13 ART 1347 and to be voted to public office, provided, however, that all qualifications prescribed by law obtain.
and to be voted to public office, provided, however, that all qualifications prescribed by law obtain. Such rights
G.R. No. L-13403. March 23, 1960
RAMON E. SAURA, plaintiff and appellant, v. ESTELA P. SINDICO, defendant and appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTIONS; THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ONE’S CANDIDACY; PUBLIC OFFICE; NOT WITHIN COMMERCE OF MAN. —
Among those that may not be the subject matter (object) of contracts are certain rights of individuals, which the
law and public policy have deemed wise to exclude from the commerce of man. Among these are the political
rights conferred upon citizens, including, but not limited to one’s right to vote, the right to present one’s
candidacy to the people and to be voted to public office, provided, however, that all the qualifications prescribed
by law obtain. Such rights may not, therefore, be bargained away or surrendered for consideration by the citizen
or unduly curtailed with impunity, for they are conferred not for individual or private benefit or advantage but
for the public good and interest.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE FIXED BY LAW NOT BY PRIVATE PARTIES. — Constitutional
and statutory provisions fix the qualifications of persons who may be eligible for certain elective public offices.
Said requirements may neither be enlarged nor reduced by mere agreements between private parties. A voter
possessing all the qualifications required to fill an office may, by himself or through a political party or group,
present his candidacy without further limitations than those provided by law.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal on issues of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
for damages.
From the records it appears that Ramon E. Saura and Estela P. Sindico were contesting for nomination as the
official candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the fourth district of Pangasinan in the congressional elections of
November 12, 1957. On August 23, 1957, the parties entered into a written agreement bearing the same date,
containing among other matters stated therein, a pledge that —
"Each aspirant shall respect the result of the aforesaid convention, i.e., no one of us shall either run as a rebel or
independent candidate after losing in said convention."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the provincial convention held by the Nacionalista Party on August 31, 1957, Saura was elected and
proclaimed the Party’s official congressional candidate for the aforesaid district of Pangasinan. Nonetheless,
Sindico, in disregard of the covenant, filed, on September 6, 1957, her certificate of candidacy for the same office
with the Commission on Elections, and she openly and actively campaigned for her election. Wherefore, on
October 5, 1957, plaintiff Saura commenced this suit for the recovery of damages. Upon motion of the
defendant, the lower court, in its order of November 19, 1957, dismissed the complaint on the basis that the
agreement sued upon is null and void, in that (1) the subject matter of the contract, being a public office, is not
within the commerce of man; and (2) the "pledge" was in curtailment of the free exercise of elective franchise
and therefore against public policy. Hence, this appeal.
We agree with the lower court in adjusting the contract or agreement in question a nullity. Among those that
may not be the subject matter (object) of contracts are certain rights of individuals, which the law and public
policy have deemed wise to exclude from the commerce of man. Among them are the political rights conferred
upon citizens, including, but not limited to, one’s right to vote, the right to present one’s candidacy to the people
may not, therefore, no bargained away or surrendered for consideration by the citizen nor unduly curtailed with
impunity, for they are conferred not for individual or private benefit or advantage but for the public good and
interest.
Constitutional and statutory provisions fix the qualifications of persons who may be eligible for certain elective
public offices. Said requirements may neither be enlarged nor reduced by mere agreements between private
parties. A voter possessing all the qualifications required to fill an office may, by himself or through a political
party or group, present his candidacy without further limitations than those provided by law.
"Every voter has a right to be a candidate for public office if he possesses the qualifications required to fill the
office. It does not necessarily follow that he can be the candidate of a particular political party. The statute
provides when and how one may be a candidate of a political party. If he cannot fill the requirement so as to be
the candidate of the political party of his choice, he may still be a candidate at the general election by petition.
The right of the voter to vote at the general election for whom he pleases cannot be limited." (Roberts v.
Cleveland, Secretary of State of the State of New Mexico, 48 NM 226, 149 P (2d) 120, 153 A.L.R. 635, 637-638)
(Italics supplied).
In common law, certain agreements in consideration of the withdrawal of candidates for office have invariably
been condemned by the courts as being against public policy, be it a withdrawal from the race for nomination,
or, after nomination, from the race for election. (See notes in 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 289 and cases cited therein; 18
Am. Jur. Sec. 352, pp. 399-400).
In the case at hand, plaintiff complains on account of defendant’s alleged violation of the "pledge" in question by
filing her own certificate of candidacy for a seat in the Congress of the Philippines and in openly and actively
campaigning for her election. In the face of the preceding considerations, we certainly cannot entertain plaintiff’s
action, which would result in limiting the choice of the electors to only those persons selected by a small group
or by party bosses.
The case of Pendleton v. Pace, 9 S. W. (2nd) 437, cited by the appellant, is clearly inapplicable. The court there
only sanctioned the validity of an agreement by the opposing candidates for nomination setting aside and re-
submitting the nomination for another primary election on account of the protest or contest filed by the losing
candidate in the first primary election. To abandon the contest proceedings, the candidates for nomination
agreed to submit again their nomination to the electors in the subsequent primary.
Appellant likewise cites and quotes a portion of our ruling in Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil., 758; 46 Off. Gaz., 210, to
the effect it is not incompetent for a candidate to withdraw or annul his certificate of candidacy. This is not in
point, for while we stated there that he may do so, there being no legal prohibition against such a voluntary
withdrawal, it does not follow, nor did we imply anywhere in the decision, that in case there is any agreement or
consideration for such a withdrawal, said agreement or consideration should be held valid or given effect.
We find it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the parties.
Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
14 ART 1355
G.R. No. 21943           September 15, 1924
ASKAY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FERNANDO A. COSALAN, defendant-appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years of age, residing in the municipal
district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various time has been the owner of mining property. The
defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the nephew by marriage of Askay, and municipal president of Tublay, who
likewise has been interested along with his uncle in mining enterprises.
About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in Tublay, Benguet. On November 23,
1914, if we are to accept defendant's Exhibit 1, Askay sold this claim to Cosalan. Nine years later, in 1923, Askay
instituted action in the Court of First Instance of Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim adhered
null, to secure possession of the mineral claim, and to obtain damages from the defendant in the amount of
P10,500. Following the presentation of various pleadings including the answer of the defendant, and following
trial before Judge of First Instance Harvey, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the
defendant from the same, with costs against the plaintiff. On being informed of the judgment of the trial court,
plaintiff attacked it on two grounds: The first, jurisdiction, and the second, formal. Both motions were denied and
an appeal was perfected.
Two questions are suggested by the assignments of error. The first is whether Judge George R. Harvey had
jurisdiction to try the case. The second is whether the plaintiff has established his cause of action by a
preponderance of the evidence.
I. On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of Justice authorized and
instructed the Honorable George R. Harvey, Judge of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District, to
hold a special term of court in the City of Baguio, Mountain Province, beginning May 2, 1923.
(Administrative Order No. 43, 21 Off. Gaz., p. 893.) Acting under the authority granted by the
order of the Secretary of Justice, Judge Harvey proceeded to hear the case of Askay vs. Cosalan,
without protest from anyone until after an adverse decision for the plaintiff and until after Judge
Harvey had left the district.
The point which plaintiff now presses is that Act No. 3107, amendatory of section 155 of the Administrative
Code, which authorizes a Judge of First Instance to be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for
a period which shall in no case exceed six months, in a district or province other than his own, for the purpose of
trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, was not in force until fifteen days after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, or not until August 3, 1923. Plaintiff relies on
section 11 of the Administrative Code, which in part reads: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of
the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded."
Now turning to Act No. 3107, its final section provides that "This Act shall take effect on its approval." The Act
was approved on March 17, 1923. Obviously, therefore, there being a special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies
to the exclusion of the general provision contained in the Administrative Code.
Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March, 17, 1923, and that it was subsequent thereto,
on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized to hold court at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923,
appellant's argument along this line is found to be without persuasive merit. We pass to the material issue which
is one of fact.
II. Plaintiff contends that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was accomplished through fraud and deceit on the
part of the defendant. Plaintiff may be right but in our judgment he has failed to established his claim. Fraud
must be both alleged and proved.
One facts exists in plaintiff's favor, and this is the age and ignorance of the plaintiff who could be easily duped by
the defendant, a man of greater intelligence. Another fact is the inadequacy of the consideration for the transfer
which, according to the conveyance, consisted of P1 and other valuable consideration, and which, according to
the oral testimony, in reality consisted of P107 in cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one cow, and two carabaos. Gross
inadequacy naturally suggests fraud and is some evidence thereof, so that it may be sufficient to show it when
taken in connection with other circumstances, such as ignorance or the fact that one of the parties has an
advantage over the other. But the fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere inadequacy of price
when both parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction, is not a
sufficient ground for the cancellation of a contract.
Against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, we have the document itself executed in the presence of
witnesses and before a notary public and filed with the mining recorder. The notary public, Nicanor Sison, and
one of the attesting witnesses, Apolonio Ramos, testified to the effect that in the presence of the plaintiff and
the defendant and of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses, the deed of sale was interpreted to the
plaintiff and that thereupon he placed his thumb mark on the document. Two finger print experts, Dr. Charles S.
Banks and A. Simkus, have declared in depositions that the thumb mark on Exhibit 1 is that of Askay. No less than
four other witnesses testified that at various times Askay had admitted to them that he had sold the Pet Kel Mine
to Fernando A. Cosalan.
Having in mind all of these circumstances, how can the plaintiff expect the courts to nullify the deed of sale on
mere suspicion? Having waited nine years from the date when the deed was executed, nine years from the time
Fernando A. Cosalan started developing the mine, nine years from the time Askay himself had been deprived of
the possession of the mine, and nine years permitting of a third party to obtain a contract of lease from Cosalan,
how can this court overlook plaintiff's silent acquiescence in the legal rights of the defendant? On the facts of
record, the trial judge could have done nothing less than dismiss the action.
We conclude therefore, that Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case, that his findings of fact are in
accordance with the evidence, that no prejudicial error was committed in the trial, and that the complaint was
properly dismissed. As a result, judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.