Appeal_01.
Intro_Rulings 1 of 24
Manila vs. Gallardo-Manzo,
657 SCRA 20, G.R. No. 163602 September 7, 2011
Annulment of Judgments—A petition for annulment
of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in
civil actions can only be availed of where “the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner.” It is a remedy granted only
under exceptional circumstances and such action is
never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own
neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies. The only grounds provided in
Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded by respondents’ asseveration.
They could have directly followed up the status of their
case with the RTC especially during the period of Atty.
Atienza’s hospital confinement. As party litigants, they
should have constantly monitored the progress of their
case. Having completely entrusted their case to their
former counsel and believing his word that everything
is alright, they have no one to blame but themselves
when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and
other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC
could no longer be availed of due to their counsel’s
neglect. That respondents continued to rely on the
services of their counsel notwithstanding his chronic
ailments that had him confined for long periods at the
hospital is unthinkable. Such negligence of counsel is
binding on the client, especially when the latter offered
no plausible explanation for his own inaction. The
Court has held that when a party retains the services
of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel’s actions and
decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is
true especially where he does not complain against the
manner his counsel handles the suit. The oft-repeated
principle is that an action for annulment of judgment
cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of
judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must
show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion
but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction
means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter is conferred by law.
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction
in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of
simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any
counterclaim for costs due to the defendants
(petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to
execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the
petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own
interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted
petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within
a certain period (two years from date of execution) and
for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in
an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution
is who between the parties is entitled to the physical
possession of the property. Such erroneous grant of
relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an
exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not
the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not
the decision rendered therein. The ground for
annulment of the decision is absence of, or no,
jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not
vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Doctrine of Stale Demands; On the timeliness of the
petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA,
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that
a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic
fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery;
and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred
by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or “stale
demands” ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier—negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. Manila vs.
Gallardo-Manzo, 657 SCRA 20, G.R. No. 163602
September 7, 2011
Fernandez vs. Fulgueras,
622 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 178575 June 29, 2010
Jurisdiction—Jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or the law, and rules of
procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated,
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute
can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies; rules of procedure cannot.
The DARAB assumed jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari by virtue of Section 3, Rule VIII of the DARAB
New Rules of Procedure, which allows the filing of
such petition to assail an interlocutory order of the
Provincial Adjudicator. However, a month after the
DARAB rendered its decision, the Court, in DARAB v.
Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800 (2005), declared that such
apparent grant of authority to issue a writ of certiorari is
not founded on any law. It declared that neither the
DARAB’s quasi-judicial authority nor its rule-making

power justifies the self-conferment of authority. Thus,
the Court concluded that the DARAB has no certiorari
jurisdiction.
As intimated in Lubrica, petitioner should have filed the
petition for certiorari with the regular courts, and not
with the DARAB. In the absence of a specific statutory
grant of jurisdiction, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial
body with limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari. Fernandez
vs. Fulgueras, 622 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 178575 June
29, 2010
Velasco vs. Gayapa, Jr.,
152 SCRA 440, No. L-58651 July 30, 1987
Appeals—We should emphasize however, that We
have allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases
where a stringent application of the rules would have
denied it, only when to do so would serve the demands
of substantial justice in the exercise of our equity
jurisdiction. The present case does not warrant such
liberality because the decision of the lower court is
satisfactorily supported by the record.
Aside from the fact that petitioners herein are barred
by prescription, there is no evidence, presented by
them that they have any right of owner ship over the
subject parcel of land. Neither have they presented
evidence showing that they have been in possession
of the said land in the concept of owner, the fact being
that petitioners never stayed in Viga, Catanduanes
since they left for Mindanao in 1939. On the other
hand, private respondent Eduardo Ogena clearly
testified with respect to his acquisition of the land by
purchase from Juliana Vda. de Tonio, and his
possession of said land after he purchased it until he
sold the same to the other private respondents Jose
Alberto and Rosita Ubalde Alberto.
Since the main case is manifestly without merit, the
order of the lower court dismissing the appeal cannot
be impugned. As was held in Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, "a remand for further proceedings, therefore,
would only result in needless delays—a few more
years perhaps of a tortuous journey through new
proceedings in the trial court, an intermediate appeal
and another resort to this Court through a petition for
review to finally achieve the same result." Velasco vs.
Gayapa, Jr., 152 SCRA 440, No. L-58651 July 30,
1987
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
647 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 190660 April 11, 2011
Appeals—Following Land Bank of the Philippines v.
De Leon, 388 SCRA 537 (2002), the proper mode of
appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts sitting
as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 2 of 24
Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41. The Court, in the immediately cited
case of Land Bank, observing that “before the instant
case reached us, Land Bank of the Philippines had no
authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of
SACs considering the seemingly conflicting provisions
of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657,” held that “Sec. 60
of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the
said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be
adopted.”
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial
process, it has been held, time and again, that the right
thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process
but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the
rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final
and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it
becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether
the decision is erroneous or not and no court—not
even the Supreme Court—has the power to revise,
review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at
some definite date fixed by law.” (emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, 647 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 190660
April 11, 2011
Yu vs Samson-Tatad
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or
inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of
statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted
or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on
the counting of the 15-day period within which to
appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15
days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules
in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to
it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43
and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file

their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15
days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
People vs. De Los Reyes,
684 SCRA 216, G.R. Nos. 130714; 139634 October
16, 2012
Appeals—At the outset, the Court notes that these
cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view
of the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon
appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with
the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People
v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004], providing for and
making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA
of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of
action would be to remand these cases to the
appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate
review.
Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during
the proceedings before the RTC and was, in fact, tried
and convicted in absentia. There is dearth of evidence
showing that he has since surrendered to the court’s
jurisdiction. Thus, he has no right to pray for affirmative
relief before the courts. Once an accused escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s
case, or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief therefrom.
It bears to stress that the right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of
the same must comply with the requirements of the
Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost. People
vs. De Los Reyes, 684 SCRA 216, G.R. Nos. 130714
& 139634 October 16, 2012
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 3 of 24
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. vs. Surio,
679 SCRA 21, G.R. No. 154213 August 23, 2012
Prospectivity of Laws―Petitioners’ position that
Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied
retroactively to the review of the POEA’s decision
dismissing their complaint against respondents has no
support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws
are prospective in application unless the contrary is
expressly provided, or unless the law is procedural or
curative in nature, there is no serious question about
the retroactive applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to
the appeal of the POEA’s decision on petitioners’
disciplinary action against respondents. In a way,
Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its
providing or omitting guidelines on appeal.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners’ complaint
by virtue of the case being then still pending or
undetermined at the time of the law’s passage, there
being no vested rights in rules of procedure. They
could not validly insist that the reckoning period to
ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time
when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in
the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042
and its implementing rules and regulations were
already in effect when petitioners took their appeal. A
statute that eliminates the right to appeal and
considers the judgment rendered final and
unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not
the right to prosecute an appeal that has been
perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the
right to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired.
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases decided by
the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the
Secretary of Labor in accordance with his power of
supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter
7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, to wit: Section 38. Definition of Administrative
Relationship.―Unless otherwise expressly stated in
the Code or in other laws defining the special
relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows: Supervision and Control.―Supervision and
control shall include authority to act directly whenever
a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship
of particular agencies, the word “control” shall
encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph. xxx. Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd.

vs. Surio, 679 SCRA 21, G.R. No. 154213 August 23,
2012
D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of
Parañaque,
656 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 170728 August 31, 2011
Appeals—It bears stressing that payment of docket
and other fees within this period is mandatory for the
perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal
is lost. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action only upon the
payment of the correct amount of docket fees
regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in
court. The payment of appellate docket fees is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement, without which the decision or final order
appealed from becomes final and executory as if no
appeal was filed. We held in one case that the CA
correctly dismissed the appeal where the docket fees
were not paid in full within the prescribed period of
fifteen (15) days but were paid forty-one (41) days late
due to inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work.
In another case, we ruled that no appeal was perfected
where half of the appellate docket fee was paid within
the prescribed period, while the other half was
tendered after the period within which payment should
have been made. Evidently, where the appellate
docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary
period, the decision of the trial court becomes final and
no longer susceptible to an appeal. For once a
decision becomes final, the appellate court is without
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often
leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities—With regard
to petitioner’s plea for a liberal treatment of the rules in
order to promote substantial justice, the Court finds the
same to be without merit. It is true that the rules may
be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to
relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures.
However, it must be stressed that procedural rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to
be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed. In this case,
petitioner has not shown any reason such as fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar
supervening casualty which should justify the
relaxation of the rules. The explanation advanced by
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 4 of 24
petitioner’s counsel that the failure to pay the appellate
docket and other legal fees within the prescribed
period was due to his extremely heavy workload and
by excusable inadvertence does not convince us. D.M.
Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of Parañaque,
656 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 170728 August 31, 2011
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt
(SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) vs. Magsalin,
650 SCRA 445, G.R. No. 164939 June 6, 2011
Practice and Procedure—In the case of Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v.
Bacungan, 582 SCRA 369 (2009), we repeated the
well-settled rule that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 43.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules
but we find no cogent reason in this case to deviate
from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist
for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the
guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such
purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as
mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation.
But they help provide for a vital system of justice where
suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and
in the correct forum. Public order and our system of
justice are well served by a conscientious observance
by the parties of the procedural rules.
The grant of separation pay or some other financial
assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is
based on equity. In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co.
v. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671 (1988), we ruled that
severance compensation, or whatever name it is
called, on the ground of social justice shall be allowed
only when the cause of the dismissal is other than
serious misconduct or for causes which reflect
adversely on the employee’s moral character.
In Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
153 SCRA 500 (1987), we ruled that a series of
irregularities when put together may constitute serious
misconduct, which under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as amended, is a just cause for dismissal.
Caragdag’s dismissal being due to serious misconduct,
it follows that he should not be entitled to financial
assistance. To rule otherwise would be to reward him
for the grave misconduct he committed. We must
emphasize that social justice is extended only to those
who deserve its compassion. Samahan ng mga

Manggagawa sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) vs.
Magsalin, 650 SCRA 445, G.R. No. 164939 June 6,
2011
Pacific Union Insurance Compay vs. Concepts &
Sytems Development, Incorporated,
644 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 183528 February 23, 2011
Appeals —The right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so
inevitably leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
Nonetheless, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence
is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause free
from the constraints of technicalities. While it is
desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even
meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict
about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
administration of justice. This is based, no less, on the
Rules of Court which itself calls for a liberal
construction of its provisions, with the objective of
securing for the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
The courts’ discretionary power in dismissing an
appeal for failure to comply with the Rules should be
used in the exercise of sound judgment in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play with a great deal
of circumspection, considering all attendant
circumstances, and must be exercised wisely and ever
prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial
justice. Pacific Union Insurance Compay vs. Concepts
& Sytems Development, Incorporated, 644 SCRA 249,
G.R. No. 183528 February 23, 2011
Navarro vs. Ermita,
612 SCRA 131, G.R. No. 180050 February 10, 2010
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned
the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself had already declared final. In this case, the
compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-
intervenors the right to be heard since they would be
adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite
not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at
the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC
with respect to the creation of local government units.
In this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with
respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect
to decentralization and the attainment of national
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 5 of 24
goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be
realized.
Tanenglian vs. Lorenzo,
550 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 173415 March 28, 2008
Appeals—The general rule is that appeal is perfected
by filing a notice of appeal and paying the requisite
docket fees and other lawful fees. However, all general
rules admit of certain exceptions. In Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, 312 SCRA
463 (1999), where the docket fees were paid six days
late, we said that where the party showed willingness
to abide by the rules by immediately paying the
required fees and taking into consideration the
importance of the issues raised in the case, the same
calls for judicial leniency, thus: In all, what emerges
from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in
the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed.
However, there are exceptions to the stringent
requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application
of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting
party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of
sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.
Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the
Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious instances exist which warrant such
departure.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities—We have not
been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules,
allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set
aside technical infirmities and give due course to the
appeal. In cases where we dispense with the
technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force
and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare
cases where we did not stringently apply the
procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to

prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that
every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just
and proper disposition of his cause. If the Highest
Court of the land itself relaxes its rules in the interest of
substantive justice, then what more the administrative
bodies which exercise quasi-judicial functions? It must
be emphasized that the goal of courts and quasi-
judicial bodies, above else, must be to render
substantial justice to the parties. In this case, petitioner
was only one day late in paying the appeal fee, and he
already stands to lose his titles to the subject
properties. We find this too harsh a consequence for a
day’s delay. Worthy to note is the fact that petitioner
actually paid the appeal fee; only, he was a day late.
That petitioner immediately paid the requisite appeal
fee a day after the deadline displays his willingness to
comply with the requirement therefor.
When petitioner sought recourse to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, his Petition was dismissed. The
Court of Appeals held that the petitioner availed
himself of the wrong remedy as an appeal from the
order, award, judgment or final order of the DARAB
shall be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. On this
point, we agree with the Court of Appeals.
All things considered, however, we do not agree in the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals dismissing
petitioner’s Petition based on a procedural faux pax.
While a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being
the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to
wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of
justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null
and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to
proceed despite inherent procedural defects and
lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application
of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent
cause of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to
attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.
The period to appeal had lapsed so that even if the
Court of Appeals considered the petition as one for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, still the
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 6 of 24
petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. But,
there can be no blinking at the fact that under Rule 43,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court, “the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review.” By any
reckoning, the Court of Appeals may even grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file
the petition under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In
other words, the period to appeal from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 is
neither an impregnable nor an unyielding rule.
Jurisdiction—The issue involved in this case is no
less than the jurisdiction of the Regional Arbitrator to
render its Decision dated 16 August 1999 declaring the
subject properties as ancestral lands. As well, it is too
flagrant to be ignored that these lands are covered by
a Torrens title in the name of the petitioner. The Court
of Appeals should have looked past rules of
technicality to resolve the case on its merits. For
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must
exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. A
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must
be evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all
its indispensable elements must be established, to wit:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by
the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are
necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant. In Heirs of Rafael
Magpily v. De Jesus, 474 SCRA 366 (2005), tenants
are defined as persons who—in themselves and with
the aid available from within their immediate farm
householders—they cultivate the lands belonging to or
possessed by another with the latter’s consent; for
purposes of production, they share the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or pay
to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce of money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system.
Republic Act No. 8371 creates the National
Commission on Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous People (NCIP) which shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to promote and protect the rights and well-
being of the indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous people (ICCs/IPs) and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their
rights thereto. Prior to Republic Act No. 8371,
ancestral domains and lands were delineated under
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and governed by DENR Administrative Order
No. 2, series of 1993. Presently, the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and
lands is guided by the principle of self-delineation and

is set forth under Sections 52 and 53, Chapter VIII of
Republic Act No. 8371; and in Part I, Rule VII of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 01-98 (Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371).
Official delineation is under the jurisdiction of the
Ancestral Domains Office (ADO) of the NCIP. It is
irrefragable, therefore, that the Regional Adjudicator
overstepped the boundaries of his jurisdiction when he
made a declaration that the subject properties are
ancestral lands and proceeded to award the same to
the respondents, when jurisdiction over the delineation
and recognition of the same is explicitly conferred on
the NCIP.
Judgments.—Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down
anytime. In Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat, 470 SCRA 92
(2005), we declared that a void judgment is in legal
effect no judgment, which no rights are divested, from
which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds
nor bonds anyone, and under which all acts performed
and all claims flowing therefrom are void. In the
Petition at bar, since the Regional Adjudicator is
evidently without jurisdiction to rule on respondents’
complaint without the existence of a tenancy
relationship between them and the petitioner, then the
Decision he rendered is void. Tanenglian vs. Lorenzo,
550 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 173415 March 28, 2008
Go vs Chaves
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules
of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end
to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In
numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal
construction of the rules when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and equity.
We agree that the CA had the discretion to dismiss
petitioners’ appeal. The discretion, however, must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.
This case involves voluminous records meriting a
review on the merits by the CA. Otherwise, the efforts
of the petitioners to protect their collateral in their
judicial battle will lead to naught once they lose their
remedy of an appeal just because of procedural
niceties. Adherence to legal technicalities allows
individual error to be suffered in order that justice in the
maximum may be preserved. Nonetheless, "we should
indeed welcome," as Judge Learned Hand once wrote,
"any efforts that help disentangle us from the
archaisms that still impede our pursuit of truth". Our
ruling in Aguam v. Court of Appeals also bears
recalling:
Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 7 of 24
cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of
the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their
merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent
course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice
to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more
delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
Pahila-Garrido vs. Tortogo,
655 SCRA 553, G.R. No. 156358 August 17, 2011
Interlocutory Orders—The distinction between a final
order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter
does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or
judgment leave something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted
the application for the writ of preliminary injunction,
was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not
be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing
an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the
merits of the action during the pendency of the
appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one
of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there
are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower
court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an
appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included
in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy
against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal
is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse

of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed
to be resorted to.
Certiorari—Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior
court to an inferior court of record, or other tribunal or
officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the
certification and return to the former of some
proceeding then pending, or the record and
proceedings in some cause already terminated, in
cases where the procedure is not according to the
course of the common law. The remedy is brought
against a lower court, board, or officer rendering a
judgment or order and seeks the annulment or
modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require. It is available when the
following indispensable elements concur, to wit: 1.
That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2. That
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
and 3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper
and be given due course, it must be shown that: (a) the
respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal cannot
afford adequate and expeditious relief. Yet, the
allegation that the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion will not alone suffice. Equally imperative is
that the petition must satisfactorily specify the acts
committed or omitted by the tribunal, board or officer
that constitute grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse
of discretion means such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of
certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having
acted without jurisdiction.
Motions for Reconsideration—That the petitioner did
not file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC before
coming to this Court did not preclude treating her
petition as one for certiorari. The requirement under
Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no appeal, or
any plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law admits exceptions. In Francisco Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA 8 (2006),
the Court has recognized exceptions to the
requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b)
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 8 of 24
where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be
danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where
the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public
interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. The
allegations of the petition definitely placed the
petitioner’s recourse under most, if not all, of the
exceptions.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities—We also
observe that the rule that a petition should have been
brought under Rule 65 instead of under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (or vice versa) is not inflexible or rigid.
The inflexibility or rigidity of application of the rules of
procedure is eschewed in order to serve the higher
ends of justice. Thus, substance is given primacy over
form, for it is paramount that the rules of procedure are
not applied in a very rigid technical sense, but used
only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. If
a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made,
their aim is defeated. Verily, the strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits. To institute a
guideline, therefore, the Rules of Court expressly
mandates that the rules of procedure “shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.”
Judgments.—Under the circumstances, the principle
of immutability of a final judgment must now be
absolutely and unconditionally applied against the
respondents. They could not anymore be permitted to
interminably forestall the execution of the judgment
through their interposition of new petitions or
pleadings. Even as their right to initiate an action in
court ought to be fully respected, their commencing
SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a
favorable ruling despite their case having been already
fully and finally adjudicated should not be tolerated.
Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the
judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their
right as the losing parties to appeal within the
prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right
of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the
resolution of her case through execution and
satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of
the law. To frustrate the winning party’s right through
dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and
expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the
costs of litigation. The interest of justice undeniably
demanded that we should immediately write finis to the
litigation, for all courts are by oath bound to guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about the
frustration of the winning party’s right, and to stop any
attempt to prolong controversies already resolved with
finality.
Preliminary Injunction—A writ of preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong

arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted
only to protect actual and existing substantial rights.
Without actual and existing rights on the part of the
applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the
matter within the conditions for its issuance, the
ancillary writ must be struck down for being issued in
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not
issue to protect a right not in esse, which is merely
contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
Gross Ignorance of the Law—We further note that
the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO effective until
further orders from him. He thereby contravened
explicit rules of procedure. He knowingly did so,
considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and
purpose of the TRO as a temporary and limited
remedy, instead of a permanent and unrestricted relief.
He disregarded Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, which expressly stated that the life span of a
TRO was only 20 days from service of the TRO on the
party or person sought to be enjoined. Considering that
the limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and
basic rule of procedure, he consciously arrogated unto
himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a rule as
elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO amounted
to gross ignorance of law and procedure. His violation
is seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby
usurped the authority of the Court as the only court
with the power to issue a TRO effective until further
orders. Pahila-Garrido vs. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553,
G.R. No. 156358 August 17, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),
662 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 152375 December 13, 2011
Distinction between a Final Judgment or Order and
an Interlocutory Order.—Case law has conveniently
demarcated the line between a final judgment or order
and an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition
made. A judgment or order is considered final if the
order disposes of the action or proceeding completely,
or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in
such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party
is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely
resolves incidental matters and leaves something more
to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order
is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence
pointedly holds that: “As distinguished from a final
order which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon. The term “final” judgment or order
signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 9 of 24
case as to all the parties, reserving no further
questions or directions for future determination. On the
other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in
character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be
had in connection with the controversy. It does not end
the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities
as against each other. In this sense, it is basically
provisional in its application.”
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains
under the control of the court until the case is finally
resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify
or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds shown at
any time before final judgment. In this light, the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution—which merely
denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of
the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009—could not have
attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final
order resolving the case on the merits does) despite
the petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or
to appeal.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion
cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually
second) motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule
37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against “a judgment or final
order.” Although a second motion for reconsideration
of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground
that it is a mere “rehash” of the arguments already
passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be
rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or
by the rules as a prohibited motion.
Certiorari—Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment
or final order which completely disposes of a case or
from an order that the Rules of Court declares to be
appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal
from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order
through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from
notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or
denial of a motion for reconsideration.
While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as
correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly
conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998
resolution should have been immediately questioned
by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a
petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the
issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling. For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither
an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law is available to the
aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of
certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of

an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is
inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved
party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the
Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of
law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily
amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence
of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of
jurisdiction. Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s
erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of
judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a
grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should
be dismissed.
Although the word “rested” nowhere appears in the
Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it
from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5,
Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of presentation of
a party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule
18 on Pre-Trial, both of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct
evidence in the course of discharging the burden of
proof, he is considered to have rested his case, and is
thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.
Whether a party has rested his case in some measure
depends on his manifestation in court on whether he
has concluded his presentation of evidence.
On the other end, though, there was nothing
intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to
reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal
offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit
a party from requesting the court to allow it to present
additional evidence even after it has rested its case.
Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate
purpose of the admission of additional evidence is
already addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
It is from the prism of the exercise of this discretion
that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case
(for the purpose of introducing, “marking and offering”
additional evidence) should be viewed. We can declare
this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof
must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he
relies upon and such evidence cannot be given
piecemeal. The obvious rationale of the requirement is
to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the
consequent delay in the administration of justice.
A party’s declaration of the completion of the
presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing further evidence; but where the evidence is
rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance,
arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from
one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to
be presented is in the nature of newly discovered
evidence, the party’s right to introduce further evidence
must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party
may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 10 of 24
Consolidation of Cases—Consolidation is a
procedural device granted to the court as an aid in
deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that
the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice
to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the
court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within
those cases. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division), 662 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 152375 December
13, 2011
Heirs andlor Estates of Atty. Rolando P.Siapian vs.
Instestate Estate of the Late Eufrocina G. Mackay,
629 SCRA 753, G.R. No. 184799 September 1, 2010
Attorney’s Fees.—It is settled that a claim for
attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which a lawyer rendered his services or in a
separate action. But enforcing it in the main case
bodes well as it forestalls multiplicity of suits. The
intestate court in this case, therefore, correctly allowed
Atty. Siapian to interject his claim for attorney’s fees in
the estate proceedings against some of the heirs and,
after hearing, adjudicate the same on April 3, 1997
with an order for Arturo, et al. to pay Atty. Siapian the
fees of P3 million due him.
The Court ruled in Palanca v. Pecson, that an attorney
may cause a statement of his lien to be registered
even before the rendition of any judgment, the purpose
being merely to establish his right to the lien. The
recording of an attorney’s lien is distinct from its
enforcement, which may only take place after the
judgment is secured in favor of the client. The CA
therefore erred in declaring null and void the June 18,
1998 order of the intestate court. Heirs andlor Estates
of Atty. Rolando P.Siapian vs. Instestate Estate of the
Late Eufrocina G. Mackay, 629 SCRA 753, G.R. No.
184799 September 1, 2010
Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua,
634 SCRA 635, G.R. No. 178899 November 15, 2010
Summary Judgments—A summary judgment, or
accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear
undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial. When the pleadings on file show that
there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in
dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

Partial Summary Judgments—The rendition by the
court of a summary judgment does not always result in
the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case.
For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules
provides: Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on
motion.—If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs
sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing
of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. The facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted on the
controverted facts accordingly. This is what is referred
to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of
this section reveals that a partial summary judgment
was never intended to be considered a “final
judgment,” as it does not  “[put] an end to an action at
law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.”
The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a
means to simplify the trial process by allowing the
court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts,
considering as established those facts which are not in
dispute. After this sifting process, the court is
instructed to issue an order, the partial summary
judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have
to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the
partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of
pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a final
judgment.
“Final Judgment,” and “Interlocutory Order,”—The
differences between a “final judgment” and an
“interlocutory order” are well-established. We said in
Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
148 SCRA 280 (1987), that: [A] final judgment or order
is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g.,
an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the
Court except to await the parties’ next move . . . and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the
established and more distinctive term, “final and
executory.” x x x x Conversely, an order that does not
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 11 of 24
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory”, e.g.,
an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules  x x x  Unlike a ‘final judgment or order,
which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
‘interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually
be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no
doubt that the partial summary judgment envisioned by
the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never
meant to be treated separately from the main case. As
we explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, 124
SCRA 297 (1983): It will be noted that the judgment in
question is a “partial summary judgment.” It was
rendered only with respect to the private respondents’
first and second causes of action alleged in their
complaint. It was not intended to cover the other
prayers in the said complaint, nor the supplementary
counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the private
respondents, nor the third-party complaint filed by the
petitioners against the Security Bank and Trust
Company. A partial summary judgment “is not a final or
appealable judgment.” (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p.
189, citing several cases.) “It is merely a pre-trial
adjudication that said issues in the case shall be
deemed established for the trial of the case.”
(Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 429.) x x x x The
partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court
being merely interlocutory and not ‘a final judgment’, it
is puerile to discuss whether the same became final
and executory due to the alleged failure to appeal said
judgment within the supposed period of appeal. What
the rules contemplate is that the appeal from the partial
summary judgment shall be taken together with the
judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after
a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a
substantial controversy exists. This is on the
assumption that the partial summary judgment was
validly rendered, which, as shown above, is not true in
the case at bar.
Appeals—Contrary to PBB’s contention, however,
certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent
Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be
corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not a
petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower
court’s judgment. It is well-settled that certiorari is not
available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the judge’s findings and conclusions of law and fact.
As we explained in Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 569
SCRA 80 (2008): As a legal recourse, the special civil
action of certiorari is a limited form of review. The
jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope; it is
restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act

within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the
exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors
of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for
review.
Pleadings and Practice—As a final point, we note
that respondent Chua has raised with this Court the
issue of the propriety of the partial summary judgment
issued by the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never
raised this issue in his petition for certiorari before the
CA. It is well-settled that no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Basic considerations of due
process impel the adoption of this rule.
Taking jurisdiction over this issue now would only
result in multiple appeals from a single case which
concerns the same, or integrated, causes of action. As
we said in Santos v. People: Another recognized
reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final
order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or
incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which must necessarily suspend the
hearing and decision on the merits of the case during
the pendency of the appeal.  If such appeal were
allowed, the trial on the merits of the case would
necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of
time, and compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as incidental questions
may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. Philippine
Business Bank vs. Chua, 634 SCRA 635, G.R. No.
178899 November 15, 2010
Quelnan vs. VHF Philippines, Inc.,
433 SCRA 631, G.R. No. 145911 July 7, 2004
Mandamus—Mandamus will lie to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
duty, and petitioner must show that he has a well
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof. The timeliness of the filing of a notice of
appeal determines whether the trial court’s giving due
course to it is ministerial. If the notice of appeal is filed
within the reglementary period, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the trial court to give it due course. If
not, the trial court cannot be compelled by mandamus
to do so.
From a considered re-examination of the immediately-
quoted rules, this Court finds that the proscription
against appealing from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not
to a final order or judgment. That that was the intention
of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan
v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), cited in above-quoted
portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court
held that an order denying a motion to dismiss an
action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable.
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 12 of 24
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order
of dismissal of a complaint is not an interlocutory order,
however, but a final order as it puts an end to the
particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the
matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the
trial court to do other than to execute the order. Not
being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion
for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of
dismissal itself. Quelnan vs. VHF Philippines, Inc., 433
SCRA 631, G.R. No. 145911 July 7, 2004
Sarsaba vs. De Te,
594 SCRA 410, G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009
Hierarchy of Courts—An appeal may be taken from
the RTC which exercised its original jurisdiction, before
the Court of Appeals or directly before this Court,
provided that the subject of the same is a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by the Rules to
be appealable. The first mode of appeal, to be filed
before the Court of Appeals, pertains to a writ of error
under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, if
questions of fact or questions of fact and law are
raised or involved. On the other hand, the second
mode is by way of an appeal by certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation
to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or
involved. An order or judgment of the RTC is deemed
final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so
that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court.
In other words, the order or judgment ends the
litigation in the lower court. On the other hand, an
order which does not dispose of the case completely
and indicates that other things remain to be done by
the court as regards the merits, is interlocutory.
Interlocutory refers to something between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides
some point or matter, but is not a final decision on the
whole controversy.
Interlocutory Orders—We have said time and again
that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory. Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. As a
remedy for the denial, a party has to file an answer and
interpose as a defense the objections raised in the
motion, and then to proceed to trial; or, a party may
immediately avail of the remedy available to the
aggrieved party by filing an appropriate special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Let it be stressed though that a petition for
certiorari is appropriate only when an order has been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Not being a proper subject of an appeal, the Order of
the RTC is considered interlocutory. Petitioner should
have proceeded with the trial of the case and, should
the RTC eventually render an unfavorable verdict,
petitioner should assail the said Order as part of an
appeal that may be taken from the final judgment to be
rendered in this case. Such rule is founded on
considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall
useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the
appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be
contested in a single appeal. In one case, the Court
adverted to the hazards of interlocutory appeals: It is
axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be
challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that
“the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal
from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating
in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory
orders would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case
being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and
from the appellate court as often as a trial court is
perceived to have made an error in any of its
interlocutory rulings.
Hierarchy of Courts—We treat the petition to have
been filed under Rule 65, the same is still dismissible
for violating the principle on hierarchy of courts.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari
is highly improper, for it violates the established policy
of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
This principle, as a rule, requires that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. However,
the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.
A strict application of the rule is not necessary when
cases brought before the appellate courts do not
involve factual but legal questions.
Pleadings and Practice—As a rule, all defenses and
objections not pleaded, either in a motion to dismiss or
in an answer, are deemed waived. The exceptions to
this rule are: (1) when the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) when there is another action
pending between the parties for the same cause, or (3)
when the action is barred by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, in which cases, the court may
dismiss the claim.
Substitution of Parties—When a party to a pending
action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules
of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section
1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
actions that survived and may be filed against the
decedent’s representatives as follows: (1) actions to
recover real or personal property or an interest
thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and (3)
actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or
a property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to
inform the court of the death of his client and give the
name and address of the latter’s legal representative.
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 13 of 24
The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule
on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s
right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover,
non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of
the right to due process for the heirs who, though not
duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially
affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is
only when there is a denial of due process, as when
the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial
proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.
Attorneys—Such failure of counsel would not lead Us
to invalidate the proceedings that have long taken
place before the RTC. The Court has repeatedly
declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his
duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such
that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the
action survives the death of such party. The trial
court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the
death of the party. The purpose behind this rule is the
protection of the right to due process of every party to
the litigation who may be affected by the intervening
death. The deceased litigants are themselves
protected as they continue to be properly represented
in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of their estate.
Judgments—We hold that the petition should be
denied as the RTC Order is interlocutory; hence, not a
proper subject of an appeal before the Court. In the
same breath, We also hold that, if the petition is to be
treated as a petition for certiorari as a relaxation of the
judicial hierarchy of courts, the same is also
dismissible for being substantially insufficient to
warrant the Court the nullification of the Order of the
RTC.
Courts—Let this be an occasion for Us to reiterate that
the rules are there to aid litigants in prosecuting or
defending their cases before the courts. However,
these very rules should not be abused so as to
advance one’s personal purposes, to the detriment of
orderly administration of justice. We can surmise from
the present case herein petitioner’s manipulation in
order to circumvent the rule on modes of appeal and
the hierarchy of courts so that the issues presented
herein could be settled without going through the
established procedures. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 156
SCRA 753 (1987), We stressed that this should be the
constant policy that must be observed strictly by the
courts and lawyers, thus: x x x. The Supreme Court is
a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of

dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs
should be exercised only where absolutely necessary
or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals,
bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that
the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy
in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe. Sarsaba vs. De Te, 594 SCRA 410,
G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009
Zamoranos vs. People,
650 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011
Certiorari—As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a
tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Appeals—The denial of a motion to quash, as in the
case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory
order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.
It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The established
rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order
is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in
due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is
handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.
On a number of occasions, we have recognized that in
certain situations, certiorari is considered an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have
recognized the propriety of the following exceptions:
(a) when the court issued the order without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
(b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a “more
enlightened and substantial justice”; (d) to promote
public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the
cases “have attracted nationwide attention, making it
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
thereof.” The first four of the foregoing exceptions
occur in this instance.
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 14 of 24
Res Judicata —The requisites for res judicata or bar
by prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or
order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on the
merits; (3) It must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) There must be between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action. Zamoranos vs. People, 650 SCRA
304, G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. vs.
Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province,
668 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 183367 March 14, 2012
Interlocutory Orders —Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an
interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one that
does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon. An order granting or
denying an application for preliminary injunction is
interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable.
Instead, the proper remedy is to file a Petition for
Certiorari and/or Prohibition under Rule 65.
Temporary Restraining Orders —Essential to
granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an
urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious
damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such
extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable
injury would arise unless it is issued immediately.
Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO
may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown
by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant
before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
Preliminary Injunctions —To be entitled to the
injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to
be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable
damage. The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case,
since the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards that end involves findings of fact left to the
said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the
exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there
is grave abuse of discretion.
Execution of Judgments —The general rule is that
after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No
court should interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to
restrain such execution. The rule, however, admits of
exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and
circumstances later transpire that would render

execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there is a
change in the situation of the parties that may warrant
an injunctive relief. In this case, after the finality of the
RTC Decision, there were no supervening events or
changes in the situation of the parties that would entail
the injunction of the Writ of Execution. Australian
Professional Realty, Inc. vs. Municipality of Padre
Garcia, Batangas Province, 668 SCRA 253, G.R. No.
183367 March 14, 2012
Manungas vs. Loreto,
655 SCRA 734, G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
Motions for Reconsideration —As properly noted by
petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is required before a decision may be
appealed through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Under the rule, there must be no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, such as a motion for reconsideration, to justify the
filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner argues
that respondent’s failure to move for the
reconsideration of the Order dated November 4, 2002
is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general rule,
however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos
Reyes v. Flores, 614 SCRA 270 (2010): We have held
in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of
certiorari and mandamus are available only when there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie
where another adequate remedy is available for the
correction of the error. x x x However, there are
several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie
without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration,
to wit: x x x x i. where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.
Special Administrators —The fact that Diosdado is
an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become
the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a
special administrator lies within the discretion of the
court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-
Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 (2005), it was stated that: It is
well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior
or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment
of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as
the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the
selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As
the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection
of the person to be appointed, discretion which must
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 15 of 24
be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason,
justice or equity.
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint
anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by
the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role
of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until
a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec.
2, Rule 80 of the Rules: Section 2. Powers and duties
of special administrator.—Such special administrator
shall take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
and preserve the same for the executors or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator. He may sell only such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court. Given this
duty on the part of the special administrator, it would,
therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint
someone interested in preserving the estate for its
eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would
ensure that such person would not expose the estate
to losses that would effectively diminish his or her
share. While the court may use its discretion and
depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical
reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the
estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To
do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. Manungas vs. Loreto, 655 SCRA 734, G.R.
No. 193161 August 22, 2011
Argana vs. Republic,
443 SCRA 184, G.R. No. 147227 November 19, 2004
Certiorari —The Court does not agree with
respondent’s contention that a petition for certiorari is
not the proper remedy to assail the February 22, 2001
Order of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed its earlier
directive to set the case against petitioners for pre-trial
following the annulment of its judgment by compromise
agreement. A special civil action for certiorari may be
instituted when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
Court has previously held that an order setting the
case for further proceedings, issued after the original
judgment rendered pursuant to a compromise
agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory order and is

therefore not appealable. Since no appeal is available
against such an order, the proper remedy to assail it is
a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy taken by
petitioners is therefore proper.
Petitioners’ contention that the Motion to Rescind filed
by the lawyers of the PCGG and of the OSG should
have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere
scrap of paper because the motion was filed without
the authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the
President of the Republic has no legal basis. There is
no requirement under the law that pleadings and
motions filed by lawyers of the government or the
PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc
and by the President of the Philippines. More
importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes the
OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee.
It must be remembered that it was the OSG which filed
Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of petitioners’
allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise
Agreement between petitioners and respondent was
an amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action
for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on
extrinsic fraud, the OSG was merely performing its
legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed
unlawfully by the late Mayor Argana during his terms
as Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was
filed precisely because the PCGG, as respondent’s
authorized representative in the compromise,
discovered that the execution of the Compromise
Agreement was attended by fraud and sought the help
of the OSG which in turn is the duly authorized
government agency to represent respondent in
forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the authority of the
OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing the Motion to
Rescind.
Petition for Relief —The Court has previously held
that as applied to a judgment based on compromise,
both the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month reglementary
periods within which to file a petition for relief should
be reckoned from the date when the decision
approving the compromise agreement was rendered
because such judgment is considered immediately
executory and entered on the date that it was
approved by the court.
The sixty (60)-day period should be counted from July
31, 1998, the date of the Sandiganbayan Decision
granting the Motion to Approve Compromise
Agreement. The sixtieth day from July 31, 1998 is
September 29, 1998. The Motion to Rescind was filed
by the OSG only on October 5, 1998, clearly several
days after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the July
31, 1998 Decision. This notwithstanding, the Court
finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the
Sandiganbayan in admitting the Motion to Rescind as
a petition for relief was timely filed. Although as a
general rule, the party filing a petition for relief must
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 16 of 24
strictly comply with the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month
reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38, it is not
without exceptions. The Court relaxed the rule in
several cases and held that the filing of a petition for
relief beyond the sixty 60-day period is not fatal so long
as it is filed within the six (6)-month period from entry
of judgment. The Court notes that the filing of the
Motion to Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed
seven days beyond the sixty 60-day period but still well
within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.
Moreover, the case involves an alleged fraud
committed against the
Affidavits of Merit —Petitioners’ claim that
respondent failed to attach an affidavit of merit to its
Motion to Rescind is belied by the record of the case.
Petitioners in fact attached, as Annex “N” of their
Petition for Certiorari, a copy of the respondent’s
Motion to Rescind. The Affidavit of Merit signed by
Dennis M. Taningco, the counsel of the PCGG in Civil
Case No. 0026, was attached to the Motion to
Rescind. In any case, the Court in Mago v. Court of
Appeals held that the absence of an affidavit of merit
does not always result in the denial of the petition for
relief, so long as the facts required to be set out in the
affidavit appear in the verified petition. The oath which
forms part of the petition elevates it to the same
category as an affidavit.
Certification Against Forum Shopping —Neither
was it necessary for respondent to attach a
Certification against Forum Shopping to the Motion to
Rescind. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the
Motion to Rescind, which in effect was a petition for
relief, is not an initiatory pleading which requires the
inclusion of a Certification against Forum Shopping.
Section 2, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief
must be filed with the court which rendered the
judgment or order sought to be set aside, and in the
same case wherein the judgment or order was
rendered. If the court finds that the allegations in the
petition for relief are true, it shall set aside the
judgment and try the principal case upon the merits as
if a timely motion for new trial had been granted.
Clearly, then, a petition for relief is not an initiatory
pleading in a new case which would require the filing
by the petitioner therein of a Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.
Inhibition and Disqualification of Judges —The
Court finds no abuse of discretion by the
Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners’ Urgent Motion
for Voluntary Inhibition. As explained in Gutang v.
Court of Appeals, the import of the rule on voluntary
inhibition is that the decision of a judge on whether or
not to inhibit is left to his or her sound discretion and
conscience, based on his or her rational and logical
assessment of the case where the motion for inhibition
is filed. It implies that in addition to pecuniary interest,
relationship, or previous participation in the matter
under litigation—which are grounds for mandatory

inhibition under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court—there might be
other causes that could diminish the objectivity of the
judge, thus warranting his or her inhibition. Petitioners’
claim of bias and partiality on the part of the
Sandiganbayan justices who issued the April 11, 2000
Resolution, evaluated in light of the resolution itself, is
evidently more imagined than real. To say, as is
petitioners’ wont, that a judge who throws out a party’s
motion in the language employed by the
Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution is
necessarily prejudiced, is to be indiscriminate and
precipitate. Argana vs. Republic, 443 SCRA 184, G.R.
No. 147227 November 19, 2004
Pasco vs. Heirs of Filomena de Guzman,
625 SCRA 342, G.R. No. 165554 July 26, 2010
Jurisdiction —It bears stressing that the question of
the MTC’s jurisdiction has not been raised before this
Court; hence, petitioners appear to have admitted that
the MTC had jurisdiction to approve the Compromise
Agreement. In any event, it is beyond dispute that the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, fixes the MTC’s jurisdiction over cases
where “the demand does not exceed Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs.” Thus, respondents’ initiatory
complaint, covering the principal amount of
P140,000.00, falls squarely within the MTC’s
jurisdiction.
Compromise Agreements —From the express
language of Rule 41, therefore, the MTC’s denial of
petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside Decision could not
have been appealed. Indeed, a decision based on a
compromise agreement is immediately final and
executory and cannot be the subject of appeal, for
when parties enter into a compromise agreement and
request a court to render a decision on the basis of
their agreement, it is presumed that such action
constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal said
decision. While there may have been other remedies
available to assail the decision, petitioners were well
within their rights to institute a special civil action under
Rule 65. Pasco vs. Heirs of Filomena de Guzman, 625
SCRA 342, G.R. No. 165554 July 26, 2010
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) vs. Aumentado, Jr.,
625 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 173634 July 22, 2010
Appeals —PAGCOR is correct that the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals over petitions for review under
Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 17 of 24
the CSC. Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules provides:
SECTION 1. Scope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals
from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, x x x. (Emphasis supplied) It is clear from
the Rules that the Court of Appeals can entertain
appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the CSC.
Judgments —The general rule is that an order of
execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would
never end. There are, however, exceptions to this rule,
namely: 1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;
2. There has been a change in the situation of the
parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3.
Execution is sought to be enforced against property
exempt from execution; 4. It appears that the
controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the
court; 5. The terms of the judgment are not clear
enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or 6. It appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that
the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ issued without authority. In these
exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice
and equity dictate that there be some remedy available
to the aggrieved party. The remedy may either be by
appeal or by a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus.
PAGCOR and respondent executed the quitclaim after
the entry of judgment. The execution of a quitclaim
after a decision has become final and executory is a
supervening event which could affect the execution of
the decision. The quitclaim between PAGCOR and
respondent brought about a change in their situation
because the validity of the quitclaim would determine
whether respondent is entitled to reinstatement. The
validity of the quitclaim will also determine if the
execution of CSC Resolution No. 98-1996 will be
inequitable or unjust. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) vs. Aumentado, Jr.,
625 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 173634 July 22, 2010
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of
Appeals,
356 SCRA 563, G.R. No. 110147 April 17, 2001
Pleadings and Practice —In its Decision, the CA
stated that parties in default did not need to have the
order of default against them lifted before they could
appeal. In other words, a party in default is not
precluded from filing an appeal, as provided in Section
2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court (in effect at
the time), x x x The above provision, particularly its
third paragraph, clearly states that one who has been

declared in default may appeal, without need of an
order lifting the default. Hence, the mere fact that the
trial court has not lifted its default order does not bar
herein respondent from filing an appeal.
Interlocutory and Final Orders —It has been held
that “[a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits.” It “refers to something
between the commencement and end of the suit which
decides some point or matter but it is not the final
decision on the whole controversy.” Conversely, a final
order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to
do to resolve the case. The test to ascertain whether
an order is interlocutory or final is: “Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it
does not, it is final.”
Writs of Execution —In the present case, the April
10, 1992 Order denied private respondent’s Motion to
hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale
of his Club Filipino share and to declare the sale void.
After rendering the Order, the trial court did not need to
do anything more to settle the rights of the parties.
Upon the affirmation of the validity of the sale, the
Certificate of Sale was to be delivered to petitioner as
the new owner. Indeed, while appeal does not lie
against the execution of a judgment, it is available in
case of an irregular implementation of a writ of
execution. This was the factual scenario in the present
case. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of
Appeals, 356 SCRA 563, G.R. No. 110147 April 17,
2001
Panay Railways, Inc. vs. HEVA Management and
Development Corporation,
664 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 154061 January 25, 2012
Procedural Rules and Technicalities —Statutes and
rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect
of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a
litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. This retroactive application does not
violate any right of a person adversely affected.
Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to
or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been
held that “a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application
to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure.”
Docket Fees —As early as 1932, in Lazaro v.
Endencia, we have held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 18 of 24
the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees.
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part
of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which
may be exercised only in accordance with the law.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities —We have
repeatedly stated that the term “substantial justice” is
not a magic wand that would automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may result in prejudice to a
party’s substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are
required to be followed, except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. Panay Railways, Inc.
vs. HEVA Management and Development Corporation,
664 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 154061 January 25, 2012
Insular Life Savings and Trust Company vs. Runes,
Jr.,
436 SCRA 317, G.R. No. 152530 August 12, 2004
Petition for Relief —A petition for relief from judgment
is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or
adequate remedy. The remedy will not be granted to a
party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to the party’s own negligence (Tuason vs. CA, 256
SCRA 158) or the inexcusable negligence of its
counsel. We find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent who acted pursuant to
law and jurisprudence.
It bears stressing that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional as well and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment or resolution final and executory.
Likewise, payment of the docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform to
the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and
executory. Insular Life Savings and Trust Company vs.
Runes, Jr., 436 SCRA 317, G.R. No. 152530 August
12, 2004
Manese vs. Jollibee Foods Corporation,
684 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 170454 October 11, 2012
It is a well-settled procedural rule in this jurisdiction,
and we see no reason why it should not apply in this
case, that an appellee who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative

relief other than those granted in the decision of the
court below. The appellee can only advance any
argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being
disputed. He can assign errors on appeal if such is
required to strengthen the views expressed by the
court a quo. Such assigned errors, in turn, may be
considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the
appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the
purpose of modifying the judgment in the appellee's
favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.
In this case, respondents did not appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter who ruled that the
dismissal of petitioner Cruz was illegal. Respondents
only filed an Opposition to Appeal, which prayed for
the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s orders declaring as
illegal the dismissal of Cruz and directing payment of
her separation pay. The NLRC stated that the registry
return receipt showed that respondents' counsel
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision on
August 28, 2003, and had ten days or up to September
8, 2003 within which to file an appeal. However,
instead of filing an appeal, respondent filed an
Opposition to complainants'/petitioners' appeal. The
NLRC stated that respondents' opposition could have
been treated as an appeal, but it was filed only in
October, way beyond the ten-day reglementary period
within which an appeal may be filed. Although the
NLRC found that Cruz was legally dismissed, it stated
that it was constrained to affirm the findings and award
of separation pay granted to Cruz by the Labor Arbiter,
since respondents failed to interpose a timely appeal.
Hence, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in toto.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Court
of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudged
that petitioner Cruz was legally dismissed, as
respondents did not appeal from the decision of the
Labor Arbiter who ruled that Cruz was illegally
dismissed. Respondents' failure to appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter renders the decision on
the illegal dismissal of Cruz final and executory.
Citytrust Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals,
196 SCRA 553, G.R. No. 92591 April 30, 1991
The present petition was given due course in line with
our settled rule that while a decision has already
become final and executory and can no longer be
challenged, the manner of its execution can be
reviewed by proper appeal. It is not only the difference
in the issue raised that makes us allow this petition. It
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 19 of 24
is also because of a different Court of Appeals decision
that is the subject of our review. The petitioner now
assails the affirmation of the order of execution based
on the trial court judgment in spite of the modified
judgment which reduced the liability of co-defendants
to pay private respondent. What bothers the private
respondent is the similarity of the arguments used by
the petitioner in all the pleadings filed with this Court in
G.R. No. 82009 and in the present petition.
The Court reiterates what it has held in the Abbot case:
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, however, what is sought to be
reviewed is not the decision itself but the manner of its
execution. There is a big difference. While it is true that
the decision itself has become final and executory and
so can no longer be challenged, there is no question
either that it must be enforced in accordance with its
terms and conditions. Any deviation therefrom can be
the subject of a proper appeal.
The petitioner alleges that the appellate court decision
dated February 23, 1989 has superseded and
renderedfunctus oficio the March 4, 1986 decision of
the trial court invoked by the private respondent and is
applicable not only to Marine Midland but also to the
petitioner.
The Court does not agree with this allegation which
hinges on the petitioner's insistence that it can benefit
from a reversal or modification of a judgment even if it
has lost its own appeal. We do not depart from our
earlier analysis in G.R. No. 82009 that the rights and
liabilities of the petitioner and Marine Midland are not
so interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are
similar as to readily warrant an operative effect upon a
party who failed to appeal.
Universal Motors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
205 SCRA 448, G.R. No. 47432 January 27, 1992
Evidence —We already stressed in the case of
Bustamante v. Hon. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 89880,
February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA 603, 608-609) that "(a)s
a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal,
provided, they are borne out by the record or are
based on substantial evidence. However, this rule
admits of certain exceptions, as when the findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; or the appellate
court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court.
Civil Procedure —Furthermore, only question of law
may be raised on a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of
fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all

over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed. Barring,
therefore, a showing that the findings complained of
are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion, such findings must stand for the
Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine
or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.
Amendment —Anent the petitioner's contention that
the respondent court committed an error in allowing
private respondents to change their defense when they
have not at any stage of the proceedings amended
their pleadings, We quote the pertinent portion of
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, to
wit: "x x x Such amendment of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. x x x" In other words, judgment
may still be rendered not on the basis of the issues
alleged, but on the basis of the issues discussed and
proved in the course of the trial. (Paras, Rules of Court
Annotated, Vol. I, Second Edition, 1989, p. 303)
Hence, the failure of the private respondents to amend
their pleadings in order to conform to the evidence
presented will not at all affect the result of the trial.
Appeal —It is obvious that the respondent court
committed no error in ruling that its decision inures to
the benefit of all the private respondents regardless of
the fact that only one appealed. It is erroneous to rule
that the decision of the trial court could be reversed as
to the appealing private respondent and continue in
force against the other private respondents. The latter
could not remain bound after the former had been
released; although the other private respondents had
not joined in the appeal, the decision rendered by the
respondent court inured to their benefit. When the
obligation of the other solidary debtors is so dependent
on that of their co-solidary debtor, the release of the
one who appealed, provided it be not on grounds
personal to such appealing private respondent,
operates as well as to the others who did not appeal. It
is for this reason, that a decision or judgment in favor
of the private respondent who appealed can be
invoked as res judicata by the other private
respondents. Universal Motors Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 205 SCRA 448, G.R. No. 47432 January
27, 1992
Hipolito vs. Cinco,
661 SCRA 312, G.R. No. 174143 November 28, 2011
Appeals —At the outset, “[i]t bears stressing that in a
petition for review on certiorari [under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court], the scope of this Court’s judicial
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 20 of 24
review of decisions of the [CA] is generally confined
only to errors of law, and questions of fact are not
entertained.” The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again
the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
More so, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh evidence pertaining to factual issues which have
not been subject of any proper proceedings below.
“Well-entrenched and settled is the rule that points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court adequately and on time need
not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” Hipolito vs. Cinco, 661 SCRA 312,
G.R. No. 174143 November 28, 2011
Philippine National Bank vs. Perez,
652 SCRA 317, G.R. No. 187640 June 15, 2011
Certiorari —A special petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is availed of when a “tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” It is intended to correct
errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its primary
purpose is to keep an inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an original and independent action. It
is not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted
in the rendition of the judgment complained of. Neither
does it “interrupt the course of the principal action nor
the running of the reglementary periods involved in the
proceedings, unless an application for a restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate
court is granted.”
Pre-Trial —In Pineda v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA
228 (1975), the Court therein discussed the
importance of the notice of pre-trial. It pointed out that
the absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes a
violation of a person’s constitutional right to due
process. Further, the Court ruled that all subsequent
orders, including the default judgment, are null and
void and without effect.
Certiorari —Time and again, this Court has
pronounced that the issues that can be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 are
limited only to questions of law. The test of whether the
question is one of law or of fact is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without

reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Same; Appeals; Matters not raised in the trial court or
lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.—It is settled that matters not raised in the trial
court or lower courts cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. “They must be raised seasonably in the
proceedings before the lower courts. Questions raised
on appeal must be within the issues framed by the
parties; consequently, issues not raised before the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”
Spouses Perez never raised this issue before the CA.
Hence, they cannot raise it before this Court now.
Philippine National Bank vs. Perez, 652 SCRA 317,
G.R. No. 187640 June 15, 2011
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. vs. Glodel
Brokerage Corporation,
639 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 179446 January 10, 2011
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action
against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service
as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject
cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in
seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because
the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a
cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray
that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it
may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance.
Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a
cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. Thus, a cross-
claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but
itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable
grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a
justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the
cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank)
vs. Sabeniano,
504 SCRA 378, G.R. No. 156132 October 16, 2006
Pleadings and Practice —Although it may seem at
first glance that respondent was simultaneously
seeking recourse from the Court of Appeals and this
Court, a careful and closer scrutiny of the details of the
case at bar would reveal otherwise. It should be
recalled that respondent did nothing more in G.R. No.
152985 than to file with this Court a Motion for
Extension of Time within which to file her Petition for
Review. For unexplained reasons, respondent failed to
submit to this Court her intended Petition within the
reglementary period. Consequently, this Court was
prompted to issue a Resolution, dated 13 November
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 21 of 24
2002, declaring G.R. No. 152985 terminated, and the
therein assailed Court of Appeals Decision final and
executory. G.R. No. 152985, therefore, did not
progress and respondent’s appeal was unperfected.
The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory
pleading before this Court, upon the timely filing of
which, the case before this Court commences; much in
the same way a case is initiated by the filing of a
Complaint before the trial court. The Petition for
Review establishes the identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and relief sought from this Court, and
without such a Petition, there is technically no case
before this Court. The Motion filed by respondent
seeking extension of time within which to file her
Petition for Review does not serve the same purpose
as the Petition for Review itself. Such a Motion merely
presents the important dates and the justification for
the additional time requested for, but it does not go into
the details of the appealed case. Without any particular
idea as to the assignments of error or the relief
respondent intended to seek from this Court, in light of
her failure to file her Petition for Review, there is
actually no second case involving the same parties,
rights or causes of action, and relief sought, as that in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51930.
Certification Against Forum Shopping —It should
also be noted that the Certification against Forum
Shopping is required to be attached to the initiatory
pleading, which, in G.R. No. 152985, should have
been respondent’s Petition for Review. It is in that
Certification wherein respondent certifies, under oath,
that: (a) she has not commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, that she is presenting a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if she should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, she shall report that fact
within five days therefrom to this Court. Without her
Petition for Review, respondent had no obligation to
execute and submit the foregoing Certification against
Forum Shopping. Thus, respondent did not violate
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court;
neither did she mislead this Court as to the pendency
of another similar case.
Appeals —It is already a well-settled rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from
the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive upon this Court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of

discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Appeals —While it is true that the general rule is that
only errors which have been stated in the assignment
of errors and properly argued in the brief shall be
considered, this Court has also recognized exceptions
to the general rule, wherein it authorized the review of
matters, even those not assigned as errors in the
appeal, if the consideration thereof is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case, and there is a
close interrelation between the omitted assignment of
error and those actually assigned and discussed by the
appellant. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding the damages when it already made findings
that would justify and support the said award. Citibank,
N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano, 504 SCRA 378, G.R. No. 156132 October
16, 2006
Bote vs. Veloso,
686 SCRA 758, G.R. No. 194270 December 3, 2012
Appeals ―In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 359 SCRA 480 (2001), the Court clarified this
provision of the Rules of Court stating that, “It is settled
jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred
in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court
below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process.” This principle forbids the parties
from changing their theory of the case. The “theory of
the case” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as: A
comprehensive and orderly mental arrangement of
principle and facts, conceived and constructed for the
purpose of securing a judgment or decree of a court in
favor of a litigant; the particular line of reasoning of
either party to a suit, the purpose being to bring
together certain facts of the case in a logical sequence
and to correlate them in a way that produces in the
decision maker’s mind a definite result or conclusion
favored by the advocate. x x x Nevertheless, such rule
admits of an exception as enunciated in Canlas v.
Tubil, 601 SCRA 147 (2009), to wit: As a rule, a
change of theory cannot be allowed. However, when
the factual bases thereof would not require
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 22 of 24
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may
give due course to the petition and resolve the
principal issues raised therein. Bote vs. Veloso, 686
SCRA 758, G.R. No. 194270 December 3, 2012
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,
359 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 134068 June 25, 2001
Appeals —Respondents raised the issue of
redemption for the first time only on appeal in
contesting the amount ordered by the lower court to be
paid by respondents to the petitioner. Thus, the
actuation of the Court of Appeals in allowing the
respondents to redeem the subject foreclosed property
is not legally permissible. In petitions for review or
appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
appellate tribunal is limited to the determination of
whether the lower court committed reversible error.
It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was
neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the
trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process. On this
ground alone, the Court of Appeals should have
completely ignored the issue of respondents’ right to
redeem the subject foreclosed property.
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Banking Act, a
mortgagor whose real property has been sold at a
public auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or
partial payment of an obligation to any bank, shall have
the right, within one year after the sale of the real
estate to redeem the property. The one-year period is
actually to be reckoned from the date of the
registration of the sale. Clearly therefore, respondents
had only until May 8, 1992 to redeem the subject
foreclosed property. Their failure to exercise that right
of redemption by paying the redemption price within
the period prescribed by law effectively divested them
of said right.
Also, in the more recent case of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, we declared that the pendency of an action
questioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar the
issuance of the writ of possession after title to the
property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. The
implication is clear: the period of redemption is not
interrupted by the filing of an action assailing the
validity of the mortgage, so that at the expiration
thereof, the mortgagee who acquires the property at
the foreclosure sale can proceed to have the title
consolidated in his name and a writ of possession
issued in his favor. To rule otherwise, and allow the
institution of an action questioning the validity of a
mortgage to suspend the running of the one year
period of redemption would constitute a dangerous

precedent. A likely offshoot of such a ruling is the
institution of frivolous suits for annulment of mortgage
intended merely to give the mortgagor more time to
redeem the mortgaged property.
Petitioner’s contention that Section 78 of the General
Banking Act governs the determination of the
redemption price of the subject property is meritorious.
In Ponce de Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, this Court had occasion to rule that
Section 78 of the General Banking Act had the effect of
amending Section 6 of Act No. 3135 insofar as the
redemption price is concerned when the mortgagee is
a bank, as in this case, or a banking or credit
institution. The apparent conflict between the
provisions of Act No. 3135 and the General Banking
Act was, therefore, resolved in favor of the latter, being
a special and subsequent legislation. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Sy v.
Court of Appeals where we held that the amount at
which the foreclosed property is redeemable is the
amount due under the mortgage deed, or the
outstanding obligation of the mortgagor plus interest
and expenses in accordance with Section 78 of the
General Banking Act. It was therefore manifest error
on the part of the Court of Appeals to apply in the case
at bar the provisions of Section 30 Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court in fixing the redemption price of the
subject foreclosed property. Union Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 359 SCRA 480, G.R.
No. 134068 June 25, 2001
Canlas vs. Tubil,
601 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 184285 September 25,
2009
Pleadings and Practice —We note that when
petitioners filed their motion to dismiss before the
MTC, they claimed that it is the RTC which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, in the
instant petition for review, petitioners changed their
theory; they now claim that it is the MTC, and not the
RTC, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter
since the dispossession was only for five months
counted from respondent’s last demand to the filing of
the complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC. As
a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed.
However, when the factual bases thereof would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the
issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the
Court may give due course to the petition and resolve
the principal issues raised therein.
The ruling cited by the Court of Appeals in Sarmiento
v. Court of Appeals (250 SCRA 108 [1995]), i.e., that
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint for ejectment such that when the complaint
fails to faithfully aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 23 of 24
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected, or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper
regional trial court, finds no application in the instant
case. In Sarmiento, the complaint did not characterize
the entry into the land as legal or illegal. It was also not
alleged that dispossession was effected through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a
case of forcible entry, nor was there a contract,
express or implied, as would qualify the case as
unlawful detainer. Contrarily, the complaint in this case
specifically alleged that possession of the petitioners
was by tolerance. The rule is that possession by
tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner
and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with
such demand. In Sarmiento, the claim that possession
of the land was by tolerance was a mere afterthought,
raised only in subsequent pleadings but not in the
complaint. The requirement that the complaint should
aver jurisdictional facts, like when and how entry on
the land was made by the defendants, applies only
when at issue is the timeliness of the filing of the
complaint before the MTC and not when the
jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed as being one for
accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. Canlas vs.
Tubil, 601 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 184285 September 25,
2009
Purcon, Jr. vs. MRM Philippines, Inc.,
566 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 182718 September 26,
2008
Relief from Judgment —The threshold issue before
Us is—Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for
review? We answer in the negative. A petition for relief
from judgment is not an available remedy in the
Supreme Court. First, although Section 1 of Rule 38
states that when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for
relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in
harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original
cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus: Section
1. Original cases cognizable —Only petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against
members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court. A
petition for relief from judgment is not included in the
list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers
only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial

Courts. As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the
previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued
the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old
rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order
of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court.
The procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are
governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court.
It may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither
the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of
the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the
CA. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making
the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court.
The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the
exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme
Court, identifies the remedies available before said
Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders
or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a
petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned. If a petition
for relief from judgment is not among the remedies
available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy
cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court
entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief
raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns
of this Court.
Even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the
same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the
petition for review does not amount to excusable
negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging
his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for
judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence
to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the
client’s cause must be shown. The relief afforded by
Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or
mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise
the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the
right of appeal which has already been lost, either
because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake
of procedure by counsel. Purcon, Jr. vs. MRM
Philippines, Inc., 566 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 182718
September 26, 2008
Samonte vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc.,
602 SCRA 231, G.R. No. 165544 October 2, 2009
Relief from Judgment—Relief from judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by
law to any person against whom a decision or order is
entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or
Appeal_01.Intro_Rulings 24 of 24
excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of
equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases
as where there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may either be a motion for new trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court,
and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence from filing such motion or
taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief
provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to his own negligence or a mistaken
mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will
be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
procedure by counsel.
In his Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the
RTC, petitioner alleged that the petition was filed on
the ground that the RTC made serious and prejudicial
mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented. He
then proceeded to discuss the errors of judgment
committed by the RTC in rendering its decision. The
mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
pertains generally to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. The word “mistake” which grants
relief from judgment, does not apply and was never
intended to apply to a judicial error which the court
might have committed in the trial. Such error may be
corrected by means of an appeal.
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court requires that
the petition must be accompanied with affidavits of
merits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon by petitioner and the
facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial
cause of action or defense as the case maybe. While a
petition for relief without a separate affidavit of merit is
sufficient where facts constituting petitioner’s
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be, are alleged in a verified petition since the oath
elevates the petition to the same category as a
separate affidavit, the petition for relief filed by
petitioner was not even verified. Thus, the CA did not
err in no longer considering the merits of the case.
Samonte vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., 602 SCRA 231, G.R.
No. 165544 October 2, 2009