Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas: The Road

Ahead for Political Development in the Region

Submitted by: Nisar Uddin Khan

Roll No.: 0838-BH-PS-16
Class: B.A (Hons) Semester VII
Submitted to: Dr. Fauzia Ghani
Subject: Elitist Politics and Political Development in Pakistan
Date: December 02, 2019

Introduction
History was made on May 31, 2018 when former President Mamnoon Hussain signed the bill to
complete the constitutional process for merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province1. It was logical that the President of Pakistan
would sign into law the piece of legislation adopted by the National Assembly, Senate and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly because the President enjoyed absolute powers concerning
FATA under Articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution. The decision effectively ended the seventy
year old special status of FATA, which has now been ommitted as a separate administrative unit
in the federation of Pakistan. It has become part of KP, the adjoining province with which it
shared so much and yet was administered by the federal government under a different set of
regulations since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.
This semiautnomous tribal region of Pakistan along the Afghan border had been a flashpoint
since 2001, when hundreds of militants, including al-Qaeda fighters, retreated from the
collapsing Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The presence of an enormous number of militants in
this neglected and economically underdeveloped region gave birth to the indigenous Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban) movement whose emergence tore apart the region’s
socio-political fabric and disrupted the centuries-old tribal traditions and power dynamics of the
region. FATA shortly became a sanctuary for all types of militants, including both local Pakistani
militants and those from outside Pakistan, primarily Afghans, Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, and
Uighurs. Following repeated military operations in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, and the
other tribal agencies and the repatriation of a large portion of the population displaced by
conflict, Pakistani government officials now claim that the back of militancy has been broken in
the tribal agencies. The challenge now, many experts believe, is to solidify the gains of these
military operations and keep the FATA region free of a militant resurgence, which requires a
proactive investment in the region’s political, administrative, and economic development and the
meaningful integration of FATA into the mainstream Pakistan. Despite widespread support and
enthusiasm for the reforms packages, mainstreaming FATA is expected to be a long and difficult
journey, with many roadblocks to be surmounted.
The process of merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa started in November 2015, with the
establishment of a cabinet-level committee on FATA reforms. The committee organized several
meetings with various stakeholders in all seven agencies of the FATA, including Maliks and
Masharaan (tribal elders), political activists, local businessmen, media personnel, and civil
society organizations. The final report of the committee submitted to the prime minister in
August 2016 suugested that the merger of FATA with KP province was the most preferred option
proposed by the locals. The decision was made based on the close socio-economic, ethno-
cultural, and adminstrative connections between FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This paper is
an attempt to explore the socio-political make-up of FATA and to understand the impact that this
will have on the mainstreaming efforts and development policies of the government to integrate
the FATA region with the rest of the country. To fully undestand the trajectory ahead, we need to

1
Iftikhar Firdous, “Analysis: How Ready Is KP for Merger with FATA?,” Express Tribune, March 06, 2019, https
://tribune.com.pk/story/1344538/analysis-ready-k-p-merger/.
explore the colonial legacy of the region, the pattern of its administration and governance, the
nature of the Tribal leadership, the security threats, and the long road to reforms.
The Colonial Legacy: Legal and Constitutional Status of FATA
The British colonial rulers sought to control FATA region and its people through indirect rule,
and to use the tribal areas as a buffer zone against Russian expansionism in the region.
Therefore, instead of expanding the adminstrative system of the Indian Civil Service, the British
conferred a form of semi-autonomy on the Pakhtun tribes through the legal system known as the
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and appointed Political Agents (PAs) who collaborated with
local tribal leaders; together, they had unchecked power. 2 The British relied on tribal paramilitary
forces called levies to enforce peace, rather than deployng regular military or conventional police
systems in the areas, in exchange for cooperation from the tribes3.
Pakistan inherited this system after independence in 1947. In exchange for commitments from
Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that the state would not interfere directly in their
affairs, the Pakhtun tribes of FATA agreed to accession to the new state, despite opposition from
some Pakhtun nationalists who sought an independent Pakhtun state instead. Jinnah announced
the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the region and asked the tribesmen to be the defenders of
the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan continued with the separate FCR administrative system for
FATA, and also continued the payement of allowances and benefits to the tribal leaders they had
previously received from the British.
Legally and constitutionally, FATA was considered to be highly autonomous, operating largely
outside Pakistan’s constitution, governance by the defined federal and provincial governments,
and the judicial and court system, which did not have jurisdiction in the agencies. The country’s
current and all previous constitutions had recognized the so-called special status of the tribal
agencies granted by the British. Under the 1973 constitution, prior to the 26 th constitutional
amendment which merged FATA with KP, only Articles 246 and 247 dealt directly with the
affairs of the tribal areas4. The constitution stipulates the fundamental rights of citizens and
obligates the judiciary to guard and protect these rights from violation. However, all these
constitutional provisions related to fundamental rights and their protections applied only to the
people of mainstream Pakistan; FATA people were exempted from them. 5 Likewise, prior to the
26th amendment, twelve assembly members represented the tribal people in the National
Assembly and eight more were indirectly elected to the Senate of Pakistan. These tribal members
of parliament could participate in all parliamentary proceedings and vote on any issue regarding
any part of Pakistan except their home region, where they had no input into the administration.
2
Sarfaraz Khan, “Special Status of Tribal Areas (FATA): An Artificial Imperial Construct Bleeding Asia,” Area Studies Center at
the University of Peshawar, Pakistan.
3
“What Is the Levies Force?,” Express Tribune, December 31, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/486847/what-is -the-levies-
force/.
4
1973 Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 246, 247, www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part12.ch3.html.
5
“FCR, a Bad Law Nobody Can Defend,” Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Peshawar Chapter, July 2005.
Furthermore, the laws and acts of the national parliament did not apply to FATA unless the
President of Pakistan specifically called for their extension to the tribal arreas.
Adminstration and Governance
The President of Pakistan was the Chief executive of the tribal areas, which were administered
through his agent, the governor of KP province. Unlike the nominal constitutional powers of the
governors of the the other three Provinces, the governorship of KP province was a special case
and carried the immense importance because of the additional duties of looking after the strategic
FATA region. For this reason, the selection of the KP governor was always considered to be a
critical appointment involving not only the President but also the military establishment.6
In 2002, the military government of former president Parvez Musharraf established a new FATA
secratariat in Peshawar that functioned as the headquarter of all tribal affairs. It was headed by a
senior civil servant with the title of additional chief secretary. The additional chief secretary was
assisted by four secretaries and some directors, who supervised various divisions of the FATA
secretariat. Political agents served as the chief commissioners of each tribal agency, assisted by
assistant political agents. The political agents were the “be-all and end-all” in the tribal agency,
wielding magisterial powers to arrest people without adhering to the usual standards of evidence
and to try them at his convenience. The PA also held executive, judicial, and revenue powers.
Law and order and policing functions were performed by the tribal levies under the command
and control of the political agent.
Tribal Leadership in FATA
The FCR functioned within the traditional rewaj (tribal customs and traditions), the Jirga (the
council of elders for resolving disputes), and Pakhtunwali—the unwritten code that serve as the
basis of the tribal Pakhtun’s collective behaviour and way of life. The political agent (PA)
exercised his authority with the help of tribal elders, locally known as masharaan ao malikan
(sigular: malik). Tribal elders are the main actors in the Jirga system of tribal councils, resolving
disputes and deciding other important matters. Tribal elders receive their status through internal
selection, mostly on hereditary basis, and the law of primogeniture also applies. However, the
official status, privileges, and benefits conferred by the PAs can also be withdrawn when elders
fail to implement government directives.
The Jirga system is a decades-old conflict resolution mechanism in the tribal areas that functions
as a customary judicial institution. Though youth can also attend jirgas, it is only the elders who
decide the dispute or adjudicate important matters. In a free and fair jirga, most decisions are
based on the consensus of the jirga members in light of local traditions. 7 Often Islamic Sharia is
also invoked in such decisions. Cases are tried and rewards and punishments assigned to parties
involved in a dispute. The role of the jirga is not limited to deciding minor disputes between
individuals; a jirga can also be called to resolve long-standing enmities, major conflicts between
6
Zulfiqar Ali, “KP Governor’s House Has a Revolving Door for Its Occupants,” Dawn, February 15, 2016, www.dawn
.com/news/1239655.
7
Yasmeen Aftab Ali, “Understanding Pashtunwali,” Nation, August 6, 2013, http://nation.com.pk/columns/06 -Aug-
2013/understanding-pashtunwali.
families, and itra-tribal feuds. If jirga decisions are violated, the perpetrators may face anything
from minor punishment to severe consequences such as the torching of houses or confiscation of
property. Tribal pakhtuns often take pride in their jirga system and consider it a built-in conflict
resolution mechanism in their society. They also consider it better and quicker than Pakistan’s
judicial system, where even civil cases take years to be decided. However, a large number of
educated tribesmen have become increasingly critical of the jirga system.
Security Threats and The Status of The Tribal Elites
Some analysts believe that the role of the tribal elders in FATA started weakening during the
1980s and the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, as President Zia-ul-Haq’s policies enhanced the
position of religious parties and mullahs (clergy) in tribal society. With foreign funds flowing
into the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, a large number of fighters from Muslim countries emigrated to
Pakistan and took up residence in Peshawar and parts of the FATA region close to the Afghan
border, which left a huge and lasting impact on the tribal society. People from the tribal areas,
particularly those from the religious seminaries, also joined the Afghan jihad. Though many of
the tribal elders sympathised with the Mujahideen during the Afghan jihad in their rhetoric, the
overwhelming majority remained more interested in holding on to their powers and privileges
than undertaking jihadi activities themselves.
However, the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan
accelerated the process of change in the tribal areas. The 2002 general election was the first time
that an alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) won a sizable victory
in the national elections from the northwest. The alliance was formed after 9/11 and campaigned
heavily on resisting the presence of US troops across the border. Out of twelve seats in the
National Aseembly from the FATA region, seven were won by candidates of the two main parties
of the alliance, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) and Jamaat-e-Islami. Previously, the
seven tribal regions had always represented by non-religious traditional tribal leaders since
political parties were not allowed to take part in elections. Only wealthy and influential tribal
elders could win a place in Parliament; indeed, before the introduction of the adult franchise in
1996, only tribal elders could vote.
After 2001 the FATA region became a sanctuary for hundreds of trans-national terrorists who
fled Afghanistan to the mountainous tribal areas next door in Pakistan after the United States
launched a war against the Taliban regime in Kabul. Pakistan initially responded by signing
peace deals with the local militants, but none of them lasted long enough to guarantee a durable
peace in the region. The militants took advantage of the situation and in 2007 formalized their
organizational structure as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), establishing a central leader or
ameer, appointing a spokesman, and forming different chapters in the region. The TTP
subsequently launched a full-fledged war against the Pakistani state and carried our dozens of
attacks across the country.
The Long Road to FATA Reforms
Many attempts were made to reform the FATA administration and the laws governing the region.
In a 1954 ruling, the Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert Cornelius the FCR as “obnoxious to all
recognized modern principles governing the dispensation of justice.” 8 Many committees were
established in the past in the past that came up with good recommendations. However, no
sustained efforts were made to implement those recommendations and effect a real change in the
colonial governance system.
The FCR had in fact been amended on eleven different occassions. Universal adult franchise was
introduced in 1996-97, giving FATA residents the right to vote. Earlier, only privileged tribal
elders had the right to vote in the general elections. The extension of the Political Parties’ Act in
2011 was another significant step that gave FATA people an opportunity to engage in mainstream
party politics as the rest of the country did. Amendments approved by former President Zardari
in 2011 also sought to drastically ameliorate the collective responsibilty clause, and establish a
FATA tribunal to review and revise decisions under the FCR. While some of these amendments
were partially implemented, others were not, including the one related to the harshest clause of
collective security.
Finally, in 2015 then Prime minister Nawaz Sharif formed a special six member FATA reforms
committee. Headed by Sartaj Aziz, special advisor to the PM, the committee was tasked with
proposing necessary reforms, identifying viable options for the future of the FATA region, and
coming up with substantive recommendations and a roadmap for implementing changes in the
tribal region. The formation of the committee was strongly protested by many segments of the
tribal society because no member of the committee came from FATA. Critics charged that the
committee members had no knowledge of the problems and struggles of the common tribesmen
and were not familiar with the traditional lifeways and customs of the Pakhtuns.
Understanding The Debate over FATA Reforms
The committee on FATA reforms came up with four options: (1) FATA should be merged with the
adjacent KP province, (2) FATA should become a full-fledged separate province in its own right,
(3) FATA should get a new autonomy arrangement with an elected council modeled on the Gilgit
Baltistan Council, and (4) FATA should remain as it was for the time being, with minor reforms
to the FCR laws.9 Though apparently all four options were considered at the outset, the
discussion soon focused on just two choices: whether FATA should be a separate province or
whether it should instead be integrated with the KP province. FATA residents themselves were
divided into two camps, one supporting the idea of a separate FATA province and the other sup-
porting a merger with KP. A December 2016 survey by an Islamabad-based independent research
centre showed that 74 percent of tribesmen broadly supported FATA’s merger with KP, while a
clear majority of 54 percent supported that objective unequivocally.10

8
“FCR, a Bad Law Nobody Can Defend,” Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Peshawar Chapter, July 2005.
9
“Committee Recommends Four Basic Options for Reforms in FATA, Wide Consensus on Integration of FATA with KP,”
Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), August 23, 2016, www.app.com.pk/committee-recommends-four-basic -options-for-reforms-
in-fata-wide-consensus-on-integration-of-fata-with-kp/.
10
Tahir Niaz, “74% of Respondents Endorse Merging FATA into KP: Study,” Nation, February 2, 2017, http://nation
.com.pk/islamabad/02-Feb-2017/74-pc-respondents-endorse-merging-fata-into-kp-study.
At the local level, Fata’s seven tribal agencies are often more integrated with adjacent districts of
KP than they are with the other FATA agencies. A significant number of FATA tribesmen have
already settled in various parts of KP, and many FATA students study in KP universities, which
have special quotas for students from the tribal areas. Both secondary and higher-level schools in
FATA and degree-granting and postgraduate colleges are affiliated with the boards and
universities of KP. Support for a merger with KP received the backing of many major
mainstream and regional political parties, including the Pashtun nationalist Awami National
Party, the Pakistan People’s Party, and the then ruling Pakistan Muslim League (N). In December
2016 the KP Provincial Assembly, where the Pakistan Tehrik-e Insaaf party ruled at the time in a
coalition with the Islamist party Jammat-e-Islami, passed a unanimous resolution favoring the
FATA merger. Some of these parties have a presence in FATA and hoped that if it was merged
with KP, they will be able to strengthen their vote share in the KP assembly and form a
government in KP.
However, at least two parties opposed the merger: the religious party JUI-F and the Pashtun
nationalist party, the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), whose share of the electorate is
mostly based in Pashtun-populated areas of Balochistan province. 11 The JUI-F too has a
formidable presence in FATA and feared losing its electoral support in the event of a merger. The
PkMAP does not have a significant presence in FATA and it feared losing support to the other
Pashtun nationalist party, the Awami National Party, which has a strong support base in KP and
will further strengthen its support across the border region with the merger. The Balochistan-
based PkMAP called for a referendum to ascertain the opinion of the FATA people on whether
they wanted to have a separate province or merge with KP. Within FATA, opposition to the
merger was mainly led by a group of traditional tribal elders from all tribal areas, many with
stakes in the prevalent system, who operated under the umbrella of the FATA Grand Alliance, a
consortium of tribal elders from all tribal agencies.
Opponents of the merger argued that FATA needed special attention and that only the status of a
separate province—with its own provincial administration, political institutions, funding,
machinery, personnel, and policy—can ensure that kind of attention.12 They believed that a FATA
province would be able to get its own provincial share of funds from the federal government and
that this would not only bring an immediate end to the sense of deprivation among the FATA
people but would also help resolve problems of the FATA region in the long run. For them, a
small administrative unit with effective coordination at the grassroots level looked like a better
option than merging with another big province. Many opponents of the merger feared that FATA
will be marginalized as part of a new, larger province.
Some elements of the bureaucracy may have also been against the FATA merger with KP because
of their vested interests in the status quo, such as the PA having executive, judicial, and financial
power and accountability to no one. The military establishment, which carries considerable
weight in strategic decision-making in the FATA region, reportedly supported the mainstreaming
of FATA. In August 2016 the military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations, released a
11
“Boycott, Protest as FATA Reforms Committee Visits Landikotal,” Nation, April 5, 2016, http://nation.com.pk /national/05-
Apr-2016/boycott-protests-as-fata-reforms-committee-visits-landikotal.
12
Talimand Khan, “Mainstreaming or Cornering FATA?,” News (Islamabad), October 26, 2016, www.thenews.com
.pk/print/159849-Mainstreaming-or-cornering-Fata.
statement by then army chief General Sharif expressing concern and dismay over the slow
process of FATA reforms. His successor, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, has also called for the
mainstreaming of FATA and has given his assurances that the army will support the
implementation of the FATA reform process.13
The Government’s Reform Plan
After months of deliberation, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s government made a land-
mark political decision in early March 2017, approving a series of reforms that were to culminate
in the merger of FATA with the neighbouring KP province. 14 The official reforms committee
ruled out the possibility of a FATA province on the grounds of questionable feasibility, lack of
revenue, and poor sustainability. The committee said in its report that the advantages of
integrating FATA with KP are far greater than the disadvantages.
The proposed reforms package, if effectively implemented, will bring the tribal areas into parity
with other parts of the country through parallel and concurrent political, judicial, administrative,
security, and economic reforms.15 The reforms aim to provide constitutional protection to the
FATA people by extending the formal justice system, introducing modern policing, establishing
local government, and starting a full range of activities for economic and social development.
The recommendations also called for the repatriation of internally displaced persons and recon-
struction of the war-torn areas due to military operations by the end of 2018.
Political and Administrative Changes
The merger of FATA with KP has brought the tribal areas under the control of the provincial
government of the neighbouring KP province. The government’s reform plan had set out a five-
year timeline for the legal and administrative integration and synchronization of various depart-
ments of FATA with KP. The territory of FATA has got new seats and representation in the KP
Provincial Assembly and elected its provincial representatives in elections held in July this year,
along with its current representation in the National Assembly. Prior to the reforms, KP had
forty-three seats in the National Assembly, so adding the twelve FATA seats increased its
representation to fifty-five out of 272 directly elected seats in the National Assembly. However,
FATA lost its distinct Senate members and will be represented instead by Senate members whose
seats are designated for KP and who are responsible for the larger, merged province. With the
merger, the number of KP Provincial Assembly members also increased, after new constituencies
were drawn based on the 2017 national census.
Local party-based elections will also be held in FATA as part of the reform process under the new
FATA Local Government Regulations. This will aid in the devolvement of power to the
grassroots level, which in the long run will not only empower FATA people but also help in
establishing the full authority of the state and contribute to the effective implementation of the
reforms.

13
Zulfiqar Ali, “Military Favors ‘Mainstreaming’ of FATA, Says Bajwa,” Dawn, February 13, 2017, www.dawn.com
/news/1314494.
14
“Cabinet Approves FATA Merger,” News (Islamabad), March 2, 2017, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/189745 -Cabinet-approves-
recommendations-on-Fata-reforms.
15
FATA Reform Committee Report, http://pmo.gov.pk/documents/PresentationFATAReformCommittee.pdf.
As part of the merger, the administrative units of KP changed as a result of the drawing of new
districts and subdivisions. Initially, the seven tribal agencies were converted into new districts of
KP. However, the boundaries may be redrawn in the future, in part because of the low population
density and in part for more effective administration and better governance. The FATA
administration is already heavily dependent on the KP government: currently, about fifty-two
thousand employees of the KP government work in various FATA departments. Similarly, the
FATA Secretariat, which is considered to be the headquarters of FATA affairs, has around seven
hundred employees who also belong to the provincial service cadre. 16 FATA people in various
agencies also rely on the KP government machinery for numerous administrative tasks. Officials
say that in some crucial sectors, such as education and health care, a merger will entail little more
than synchronization because the KP government already provides the workforce. However,
synchronization will not be easy if the FATA tribal agencies are not brought into parity with the
districts of KP. The integration of FATA into KP has the potential to shift the political balance of
power in the province.

Conclusion: Implementing FATA Reforms and The Way Ahead

Pakistan needs a holistic and multipronged approach to the security and political challenges
posed by FATA. Mainstream Pakistan must restore the trust of the FATA people and must be
willing to make some sacrifices for the people of FATA as fellow Pakistanis. Unfortunately, for
the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis, the tribal areas are portrayed as a medieval, even a
primitive culture. Mainstream Pakistan needs to know that while thousands of people across the
country have been killed in acts of terrorism, it is the FATA tribesmen who have been on the
front line in the war on terror and the chief victims of this protracted conflict.
Yet another important question mark about the FATA reforms concerns the role of the military.
The FATA region has long been used by the military establishment for strategic objectives, which
may explain why the army initially had reservations about mainstreaming FATA. However, the
military is now publicly supporting the reform process. And with the army’s public support for
the reform process, it is now up to the political leadership to move forward promptly and wisely
with implementing the reforms. There will be hurdles to overcome along the way. However, the
government must not surrender to the vested interests of groups that wish to derail the process.
The government should move ahead with a plan that the majority of Pakistanis endorse and that
realistically can be implemented with available resources.
The government also needs to take a sober look at its own role. It needs to understand that
providing justice to the masses is not only a matter of state responsibility, it is also part of the
state’s writ. The state needs to strengthen the modern legal framework for dispute settlement and
apply federal law uniformly across the country without discrimination.
For the successful implementation of the FATA reforms, including creating awareness among the
FATA people about their legal and political rights, insisting on grassroots-level accountability of
officials and keeping an eye on public expenditures and ensuring transparency in the tribal areas,
a free and impartial press must be able to function. In this regard, the government must take
measures to ensure the safety and security of tribal journalists and ensure the freedom of the
press in the region. Freedom of the press will have a crucial role in the political development
process in the region.

16
See the website of the FATA Secretariat (https://fata.gov.pk/).
Similarly, the government must ensure the participation of women in the reform process. Women
constitute more than half of the total FATA population. However, they have been assigned a
subservient role in tribal society, partly because of local traditions but also because of the
indifference shown by successive governments toward all issues in political, economic, and
social spheres affecting the FATA people in general and women in particular. As part of a
successful reforms package, not only should seats be reserved for women in the National and
Provincial Assemblies, the government should also take solid steps to ensure the participation of
women in the electoral process.
Finally, government cannot implement all these reforms on its own. Responsibility for
implementation also falls to the FATA people and tribal elders, many of whom still cling to older
traditions. They need to understand that too many disruptive things have happened just in the
past decade that stand in the way of continuing past ways. That is not realistically possible, nor is
it any longer an aspiration of the overwhelming majority of the tribespeople. The preservation of
an older system at the expense of modern governance in the twenty-first century harms FATA
and its people. Cultural relativism aside, the old guard of the tribal society needs to give space
and role to the new guard, the tribal youth, in day-to-day affairs. The tribal elders must look to
the future for the sake of their own coming generations. Fed up with the state of affairs in their
home region, youth from FATA and other Pashtun areas are struggling for their rights in a new
wave of activism, which should serve as a wake-up call to both the tribal elites and the Pakistani
elite as well.