CASE DIGESTS ASSIGNMENT IN CONFLICT OF LAWS- TARIGA,

CARLYN

Heine v. New York Life Insurance Company

Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the
insurance companies") were corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions
to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to agree to be
supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German
securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may be served. The
insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US and Germany
for the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German
nationals, payable in German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff

As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they
have no choice but to try the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German
courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may
be served upon the insurance companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring the
insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to
great and unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of
having to bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in Germany.
Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that
jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over
a case the cause of action of which arose from another jurisdiction and wherein
both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York

Facts.

Loucks was killed in Massachusetts when he was run down by an employee of

Standard Oil (Defendant).His administrator (Plaintiff) brought a wrongful death suit
in New York based on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute.
Loucks was killed when a negligent driver employed by Standard Oil (Defendant)
ran him down.  The accident took place in Massachusetts, but he was a resident of
New York, and his administrator (Plaintiff) brought a suit for wrongful death in New
York.The suit was based on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, which
provided a minimum recovery of $500 and a maximum recovery of $10,000 with
the amount of damages awarded to be based on the degree of fault of the
defendant.  Standard Oil (Defendant) moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the Massachusetts Statute was penal in nature and therefore
unenforceable in New York.

Issue.
May a right created by statute in one state be enforceable in another state if the
enforcement of the right would not violate the public policy of the forum and the
underlying statute is not penal in nature?

Held.
Yes.  One stateʼs penal laws are not enforceable in any other state. Whether a
statute is penal depends on the type of liability it creates. Where the penalty is
awarded to the state or a member of the public is suing in the interest of the whole
community to right a public wrong, the statute and/or recovery is penal.  While this
statute is penal in the sense that damages are awarded on the basis of the
defendantʼs conduct rather than the plaintiffʼs measure of damages, the right to
recover is private and therefore the statute is not penal in the international sense.
The public policy of New York is not violated by the enforcement of the right, as
New York recognizes the right of survivors to recover for wrongful death. The fact
that the Massachusetts Statute is different in the way it is enforced does not make
the Massachusetts Statute wrong. The forum may refuse to enforce a right based
on a foreign statute only where enforcement would violate an express strong
public policy of the forum. That is not the case here and since the Statute is not
penal in the international sense, there is no bar to its being enforced in New York.
Judgment reversed and order of the Special Term affirmed.
Note that the forum has much wider latitude in applying its own public policy to
deny relief where the original action is being brought and where it is not a suit on a
judgment obtained somewhere else.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

A right of action created by the law of a neighboring state is enforceable in any
other state unless the law is penal in the international sense or enforcement of the
right would violate the strong public policy of the forum.

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. - 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987)

FACTS:
A Japanese company manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells them
to several tire manufacturers, including a Taiwanese company. The sales to the
Taiwanese company, which amounted to at least 100,000 units annually from 1978
to 1982, took place in Taiwan. The Taiwanese company incorporates the
assemblies into its finished tires, which it sells throughout the world, including the
United States, where 20% of its sales takes place in California. In 1978, in Solano
County, California, the driver of a motorcycle lost control of his vehicle and
collided with a tractor, as a result of which he was severely injured and his
passenger, who was his wife, was killed. He filed a product liability action in the
Superior Court of California for Solano County against the Taiwanese company,
among others, alleging that the accident was caused by a sudden loss of air and
an explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle, and that the motorcycle tire, tube,
and sealant were defective. The Taiwanese company filed a cross-complaint
seeking indemnification from, among others, the Japanese company. The
motorcycle driver settled his claims against the Taiwanese company and the other
defendants, leaving only the Taiwanese company's indemnity action against the
Japanese company. The Japanese company moved to quash the Taiwanese
company's service of summons, claiming that the state could not exert jurisdiction
over it consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. In affidavits submitted in connection with the motion to
quash, it appeared that while the Japanese company was fully aware that tire valve
assemblies it sold to the Taiwanese company would end up throughout the United
States and in California, the Japanese company never contemplated that its
limited sales to the Taiwanese company in Taiwan would subject the Japanese
company to lawsuits in California. The Superior Court denied the motion to quash
summons, but on appeal, the Court of Appeal of California issued commanded the
Superior Court to quash service of summons. The Supreme Court of California
reversed, finding the exercise of jurisdiction over the Japanese company
consistent with the due process clause. The case was elevated on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States.

ISSUE:
Could the court exercise jurisdiction over the Japanese company consistent with
the due process clause?

ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Japanese
company was unreasonable and unfair, so as to violate the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere fact that petitioner knew that some of its
component parts would be used in products that would be sold in the state did not
provide the necessary minimum contacts for the state to exercise personal
jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner did nothing to purposely avail itself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the state. Therefore, since there were no
minimum contacts, the state was estopped by Fourteenth Amendment due
process from exercising personal jurisdiction over petitioner.

RULE:

The determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each

case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A court must consider the
burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.

Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll

Facts.

Carroll (Plaintiff) worked as a railroad brakeman, and was injured in Mississippi due
to the failure of other employeesʼ to inspect the brakes in Alabama.
Carroll (Plaintiff), a resident of Alabama, was injured in Mississippi due to a break
in a defective railroad car link.  The Railroadʼs (Defendant) employees had been
negligent in their duty to inspect the links in Alabama.  Plaintiff sued the
Defendant in Alabama under a state statute that authorized recovery. Mississippi
would have denied recovery as it had no similar statute.

Issue.
May recovery be obtained for a tortious act in the state where the breach of duty
occurred, but not the injury?

Held.
No.  The general rule is that recovery cannot be made in one state for the injuries
to the person sustained in a different state unless the infliction of the injuries is
actionable under the law of the state where the injuries were received. In this case,
up to the time the train passed from Alabama, no injury had resulted.The Alabama
statute has no efficiency beyond state lines.  Only Mississippi could apply proper
jurisdiction over the claim. There may have been a different result if Carroll had
been injured in Alabama but suffered in Mississippi.  As for an argument that the
Railroad (Defendant) was under a contractual duty to Carroll (Plaintiff), which
arose in Alabama, the Alabama law will govern only occurrences of the
employment relationship and not with any specific contractual obligations.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Where a negligent act is committed in one state, but causes injury in a different
state, an action seeking damages for injuries resulting from the act may be
brought only in the state where the result occurred, and not where the act was
committed.

Grant v. McAuliffe

Facts

Two California residents driving separate cars in Arizona crashed into one another
and one died as a result. Under Arizona law, a tort action did not survive the death
of the plaintiff, while under California law it did.
Pullen was a resident of California and the driver of an automobile who died as
result of an auto accident in which he was allegedly the negligent party.  The
accident took place in Arizona. Grant (Plaintiff), also a resident of California, was
injured in the accident and sought damages from McAuliffe (Defendant), Pullenʼs
administrator.Under California law, tort actions survive the tortfeasorʼs death,
however, under Arizona law they do not. The California trial court found that
Arizona law applied sine it was a substantive rather than procedural nature and,
therefore, granted McAuliffeʼs (Defendant) motion to abate Plaintiffʼs suit.Plaintiff
appealed, arguing that the law was in fact procedural and therefore the law of the
forum, California, should apply.

Issue
Is a survival statute as to tort actions substantive law that would govern litigation
over injuries sustained wherever the case is tried?

Held
  No. A survival statute as to tort actions is not substantive law that would govern
litigation over injuries sustained wherever the case is tried. This court recognizes
the doctrine that the substantive law of the place of the wrong must govern
litigation wherever it is tried. However, the forum state may always follow its own
procedural rules of law. Since the authorities are split on whether a survival statute
is procedural or substantive, this court will determine which argument has the
most merit.  Because a survival statute does not create a new cause of action but
simply allows the continuation of an existing action, it is procedural.  All the
relevant contacts are with California and the survival statute does not relate to
liability but is a procedural rule to enforce claims for damages.Since a court may
always follow its own procedural rules, this case may properly be tried under
California law.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

Statutes providing for the survival of a tort action if the plaintiff dies are
procedural, not substantive, and may be applied to a suit that arises from an injury
sustained in a different jurisdiction.

Discussion
The California court was preparing the groundwork for abandoning the vested
rights doctrine in choice of laws.The substance-procedure distinction was an
escape device to allow the state that had the most contacts to apply its own law to
the case.Arizona had no interest in this case, as all the parties and their families
were in California.

University of Chicago v. Dater

Supreme Court of Michigan
270 N.W. 175 (1936)

Facts
George Dater (defendant) and John Price (defendant), both from Michigan, owned
real property in Chicago, Illinois. Dater and Price entered into negotiations with the
University of Chicago (university) (plaintiff) to borrow $75,000. Dater and Price
offered the Chicago property as collateral for the loan. The university agreed to
lend Dater and Price the money so long as title to the property was good. Dater
and his wife, Nellie, along with Price and his wife, Clara, (defendants) executed
promissory notes and a trust deed at a bank in Michigan. The documents were
mailed from Michigan to the universityʼs agent in Chicago, where the trust deed
was subsequently recorded. After John Price died, Clara became the owner of at
least one-half of the Chicago property. Four years later, the property went into
foreclosure because Clara could not make payments on the loan. The university
filed suit in Michigan state court to collect on the promissory note. The trial court
rendered a $15,536 judgment in favor of the university against George Dater.
Additionally, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Clara. The university
appealed.

Issue:
The question is whether or not the law of Michigan or Illinois governs this case.

Held:

It is conceded that under the law of Illinois a married woman is as free to contract
as a man, while in Michigan a married woman has not the legal capacity to bind
herself or her separate estate by signing these notes.
The plaintiff contends that the contract was an Illinois contract; that the signing of
the notes in Michigan was not the final act in the making of the contract, but
rather a preliminary step, the delivery of the note being conditional upon
defendant's producing a satisfactory title, the approval of the title in Illinois was
the last act necessary to make a legal delivery.
The general rule is well stated in John A. Tolman Co. v. Reed, 115 Mich. 71, where
the court said:
"The law is well settled that contracts must be construed and their validity
determined by the law of the country where they were made, unless the
contracting parties clearly appear to have had some other law in view."
Doctrine is where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in
some place other than where it is made, the general rule is in conformity to the
presumed intention of the parties, the contract (as to its validity, nature and
obligation and interpretation is to be governed by the law of the place of the
performance.

Annesley v. Annesley

Facts
Sybil Annesley ("Annesley"), a British subject, was married to a British domiciliary.
The spouses resided in France until the death of the husband. Annesley remained
in France without taking the steps set forth under French law for the formal
acquisition of domicile in that country and seldom returned to Britain until her
death. She left a will executed in France but in British form bequeathing her estate
to her daughter. By French law, Annesley is not a domiciliary of France, but by
British law, Annesley is a domiciliary of France. By the laws of France, the estate of
Annesley is governed by the laws of her nationality, but by the laws of Britain, the
estate of Annesley is governed by the laws of the domicile. French law only allows
the testator to freely dispose of one-third of her estate.

Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by French law.

Held
Yes. French law governs.

Ratio
Notwithstanding the lack of a formal French domicile, Annesley is a French
domiciliary by British law given the concurrence of actual residence in a
foreign jurisdiction coupled with the intent to remain there.  Thus, French law
refers the matter to English law which, in turn, will refer the matter back to French
law. Consequently, in these circumstances, French law dictates that French courts
will apply the domestic law. Hence, French law governs the succession and
Annesley may only dispose of one-third of her estate.