Cosmopolitan Democracy Revisited. Torbjörn Tännsjö

North American Philosophical Publications
Cosmopolitan Democracy Revisited

Author(s): Torbjörn Tännsjö
Source: Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 267-291
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
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Public Affairs Quarterly
Volume 20, Number 3, July 2006
COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY REVISITED
Torbjörn Tännsjö
i . Introduction
least since the seventeenth century there have been some voices advocating
"cosmopolitanism" in a strong sense, implying a world government serving
a sovereign world parliament.1 During the twentieth century many thinkers hav
added that the world government should be democratic.2 The rationale behind
these claims has been that there are many problems facing humanity that seem
hard to handle on a less than global level. The first and foremost of these problem
is, of course, how to obtain a secure and lasting peace in the world. The idea is
that just as peace has been secured in a certain territory once a state has been
established, peace would be secured in the world once a world government with
monopoly on military forces had been established. But other problems have been
added to this traditional one in recent times. Here we find problems having to d
with the environment (global warming), crimes against humanity, corruption, and
global justice (Peter Singer,3 Peter Unger,4 Charles Beitz,5 and Thomas Pogge6
are some thinkers who have stressed this aspect of globalization). But those wh
have advocated a world government serving a sovereign world parliament have
been in the minority. Their proposal has been met with skepticism. The main
objection has been that the idea of a democratic world government serving
sovereign world parliament is Utopian (raised already by Rousseau). And many
tend to believe that, even if a world government could be established, this would
not be desirable. There are better options available to humanity.
As a matter of fact, there seem to exist three radically different approaches to
the traditional problem of peace, and the emerging problems to do with the envi
ronment, international justice, corruption, and so forth. One of these approaches
is the idea that these problems are best handled through the establishment of
world government, serving a sovereign world parliament. We will speak of this
approach as a world "federation," but observe that there are many other possible
uses of the word "federation."
Another idea has been that we should civilize each nation state; if we do it
will be possible to find solutions to the problems facing humanity through peace-
267
268 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
ful negotiation between sovereign nation-states. This was the opini

Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, who believed that, at the en
an anarchistic system of peaceful cooperation between independent
evolve if each and any one of the states themselves were internally
in certain ways.7 Note, however, that this did not stop Kant from
"federation of free states," a contradiction in terms, according to m
word "federation." What Kant referred to, however, was the mere p
free states made international agreements among each other.
There is also a third compromise position: we should seek to esta
of "confederation" between sovereign states, where some decisions
a global level, while other decisions are taken on a national (or regi
have you) level. This position is taken up in the recent discussion b
are usually described as advocates of global or cosmopolitan democr
a few examples of this will be given.
We will reject both the anarchic solution of Kant and Bentham a
federate position taken up by many contemporary "cosmopolitaria
As a matter of fact, we will try to show that these putative altern
establishment of a sovereign world government are indeed Utopian
In order to come to grips with the question of whether democrati
tanism is a viable position, we need to define our notions. What ar
by "democracy?" What are we to mean by "cosmopolitanism"? Wha
of the notion of sovereignty?
2. Democracy
We need a notion of democracy, which renders it possible for us to asses

what degree a world government serving a sovereign world parliament coul
democratic. In the present context democracy will be conceived of as a met
of collective decision-making. A collective decision D, is reached by a co
tivity C in a democratic manner, if, and only if, D is reached through a me
guaranteeing that the will of the members of C prevail. If there is no unanim
will among the members of C, but if a will of a unique majority exists, then
crucial that the method guarantees that the will of this majority prevail. If th
no unique majority, since there are more than two ways to solve the matter,
there are cyclical majorities, then the exact outcome of the decision is not cr
to its democratic status. And, likewise, if there are only two options but a draw,
outcome doesn't matter to the democratic status of the decision. In these ca
the crucial thing is that the method used to reach the decision is such that
there been a unique majority will, then this will would have prevailed.8
Clearly, this is a descriptive notion of democracy. No evaluations need to
made when we want to settle whether a certain decision has been arrived at
a democratic manner. This is a merit. Moreover, there is no restriction to wh
collectivities can take democratic decisions about what. This too is a merit.
COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY REVISITED 269
There are some vague notions employed in the definition. In par

from clear what it means to say that something is in accordance
of an individual or a collectivity. The core notion here is that of a
vidual. The will of the majority (or a minority, or any other grou
of the will of the individuals that make it up. However, what doe
individual to "will" that a task be solved one way rather than an
Since our interest in the notion is political it is reasonable to
of a person to be tantamount to some kind of properly and expl
opinion. We are not interested here in interests, or welfare, or
kind (as we may be in moral philosophy or welfare economics). H
on what people themselves have to say about the possible solutio
problem. The reason why a certain individual, taking part in dem
sion-making, wants a certain matter to be solved in one way rath
may well be tactical; log-rolling is an acceptable and standar
democratic decision-making.
All this means that, in order for there to be a democratic decis
place, there must exist political agents prepared to voice their o
appropriate manner).
Once democracy has been defined in this strictly naturalistic m
having recourse to any value terms in the definiens), it is possib
various different ideals in terms of democracy. Most political id
something to say about democracy. And most present day po
are in one way or another favorable to democracy. In each p
there is some room for democratic decision-making. If the notio
here defined is used in the statement of such ideologies, then it
specify such things as what decisions should, and what decisi
according to a certain political ideology, be taken in a democrati
with respect to those that should be taken in a democratic mann
the political ideology in question, it is possible to specify by wh
be taken as well.
It should be noted that on this conception of democracy there may exist
many and rather different mechanisms for arriving at democratic decisions. The
crucial thing is that the method used guarantees that, if there is a unique will of
the people, then this will is going to prevail. The most obvious way of seeing to
this is perhaps to meet, to have everybody putting forward his or her proposals,
to have a public discussion and then take a vote, where the majority, if a unique
majority exists, will have its way. This, of course, is the "classical," "direct," or
"participatory" technique. But other methods exist as well. Most important among
them is the "representative" model.
The rationale behind a system where representatives of a group gather, put
forward proposals, discuss them, and have a vote, is the idea that the decision these
people reach is the one those who are represented would have reached, had they
been able to gather in the same manner. The most effective way of ap
to this (populist) idea is probably to take a statistical sample of the gr
tion and allow it to decide matters. This method is rarely used, how
small-scale social experiments along this line have been made the las
The reason that this method is rarely used is that people are skeptic
a radical democratic approach. Most people seem to be in favor of
only if the ideal is somewhat tempered with a kind of elitism. This is
exist political parties, why people can take up a political career, and
typical representative of this kind of moderate elitism is James Ma
argued that the elected representatives are likely to be competent an
of "discerning the true interest of their country,"9 while those repr
considered to be intolerant, unreliable, and unjust. However, a straig
defense of the ideal was given by John Adams, who argued that a rep
legislature "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at
should think, feel, reason and act like them."10
It is noteworthy that, in a representative democracy, there may wel
respect to political opinions, a gap between those who are represente
representatives. There are two main reasons why such a gap may de
who are represented need not bother to form any opinion at all wit
some political questions (apathy). Or, they may hold opinions that, w
bother to discuss them with others and put them to critical scrutiny in
their representatives do, they would change them.
It is debatable whether a representative system based on parties r
proaches the ideal, but this theme will not be pursued in the presen
will be assumed that such as system, especially if the method used to
representatives is strictly proportional and hence allowing that the va
ent parties be represented in a way similar to how the preferences ar
within the electorate, is close enough to the mark to earn the right
"democratic." When such an assembly takes a decision on behalf of th
we are allowed to say that it approximates to the decision the electo
have taken, had it itself been able to gather, discuss and take a vote
The representative political system should not be conflated with an
nique for reaching collective decisions, which has also been called "d
but where it is less clear that it really is close enough to the mark
right to be so called. This is a system where no attempt is made to ha
of the people prevail; the idea is simply that those who rule the peo
their mandate in a certain way: through a competitive struggle for
vote. Such a system is "democratic" according to Joseph Schumpeter's
definition of democracy:
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving a

decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
ing struggle for the people's vote.11
COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY REVISITED 27 1
Political systems satisfying Schumpeter's requirement, but not the

articulated by me, are typically systems where only two major pa
A method to approach such a system is of course to have a majori
method. For a political system to have any chance of meeting the
cal, populist) requirements articulated by me it need to rely on ma
a way of approaching such a system is to have a strictly proporti
system.
We may abide by Schumpeter's advice, of course, and conceive of democracy
without connecting it in any way to the idea that democracy means that the will
of (the majority) of those who take collective decisions prevail. But then it is
hard to see where to stop. Why not also consider a rule in the best interest of the
people to be democratic as well?
Anyway, in the present context, a "populist" notion of democracy will be taken
for granted. The ambitious claim made in this paper is that a world parliament
should indeed aspire at the populist kind of democracy here defined.
Since the present writer addressed the subject (Populist Democracy: A De-
fense, 1992), the notion of deliberative democracy has been at the focus of much
discussion. Here is a representative statement of what has been conceived of as
a recent trend:
Around 1990 the theory of democracy took a definite deliberative turn. Prior to that
turn, the democratic ideal was seen mainly in terms of aggregation of preferences
or interests into collective decisions through devices such as voting and representa-
tion. Under deliberative democracy, the essence of democratic legitimacy should
be sought instead in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision
to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision. These individuals should
accept the decision only if it could be justified to them in convincing terms.12
Does deliberative democracy present an interesting alternative to more traditional

notions of democracy, of importance in the discussion about global democracy? It
does not. On the most charitable interpretation of the above quotation it allows us
to conceive of "deliberative" democracy as a kind of (populist) democracy, as here
defined. What characterizes deliberative democracy, then, is that the members of
a collectivity that reaches a democratic decision has the possibility to exchange
views in a certain manner, where the result is also, perhaps, that the decision
gains a kind of "legitimacy." Or, the deliberation among those represented (in a
representative democracy) may be seen as a means to lessening the opinion gap
between representatives and those represented (commented upon above).
On a less charitable interpretation of the quoted passage, however, the point
in speaking about deliberative democracy is to put forward a competing notion
of democracy, according to which a collective decision is democratic once it
has been preceded by a certain discourse, or once it is in fact accepted by those
concerned by it as reasonable, irrespective of how it was reached. What gives this
impression is the fact that the author goes on to assert that there are two closely
connected recent ideas of democracy, the "deliberative" one and the

one, and that they have one thing in common:
they share some key features, including a rejection of aggregative m

democracy.13
Such an interpretation leaves me unsatisfied. There is no need to enter

exegesis, however. It must suffice to note that, on the present accoun
racy, be it deliberative or not, it is a method of aggregation. Neither S
notion, nor any deliberative notion inconsistent with the one here def
counted as a notion of democracy. Not even a combination of Schum
proach and the deliberative one (where a world government earns its
through a competitive struggle for the people's vote and where ther
wide political discourse going on) is enough to satisfy these radical d
order to meet these demands the world parliament legislating for the
be responsive to the will of the people on the globe.
This is partly a mere stipulation, but a stipulation fruitful to the p
the discussion in this paper. The query, in the present context, is sim
is a place for "democratic" rule, in this sense, in a society where cit
become cosmopolitan.
The promise such a populist democratic ideal would hold out o
scale is some sort of participation by the people on the globe concer
istential" problems to do with war and peace, environment, social ju
human rights. It may well be the case that a less democratically dema
of world government (even an elitist one putting power in the hands
would solve some of these problem just as well, or even easier, than t
envisaged. However, there is little hope that popular support will be
a global scale for anything less than the populist democratic ideal; h
important sense, radicalism is here a presupposition of realism.
3. Cosmopolitanism
There is no unanimity about how we are to understand cosmopoli

my account, a cosmopolitan is a citizen of the world. Cosmopolitanis
an ideal of an all-encompassing polity, i.e., an idea of global citizenshi
a different notion has been standard in recent discussions. Cosmopo
also been conceived of as a moral outlook (with roots in Antiquity),
an institutional arrangement. This is how Brian Barry is using the te
A cosmopolitan is, by definition, a citizen of the world. But this should no

understood. Cosmopolitanism is a moral outlook, not an institutional pre
The first people to call themselves cosmopolitans were the Stoics, who
belonged to a state that encompassed the whole of the civilized world.
point for them was to indicate that they were, in the first instance, hum
living in a world of human beings and only incidentally members of p

this spirit that animates contemporary cosmopolitanism, which is a
consisting of three elements: individualism, equality, and universality.
Even if Barry would count this as "misunderstanding," this is no

word "cosmopolitan" is used in the present context. On the use o
the present context it is an institutional prescription (to the effe
citizenship should exist) and an institutional prescription only. T
cosmopolitanism, a global citizenship, as here conceived, is consis
ciple) with all kinds of rule, democratic, autocratic, plutocratic, d
forth. Yet, it should be conceded that, if a rationale behind cosmop
it should acknowledge some kind of individualism, equality, and u
does such a rationale exist? Is cosmopolitanism as such a viabl
4. Is Cosmopolitanism a Viable Ideal?
Even on a rather legalistic understanding of the notion of a glo

it is clear that, to some extent, such a global citizenship exists. N
actions open to national governments severely restricted by the exist
economic actors on the global arena, their sovereignty with respe
citizens withers. There are international conventions, such as th
human rights, which are binding for all citizens on the globe, irr
tionality. The same is true of documents such as the Charters of t
and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, the Helsinki Declaration, t
Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Huma
there are institutions such as the international war crimes tribun
capable of punishing (some) actions at variance with them.
The recent International Criminal Court, moreover, a permanen
to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, d
tions, holds out hopes for the future. The court is able to investig
those individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, an
if national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecu
The International Criminal Court will also help defend the right
as women and children, who have often had little recourse to jus
On a less legalistic understanding of the notion of a global citi
clear that there are all sorts of political decisions taken in the w
facto binding for all citizens on the globe; we may think here of
by international organizations such as the WTO, the IMF, the W
various transnational judicial forums.
Furthermore, and even more importantly, there are decisions
vidual governments, the US government in particular, which, as a
are binding for all citizens of the globe. We may think here of dec
the growing of certain crops (such as coca in South America), wh
binding on all citizens of the globe. We may think here also of all k
called anti-terrorist measures, which are carried out on a global scal
In a global world, moreover, and this is a point of growing importa
people travel and where trade is global, it is also clear that, even a la
by a national parliament is in fact binding all citizens of the world. If
African parliament decides to tax certain products, these taxes will
paid by anyone who travels to, or establishes commerce with, South
However, all this does not mean that a truly cosmopolitan citizensh
established. The individual is a subject of much legislation, all right,
many of the rights, which may also be seen as definitive of true citize
are indeed many sources of legal obligations binding the people on t
have entered what has been called a kind of neo-medieval order. Thi
"realist" H. Bull famously puts the point:
In Western Christendom in the Middle Ages ... no ruler or state was so

in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segmen
Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and
pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above. ... If
states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their a
command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authori
on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an ext
the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-mediaeval
universal political order might be said to have emerged.15
In order to have world citizenship we need to move beyond this stat

to have one source and one source only, of our legal obligations. And
be granted certain rights with respect to the sovereign. Is this possib
sible to achieve, on a global level, what has been achieved earlier in h
various different national levels?
This question has been answered negatively by many who have pondered
whether a world government can be established. They have complained that,
when national states were established, this was always the result of one group
within a territory getting the upper hand of the rest. Nation-states have typically
been established in a forceful manner. And certainly, we do not want to establish
world government in that manner, they claim. This is how Hans Kelsen put the
point back in 1944:
The suggestion to secure international peace through a World State is based on the
analogy assumed to exist between a World State and the national State by which
national peace is so effectively secured. This analogy, however, seems to be not
very favorable to the intentions of those who wish to bring about the peace of the
world by methods which comply with the principles of democracy: liberty and
equality, applied to international relations. For the national State with its effect of
national peace is not the result of an agreement voluntarily negotiated by free and
equal individuals. The supposition maintained by the natural law doctrine ... has
been abandoned and replaced by another hypothesis according to which the State
comes into existence through hostile conflicts between social groups

economic structure. In the course of these armed conflicts, which have
of bloody wars, the most aggressive and warlike group subjugates th
imposes upon them a peace order.16
But Kelsen's view is now dated. We should remember that there have existed
systems that come close to world government; the Roman empire is the best ex-
ample of this (mentioned by Kelsen). And we are rapidly approaching a similar
situation, never thought of by Kelsen. This is where the USA enters the picture.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Empire the USA has been the sole and unique
superpower of the world. In the foreseeable future this fact will remain. We should
not complain about this fact but, rather, take advantage of it. Not since the heydays
of the Roman Empire have the circumstances been so favorable to the idea of
a world government as they are today. And, contrary to the situation some two
thousand years ago, the idea of a democratic world government has become a
viable option. The time is ripe therefore to grasp this unique possibility.
Below it will be explained how. It must suffice here to note that it would be vain
to attempt to argue that no ideal of a cosmopolitan citizenship could be realized.
We may safely argue from what exists, or, at least, from what is slowly coming
into existence, to what is possible. The problem to face is if there is a way of
"democratizing" global citizenship rather than accepting that democracy withers.
This is how we should go about, if we want to explore this possibility.
5. Representative Democracy on a Global Level
The following idea of a cosmopolitan citizenship and a world government

could be adumbrated. We build here on the only availing existing institution, the
UN. In the interest of cosmopolitan citizenship together with a world government
the UN is reformed in the following manner (the point of departure for these
speculations are ideas put forward in Tännsjö, Populist Democracy - similar
proposals, some of them less and others more specific have been made by many
other thinkers who have addressed the issue).17
The general assembly is divided into two houses. The House of Commons is
elected in a proportionate manner and the representatives that take place in the
House of Commons will have one vote each. The elections must be supervised
and accepted by representatives of the UN. All countries are allowed to take part
in the elections. If there are countries where the government hesitates to allow
free elections, then the seats from these regions of the world will remain empty.
This will provide a strong incentive for the governments to resist their fears of
free elections. Consider for example the prospect that India will elect their rep-
resentatives, while China will leave their seats vacant. How bad this would seem
to the Chinese public at large!
If all the most important countries agree to take part in the electio
interesting view of the world we will meet when we see the represe
semble! A third of all the representatives will be from China and In
Or, is this perhaps a problem? Some advocates of world govern
thought so. A. C. Ewing, for example, wants to restrict the represent
the most densely populated regions of the world:
Without casting any reflections whatever on the Indians or Chinese, it

admitted that few Englishmen or Americans would care to be governed by
in which these two countries had together four or five times as much s
Anglo-Saxon peoples.18
This qualification is not very reasonable. And it is certainly not accep

Indians or the Chinese. So the fact described here is rather something
teach many (of us) Western people a lesson. If we compromise the pop
cratic ideal from the start, the political struggle in defense of it will
The House of Lords of the UN will consist of representatives o
governments according to the system, one country, one vote.
Once a World Parliament has been established there should also be
Government. How should it be elected? Together the two houses of
Assembly could select some representatives to it. But it is also natur
that there are some permanent members of it, such as, for example, repr
from the governments of China, India, Russia, the EU, and the Unit
Unless these powers feel that they can keep control over world politic
hardly exist any global citizenship in the first place.
If the General Assembly lacks power, if the main powers in the world
and the United States in particular, feel that the system is safe, then
reason to assume that such a constitutional reform of UN would not
Or, is it squeamish not immediately to give up the privileged positio
main powers in the UN? Johan Galtung thinks so:
To the argument that this is the condition for Big Powers being in the UN
fectly reasonable answer would be that if having special privileges is the c
for their membership then they do not belong in the key organization of
heading for global democracy.19
There is no denying that the answer suggested by Galtung may

able," but it is hardly wise. For strategic reasons it is extremely impo
the House of Commons in place. Once it exists we may rely in our d
enterprise to a large extent on its appetite for power. And of course,
the long run is that the House of Lords should be abolished and t
Commons be sovereign.
6. The Military Question
One of the most urgent tasks for the World Government to de

to it that international order could be established. This takes mi
Hobbes put the point, "covenants, without the sword, are but w
strength to secure a man at all."20 A solution, in line with the or
with the UN Charter, can thus be suggested. Those countries tha
have already a rather secure situation should be encouraged
give up their military defense in exchange for guaranteed border
Government). They should also be required to keep some mi
available to peace-keeping missions ventured upon by the World
and the World Government only.
Since military resources are cost consuming, there will exist a
this policy. To adopt it would mean economic gain coupled with
tional standing. Yet, for all that, is it at all realistic to hope tha
will ever get going? History presents us with few examples of th
situation in the world today with one dominating super power is
what we have experienced for a very long time. It is crucial, of co
countries break the ground; then it is not farfetched to believe
follow suit. Crucial to success here is that upon consideration pe
find the idea attractive.
An attempt has been made to find out what the Swedes th
proposal. When writing a book on the ethics of killing (in Swedi
author had a survey made. 88 percent of the Swedes were in fav
defense (90 percent of the men, 86 percent of the women). They
the following question: If Sweden could give up its military defe
for security guarantees from the United Nations, while contribut
organization some military peace-keeping forces, do you think S
doso?
Here 36 percent (42 percent of the men and 31 percent of the women) said
"yes" (and 57 percent "no").
This result is encouraging. If more than a third of the population support the
proposal, before it has even been subjected to public debate, it should not be
impossible for a dedicated cosmopolitan political movement to gain majority!
Somewhat unexpectedly it seems that such a movement will have to convince
more women than men that this is a good idea.21
In a situation where there exists only one super power, it is plausible to think
that the entire world will follow suit rather swiftly (perhaps with the exception
for some "rogue" states, "contained" by the UN peace-keeping forces); the sole
exception for this would be the single military super power (the United States).
At last a situation is reached, foreshadowed by A. C. Ewing (1947), where the
difficulty would be "not to persuade states to limit their armaments, but to per-
suade them to contribute their rightful share in armaments to the s

whole."22
However, is there any hope that the USA will ever follow suit? It
been adopted official US policy that no power should be allowed to
military strength that parallels that of the United States. According
White House document, published on September 20, 2002 and subm
gress, no state will be allowed to challenge the military supremacy o
States. A key pillar of American national security policy would be
future military competition," the document states. The essential role
strength is to "build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge
will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from

build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of
There is no need to complain about this arrogant move by
tion. It doesn't come easy to admit this; in particular, this is
to admit. However, easy or hard to admit, this is a fact. The
to turn the other cheek. The rest of the world ought to cha
arrogance with radical pacifism and successive, systematic
The rest of the world should do so in the hope that this wou
on the Americans at large. Is this overly optimistic?
It is not. When the rest of the world has disarmed there wil
in the United States that one nation should bear this kind
This may seem especially strange if there exist no rivaling m
the world. So there will be a strong incentive also in the Un
and to join the rest of the world.
Or, is the USA exploiting the rest of the world economic
that, if it cannot through military means sustain the system
cost to the average American citizen?
The present author is certainly no expert on international
but it is hardly likely that imperialist exploitative relations
place, play such a significant role. And unless they do, a re
is that there will be popular dissent with American militar
plausible.
It might be objected, of course, that what matters is not whether the average
American would stand to gain or lose, once the military costs were abolished, but
what the average American would believe about this. And could not the military
expenditure be retained through the production of the right kind of ideology?
This is certainly a possibility, but this only means that it is an important political
task incumbent on all those who adhere to the global democratic ideal to expose
and dismantle this kind ideology. And it is certainly a sine qua non to such an
exposure that there be no competing military forces left in the world.
As a matter of fact, this is the main reason for being EU skeptic, while being
enthusiastic with respect to cosmopolitanism. The present author used to argue
differently (in Populist Democracy), when, like most people who

about a world government, the road to the establishment of it w
as a series of steps, where regions first unite, and then form the
unity. This can now be seen, in a new historic situation, as mistake
would rather compete with each other than unite. And the idea
a special mission in history, recently advocated by Habermas et
arrogant than the official US policy described above. It is indeed
of one absolute superpower that prepares the way to a world gov
It has now been shown that the idea of a sovereign world gove
completely Utopian. But is it desirable that the idea be put into
rather a kind of dystopia? Many objections come to mind and th
dressed in order.
7. The Argument from Lack of Democracy
One objection to the adumbrated reform would undoubtedly be

ing in democratic quality. And this objection is certainly correct
taken by two of the three bodies (the two houses of the general
very well be "democratic" in the sense that each decision ref
the body who takes it. It is desirable that a democratic procedur
here. Moreover, if the House of Commons are elected in a strict
manner, it may make sense to say of its decisions that they reflec
people on the globe. This being a fact will be a strong impetus to
participation on a global scale and, hence, to an urge for further
However, as has been stressed, the decisions taken by the Hou
of the General Assembly will be of minor importance. So even i
Commons of the General Assembly could be representative of th
tion, in a straightforward sense (once elections have been arrang
level), by their decisions they would not be able to make muc
world politics. And, as has also been stressed, there would have t
a veto from the Security Council against any bills taken by the
bly - in a foreseeable future. And there would have to be a righ
representatives of the permanent members of the Security Coun
Government) against almost any kind of political action upon wh
of the members want to embark. So the objection that a political
one adumbrated would not mean that the will of the world popu
any way be decisive to the political decisions reached by the Worl
would certainly be correct. However, is this a relevant objection
institution? It is not.
After all, if these institutions were established, and this is tr
of the House of Commons, then there would exist an important
future democratization. In the same manner that the European Pa
to obtain more power and influence, it is reasonable to assume t
Commons of the UN would be eager to obtain power. And in the sam

that the European Parliament has an important role to play when pub
discussions take place that mould the general public opinion within
House of Commons of the UN would mould world opinion.
However, there is an important difference between the EU and th
Within the EU there are many strong nations competing for influe
politics bears little semblance to this. And this leads to the next
World Government elected along the aforementioned lines would no
little responsive to the political opinion held by the world population,
a matter of fact, be in the grips of the US administration. The system
would mean the USA would rule the world through the UN. Or, as i
the second Iraq war (in 2003), when they fail to obtain support from
their military adventures, they will carry on with these adventures i
of what the UN decides.
Again we must conclude that this objection is true but irrelevant. The USA
rules the world anyway! And we should think here, not of the present, but of the
future. We should compare here with how the process towards national democracy
in many countries has taken place. It is the rule, not the exception, that institutions
have been established that, at first, have had no effective say in politics. However,
eventually, they have become decisive. The establishment of a political order need
not be the solution to any immediate problem to be of value. Even a national
parliament, lacking completely in power, may be (has often been) the beginning
of a process that has lead to a democratic order. This is how we ought to conceive
of the establishment of a World Parliament and a World Government. Once the
institutions are in place, it will be a feasible goal to aspire to more democracy.
There will be an urge to get rid of the House of Lords, to get rid of the right to
any veto, to get rid of the permanent national representation, and so forth. And
the final goal would be to establish a sovereign world parliament, which elects a
responsible world government.
Here a caveat is in place. We may certainly expect that, once established, a
democratic world government may be a guarantee of peace. However, as we have
seen, the road to the establishment of a fully fledged world government is long.
For quite a while, we will have to live with a quasi-democracy on the global
level. And it is far from certain that a quasi-democratic world government will
be a guarantee of peace. There is growing evidence to the effect that, while it is
rare that two democracies wage war against each other, it is not uncommon that
democracies breed internal conflict.24 In particular, it seems as though quasi-
democracies provide the worst protection against civil war and disorder. So it is
crucial that the world government is established in a manner compatible with the
preservation of national democracies, where such national democracies exist. This
means that the world government should not be overly ambitious in its attempts
to rule the world. And this carries over to the next objection.
8. The Argument from Communitarianism
There exits an argument from communitarianism to the effect that a global

citizenship is not desirable. The point of departure of this argument is the idea
that citizenship should go together with a kind of communality. Citizenship, on
this notion, presupposes immersion in a common language, a common culture, a
set of values, a common history, and so forth. To put things bluntly, this objection
is ill construed. The premise upon which it is based, the notion that a common
citizenship requires the kind of communality here put forward, is false. It is neither
necessary nor desirable that people who belong to the same political unit share
language, culture, basic values, nor anything of the kind. All these things are
important to our well-being and our sense of identity, but it is equally important
that they are allowed to flourish in small and voluntary associations, not within
political units. This is to do with the fact that political units are not, or are only
to some extent, voluntary. We are not only born into political units (like we are
born into cultures), it may prove very difficult and even impossible for us to leave
them. But then they should not take a form which could mean that we would
feel suffocated once we found out that we were destined to belong to any one of
them in particular. This theme has been discussed elsewhere, so there is no need
to belabor the point in the present context.25
This insistence that basic values need not be shared on the globe is not to
say that no values need to shared, if a world government should be installed.
Certainly a common adherence to democracy of some sort (for reasons that can
take a variety of forms), would be necessary. So unless national democracy is
established in at least a majority of nations, and in the largest ones in particular,
the idea of a world government is a non-starter. However, the very idea of starting
to democratize the UN institutions is to render possible a world-wide transfor-
mation towards democracy. A kind of "democratic determinism" put in motion
through the establishment of the House of Commons of the United Nations is
intended to achieve this task.26
It might be thought that, in the aforementioned argument, the problem of a
common language is dismissed too easily. Our language could be a sign of our
identity, and perhaps we need not share this kind of identity with our fellow
citizens. However, we need to communicate with them, at least if the political
process where collective decisions are reached is to have a civilized form. But
how is it possible for all the citizens on the globe to communicate, considering
the fact that we speak different languages? Already Saint Augustine made this
objection to the idea of a world government:
For if two men, each ignorant of the other's language, meet and are compelled . . .
to remain together, then it is easier for dumb animals, even of different kinds, to
associate together than for them, though both are human beings.27
But had not Rome succeeded in spreading its own lingua franca?
established a world order? It had, Saint Augustine conceded, "but at
has this unity been achieved, all those great wars, all that human sla
bloodshed."28
This is to my taste a way too moralistic objection. As a matter of f
is rapidly coming to fulfill the role Latin once played. This may see
desirable, it may be correctly interpreted as a sign of Anglo-American
and it has certainly had a cost in terms of slaughter and bloodshed an
a fact it means that this kind of objection to a global citizenship loses
9. The Argument from Lack of Economic Integrati
An economic objection, similar to the communitarian one, but bas

concern that there is lack of economic unification in the world rather
or cultural, has been put forward. The advocates of economic globaliza
contrary notwithstanding, the existing economic development does
the direction of true integration, these critics claim. The economic
means widening gaps and many are simply left behind. As Danilo Zo
point:
The rhetoric of civil globalization and of a rising "cosmopolitan citizenship" under-

estimates one of the most characteristic and most serious consequences of the way
in which westernization is cultural homogenization without integration: namely,
the antagonism between the esteemed citizenships of the West and the countless
masses belonging to regional and subcontinental areas without development and
with a high rate of demographic growth
the situation over the coming decades.29
Again my comment must be that, even if this is true, and to some

it is irrelevant as an argument against a cosmopolitan citize
points at are undesirable consequences of the existing economic
not consequences of any cosmopolitan citizenship as such.
It is crucial to find strategies to improve the economic situati
but there is no reason to think that a cosmopolitan citizenship
prove problematic to such a desired development. On the contrar
that it can be democratized, in the manner discussed above, th
sons to believe that it will be one among many possible instrum
development of all sorts of aspects of the world.
In particular, it is important to observe that, just as the establi
mopolitan citizenship does not presuppose the existence of cultu
it does not presuppose any existing economic integration. The fo
not desirable, the latter is, but neither is a prerequisite to the e
cosmopolitan citizenship.
Even a dedicated socialist, like myself, should admit that the esta
global democracy is one thing, the establishment of global justice
one, and the latter should not be allowed to stand in the way of the
io. The Argument from Confederalism
It was noted at the beginning of the paper that three approaches compete with
regard to how we ought to handle global problems. It has been argued that we
should attempt to establish a sovereign world government. Some reject the idea
of a world government altogether. However, some want to opt for a compromise
position, which has here been referred to as "confederate." On this notion, we
may well have a kind of world government, but it should not be sovereign: There
should be a system of shared sovereignty between the world government and na-
tion-states. So we had better address this question: Should the world parliament
be sovereign?
It needs to be sovereign. It is tempting to argue that once international and
national affairs have been properly separated, it is enough if the world parlia-
ment decides about international affairs.30 However, on the view of cosmopolitan
democracy here defended, it is crucial that the world parliament is sovereign. It,
and it alone, decides on what level a certain decision should be taken.
Here we are in disagreement with most other cosmopolitan writers who opt
for a kind of confederation rather than a true federation.31 This is true of many
"classical" statements of a cosmopolitan view, relying on the distinction between
national and international affairs, such as the ones put forward by the World
Movement for World Federal Government at the end of The Second World War
requiring merely that "limitations" of national sovereignty be made and urging
merely that the transfer to the world federal government should take place of such
legislative, executive and judicial powers as "relate" to world affairs.32 Once other
reasons for world government, besides securing a lasting peace, have been added,
more complicated demarcation problems have surfaced. Recent examples of such
con-federate rather than truly federate views are hence cast in more complex
terms. One such view is exemplified by the Italian cosmopolitan thinker Daniele
Archibugi stating that
democratic procedures and norms need to be tailored according to the issues con-
cerned: for example, what are the appropriate constituencies to settle problems
involving two local communities of separate states but located on opposite sides of
the same river, for problems involving regional settlements, or for problems of global
concern? Quite clearly, the forum will be different in each of these cases.33
An even more elaborate proposal in the same vein has been put forward by the
contemporary British cosmopolitan thinker David Held who hesitates to propose
that the sovereignty of the world parliament be exchanged for the (lost) sover-
eignty of national states (parliaments). Like Archibugi he is not satisfied with
any simplistic division of questions into national and international

proposes a complex system for distributing authority to different
regard to different issues. This is how he describes the system:
The test of extensiveness examines the range of peoples within and acr
ited territories who are significantly affected by a collective problem
question. The test of intensity assesses the degree to which the latter
on a group of people(s) and, therefore, the degree to which national, r
global legislation or other types of intervention are justified. The third te
sessment of comparative efficiency, is concerned to provide a means of e
whether any proposed national, regional or global initiative is necessary
as the objectives it seeks to meet cannot be realized in an adequate way
operating at "lower" levels of decision-making.34
It is interesting that even Pope John XXIII in his Pacem in Terris

cosmopolitan solution to the problem of world peace:
[T]he common good of all nations involves problems which affect peo
world over: problems which can only be solved by a public authority . . . w
covers the entire globe. We cannot therefore escape the conclusion that t
order itself demands the establishment of some sort of world governmen
The pope, of course, famously advocates the principle of "subsidiar

ing to which decisions should be taken at the lowest possible lev
hierarchical socio-political structure.
This is not plausible. There is no denying that different question
handled at different levels, of course. And it should be conceded th
states in most cases should continue to exist, when a World Govern
tablished. However, the claim here is that in the transfer to World
these states must be robbed entirely of their sovereignty. They beco
World Parliament is in place, similar to local governments within a
The reason for this radicalism is simple. No algorithm signing deci
appropriate level can be provided. The idea that those who are affect
sion should take it is far too vague to be of much help. And it gets
we have to assess also to what extent those affected are affected. Th
nice as it may sound, the "all affected principle," or the "subsidiar
becomes useless for the purpose of "limiting" national sovereignty
distinction between national and international affairs is extremely v
cally contested and insufficient when it comes to problems to do n
war and peace, but also with the environment, international justice,
Various different political ideologies will answer the question to w
certain decision belongs differently. But there must be a definite pla
questions are sorted into appropriate levels.
Suppose there is conflict, and conflict there will be. Unless there
available to the central authority, to back up a decision as to where
is to be handled, the system of states will be thrown back into a

Rousseau was right in his claim that sovereignty is indivisible.3
was a descriptive claim, not a normative one.
On my suggestion, it is up to the central political authority, th
ment, to decide where a question should be handled. Here radica
to realism.
ii. The Argument from the Totalitarian Specter
A final objection to the idea of a sovereign world government is that it m

become tyrannical. After all, when we establish a world government, if w
this is a single shot. When a national democratic government is established
result may turn out to be devastating. We know from the Weimar republi
a people may come to elect a dictator as its ruler. What if something s
would happen on a global scale? In particular, if a centralized military forc
established and put in the hands of the world government, doesn't this mea
the world government as such might come to pose a totalitarian threat to
world? Would it not be, if it could be established, an unprecedented almig
and terrible force? Would it not be more safe to follow the advice of Immanuel
Kant and opt rather for an association of independent states? This is how Kant
puts forward his concerns:
The idea of a law of nations presupposes the separate existence of many states which
are independent of each other. Such a situation constitutes in and by itself a state
of war (unless there is a federal union to prevent hostilities breaking out). Yet such
a situation is from the standpoint of reason better than the complete merging of all
these states in one . . . because the laws lose more and more of their effectiveness
as the government increases in size, and the resulting soulless despotism is plunged
into anarchy after having exterminated all the germs of good.37
It may seem here as though Kant accepts the federal solution to the problem of
maintaining international peace but, as was pointed out above, appearances are
deceptive. What Kant has in mind when he speaks a "federal union" is a union
of "free states." What he means by "federation" is not what is here meant by the
word. What Kant hopes for is rather peaceful cooperation between separate states
and this is Utopian. He may even himself be aware of this when he speaks of his
system as ultimately a "state of war." And yet, for all that, he wants to stick to this
basic kind of system, tempered merely through treaties between free states. Why?
Obviously not only because he thinks the idea of a world government Utopian but
also, and mainly, because he does not see it as desirable. So his objection needs
to be discussed. The objection comes in two parts.
First of all we have the objection that world government must result in soulless
despotism. This part of it is founded on a misunderstanding, at least when the
objection is directed at the kind of proposal here made. The military force of the
world government need not, and should not, be a terribly strong on

then the USA would not feel any inclination to surrender to it!
The UN force need be just strong enough to contain terrorist gr
world, and to secure peace and order, but no stronger than this. The
supremacy will not, and ought not to be challenged by the world g
The reason that the USA eventually surrenders to it, if it does, mu
there seems to be no further point for the USA to carry the econom
maintaining a military force of the kind we are familiar with tod
for the USA to surrender would be that, in a world where security
by the UN, and where neither the UN nor any other power in the w
lenging the US military supremacy, there is no need any more for
monstrosities as the US military system.
What about the second part of Kant's objection, then, the part sayi
lose more and more of their effectiveness as the government incr
This may be true of some laws, but hopefully the World Parliam
pass that kind of bill. However, with respect to other kinds of laws,
is true. This is true in particular of laws such as regulations to do
vironment. Take, for example, restrictions intended to counter glo
We know that it is difficult for free states to solve this kind of p
immediately find themselves facing the problem of the tragedy of
Here the only efficient manner of legislating is to legislate for the
It is not difficult to come up with many similar examples.
This is not to say that a cosmopolitan democracy as a politic
foolproof, of course. The world parliament can be taken over by fun
of some sort, the military forces in the command of the World Gov
be used for oppressive purposes, and so forth. No political system
However, the more all-encompassing a system is, the less serious t
it will be taken over by one very special factional interest. So even
of world government is special in the sense that its establishment
"single shot," this is a shot to be looked upon with more optimism
leveled before, on a restricted national level.
There is no radical and very special religious belief, nor any poli
of the same radical order in the world today, that seems capable of
allegiance from more than a tiny fraction of the world's population
talist religion can conquer a state and even a region of the world, bu
entire globe. This should be our source of hope and confidence in t
of cosmopolitan democracy.
12. Conclusion
There is no denying that many problems facing humanity have a global nat
If we are to solve them at all, we need to solve them on a global level. How
this be achieved? There seem to be three main ideas about this.
One possible response to global problems is to stick to natio

and attempt to keep various different kinds of transnational an
citizenships "as thin as possible." The global problems should be s
peaceful cooperation between sovereign and civilized states.
Another possible (or, as has here been argued, in the final analy
response is to go for a confederation of states. Each problem sho
at the level where it can be best handled. Where this is is a matt
tion between states, giving up some, but not all, of their sovereig
internationally binding treaties.
A third possible response is to try to establish at least a rudime
democratic cosmopolitan citizenship, in the hope that in the lon
be a (democratic) growth potential for it.
In this paper the latter response has been defended. Against th
such a democracy would be shallow (few and restricted options w
it), that it will be in the grips of the government of the United S
objected that, even if this is so, there is a potential for this kind o
grow more important as well as more independent in the future
is, any way, in the grips of the US government. Against the cha
political system may evolve into tyranny (of the majority over
has been claimed that, the more all-encompassing a polity is, the
risk becomes. And it is difficult to think of a polity that is more
than the world itself.
Finally, provided world government is possible and desirable, h
about? In the same manner that national democracy has come abou
through political struggle. People who feel that already they are
must take the lead. They must articulate political programs, organ
political campaigns, and get the process in motion. New media re
of political action not only possible but almost inevitable. Once o
have been taken in the right direction democratic determinism w
ate. Or so we may hope, at any rate.
Stockholm University
NOTES
This paper has been presented to the philosophy seminar at Stockholm University
2003; to the Nordic Network in Political Theory 24-26 October 2003 in Soenderbor
Denmark; to the 2004 congress at Durban of Philosophy Society of Southern Afri
(PSSA); to the International Social Science Seminar (ISSS) at the Department of Poli
cal Science at Stockholm University in February 2004; and to a Stockholm conferenc
organized in March 2004 by the research project Democracy Unbound, of which it is
first result. Many individual commentators have made valuable critical comments on
In particular, many thanks go to Anne Julie Semb of Oslo University, Gu

and Folke Tersman of Stockholm University, Tony Fluxman of Rhodes U
Lena Halldenius of Lund University.
1 . The pioneers seem to have been Emeric Crucé with his Noveau Cyné
followed by Anacharsis Cloots, La République universelle, at the time
revolution (1792).
2. While others have opted for a "technocratic" version, most famously H

a serious of books published between 1901 and 1940, ranging from Anti
to The Common Sense of War and Peace (1940).
3. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality."
4. Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence
5. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations.
6. Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls.

7. Even if Bentham is certainly more optimistic about the near futur
these authors agree, Bentham in A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual P
in Perpetual Peace, that independent and sovereign nation-states can learn
fully together, if some domestic conditions are met (no colonies, no sec
and a free press, according to Bentham, and a republican political system
Kant).
8. The counterfactual clause is used to counter objections to the effect that Condorcet
or Arrow has shown that a "populist" notion of democracy, resting on the idea that a ma-
jority will should be decisive, is somewhat flawed. Cf. William Riker, Liberalism Against
Populism for the most influential statement of this kind of objection.
9. The Federalist Papers, no. 10, p. 20.

10. John Adams, "Letter to John Penn," p. 205. Here quoted from Hanna Pitkin, The
Concept of Representation, p. 60.
11. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 173-174.

12. John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. v.
13. Ibid., p. 3.
14. Brian Barry, "Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique," p. 35.
15. H. Bull, The Anarchial Society, pp. 254-255.
16. Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law, pp. 5-6.
17. Above, Crucé with his pioneering work in 1623-1624 was mentioned. It seems
as if this theme has been raised over an over again at the end of devastating wars. There
was one discussion going on at the end of the First World War, resulting in the creation
of the League of Nations. After the Second World War the discussion was intense with
contributions from distinguished thinkers such as Kelsen and A. C. Ewing. The present
author's interest in the subject was raised at the end of the cold war. The number of other
recent proposals is legion; to mention only a few examples, see J. Burnheim, Is Democracy
Possible?', D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, and Nigel Dower, An Introduction
to Global Citizenship. Many people in recent times have made rather specific propos-
als about reforms about the UN institutions, such as, for example, Jo
comprehensive statement of his view, see "Alternative Models for G
18. A. C. Ewing, The Individual, the State, and World Government,
19. Galtung, 'Alternative Models for Global Democracy," p. 154.

20. Leviathan, part 2, chap. 17, p. 2.
21 . Cf. my book Du skall understundom dräpa! Appendix, about th
22. A. C. Ewing, The Individual, the State, and World Governmen
23. In an essay written by Habermas, co-signed by Derrida, and

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in June 2003. The authors advocate
union capable of challenging the US even in military terms. Certainly
first thinkers to develop this theme; it was taken up already in 1866 by
who supported the establishment of the United States of Europe as a
the American "political colossus" that was emerging on the other side of
F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 122, about this.
24. J. D. Faeron, and D. D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and C

Müller and E. Weede, "Cross-National Variations in Political Violence:
Approach"; and H. Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?"
25. Tännsjö, "The Secular Model of the Multi-Cultural State," Inquir

pp. 109-117.
26. The term "democratic determinism" was suggested by Michèl
mistakenly thought that the present author used it when giving at talk o
at the department of political science at Stockholm University.
27. This quotation is from Derek Heater, World Citizenship and Wo

p. 189.
28. Ibid.
29. D. Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government, pp. 137-138.

30. The first author who introduced this idea seems to have been James Lorimer
The Application of the Principle of Relative or Proportional Equality to Internation
Organizations (1877). The quotation is here taken from F. H. Hinsley. According
Hinsley, Lorimer "prided himself on being the first to suggest that the national and
international fields should be rigidly separated and that the sphere of the internati
government should be rigidly confined to the latter" (Power and the Pursuit of Peac
136).
31. In this radicalism the present author seems to be in agreement with some of his
philosopher colleagues, however, such as A. C. Ewing, who expressed his hope that "the
United Nations Organization will gradually, by explicit amendment or tacitly in the course
of its working, come nearer to a federation," The Individual, the State, and World Gov-
ernment, p. 315, and with Kai Nielsen who, in "World Government, Security and Social
Justice," argued that we need world government as a "Leviathan" to grant us peace.
32. Cf., e.g., the influential Montreux Declaration of the World Movement for World
Federal Government, issued in 1947 (second paragraph).
33. Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy," p. 209.
34. D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to
Governance, p. 236.
35. This quotation is from Derek Heater, World Citizenship and Go
163.
36. Rousseau, The Social Contract, book 2, chap. 2.

37. Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 259. The omitted passage gives a qualification: "unless
there is a federal union to prevent hostilities breaking out." But remember that a "federal
union" as Kant is using the word, is a union of "free states."
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North American Philosophical Publications

Cosmopolitan Democracy Revisited

North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press are collaborating

COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY REVISITED

ful negotiation between sovereign nation-states. This was the opini

We need a notion of democracy, which renders it possible for us to asses

There are some vague notions employed in the definition. In par

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving a

Political systems satisfying Schumpeter's requirement, but not the

Does deliberative democracy present an interesting alternative to more traditional

connected recent ideas of democracy, the "deliberative" one and the

they share some key features, including a rejection of aggregative m

Such an interpretation leaves me unsatisfied. There is no need to enter

There is no unanimity about how we are to understand cosmopoli

A cosmopolitan is, by definition, a citizen of the world. But this should no

living in a world of human beings and only incidentally members of p

Even if Barry would count this as "misunderstanding," this is no

4. Is Cosmopolitanism a Viable Ideal?

Even on a rather legalistic understanding of the notion of a glo

In Western Christendom in the Middle Ages ... no ruler or state was so

In order to have world citizenship we need to move beyond this stat

comes into existence through hostile conflicts between social groups

5. Representative Democracy on a Global Level

The following idea of a cosmopolitan citizenship and a world government

Without casting any reflections whatever on the Indians or Chinese, it

This qualification is not very reasonable. And it is certainly not accep

There is no denying that the answer suggested by Galtung may

6. The Military Question

One of the most urgent tasks for the World Government to de

suade them to contribute their rightful share in armaments to the s

will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from

differently (in Populist Democracy), when, like most people who

7. The Argument from Lack of Democracy

One objection to the adumbrated reform would undoubtedly be

Commons of the UN would be eager to obtain power. And in the sam

8. The Argument from Communitarianism

There exits an argument from communitarianism to the effect that a global

9. The Argument from Lack of Economic Integrati

An economic objection, similar to the communitarian one, but bas

The rhetoric of civil globalization and of a rising "cosmopolitan citizenship" under-

the situation over the coming decades.29

Again my comment must be that, even if this is true, and to some

io. The Argument from Confederalism

any simplistic division of questions into national and international

It is interesting that even Pope John XXIII in his Pacem in Terris

The pope, of course, famously advocates the principle of "subsidiar

is to be handled, the system of states will be thrown back into a

ii. The Argument from the Totalitarian Specter

A final objection to the idea of a sovereign world government is that it m

world government need not, and should not, be a terribly strong on

One possible response to global problems is to stick to natio

In particular, many thanks go to Anne Julie Semb of Oslo University, Gu

2. While others have opted for a "technocratic" version, most famously H

3. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality."

6. Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls.

9. The Federalist Papers, no. 10, p. 20.

11. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 173-174.

18. A. C. Ewing, The Individual, the State, and World Government,

19. Galtung, 'Alternative Models for Global Democracy," p. 154.

21 . Cf. my book Du skall understundom dräpa! Appendix, about th

22. A. C. Ewing, The Individual, the State, and World Governmen

23. In an essay written by Habermas, co-signed by Derrida, and

24. J. D. Faeron, and D. D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and C

25. Tännsjö, "The Secular Model of the Multi-Cultural State," Inquir