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Adm. Case No. 4673. April 27, 2001

ATTY. HECTOR TEODOSIO, petitioner, vs. MERCEDES NAVA, respondent.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review filed by Atty. Teodosio assailing the IBP Resolution.
He alleged that IBP Board ordered him suspended from the practice of law without
stating the facts and the law on which its decision is based.

Atty. Teodosio, on behalf of Espinosa and Palma filed a case against Nava and
Batislaong for annulment of contract and damages. Nava alleged that Atty. Teodosio
violated Rule 15.01 of the CPR when he acted as counsel for Batislaong while acting as
counsel for Espinosa and Palma.

Atty. Teodosio denied that his clients’ interests were conflicting and contends that
his clients in fact have common interest against Nava. He agreed to represent
Batislaong only after he had explained to her the nature of the complaints filed by
Espinosa and Palma against her. His three clients executed affidavits stating that they
have no complaints in the way Atty. Teodosio handled their cases and that each of them
was aware that the other was represented by Atty. Teodosio.

Commissioner San Juan recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit. However, the Board of Governors found Atty. Teodosio guilty of violation of Rule
15.03 of the CPR and was ordered suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the IBP failed to observe the procedural requirements of this
administrative case.

 Whether or not Atty. Teodosio is guilty of representing conflicting interest.

HELD:

1. YES. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 8. Investigation-
Upon joinedr of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the
case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if
upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.

SEC. 10. Report of Investigator.— Not later than thirty (30) days for
termination of the investigation, the investigator shall submit a report
containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of
Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof,
and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of
the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being
sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the investigator’s personal
notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies.

SEC. 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors—(a) Every case
heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall
be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator’s report; (b) If the
Board, by vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
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The requirement that the IBP investigator afford Atty. Teodosio in a disbarment
complaint full opportunity to present his case cannot be taken lightly for it is meant to
ensure that baseless accusations against members of the Bar do not prosper. Similarly,
the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts
of record, serves an important function. For aside from informing the parties the reason
for the decision to enable them to point out the appellate court the findings with which
they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also
an assurance that the judge , or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his
judgment through the process of legal reasoning.

In the case at bar, IBP failed to observe the procedural requirements in the
administrative proceeding. Commissioner San Juan appears not to have scheduled a
hearing on the case nor required the parties to submit their evidence. Similarly, the
Board of Governors’ resolution in suspending Atty. Teodosio from the practice of law
does not contain any findings of fact or law upon which it based its ruling.

2. NO. Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts.” and under Canon 6 of the previous Canon of Professional
Ethics, a lawyer is deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contendfor that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose. The rule is designed to remove from attorneys the opportunity to
take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained during the existence of the
client-attorney relation.

Atty. Teodosio’s conduct does not amount to a violation of the rule. In the cases filed
by Espinosa and Palma, it is only Nava against whom the former have an adverse
interest. Indeed, there would have been no need to implead Batislaong as a defendant if
it’s not for the offer of Palma and Espinosa to settle their obligation. On the other hand,
in the other cases in which Batislaong is a party, neither Palma nor Espinosa are parties.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the danger that Atty. Teodosio may abuse his
clients’ confidences to the detriment of the other is absent. Even granting that his
clients’ interests were conflicting, Atty. Teodosio cannot be held liable for acting as their
common counsel in view of the fact that he explained to them the consequences of his
representation and that they gave their consent to him.

Adm. Case No. 5134. December 14, 2005

TIRSO UYTENGSU III, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSEPH M. BADUEL, respondent.

FACTS:

Uytengsu, III was one of the heirs of Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a
pending patent application. He alleged that Atty. Baduel caused Kokseng (former
guardian of the heirs), to execute a SPA in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo to their damage
and prejudice even if he knew that Kokseng had no authority to do so; and that the said
SPA was the same SPA presented to him, which he refused to sign and was prepared
and notarized by the law firm of Atty. Baduel.

Atty. Baduel argued that the allegations were purely hearsay and that Uytengsu was
instituted to harass him because he was the counsel of an opposing litigant against
complainant’s corporation in an ejectment case.

The IBP approved and adopted the report and recommendation of the investigating
commissioner, dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Atty. Baduel is guilty of the allegations.

HELD:

NO. The SC agrees with the investigating commissioner that the allegations
against Atty. Baduel constitutes mere hearsay evidence and not be admissible in any
proceeding.

It was held that in all cases the determination whether an attorney should be
disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
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discretion, mindful always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary action and should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer
demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved
professional standards. The burden of proof is on the complainant to overcome such
presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an

opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against him. The case must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.

In the case at bar, other than the bare assertions of complainant, the evidence
presented by the latter does not suffice to tip the scale of justice to his side. The
burden of proof is on the complainant to overcome such presumption and
establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence. There must be
substantial evidence to support Atty. Baduel’s guilt.

As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, all the charges against

Atty. Baduel are not based on Uytengsu’s personal knowledge but acquired from
another sources. What he offered in evidence to prove his charge is a second-hand
version. Though he identified his source, he failed to present any sworn statement or
affidavit of said witness. In other words, what he presented in evidence to prove his
charge is hearsay.

The hearsay rule provides that no assertion offered as testimony can be received
unless it is or has been open to test by cross-examination, except as provided otherwise
by the rules on evidence, by rules of court, or by statute. The chief reasons for the rule
are that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made under oath and are
not subject to cross-examination. As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies to
the party who makes the allegations– ei incumbit probatio, qui decit, non qui negat. He
who asserts not he who denies must prove.

The SC DISMISSED the instant case against Atty. Baduel for lack of merit.

Adm. Case No. 6792. January 25, 2006.

ROBERTO SORIANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON, respondent.

FACTS:

Atty. Dizon was convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation,
conditioned on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after the judgment was
rendered, Atty. Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed for Atty. Dizon’s disbarment alleging that the latter’s conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR; and constitutes sufficient ground
for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt in the crime of frustrated homicide involves
moral turpitude and warrants his disbarment.

HELD:

YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By
such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of
justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant case, Atty.
Dizon has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment of frustrated
homicide.

Moral turpitude is defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice,

modesty, or good morals; an act of business, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
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It was held that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending
on the degree of the crime. It is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all
the surrounding circumstances.

In the case at bar, Atty. Dizon was the aggressor and his act was aggravated
with treachery when he shot Soriano when the latter was not in the position to defend
himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was over, he was unarmed and
was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon. He also tried to escape punishment
by wrapping the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints.

By his conduct, he revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-

importance. As it were he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated
and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.

He seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the CPR through his illegal possession of

an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, which is a
violation of lawful orders of the courts.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of
the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally
unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license
and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.

Atty. Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty. He consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous
behaviour when he sought the help of Vice Mayor Farinas for an out-of-court settlement
with the family of Soriano but when this effort failed; he concocted a complete lie by
making it appear that it was Soriano’s family that had sought a conference with him to
obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. He also fabricated a story of having been mauled
by Soriano and two other persons.

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is

more important that truthfulness. Lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by an artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of Atty. Dizon erode rather than enhance public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, whit honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach. Atty. Dizon has fallen short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. The appalling vindictiveness,
treachery and brazen dishonesty clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a
member of the bar.

Atty. Manuel Dizon was DISBARRED and his name was ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.

A.C. No. 5113. October 7, 2004

Dolores Silva Vda. De Fajardo, complainant, vs. Atty. Rexie Efren A. Bugaring
respondent.

FACTS:

Fajardo and her co-heirs were encountering disputes with the Cruz family and
the tenants of the two lots that they were trying to sell to Golden Bay, which they
inherited from their predecessors. The dispute with Cruz family got branched out to
about eleven (11) cases. Atty. Bugaring represented Fajardo in all those cases.

Atty. Bugaring devised two fictitious contracts, which she can show to her co-
heirs who had been asking for the cost of legal services. A compromise agreement with
the Cruz family was executed in June 1992, which becomes the basis of the Judgment
and the dismissal of the offshoot cases. On the other hand, the compromise agreement
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reached with the tenants consisted of agreement totally ceding lot 2454 as disturbance
compensation. Fajardo and tendered the amount of Php 100, 000.00 to Atty. Bugaring
but he rejected it. Instead, he made a deal with Fajardo to just pay him Php 85,000.00
and that her co-heirs will pay the amount of Php 1,200,000.00. Fajardo learned that her
property in Tandang Sora was already attached by Atty. Bugaring.

Due to adamant refusal of Fajardo to settle attorney’s fees, Atty. Bugaring filed a
case against her for Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Attachment for collection of his legal fees. He also averred that from 1991 to May 1994,
he was retained by Fajardo as her personal legal consultant and lawyer in nineteen (19)
court cases. He further stated the Contract of services he prepared and signed by
Fajardo was dated December 11, 1992.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Atty. Bugaring is liable for gross misconduct.

HELD;

YES. Canon 10 of CPR provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to courts. Accordingly, Rule 10.01 requires a member of the bar “not to do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.”

Moreover, Section 20 (d) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer
must employ “such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek
to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

Atty. Bugaring has not completely been honest when he claimed that the entire
estate of Adela Silva was the subject of litigation in the case for partition. It is clear that
lots 2434 and 2454 were the only properties mentioned in the Complaint for partition.
He also lied and mislead the court when he made two inconsistent statements regarding
the date his services was retained by Fajardo and that the Contract of Service for the
“Mother Case” was executed six months after the execution of the Compromise
Agreement .

A lawyer is entitled to the protection of the courts against any contempt on the
part of a client to escape payment of attorney’s fees. However, such protection must not
be sought at the expense of truth. Complete candor or honesty is expected from
lawyers.

This proceeding is not about the merits of Atty. Bugaring’s fees, but about his
conduct as an officer of the court. Disbarment proceeding belong to a class of their own,
distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action. This disbarment case may proceed
independently of all civil action for collection, without running afoul of the prohibition
against forum shopping. The judgment in the disbarment proceeding would not bar the
collection proceeding.

Atty. Bugaring is found liable for gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon the finality of the
decision.
Adm. Case No. 2474. September 15, 2004

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA respondent.

FACTS:

Atty. Palma was hired by Cojuangco as his personal counsel for his business.
He becomes very close to his family. He tutored Cojuangco’s 22-year old daughter Lisa.
He misrepresented himself as “bachelor” before the Hong Kong authorities and married
Lisa in Hong Kong despite the fact that he is married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and with
three (3) children. The next day, he informed Cojuangco about the marriage and
assured him that “everything is legal.”

Cojuangco filed with the CFI a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
and it was declared void ab initio by the trial court. Subsequently, he filed for Atty.
Palma’s disbarment on the grounds of “deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.”
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First Division of this court set aside the CFI decision and remand the case to the
CFI for proper proceeding and determination. The records of the case fail to disclose
the outcome of the said case. Atty. Palma filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on the ground that the final outcome of the civil case poses a prejudicial
question to the disbarment proceeding.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not Atty. Palma is guilty of the charges against him.

 Whether or not the civil case (nullity of marriage between Atty. Palma and Lisa)
poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding.

HELD:

1. YES. It must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a
dichotomy of standards among its members. This is because lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not
only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at
any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Palma’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground

for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contacting a second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. The court defined immoral conduct as
“conduct which is wilful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of community”.

Atty. Palma’s act is manifestly immoral. He abandoned his lawful wife and three
children. He lured an innocent young woman into marrying him and he misrepresented
himself as “bachelor” so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. His culpability was
aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just 22-year old college student and was under
psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Clearly, he had crossed the limits of propriety and decency. Professional competency
alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is
always an indispensable requirement.

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the CPR, is that they
“shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Lawyer’s
primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 of the CPR which states that, “A
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes”, which is also enshrined in the Lawyer’s Oath.

2. NO. The Court ruled that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage

has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. It was held that a disbarment case
is sui generis (class of its own) for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but it is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.

Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an

administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case
does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage
does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof—clear preponderance of evidence—in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.

Atty. Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of
his oath as lawyer and was DISBARRED from the practice of law.