right knee.
Roberto Flores followed suit by clubbing the victim several times with a piece of
wood. Samson and Senando continued the assault with their sharp boloes as he lay
helpless on the ground. During the gory incident, Eleuterio Panganiban was heard
shouting in Visayan "Sigue, Samson, patia ninyo! Patia ninyo." 3

There was testimony to the effect that Milagros Lida, filled with a deep sense of pity
at seeing Samson Panganiban still continuing with his bolo thrusts on the
defenseless victim, shouted from the balcony "Samson, tama na, kaawa-awa
naman si Manong Making." 4 Samson did pause for a while and glanced at the
frightened Milagros, advancing towards her with upraised bolo, She promptly ran
inside the house and bolted the door after her. She was met at the door by her
mother, who likewise saw what happened, from her vantage point at their kitchen
window. Samson Panganiban was by no means through; he did use his bolo again
on the prostrate body of Martinez. Only then, in the company of the other three
appellants, did he leave the premises.

In their brief as appellants, the antecedents leading to the death of Almaquio

Martinez were set forth thus: "At about 7:00 a.m., of November 25, 1949, Eleuterio
went to the house of the barrio lieutenant, Emilio Lida, to find out why Martinez
brought their carabao to the said barrio lieutenant. Then Samson also arrived. At
that time, Emilia Gagnao and Milagros Lida left their house to harvest palay. The
barrio lieutenant also left to look for Martinez, while Eleuterio, Samson and Aladino
Badi, who was called by the barrio lieutenant to entertain the two, seated
themselves in the balcony of the house of Lida, conversing. Emilio Lida arrived at
about 9:00 a.m., saying that he could not find Martinez. After which, he left again
to look for the latter. The three remained in the place talking up to 12:30 p.m.
When Lida did not return, they went home. Eleuterio and Samson went to the
house of Samson in sitio Cambaroang which was about one-half kilometer from
Lida’s house. They ate, after which, Eleuterio took a rest, while Samson went to his
field to clean the same. Eleuterio then returned to the house of Lida alone. When he
arrived in said house, nobody was in the premises, so he sat on a sledge in the
yard. After clearing his field, Samson, with a relative, Accused Roberto Flores,
proceeded to the house of Lida, and on the way, they met Senando Panganiban
who was also going to the barrio lieutenant to look for his missing carabao. When
these three arrived, there was nobody yet in the house as Emilia Gagnao and
Milagros Lida were harvesting palay in Cambaroang from 10:00 a.m. up to 3:00
p.m., together with Corita Sualog, who took her lunch with the said mother and
daughter. When Emilio Lida failed to arrive in his house, Eleuterio instructed Flores
to look for him, and he left. After some moments, Martinez came. Eleuterio was
then seated on a sledge and Senando was behind him, while Samson was near a
well drinking." 5

As to how the killing took place, appellants would impress upon this Court that it
happened thus: "Upon Martinez’ arrival, he asked Eleuterio why they were there
and in reply, Eleuterio asked him why he brought the carabao to the barrio
lieutenant. Martinez answered that he brought it there as they did not comply with
the agreement. And then in a loud and angry voice, he added, ‘You sons of
prostitute, you are all good in amicable settlement, I’m going to kill you and I am
going to stay in Muntinlupa for that.’ Eleuterio insisted that they settle the matter
amicably. While they were conversing, Samson approached them and asked: ‘Is it
true that you promised to return the carabao after you are through making the
furrow? Martinez then answered: ‘You are like that, sons of prostitute.’ Immediately
after uttering these words, Martinez boxed Samson, but the latter was able to
evade it. Martinez then took hold of the handle of his bolo as if he was going to
draw the same. To defend himself, Samson hacked Martinez with the bolo he was
then carrying for fear that the latter would hack him first. As Martinez drew his bolo
(he was able to raise the bolo up to the level of his breast), Samson did not stop
hitting him. He hit him many times. After the first blow of Samson, Senando and
Eleuterio ran away for fear. Eleuterio did not deliver fistic blow to the deceased;
Senando also did not hack the victim on any part of his body; and Roberto Flores
was not at the scene of the crime when the incident happened. During the incident
Eleuterio and Senando have no weapons. When Eleuterio was already far, he
shouted at Samson to stop hacking the victim as the latter was already dead. After
the incident Samson ran towards the poblacion and on the way he overtook
Eleuterio and Senando. Samson accompanied by Eleuterio, went to the municipal
building and surrendered himself to the Chief of Police." 6

The lower court, after evaluating the evidence gave "full weight and credit to the
testimony of the State witnesses, which is probable, clear and unbiased." 7 The
decision continues: "There is nothing in the records which shows that the witness
for the prosecution — the barrio lieutenant, his wife and his daughter could have
been motivated by no other desire than to tell the truth. In fact the barrio
lieutenant is an elected public official and is presumed to have performed his
functions regularly and well. The two witnesses to the commission of the crime,
Milagros Lida, daughter of the barrio lieutenant, and her mother, Emilia Gagnao,
were undeniably at a vantage place in witnessing the deadly assault by four
accused on the deceased Almaquio Martinez, as the daughter was in the veranda of
their house overlooking the yard where the crime took place, while the mother was
at the window of the kitchen and there, was able to see very well the incident
happening below the house." 8 Why their testimony should be believed was
stressed by the lower court thus: "The testimony of mother and daughter jibe with
each other in all important details. The deadliness of the attack of the said four
accused find corroboration in the great number of mortal wounds suffered by the
deceased Almaquio Martinez which were caused by sharp bladed instrument. On
the head, he suffered seven (7) wounds; on the right and left upper extremities he
suffered ten (10) wounds; and on the right lower extremity one wound. There were
contusions and fractures which confirm the attack with blunt instruments. As the
daughter recited the gruesome events, the court cannot help but be impressed with
her sincerity. She was at the time so overwhelmed by the recalling of the events
that she sobbed on the witness stand." 9

The conclusion thus reached by the lower court must be upheld. It has, as was
noted in People v. Gumahin, 10 "in its favor the well- settled principle that as far as
credibility is concerned, the findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to
see, hear and observe the witnesses testify and to weigh their testimonies will be
accorded the highest degree of respect by this Tribunal." It is the rule then for this
Court to desist from "disturbing the conclusion of the trial court concerning the
credibility of the witnesses, . . ." 11

In seeking a reversal of the judgment of conviction, appellants invoked the plea of

self-defense in their two assigned errors, although the very wording of the first
error assigned is quite indicative of their own lack of complete belief in the
plausibility of their plea as it is phrased in the conditional, "the deceased could be
the aggressor as he had a grudge against the appellants", and the second merely
would dispute the failure of the lower court to give credence to their testimony that
they acted in self-defense. In view of the number of wounds of the deceased,
nineteen (19)in number, the plea of self-defense cannot be seriously entertained.
So it has been constantly and uninterruptedly held by this Honorable Tribunal from
United States v. Gonzales, 12 to People v. Constantino, 13 a span of sixty (60)
years.

In the Gonzales case, the then Justice Torres considering the ten (10) wounds
inflicted on the deceased correctly characterizes the allegation of self-defense as
"incredible because it is improbable." In People v. Constantino, this Court, thru
Justice Bengzon, had to reject the plea of self-defense which in his opinion was
"belied and negatived" by the "nature, number and location of the decedent’s
wounds." People v. Somera, 14 speaks to the same effect thus: "The theory of self-
defense on the part of Pablo is clearly negatived by the numerous (19) wounds
inflicted upon Felix. Upon the other hand, such wounds are indicative of aggression
and of the participation therein of appellant . . ." In another opinion of this Court in
People v. Mendoza, 15 it was persuasively stressed: "Finally, the number of wounds
on the body of the deceased, and their location as registered in the autopsy report,
expose the inherent weakness of the claim to self-defense. There were in all fifteen
wounds, one in the neck, two in the abdomen, seven in the chest and the others in
the various parts of the arms." The two alleged errors assigned by appellants
therefore do not call for a reversal of the judgment of conviction.

The lower court was correct in finding that the killing of the deceased Almaquio
Martinez constituted murder, qualified by treachery. The appropriate penalty on
each of the appellants, as set forth in the opening paragraph of this opinion, was
meted out, Samson Panganiban being entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and Roberto Flores having in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With costs.

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED: 276

G.R. No. L-25769 December 10, 1974

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.

Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:p

A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial1 led this Court to act affirmatively on a certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a
case then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering the length of time that had elapsed, it is readily discernible why an inquiry into the
matter is well-nigh unavoidable. The accusation for robbery against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was filed as far back as
December 31, 1951. The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed on
December 8, 1955.2 For a period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that day, there
was a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material
for the disposition of the case.3 Such a resolution was amended by a second resolution dated August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for
counsel of appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be
received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as found.4 Accordingly, the case was
returned to the lower court with the former decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a year because
the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for such hearing.5 It was further alleged that when thereafter he
did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember the
details of the alleged crime; there was even a failure to identify the two accused.6 Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having
been set aside as required by the Court of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal.7 At that stage, five
more years having elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate
delay in their disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke
their constitutional right to a speedy trial.8 Respondent Court of Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of
counsel for petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the answer on behalf
of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above set forth were substantially admitted. However, a special and affirmative defense raised
was that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office
exercising judicial functions and that without the Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was expressed that under the circumstances, it was not
adequately shown that the right to a speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps necessary to complete
the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.

On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right
to a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been
accorded due respect. There is thus merit in the petition.

1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v.

Sarmiento,  "means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, ... ."   Thus, if the
9 10

person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and
apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to
the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid
defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance of
this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case."   The above ruling is a reiteration of the
11

doctrine announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera,   a 1924 decision. In 12

that case, Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with the requirement of
the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays."   Further: "We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
13

without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by
a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."  14

In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v.
Castañeda,   where it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years
15

and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set aside the
appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the accused. As was pointed out by the ponente,
Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the
administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal
proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the
custody of the law."   It was on the basis of the above judgment that the dismissal of a second
16

information for frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the
first information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the
original complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions the case was set for trial, the
private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire
calendar for the month it was supposed to have been heard.   The same result followed in Esguerra
17

v. De la Costa,   where the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been
18

criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a
year and three months, with the lower court twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the
same offense on a new information, thus compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the
lower court to terminate the case was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed
appropriate by this Court.

There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That
was in Mercado v. Santos.   Here, for a period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested
19

four times on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were
subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to
obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The
lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused
moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He
elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An
accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. ... He cannot be oppressed by
delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending
trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed."   The opinion likewise considered as not
20

decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an information was filed charging the
accused with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the
right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced."   The latest decision in point, Acebedo v. Sarmiento,   presented an even clearer
21 22

case. The information for damage to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested
until May 19, 1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in his
order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when
the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the
provincial fiscal sought the postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal.
The lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind and
reinstated the case.

Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the
absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May
10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that
they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not
the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times
unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to
them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of
August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional
safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling
doctrine announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.

2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been met. The decisive question has
been answered. There is an affirmation of the worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not
too much significance should be attached to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the
People of the Philippines that the Court of Appeals should have been made the party respondent.
What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this particular constitutional right. It
did amount at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading may
then be singled out, it cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one of the most important safeguards
granted an accused. To deny petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt form over substance.
At any rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, the defenses that could have interposed to justify the action taken were invoked
by the People of the Philippines. They certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to a speedy
rial speak too categorically to be misread. This is one of those situations then where, in the apt
language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give way to the
realities of the situation." 
23

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
No. 16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion
to dismiss as well as its order of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the
order of January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside,
nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against petitioners in the aforesaid
CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, C.J, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ, concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: 3O5

G.R. No. 103323 January 21, 1993

RAMON S. PAULIN, ANGELA F. PAULIN and JOSE BACHO, Petitioners, vs. HON. CELSO M.
GIMENEZ (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu City, Branch 5), HON. MAMERTO Y.
COLIFLORES (In his capacity as Judge of the MTC of Talisay, Branch IX, Cebu); CASTRO BELME,
and The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Mari V. Andres and Romarie G. Villonco for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library

Garcia, Garcia, Ong, Vano & Associates for respondent Castro Belme Mabuyo.

MELO, J.:

The petition before us arose from a November 10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private
respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden
by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with
dust.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Irked by this incident, Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan
Originals in Tanke, Talisay Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby security guard as to who owns the Nissan
Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner Dr. Ramon
Paulin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Later, while Mabuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu,
Dr. Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a
companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call
the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses and their lone
companion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the
police officers, they were brought to the police station. On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt.
Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein
petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20, 1989, the
station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and oral defamation," against private
respondent Mabuyo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5213.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu
(Branch IX), acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No.
5204. On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order
which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3, 1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

At the hearing of Criminal Case No. 5213 on July 5, 1990, petitioners vigorously sought the setting
aside of the July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the same was denied in another
resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Not satisfied with the resolution of respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, petitioners filed on July
31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial
Region, which was thereafter docketed as Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207 and later re-raffled to
Branch 5 stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who
dismissed the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. The decretal portion of the decision
states:
All the foregoing considered, for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, as revised, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Public respondent is
hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of Crim. Case Nos. 5204 and 5213 and to decide both cases
on their merits within the period provided under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The
preliminary injunction heretofore issued dated May 9, 1991, is hereby lifted and set aside. (p. 118,
Rollo.)

Still not contented, petitioners have now resorted to the instant petition, arguing that (a) the decision
of the municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was a judgment of
acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating petitioners' right against double jeopardy;
and (b) the regional trial court, in dismissing the petition in CEB-9207 abused its discretion as it
ignored petitioners' right against double jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal
as the same would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy. The secondary issue dwells on
the applicability of the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting motions to dismiss and petitions for
certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the following requisites must have been
obtained in the original prosecution;chanrobles virtual law library

a) a valid complaint or information;chanrobles virtual law library

b) a competent court;chanrobles virtual law library

c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; andchanrobles virtual law library

d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent (People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 [1968]: Caes v. IAC, 179
SCRA 54 [1989]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application to the
case at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the
trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate
court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. (People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521 [1990], at p. 529.)

For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the
accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481 [1991]). Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or
with the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against double
jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy
thus did not attach. This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and formally
introduced in People v. Salico (84 Phil. 722 [1949]), where Justice Felicisimo Feria stated:

. . . when the case is dismissed, with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
(See also People v. Marapao (85 Phil. 832 [1950]); Gandicela v. Lutero (88 Phil. 299 [1951]), People
v. Desalisa (125 Phil. 27 [1966]); and, more recently, People v. Aquino (199 SCRA 610 [1991]).

Petitioners insist that the June 13, 1990 decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) is an acquittal
since it was issued after it had allegedly considered the merits of the prosecution's
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In People v. Salico (supra), distinctions between acquittal and dismissal were made, to wit:

. . . Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the
case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either
because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint

or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. . . . (at pp. 732-733.)
The MTC decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal from the charge considering that no finding
was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, it is stated:

Sec. 14. Amendments. - . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Sec. 11 . . .

In Section 11 of the same Rule, it is provided:

When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be
good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. (Id., Sec. 11, Rule
119.)

In the case at bar, the original case was dismissed without the proper information having been filed,
it appearing that the proper charge should have been, "disturbance of public performance,"
punishable under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code instead of "grave threats," under Article 282
of the same penal code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final,
disposing of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused
himself, to wit:

1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to
a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. (Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 [1989] at pp. 60-
61.)

Petitioners' motion to dismiss premised on procedural grounds cannot be considered a demurrer to

evidence nor was the dismissal sought by them predicated on the denial of their right to speedy trial.
Hence, the exceptions mentioned find no application in the instant case, especially so because when
the municipal trial court dismissed the case upon petitioners' motion, the prosecution still had to
present several witnesses.

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated (People v. Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, Aug. 31, 1966, 17 SCRA
1119; Uy v. Genato, G.R. No. L-37399, May 29, 1974, 57 SCRA 123). Where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of jurisdiction. Hence, the violation of the State's right to
due process raises a serious jurisdictional error (Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, G.R.
No. L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420) as the decision rendered in disregard of the right is void
for lack of jurisdiction. (Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973], at p. 78.)

Where the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and
adjudication, the order is null and void (People v. Pamittan, 30 SCRA 98
[1969]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In People v. Bocar (138 SCRA 166 [1985]), this Court found that the prosecution was denied due
process as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of
Court in view of the trial court's order of dismissal. The trial court was thereby ousted from its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to
complete the presentation of its evidence and, therefore, the first jeopardy had not been terminated.
Hence, the remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy
and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511 [1988]), this Court reiterated its
previous ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial court exceeded it's jurisdiction and acted with
grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the
case and as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its
case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process. With such violation, its orders are,
therefore, null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the more recent case of Saldana v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 396 [1990]), the issue raised
was as follows: "Where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence, may the case be
remanded for further proceeding?" This Court, applying the Bocar case, ruled that the order of the
Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not violate
the rule on double jeopardy inasmuch as the trial court was ousted from its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on double jeopardy when it set aside the order
of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its
error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right
to complete the presentation of its evidence. It follows then that the decision of respondent regional
trial court sustaining that of the court of origin cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Rule on Summary Procedure was correctly applied by the public respondents in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners argue that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in applying the provision
prohibiting the filing of motions to dismiss and petitions for certiorari provided under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. They claim that the prohibition under Section 15 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure refers to motions to dismiss or to quash filed before the accused enters his plea. In any
event, petitioners insist that they filed a demurrer to evidence which is not a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Demurrer to evidence due to its insufficiency pre-supposes that the prosecution had already rested
its case (Sec. 15, Rule 119, 1985, Rules on Criminal Procedure). Hence, the motion is premature if
interposed at a time when the prosecution is still in the process of presenting its evidence (Aquino v.
Sison, 179 SCRA 648 [1989]), as what happened in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Petitioners, of course, maintain that all the prosecution's evidence was already on record since the
affidavits of complainant and his witnesses, in law, constituted their direct testimonies and that,
therefore, no other evidence could have been introduced by the
prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Submission of the affidavits to the court does not warrant the interference that the prosecution had
already finished presenting its evidence because the affiants are still required to testify and affirm the
contents thereof; otherwise, these affidavits cannot serve as competent evidence for the
prosecution. The Rule on Summary Procedure states:

Sec. 14. Procedure of Trial. - Upon a plea of not guilty being entered, the trial shall immediately
proceed. The affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the
witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be subjected to cross-examination.
Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the
party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible
purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

No witness shall be allowed to testify unless he had previously submitted an affidavit to the court in
accordance with Sections 9 and 10 hereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
December 19, 1991 AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

CITIZENSHIP: 334

[G.R. No. L-15955. October 26, 1961.]

IN RE: PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION, NARCISO CHING, Petitioner-

Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Andres F. Matias and Romulo L. Chua for Petitioner-Appellee.

Federico V. Sian for Oppositor-Appellant.

 SYLLABUS

1. NATURALIZATION; FAILURE TO DECLARE ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTION. — One who desires to become a Filipino citizen must allege and
prove that he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. In the
absence of allegations and competent proof of such belief, courts may not admit
applicant to Filipino citizenship.

DECISION

BENGZON, C.J. :

Having appealed from the decision of the Rizal court of first instance that granted
the petition for naturalization of Narciso Ching, the Solicitor-General points out that
petitioner failed to allege and prove: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) his belief in the principle underlying the Philippine Constitution;

(b) continuous residence in the Philippines from the date of filing the petition up to
the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship.

The Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act 473) provides that the
applicant must be one who is "of good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution . . ." 1 The Act also provides that
the petition for citizenship must contain "a declaration that he has the qualifications
required by this Act specifying the same. 2

The official form of petitions for naturalization prescribed under sec. 21 of the
Naturalization Act reads partly: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Twelfth. — I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have

conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
my residence in the Philippines in my relation with the constituted Government as
well as with the community in which I am living. I have mingled socially with the
Filipinos, and have evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipinos. I have all the qualifications required under
section 2, and none of the disqualifications under section 4, of Commonwealth Act
No. 473." (Italics Ours.)

Notwithstanding the above requirements, the petition of Narciso Ching printed on

the first pages of the Record on Appeal contains no assertion by the petitioner that
"he believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution." At the hearing of his
petition, he made no declaration of such belief. Such assertion and belief are
essential.

It is argued by his counsel that inasmuch as applicant had, at the hearing, stated
his belief in the ideals of the Filipino people, the omission had been cured. We do
not think so. One who desires to become a Filipino citizen must explicitly declare his
allegiance to the Philippine Constitution and its principles. We may even be asked,
and should be asked, what those principles are — at least, the fundamental ones.
In the absence of allegations and competent proof of such belief, courts may not
admit applicant to Filipino citizenship.

In this view, we find it unnecessary to go into the other objection of the legal
representative of the Government.

The appealed decision is reversed and the petition for naturalization is hereby
denied. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, and De

Leon, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. L-15955. October 26, 1961.]

IN RE: PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION, NARCISO CHING, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Andres F. Matias and Romulo L. Chua for Petitioner-Appellee.

Federico V. Sian for Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. NATURALIZATION; FAILURE TO DECLARE ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTION. — One who desires to become a Filipino citizen must allege and prove that he
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. In the absence of allegations and
competent proof of such belief, courts may not admit applicant to Filipino citizenship.

DECISION

BENGZON, C.J. :

Having appealed from the decision of the Rizal court of first instance that granted the petition for
naturalization of Narciso Ching, the Solicitor-General points out that petitioner failed to allege and
prove:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) his belief in the principle underlying the Philippine Constitution;

(b) continuous residence in the Philippines from the date of filing the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship.

The Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act 473) provides that the applicant must be one
who is "of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution .
. ." 1 The Act also provides that the petition for citizenship must contain "a declaration that he has
the qualifications required by this Act specifying the same. 2
The official form of petitions for naturalization prescribed under sec. 21 of the Naturalization Act
reads partly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Twelfth. — I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in
my relation with the constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living. I
have mingled socially with the Filipinos, and have evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos. I have all the qualifications required under section 2,
and none of the disqualifications under section 4, of Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Italics Ours.)

Notwithstanding the above requirements, the petition of Narciso Ching printed on the first pages of
the Record on Appeal contains no assertion by the petitioner that "he believes in the principles of the
Philippine Constitution." At the hearing of his petition, he made no declaration of such belief. Such
assertion and belief are essential.

It is argued by his counsel that inasmuch as applicant had, at the hearing, stated his belief in the
ideals of the Filipino people, the omission had been cured. We do not think so. One who desires to
become a Filipino citizen must explicitly declare his allegiance to the Philippine Constitution and its
principles. We may even be asked, and should be asked, what those principles are — at least, the
fundamental ones. In the absence of allegations and competent proof of such belief, courts may not
admit applicant to Filipino citizenship.

In this view, we find it unnecessary to go into the other objection of the legal representative of the
Government.

The appealed decision is reversed and the petition for naturalization is hereby denied. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., took no part.

EDUC, SCIENCE AND TECH, ARTS, CULTURE & SPORTS ED: 363

G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman,
Board of Medical Education, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth
Judicial Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF
MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.

Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.

Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises and regulates
the country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and
set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo,
Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure
of the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply
the College).lâwphî1.ñèt

The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of
producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The,
unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo,
Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga
City where the school was first proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its
permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.

In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical
Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical
schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much
short of the minimum standards set for medical schools.   The, team of inspectors, composed of
1

Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and
Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the school   upon the following findings, to wit:
2

(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because
of its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to
Muslim culture and welfare;
 (b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a "balanced
humanistic and scientific" education;

(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training of its students in the
major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;

(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time,
resulting in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general,
poor quality teaching.

The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the Board of
Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors   for a re-evaluation of the College.
3

After inspection, the team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the
school. 4

The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors.   A year
5

thereafter, the College failed another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to
continue as a medical school conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of
Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for government recognition. The,
College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities,
teaching hospital, and studentry.   The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines
6

Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition.

Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of the College,
effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The, College however succeeded in having the
Board form yet another team to review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto
Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on
June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant
for classroom instructions and the library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical
facilities and library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no prospects for
satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was) below par from the point of view of
credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various
stages of medical education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of
serious development efforts in academic medicine — i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no
serious effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the
recommendation was to close the College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other
medical schools.  7

In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the College's Board
of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the
College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in
order not to dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss.   The, Board
8

subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only until May, 1989, after which it
was to be closed, this decision being "final and unappealable." The, College was, however, assured
of assistance in the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health-
related and paramedical courses.  9

The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of discretion
to the Secretary.   On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no
10

reason to disturb" the contested decision, affirmed it. 11

On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent
Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.

The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May 10, 1989.   His Honor
12

ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and on such
basis sustained the claim of the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard
manner" by a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that
there was no evidence supporting the findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his
philosophy ocular inspection of the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report
were non-existent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big enough," and
in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on smoothly at the time of the ocular
inspection."

The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all levels of
the medical college and in its pre-board review classes.  13

Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989 as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a restraining order against its enforcement as
well as for the dismissal of the action instituted in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989
ordered the respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting students, and the
respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction order.

The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on the ground
that the closure order against which it was directed was issued without factual basis and in violation
of the right of the College to due process of law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of
1986) to the effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the
last evaluation, which in this instance was made, on June 18, 1988.

Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There
is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or
any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an
educational institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its
opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the
competence to do so.

The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law
and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him
should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.

Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case exercised
so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory
correction — or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or
excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled — it
becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme instances,
where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies
and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within
bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary
the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by an educational institution
of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute
its over judgment for that of said office.

In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of grave abuse of
discretion containing the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly show the challenged
decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent
institution to determine its compliance with the minimum standards established for a medical college.
The, first survey, that undertaken by the Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various
and significant deficiencies in the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure.
Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or teams, at the
school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results of that first survey.
Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President. Indeed, the
petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the
validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out
of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent College knew that the recommendation for its closure
was made, as early as 1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times
thereafter until it was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was confirmed
by the Office of the President. Said respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence
of all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which
was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students before June, 1989
and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After having resorted to the whole range of
administrative remedies available to it, without success, it sought to obtain from the respondent
Court the relief it could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its closure as of June,
1989 openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old
students.

Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to
mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse
of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official
action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite
government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof,
did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true
state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of the evaluating team came
from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine,   and their judgment in this
14

particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the
school could hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and
facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of
justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that
courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter
are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts in that regard
are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.   There are, to be sure, exceptions to
15

this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.

The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the
College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but
remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact,
admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its
letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints
of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-
evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a
reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to
be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.

There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated NMCS ORDER
No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period
therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the
last evaluation. The, provision referred to reads:

The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for failure to
comply with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.:

xxx

c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government; authority to operate, for

failure to fully comply with the prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the
last evaluation conducted on the school.

It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation therein
contemplated — where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the prescribed
requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3)
years from the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar — where
respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to warrant its immediate closure.
Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of
government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the
school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year waiting period before
authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of
Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an
educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not
exceeding three (3) years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or
cancellation of the government; authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far
from nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in
question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to
comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed,
its discovered deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be
irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time
the petitioner school had already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether
or not the original recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as
already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years, served but
to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore,
even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held
that there has been substantial compliance therewith.

Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose
to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable
reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the
petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that
this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the
Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as
here ruled, it has not that power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining
order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated
May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.

SO ORDERED.