426 People vs.

Alarcon [GR 46551, 12 December 1939]

En Banc, Laurel (J): 5 concur
Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in criminal case
5733 (People s vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al.), convicting the accused therein except
one — of the crime of
robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was
addressed to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to
Federico Mangahas who, as
columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
quoted the letter in an article
published by him in the issue of that paper of 23 September 1937. The article
provides, in part, that "Fifty-two
(52) tenants in Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged and convicted on a
trumped up charge of robbery
in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from
the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. These tenants contend that they
have the right to take the
palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to give them rations of
palay for their main
tenance and their families to be paid later with their share of their crop. But this is
not all. When the convicted
tenants appealed the case and were released on bail pending their appeal, court and
public officials exerted
pressure upon one of their bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the tenants, to
withdraw his bail for them,
and the fifty two tenants were arrested again and put in jail." On 29 September
1937, the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga filed with the Court of First Instance of that province to cite Federico
Mangahas for contempt. On
the same date, the lower court ordered Mangahas to appear and show cause.
Mangahas appeared and filed an
answer,alleging, among others, that “the publication of the letter in question is in
line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.” On 29 November
1937, the lower court entered an order, imposing upon
Mangahas the nominal fine of P25, or in case of insolvency, 5 days in prison; this
without prejudice to the
action for libel that the public prosecutor believes to be advisable to file against Luis
M. Taruc. Mañ gahas
appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals — which later certified the case to
the Supreme Court as
involving only a question of law.
Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for contempt inasmuch as
the robbery-in-band case is
still pending appeal.
Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence
the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt
which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must,
however, clearly appear that
such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of
justice before the author of
the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
against the influence of
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in
the decision of a pending
case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a
decision and has lost
control either to reconsider or amend it. That is the present case, for here the letter
complained of was
published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the criminal
case for robbery in band,
and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a
motion to reconsider its
order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be
admitted; but, the important
consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision
which it had rendered upon
the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the questioned
publication. If it be contended,
however, that the publication of the questioned letter constitutes contempt of the
Court of Appeals where the
appeal in the criminal case was then pending, the interrelation of the different
courts forming our integrated
judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not,
for this reason, punish
contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not its own. The
appeal transfers the
proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court be comes thereby charged
with the authority to deal with
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal.

In re: Vicente Sotto

Atty. Vicente Sotto, a member of the Congress, was frustrated with how the Court interpreted the law he authored
in a particular case. In his letter, he mentioned that he would file a bill seeking the reorganization of the Court.
Facts:
1. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement, published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of
the locality, in connection with the Court’s decision in In re: Angel Parazo.
2. Sotto is disappointed with how the Court interpreted the Press Freedom Law, of which he is the author,
in the case of Angel Parazo. More so, he declared the incompetency of narrow-mindedness of the
 majority of the Court’s members. He furthers that the only remedy for the deliberate “narrow-
mindedness” is to change the members of the Court.

Ruling:
1. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well-founded it
may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed but if it is not well-
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the Court in reversing or modifying its
decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is
wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from
what he, as proponent of the original bill, which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that
case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the
court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by
both Houses of Congress, and the clause “unless the Court finds that such revelation is demanded by
the interest of the State” was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by
any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the
one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.
2. The respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, as to change the members of this
Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But, the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration of justice.
3. It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its
fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with
liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise
of the right of citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. In the words of Justice
Holmes in US v. Sullens, “[t]he administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate
and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts
have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution
and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of
legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging
upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be
insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of
self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.”
4. Sotto was found guilty of contempt of Court; thus, fined of Php 1,000.

Cabansag v. Fernandez
Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his
case pending at the CFI of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for a line
in his letter.
Facts:
1. Petitioner (Apolonio Cabansag) sought for the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez from a parcel of land
who, on the other end, filed their answer and a motion to dismiss. Even though pleadings were
submitted, the hearings were suspended several times from 1947 to 1952.
2. Upon President Magsaysay’s assumption in office and creation of Presidential Complaints and Action
Commission (PCAC), Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of
 Justice and the Executive Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had been long
been pending be decided already. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the said letter to the Clerk of CFI
Pangasinan.
3. Counsel for defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that
Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the
PCAC when he wrote “thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.”

Ruling:
1. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First
Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But
mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without
violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and
political institutions – principles which the 14 th Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due
process clause.
2. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom
may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is
a free press.
3. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import
in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and the
independence of the judiciary. These are “the clear and present danger” rule and the “dangerous
tendency” rule.
4. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the “substantive evil” sought to be
prevented. And this evil is primarily the “disorderly and unfair administration of justice.” This test
establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe
published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a
clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The US Supreme
Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule “is an appropriate guide in determining the
constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to prevented by the
restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy.” The Court furthers
“clear and present danger of substantive evil as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding
judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press
only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high… A public utterance
or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely
because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case,
it must be necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of
engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a
substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press.”
5. As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said that the “[f]reedom of speech and press
should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him
unpopular or to belittle him… The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications
concerning a judge’s decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires
which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of
justice.” Furthered in Pennekamp v. Florida, “[a]nd in weighing the danger of possible interference
with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such
criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that ‘freedom of public comment
should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases.’”
Thus, the question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
 about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree.
6. The second, which is the “dangerous tendency” rule, has been adopted in cases where extreme
difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to
protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle
of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress
of grievance, while guaranteed by the Constitution, are not absolute. As held in Gilbert v. Minnesota,
“[t]hey are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against
contempt.”
7. As furthered by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York, the dangerous tendency rule may be
epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
8. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press, which is
secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without
responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity
for every possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited, this freedom is an inestimable privilege in
a free government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic.
9. The Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansag’s mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to
belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for. This is clearly inferable
from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when
he said that he “has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical
lawyer.” Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, “the criticism refers, not to
the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres” has allegedly caused the undue delay of
the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent
indifference in transcribing their notes.
10. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of
the contempt charge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President, asking for help
because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. Such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be
so, the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can the Court
infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court or undermine the administration of
justice for Cabansag merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of
a legitimate grievance.
O In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings
and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the
case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:
(1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the
court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice
would be impeded.

People vs. Castelo

In People v. Castelo,  the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that
the principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt
proceeding. The Court ruled:
 While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin
to a case of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press
or freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is
considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The
same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom
of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding
privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of the appellant.

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales

166 SCRA 316 – Legal Ethics – Contemptuous Language – Duty of a

Lawyer 
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique.  He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution.
The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain
from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a
newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on
the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is
a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The
Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez
stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he
was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to
criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching
notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have
approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not
embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
 HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply
that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office.
Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the
Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade
the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is
also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to
the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of
the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing
lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his
criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements,
particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme
Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the
practice of law.
7. PEOPLE V. GODOY
O
O FACTS: This case stems from a complaint filed by Judge Estaquio Gascott, Jr. of RTC Palawan
for indirect contempt against a columnist named Mauricio Reynoso and Eva Ponce De Leon,
the publisher of Palawan Times.
O
O Reynoso, on his column “On the Beat”, wrote that Judge Gascott was claiming that he
received death threats from Wilmar Godoy, whose criminal case was being tried by Judge
Gascott. Godoy, in the article however, denied that he made threats. There is also a statement
there saying “…Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na magingat sa pag-break sa
 inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty,
lalo na kung kay Judge Gascott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid ang laban diyan.”
O
O Judge Gascott avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle and downgrade the
administration of justice because of the disrespectful and insulting averments made. It casts
doubt on the integrity and honesty of Judge Gascott and on his ability to administer justice
objectively.
O
O Reynoso however contends that his article does not intend to impede nor obstruct
administration of justice because the article was published after Judge Gascott had
promulgated his decision. He also contends that it will not affect appeal to SC because
Palawan Times was being circulated in Puerto Princesa only. He also claims it as an exercise
of freedom of expression and press. Also, he claims that he was just giving a reaction to the
INTERVIEW given by Judge Gascott in the show “Magandang Gabi Bayan” where he defended
his decision in the said case.
O
ISSUE: W/N Reynoso and De Leon should be cited for contempt.
O
HELD/RATIO: No. What is involved here is a situation where the statements have been
taken out of context. No reason for contempt proceedings. Constitutes mere fair
criticisms.
O
O The article written by Reynoso does not deal with the merits of the case but rather, with the
public accusations being made by Judge Gascott that he is receiving death threats from
Godoy. It is a report of rumors, not presented as facts. He merely gave a reaction, not to the
decision made in the case, but to the interview given by J. Gascott to Magandang Gabi Bayan.
O
O Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely
which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. There has not been shown that there
exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and imminent as to warrant punishment
for contempt and sufficiently disregard freedom of speech and press.
O
[Then the SC goes on to set down guidelines for contempt proceedings in cases like
these]
O
ISSUE: W/N there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements or
publications.
O
Which court has jurisdiction over contempt committed against the trial court while
case is pending on appeal.
O
HELD/RATIO: Exercise of power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect: proper
punishment for the party who disrespects the court and compulsory performance of an act
or duty required of him which he refuses to perform. Contempts are classified as civil or
criminal:
O Criminal contempt— conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court
or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends
to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Punitive in nature. Intent is necessary.
O Civil contempt— failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for
the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order is made. Remedial in nature. Intent is immaterial.
O The proceeding for criminal contempt is sui generis because it has some elements of both
civil and criminal procedures but it is neither. Punitive in nature. Civil contempt proceedings
are generally held to be remedial/ civil in their nature to enforce some duty, and a remedy
for coercing a person to do the thing required to preserve rights of parties and compel
 obedience. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party,
or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In
criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.
O
O As to Issue #2: General Rule: Contemptuous publications were actionable only if committed
with respect to pending suits.
O
O However, this general rule is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. The
termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for
publications or utterances which are defamatory or libelous, depending on the purpose and
effects thereof. In other words, one may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case
has ended, where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to
vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the
court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court.
O
O In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings
and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the
case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:
(1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the
court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice
would be impeded.
O
O As to issue #3: Where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for
contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the
proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise
interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
O
In re jurado

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In re de vera

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KMU vs. Director General