PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS | ATTY. J. G.
CAPANAS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
TOPIC: SELF REPRESENTATION
MADERADA VS. MEDIODEA
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459 : October 14, 2003
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level
court may -- without having to resign from their posts --
conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for
and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants.
However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff
subjects the employee to administrative liability.
FACTS:
A Complaint was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against
Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th MCTC Iloilo. In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of
the law amounting to grave misconduct for failing to
observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure in a civil case.
Complainant, prior, filed before the 12th MCTC of Iloilo --
presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for
forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary injunction,
TRO and damages covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in
the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the
case. Thus, Executive Judge Gustilo designated respondent
judge to hear and decide the case.
Respondent required the defendants in the civil case to
show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be
granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing, but
defendants therein filed a Manifestation, praying that they
be given an additional period of ten days to file an answer.
After said hearing, respondent reset the hearing to a later
date. Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition to
complainants’ prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO.
The later hearing was held in abeyance after the
defendants’ lawyer questioned the authority of
complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her
co-plaintiff. Respondent gave the defendants ten days to
file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as
counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her opposition
thereto.
In his Order, respondent denied the defendants Motion to
disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of and as
counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of 3 Motions praying for
judgment to be rendered, but respondent denied
complainants Motions because of the pending hearing for
the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He
likewise denied the defendants Motion for extension of
time to file an answer. Complainant did not ask for a
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reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of
Judgment.
Respondent:
 Contends that complainant filed a Petition for
his inhibition after filing two administrative
cases against him.
 Argues that the mere filing of administrative
charges against judges is not a ground for
disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the
exercise of their discretion, however, they may
voluntarily disqualify themselves.
 It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited
himself from said civil case. The case was then
reassigned to the judge of the 14th MCTC of
Iloilo.
 Avers that the delay in the resolution of the case
cannot be attributed to him, considering that he
was mandated by law and the rules of procedure
to pass upon every motion presented before
him.
 Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present
evidence necessary for the immediate resolution
of her prayer for preliminary injunction.
 Refutes complainant’s assertion that she
appeared as counsel on her own behalf because
she could not afford the services of a lawyer.
Such claim was allegedly without basis, since
her compensation and other benefits as clerk of
court were more than enough to pay for the
services of counsel.
 Alleges that she did not secure authority from
this Court to appear as counsel, and that she
failed to file her leave of absence every time she
appeared in court.
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court
Administrator:
 The issuance of the preliminary injunction
prayed for in the Complaint should first be
resolved before judgment should be rendered in
the principal action.
 However, the prayer for preliminary injunction
should have been decided within 30 days from
the filing thereof.
 Both the motion for preliminary injunction and
the principal action for forcible entry remained
unresolved even after four months had already
lapsed since the filing of the civil case.
 Recommended that respondent judge be fined
in the amount of P1,000 with a stern warning
that a similar infraction in the future would be
dealt with more severely.
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It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless.
It therefore undertook another round of investigation, the
subject of which was complainants’ appearance in court as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without
court authority.
OCA: Officials and employees of the judiciary must devote
their full time to government service to ensure the efficient
and speedy administration of justice.
 Although they are not absolutely prohibited
from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they
should do so only with prior approval of this
Court.
 That engaging in any private business, vocation
or profession without prior approval of the
Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which
amounts to malfeasance in office.
 Recommended that Complainant Maderada be
fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as
counsel without authority from this Court, with
a stern warning that any similar infraction in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
 Also recommended that she be directed to file
her application for leaves of absence on the days
she had appeared in court to litigate her case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge Mediodea is guilty of
gross inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary
periods in deciding cases. (YES)
2. Whether or not Imelda Y. Maderada is guilty for
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without
court authority. (YES)
RULING:
The agreed with the findings and recommendations of the
OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to the rules.
 Respondent Judge Mediodea is GUILTY of
gross inefficiency in failing to observe the
reglementary periods in deciding cases, and
is FINED in the amount of P10,000 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or of a
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
 On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is
hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as
counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court
authority and is likewise warned that a future
similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.
1. The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the
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amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
 They involve the disturbance of the social order,
which should be restored as promptly as
possible.
 They are governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure to disencumber the courts from the
usual formalities of ordinary actions.
Technicalities or details of procedure that may
cause unnecessary delays should be carefully
avoided.
 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are designed to provide expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved.
Both are time procedures designed to bring
immediate relief.
In an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
 A preliminary injunction is an order granted at
any stage of court actions or proceedings prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from
doing a particular act or acts.
 It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts; in which case it is known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
 Since this remedy is granted prior to the
judgment or final order, the prayer for
preliminary injunction should first be resolved
before the main case of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing.
 A possessor deprived of his possession through
forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within
five (5) days from the filing of the complaint,
present a motion in the action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore
him in his possession.
 The court shall decide the motion within thirty
(30) days from the filing thereof. (Italics ours)
 Respondent should have known that since a
prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy in an action for forcible
entry, it should lend itself to the summary
nature of the main case.
Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
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 Their failure to do so constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges
judges to dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
2. As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA
recommended that she be fined in the amount
of P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private
vocation or profession without prior approval of the
Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held
that her appearance as counsel for herself and on
behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to
moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private
vocation or profession when she appeared on her own
behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was
in the practice of law.
 A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation
conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may
personally do everything during its progress -- from its
commencement to its termination. When they, however,
act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same
rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably
rewarded.
 Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own
actions; and when they do so, they are not
considered to be in the practice of law.
 One does not practice law by acting for himself
any more than he practices medicine by
rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,
involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
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capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others.
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or
employees of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General from engaging in private
practice] has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the
public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment
for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines profession in the
collective sense as referring to the members of
such a vocation.
 In turn, vocation is defined as a person’s regular
calling or business; one’s occupation or
profession.
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession
to litigate their own case in court.
 The right of complainant to litigate her case
personally cannot be taken away from her.
 Her being an employee of the judiciary does not
remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation.
 To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot
make one administratively liable.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant
had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case
below, for which act the former cannot be completely
exonerated. Representing oneself is different from
appearing on behalf of someone else.
 The raison detre for allowing litigants to
represent themselves in court will not apply
when a person is already appearing for another
party.
 Obviously, because she was already defending
the rights of another person when she appeared
for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that
complainant was merely protecting her rights.
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 That their rights may be interrelated will not
give complainant authority to appear in court.
 The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-
plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former
may be impairing the efficiency of public service
once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.
Again, everyone connected with an office that is charged
with the dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of
responsibility.
SANTOS VS. JUDGE LACUROM
A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1823, AUGUST 28, 2006
DOCTRINES:
- A party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered to
be a practice of law as "one does not practice law by acting for
himself, any more than he practices medicine by rendering first
aid to himself.
- During the course of the proceedings, a party should not be
allowed to shift from one form of representation to another.
FACTS:
The complaint stemmed from respondent judge’s alleged
bias and partiality in favor of one Rogelio R. Santos, Sr.
("Santos"), who had three pending cases before respondent
judge’s sala, as shown by the following:
1. Respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-
lawyer, to appear in court and litigate
personally the three cases. Complainant pointed
out that Santos was already represented by
counsels who have not withdrawn their
appearances. (fact relevant to the topic)
2. Respondent judge always granted, with
dispatch, all the pleadings of Santos.
3. Respondent judge had unduly delayed the
execution of the 28 April 2000 Court of Appeals’
decision against Santos.
4. Respondent judge denied complainant’s letter-
request dated 16 March 2001 for respondent
judge to inhibit himself from the cases to avoid
suspicion of bias, prejudice, conflict of interest
and partiality.
Complainant pointed out that in an earlier case respondent
judge inhibited himself because Santos is respondent
judge’s "close friend."
Complainant also added that respondent judge refused to
inhibit himself because he was protecting his interest in
Villa Benita Subdivision ("subdivision"). Complainant
explained that all three cases involved properties in the
subdivision and that respondent judge is an incorporator, a
director, an officer and a legal adviser of Villa Benita
Homeowners Association.
Respondent judge explained that Santos became a "close
friend" when Santos lent his portable bunker to Dr.
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Ferdinand Lacurom ("Dr. Lacurom"), respondent judge’s
son, during the construction of Dr. Lacurom’s house in the
subdivision. Respondent judge also admitted that the
officers of Fabern’s Inc. extended a favor to Dr. Lacurom
when they facilitated the cementing of the road in front of
Dr. Lacurom’s house.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Santos, a non-lawyer, can
represent himself in court. (relevant to the topic)
2. Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of
misconduct.
RULING:
First Issue: YES.
Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and that his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do
everything in the progress of the action from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. A
party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered
to be a practice of law as "one does not practice law by
acting for himself, any more than he practices medicine by
rendering first aid to himself.
Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of the cases
personally. Santos acts not as a counsel or lawyer but as a
party exercising his right to represent himself. Certainly,
Santos does not become a counsel or lawyer by exercising
such right.
The Court, however, notes the use of the disjunctive word
"or" under the Rules, signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each of the other things
enumerated, to mean that a party must choose between
self-representation or being represented by a member of
the bar. During the course of the proceedings, a party
should not be allowed to shift from one form of
representation to another.
Second Issue: YES.
Respondent guilty of simple misconduct.
On respondent judge's admission that Dr. Lacurom, his
son, received a favor from the officers of Fabern's Inc.,
respondent judge violated Rule 5.04 of the Code. Fabern's
Inc. is the petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF, which
was then pending before respondent judge's sala.
Respondent judge should have advised Dr. Lacurom not to
accept any favor from Fabern's Inc. or from any of its
officers or principal stockholders. Their private, as well as
their official conduct, must always be free from the
appearance of impropriety.
On respondent judge's close friendship with Santos, such
fact did not render respondent judge guilty of violating any
canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with
Santos did not influence his official conduct as a judge in
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the cases where Santos was a party. Complainant failed to
present convincing proof. However, it would have been
more prudent if respondent judge avoided hearing the
cases where Santos was a party because their close
friendship could reasonably tend to raise suspicion that
respondent judge's social relationship with Santos would
be an element in his... determination of the cases of Santos.
CRUZ VS. MIJARES
G.R. NO. 154464, SEPTEMBER 11, 2008
FACTS:
This case involved petitioner Cruz, a fourth-year law
student, who sought permission to enter his appearance for
and on his behalf, as the plaintiff in a civil case (Abatement
of Nuisance) before the RTC of Pasay City. He anchored his
claim under Section 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court (ROC),
wherein, a non-lawyer may appear before any Court and
conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, respondent Judge Mijares required
the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as
counsel for himself, as a party-litigant. The counsel of the
opposing party filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) to which
petitioner Cruz objected positing that, an MTD is not
allowed after the Answer had been filed. The respondent
Judge then remarked, "Hay naku, masama `yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the
pending MTD and calendared the next hearing on another
date.
Further, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of the
respondent Judge. It asserted that the respondent judge, in
uttering an uncalled-for remark during pre-trial, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that
justice will not be served. In an Order, the respondent
Judge denied the Motion for Inhibition and the Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) filed by petitioner Cruz was denied
with finality.
In the same Order, the Trial Court denied petitioner’s Cruz
appearance for failure to submit the promised document
and jurisprudence, as well as his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A, ROC. In an
MR, petitioner Cruz reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138.
However, the respondent Judge denied the same basing its
decision under Rule 138-A, ROC.
The respondent court held that, petitioner Cruz could not
appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure
to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner Cruz’s
appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact
that, Circular No. 19 was issued, which eventually became
Rule 138-A. Hence, the failure of petitioner Cruz to prove
on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school's
clinical legal education program and is under supervision
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of an attorney duly accredited by the law school warrant
the denial of his entry of appearance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent RTC gravely erred and
abused its discretion when it denied the appearance of
petitioner Cruz by failure to satisfy Rule 138-A, ROC?
RULING:
YES. The Trial Court erred in applying Rule 138-A, when
the basis of petitioner Cruz’s claim is Section 34, Rule 138.
The former rule provides for conditions when a law
student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows
the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing
himself.
A comparative reading of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court is necessary.
Rule 138-A, ROC or the “Law Student Practice Rule”
provides that:
“Sec. 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal
clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law
school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda
or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, petitioner Cruz insisted that the basis of his
appearance was Sec. 34, Rule 138, which provides:
“Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of
a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar.”
Under, Sec. 34, Rule 138, petitioner Cruz’s contention has
merit. Under this provision, it recognizes the right of an
individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a
party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his
litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that
his appearance must either be personal or by a duly
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authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. Hence,
Cruz as the plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of the civil case, wherein, he would
act not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his
right to represent himself. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled
that the Trial Court must have been misled by the fact that
petitioner Cruz is a law student and must, therefore, be
subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule.
Moreover, the conclusion of the Trial Court that Rule 138-
A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is
misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138
when it released the guidelines for limited law student
practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the
instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and
was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-
A. Also, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730,
that by virtue of Sec. 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without
need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts.
In the case at hand, petitioner Cruz, is a fourth-year law
student, who wished to represent himself in Court, as the
party litigant. The SC ruled that such must be granted.
With this, the RTC of Pasay City is directed to admit the
Entry of Appearance of petitioner Cruz for the civil case for
Abatement of Nuisance.
TOPIC: REPRESENTATION BY NON-LAWYER
PEOPLE VS. TULIN
G.R. NO. 11709, AUGUST 30, 2001
FACTS:
"M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, was sailing off the
coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members was suddenly
boarded with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven
fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and
bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of
the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered
three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the
name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the
vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the
vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name
"Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The
crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending
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misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported
the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast
Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and
rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
cruised around the area presumably to await another
vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were
thus forced to return to the Philippines arriving at
Calatagan, Batangas where it remained at sea.
"M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored from
Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels
leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
"M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the
vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of
the crew were released in three batches with the stern
warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the
members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The
crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding
the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments
of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio
Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them
to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer,
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to
procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr.
Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them.
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However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February
11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not
a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas
had presented and examined seven witnesses for the
accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio,
Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence;
were forced to sign statements without being given the
opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied
assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights,
in violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred
in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy.
They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew
who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The
crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates.
ISSUE:
What are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a
non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the
trial?
RULING:
The record reveals that a manifestation was executed by
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr.
stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced
when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver
of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as
covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if
made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During
the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul
Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-
appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they
voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also
affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in
open court.
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be
present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment. This is hinged on the fact that a
layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However,
it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with right recognized by law." Thus, the same
section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused
may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
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sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By
analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed
by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown
that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently
and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas
Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he
knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that
there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial, considering that it was
unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and
with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul
Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has
been made.
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel
during custodial investigation may not be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S.
436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning
during custodial investigation, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds
the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in
writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the
so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them
invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights
was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
afore-stated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from
the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice
Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs.
United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by
the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounseled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver
of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound
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deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco
(Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to
commit the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-
appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
TOPIC: APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY
QUE VS. ATTY. REVILLA, JR.
A.C. NO. 7054, DECEMBER 04, 2009
FACTS:
Conrado Que (QUE) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(ATTY. REVILLA) before the s IBP-CBD of the following
violations of the provisions of the CPR and Rule 138 of the
ROC: (Here, Que won the case against the clients of Atty. Revilla
in the unlawful detainer case, the former alleged that Atty.
Revilla willfully delaying the final judgment by filing these
petitions below)
1. Abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a
petition for certiorari before the (CA), two
petitions for annulment of title, annulment of
judgment before the RTC (collectively, subject
cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments
of MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against Atty. Revilla’s clients.
Repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that
these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer case.
Here, Atty. Revilla maintained that he professed his
sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions, that
there were all based on valid grounds, that the lack of
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic
fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico (previous
lawyer of Atty. Revilla’s client, and the extrinsic fraud
committed by the QUE and his family against his clients;
he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not
really belong to QUE and his family but is a forest land.
2. His commission of forum-shopping by filing the
subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and
frustrate the efficient administration of justice.
5. Deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court in the petition for
annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of
whom are already deceased
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6. His willful and fraudulent appearance in the
second petition for annulment of title as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines without
being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused Atty. Revilla of
representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
He denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance
in court (Par 5 & 6). That the 52 litigants were impleaded
by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by
dropping them from the case. Atty. Revilla pointed out that
there was no allegation that he was the sole representative
of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of
the Philippines. He pointed out that the petition embodied
a request to the Office of the SOLGEN to represent his
clients in the case.
Atty. Revilla submitted that he did not commit any illegal,
unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the
complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in
good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was
consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold
justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients.
He additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed
because the complainant's counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty.
Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the
IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on forum
shopping considering that the subject cases were also the
ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD
Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP-CBD. The
respondent also posited that the present complaint was
filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and
reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are
marginalized members of the KDC
FINDINGS OF INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONER:
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating
Commissioner disregarded the respondent's explanation
that he had no intention to represent without authority 15
of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in
the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-
01-45556).
Atty. Revilla merely glossed over the representation issue
by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the
litigants complied with the certification of non-forum
shopping requirement. Also, his argument regarding his
misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment
of title since he knew very well that only the SOLGEN can
institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent
solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of
his clients and of the Republic.
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ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Revilla made appearances without
authority thereby violating the CPR?
RULING:
YES. Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan's
finding that the respondent twice represented parties
without proper authorization: first, in the petition for
annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition
for annulment of title.
In the first instance, Annulment of Judgment, the records
show that the Atty. Revilla filed the petition for annulment
of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave
their consent while the other 15 individuals did not.
We cannot agree with Atty. Revilla’s off-hand explanation
that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who
signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the
petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign
for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind
of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer
like Atty. Revilla, who has been engaged in the practice of
law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and
strict training as he so proudly declares, from the
University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two
law firms with which he was previously associated.
As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondent's explanation of compliance with the rule on
the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the
real charge of appearing in court without the proper
authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second
complaint for annulment of title, Atty. Revilla knew that
only the SOLGEN can legally represent the Republic in
actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an
amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent,
as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate.
Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all
the plaintiffs - his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, Atty. Revilla violated Sections 21 and
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the
unauthorized appearances.
The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant
without authority from the latter or from the latter's
representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of
court. The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for
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a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct
and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring
lawyer for professional misconduct.
VILLAHERMOSA, SR. VS. CARACOL,
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases derived from
OCT No. 433. Atty. Aquino was the counsel on record of
for the Plaintiff.
On March 1994, DARAB issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived
from OCT no. 433 stating that it was not covered by the
agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and
affirmed by the DARAB CB and CA.
On Sept. 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add'l Counsel for
Plaintiffs-Movant," filed a motion for execution with the
DARAB praying for the full implementation of the March
1994 decision.
On Dec. 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of
2nd Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he
signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela".
Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that:
 Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions
since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs
and the counsel of record.
 Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to
file the second motion because Efren had already
been dead for more than a year.
 Atty. Caracol's real client was a certain Ernesto I.
Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same
parcel of land.
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him
to appear as "additional counsel". He said that he had
consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with
the filing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Caracol has authority to appear as
counsel for Plaintiff?
RULING:
NO. Sec. 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an
Atty. Is presumed to be properly authorized to represent
any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
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require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a

case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney
willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished
for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved
in his official transactions.

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to

act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may
he appear in court without being employed unless by leave
of court. If an attorney appears on a client's behalf without
a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant
whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may
be bound or affected by his appearance unless the
purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed
authority

Moreover, even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an

attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either
client or the lawyer.

ITC, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when

he appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already

passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of
Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition.

As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should

have informed the Court of his client's passing and
presented authority that he was retained by the client's
successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been
substituted.

WHEREFORE, Court finds Atty. Caracol GUILTY.

Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Caracol from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR.

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