College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

De-Constructing the Chinese Nation

Author(s): Prasenjit Duara
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 30 (Jul., 1993), pp. 1-26
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the College of Asia and the Pacific, The
Australian National University
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 DE-CONSTRUCTING THE CHINESE NATION

PrasenjitDuara

MostSinologists viewtheChinesenationas a relatively recentdevelopment,

one thatmadethetransition fromempireto nationonlyaroundtheturnof the
twentiethcentury. Thiscontrasts withtheviewoftheChinesenationalists and
theordinary peopleof Chinathattheircountry is an ancientbodythathas
evolvedintopresenttimes. This splitin theunderstanding of theChinese
nationcannotbe easilyresolvedby Westerntheoriesof nationalism, whose
assumptions are deeplyembeddedin modernization theory.In thispaper,I
proposea few alternative categories,inspiredin part by post-modernist
theoriesand in partby a comparative perspective,to understand boththe
questionofthehistory ofthenationas wellas therelatedone aboutthenature
ofnationalidentity.
In theproblematique ofmodernization theoriesthenationis a uniqueand
unprecedented formof community whichfindsits place in theoppositions
betweenempireandnation,tradition andmodernity, andcentreandperiphery.
As thenew and sovereignsubjectof history, thenationembodiesa moral
forcethatallowsitto supersede dynasties andrulingsegments, whichareseen
as merelypartialsubjectsrepresenting onlythemselves through history.By
contrast,the nationis a collectivesubject- whose ideal periphery exists
outsideitself- poisedtorealizeitshistorical
destinyin a modern '
future.
To be sure, modernization theoryhas clarifiedmany aspects of
nationalism. But in its effortto see the nationas a collectivesubjectof
modernity,itobscuresthenatureofnationalidentity. I proposeinsteadthatwe
view nationalidentityas foundedupon fluid relationships; it thus both
resemblesand is interchangeable with otherpolitical identities.If the
dynamicsof nationalidentity lie within the same terrainas other political
we will need to breakwithtwo assumptions
identities, of modernization

IThe Oxord EnglishDictionary(compactedition)definesthe modernphilosophical

or
subject... thethinking
meaningof the'subject'as 'More fullyconsciousor thinking
cognizingagent;theselfor ego'. Oxord EnglishDictionary(OxfordUniversity Press,
Oxford,1971),vol.II,p.3120.

JOURNAL
THEAUSTRALIAN NO.30,JULY1993
OF CHINESEAFFAIRS,
2 THEAUSTRALIAN OF CHINESEAFFAIRS
JOURNAL

theory.The firstof theseis thatnationalidentity is a radicallynovelformof

consciousness.Below, we will develop a crucialdistinction betweenthe
modemnation-state systemandnationalism as a formofidentification. As an
witha politicalcommunity,
identification nationalism is neverfullysubsumed
by thenation-stateandis bestconsidered in itscomplexrelationships toother
historicalidentities.
The secondassumption is theprivileging of thegrand
of thenationas a collectivehistorical
narrative subject.Nationalism is rarely
the nationalismof the nation,but ratherrepresents the site wherevery
viewsof thenationcontestandnegotiate
different witheach other.Through
thesetwopositions, we willseekto generate a historical understanding ofthe
nationthatis neitherhistoricist
noressentialist, and through whichwe might
trytorecoverhistory itselffromtheideologyofthenation-state.

HistoricalNationsin China
Scholarshipof modernChinain theWesthas preferred to see nationalismin
China as a modem phenomenon. JosephLevenson observeda radical
discontinuitybetweena nationalistic whichhe believedcame to
identity,
Chineseintellectuals aroundthe turnof the twentieth century, and earlier
formsofChineseidentity.2 Thehighculture, ideologyandidentification ofthe
mandarin, he believed,wereprincipally formsof culturalconsciousness, an
withthemoralgoalsandvaluesof a universalizing
identification civilization.
Thusthesignificanttransitionhereis froma 'culturalism' to a nationalism,
to
the awarenessof the nation-state as the ultimategoal of the community.
Culturalismreferredto a natural
conviction ofculturalsuperiority thatsought
or defenceoutsideofthecultureitself.Onlywhen,according
no legitimation
to Levenson,culturalvaluessoughtlegitimation in thefaceof thechallenge
posedbytheOtherin thelatenineteenth do we beginto see 'decaying
century
culturalism'and its rapidtransformation to nationalism - or to a culture
protectedbythestate(politicization
ofculture).
It is very hard to distinguish'culturalism'as a distinctformof
identification
fromethnicornationalidentification.3In orderforittoexistas a
pureexpression ofculturalsuperiority,
itwouldhavetofeelno threat froman
Otherseekingto obliterate thesevalues.In fact,thisthreat arosehistorically
on severaloccasionsandproducedseveralreactions fromtheChineseliterati
and populace.First,therewas a rejectionof theuniversalist pretensionsof
Chinesecultureand of theprinciplethatseparatedculturefrompoliticsand
the state.This manifested itselfin a formof ethnocentrism thatwe will
considerin a moment.A second, more subtle,responseinvolvedthe

2 Joseph ModernChinaanditsConfucian
Levenson, Past: TheProblem
ofIntellectual
Continuity
(AnchorBooks,New York,1964).
3 I have profitedgreatlyfrommylong-standingexchangeswithJamesTownsendon the
subjectof 'cultuaalism'.See JamesTownsend,'ChineseNationalism',
The Australian
JournalofChineseAffairs, no.27(January
1992),pp.97-130.
 DE-CONSTRUCTINGTHE CHINESE NATION 3

ofculturaluniversalism
transformation froma setof substantive moralclaims
intoa relatively
abstractofficialdoctrine.This doctrinewas oftenused to
concealthecompromises thattheimperialstatehad to makein its abilityto
practicethesevaluesor to concealits inability
to makepeoplewho should
inthecultural-moral
havebeenparticipating orderactuallydo so.
Considerthesecondreactionfirst.
TheJinandMongolinvasionsofnorth
Chinaduringthetwelfth centuryand theirscantrespectforChineseculture
producedan ideologicaldefensivenessin thefaceof therelativization
of the
conception of the universal empire (tianxia). In the twelfthand thirteenth
centuries Confucianuniversalists could onlymaintaintheiruniversalism by
performing two sleightsof hand: connectingindividualsto the infinite
(severingtheoryfromfact)and intemalizing thedetermination of personal
values,bothofwhichrepresented a considerable
departurefromthetraditional
Confucianconcernwithan objectivemoralorder.4 DuringtheMingdynasty,
the Han that
Chinesedynasty succeededtheMongols,Chinesehistorians dealt
withthelack of fitwiththe Chineseworldview simplyby maintaining a
silence.5Whenwe lookat thetribute tradesystem,
whichis oftencitedas the
paradigmatic expressionof universalistic claims to moral superiority, the
imperialstateadaptedreadilyto thepractical powerpoliticsof theday.In the
earlynineteenth century, thetinynorthwestern khanateof Kokand(like the
Jesuits, theRussiansand severalothersbefore)successfully challengedthe
Qing tributesystemand had establishedall but a formaldeclarationof
equalitywiththe Chineseempire.The Qing was forcedintoa negotiated
settlement, butit continued to use thelanguageof universalism - civilizing
values radiatingfromthe son of heaven- to conceal the alteredpower
relations betweenthetwo.6
Thus the universalistic claims of Chineseimperialcultureconstantly
bumpedup against,and adaptedto, alternative views of the worldorder,
whichit tendedto cover withthe rhetoricof universalism: this was its
defensive strategy.It seemsevidentthatwhentheuniversalistic claimsof this
culturewererepeatedly compromised andeffortsweremadeto concealthese
compromises, advocatesof thisuniversalism wereoperating withinthetacit
idea of a Chineseuniversalism - whichis ofcoursenoneotherthana hidden
formof relativism.We have tendedto accept Chinese declarationsof
universalism at facevaluefarmorereadilythanwe do otherofficialdoctrines

4 RolfTrauzettel,
'Sung Patriotism
as a FirstStepTowardChineseNationalism', in John
W. Haeger(ed.), Crisisand Prosperity in Sung China (University
of ArizonaPress,
Tuscon,1975),pp.199-214.
S WangGungwu,'EarlyMingRelationswithSoutheastAsia: A Background
Essay', in
JohnK. Fairbank(ed.), The ChineseWorldOrder:Traditional
China'sForeign
Relations(HarvardUniversity
Press,Cambridge,
1968),pp.4546.
6 JosephFletcher,'The Heydayof theCh'ingOrderin Mongolia,SinkiangandTibet',in
JohnK. Fairbank(ed.), TheHistoryofChina(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,
1978),pp.351408.
4 THE AUSTRALIANJOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

(perhapsbecauseit playsa crucialroleas theOtherin interpretations of the

encounter withthenation-states oftheWest).7
Viewing'culturalism' (or universalism)as a 'Chineseculturalism' is to
see itnotas a fonnofcultural consciousnessperse, butrather to see culture -
a specificcultureof the imperialstateand Confucianorthodoxy - as a
criterion defining a community. Membership in thiscommunity was defined
byparticipation in a ritualorderthatembodiedallegiancetoChineseideasand
ethicscentredaroundtheChineseemperor. Whilethisconception of political
community mayseemrather distantfromnationalism, one shouldconsiderthe
factthattheterritorial boundaries and peoplesof thecontemporary Chinese
nationcorrespondroughlyto the Qing empire,whichwas held together
ideologicallypreciselyby theseritualpractices.A look at the ideas of
Confucianmodernizers writingin the late nineteenth and earlytwentieth
centuries, as
such KangYouwei and Zhang Zhitong, reveals thatthenational
community theyhad in mind was establishedon Confucian culturalprinciples
thatwouldinclude ethnically non-Han peoples - such as the Manchus - as
longas theyhadaccepted(Chinese)cultural principles.
This was, of course,challengedby the revolutionaries of the 1911
revolution,who saw nationhoodas based on inherited'racialist' (or
ethnocentric), notcultural However,itis important
traits. tonotethatafterthe
1911revolution, therevolutionaries themselves reverted to theboundaries of
theQing empireto boundtheirnation;moreover, thecommunist versionof
thenationbuildsupona conception grounded in theimperialidea ofpolitical
community.
Justas significantly, duringthe Jininvasionof the twelfth century,
segments of thescholarclass completely abandonedtheconcentric, radiant
conceptofuniversal empirefora circumscribed notionoftheHancommunity
and fatherland (guo) in whichthebarbarians hadno place.Thisethnocentric
notionofChineseness was,ofcourse,notnew.Chineseauthors typically trace
it to a quotation fromtheZuo Zhuan:'theheartsof thosewhoarenotof our
racemustbedifferent'.8 Otherssuchas YangandLangloisfounditstillearlier
in theconcentric realmofinnerandouterbarbarians foundin theShangShu:
pacificculturalactivities wereto prevailin theinnerpartwhoseinhabitants

7 We are perhapsbeginning to see thecomplexstatusof 'culturalism' as a concept,or

moreappropriately, as a representationof Chineseculture.Whileit obviouslyoccupies
an important rolein constructingnineteenth-centuryChinaas theOther,it also playsa
majorpart- perhapsas thecentrepiece - in theintellectual
apparatusofSinology.In this
respect,like the conceptof 'sinicization',culturalism may, too, have reflectedan
'unskepticalapproachto thecivil ideal in Chineseeliteculture'.See PamelaCrossley,
'ThinkingAboutEthnicity in EarlyModemChina',Late ImperialChina,vol.11,no.1
(1990),pp.1-35.
8 Tsung-IDow, 'The ConfucianPrincipleof A Nationand Its HistoricalPractice',Asian
Profile,vol.10, no.4 (1982), p.353, and Li Guoqi, 'Zhongguojindai minzusixiang'
[Modem ChineseNationalistThought],in Li Guoqi (ed.), Minzuzhuyi [Nationalism],
(ShibaoChubanGonsi,Taipei,1970),p.20.
 THE CHINESENATION
DE-CONSTRUCrING 5

werenotcharacterized as ethnically
different,withmilitancy towardtheouter
barbarianswho appearedto be unassimilable.9 Trautzellbelievesthatin the
Song,thisethnocentrism broughttogetherstateandpeople.The statesoughtto
cultivatethe notionof loyaltyto the fatherland downwardinto peasant
communities fromamongwhomaroseresistance againsttheJinin thename
oftheChinesecultureandtheSongdynasty.10
Whilewe see theethnicnationmostclearlyin theSong,itsmostexplicit
advocatein the late imperialperiodwas Wang Fuzhi. Wang likenedthe
differencesbetweenManchusandHan to thatbetween jade and snow,which
are bothwhitebutdifferent in nature,or,moreominously, betweena horse
anda manof thesamecolourbutwhosenaturesareobviouslydifferent.11 To
be sure, it was the possessionof civilization(wen) by the Han that
distinguishedthemfromthebarbarians, butthisdidnotdeflectWangfromthe
view that 'it is not inhumaneto annihilate(the barbarians)... because
andrighteousness
faithfulness arethewaysof humanintercourse and are not
to be extendedto alien kinds(i-lei [yilel])'.12AlthoughWang may have
espousedthemostextreme viewof hisgeneration, severalprominent scholars
of the Ming-Qingtransition era held on to the idea of the fundamental
oftheyi(barbarian)
unassimilability bythehua (Chinese).13
Despitethe undoubtedsuccesswithwhichthe Qing made themselves
acceptableas thelegitimate sonsof heaven,theywereunableto completely
suppresstheethnocentric oppositionto theirruleeitherat a popularlevelor
amongthescholarly elite.The anti-Manchu writings of WangFuzhi,Huang
Zongxiand Gu Yanwu duringtheearlyperiodof Qing rule together with
collectionsof storiesof Manchuatrocities duringthe time- MingjiYeshi
[Unofficialhistoryof the late Ming]- werein circulation even beforethe
middleof the nineteenth century.14Zhang Binglin,forinstance,claimsto
havingbeennourished bothin hisfamilyandin widerZhejiang
bya tradition
societywhichheldthatthedefenseof theHan againstthebarbarians (yixia)

9 See JohnD. LangloisJr.,'ChineseCulturalismand the Yuan Analogy:Seventeenth-

Century HarvardJournalofAsiaticStudies,vol.40,no.2 (1980), p.362;
Perspectives',
and Lien-shengYang, 'HistoricalNotes on the Chinese World Order',in JohnK.
Fairbank(ed.), The Chinese World Order: TraditionalChina'sForeign Relations
(HarvardUniversity
Press,Cambridge,1968),pp.20-33.
10 op. cit.
RolfTrauzettel,
1 Li, 'Zhongguojindaiminzusixiang',op. cit.,p.22.
12 JohnD. LangloisJr.,op. cit.,p.364.
13 HidemiOnogawa, 'Zhang Binglindepaimansixiang' [The anti-ManchuThoughtof
ZhangBinglin]in Li, Minzuzhuyi,op. cit.,pp.207-60.Wu Wei-to,'Zhang Taiyanzhi
minzuzhuyishixue' [Zhang Taiyan's HistoricalStudies of Nationalism]in Li,
'Zhongguojindaiminzusixiang',op. cit.,pp.261-71.
14 Wu,ibid.,p.263.
6 THE AUSTRALIANJOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

was as important as the righteousness of a ruler.'5CertainlyHan ethnic

consciousness seemsto havereacheda heightby thelateeighteenth century
whenthedominant Han majority confronted thenon-Hanminorities of China
in greaternumbers thaneverbeforeovercompetition forincreasingly scarce
resources.16Thus it is hardlysurprising to findresistanceto the increased
foreignpresenceaftertheOpiumWars through to theBoxer Rebellionof
1900amongboththeeliteandthegeneralpopulace.'7
At least two conceptualizations of thepoliticalcommunity in imperial
Chinesesocietycan be discerned: theexclusiveethnic-based onefounded on a
self-descriptionof a peopleas Han and a community basedon thecultural
values and doctrinesof a Chinese elite. What has been describedas
culturalismis a statement of Chinesevaluesas superior but,significantly,not
exclusive.Through a processofeducation andimitation, barbarianscouldalso
become partof a community sharingcommonvalues and distinguishing
themselves fromyetotherbarbarians whodidnotsharethesevalues.In these
terms,culturalism is notsignificantly differentfromethnicity, because,like
ethnicgroups,it definesthe distinguishing marksand boundariesof a
community.The difference lies in the criterionof admissibility:the
ethnocentricconception refusedto acceptas partof thepoliticalcommunity
anyonenotbornintothecommunity, despitetheireducability intoChinese
values,whereasthecultural conception did.
The socialwholeinhistorical Chinawasconceived, inshort,ina waythat
is notcompletely different fromtheconceptualization of thesocial wholeof
modernnationalism. Yet theimpulseinmodemscholarship toviewthetwoas
fundamentally differentis notconfined to Chinascholarship, butinforms the
mostinfluential studiesof nationalism today.Two suchstudies,by Benedict
Andersonand ErnestGellner,have stressedthe radicallynovel formof
consciousness represented bynationalidentity. Bothanalysts identify national
consciousness conventionally as theco-extensiveness ofpoliticsandculture -
an overridingidentification oftheindividual witha culture thatis protectedby
thestate.Bothalso providea sociologicalaccountof howit was onlyin the
modernera thatsucha typeof consciousness - wherepeoplefromdiverse
localescould'imagine'themselves as partofa singlecommunity - was made
possible.Gellnerprovidesa fullaccountof thisdiscontinuity. Pre-industrial
societyis formedof segmentary communities, each isolatedfromtheother,
withan inaccessiblehighculture jealouslyguardedby a clerisy- Gellner's
generaltermforliterati rulingelites.Withthegrowth ofindustrialism, society
requiresa skilled,literateand mobileworkforce. The segmentary formof

1S Onogawa,op. cit.,p.216.
16 Susan Naquinand EvelynS. Rawski,Chinese intheEighteenth
Society Century
(Yale
University
Press,New Haven,1987).
17 JosephW. Esherick,TheOriginsof theBoxerUprising(Universityof CalifomiaPress,
Berkeley,1987) and FredericWakemanJr.,Strangersat theGate: Social Disorderin
SouthChina1839-1861(UniversityofCalifomnia
Press,Berkeley/LosAngeles,1966).
 DE-CONSTRUCTING
THE CHINESENATION 7

communities is no longeradequateto createa homogeneously educatedwork

forcein whichtheindividual members areinterchangeable. The statecomesto
be in chargeof the nation,and throughcontrolof educationcreatesthe
requisiteinterchangeability of individuals.The primaryidentification with
segmentary communities is transferredto thenationstate.18 In Anderson's
view,thespreadof printmediathrough thecapitalist
marketmadepossiblea
unitywithoutthe mediationof a clerisy.Printcapitalismpermitted an
unprecedentedmode of apprehendingtime that was 'empty' and
'homogeneous'- expressedin an abilityto imagine the simultaneous
existenceofone's co-nationals.19
I believethatthisclaimof a radicaldisjuncture is exaggerated. The long
history of complexcivilizations suchas thatof Chinadoes notfitthepicture
of isolatedcommunities and a verticallyseparatebutunifiedclerisy.Scholars
havefilledmanypageswriting aboutcomplexnetworks of trade,pilgrimage,
migration and sojourningthatlinkedvillages to wider communities and
politicalstructures. This was the case as well in Tokugawa Japanand
eighteenth centuryIndia.20Moreover,even if thereachof thebureaucratic
statewas limited, recently developednotionsoftheculture-state2l indicatethe
widespreadpresenceof commonculturalideas whichlinkedthe stateto
communities andsustained thepolity.
It was notonly,or perhapsevenprimarily, theprintmediathatenabled
Han Chinesetodevelopa sharpsenseoftheOther,andhenceofthemselves as
a community, when they confronted othercommunities. The exclusive
emphasison printcapitalism as enablingtheimagining of a commondestiny
andtheconceptof simultaneity ignoresthecomplexrelationship betweenthe
written and the spokenword.In agrariancivilizationsthisinterrelationship
furnishes an extremely richand subtlecontextforcommunication acrossthe
culture. Forinstance, inpan-Chinese myths, suchas thatofGuandi,thegodof
war,notonlywereoralandwritten traditions
thoroughly intertwined,themyth
also provideda mediumwherebydifferent groupscould announcetheir
participation in a nationalcultureeven as they inscribedtheir own
interpretationof themyththrough thewrittenand otherculturalmedia,such

18 ErnestGellner,NationsandNationalism
(ComellUniversity
Press,Ithaca,1983).
19 Benedict
Anderson,
Imagined
Communities:
Reflections
on theOrigins
andSpreadof
Nationalism
(VersoEditionsandNLB, London,1983).
20 ChrisBayly,'The Prehistory
of Communalism: ReligiousConflictin India 1700-1850',
ModernAsianStudies,vol.19,no.2 (1985), andHomiK. Bhabha,Nationand Narration
(Routledge,London/New York,1990).
21 See, forinstance,BurtonStein'sconceptof thesegmentary statein India in Peasant
StateandSociety
in Medieval
SouthIndia(Oxford
University
Press,Delhi/New
York,
1980), and StanleyTambiah'sgalacticpolityin the Thai kingdomof Ayutthaya
in
Culture,Thoughtand Social Action(HarvardUniversity
Press,Cambridge,
1985).
8 THE AUSTRALIANJOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

as folk drama and iconography.22 These groupswere articulating their

understanding of the wider culturaland politicalorderfromtheirown
particularperspective.There were large numbersof people in agrarian
societieswho wereconsciousof theircultureand identity at multiplelevels,
and in thatsense were perhapsnot nearlyso different fromtheirmodem
counterparts.
The pointis not so muchthatnationalidentity existedin pre-modem
times;rather, it is thatthemannerin whichwe haveconceptualized political
identitiesis fundamentally problematic. In privilegingmodemsocietyas the
onlysocial formcapableof generating politicalself-awareness, Gellnerand
Anderson regardnationalidentity as a distinctivemodeof consciousness: the
nationas a wholeimagining itselftobe theunifiedsubjectofhistory. Thereis
a specialandrestricted sensein whichwe can thinkof a unifiedsubjectivity;
we shallhave occasionbelowtoreviewitinourdiscussionofnationalism as a
relationalidentity. But thisrestrictedsenseof unityis notuniqueto modem
society.23Thedeepererror, however, liesin thegeneralpostulate ofa cohesive
subjectivity.
Individualsand groupsin bothmodernand agrariansocietiesidentify
simultaneously with several communitiesthat are all imagined;these
identifications are historicallychangeable,and oftenconflictinternally and
witheach other.Not only did Chinesepeople historically identifywith
differenttypesofcommunities, but,as we shallsee,whentheseidentifications
becamepoliticizedtheycameto resemblenationalidentities. To be sure,this
does notvalidatetheclaimof somenationalists thatthenationhad existed
historically as a cohesivesubjectgathering self-awareness and poised to
realizeits destinyin themodernera. Pre-modern politicalidentificationsdo
notnecessarily or teleologicallydevelopintothenationalidentifications of
modemtimes.A new vocabularyarises withinwhicha politicalsystem
selects, adapts, reorganizesand even recreatesthese older identities.
Nonetheless, thefactremainsthatmodemsocietiesare not the onlyones
capableofcreating self-conscious
politicalcommunities.
At the same timewe can see thatmodernnations,too, are unableto
confinethe identity of individualsexclusively, or even principally, to the
nation-state. All over the world,the nation-state faces one challengeor

22 PrasenjitDuara, 'Superscribing
Symbols:The Mythof Guandi,ChineseGod of War',
JournalofAsianStudies,vol.47,no.4(1988),pp.778-95.
23 Even a pre-modem villagecommunity has to be imagined.EtienneBalibarsays about
'imaginary' communities that'Everysocialcommunity reproduced bythefunctioning of
institutions
is imaginary,thatis, itis basedon theprojection of individualexistenceinto
the weftof a collectivenarrative, on the recognition of a collectivename and on
traditions
livedas thetrae of an immemorial past(even whentheyhave been created
and inculcatedin therecentpast). But thiscomes down to acceptingthat,in certain
conditions,onlyimaginary communities are real'. EtienneBalibar,'The NationForm:
HistoryandIdeology',Review,vol.13,no.3(1990),p.346.
 DE-CONSTRUCrING THE CHINESE NATION 9

anothertoitsclaimtosovereignty, whether itis inBrittany, Quebec,Punjabor

Tibet.Moresubtleare thechanging relationshipsbetweenbothold and new
sub-groups and thenation-state,suchas thewaxingand waningof Scottish
nationalism Chinese'regionalism'.
or southern Finally,all goodnationalisms
ideal,whether
arealso disposedtoa trans-national itbe anti-imperialism,pan-
Europeanism, pan-Africanism,pan-Islamism, Shiismor Judaism. Sun Yatsen
and otherChinesenationalists believedthatit was in theinterest of Chinese
minoritiesto join withtheHan majority againsttheimperialists duringthe
war-ravaged republicbecauseof thesecurity bestowedbynumbers. Whenthe
imperialistthreatfaded,it becameeasy fortheseminorities to perceivethe
threatfrompreciselythenumbers of theHan majority. Whenthesepolitical
are viewedin thesedynamicor fluidterms,it becomesclear
identifications
thatwhatwe call nationalism is moreappropriately a relationship betweena
constantlychangingSelf and Other,ratherthana pristinesubjectgathering
self-awarenessina manner similartotheevolution ofa species.

TheModernNation-State
System ofHistory
andtheQuestion
Whatis novelaboutmodemnationalism is notpoliticalself-consciousness,
but the world systemof nation-states. This system,whichhas become
globalizedin thelast hundredyearsor so, sanctionsthenation-state as the
onlylegitimate form of polity.It is a politicalform with territorial
distinct
boundaries withinwhichthesovereign state,'representing'thenation-people,
has steadilyexpandedits role and power.The ideologyof thenation-state
systemhas sanctioned thepenetration ofstatepowerintoareasthatwereonce
dominated by local authoritystructures. For instance,'children'have come
increasingly underthe jurisdictionof the state as the institutional rules
governing childhoodwerediffused to all typesof nation-states overthepast
hundred years.24 The termnationalism is oftenconfusedwiththeideologyof
thenation-state whichseeksto fixor privilegepoliticalidentification at the
levelofthenation-state. The slippagein thisrelationship is a principal
source
oftheinstabilityinthemeaning ofthenation.
The lineageofthesovereign territorial conceptionmaybe tracedto what
WilliamMcNeill has characterized as the systemof competitive European
states.Fromas farbackas 1000 AD, each of thesestateswas drivenby the
urgeto gain an edge over theothersin resources, populationand military
technology. In theircompetition,thesestatesgradually becamedependent on
capitalmarkets, bothexternally and internally, whichfurther propelledthe

24 JohnW. Meyer,'The WorldPolityand theAuthority of theNationState',in Albert

Bergesen(ed.),StudiesoftheModernWorldSystem (AcademicPress,New York,1980).
See also JohnBoli Bennetand JohnW. Meyer,'The Ideologyof Childhoodand the
State:Rules Distinguishing 1870-1970',American
Childrenin NationalConstitutions,
SociologicalReview,no.43(1978),pp.797-812.
10 THEAUSTRALIAN OF CHINESEAFFAIRS
JOURNAL

development of theireconomyand thecompetition betweenthem.25 In time,

the Churchcame to sanctionsome of theseemergentregionalstatesby
endowing themwitha theory ofsovereignty without at thesametimeobliging
themto achieve universalizing empire.This was possible because of the
separationoftemporal andspiritualauthority,or,in otherwords,thesourceof
legitimacyfromthe actual exerciseof power.26The culmination of this
conceptionof the nationwas firstseen in the Frenchrevolutionand
exemplified in theidea ofcitizenship
forall withinthetemtory.27
Elsewherein the world,competition was neverinstitutionalized in the
sameway.For instance,in Chinaduringthemanyperiodsof inter-dynastic
struggles,thedivisionsof theempirewerebrought to an end by a victorwho
establisheda commandpolitythatsquelchedthe dynamicof competition
amongstates.Similarly, althoughregionalsuccessorstatesemergedfromthe
disintegration of the Moghul empire in eighteenthcenturyIndia, the
competition betweenthem was not institutionalized in the same way.
Moreover,fromthe point of view of sovereignty, legitimacyin China
necessarilyresidedin the imperialcentre,in the son of heaven,and thus
regionalstateswere never able to claim any durable sovereignstatus.
Likewise,the most powerfulsuccessorstateof the Moghuls,the Hindu
Marathas, strovenotforterritorial sovereignty buttowardtheBrahminideal
ofa universalruler.28
However,no contemporary stateis a nationexclusively in thisterritorial
sense.EvenamongtheearlymodemEuropeanstates,Europeandynasts hadto
combinethetheory of territorial
sovereignty withethnicity to createmodem
nationstates.29Whilemosthistorical nations,definedas self-aware and even
politicizedcommunities, lackedthe conceptionof themselvesas partof a
systemof territoriallysovereignnation-states,modemnationsembodyboth
andethnicconceptions.
territorial Of course,itmaylegitimately be asked,'To
whatextentdoes the (modem)nation-state systeminfluencethe political
of itscitizens?'As EtienneBalibarpointsout,thenation-state
identities has
doubtlessdeveloped the abilityto have territorial boundariesacquire a
salience and have its citizens develop powerfulattachments to these
boundaries.30Yet eventheseterritorial identificationshave to come to terms

25 WilliamMcNeill,ThePursuitofPower(University
ofChicagoPress,Chicago,1982).
26 JohnA. Armstrong, NationsbeforeNationalism(University
of NorthCarolinaPress,
ChapelHill,1982).
27 GeoffEley,'Nationalism
and Social History',Social History,
vol.6,no.1 (1981), pp.83-
107.
28 AinsleeT. Embree,'IndianCivilizationand RegionalCultures:The Two Realities',in
Paul Wallace (ed.), Regionand Nationin India (OxfordUniversity
Press,New Dehli,
1985),p.32.
29 JohnA. Armstrong,
op. cit.
30 Balibar,op. cit.
 DE-CONSTRUCTINGTHE CHINESE NATION 11

withhistoricalunderstandings, as we shall see in thecase of the Chinese

republicanrevolutionaries. More generally, territorial
identifications
have to
bearsomerelationship senseof the'homeland'- evenif this
to an inherited
senseis a highlycontested one.
The shape and contentof nationalidentities in the modemera are a
productof negotiation withhistorical identitieswithinthe framework of a
modemnation-state system. Fromthisvantagepointtheefforts by scholars-
fromKedouneto Gellner- to vociferously debunknationalisthistoriography
forassumingan ancienthistoryof the nation(the nationas a continuous
subjectgathering self-awareness)seemtomissthepoint.Nationalist historians
engagein whatall historians haveto do: narratethefactsof thepastin a way
thatis mostmeaningful tothem.
Duringtheyearsbeforetherepublican revolutionof 1911 whenmodem
nationalism tookholdamongtheChineseintelligentsia, thedebatesbetween
themaboutthenatureof thefuture Chinesenationwereshapedas muchby
modem discoursesof the nation-state (see below) as by the historical
principles involvedin defining community thatwe have tracedabove. The
constitutional monarchists,represented by Kang Youwei, inheritedthe
Confucian culturalist
notionofcommunity. AlthoughKangwas influenced by
modemWesternideas,theconception ofpoliticalcommunity thathe retained
drewon culturalist Confucian notions.We see thisin hislifelongdevotionto
theemperor (inhisfounding oftheProtect theEmperor Society),whichin the
politicalcontextof thetimemeantmorethana nostalgiaformonarchy. That
themonarchswereManchuand notHan impliedthatKang was convinced
thatthe community was composedof people withsharedcultureand not
restrictedtoa raceorethnicgroup(imputed orotherwise).31
Revolutionaries such as Zhang Binglinand Wang Jingweiarticulated
theiroppositionto this conceptionby drawingon the old ethnocentric
tradition,whichacquirednewmeaningin thehighlychargedatmosphere of
the 1900s. To be sure,Zhang was a complexfigurewhose thoughtcan

31 In hisdebateswiththerepublican revolutionary
ZhangBinglin,KangcitesConfuciusin
The Springand Autumn Annalsto arguethatalthoughConfuciusspokeof barbarians,
theirbarbarism was expressedin theirlackof ritualand civilization.
See Onogawa,op.
cit.,p.245.If indeedtheypossessedculturethentheymustbe regarded as Chinese.Since
theManchushad culturetheywereChinese.Appealingto history, Kang declaredthat
duringthe WarringStatesperiod,Wu and Chu had been different countries,
but had
becomepartof China by thetimeof theHan. Similarly, althoughtheManchuswere
barbarians in theMing,by now theyhad becomeChinese.Kang asked whether it was
necessaryforChinato getridof theManchusinorderto builda newnationor whether
the nationcould embraceall ethnicgroupson a harmoniousbasis, includingthe
Manchus,Hans,Miaos and Muslims,as wellas theTibetans?His discipleLiangQichao
developedthisargument further,allegingthattherevolutionaries deliberately
confused
bad government withracism.Whatwas important was thatthegovernment was badly
run;whether it was runby Manchusor Han was besidethepoint.Therewas no reason
whyChinacouldnotbe rebuilt on a multi-racial
basis.See Onogawa,op. cit.,p.249.
 12 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

scarcelybe reducedto anysinglestrain.But he and his associate,Zou Rong,

succeededin articulating an imageof thenewcommunity thatwas persuasive
to manyin his generation. At the base of this reformulation of the old
ethnocentrism was a dialecticalreading of Wang Fuzhi's notions of
evolutionism plus a new Social Darwinistconception of thesurvivalof the
fittestraces.The complexarchitecture of Zhang'sideasofthenationseemas
muchto use modemideastojustify an ethnocentric celebrationof theHan as
it was a selectiveuse of thepastto groundthepresent.Modemnationalists
likeKang and Zhangwereeach engagedin dialogueswithdisputedlegacies
thatwere,nonetheless, authentic and by no meanscompletely assimilableby
modemdiscourses.
This same type of critiquein scholarlywritingson nationalismis
misplacedbecauseit slightsthestrong contrary,urge within nationalism to see
itselfas a modemphenomenon. Whileon theone handnationalist leadersand
nation-states glorifythe ancientor etemal characterof the nation,they
simultaneously seek to emphasizethe unprecedented noveltyof the nation
state,becauseitis onlyin thisfonnthatthe'people' havebeenable torealize
themselves as thesubjectsor mastersof theirhistory. The discourseof the
people as sovereign,which the nation-state promotes(withoutalways
questioning too closelythe factof the nation-state's representationof this
sovereignty), remainsthesinglemostimportant sourceof legitimacy of the
nation-state within thenation.
Thereis thus a built-inambivalencein modem nationalistideology
towardthe historicality of the nation,whichwe can sometimessee in the
writing of a singlefigure.In thewritings of Sun Yat-sen,theambiguity is
concealedthrough a politicalattackon his enemies.Sun arguesthatChina,
whichforhimis theHan nation,is theworld'smostperfectly formed nation
becausethepeopleare boundtogether by all thefivecriteriathat(forhim)it
tookto forna nation:blood/race, language,custom,religionand livelihood.
At the same time,Sun is unclearon whetherthe nationis alreadyfully
awakenedor whether nationalconsciousness needsto be further aroused.He
is tornbetweentheseoptions,because,on the one hand,nationalists like
himself couldfulfiltheirmissiononlyif theHan peoplestillsuffered froma
'slave mentality' withno nationalconsciousness. On theotherhand,thepre-
existing fullness
ofChinaas a nationwas necessary forthelegitimacy of any
nationalist rhetoric.Initially,
Sun maintained bothpositionsby arguingthat
theawakeningwas also a re-awakening. Therehad been difficult historical
periodswhenthe Han people had risento the occasion and revealedthe
fullness oftheirnationalbeing,as duringHan resistance to theJurchens or the
Mongols.
Ultimately, Sun concealedthis ambiguityby transforming it into a
probleminherent in Confuciancosmopolitanism: the originalspiritof Han
independence hadbeenweakenedbya cosmopolitanism whichacceptedalien
rulerslike thepresentManchuregimeas rulersof theChinesepeople.This
was, of course,preciselythe cosmopolitanism advocatedby his reformer
 DE-CONSTRUCTING THE CHINESE NATION 13

enemies,whoadvocateda Chinacomposedof all of theethnicgroupsof the

old empire.Sun and the republicanrevolutionaries soughtto mobilizea
particularhistorynotonlyto serveas thefoundation of thenewnation-state,
but to de-legitimate the ideologicalcore of the alternative
territorial
and
culturalist
conception ofthenation.Thusambivalence betweentheold andthe
newpresents us witha windowtoviewhistory, notas somethingmerelymade
up, but as the site of contestation
and repressionof different
views of the
nation.32
The ambivalenceabout the historicality of the nation reveals a
fundamental aporiafornationalists: if the people-nationhad always been
presenthistoricallythenon whatgroundscan thepresent nation-state
makea
specialclaimto legitimacy as thefirstembodiment of thepeople-nation? We
have seentheelaboraterhetorical strategythatSun employedto addressthis
ambiguity. In othercases,suchas in Israelor India,thetensionsbetweenthe
claimforan ancientand pristine essenceof thenationand theclaimforthe
newandmodemcannotbe contained bytherhetoric ofnationhood, anderupts
An important
intopoliticalconflict. aspectoftheideologicalstruggle between
theCCP andtheKMT - bothardentnationalists - centreduponhowmuchof
the'historical'nation(orwhichhistorical nation)neededtobe transformed or
revolutionized. Thus nationalistshave not been able to fullycontrolthe
meaningofthenation'shistory. Therealsignificance ofthisaporialies in the
it generates
possibilities forcontestedmeaningsof thenation.Modernist and
post-modernist understandings of the nation tend to view history
epiphenomenally - as thespace forforgetting and recreatingin accordance
withpresent needs.A morecomplexviewofhistory suggeststhatifthepastis
shapedby thepresent, thepresentis also shapedby thepastas inheritance,
and the most fertilequestionslie in understanding how this dialecticis
articulated
inthecontest overthesignificanceofnationalhistory.

Towardan AnalyticsofNationalFormations:Identityand Meaning

Social scienceexplanations - ethnicand national- have
of politicalidentity
centred around the debate over whetherthese are primordialor
Neitherhas much use for historicalprocess since the
instrumentalist.
primordialists
simplyassumean essentialand unchanging identity,
whereas
who usuallyattribute
theinstrumentalists, thecreationof suchidentitiesto
manipulationbyinterestedelitesor others,
oftenfindthepasttobe irrelevant.

32 The discussionis reproduced in thethirdlectureof nationalism

in Sun's ThreePeople's
Principlesdeliveredin 1924.The attackagainstcosmopolitanism is also directed
against
thecosmopolitan strainin theMay4 'new culture'movement. Incidentally, theEnglish
versionof thislecturecontainsyet anotherlevel of repressionforit leaves out the
vitriolic
racialistlanguagecharacteristicof theoriginalChinesetextand omitsmanyof
Sun's references to hisdebateswiththereformist cosmopolitansin theearlyyearsof the
century.Sun Yat-sen, Santnnzhuyi[The Three People's Principles](a reprint)
(Zhongyang wenwugongyingshe, Taipei,1986),pp.4142.
14 THE AUSTRALIANJOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

Whatremainsunclearin theinstrumentalist viewpertains to whatitis thatis

being manipulated.More recently,the instrumentalist positionis being
revisitedby scholarsinfluenced bypost-structuralism anddiscourseanalysis,
who are extremely suspiciousof historicist or even historical explanations,
preferring to see identitiesas 'constructed' bythediscourses oftheera.
The altemative strategy thatI havebeenproposing in thisessaypositsa
pluralityof sourcesof identifications in a society- whichdo notnecessarily
harmonize withone another. Thuswhilea nationalist identity maysometimes
be entirely invented, moreoftenthannotitsformulators are able to buildit
upon, or fromamong,pre-existent loci of identification. Buildingthis
identification, ofcourse,entailsobscuring andrepressing otherexpressions of
identity, whethertheseare historicalvestigesor whethertheyevolve as
oppositionalforms.In thisway,historical agentsare constantly in dialogue
witha pastthatshapesbutdoes notdetermine them.Moreover, sinceit is a
history rather thanHistory, ithastheauthority ofauthenticity at thesametime
as itis manipulated.
Identifying the processesby whichnationalisms and nation-views are
formedand repressed, and is a
negotiated de-legitimated complexproblem
thathas had to relinkissues thatthe studyof nationalism had considered
separate,suchas ethnicity and nationality, and empireand nation.Consider
nowthemoresubtlerelationship betweenidentity andmeaning. The argument
is oftenmadeaboutnationalism thatwhileone can havedifferent ideasofthe
nation,thesenseof identification withthenationoverrides thedifferences. It
is doubtlesstruethatthereare timeswhenone simplyfeelsAustralian or
Chinese,and indeed,whenfacedwitha commonoutsidethreat, differences
aboutwhatit meansto be an Australian or Chineseare oftentemporarily
submerged. Thisis whatwe havemeantbynationalism as a relationalidentity.
But thestrength of thefeelingforthenation- whichis also exactlywhat
passionatelydividesfellow-nationals - derivesfromwhatit means to be
Australianor Chinese.Identities are forgedin a fluidcomplexof cultural
signifiers:symbols,practicesand narratives. How are thecentralreference
pointsof thiscomplexfixed,authorized, contested andchangedovertimeand
space?
For analyticalpurposes,I will separate'meaning'- whatthe nation
meansto thepeople- intotwoareas:1) discursive meaning, and2) symbolic
meaning. In thefirst realm,I includesuchsubjectsas language-as-rhetoric and
ideology- subjectsthathave traditionally fallenwithinthe scope of the
intellectualhistorian. In thissense,thenationis a product of therhetoric and
ideas of nationalist intellectuals and pamphleteers. In therealmof symbolic
meaning,I includethe ensembleof culturalpracticesof a groupsuch as
rituals,festivals,kinshipforms, andculinary habits- subjectstraditionally of
the social historianor anthropologist. In this sense, the nationis an
embodiment of theculturalmarksof itsdistinctiveness. While,ofcourse,the
tworealmsareinseparable in thewaythenationis imagined bythepeople,it
 DE-CONSTRUCTING
THE CHINESENATION 15

is usefulforthehistorian to be able to separateand subsequently recombine

themin ordertobetter conceivetheformation/repression process.
In thediscursiverealm,themeanings of thenationare producedmainly
throughlinguisticmechanisms. These are the narratives,33 the signifying
chainsof metaphors, metonyms and binaryoppositions thatgivemeaningto
the nationand vice-versa(cross-referentially).34 Amongnarratives of the
nationarenotonlythehistorical narrativesofindividual nationssuchas those
of Nehruand Sun Yatsen,butalso narratives of thepresentand futurewith
whichthesehistoricalnarratives havetoengage.One suchnarrative bywhich
earlytwentiethcentury Chinesenationalists constructedtheirunderstanding of
modemnationsand the nation-state systemwas the storyof evolutionary
rankingand competition as theroadto successdrawnin majorpart,butnot
exclusively,fromWesternSocial Darwinism.This narrative also drewits
sustenance fromChineseevolutionary thought,mostnotably fromthewritings
ofWangFuzhi.It was a narrative inwhichthemeaning ofa 'civilized'nation
derivedfromthemodelofWestern nation-states.Subsequently,thisnarrative
was bothcounteredand intertwined witha narrative of victimizationand
redemption: thenarrative of anti-imperialism.By the 1920s,thewritings of
Sun Yatsenindicatedthatitwas notenoughforChinato aspireto thegoal of
an industrialcivilization.China would fulfillits 'sacred mission' by
supporting weakandsmallnationsandresisting strongworldpowers.It would
do so bytranscending Western goalsofmaterialism andviolenceand seekto
realizeits own culturaldestinyin thewayof thesage kings(wangdao) of
ancientChina.35
Whereasscholarship has posedclass as theantithesis of nation(the.two
vyingfortherole of historical subjectin themodemera), we can also see
how,through a varietyof rhetorical
mechanisms, thetropeof class and class
strugglehas givenmeaningto thenation.Li Dazhao imaginedthenationin
theimageof a class on theinternational stage:theChinesepeople werea
nationalproletariat(withinan international proletariat)
oppressedby the

33 Homi K. Bhabha,'DissemiNation:Time,Narrativeand the Marginsof the Modem

Nation',in Homi,op. cit.,pp.291-322.
34 For a good exampleof a binaryopposition definingthenationalidentityof Australian
settlerculture,see PatrickWolfe, 'On Being Woken Up: The Dreamtimein
Anthropology and in AustralianSettlerCulture,ComparativeStudiesin Societyand
History,vol.33,no.3 (1991),pp.197-224.Austaliansettlersadaptedtheanthropological
notionof 'dreamtime'and theDreamingcomplex- thepre-contact idyllin whichthe
aborigineslived- as timelessnessand spacelessnessand counterposedit to theirown
idea of 'awakenment'embodiedin the doctrineof progressand legitimation of
colonization.By doing so, they were able to establisha claim to the land by
romanticizingandthusexcludingthe'dreaming' aborigines fromanyterrestrialclaims.
35 Lev Delyusin,'Pan-AsiaticIdeas in Sun Yatsen's Theoryof Nationalism',in Lev
Delyusin(ed.), China,Stateand Society(Social SciencesTodayEditorialBoard,USSR
AcademyofSciences,Moscow,1985),p.190.
16 THE AUSTRALIANJOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

Westerncapitalists.36
Certainly,
thisis notuniqueto China.AbdullahLaroui
speaksofa phaseofnationalism
whichhecalls 'class nationalism':
Where,in confrontation withEurope,the fundamentalists opposea culture
(Chinese,IndianIslamic)and theliberalopposeda nation(Chinese,Turkish,
Egyptian,Ianian),therevolutionaryopposesa class- onethatis often
extendedto
includeall thepartofthehuman raceexploited bytheEuropean bourgeoisie.
One
mayrefer toitas classnationalism
thatneverthelessretains
manyofthemotifs of
andcultural
political hencethedifficulties
nationalisms; experienced bymanyof
theanalysts whohaveattemptedtodefine it.37
The class-nationoftheinternational arenaalso hasa domesticexpression.
In thisconception,the supposedattributes of a class are extendedto the
nation,and themeasureto whichone fulfilled thiscriterion
ideallygoverned
admissibilityto thenationalcommunity. This is truein thecase of Chinese
communism, especiallyduringtheCulturalRevolution, whenthegoal was to
purgeor disenfranchise undesirable classes in thenationand striveto shape
thenationin theimageoftheidealizedproletariat. Heretheidea of thenation
becomesthesiteof a tensionbetweena revolutionary languagewithitstrans-
nationalaspirationsand the realityof nationalboundedness.Yet another
meanswhereby thelanguageof revolutionary class strugglecomesto define
thenationis theprocessofplacingthe'universal'theory ofclass struggle into
a nationalcontext.The elevationof Mao to the role of supremetheorist
(together withLeninand Stalin)and thecreationof the'Chinesemodel' of
revolutionary transformation in the late 1930s marksthe sinification of
Marxismin whichnationaldistinctiveness is embodiedin theparticular model
ofclass struggle
pioneered bytheChinese.
Thatthenationis a linguistically gendered phenomenon is evidenteven
fromthe simple fact that its most commonsignifieris fatherland or
motherland. The mastermetaphor of the nationas familyin turnyieldsa
varietyof strategies and tacticsfor incorporating womeninto the nation.
Historicallyin China,thepurityof the woman'sbodyhas servedbothas
metaphor and metonymy of thepurity of thenation.38 The bodiesof Chinese
womenrapedbyforeign invaders - Mongol,ManchuorJapanese - wereboth
symbolandpartofthenationalbodyviolatedbytheseforeigners. However,as
Lydia Liu has recentlyshown,at least some womenregistered a strong

36 See Maurice Meisner,Li Ta-chao and the Originsof ChineseMarxism(Harvard

UniversityPress,Cambridge, 1967). See also JohnFitzgerald,
whohasexploredtherole
as well as theproblemof class and nationin Chinesenationalist
of narrative thought
withingenuityandsophistication.
JohnFitzgerald, 'The MisconceivedRevolution:State
and Societyin China's NationalistRevolution1923-1926',Journalof Asian Studies
vol.49,no.2(1990),pp.323-43.
37 Cited in John Fitzgerald,'Nation and Class in Chinese NationalistThought',
unpublished
paper,p.10.
38 KeithR. Schoppa,XiangLake: Nine CenturiesofChineseLife(Yale University
Press,
New Haven,1989).
 DE-CONSTRUCTING
THE CHINESENATION 17

ambivalenceand, in the case of the writerXiao Hong, a rejectionof

nationalism's incorporation ofwomen.In Liu's analysisofXiao Hong'sField
of Life and Death, nationalism 'comes across as a profoundly patriarchal
ideology that grantssubject-positions to men who fightover territory,
possessionand the rightto dominate.The womenin this novel, being
themselves possessedby men,do notautomatically sharethemale-centred
sense of territory'.39 In a deliberatesubversion of the tropeof the raped
womanin nationalist discourse,Xiao Hong's protagonist turnsout to have
been raped by a Chinese man. As Liu notes, 'The novel resists the
appropriation of the femalebody by nationalist discourseand chooses to
presentnationalism froma woman'spointofview'.40
In mostmodemnations, thefamilywas valorizedas embodying national
morality andtheobligation toeducateand'emancipate'women,derivedfrom
theimperative to producemoreefficient mothers.4' Tani Barlowand Wendy
Larsonhaverevealedthatin Chinathereexistedanotherstrategy amongthe
May 4 generation of culturaliconoclastswhereby womenwereincorporated
intothemodemnation.These radicalssoughtto absorbwomendirectlyas
citizensof the nation(guo) and thusforcethemto rejecttheirkin-based
genderrolesin thefamilyorjia. The vitriolic May 4 attackon thefamilyas
siteofthereproduction ofhierarchy in societymayhavebeenthereasonwhy
theradicalintelligentsia foundit almostimpossibleto 'identify women'srole
withinthejia as a positionfromwhichtoinitiate a positivere-theorizationof
"women".42 In doingso, theyde-gendered women(who wereto be just like
male citizensof thenation),and manyimportant womenwriters like Ding
Lingultimately abandonedwriting abouttheproblemof gender.Nonetheless,
Larsonobservesa kindofresistance amongsomewomenwriters to thismode
of incorporation as theybeganto reject'nation'as an overarching concept
withinwhichtoframe'woman'.43
Thus while it is rhetoricalstructures par excellencethat generate
meanings of thenation,thesestructures arebyno meanscloseduniverses. In
everycase we see how languagesofferthemeansto construethe nation
Evenwherethisvariety
differently. is stillrestrictive,
as forthewomenwriters
above,theywereable torefusetoparticipate in thedominant anddominating
metaphors of the nation.But thereare othersubtlermeansof registering
differencebyinflecting andimprovising uponthelanguage.

39 LydiaLiu,'TheFemaleBodyandNationalist Discourse:
TheSplitNationalSubjectin
Xiao Hong'sFieldofLifeandDeath',Paperpresented at theAssociation
of Asian
Studies AnnualMeeting,NewOrleans,
11-14April1991,p.25.
40 ibid.,p.32.
41 WendyLarson,'Definition and Suppression:
Women'sLiteraturein Post-May4th
China',Paperpresented at theAssociation
of AsianStudiesAnnualMeeting,New
Orleans, 11-14April1991.
42 ibid.,p.11.
43 ibid.,p.13.
18 THEAUSTRALIAN OF CHINESEAFFAIRS
JOURNAL

For instance,theSocial Darwinistnarrative had providedthecategories

forChinesenationalists like Yan Fu to conceiveof nationalsurvivalin a
struggleofthefittest nationsbyarguing forpursuitofthewealthandpowerof
the nation-state. However,the youngrepublicanrevolutionaries, who had
becomecommitted to theidea ofa raciallypureHan China,derivedfromthis
same rhetoricthe necessityforthe survivalof races and the expulsionof
Manchusandother'races'.44Yet another improvisation uponthisauthoritative
narrative was performed by the advocatesof an emergent, province-based
nationalism, suchas Ou Qujia,to validatetheirviewof thenation.Ou argued
thattheunityof China'svast,ancientlandinstilleda senseof security that
prevented a healthy competition amongitsprovinces, which in turninhibited
contact,knowledgeand ultimately a senseof closenessamongthedifferent
provinces.Since love forthe nationwas not as intimateas love for the
provincein whichone was born,he urgedChineseto investtheirenergiesin
developingthe competitiveness and independence of the province.In the
strivingsand competition of the provinces, those whichwere unable to
establishtheir own independence would be merged with (guibing)the
successful ones, and on the bases of thesestrongindependent provinces could
be builta federated independent China.45
I have highlighted theopennessof languageto strategic appropriations
becausetraditional writing aboutnationalist rhetoricall too easilyacceptsits
closures.Theseappropriations also revealthatlanguagecan onlybe mapped
uponsocialreality through themediation ofideology.Havingmadethispoint,
I wouldemphasizethatitis notinfinitely manipulable andthelimitsimposed
by themeaningsof wordsreflectnottheunerasabletruth of some historical
reality,but powerfulpoliticalforcesbentupon nippingin the bud certain
deployments of language.The limitsof linguistic appropriation areillustrated
by thenarratives of history employedin thecontestbetweencentralizers and
federalists in thefirsttwentyyearsof the twentieth century. Most nation-
buildersin republican Chinasharedmorewiththeimperialstatethanwe have
recognized:i.e., the depictionof the telos of Chinese historyas the
maintenance of unityunderthecentralized state.Theiropponents, theabove-
mentioned federalists, soughtto builda federated structurefromthebottom-
up,withautonomous provinces determining thenature ofthefederalstate.46
The federalists fought a hardpoliticalbattlefortheircause,especiallyin
the provincesof Hunan,Guangdongand Zhejiang,but were ultimately
defeatedin thenorthern expedition bythecombinedcentralizing forcesof the

44 JamesReevePussey,Chinaand CharlesDarwin(Councilon East AsianStudies,

Harvard
University, 1983),p.327.
Cambridge,
45 in ZhangYufa (ed.), Wanqinggeming
Ou Qujia, 'Xin Guangdong'[New Guangdong],
wenxue Literature]
[LateQingRevolutionary zazhishe,
(Xinzhi Taipei,1971),pp.2-3.
46 Prasenjit
Duara,'Provincial
Narratives Centralism
oftheNation: andFederalism in20th
Century Nationalism
Befu(ed.),Cultural
China',in Harumi of
in EastAsia (Institute
EastAsianStudies, Berkeley,
ofCalifornia,
University 1992).
 THECHINESENATION
DE-CONSTRUCTING 19

CCP andtheKMT in 1926-27.Yet one couldarguethatthegreatest failureof

thefederalists layin theirultimate inability to appealto a historicalnarrative
thatwouldlegitimate theircause.Thustheywerealwayssubjectto thecharge
madeby thecentralizers thata federalistpolityrepresented a veiledprogram
forthe'feudalization' of Chinaandtheviolationofitshistorically sacrosanct
unity.Yet thefederalists could have appealedto an alternative historyif it
werenotfortheway in whichlanguagehad closed offthispossibility. In
imperialChina- especiallyin thehandsof suchstatesmen as Gu Yanwuand
Feng Guifen- thewordfenglian[feudalism]had developeda historically
criticalrole as a checkupon absolutistpower.47By the 1910s, the same
signifierreturned by wayof Japanto denotea completely differentsenseof
Now
thereferent. fengjianand its associatedvocabulary in China came to
carrythemorefamiliar negativemeaningas theOtherof modernity and the
Enlightenment thatgrewoutof thehistory of Europe.Thistransforrnation of
thesenseofthewordfengian costthefederalists mostdearly,foriteffacedan
entiretradition of politicaldissentwithwhichtheymayhave been able to
associatethemselves. It also deprivedthemof a rhetorical strategy whereby
they could claim to be the legitimatesuccessors to thistraditionand thereby
mobilizehistory on behalfoftheircause.
These narratives and therhetoric of nationhood - particularlyhistorical
narrativesthatare able to speakto presentneeds- are onlyone meansof
thenation:thediscursive
articulating means.Ofcourse,forsomeindividuals a
historicalnarrativemay itself be sufficiently powerfulto command
identificationeven whereno otherculturalcommonalities exist.This is the
case withnon-practising, non-believing Jewswho mightnonetheless make
greatsacrifices forthehistorical narrative thatlegitimates thepresent nation-
stateof Israel. More commonly, the cominginto being of a nationis a
complexeventin whichan entireculturalapparatus - therealmof symbolic
meaning- is mobilizedin the task of forminga distinctivepolitical
community. Andthismobilization mustbe performed by,and in accordance
with,thenarratives we haveoutlinedabove.In turn,thesenarratives derive
depthonlywhentheyare embodiedin a culture.The intellectual historian
mustdonthecap ofthesocialhistorian.
Thusthemanner in whicha nationis createdis nottheresultofa natural
processofaccumulating culturalcommonalities. Ratherit is theimposition of
a historicalnarrative or a mythof descent/dissent uponbothheterogeneous
and relatedcultural practices: a template by whichtheculturalclothwill be
cut and given shape and meaning.When a mytho-historical narrativeis
imposedupon culturalmaterials,the relevantcommunity is formednot
primarily by thecreationof new culturalforms- or even theinvention of
tradition- but by transforming the perceptionof the boundariesof the

47 PhilipA. KuhnandTimothy Brook(eds), Tu-kiMin,NationalPolityand Local Power:

of Late ImperialChina (Councilof East Asian Studies,Harvard
The Transformation
Cambridge,
University, 1989),pp.92-112.
20 THE AUSTRALIANJOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS

community. However,thisis notonlya complexprocess,it is also fraught

withdanger.Narratives, selectiveprocesses
as we have seen,are necessarily
whichrepressvarioushistoricaland contemporary materialsas theyseek to
definea community; thesematerialsare fairgameforthespokespeopleof
thoseon theoutsoron themargins whowillseektoorganize
ofthisdefinition
ofmobilization.
themintoa counter-narrative

Hard and SoftBoundaries

An incipientnationality is formedwhentheperception of theboundaries of
community are transforned: whensoftboundaries are transformed intohard
ones. Everyculturalpracticeis a potential boundary marking a community.
These boundariesmaybe eithersoftor hard.One or moreof thecultural
practicesofa group,suchas rituals, language, dialect,music,kinship practices
or culinaryhabits,maybe considered softboundaries iftheyidentify a group
butdo notprevent thegroupfromsharing andevenadopting, self-consciously
or not,thepractices ofanother. Groupswithsoftboundaries betweenthemare
sometimes so unconscious of theirdifferencesthattheydo notviewmutual
boundary breachesas a threat andcouldeventually evenamalgamate intoone
community. in
Thus, differences dietaryand religiouspractices may not
prevent thesharing of a range of between
practices local Hui muslim and Han
communities. The important pointis thattheytoleratethesharingof some
boundaries and thenon-sharing ofothers.
Whena masternarrative ofdescent/dissentseekstodefineandmobilizea
community, itusuallydoes so byprivileging a particular culturalpractice(ora
setof suchpractices)as theconstitutive ofthecommunity
principle - suchas
language,religionor commonhistorical experience - thereby heightening the
self-consciousness of thiscommunity in relationto thosearoundit. What
occurs,then,is a hardening ofboundaries. Notonlydo communities withhard
boundaries privilege theirdifferences, theytendto developan intolerance and
suspiciontowardtheadoptionoftheother'spractices andstrivetodistinguish,
in someway or theother,practicesthattheyshare.Thus,communities with
hardboundaries willthedifferences betweenthem.It will be notedthatthe
hardening ofboundaries is byno meansrestricted tothenationortotheeraof
thenation-state, buttheprinciple of nationalformation necessarilyinvolves
the closingoffof a groupwhose self-consciousness is sharpenedby the
celebrationofitsdistinctive culture.
Becausea narrative privileges certainculturalpractices as theconstitutive
principleof a community, it shapesthecomposition of thecommunity: who
belongsand who does not,who is privilegedand who is not. Thus if a
commonhistoryis privilegedover languageand race (extendedkinship),
languageand race alwayslie as potential mobilizers of an alternativenation
thatwill distribute its marginalsdifferently. Therefore, withinthe hard
community therewill always be softboundarieswhichmay potentially
transform into hardboundaries, or new softboundariesmay emergeand
 THECHINESENATION
DE-CONSTRUCTING 21

transform intohardones. Moreover,boundariesbetweencommunities exist

alonga spectrum betweenhardand softpolesand are alwaysin flux.Thisis
as muchthecase in themodemnationas in pre-modern societies.Thus the
growthof groupself-consciousness does notentailtheequal rejectionof all
others.A community may occupy a positionon the harderside of the
spectrum withrespectto community A thanwithcommunity B, and these
positionsmaychangeovertimeas well.Notonlydo softboundaries harden,
buthardboundariessoftenas well,as whena prolongedconflictagainsta
commonenemysubmerges thedifferencesbetweentwoerstwhile foesnow
unitedin theircommonopposition.
This modeof analysischallengesthenotionof a stablecommunity that
gradually developsa nationalself-awareness. Itis truethattheremustbe some
prioragencywhichgivesmeaningto a culturalpracticewhichin turnwill
effecttherelativeclosure(relativeto a variableother)of thecollectivity. But
ofequal significance is thefactthatthegroupis onlyconstituted whencertain
culturalpracticesbeginto function as markers. So whatis thenatureof the
collectivitybeforeit is marked?It is preciselya group with multiple
orientationsandidentifications - thehardening ofitsboundariesrepresents the
privilegingof one of theseidentifications, but in timetoo the privileged
practicesthatorganizethisidentification willchange.
ConsidertherelationsbetweenManchuand Han in lateimperialChina.
The rulingQingdynasty (1644-1911)was froma Manchuethniccommunity
thatmaintained an ambivalent attitudetowardthedominant Han culturethatit
ruled.In theearlystagesof its ruleit activelysoughtto maintainManchu
distinctivenessthrough a varietyof means,including a banon inter-marriage
andon Han migration to Manchuria, andthefostering ofdifferent customs.In
time,however, notonlywas thebanon migration andinter-marriage ignored,
butManchuembraceof Chinesepoliticalinstitutions caused it to blurthe
distinctionsbetweenit and thecommunities it ruled.More importantly, and
unlikethe Mongols,theManchusrecognizedearlytherootsof politicsin
cultureandrapidlybecamethepatrons ofHan Chineseculture. I referherenot
merelyto itspatronage ofclassicalConfucian learning,butitseffortstoreach
intolocal communities through theinstitutions of popularculture,especially
thoseofreligionand kinship. Local communities thathadpatronized popular
godsand heroessuchas Guandi,Yue Fei andMazu,encountered versionsof
theirgods and mythsrevisedby theimperialstateand its orthodoxy, which
thesecommunities in turnadaptedto theirown purposes.In thisprocess,
althoughgroupsmanagedto sustaintheirown versionsof thegod,a shared
culturalfornatof communication emergedthatdid much to softenthe
boundaries betweentheManchusandtheHan.48

48 Symbols:The Mythof Guandi',op. cit.,pp.778-95;

See PrasenjitDuara,'Superscribing
and JamesWatson,'Standardizing of T'ien Hou [Empressof
theGods: The Promotion
Heaven]AlongtheSouthChinaCoast,960-1960',in DavidJohnson etal. (eds),Popular
22 THE AUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL
OF CHINESEAFFAIRS

Thehistory oftheManchucommunity inChinafromtheeighteenth tothe

twentieth centuriesfurnishesa good example of the multiplicity and
changeabilityof identity
thatwe havebeenspeakingof.Thereis no question
thatby theeighteenth century, in termsof theirsocialand culturalrelations,
theManchucommunities residentin thehundreds ofgarrisonsoutsideoftheir
homelandin thenortheast weremeldingintothegeneralHan populace.Not
onlyweretheyviolating thebanon inter-marriage; Manchuswerelosingtheir
abilityto speak and read Manchuas well as losingcontactwiththe folk
oftheirclans.Indeed,theheroofManchuchildren
traditions inHangzhouwas
Yue Fei, a symbolof Han oppositionto theJurchen, thepurported twelfth
centuryancestorsof theManchusthemselves.49 At the same time,though,
powerful counter-tendenciesworkedto shoreup - orreconstruct - a Manchu
identity.Most noteworthy, if notthemosteffective, weretheefforts of the
Qingcourt,especiallythoseof theQianlongemperor (1736-95),to introduce
theidea thatrace shouldbe theconstitutive principleof thepeoplesof the
empire.In part,thiswas motivated bya fearon thepartoftheemperor oftotal
culturalextinctionoftheManchus.Butitwas also partof a grandnarrative of
rule whicheschewed,or ratherencompassedat a higherlevel,bothethnic
exclusivismand culturaluniversalismas principlesdefmingChinese
community.
CrossleysuggeststhattheQianlongemperorimposeda novelcultural
structureuponthepolitywhichattempted toharmonize 'race' andculture with
theemperorship as itsintegrating
centre.In thisstructure,
every'racial'group
- Manchus,Mongols,Tibetans,Han, thevariousgradations of acculturated
andunacculturated Chinesefromthenortheast, thecentralChinese,theTurkic
peoplesof CentralAsia - all had theirproperstatusaccordingto theirrace
(notculture).
The Manchusas a racewereseentoreflect theculmination ofan
imperialtradition
and civilization
datingto theJinin thenortheast thatwas
independentoftheChinesetradition. Thesedifferentracesborea relationship
to theemperor setby thehistorical in thecreationand
roleof theirancestors
development of thestate.50Thus,in thisconception, universalemperorship
required'nottheattenuationbuttheaccentuation andcodification ofcultural,
andracialsectorsofthepopulation'.51
linguistic

CultureinLateImperial
China(University
ofCalifornia
Press,Berkeley/Los
Angeles,
1985).
49 PamelaCrossley,OrphanWarriors:ThreeManchuGenerations
and theEnd oftheQing
(Princeton
University
Press,
Princeton,
1990),pp.3,30.
50 PamelaCrossley,
'Manzhouyuanliu
kaoandtheFormalization
oftheManchu
Heritage',
JournalofAsianStudies,vol.46,no.4(1987),p.780.
51 In thisviewofthecommunity,itis notshared
cultural
valuesthatgovemadmissionbut
relationship
totheemperor.
Differentpeoplesweretoretain
theiruniquetraditions,
but
wereheldtogether bytheinstitution
ofemperorship.
Theuniversalemperorexpressed
hisuniversalsovereignty
byassuming themanifestation
appropriate
foreachgroup.
Itis,
forinstance,
inthiscontext
thatwecanunderstand howtheemperor portrayed
himself
in
 THECHINESENATION
DE-CONSTRUCTING 23

Whilethisconception wouldhave long-term implications in theway it

endorsedrace as a constitutive principleof community, it was not the
principalcause forthetragicflowering of Manchuidentity in thenineteenth
century. Manchuidentity grewin largemeasureas a reactionto a Han ethnic
exclusivismthatbecame most evidentduringthe years of the Taiping
Rebellion.We have observedhow Han ethnicconsciousnesswas probably
heightened byincreasing settlementofperipheral areasinhabited by non-Han
in thelate eighteenth century and how Han anti-Manchuism had been kept
alive throughout theperiodat boththescholarlyand popularlevels. In the
daysbeforetheBritish attackon thelowerYangzicityofZhenjiangduringthe
OpiumWar, the tensionin the cityled to hostility betweenthe Manchu
soldiersin thegarrisons andthecivilianHan populacein whichcountlessHan
wereslaughtered byManchusoldierson theallegationthattheyweretraitors.
MarkElliotshowsthattheentireeventwas interpreted as ethnicconflictby
bothsurvivors This
andlocalhistorians.52 simmering tension culminated inthe
horrifying massacres of Manchu bannermen and their families duringthe
TaipingRebellionand againin therepublican revolution of 1911.53 Manchus
in therepublicanera sustainedtheiridentity onlyby hidingit frompublic
view and by quietlyteachingthe oral traditionsto theirchildrenand
grandchildren within theirhomes.TodayManchuidentity findsexpression not
only in theirstatusas a nationalminority in the PRC but,as Crossley
observes,in suchforms as theManchuAssociation formed inTaipeiin 1981.
Andyetitwouldbe wronganduntrue tothemodeofanalysisI havetried
toestablishheretopositan essentializing evolutionarytrendin thegrowth of
Manchuidentity andtheworsening ofHan-Manchu relations.Crossleyherself
is sensitiveto theambivalences ofManchustowardthisidentity andwe have
seenhowimportant leadersoftheConfucian werecommitted
intelligentsia to
a cosmopolitanism in theirnationalismthatincludedtheManchusas Chinese.
Perhapsleastappreciated inthisregardaretheBoxer'rebels'oftheturnofthe
century,whoactuallysoughtto support theQingcourt- as therepresentative
of Chineseculture- in theeffort to expel thehatedlforeigner. The Boxer
movement notonlygivesthelie to thedichotomy betweena populistracist
nationalism and a moreenlightened, elitistone - it was arguablyless racist
thantheviolentanti-Manchuism of therepublican revolutionaries - buteven
revealstheappealof theassimilationist, culture-based nationalism amongthe
populaceas well.
The Manchusearchforitsownseparateidentity maybe tracedbackto a
narrativewhichprivileged'race' as thedefinerof community. This was a

te nomadicworldas a boddhisatvaruler:as thereincarnation

of Manjusri,blendingthe
Tibetantheory
of theruleras incarationand theChineseManjusricultof Mt Wutaiin
Shanxi.SusanNaquinandEvelynS. Rawski,op. cit.,p.29.
52 Mark Elliot, 'Bannennanand Townsmen:Ethnic Tension in NineteenthCentury
Jiangnan',
LateImperial
China,vol.1, no.1(1990),p.64.
53 PamelaCrossley,OrphanWarriors,
op. cit.,pp.130,196-97.
24 THEAUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL
OFCHINESE
AFFAIRS

of boththeQing court'singeniousdiscoveryof race as well as

contribution
the resurfacingof Han racial nationalism. The tragedyof it was thatthis
rhetoric
forceda highly,ifambivalently, assimilated peopletoturntheirbacks
on whathad,afterall, becometheirculture.But theeffects of theemphasis
uponrace was notto end withtheManchusalone.Partlyas a resultof the
Qianlongideologyof rule,mostof thelargeminority communities viewed
theirincorporationintotheQingempireas beingon a parwiththeenforced
incorporationoftheHan; theydidnotequatetheQingempirewithZhongguo
(China).Theoverthrow oftheQingin 1911createdforthemthepossibility of
independence: thehardening of boundaries thatwas,ofcourse,encouraged by
the revolutionaries'
rhetoric of racialistnationalism.The growingMongol
independence movement, theestablishment of an independent Mongoliain
1911,54and the threatening situationin Tibet and Xinjiang could not
persuasively
be countered bytherepublican sincetheytoohad
revolutionaries,
espousedtheprinciple thatthenationwas to be constituted byrace.It was in
thesecircumstances thatSun Yat-senand the leadersof the new republic
soughtto quicklyswitchto the narrative of the nationespousedby their
enemies- thereformers and theQingcourtitself.The Chinesenationwas
nowtobe madeupbythe'fiveraces'(Manchu,Mongol,Tibetan,Muslimand
Han) and so it happenedthattheboundaries of theChinesenationcame to
followtheoutlineof theold Qing empire.Later,the principleof race as
constitutive
ofthenationwouldbe submerged in
(thoughnotveryeffectively)
a largernationalistnarrative of the commonhistoricalexperienceagainst
imperialism.
Oureffortto linknarratives
of descent/dissent to theself-definition
of a
groupby way of thetransformation of its social and culturalboundariesis
relevantnotonlyforethnicnationalisms such as thoseof the Manchuor
Mongols,butalso forthenation-views of less visiblecommunities. These
includeregionaland provincialgroupingswithinthe Han such as the
Cantonese,theso-calledsub-ethnicgroupssuchas theHui and theHakka,55
marginalssuchas theboatpeople(tanka)andthe'meanpeople' (jianmin)and
otherimmigrantandsojourninggroupswhoencounter cultural
barriers
among

54 TatsuoNakami,'A ProtestAgainsttheConceptof theMiddleKingdom:The Mongols

and the1911Revolution',in Eto Shinkichi
et al., (eds), The 1911 Revolutionin China
(TokyoUniversity
Press,Tokyo,1984).
55 In themid-nineteenthcentury, theHakkasdiscovereda narrativeof descent/dissent in a
versionof Christianity whichdepictedthemas a 'chosen people' and gave thema
missionin theirprotracted,drearybattleagainsttheoriginalsettlersin southChina.It
also causedthemtocelebratetheirowndistinctive traditions
overthoseofthelargerHan
community of whichtheywerea highlyambiguouspart This movement of the 'god-
worshipping society'wouldgo on tobecomethecataclysmic TaipingRebellionin which
theoriginalanimusagainsttheneighbouring Punticommunity was transformed intoan
anti-Manchu zealotry.Philip A. Kuhn, 'The Originsof the Taiping Vision: Cross
CulturalDimensionsof Chinese Rebellions',ComparativeStudiesin Societyand
History,vol.19,no.3(1977), pp.350-66.
 DE-CONSTRUCTING
THE CHINESENATION 25

the'host'or dominant communitiestheyareforcedto livewith.Takefor

instancethe way in whichthe boundaries hardenarounda marginal,
immigrant, regionalgroupin ShanghaitheSubeipeople,during a periodof
intense EmilyHonigwrites
nationalism. oftheenduring prejudiceagainst the
underclass Subeipeopleof northernJiangsuin Shanghai, wherea common
curseis 'Subeiswine'.Afterthe1932Japaneseattack onShanghai, theSubei
peoplebecameidentified as Japanese andduring
collaborators, theoccupation
of 1937-45the expression 'Jiangbei(Subei) traitor'and accompanying
hosdlity towardthembecamewidespread. Whiletheremayhavebeenan
element oftruthtotheaccusations Honigobserves
ofcollaboration, thatother
peoplewho collaborated werenottargeted in thesameway.It was the
prejudice againstthemthateasilyincorporated themintothecategory of
traitor.
OneSubeinative complainedin 1932that'whenI walkon thestreet
and hearpeople makingfunof us it feelsworsethanbeinga Chinesein a
foreign
country'.'56
Thehardening hadexcisedtheSubeifolk
ofboundaries
fromthenation.

Condusion
I beganthisessaybyexploring
thegapbetween theChinesenationalist view
andtheSinologicalviewofChinese
nationality.Although itis easytodebunk
theteleological
nationalist
viewthatpositsa nationalsubjectgathering self-
awareness,theSinological of Chinesenationalism
analyses weretoodeeply
embedded in themodernistproblematiqueto be able to see thattheirown
positionregardingthenovelty of thenationcorrespondedpreciselyto a need
withinnationalist
ideologyto viewitselfas a uniquelymodemphenomenon -
a needas powerfulas theonewhichseekstoviewitselfas an ancientessence.
The questionof thehistoricalnatureof theChinesenationis intimately
tiedtothequestion
ofnational
identity.
Whenthenationis viewedas a subject
whichultimatelytranscends
all differences,
itmustnecessarily
havea single
historywhichevolvesintothecohesive,transcendent
ideal. Framedin this
way,nationalists seekto suppress or conflatethemultiplehistories
of the
peopleswhoinhabit a geographicalexpanseintothehistory ofthe'people-
It is also thereasonwhyeventhosewhosee thenationas a
nation-state'.
recentdevelopment stillcannotbreakwiththe evolutionary modelof
understandingthenation.
Atthesametime, radicalbreakinself-consciousness
theideaofa single,
is hardto sustain, becauseit effectivelydenieshistory.By stressingthe
ofidentities
multiplicity thatis correlative
withthevarietyofhistories,
I have
suggested
thatthenationbe understood
through
different,
contested
narratives
bothhistorically
andwithin
theframeworkof thenewnation-state
system.
Onlythuscanweseethecontinuities
(anddiscontinuities)
without
falling
into

56 EmilyHonig,'SubeiPeopleinRepublican-Era
Shanghai',
ModernChina,vol.15,no.3
(1989),p.269.
26 THEAUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL
OFCHINESE
AFFAIRS

thetrapof theevolutionary modelofthecontinuous nation.The construction

of a narrativeof politicalcommunity whichendowsthenationwithmeaning
is inevitablyalso a repressiveactivity.Thus theold modelof a movement
towardtheidealof a unifiedcommunal subjectmustinsteadbe understood as
a specificmobilizationtowarda particular sourceof identification
at the
expenseof others/Other(s). At no othertimeis thismultiplicity
of political
identities,with its ambivalencesand conflicts,clearerthan in our own
confusedtime,whenthenation-state is as muchin theascendantas it is in
decline.

Chicago
October1992

Contemporary
ChinaPapers
Australian
NationalUniversity

UsingthePast to Serve
thePresent:
Historiography
and Politics
In Contemporary
China
JONATHAN
UNGER,editor

Underboth Mao and Deng,Chinesehistoriansand culturalfigures

regularlyhavemadepolitical pointsaboutcontemporary affairsthrough
cleverhistoricalanalogies,bothin supportof thestateand in dissent.
This book elucidatestheMao-eracontroversies over 'historywriting'
thatsentfamousintellectuals toprisonandgave theCulturalRevolution
itsname.It examinesthepoliticaldebatesof the 1980soverdespotism
in Chinesehistory,overtheParty'sownhistory, andoverwhether China
denvedbenefits earlierthiscenturyfromcapitalistoperations
andfrom
international finance(and, by implication,whetherChina benefits
today).It analyseshowpopular culture
in the1990sre-interprets
history,
as popularopinionand portions of the mass media increasinglyslip
beyondgovernment control.Tenscholarsfromthreecontinents focuson
topicsand issues thatwill engrosshistonansand politicalscientists
alike.

M.E.Sharpe,Inc.
80BusinessParkDrive
Armonk, NY,USA.
304pages.US$55.00
US$19.95(paperback)
(hardcover),