G.R. No.
133179               March 27, 2008 manager’s check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,  check.5 Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos so that So
vs.
LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and
PRODUCERS BANK, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
To ingratiate themselves to their valued depositors, some banks at
times bend over backwards that they unwittingly expose themselves
to great risks.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse
the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision promulgated on March 18,
19981 in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 entitled Lim Sio Wan v. Allied
Banking Corporation, et al. The CA Decision modified the Decision
dated November 15, 19932 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
63 in Makati City rendered in Civil Case No. 6757.
The Facts
The facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are as
follows:
On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes
Branch in Manila a money market placement of PhP 1,152,597.35 for
a term of 31 days to mature on December 15, 1983,3 as evidenced
by Provisional Receipt No. 1356 dated November 14, 1983.4
On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called
up Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-
terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement, to issue a
give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the
could easily identify her.6
Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for
a manager’s check to be issued.7 The bank issued Manager’s Check
No. 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the proceeds of Lim
Sio Wan’s money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as
payee.8 The check was cross-checked "For Payee’s Account Only"
and given to Santos.9
Thereafter, the manager’s check was deposited in the account of
Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank),10 with the forged signature of Lim
Sio Wan as indorser.11
Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market
placement for PhP 2 million with respondent Producers Bank. Santos
was the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s
account.12 Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt No.
31756813 and a Letter dated September 21, 1983 of Santos
addressed to Angie Lazo of FCC, acknowledging receipt of the
placement.14 The placement matured on October 25, 1983 and was
rolled-over until December 5, 1983 as evidenced by a Letter dated
October 25, 1983.15 When the placement matured, FCC demanded
the payment of the proceeds of the placement.16 On December 5,
1983, the same date that So received the phone call instructing her
to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s placement, the manager’s check in
the name of Lim Sio Wan was deposited in the account of FCC,
purportedly representing the proceeds of FCC’s money market
placement with Producers Bank.17 In other words, the Allied check
was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers
Bank’s payment of its obligation to FCC.
To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and
Regulations, Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which
reads: "All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement
guaranteed."18
The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the
presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without
checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement.
Thus, the amount on the face of the check was credited to the
account of FCC.19
On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second
money market placement to mature on January 9, 1984.20
On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money
market placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.21 She
was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon
her instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the
proceeds thereof. She desisted from further complaints when she
was assured by the bank’s manager that her money would be
recovered.22
When Lim Sio Wan’s second placement matured on January 9,
1984, So called Lim Sio Wan to ask for the latter’s instructions on the
second placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over the
placement for another 30 days.23On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan,
realizing that the promise that her money would be recovered would
not materialize, sent a demand letter to Allied asking for the payment
of the first placement.24 Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan, claiming
that the latter had authorized the pre-termination of the placement
and its subsequent release to Santos.25
Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated
February 13, 198426 docketed as Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied
to recover the proceeds of her first money market placement.
Sometime in February 1984, she withdrew her second placement
from Allied.
27
Allied filed a third party complaint  against Metrobank and Santos. In
turn, Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint28 against FCC. FCC for
its part filed a fifth party complaint29 against Producers Bank.
Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos,
who was no longer connected with Producers Bank.30
On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months after funding the
check, Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check
was forged.31 Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount represented by
the check from FCC. Later on, Metrobank agreed to release the
amount to FCC after the latter executed an Undertaking, promising to
indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the amount.32
Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include
Metrobank as a party-defendant, along with Allied.33The RTC
admitted the amended complaint despite the opposition of
Metrobank.34 Consequently, Allied’s third party complaint against
Metrobank was converted into a cross-claim and the latter’s fourth
party complaint against FCC was converted into a third party
complaint.35
After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay
plaintiff the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per
annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid;
2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount
of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount
of P173,792.20 by way of attorney’s fees; and,
4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.
Defendant Allied Bank’s cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is
DISMISSED.
Likewise defendant Metrobank’s third-party complaint as against
Filipinas Cement Corporation is DISMISSED.
Filipinas Cement Corporation’s fourth-party complaint against
Producer’s Bank is also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.36
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued the assailed Decision
on March 18, 1998, modifying the RTC Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing
defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%)
percent and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company forty (40%) of the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12%
interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be
paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation and
defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the
same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.37
Hence, Allied filed the instant petition.
The Issues
Allied raises the following issues for our consideration:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lim Sio Wan
did not authorize [Allied] to pre-terminate the initial placement and to
deliver the check to Deborah Santos.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in absolving Producers Bank
of any liability for the reimbursement of amount adjudged
demandable.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding [Allied] liable to the
extent of 60% of amount adjudged demandable in clear disregard to
the ultimate liability of Metrobank as guarantor of all endorsement on
the check, it being the collecting bank.38
The petition is partly meritorious.
A Question of Fact
Allied questions the finding of both the trial and appellate courts that
Allied was not authorized to release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s
money market placement to Santos. Allied clearly raises a question
of fact. When the CA affirms the findings of fact of the RTC, the
factual findings of both courts are binding on this Court.39
We also agree with the CA when it said that it could not disturb the
trial court’s findings on the credibility of witness So inasmuch as it
was the trial court that heard the witness and had the opportunity to
observe closely her deportment and manner of testifying. Unless the
trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value, which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case,40 we find it best to
defer to the trial court on matters pertaining to credibility of
witnesses.
Additionally, this Court has held that the matter of negligence is also
a factual question.41 Thus, the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the
CA, that the respective parties were negligent in the exercise of their
obligations is also conclusive upon this Court.
The Liability of the Parties
As to the liability of the parties, we find that Allied is liable to Lim Sio
Wan. Fundamental and familiar is the doctrine that the relationship
between a bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor.
Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to
the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks
and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan.
Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases that a bank deposit is in the
nature of a simple loan or mutuum.42 More succinctly, in Citibank,
N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, this Court
ruled that a money market placement is a simple loan or
mutuum.43 Further, we defined a money market in Cebu International
Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, as follows:
[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term
credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and
borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle
man or dealer in open market. In a money market transaction, the
investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a
middleman or dealer.
In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the
petitioner and the private respondent is in the nature of a loan.44
Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market
placement, is entitled to payment upon her request, or upon maturity
of the placement, or until the bank is released from its obligation as
debtor. Until any such event, the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan
remains unextinguished.
Art. 1231 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when
obligations are considered extinguished, thus:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment,
rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, and prescription, are
governed elsewhere in this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that Lim Sio
Wan did not authorize the release of her money market placement to
Santos and the bank had been negligent in so doing, there is no
question that the obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had not
been extinguished. Art. 1240 of the Code states that "payment shall
be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to
receive it." As commented by Arturo Tolentino:
Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish
the obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence
which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in
utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or
through error induced by the fraud of a third person, the payment to
one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such
payment, is void, except as provided in Article 1241. Such payment
does not prejudice the creditor, and accrual of interest is not
suspended by it.45 (Emphasis supplied.)
Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wan’s money
market placement, the bank still has an obligation to pay her at six
percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof.
We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim
Sio Wan.
Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate cause of the loss of Lim
Sio Wan’s money. It points out that Metrobank guaranteed all prior
indorsements inscribed on the manager’s check, and without
Metrobank’s guarantee, the present controversy would never have
occurred. According to Allied:
Failure on the part of the collecting bank to ensure that the proceeds
of the check is paid to the proper party is, aside from being an
efficient intervening cause, also the last negligent act, x x x
contributory to the injury caused in the present case, which thereby
leads to the conclusion that it is the collecting bank, Metrobank that
is the proximate cause of the alleged loss of the plaintiff in the instant
case.46
We are not persuaded.
Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred."47 Thus,
there is an efficient supervening event if the event breaks the
sequence leading from the cause to the ultimate result. To determine
the proximate cause of a controversy, the question that needs to be
asked is: If the event did not happen, would the injury have resulted?
If the answer is NO, then the event is the proximate cause.
In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had not issued the
check payment, the money represented by the check would still be
lost because of Metrobank’s negligence in indorsing the check
without verifying the genuineness of the indorsement thereon.
Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
provides:
Section 66. Liability of general indorser.—Every indorser who
indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in
due course;
a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b)
and (c) of the next preceding section; and
b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid
and subsisting;
And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be
accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be according to its tenor,
and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on
dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder,
or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.
Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so forth.—Every
person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified
indorsement, warrants:
a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it
purports to be;
b) That he has a good title of it;
c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair
the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.
But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in
favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee.
The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not apply to
persons negotiating public or corporation securities, other than bills
and notes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The warranty "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what
it purports to be" covers all the defects in the instrument affecting the
validity thereof, including a forged indorsement. Thus, the last
indorser will be liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable
instrument even if a previous indorsement was forged. We held in a
line of cases that "a collecting bank which indorses a check bearing
a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees
all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement itself, and
ultimately should be held liable therefor."48
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions. One such
exception is when the issuance of the check itself was attended with
negligence. Thus, in the cases cited above where the collecting bank
is generally held liable, in two of the cases where the checks were
negligently issued, this Court held the institution issuing the check
just as liable as or more liable than the collecting bank.
In isolated cases where the checks were deposited in an account
other than that of the payees on the strength of forged indorsements,
we held the collecting bank solely liable for the whole amount of the
checks involved for having indorsed the same. In Republic Bank v.
Ebrada,49 the check was properly issued by the Bureau of Treasury.
While in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco de Oro)
v. Equitable Banking Corporation,50 Banco de Oro admittedly issued
the checks in the name of the correct payees. And in Traders Royal
Bank v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,51 the checks were issued at
the request of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. from Traders Royal
Bank.1avvphi1
However, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we
said that the drawee bank is liable for 60% of the amount on the face
of the negotiable instrument and the collecting bank is liable for 40%.
We also noted the relative negligence exhibited by two banks, to wit:
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an
impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It
was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which
resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. While it is true that
petitioner BPI’s negligence may have been the proximate cause of
the loss, respondent CBC’s negligence contributed  equally to the
success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged
checks. Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the
Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its
losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.
(See Phoenix Construction Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Courts, 148
SCRA 353 [1987]).
Considering the comparative negligence of the two (2) banks, we
rule that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating
the loss of P2,413,215.16 and the costs of the arbitration proceeding
in the amount of P7,250.00 and the cost of litigation on a 60-40
ratio.52
Similarly, we ruled in Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals that the
issuing institution and the collecting bank should equally share the
liability for the loss of amount represented by the checks concerned
due to the negligence of both parties:
The Court finds as reasonable, the proportionate sharing of fifty
percent-fifty percent (50%-50%). Due to the negligence of the
Province of Tarlac in releasing the checks to an unauthorized person
(Fausto Pangilinan), in allowing the retired hospital cashier to receive
the checks for the payee hospital for a period close to three years
and in not properly ascertaining why the retired hospital cashier was
collecting checks for the payee hospital in addition to the hospital’s
real cashier, respondent Province contributed to the loss amounting
to P203,300.00 and shall be liable to the PNB for fifty (50%) percent
thereof. In effect, the Province of Tarlac can only recover fifty percent
(50%) of P203,300.00 from PNB.
The collecting bank, Associated Bank, shall be liable to PNB for fifty
(50%) percent of P203,300.00. It is liable on its warranties as
indorser of the checks which were deposited by Fausto Pangilinan,
having guaranteed the genuineness of all prior indorsements,
including that of the chief of the payee hospital, Dr. Adena Canlas.
Associated Bank was also remiss in its duty to ascertain the
genuineness of the payee’s indorsement.53
A reading of the facts of the two immediately preceding cases would
reveal that the reason why the bank or institution which issued the
check was held partially liable for the amount of the check was
because of the negligence of these parties which resulted in the
issuance of the checks.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly found Allied negligent in
issuing the manager’s check and in transmitting it to Santos without
even a written authorization.54 In fact, Allied did not even ask for the
certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio
Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both
actions could have prevented the whole fraudulent transaction from
unfolding. Allied’s negligence must be considered as the proximate
cause of the resulting loss.
To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence due from a financial
institution, the check would not have been issued and no loss of
funds would have resulted. In fact, there would have been no
issuance of indorsement had there been no check in the first place.
The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent with that of Metrobank
as the last indorser of the check. When Metrobank indorsed the
check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations55 without
verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement and when it
accepted the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked
payable to payee’s account only,56 its negligent and cavalier
indorsement contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio Wan’s
money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the relative participation
of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot be
adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of
Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.
FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in
the forgery of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement, can raise the real defense
of forgery as against both banks.57
As to Producers Bank, Allied Bank’s argument that Producers Bank
must be held liable as employer of Santos under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code is erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to the vicarious liability of
an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such
provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103
of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on the
part of the employer for the civil aspect of the criminal act of the
employee is based on the conviction of the employee for a crime.
Here, there has been no conviction for any crime.
As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of
Producers Bank, the same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its
petition that Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever
judgment that may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the
Civil Code, which provides: "Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just
cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him."1avvphi1
The above provision of law was clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we
ruled that "[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains
a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience."58
In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust
enrichment, thus: "Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust
enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such
benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another."59
In the instant case, Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in Allied
Bank was pre-terminated and withdrawn without her consent.
Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in
Producers Bank’s account in Metrobank without any justification. In
other words, there is no reason that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans’
placement should be deposited in FCC’s account purportedly as
payment for FCC’s money market placement and interest in
Producers Bank.lavvphil With such payment, Producers Bank’s
indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby benefitting the
former. Clearly, Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the
expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and circumstances of
the case, Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for
the amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.
It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank,
should be considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be
remembered that FCC’s money market placement with Producers
Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Bank’s
payment thereof was justified. FCC was entitled to such payment. As
earlier stated, the fact that the indorsement on the check was forged
cannot be raised against FCC which was not a part in any stage of
the negotiation of the check. FCC was not unjustly enriched.
From the facts of the instant case, we see that Santos could be the
architect of the entire controversy. Unfortunately, since summons
had not been served on Santos, the courts have not acquired
jurisdiction over her.60 We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in
the instant case.
Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank
for the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which Allied and
Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion
of 60:40.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 18,
1998 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 and the November 15,
1993 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 6757 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
Thus, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED, the fallo of which is
reproduced, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing
defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%)
percent and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company forty (40%) of the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12%
interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be
paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation and
defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the
same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Additionally and by way of MODIFICATION, Producers Bank is
hereby ordered to pay Allied and Metrobank the aforementioned
amounts. The liabilities of the parties are concurrent and
independent of each other.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183984               April 13, 2011
ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner, 
vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C.
LINDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008
Decision2 and the 4 August 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals’ Decision, are as
follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo
Flores (petitioner) amounting to ₱400,000 payable on 1 December
1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in
case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of
Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively,
respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note5and the Deed for
herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All
checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents. The case was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 (RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The
RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without
the consent and authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33 noted that
the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated 4 November
1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded
from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action
against her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the place
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8
January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of
merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
with Damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42
(RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that it only
amounted to ₱340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was
not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without
Enrico’s signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case
on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping,
invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005,
respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the
motion to dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res judicata will not
apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of the
same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action
and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February 2006, the
RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents’ motion. The RTC, Branch 42
ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did
not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan petitioner
extended to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22
July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the rule admits
of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42
acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents’ motion
to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of
the others. The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a
note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action
against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the
suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either
a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to
pay her obligation and he could not split the single cause of action by
filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By
filing a petition for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the Court
of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal
action to recover the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection
of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action
against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.10 The
mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for
collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on
the mortgage security.11 An election of the first bars recourse to the
second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the
debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the
location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the
parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by
itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage,
he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice
versa.14 The Court explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other
words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By
such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for
each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to
bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the
debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues
his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for deficiency judgment,
in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the
deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action
undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or
the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of
election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property, would
result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano
v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v.
San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the
vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the
residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the
property lies.15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit
and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be
authorized plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
costs to the court and with so much vexation and oppressiveness to
the debtor.16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes
into consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC,
Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure
because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without
Enrico’s consent. The RTC, Branch 33 stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who
has the burden of proving his cause of action. On the other hand,
said circumstances tend to support the claim of defendant Edna
Lindo that her husband did not consent to the mortgage of their
conjugal property and that the loan application was her personal
decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed
by defendant Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of her
husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void
pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the
₱400,000 loan plus interest which he extended to defendant Edna
Lindo. He can institute a personal action against the defendant for
the amount due which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides at the election of the plaintiff in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no
jurisdiction to try such personal action.17
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the
loan. She claimed, however, that her husband did not give his
consent and that he was not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the
RTC, Branch 33 held that petitioner could still recover the amount
due from Edna through a personal action over which it had no
jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna (RTC, Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the
Real Estate Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without the consent
of her husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their
conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must
be consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case,
the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the
husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this
case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special
power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to
retroact to October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously
made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan
however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage.
Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which
it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void. That obligation
matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the
stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what
is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special
remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the
principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as
evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the
amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority
or consent of petitioner’s spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on
the principal contract of loan however subsists notwithstanding the
illegality of the real estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Edna’s liability is not affected by
the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the
rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal
partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family
Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state
that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of
Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the
SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the
decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become
final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief.
The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal
action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence
on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the
loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may
institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt
or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the
remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of
a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.  22 was in
effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-
debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that
respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the loan,
applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience."23 The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or
justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another.241avvphi1
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without
just cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case
considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and
the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was
declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she
raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when
she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93.
Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he
should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it
had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might
have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against
unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the
procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the
assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she
claimed it only amounted to ₱340,000. Edna should not be allowed
to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the
two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed.
Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses
before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her
indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003
are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is
directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179736               June 26, 2013
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, 
vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN
CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for one's personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11,
2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28,
against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of
land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of
petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005,
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent
to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras
facing petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their
employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures
of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of
respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they
did not install the video surveillance cameras,16nor did they order
their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction.17 They
also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the
application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and
approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at
₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are
hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that
they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of
petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back
where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance
of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the
road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the
same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance
with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition
for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed
to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA
explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the
controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since
respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have
installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders
of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are
not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The
assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued
by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
I.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED
18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT
THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND
THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y
WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
III.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO
DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY
UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
IV.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE
PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED
15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X
X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of
petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the
proper parties to this suit.
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction because respondents’ installation of a
stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving
camera covering a significant portion of the same property
constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into
the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to
the privacy of another’s residence, petitioners opine that it includes
business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it
is still covered by the said provision.37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this
case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the
same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real
owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were
installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.39
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that
petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property
involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that
they had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance
cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the
building,41as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were
wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws.
It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is
the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to
live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right
to privacy is "the right to be let alone."47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and
protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the
State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses.
No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need
and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can
disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against
abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his
right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It
includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively
into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The
phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however,
does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s
residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence is
entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter
may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right
to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
The "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v.
Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence,
the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places
where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent
of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was
obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy
of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different
from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200
or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary
Injunction, ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for
a temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a
revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated
the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent
lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents’ property or the
roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources,
Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of
petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner
Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was
set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his
property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory
of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the
back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera
should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Respondents’ camera cannot be made to extend the view to
petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection
of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property
owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering
a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation
of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking
cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here,
there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the
CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive
writ.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the
proper parties to this suit.
A real party defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation
to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s
act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former."57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA
reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not
have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning,
however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the
registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that
they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the
video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could
be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of
the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that
when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he
immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to
care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents
before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has
already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these
factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the
proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned
corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their
claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to
enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap
inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-
up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October
18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo
would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed
and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of
respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that
respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a
shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing,
we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005
and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285               September 11, 2013
UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J.
MARTINEZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH
168, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 192073
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, in her capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 60 and UNICAPITAL, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari1 assailing separate issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA)
as follows:
(a) The petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 filed by
Unicapital, Inc., (Unicapital), Unicapital Realty, Inc. (URI),
and Unicapital Director and Treasurer Jaime J. Martirez
(Martirez)assail the CA’s Joint Decision2 dated October 20,
2005 and Resolution3 dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 64019and 64451 which affirmed the Resolution4 dated
September 14,1999 and Order5 dated February 15, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68
(RTC-Pasig City) in SCA No. 1759, upholding the denial of
their motion to dismiss; and
(b) The petition in G.R. No. 192073 filed by Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. (Consing, Jr.) assails the CA’s Decision6dated
September 30, 2009 and Resolution7 dated April 28, 2010
inCA-G.R. SP No. 101355 which affirmed the Orders dated
July16, 20078 and September 4, 20079 of the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 60 (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 99-
1418,upholding the denial of his motion for consolidation.
The Facts
In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia
Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an ₱18,000,000.00 loan from
Unicapital,₱12,000,000.00 of which was acquired on July 24, 1997
and the remaining₱6,000,000.00 on August 1, 1997. The said loan
was secured by Promissory Notes10 and a Real Estate
Mortgage11 over a 42,443 square meter-parcel of land located at
Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of Dela Cruz as per Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 (subject property).12 Prior to
these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company,
was already interested to develop the subject property into a
residential subdivision.13 In this regard, PBI entered into a joint
venture agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate
development arm, URI. In view of the foregoing, the loan and
mortgage over the subject property was later on modified into an
Option to Buy Real Property14 and, after further negotiations, Dela
Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For this
purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.15
Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the
subject property for a consideration of ₱21,221,500.00 (against
which Dela Cruz’s outstanding loan obligations were first offset),
while PBI bought the remaining half for the price of
₱21,047,000.00.16 In this relation, Dela Cruz caused TCT No. T-
687599 to be divided into three separate titles as follows: (a) TCT
No. T-851861 for URI;17 (b) TCT No. T-851862 for PBI;18 and (c)TCT
No. T-51863 which was designated as a road lot.19 However, even
before URI and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their
names, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed
Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject property as
evidenced by TCT No.T-114708;20 that they did not sell the subject
property; and that Dela Cruz’s title, i.e., TCT No. T-687599, thereto
was a mere forgery.21 Prompted by Teng and Yu’s assertions, PBI
conducted further investigations on the subject property which later
revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious origin. Based
on this finding, PBI and Unicapital sent separate demand letters22 to
Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the purchase price
they had paid for the subject property.
From the above-stated incidents stemmed the present controversies
as detailed hereunder.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285
On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a
Complex Action for Declaratory Relief23 and later amended to
Complex Action for Injunctive Relief24 (Consing, Jr.’s complaint)
before the RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI
General Manager Mariano Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz and Does
1-20, docketed as SCA No. 1759. In his complaint, Consing, Jr.
claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him
by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the purchase price they had
paid for the subject property constituted harassment and oppression
which severely affected his personal and professional life.25 He also
averred that he was coerced to commit a violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 2226 as Unicapital and PBI, over threats of filing
acase against him, kept on forcing him to issue a post-dated check in
the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge
that he had no funds for the same.27 He further alleged that
Unicapital and URI required him to sign blank deeds of sale and
transfers without cancelling the old one sin violation of the laws on
land registration and real estate development.28 Likewise, Consing,
Jr. added that Unicapital and PBI’s representatives were" speaking
of him in a manner that was inappropriate and libelous,"29 and that
some John Does "deliberately engaged in a fraudulent scheme to
compromise Consing, Jr.’s honor, integrity and fortune x x x
consisting of falsifying or causing to be falsified, or attempting to
present as falsified certain transfers of Land Titles and Deeds for
profit,"30 classifying the foregoing as ultra vires acts which should
warrant sanctions under the corporation law, Revised Securities Act
and related laws.31 Accordingly, Consing, Jr. prayed that: (a) he be
declared as a mere agent of Dela Cruz, and as such, devoid of any
obligation to Unicapital, URI, and PBI for the transactions entered
into concerning the subject property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be
enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from speaking about
him in a derogatory fashion; and (c) Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him
actual and consequential damages in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00,
moral damages of at least ₱1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of
₱1,000,000.00, all per month, reckoned from May 1, 1999 and until
the controversy is resolved, and attorney's fees and costs of suit.32
For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed
separate Motions to Dismiss33 Consing, Jr.’s complaint (Unicapital, et
al.’s motion to dismiss) on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, considering that: (a) no document was attached against which
Consing, Jr. supposedly derived his right and against which his rights
may be as certained; (b) the demands to pay against Consing, Jr.
and for him to tender post-dated checks to cover the amount due
were well within the rights of Unicapital as an unpaid creditor, as
Consing, Jr. had already admitted his dealings with them; (c) the
utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out in the
complaint; and (d) the laws supposedly violated were not properly
identified. Moreover, Unicapital, et al. posited that the RTC-PasigCity
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing, Jr.
failed to pay the proper amount of docket fees. In the same vein,
they maintained that the RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction over their
supposed violations of the Corporation Code and Revised Securities
Act, which, discounting its merits, should have been supposedly
lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, they
pointed out that Consing, Jr.’s complaint suffers from a defective
verification and, thus, dismissible.34
Similar to Unicapital et al.’s course of action, PBI and its General
Manager, Martinez (Unicapital and PBI, et al.), sought the dismissal
of Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the ground that it does not state a
cause of action. They also denied having singled out Consing, Jr.
because their collection efforts were directed at both Consing, Jr.
and Dela Cruz, which should be deemed as valid and, therefore,
should not be restrained.35
On September 14, 1999, the RTC-Pasig City issued a
Resolution36 denying the above mentioned motions to dismiss,
holding that Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
ruled that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like
Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge from the courts. It also
noted that the elements of libel in a criminal case are not the same
as those for a civil action founded on the provisions of the Civil Code,
and therefore, necessitates a different treatment. It equally refused to
dismiss the action on the ground of non-payment of docket fees,
despite Consing, Jr.’s escalated claims for damages therein, as
jurisdiction was already vested in it upon the filing of the original
complaint. Moreover, it resolved to apply the liberal construction rule
as regards the subject complaint’s verification and certification,
despite its improper wording, considering further that such defect
was not raised at the first opportunity. Consequently, it ordered
Unicapital and PBI, et al. to file their Answer and, in addition, to
submit" any Comment or Reaction within five (5) days from receipt
hereof on the allegations of Consing, Jr. in his rejoinder of
September 9, 1999regarding the supposed filing of an identical case
in Makati City,"37 i.e., Civil Case No. 99-1418. Unperturbed,
Unicapital and PBI, et al. moved for reconsideration therefrom which
was, however, denied by the RTC-Pasig City in an Order38 dated
February 15, 2001 for lack of merit. Aggrieved, they elevated the
denial of their motions to dismiss before the CA via a petition for
certiorari and prohibition,39 docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64019 and
64451.
On October 20, 2005, the CA rendered a Joint Decision40 holding
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC-Pasig
City in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint.1âwphi1 At the
outset, it ruled that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is
a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment will not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case. In this regard, it considered that
should there be any deficiency in the payment of such fees, the
same shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.41 It also refused
to dismiss the complaint for lack of proper verification upon a finding
that the copy of the amended complaint submitted to the RTC-Pasig
City was properly notarized.42 Moreover, it upheld the order of the
RTC-Pasig City for Unicapital and PBI, et al. to submit their comment
due to the alleged existence of a similar case filed before the RTC-
Makati City.43
Anent the substantive issues of the case, the CA concurred with the
RTC-Pasig City that Consing Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action.
It found that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s purportedly abusive manner
in enforcing their claims against Consing, Jr. was properly
constitutive of a cause of action as the same, if sufficiently proven,
would have subjected him to "defamation of his name in business
circles, the threats and coercion against him to reimburse the
purchase price, fraud and falsification and breach of fiduciary
obligation." It also found that the fact that Consing Jr.'s complaint
contains "nebulous" allegations will not warrant its dismissal as any
vagueness therein can be clarified through a motion for a bill of
particulars."44 Furthermore, it noted that Consing, Jr. does not seek
to recover his claims against any particular provision of the
corporation code or the securities act but against the actions of
Unicapital and PBI, et al.; hence, Consing, Jr.’s complaint was
principally one for damages over which the RTC has jurisdiction,
and, in turn, there lies no misjoinder of causes of action.45
Dissatisfied, only Unicapital, et al. sought reconsideration therefrom
but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution46 dated October
25,2006. Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari in G.R.
Nos.175277 and 175285.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073
On the other hand, on August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a
complaint47 for sum of money with damages against Consing, Jr. and
Dela Cruz before the RTC-Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-1418, seeking to recover (a) the amount of ₱42,195,397.16,
representing the value of their indebtedness based on the
Promissory Notes (subject promissory notes) plus interests; (b)
₱5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) attorney's fees; and (d)
costs of suit.48
PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment against
Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC of Manila, Branch 12,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, also predicated on the same
set of facts as above narrated.49 In its complaint, PBI prayed that it
be allowed to recover the following: (a) ₱13,369,641.79, representing
the total amount of installment payments made as actual damages
plus interests; (b) ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c)
₱200,000.00 as moral damages; (d) attorney's fees; and (e) costs of
suit.50 Civil Case No. 99-95381 was subsequently consolidated with
SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.51
For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 99-
1418 which was, however, denied by the RTC-Makati City in an
Order52 dated November 16, 1999. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for
Consolidation53 (motion for consolidation) of Civil Case No. 99-1418
with his own initiated SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig
City.
In an Order54 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC-Makati City dismissed
Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation and, in so doing, ruled that the
cases sought to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of
action and the reliefs sought for by Consing, Jr. from the RTC-Pasig
City will not bar Unicapital from pursuing its money claims against
him. Moreover, the RTC-Makati City noted that Consing, Jr. filed his
motion only as an after thought as it was made after the mediation
proceedings between him and Unicapital failed. Consing, Jr.'s motion
for reconsideration therefrom was denied in an Order55 dated
September 4, 2007. Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101355, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC-Makati City in refusing to
consolidate Civil Case No. 99-1418 with SCA No. 1759 in Pasig City.
On September 30, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision56 sustaining the
Orders dated July 16, 2007 and September 4, 2007 of the RTC-
Makati City which denied Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation. It
held that consolidation is a matter of sound discretion on the part of
the trial court which could be gleaned from the use of the word "may"
in Section 1, Rule38 of the Rules of Court. Considering that
preliminary steps (such as mediation) have already been undertaken
by the parties in Civil Case No.99-1418 pending before the RTC-
Makati City, its consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the
RTC-Pasig City "would merely result in complications in the work of
the latter court or squander the resources or remedies already
utilized in the Makati case."57 Moreover, it noted that the records of
the consolidated Pasig and Manila cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and
Civil Case No. 99-95381, respectively, had already been elevated to
the Court, that joint proceedings have been conducted in those
cases and that the pre-trial therein had been terminated as early as
October 23, 2007.Therefore, due to these reasons, the consolidation
prayed for would be impracticable and would only cause a
procedural faux pas. Undaunted, Consing, Jr. filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom but was denied by the CA in a
Resolution58 dated April 28, 2010. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No. 192073.
The Proceedings Before the Court
After the filing of the foregoing cases, the parties were required to file
their respective comments and replies. Further, considering that G.R.
No.192073 (Makati case) involves the same parties and set of facts
with those in G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 (Pasig case), these cases
were ordered consolidated per the Court's Resolution59 dated
November 17, 2010. On March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to give
due course to the instant petitions and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.60
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues in these cases are as follows: (a) in G.R.
Nos.175277 and 175285, whether or not the CA erred in upholding
the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss;
and (b) in G.R. No. 192073, whether or not the CA erred in upholding
the RTC-Makati City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for
consolidation.
The Court’s Ruling
A. Propriety of the denial of
Unicapital, et al.’s motion to
dismiss and ancillary issues.
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.61 It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.62 In
this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of
action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.63 Thus, if the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of
the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.64 As edified in
the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro,65 citing
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited. v.
Catalan66 (HSBC):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether
the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment
upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not
the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it
should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendants.67 (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an
analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of
action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it
be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a
ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 1668 of the
Rules of Court(Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal
under the same rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in SCA
No.1759 properly states a cause of action since the allegations there
insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26
of the Civil Code.
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations
which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital
and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Among others,
the complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed
and bothered by Unicapital and PBI, et al.; x x x besieged by phone
calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them
variously, and on a continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend
to his work as an investment banker."69 In the same pleading, he also
alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding a
postdated check knowing fully well that he does not have the
necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to have them
is equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful
coercive force."70 Accordingly, these specific allegations, if
hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages
pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." As explained in the HSBC case:
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
beheld responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established,
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.71 (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for
damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
The rationale therefor was explained in the case of Manaloto v.
Veloso III,72 citing Concepcion v. CA,73 to wit:
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its
inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of
every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system
of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from
being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted
- then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind.74
To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may also lead to the
payment of moral damages under Article 2219(10)75 of the Civil
Code.
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he
has come to discover that Unicapital and PBI, et al. are speaking of
him in a manner that is inappropriate and libelous; and that they have
spread their virulent version of events in the business and financial
community such that he has suffered and continues to suffer injury
upon his good name and reputation which, after all, is the most
sacred and valuable wealth he possesses - especially considering
that he is an investment banker."76 In similar regard, the hypothetical
admission of these allegations may result into the recovery of
damages pursuant to Article 26, and even Article2219(10), of the
Civil Code.
Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.’s contention77 that the case should
be dismissed on the ground that it failed to set out the actual libelous
statements complained about cannot be given credence. These
incidents, as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the
manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. pursued their claims
against Consing, Jr. may be better ventilated during trial. It is a
standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the
allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of
the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a
mere motion to dismiss,78 as in this case. Hence, as what is only
required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the Court – in view of the above-stated
reasons – finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would
necessitate the reversal of the CA’s ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of
discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.79 This the Court does not perceive in the case at bar.
Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court
equally finds that the causes of action in SCA No. 1759 were not –
as Unicapital, et al. claim – misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred
that Unicapital and PBI, et al. violated certain provisions of the
Corporation Law and the Revised Securities Act.80
The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions
under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results in a misjoinder of causes
of action:81
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action . - A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as
he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of
the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not
seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al. liable for any specific violation
of the Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he
merely sought damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts
of making him sign numerous documents and their use of the same
against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an
injunction and damages case82 which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City.83 Therefore, there was no violation
of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof.
Besides, even on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of
causes of action, still, such defect should not result in the dismissal
of Consing, Jr.’s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly
states that a "misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and
proceeded with separately."
Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees
lead to the dismissal of his complaint.1âwphi1 It has long been
settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at
the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause
the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a
reasonable period.84 Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that
the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the
case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA85 should be
applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that
Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay
the correct amount of filing fees. As pronounced in the case of Heirs
of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:86
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment.
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs
and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply.87 (Emphasis and italics in the
original)
Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s
apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered" claim for damages to the
tune of around ₱2,000,000.00 per month88 may balloon to a rather
huge amount by the time that this case is finally disposed of, still, any
amount that may by then fall due shall be subject to assessment and
any additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien against the
judgment as explicitly provided under Section 2,89Rule 141 of the
Rules.
Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.'s complaint
was properly verified, suffice it to state that since the copy submitted
to the trial court was duly notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and
that it was only Unicapital, et al.’s copy which lacks the notarization,
then there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
rules on pleadings.90
In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in
sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital et al.’s motion to
dismiss. As such, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285
must be denied.
B. Propriety of the denial of
Consing, Jr.’s motion for
consolidation.
The crux of G.R. No. 192073 is the propriety of the RTC-Makati
City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for the consolidation of the
Pasig case, i.e., SCA No. 1759, and the Makati case, i.e., Civil Case
No. 99-1418.Records show that the CA upheld the RTC-Makati
City’s denial of the foregoing motion, finding that the consolidation of
these cases was merely discretionary on the part of the trial court. It
added that it was "impracticable and would cause a procedural faux
pas
"if it were to "allow the RTC-Pasig City to preside over the Makati
case."91
 The CA’s ruling is proper.
It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the
same parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same
must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them
promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination
of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding
the possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or
more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single
suit.92 The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which
provides:
SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.
In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e.,
SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418, although involving the
same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should
remain unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of
obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA
No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code
provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-
1418 is a collection and damages suit based on actionable
documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No.
1759 deals with whether or not Unicapital and BPI, et al, abused the
manner in which they demanded payment from Consing, Jr., while
Civil Case No. 99-1418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may
demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory
notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no practical
effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are
separate and distinct from the other.
Likewise, as the CA correctly pointed out, the RTC-Makati City could
not have been failured in retaining Civil Case No. 99-1418 in its
dockets since pre-trial procedures have already been undertaken
therein and, thus, its consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending
before the RTC-Pasig City would merely result in complications on
the part of the latter court or squander the resources or remedies
already utilized in Civil Case No. 99-1418.93 In this light, aside from
the perceived improbability of having conflicting decisions, the
consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418 would,
contrary to its objective, only delay the proceedings and entail
unnecessary costs.
All told, the Court finds the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil
Case No. 99-1418 to be improper, impelling the affirmance of the
CA’s ruling. Consequently, the petition in G.R. No. 192073 must also
be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285 and
192073 are DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ Joint
Decision dated October 20, 2005 and Resolution dated October 25,
2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64019 and 64451 and the Decision dated
September 30, 2009 and Resolution dated April 28, 2010 in CA-G.R.
No. 101355 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and
SANCHA DELMO (as private respondents), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals which afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the
West Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by
some students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late
Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended
loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the
school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was
against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as
President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she
was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she
would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner
denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the
Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13,
1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted
by one of the legal officers of this Office disclosed
the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer
of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student
organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed
Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to
disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid
and other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance
with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club,
Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club upon proper application duly
approved by the majority of the members of the
Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report
from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the
Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the
matter and having been convinced of the guilt of
Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of
the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision
in question. In justifying that Office's order or
decision, it is contended that approval by that Office
of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is
necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it
was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no
valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a
consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed
based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without
any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta
Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal
(sic), hence, she and the other students involved are
deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the
Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor
Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and
Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the
Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a
meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant
to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the
majority of the members of the Executive Board
passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution became
the basis for the extension on of loans to some
officers and members of the Club, that the Club
honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws
has been approved by the superintendent because
the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured
the President of the Club that he will cause the
approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been
inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the
Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise
allowed to cosponsor the Education Week
Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office
sustains the action taken by the Superintendent in
penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the
officers and members thereof by dropping them from
membership therein. However, this Office is
convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good
faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending
loans to the officers and members of the Student
partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the
Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need
of financial assistance and other humanitarian
purposes had been approved by the Club adviser,
Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval
was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and
extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside
from misleading the officers and members of the
Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained
why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws
of the Club to the Superintendent for approval
despite his assurance to the Club president that he
would do so. With this finding of negligence on the
part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the
performance of his duties as such, this Office
considers as too severe and unwarranted that
portion of the questioned order stating that Violeta
Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or
citation from this school or any organization in this
school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a
consistent full scholar of the school and she alone
has maintained her scholarship. The decision in
question would, therefore, set at naught all her
sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with
honors in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and
so holds and hereby directs that appellant Violeta.
M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club
members or officers involved in this case, be not
deprived of any award, citation or honor from the
school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo,
pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the
Director and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner
received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT
THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the
petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also
send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the
records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the
Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The
petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the
latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained
a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received
another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo
of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include
Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the
petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being
awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the
Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he
believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors.
The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the
school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor,
"Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in
flag action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency
of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended
and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole
and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner
and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now
petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation of Violeta
Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of
the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the
defendant who inducted the officers of the Student
Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club
was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week
Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not
approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club,
why did he induct the officers into office and allow
the Club to sponsor the Education Week
Celebration"? It was through his own act that the
students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with
the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the
assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who
made the students believe that he was acting as an
extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith
is the fact that, although, he kaew as early as April
27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he
was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept
Id information to . He told the Court that he knew
that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not
to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she
(sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter-
decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to
give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974,
testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not
be true that he has not finished reading the letter-
decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of
only three pages, and the portion which directed that
Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation
or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto
is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did
he know the last paragraph if he did not read the
letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam
had been one of bias and prejudice. When his action
would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the
utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus,
although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the
exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino,
he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is
eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On
April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him to
furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L,"
but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the
decision, since he said he mailed back the decision
on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April
29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter
that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"),
together with the record. Why a night letter when the
matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the
case, because graduation day was only four days
ahead? An examination of the telegrams sent by the
defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary
telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7").
At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of
the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should
have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors
and citation in the commencement be announced or
indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit
a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by
his own testimony despite his knowledge that his
decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her
was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his
wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that
she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974,
p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of
 Director Bernardino which the defendant received
hours before the commencement executory on May
3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino
because he said in his testimony that he would be
embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently,
he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r
Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and
wantonly disregarded by bim And certainly, not the
least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts
speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of
mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having
been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s
case smacks of contemptuous arrogance,
oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it.
He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead,
chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal,
p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo
and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for
nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of
P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this
petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question
of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts
should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went
through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but
proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of defendant's wrongly act or omission."
(People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate
omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of
the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to
enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he
received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it
back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of
it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner
should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's
father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This,
the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant bad
faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision, to
wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish
Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he could have
used his discretion and plain common sense by
informing her about it or he could have directed the
inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed
commencement program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of
Director Benardino hours before the commencement
exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior
by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with
a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he
 did so, to the prejudice of and in complete disregard
of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of
meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss Delmo,
who tried several times to see defendant in his office
thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment
and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted
with circumspection and due regard to the rights of
Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of
his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful
directive of his superior, Director Bernardino,
defendant is liable for damages in his personal
capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in
order. In the same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc.,  supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective
damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et
al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award
the spouses Delmo damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately
from and in addition to what they are already entitled
to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo.
Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral
damages are awarded to the spouses in their own
behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight
modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122150            March 17, 2003
GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U.
CARANTES, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on
certiorari, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON
AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32,
33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED
FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE
CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE
SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO
RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE
TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION
STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1
OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF
A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED
WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as
follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for damages2for the injuries and
expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent
bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.3 In answer thereto,
respondent contended that the criminal case arising from the same
incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,4had already
been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba,
Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioner’s lack of interest;5 and
that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities
of respondent.6
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated
December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not barred by the
dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to
damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing
defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff George
Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and
medical expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as
Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages,
P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as
Attorney’s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on
March 8, 1995,9 reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court,
and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make
any reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, it was
impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the
criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages,
notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it
amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the
merits. 10
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v.
Marave11 should be observed, i.e., a civil action for damages may be
filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even without
reservation to file the same has been made;12 and that the
requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial
right.13
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence,
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and governing law in this
case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
same act or omission of the accused.
...
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from
crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right
to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should be
dismissed;16 and that the reservation requirement does not impair,
diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise
in the general interest of orderly procedure.17
In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the
bus driven by Herminio Andaya that figured in a vehicular accident
with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado. The petitioner
therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for
damages filed against him in view of the pendency of the criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in
the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil
action against the petitioner or his driver. The criminal case was later
dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On
appeal, the Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent
can file a civil action for damages despite the absence of reservation;
(2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the
dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation
requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making
power of the Court.18
The Court expounded:
. . . §1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made
to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil
liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. … In other words the right of
the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be
reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the
criminal action.
...
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement
that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be
reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive
rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest
of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in
nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing
in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly
liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that
such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately.19
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary,
the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the
civil action.
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any
of these independent civil actions can be instituted and
thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or
simultaneous with the criminal action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose
of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in
"Caños v. Peralta":
‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against
oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial
court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.’20
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to
separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No.
2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be
dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever
civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted
therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14534             February 28, 1962
MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G.
Soriano for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against
the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and
Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case
No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958,
an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal
against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal
Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married
one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been
dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco
for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force
and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as
defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied
on July 7 of the same year. 1äwphï1.ñët
On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal
Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that
the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question.
Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well
as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his
arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the
present action.
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17,
1954). The prejudicial question — we further said — must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the
same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra).
These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question
for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the
evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was
involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of
the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or
innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be
no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with
respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of
said court.
In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the
defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void
and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the
civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for
bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule
when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is
void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force
and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted.
Without costs.
G.R. No. L-22579             February 23, 1968
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.  above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
          In this petition for certiorari  and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, the question before the Court is whether or not the
existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance
of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a
third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the
first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for
bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the
negative. We sustain him.
          The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On
February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge,
with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that
petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe
Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the
Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff
respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the
alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by
petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June
15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the
first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party
defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of
threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and
contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati,
Rizal.
          Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend
the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question
of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit.
Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack
of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
          In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent
Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary
injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with
the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the
answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the
amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the
Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such
amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
          Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of
that year where the statement of facts as above detailed was
admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed
upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged
as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that
"there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are
automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension
of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on
the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that
"parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty
provided for in this Article. . . ." 2
          This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in
authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in
issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be
determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action
can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We
have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second
marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil
action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The
question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a
prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the
second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede
the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court
then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the
second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid."
Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a
decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can
proceed."
          To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v.
Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have
heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a
case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further said — must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the
same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are
present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the
second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's
consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be
the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue
involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. . . ."
          The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the
petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that
two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not
petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-
party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage
with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of
respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
          Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to
indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the
first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy
was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could
thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question.
The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude
a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused,
his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by
petitioner.
          WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. 111244 December 15, 1997
ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A.
LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO
CARLOS, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which
affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 372 denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of
proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Arturo Alano" as well as his motion for
reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa.
The information3 alleges:
That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the
said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 1,172 square meters,
more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-
00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the
same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00,
sold the aforesaid property for the second time to
one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby
depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful
ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S.
Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00,
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the
ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in
another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
55103 and entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo
Alano, et. al.," concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of
possession and damages. In the aforementioned Civil Case, private
respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the
annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the
petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said
land was previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends
that he never sold the property to the private respondents and that
his signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of the
latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and
inexistent. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case
was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when
the criminal case for estafa was instituted.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion as
well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari  and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed
order.
On July 26, 1993,4 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the
same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost against
petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case
No. 55103, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the
petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of
absolute sale in favor of private respondent was a forgery, such that
there was no second sale covering the said parcel of land. Otherwise
stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to
herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of
petitioner's signature in the first deed of sale, it follows that the
criminal case for estafa would not prosper.
While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioner's claim, we
are compelled to affirm the Court of Appeal's findings.
The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action.5 In other
words, if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue
in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exists, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied.6
On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in
the case at bar, the disposition of the issue raised need not unduly
detain us. We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for
alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a civil
action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the
alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.7
Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved,
the Court of Appeals still affirmed the Order of the trial court
denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of the
proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of
facts, had already admitted during the pre-trial order dated
October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the validity of his
signature in the first deed of sale between him and the
private respondent, as well as his subsequent
acknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three (23) cash
vouchers evidencing the payments made by the private
respondent.8 Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of
Appeals that petitioner even wrote to the private respondent
offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid.9
In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subject. . . . The pre-
trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining
(b) Stipulation of facts
From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by
the parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations
constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the
parties10 and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the
introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right
to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the
exhibit.11
Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order
amounts to an admission by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of
his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true that the
right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution,12 this
right may be waived expressly or impliedly.13
Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial
question is only a procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver
by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the doctrine of
waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual
in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the
community at large.14
Accordingly, petitioner's admission in the stipulation of facts during
the pre-trial of the criminal amounts to a waiver of his defense of
forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such
waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.15 Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the
pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the rule
that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial
hearing applies.16
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137567               June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati
City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January
28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-
3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and
Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a
concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against
his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were
married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish
Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four
children,2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix
alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and
lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution
dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information6 against them. The case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including
the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing
motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the
concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated
August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes
and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an
Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued
another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage
and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court
might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the
possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage
can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court
rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason
of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has
never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted
in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the
civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of
said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas,
for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where
a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as
well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his
marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and
void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs.  Relova 1 cited
in Donato vs.  Luna 14 where this Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material
to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does
not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse
the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August
1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the
Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were
married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live
together after the marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on
April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was
subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain
Julieta Santella (Santella).4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent
sometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s
marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on
August 9, 1990.5 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
90-14409.6
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon
City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private
respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He
alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another
man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case
against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective
engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of
immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other
despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner
was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner,
private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by
stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion
to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity
towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order
dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be
granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima
facie case against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s
motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.10
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge,
Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity
towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due
process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and]
demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3)
disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for
judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a
criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of
an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.11
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC
(PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his
engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the
proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case
for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of
Quezon City.12 When the Board denied the said motion in its Order
dated July 16, 1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely
abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the
annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative
case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of
proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory
petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for
bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not
allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the
PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative
proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of
facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 26178.14
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose
from the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered
the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate
court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to
petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court
judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled
that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on
the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.15 The Court
of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to
evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive
grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was
able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of
bigamy.16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial
question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed
since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature,
and the other action involved is a civil case.17
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR
IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL
ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of
the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for
revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board
moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial
question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and
rules.20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.21 The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of
the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against
private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would
necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said
civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.23Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to
private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the
criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their
marriage was void ab initio  would necessarily absolve him from
criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs.
Mendoza24 and  People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is
void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time
of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988.
Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the
law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.26 In Landicho
vs. Relova,27 we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption of marriage exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give
rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law,
still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the
suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board.
As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a
civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no
prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is
civil.29
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly
provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be
suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil
case against the respondent involving the same facts as the
administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or
an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee
or registered professional involving the same facts as in the
administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither
suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall
proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall
render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of
the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative
complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the
alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella.
Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure
to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as
father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the
benefit of marriage.30 The existence of these other charges justified
the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal
case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable
doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract
between him and private respondent was not presented, the
signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no
showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with.
He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract
between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he
signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness
presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in
by him ever took place.31
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion.32 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its
denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution
established a prima facie  case for bigamy against the petitioner; and
second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to
justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court
will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s
evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not
yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case
against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in
his defense.34
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s
misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of
the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was
already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense
charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the
RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but
merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence
to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to
resolve the case.35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima
facie  case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had
presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner
had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents
evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.36 Said
declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement
of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the
trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present
evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case
based on the evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said
judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances.
First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the
proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory
and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had
not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that
he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for
trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay
the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate
to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he
was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same.
According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards
petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the
grant of his motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by
petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the
latter was biased and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38this Court held that while bias and
prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary
inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule
is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias
and partiality.39
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to
inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay
within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law
states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing
and deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge
in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the
propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was
deprived a fair and impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge
Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against
petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and
impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of
petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the
demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that
petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim
that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial.
Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel
to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by
unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty
to disposing of the court’s business promptly.41
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124498            October 5, 2001
EDDIE B. SABANDAL, petitioner,  funds and/or account closed. Consequently, respondent made oral
vs.
HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 42, and PHILIPPINES
TODAY, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42,1 where petitioner Eddie B.
Sabandal is charged with eleven counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.2
The Facts
On February 18, 1989, Eddie B. Sabandal entered into a
memorandum of agreement on dealership with respondent
Philippines Today, Inc. for the distribution of the newspaper
Philippines Today, (now Philippine Star) in Bacolod City and in
designated towns in Negros Occidental.3
Under the agreement, petitioner shall pay for an equivalent amount
of one month of deliveries in advance within the first seven days of
the succeeding month. Petitioner's allowable percentage of return
shall be 10% and be entitled to a rebate of P0.15 per copy sold.
After execution of the agreement, respondent Philippines Today, Inc.
made regular deliveries of the agreed copies of the newspaper to
petitioner.
In order to make partial payments for the deliveries, on December
18, 1990 to April 15, 1991, petitioner issued to respondent several
checks amounting to ninety thousand (P90,000.00) pesos.
When respondent presented petitioner's checks to the drawee banks
for payment, the bank dishonored the checks for insufficiency of
and written demands for petitioner to make good the checks.
However, petitioner failed to pay despite demands.
In December 1992, on the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by
respondent Philippines Today, Inc., assistant city prosecutor of
Manila Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila eleven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 against petitioner.4
Three years later, or on October 11, 1995, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Negros Occidental at Himamaylan, a complaint
against Philippines Today, Inc. for specific performance, recovery of
overpayment and damages.5
On October 11, 1995, petitioner also filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 42, a motion to suspend trial in the criminal
cases against him based on a prejudicial question.6
On November 27, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to
suspend trial based on a prejudicial question.7
On December 20, 1995, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion
for reconsideration of the denial.8
On January 9, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration.9
Hence, this petition.10
The Issue
The issue raised is whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant
the suspension of the trial of the criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner until after the resolution of the
civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and
damages.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.11
"A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused."12
"For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1) the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal."13
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one
is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied.14 It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.15 If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil
case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,"
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.16 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other.17
In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued
worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages is whether complainant
Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. If, after
trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid
respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the
bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the
checks is itself an offense.18
The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a
civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages did
not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal cases for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate
that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the
criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil
action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in
the criminal cases.
Petitioner's claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a
defense during the trial of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil action for recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal
action.19 Hence, petitioner may invoke all defenses pertaining to his
civil liability in the criminal action.20
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit. The Court directs the Regional Trial Court, Manila to proceed
with the trial of the criminal cases against petitioner with all judicious
dispatch in accordance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.21
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,  marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE
FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a
criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of
Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The
respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23,
1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal
Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to
Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private
respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was
docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on
the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the
no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a
certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's
answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's
consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent
or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived
together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by
a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which
reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant
to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No.
43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said
case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment
of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before
the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the
motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for
bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in
the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the
proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru
counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings
the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent
judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied
in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a
case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure  of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at
bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is
not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent
was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage
should have been declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the
civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine
elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied
to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that
his act in the second marriage must be involuntary
and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact
that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second
spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that
 petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging
that his marriage with her should be declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was
null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the
fact would not be material to the outcome of the
case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The lower court therefore, has not abused much less
gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend
the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his
consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of
De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the
one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the
case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was
accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed.
Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the
present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage
was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already
rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was
null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no
such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner
Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case
for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved
that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by
means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as
such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question
to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal
that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he
had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband
and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both
petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated
that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital
union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the
fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on
September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the
use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978,
when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen
that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no
pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-
02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be
undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the
order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159218             March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS
ABUNADO, Petitioners, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which
affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting
petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married
Narcisa Arceño at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro
Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the
Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having
an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City
cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on
January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a
certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in
San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador
against Narcisa.4 On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by
Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24,
1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and
has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It
appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage
so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request
of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador
Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as
to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of
age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First,  he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that
the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should
have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.8 It is required that the acts and
omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged
in the Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts
alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the
offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental
that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged
in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the
definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another
woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the
Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally
married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967
which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to
Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989which has all the
essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or
about and sometime in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious
typographical error, for the same information clearly states that
petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas
Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore,
that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a
judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence
during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.12 It
should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the
requisites for validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object
to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only
raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
Second,  petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to
Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of
complainant when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same
was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But
then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal
action considering that a crime is committed against the State and
the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not
only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited
citizen who may come to know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of
nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings
in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the
pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on
October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that
an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both
the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was
improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by
the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of
age,21 which is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its
minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to
eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be taken from prision
correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S.
Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184861               June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,  Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A.
FAMINI, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the
August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed
the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.
Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,
Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,
20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against
private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-
2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for
violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on
February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint
dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case
was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed
as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the
criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and
issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the
issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the
criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to
Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds
that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission
of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is
that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the
nullification of the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of
BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the
herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause,
since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any
time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May
13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated
August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence
of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a
"previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the
conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence
of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal
proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was
instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal
action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any
less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED
TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON
THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO.
LP-06-0197.11
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988,
the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,
Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a
prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in
Beltran v. People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
however, became effective and the above provision was amended by
Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to
create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it
must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the
filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to
guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil
action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the
proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to
mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed
either before the institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that
there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court
and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have
presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded
the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change
in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously
instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action
involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action.
This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
"subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no
other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their
petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their
omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final
judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as
that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a
decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this
case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in
Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute
should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is
consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus
est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly
conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that
resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would
harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted
civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of
the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion
to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary
investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the
investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule
111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary
investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order
to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant
case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent
move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence
of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to
delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed
involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and
damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the
civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate
that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the
criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil
action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in
the criminal cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the
criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent
allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth
noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2
½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than
three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of
the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a
mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed
for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus,
private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not 
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the
criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that
would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question,
as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case.
Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction
agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract
would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a
criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable
under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to
support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued
for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the
crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the
agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v.
People,22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is
the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was
issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for
which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the
framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless
check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we
ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance
of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to
wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for
value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of
a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed
that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit
or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor,
or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an
obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the
contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks
in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest
from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This
is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That
there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred
on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner
was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989,
cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista
or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act
of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because
the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the
construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private
respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private
respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of
prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the
existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in
the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may
proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the
RTC, Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October
16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the
MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue
with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, 
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo)
for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding
that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and
whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial
Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005
Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the
Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005
Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced
the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other
hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated
parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the
Court of Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt
on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-
04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was
served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4
November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111
of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
 Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue
is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still
be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
accused would necessarily be determined.11
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the
Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
element in the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, concerned."19
or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court
crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in
of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed
the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt
case.
or innocence of the accused.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166836               September 4, 2013
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, 
vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO
B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS,
STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M.
MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE,
AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance
brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to
deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is
properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground
of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical
antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased
in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes),
then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its
duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345
square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00. The
transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.3 The
TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were
fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of
the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters
purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and
for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20
TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale
because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at
the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as
receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989
pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus,
on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit
in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las
Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with
non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section
39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-
11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its
favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-
2256,7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San
Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel
Properties’ claim was not legally demandable because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and
1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation
receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale
conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized;
(c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF
Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was
essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in
order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free
from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder
the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were
under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings,
necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed
in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to
suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas,8 citing the pendency of
BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition,
BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September
12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27,
2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a
motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
intervening termination of the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its
resolution,10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action
could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC
that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question
necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the
issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined
by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be
no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual
signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel
Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000,
holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable
for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957
without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions;
and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did
not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the
titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las
Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary
denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City
Prosecutor concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation
of PD 957, there is still pending with the Housing and Land Use
Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific
performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and
rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in
question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF
Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA
72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices
under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union
Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29,
1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules
on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with
specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes
in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally
respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words,
complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such
time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity of
the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for
reconsideration.13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to
the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008),
contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave
abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors
and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not
HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial
question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’
petition, holding and ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule
on prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions
only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs.
Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an
administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the
resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the
suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative
proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme
Court relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court
similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed
petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should the
demolition of private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a
result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil
action involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial
question which must be resolved prior to an administrative
proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that
in the interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case
pending determination of another case closely interrelated or
interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of
discretion x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to
the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of
the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes,
Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of
private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising
from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in
the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB
proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private
respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we
were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to
delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the
ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents
for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not under
any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by herein public
respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public
prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him.
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor
prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated
15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on
January 18, 2005.16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the
following for consideration and resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND
DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS
FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO
PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS
MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS
DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203,
ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR
REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES
CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39,
PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF
RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE
SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION,
TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH
CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA
NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID
PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURB’S RULING IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY
ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED.17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for
specific performance and damages that San Miguel Properties
instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002,
the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the
proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s
authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because
the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the
determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the
HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB
Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB
Arbiter’s decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could
arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other
administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the
cases pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in
the interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the
Office of the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in
suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed
the HLURB Board’s ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance
under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 – "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."
As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the
authority of the HLURB, as successor agency of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation
to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases "involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots
… against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the
HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions,
"must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the
parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever
appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for
some forum to decide – if ever one is forthcoming – the issue on the
authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily
resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon
having been joined and the respective position papers and the
evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved
the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the right and
obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the
obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile
Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of
others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed
to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether
or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the
question of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction
with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on the
rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether
or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC
resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty.
Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
83631,20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction
over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision
and ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further
proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the
HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB
has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling
the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURB’s
competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB
should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be
remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take
under the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the
proper presentation of evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the dismissal of San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable
cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case
brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to
suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’
posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the
HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential
elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a
criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission
that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no
civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the
action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the
charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524of Presidential Decree
No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted
elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action
was exclusive and original.25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be
suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the
facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance
case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint
for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the
question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of
the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the
exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was
made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party
bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific
performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal
ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either
case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific
performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded,
Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal
obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code
which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied
only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the
contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the
injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one,
contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is
granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the
rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment
of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that
regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of
the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the
basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming
magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free
from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957
authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and
license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure
to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines
and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its
provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance
in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties
was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs,
while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’
directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20
TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of
the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not
entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not
have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the
criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with
the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is
enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of
the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a
single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its
case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground
of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case
pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no
consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific
performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the
HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative
agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these
agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently
invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of
controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has
observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation
of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts
are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the
regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into
play on matters demanding the special competence of administrative
agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination
the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical
matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in
an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the
jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call
for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension
until after the matters within the competence of the administrative
body are threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot
and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the
competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having
been so placed within the special competence of the administrative
tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for
its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot
resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an
administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the
latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.33
3.
Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character
of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum
prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’
directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already
rendered the suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act
or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative
inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of
rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the
procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be given a
reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing
prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would
produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not
validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the
criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves
initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal
action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question
arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the
party who filed or initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question
makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes
no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO.
73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60544 May 19, 1984
ARSENIO FLORENDO, JR., MILAGROS FLORENDO and
BEATRIZ FLORENDO, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PERPETUA D. COLOMA, Presiding Judge of Branch VII,
City Court of Quezon City; GAUDENCIO TOBIAS, General
Manager, National Housing Authority; Registrar of Deeds for
Quezon City; WILLIAM R. VASQUEZ and ERLINDA
NICOLAS, respondents.
Emilio A. de Peralta for petitioners.
Byron S. Anastacio for respondent Vasquez.
Emilio Purunganan for respondent Nicolas.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the petitioners
seek the annulment of: (1) the May 20, 1975 decision of the
respondent court in Civil Case No. VII-17952 for ejectment
entitled Adela Salindon v. William Vasquez and Silverio Nicolas; (2)
the August 3, 1981 writ of execution issued by the respondent court;
and (3) the March 1, 1982 order also issued by the respondent court
directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annul Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 138007 in the name of Adela Salindon and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 239729 in the name of the
petitioners.
On July 11, 1969, Adela Salindon an awardee of a Philippine
Homesite and Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
PHHC) lot filed a complaint for ejectment against William Vasquez
and Silverio Nicolas with the respondent court. The disputed
residential lot, located at Diliman, Quezon City, is more particularly
described as follows:
Residential lot situated at Quezon City, Philippines,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138007,
in the name of the herein plaintiff, containing an area
of 915.00 square meters. Designated as Lot No. 1,
Block No. 101 Psd — 68808 Diliman Estate
Subdivision. Bounded on the SW-by Lot No. 2, Block
101; of the subdivision plan; on the NW-by Road Lot
8, Pcs-4564; on the NE by Road Lot 96; and on the
SE by Lot No. 12, Block 101; both of the subdivision
plan.
In her complaint, Salindon alleged that the defendants were
squatters occupying her property.
Defendant William Vasquez denied his being a squatter in the
subject parcel of land. He alleged that he had been in continuous,
open, adverse and actual possession and occupation of the lot since
1950. He also questioned the city court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action stating that the facts alleged in the complaint
involved questions of title or ownership of the lot, matters outside the
jurisdiction of the respondent court. He further questioned the
qualifications of Salindon to purchase the disputed lot from the
PHHC, as she was the owner of several other registered real estate
properties and an outsider in so far as the lot was concerned.
On March 12, 1971, defendant Silverio Nicolas died. He was
substituted by his wife Erlinda who filed an amended answer with
third party complaint against PHHC. In his answer, Nicolas had
denied that he was a squatter on the lot. He alleged that lie had been
a possessor and occupant of a piece of residential lot located at
Malaya Avenue, continuously, openly, publicly and adverse to any
other claimant and under concept of an owner for more than ten
years. Like defendant Vasquez, he also questioned the jurisdiction of
the respondent court over the subject matter of the action and the
qualifications of Salindon to purchase the subject parcel of land.
Third-Party defendant PHHC admitted the sale of the disputed land
to Adela Salindon. According to PHHC, the award of the lot to
Salindon was a valid exercise of the PHHCs powers and could not
be collaterally assailed the illegal acts of the defendants could not
ripen into legal ones; the defendants being squatters have not
acquired any vested right over the property and that, since the
subject lot is not a relocation area intended for squatters, the
defendants can not claim preference in the award of the lot. The
PHHC also questioned the jurisdiction of the city court over the third
party complaint on the following grounds: (1) cancellation of the deed
of sale executed in favor of Salindon amounts to an action for
rescission of contract which falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and (2) the action involves
title or possession of real property, hence the action against PHHC
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
After trial on the merits, the respondent court issued a decision in
favor of the defendants. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiff as follows:
(1) declaring the conditional and the absolute deeds
of sale executed by the PHHC in favor of the plaintiff
Adela Salindon as null and void; and
(2) ordering the PHHC to award the lot in litigation to
the defendant William Vasquez and Erlinda Nicolas
and, upon payment by said defendants of the total
consideration within 30 days from notice of this
decision, to execute the corresponding deed of
absolute sale in their favor.
On August 25, 1975 Adela Salindon appealed the aforequoted
decision to the Court of Appeals.
On December 11, 1976, Salindon died. There was, however, no
substitution of party, hence Salindon continued to be the appellant in
the appealed case. On March 21, 1977 the case was remanded to
the city court for the retaking of testimony which could not be
considered because the stenographic notes could not be transcribed.
The deceased Salindon continued to be an adverse party.
Meanwhile, after Salindon's death, her heirs settled her estate and
the subject lot was transferred with a new Transfer Certificate of Title
to the petitioners.
On July 31, 1980 the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution ordering
plaintiff-appellant Salindon to show cause why her appeal should not
be dismissed.
On December 4, 1980, the Court of Appeals issued another
Resolution dismissing the appeal for having been abandoned.
On August 3, 1981, respondent court issued a writ of execution to
enforce the decision.
On November 7, 1981, respondent General Manager Gaudencio
Tobias of the National Housing Authority (hereinafter referred as
NHA), successor to the powers and functions of the PHHC, wrote a
letter to private respondents informing them that the NHA was ready
to implement the decision and suggesting that in order to avoid
delay, they secure an order directing the Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 239729.
On February 16, 1982 respondent William Vasquez filed a motion for
the issuance of an order directing the Quezon City Register of Deeds
to cancel TCT No. 138007 in the name of Adela Salindon and TCT
No. 239729, in the name of petitioners. A similar motion was filed by
respondent Erlinda Nicolas.
On March 19, 1982, petitioner Arsenio Florendo, Jr., filed a
manifestation and opposition to the motions for cancellation alleging
that the court has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the titles
Hence, the instant petition.
Considering the circumstances of the case, a preliminary issue
surfaces as to the status of the decision vis-a-vis the petitioners. The
petitioners challenge the proceeding in the Court of Appeals after the
death of the plaintiff-appellant Adela Salindon. They are of the
opinion that since there was no legal representative substituted for
Salindon after her death, the appellate court lost its jurisdiction over
the case and consequently, the proceedings in the said court are null
and void. This argument is without merit.
There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a
party. The supervening death of plaintiff-appellant Salindon did not
extinguish her civil personality (Republic v. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242;
Vda. de Haberes v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534). Section 17,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased within
a period of thirty (30) days or within such time as
may be granted ...
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides:
Whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court
promptly of such death ... and to give the name and
residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representative of the deceased ...
In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December
11, 1976 failed to inform the court of Salindon's death. The appellate
court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the
death of Salindon without the proper manifestation from Salindon's
counsel. In such a case and considering that the supervening death
of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate
court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case.
There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the
case were tainted with irregularities.
It appears that the petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it
was because of this relationship that the petitioners were able to
transfer the title of Adela Salindon over the subject lot to their names.
After Salindon's death, the disputed lot was included as part of her
estate. Salindon's counsel, whose acts bind his client, failed to
comply with his duty to the court and his deceased client.
Considering all this, the appellate decision is binding and enforceable
against the petitioners as successors-in-interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action (Section 49 (b) Rule 39, Rules of
Court). Furthermore, "... judgment in an ejectment case may be
enforced not only against defendants therein but also against the
members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derived their
right of possession from the defendants" (Ariem v. De los Angeles,
49 SCRA 343). Under the circumstances of this case, the same rule
should apply to the successors-in-interest if the decision should go
against the original plaintiff.
We note, however, that the petitioners challenge the decision on the
ground that the respondent city court had no jurisdiction in the first
instance over the ejectment complaint.
In this respect, the petitioners are correct. Adela Salindon filed an
ejectment case to evict alleged squatters who were in possession of
a lot awarded to her by the PHHC. Instead of dealing with the case
as a simple one of ejectment and handling the issues within the
confines of its limited jurisdiction, the respondent city court went
further into territory out of bounds to it and cancelled the
administrative determinations of the PHHC, rescinded the deeds of
sale, usurped the powers of the administrative agency by awarding
the government lots to the defendants on the basis of evidence
clearly inadequate from the records and by the rules of the agency to
sustain such awards, conclusively adjudicated on the basis of
irregular proceedings the ownership of the disputed lot, and ordered
the cancellation of Torrens titles already issued in the petitioners'
names.
May the petitioners take advantage of this lack of jurisdiction?
As a rule, the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The time honored principle is that "... jurisdiction of a court is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of
the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal ...".(Calimlim v. Ramirez,
118 SCRA 399). This principle, however, is not absolute. There are
cases wherein we ruled that because of their exceptional and
peculiar circumstances, a party is estopped from invoking the lack of
the court's jurisdiction. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29;
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 543). We always look into
the attendant circumstances of the case so as not to subvert public
policy. (See Paro v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).
This is one such case where the successors-in- interest of the
original plaintiff are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. Adela Salindon, the original plaintiff in the
ejectment case consistently maintained her stand that the
respondent court had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint. She
insisted on this jurisdiction over the opposition of the defendants, the
private respondents herein. Thus, she filed a lengthy memorandum
against the dismissal of the complaint after the trial on the merits of
the case and made an emphatic justification of the jurisdiction of the
respondent court.
The following rule applies:
... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean
vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further
said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid
and conclusive as an adjudication but for the reason
that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously
 for reasons of public policy. (Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, supra)
Equitable considerations cannot also help the petitioners. Their own
deed of extra-judicial partition dated March 31, 1977 shows that
Adela Lucero Salindon left forty four (44) parcels of land, forty two
(42) of which were in Pangasinan, one (1) parcel in Natividad Street,
Manila and the disputed parcel in Quezon City. There is no showing
in the records that the forty three (43) other parcels were either not
owned by Salindon when the PHHC lot was awarded to her or that
ownership of these lots and of 706,684 shares of stock in such blue
chip corporations as Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Philippine
Overseas Drilling and Oil Development Corporation, etc. did not
disqualify her from applying for a PHHC lot. There is no showing
from the records that the petitioners would suffer from a denial of
substantial justice if the foregoing rules are applied to them.
The private respondents, however, stand on an entirely different
footing. As defendants in the ejectment case they vigorously
questioned the jurisdiction of the city court. They cannot now take
advantage of a decision issued in excess of jurisdiction and in doing
so abandon a principal averment in their respective answers. The
respondent court had no jurisdiction to take over the functions of the
PHHC and award ownership of the lot to them.
Not only was the decision of the city court rendered without
jurisdiction, it was also erroneously irregular to the point of
constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The PHHC was correct when it stated that squatters and intruders
who clandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by
such act, acquire any legal right to said property. There is no
showing in the records that the entry of the private respondents into
the lot was effected legally and properly. An act which was illegal
from the start cannot ripen into lawful ownership simply because the
usurper has occupied and possessed the government lot for more
than ten (10) years, cleared it of cogon grass, fenced it, and built a
house on the premises. No vested rights should be allowed to arise
from the social blights and lawless acts of squatting and clandestine
entrance. True, the government by an act of magnanimity and in the
interest of buying social peace through the quieting of mass unrest
may declare usurped property as a "relocation" area for the
squatters. However, the records fall to show that there has been
such action insofar as the disputed lot is concerned or that the
private respondents fall within such a policy or that they have
complied with the usual requirements before the benefits of
relocation may be given them. At any rate, this was for the PHHC,
now the NHA, to decide and not the city court.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ownership of the disputed
lot remains with. the National Housing Authority. The NHA may use
the authority of this decision to evict the private respondents and
their successors-in-interest from the property and deal with the lot
according to its present powers vested by law and in the light of its
current policies and programs. This decision, however, should not be
interpreted to preclude the private respondents from introducing
evidence and presenting arguments before the National Housing
Authority to establish any right to which they may be entitled under
the law and the facts of the case.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 20, 1975, the writ of
execution dated August 3, 1981 and the order to annul TCT Nos.
138007 and 239729 dated March 1, 1982, all issued by the
respondent city court are nullified and set aside for having been
issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
insofar as the private respondents are concerned. Considering our
findings as regards the petitioner, the Registrar of Deeds for Quezon
City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 239729 in the names of the
petitioners and TCT No. 138007 in the name of Adela Salindon. The
National Housing Authority is declared the owner of the disputed lot
and is directed to take possession of the same and to either hold or
dispose of it according to law and this decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria;
FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,  Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No.  the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven,
Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The
lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A,
in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under
that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for
the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real
properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after
the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality
Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond
and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had
given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and
six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public
auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the
lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13,
1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality
Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria,
was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in
Civil Case No. 
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy
sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such
service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own
behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all
surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated
will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for
against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873
that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case,
Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs
were aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the
said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over
Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over
Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason
of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in
bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It
specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of
Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision
the plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled
down to the issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment
against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other
world, was never served with summons.

There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was

acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang
Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4
Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against

him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity,
which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also
appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance
which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as
contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-
defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not
follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that
corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death.
Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in
good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside.

Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared
void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered
by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.